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can: af_can: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability

PATCH In review Gustavo A. R. Silva 2 participants 2 messages Dec 21, 2018 – Dec 23, 2018

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PATCH 1/1 can: af_can: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability

protocol is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

net/can/af_can.c:115 can_get_proto() warn: potential spectre issue 'proto_tab' [w]

Fix this by sanitizing protocol before using it to index proto_tab.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

---
 net/can/af_can.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/can/af_can.c +2 -0
index 1684ba5b51eb..cade7250c6d4 100644
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
 #include <linux/can/core.h>
 #include <linux/can/skb.h>
 #include <linux/ratelimit.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
 #include <net/sock.h>
 
@@ -136,6 +137,7 @@ static int can_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
 
 	if (protocol < 0 || protocol >= CAN_NPROTO)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	protocol = array_index_nospec(protocol, CAN_NPROTO);
 
 	cp = can_get_proto(protocol);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
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#1 lore raw

After *trying* to follow the discussion on ...

https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=154554485324143&w=2
[PATCH] net: core: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability

... I'm still not sure whether af_can.c needs this enhancement or not.

Just waiting for the end of the discussion :-)

Thanks to the experts!

Oliver

Quoted 41 lines · Gustavo A. R. Silva

protocol is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

net/can/af_can.c:115 can_get_proto() warn: potential spectre issue 'proto_tab' [w]

Fix this by sanitizing protocol before using it to index proto_tab.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

---
  net/can/af_can.c | 2 ++
  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/can/af_can.c +2 -0
index 1684ba5b51eb..cade7250c6d4 100644
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
  #include <linux/can/core.h>
  #include <linux/can/skb.h>
  #include <linux/ratelimit.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
  #include <net/net_namespace.h>
  #include <net/sock.h>
 
@@ -136,6 +137,7 @@ static int can_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
 
  	if (protocol < 0 || protocol >= CAN_NPROTO)
  		return -EINVAL;
+	protocol = array_index_nospec(protocol, CAN_NPROTO);
 
  	cp = can_get_proto(protocol);