3.18.132-stable review
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 1/47 USB: hso: Fix OOB memory access in hso_probe/hso_get_config_data
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hui Peng <[email protected]>
commit 5146f95df782b0ac61abde36567e718692725c89 upstream.
The function hso_probe reads if_num from the USB device (as an u8) and uses it without a length check to index an array, resulting in an OOB memory read in hso_probe or hso_get_config_data.
Add a length check for both locations and updated hso_probe to bail on error.
This issue has been assigned CVE-2018-19985.
--- drivers/net/usb/hso.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/usb/hso.c +16 -2
@@ -2814,6 +2814,12 @@ static int hso_get_config_data(struct usreturn -EIO ; } +/* check if we have a valid interface */ +if (if_num >16 ) { +kfree (config_data); +return -EINVAL ; + } +switch (config_data[if_num]) {case 0x0 : result =0 ;
@@ -2884,10 +2890,18 @@ static int hso_probe(struct usb_interfac/* Get the interface/port specification from either driver_info or from * the device itself */ -if (id->driver_info) +if (id->driver_info) { +/* if_num is controlled by the device, driver_info is a 0 terminated +* array. Make sure, the access is in bounds! */ +for (i =0 ; i <= if_num; ++i) +if (((u32 *)(id->driver_info))[i] ==0 ) + goto exit; port_spec = ((u32 *)(id->driver_info))[if_num]; -else + }else { port_spec =hso_get_config_data (interface); +if (port_spec <0 ) + goto exit; + }/* Check if we need to switch to alt interfaces prior to port * configuration */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 10/47 ipv6: explicitly initialize udp6_addr in udp_sock_create6()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fb24274546310872eeeaf3d1d53799d8414aa0f2 ]
syzbot reported the use of uninitialized udp6_addr::sin6_scope_id. We can just set ::sin6_scope_id to zero, as tunnels are unlikely to use an IPv6 address that needs a scope id and there is no interface to bind in this context.
For net-next, it looks different as we have cfg->bind_ifindex there so we can probably call ipv6_iface_scope_id().
Same for ::sin6_flowinfo, tunnels don't use it.
--- net/ipv6/ip6_udp_tunnel.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv6/ip6_udp_tunnel.c +2 -1
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@int udp_sock_create6 (struct net *net,struct udp_port_cfg *cfg,struct socket **sockp) { -struct sockaddr_in6 udp6_addr; +struct sockaddr_in6 udp6_addr = {};int err;struct socket *sock =NULL ;
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ int udp_sock_create6(struct net *net, st goto error;if (cfg->peer_udp_port) { +memset (&udp6_addr,0 ,sizeof (udp6_addr)); udp6_addr.sin6_family =AF_INET6 ;memcpy (&udp6_addr.sin6_addr, &cfg->peer_ip6,sizeof (udp6_addr.sin6_addr));
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 2/47 USB: serial: option: add HP lt4132
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tore Anderson <[email protected]>
commit d57ec3c83b5153217a70b561d4fb6ed96f2f7a25 upstream.
The HP lt4132 is a rebranded Huawei ME906s-158 LTE modem.
The interface with protocol 0x16 is "CDC ECM & NCM" according to the *.inf files included with the Windows driver. Attaching the option driver to it doesn't result in a /dev/ttyUSB* device being created, so I've excluded it. Note that it is also excluded for corresponding Huawei-branded devices, cf. commit d544db293a44 ("USB: support new huawei devices in option.c").
T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=02 Cnt=02 Dev#= 3 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=ff MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 3 P: Vendor=03f0 ProdID=a31d Rev=01.02 S: Manufacturer=HP Inc. S: Product=HP lt4132 LTE/HSPA+ 4G Module S: SerialNumber=0123456789ABCDEF C: #Ifs= 6 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=2mA I: If#=0x0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=06 Prot=10 Driver=option I: If#=0x1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=06 Prot=13 Driver=option I: If#=0x2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=06 Prot=12 Driver=option I: If#=0x3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=06 Prot=16 Driver=(none) I: If#=0x4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=06 Prot=14 Driver=option I: If#=0x5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=06 Prot=1b Driver=option
T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=02 Cnt=02 Dev#= 3 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=ff MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 3 P: Vendor=03f0 ProdID=a31d Rev=01.02 S: Manufacturer=HP Inc. S: Product=HP lt4132 LTE/HSPA+ 4G Module S: SerialNumber=0123456789ABCDEF C: #Ifs= 7 Cfg#= 2 Atr=a0 MxPwr=2mA I: If#=0x0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(commc) Sub=06 Prot=00 Driver=cdc_ether I: If#=0x1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=06 Prot=00 Driver=cdc_ether I: If#=0x2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=06 Prot=10 Driver=option I: If#=0x3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=06 Prot=13 Driver=option I: If#=0x4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=06 Prot=12 Driver=option I: If#=0x5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=06 Prot=14 Driver=option I: If#=0x6 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=06 Prot=1b Driver=option
T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=02 Cnt=02 Dev#= 3 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=ff MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 3 P: Vendor=03f0 ProdID=a31d Rev=01.02 S: Manufacturer=HP Inc. S: Product=HP lt4132 LTE/HSPA+ 4G Module S: SerialNumber=0123456789ABCDEF C: #Ifs= 3 Cfg#= 3 Atr=a0 MxPwr=2mA I: If#=0x0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(commc) Sub=0e Prot=00 Driver=cdc_mbim I: If#=0x1 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim I: If#=0x2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=06 Prot=14 Driver=option
--- drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/serial/option.c +6 -1
@@ -2042,7 +2042,12 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(WETELECOM_VENDOR_ID, WETELECOM_PRODUCT_WMD200, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff) }, { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(WETELECOM_VENDOR_ID, WETELECOM_PRODUCT_6802, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff) }, { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(WETELECOM_VENDOR_ID, WETELECOM_PRODUCT_WMD300, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff) }, - { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x03f0, 0x421d, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff) }, /* HP lt2523 (Novatel E371) */ + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x03f0, 0x421d, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff) }, /* HP lt2523 (Novatel E371) */ + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x03f0, 0xa31d, 0xff, 0x06, 0x10) }, /* HP lt4132 (Huawei ME906s-158) */ + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x03f0, 0xa31d, 0xff, 0x06, 0x12) }, + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x03f0, 0xa31d, 0xff, 0x06, 0x13) }, + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x03f0, 0xa31d, 0xff, 0x06, 0x14) }, + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x03f0, 0xa31d, 0xff, 0x06, 0x1b) }, { } /* Terminating entry */ };MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE (usb, option_ids);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 3/47 mmc: core: Reset HPI enabled state during re-init and in case of errors
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ulf Hansson <[email protected]>
commit a0741ba40a009f97c019ae7541dc61c1fdf41efb upstream.
During a re-initialization of the eMMC card, we may fail to re-enable HPI. In these cases, that isn't properly reflected in the card->ext_csd.hpi_en bit, as it keeps being set. This may cause following attempts to use HPI, even if's not enabled. Let's fix this!
--- drivers/mmc/core/mmc.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mmc/core/mmc.c +3 -1
@@ -1485,9 +1485,11 @@ static int mmc_init_card(struct mmc_hostif (err) {pr_warn ("%s: Enabling HPI failed\n" ,mmc_hostname (card->host)); + card->ext_csd.hpi_en =0 ; err =0 ; - }else + }else { card->ext_csd.hpi_en =1 ; + } }/*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 5/47 gpio: max7301: fix driver for use with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
commit abf221d2f51b8ce7b9959a8953f880a8b0a1400d upstream.
spi_read() and spi_write() require DMA-safe memory. When CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is selected, those functions cannot be used with buffers on stack.
This patch replaces calls to spi_read() and spi_write() by spi_write_then_read() which doesn't require DMA-safe buffers.
--- drivers/gpio/gpio-max7301.c | 12 +++--------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/gpio/gpio-max7301.c +3 -9
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ static int max7301_spi_write(struct devistruct spi_device *spi =to_spi_device (dev);u16 word = ((reg &0x7F ) <<8 ) | (val &0xFF ); -return spi_write (spi, (const u8 *)&word,sizeof (word)); +return spi_write_then_read (spi, &word,sizeof (word),NULL ,0 ); }/* A read from the MAX7301 means two transfers; here, one message each */
@@ -37,14 +37,8 @@ static int max7301_spi_read(struct devicstruct spi_device *spi =to_spi_device (dev); word =0x8000 | (reg <<8 ); - ret =spi_write (spi, (const u8 *)&word,sizeof (word)); -if (ret) -return ret; -/* -* This relies on the fact, that a transfer with NULL tx_buf shifts out -* zero bytes (=NOOP for MAX7301) -*/ - ret =spi_read (spi, (u8 *)&word,sizeof (word)); + ret =spi_write_then_read (spi, &word,sizeof (word), &word, +sizeof (word));if (ret)return ret;return word &0xff ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 6/47 Drivers: hv: vmbus: Return -EINVAL for the sys files for unopened channels
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dexuan Cui <[email protected]>
commit fc96df16a1ce80cbb3c316ab7d4dc8cd5c2852ce upstream.
Before 98f4c651762c, we returned zeros for unopened channels. With 98f4c651762c, we started to return random on-stack values.
We'd better return -EINVAL instead.
--- drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +20 -0
@@ -258,6 +258,8 @@ static ssize_t out_intr_mask_show(structif (!hv_dev->channel)return -ENODEV ; +if (hv_dev->channel->state !=CHANNEL_OPENED_STATE ) +return -EINVAL ;hv_ringbuffer_get_debuginfo (&hv_dev->channel->outbound, &outbound);return sprintf (buf,"%d\n" , outbound.current_interrupt_mask); }
@@ -271,6 +273,8 @@ static ssize_t out_read_index_show(strucif (!hv_dev->channel)return -ENODEV ; +if (hv_dev->channel->state !=CHANNEL_OPENED_STATE ) +return -EINVAL ;hv_ringbuffer_get_debuginfo (&hv_dev->channel->outbound, &outbound);return sprintf (buf,"%d\n" , outbound.current_read_index); }
@@ -285,6 +289,8 @@ static ssize_t out_write_index_show(struif (!hv_dev->channel)return -ENODEV ; +if (hv_dev->channel->state !=CHANNEL_OPENED_STATE ) +return -EINVAL ;hv_ringbuffer_get_debuginfo (&hv_dev->channel->outbound, &outbound);return sprintf (buf,"%d\n" , outbound.current_write_index); }
@@ -299,6 +305,8 @@ static ssize_t out_read_bytes_avail_showif (!hv_dev->channel)return -ENODEV ; +if (hv_dev->channel->state !=CHANNEL_OPENED_STATE ) +return -EINVAL ;hv_ringbuffer_get_debuginfo (&hv_dev->channel->outbound, &outbound);return sprintf (buf,"%d\n" , outbound.bytes_avail_toread); }
@@ -313,6 +321,8 @@ static ssize_t out_write_bytes_avail_shoif (!hv_dev->channel)return -ENODEV ; +if (hv_dev->channel->state !=CHANNEL_OPENED_STATE ) +return -EINVAL ;hv_ringbuffer_get_debuginfo (&hv_dev->channel->outbound, &outbound);return sprintf (buf,"%d\n" , outbound.bytes_avail_towrite); }
@@ -326,6 +336,8 @@ static ssize_t in_intr_mask_show(structif (!hv_dev->channel)return -ENODEV ; +if (hv_dev->channel->state !=CHANNEL_OPENED_STATE ) +return -EINVAL ;hv_ringbuffer_get_debuginfo (&hv_dev->channel->inbound, &inbound);return sprintf (buf,"%d\n" , inbound.current_interrupt_mask); }
@@ -339,6 +351,8 @@ static ssize_t in_read_index_show(structif (!hv_dev->channel)return -ENODEV ; +if (hv_dev->channel->state !=CHANNEL_OPENED_STATE ) +return -EINVAL ;hv_ringbuffer_get_debuginfo (&hv_dev->channel->inbound, &inbound);return sprintf (buf,"%d\n" , inbound.current_read_index); }
@@ -352,6 +366,8 @@ static ssize_t in_write_index_show(strucif (!hv_dev->channel)return -ENODEV ; +if (hv_dev->channel->state !=CHANNEL_OPENED_STATE ) +return -EINVAL ;hv_ringbuffer_get_debuginfo (&hv_dev->channel->inbound, &inbound);return sprintf (buf,"%d\n" , inbound.current_write_index); }
@@ -366,6 +382,8 @@ static ssize_t in_read_bytes_avail_show(if (!hv_dev->channel)return -ENODEV ; +if (hv_dev->channel->state !=CHANNEL_OPENED_STATE ) +return -EINVAL ;hv_ringbuffer_get_debuginfo (&hv_dev->channel->inbound, &inbound);return sprintf (buf,"%d\n" , inbound.bytes_avail_toread); }
@@ -380,6 +398,8 @@ static ssize_t in_write_bytes_avail_showif (!hv_dev->channel)return -ENODEV ; +if (hv_dev->channel->state !=CHANNEL_OPENED_STATE ) +return -EINVAL ;hv_ringbuffer_get_debuginfo (&hv_dev->channel->inbound, &inbound);return sprintf (buf,"%d\n" , inbound.bytes_avail_towrite); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 7/47 x86/mtrr: Dont copy uninitialized gentry fields back to userspace
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>
commit 32043fa065b51e0b1433e48d118821c71b5cd65d upstream.
Currently the copy_to_user of data in the gentry struct is copying uninitiaized data in field _pad from the stack to userspace.
Fix this by explicitly memset'ing gentry to zero, this also will zero any compiler added padding fields that may be in struct (currently there are none).
Detected by CoverityScan, CID#200783 ("Uninitialized scalar variable")
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/if.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/if.c +2 -0
@@ -173,6 +173,8 @@ mtrr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned istruct mtrr_gentry gentry;void __user *arg = (void __user *) __arg; +memset (&gentry,0 ,sizeof (gentry)); +switch (cmd) {case MTRRIOC_ADD_ENTRY :case MTRRIOC_SET_ENTRY :
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 9/47 ibmveth: fix DMA unmap error in ibmveth_xmit_start error path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tyrel Datwyler <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 756af9c642329d54f048bac2a62f829b391f6944 ]
Commit 33a48ab105a7 ("ibmveth: Fix DMA unmap error") fixed an issue in the normal code path of ibmveth_xmit_start() that was originally introduced by Commit 6e8ab30ec677 ("ibmveth: Add scatter-gather support"). This original fix missed the error path where dma_unmap_page is wrongly called on the header portion in descs[0] which was mapped with dma_map_single. As a result a failure to DMA map any of the frags results in a dmesg warning when CONFIG_DMA_API_DEBUG is enabled.
------------[ cut here ]------------ DMA-API: ibmveth 30000002: device driver frees DMA memory with wrong function [device address=0x000000000a430000] [size=172 bytes] [mapped as page] [unmapped as single] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 8426 at kernel/dma/debug.c:1085 check_unmap+0x4fc/0xe10
...
<snip>
...
DMA-API: Mapped at:
ibmveth_start_xmit+0x30c/0xb60 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x100/0x450 sch_direct_xmit+0x224/0x490 __qdisc_run+0x20c/0x980 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1bc/0xf20
This fixes the API misuse by unampping descs[0] with dma_unmap_single.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmveth.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmveth.c +5 -1
@@ -1059,11 +1059,15 @@ out: map_failed_frags: last = i+1 ; -for (i =0 ; i < last; i++) +for (i =1 ; i < last; i++)dma_unmap_page (&adapter->vdev->dev, descs[i].fields.address, descs[i].fields.flags_len &IBMVETH_BUF_LEN_MASK ,DMA_TO_DEVICE ); +dma_unmap_single (&adapter->vdev->dev, + descs[0 ].fields.address, + descs[0 ].fields.flags_len &IBMVETH_BUF_LEN_MASK , +DMA_TO_DEVICE ); map_failed:if (!firmware_has_feature (FW_FEATURE_CMO ))netdev_err (netdev,"tx: unable to map xmit buffer\n" );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainercover 3.18.132-stable review
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.18.132 release. There are 47 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun Jan 13 13:09:31 UTC 2019. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/stable-review/patch-3.18.132-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-3.18.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 3.18.132-rc1
Lubomir Rintel <[email protected]>
power: supply: olpc_battery: correct the temperature units
Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
genwqe: Fix size check
Yan, Zheng <[email protected]>
ceph: don't update importing cap's mseq when handing cap export
Dominique Martinet <[email protected]>
9p/net: put a lower bound on msize
Larry Finger <[email protected]>
b43: Fix error in cordic routine
Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>
gfs2: Fix loop in gfs2_rbm_find
Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
dlm: memory leaks on error path in dlm_user_request()
Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
dlm: lost put_lkb on error path in receive_convert() and receive_unlock()
Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
dlm: possible memory leak on error path in create_lkb()
Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
dlm: fixed memory leaks after failed ls_remove_names allocation
Hui Peng <[email protected]>
ALSA: usb-audio: Fix an out-of-bound read in create_composite_quirks
Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: usb-audio: Avoid access before bLength check in build_audio_procunit()
Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
ALSA: cs46xx: Potential NULL dereference in probe
Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
sunrpc: use SVC_NET() in svcauth_gss_* functions
Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
sunrpc: fix cache_head leak due to queued request
David Herrmann <[email protected]>
fork: record start_time late
Steffen Maier <[email protected]>
scsi: zfcp: fix posting too many status read buffers leading to adapter shutdown
Georgy A Bystrenin <[email protected]>
CIFS: Fix error mapping for SMB2_LOCK command which caused OFD lock problem
Huacai Chen <[email protected]>
MIPS: Align kernel load address to 64KB
Huacai Chen <[email protected]>
MIPS: Ensure pmd_present() returns false after pmd_mknotpresent()
Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
media: vivid: free bitmap_cap when updating std/timings/etc.
Macpaul Lin <[email protected]>
cdc-acm: fix abnormal DATA RX issue for Mediatek Preloader.
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
ext4: force inode writes when nfsd calls commit_metadata()
Maurizio Lombardi <[email protected]>
ext4: missing unlock/put_page() in ext4_try_to_write_inline_data()
Pan Bian <[email protected]>
ext4: fix possible use after free in ext4_quota_enable
Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM: x86: Use jmp to invoke kvm_spurious_fault() from .fixup
Jia-Ju Bai <[email protected]>
usb: r8a66597: Fix a possible concurrency use-after-free bug in r8a66597_endpoint_disable()
Scott Chen <[email protected]>
USB: serial: pl2303: add ids for Hewlett-Packard HP POS pole displays
Deepa Dinamani <[email protected]>
sock: Make sock->sk_stamp thread-safe
Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
xen/netfront: tolerate frags with no data
Jorgen Hansen <[email protected]>
VSOCK: Send reset control packet when socket is partially bound
Jason Wang <[email protected]>
vhost: make sure used idx is seen before log in vhost_add_used_n()
Xin Long <[email protected]>
sctp: initialize sin6_flowinfo for ipv6 addrs in sctp_inet6addr_event
Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
packet: validate address length if non-zero
Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
packet: validate address length
Cong Wang <[email protected]>
netrom: fix locking in nr_find_socket()
Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
isdn: fix kernel-infoleak in capi_unlocked_ioctl
Cong Wang <[email protected]>
ipv6: explicitly initialize udp6_addr in udp_sock_create6()
Tyrel Datwyler <[email protected]>
ibmveth: fix DMA unmap error in ibmveth_xmit_start error path
Cong Wang <[email protected]>
ax25: fix a use-after-free in ax25_fillin_cb()
Colin Ian King <[email protected]>
x86/mtrr: Don't copy uninitialized gentry fields back to userspace
Dexuan Cui <[email protected]>
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Return -EINVAL for the sys files for unopened channels
Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
gpio: max7301: fix driver for use with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
Russell King <[email protected]>
mmc: omap_hsmmc: fix DMA API warning
Ulf Hansson <[email protected]>
mmc: core: Reset HPI enabled state during re-init and in case of errors
Tore Anderson <[email protected]>
USB: serial: option: add HP lt4132
Hui Peng <[email protected]>
USB: hso: Fix OOB memory access in hso_probe/hso_get_config_data
-------------
Diffstat:
Makefile | 4 +- arch/mips/boot/compressed/calc_vmlinuz_load_addr.c | 7 ++- arch/mips/include/asm/pgtable-64.h | 5 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/if.c | 2 + drivers/gpio/gpio-max7301.c | 12 +--- drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 20 +++++++ drivers/isdn/capi/kcapi.c | 4 +- drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-vid-cap.c | 2 + drivers/misc/genwqe/card_utils.c | 2 +- drivers/mmc/core/mmc.c | 4 +- drivers/mmc/host/omap_hsmmc.c | 12 +++- drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmveth.c | 6 +- drivers/net/usb/hso.c | 18 +++++- drivers/net/wireless/b43/phy_common.c | 2 +- drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 2 +- drivers/power/olpc_battery.c | 4 +- drivers/s390/scsi/zfcp_aux.c | 6 +- drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c | 10 ++++ drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.h | 1 + drivers/usb/host/r8a66597-hcd.c | 5 +- drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 7 ++- drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.c | 5 ++ drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.h | 5 ++ drivers/vhost/vhost.c | 2 + fs/ceph/caps.c | 1 - fs/cifs/smb2maperror.c | 4 +- fs/dlm/lock.c | 17 +++--- fs/dlm/lockspace.c | 2 +- fs/ext4/inline.c | 5 +- fs/ext4/super.c | 13 ++++- fs/gfs2/rgrp.c | 2 +- include/net/sock.h | 36 +++++++++++- include/trace/events/ext4.h | 20 +++++++ kernel/fork.c | 13 ++++- net/9p/client.c | 21 +++++++ net/ax25/af_ax25.c | 11 +++- net/ax25/ax25_dev.c | 2 + net/compat.c | 15 +++-- net/core/sock.c | 3 + net/ipv6/ip6_udp_tunnel.c | 3 +- net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 15 +++-- net/packet/af_packet.c | 8 ++- net/sctp/ipv6.c | 1 + net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c | 8 +-- net/sunrpc/cache.c | 9 ++- net/sunrpc/svcsock.c | 2 +- net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++------ sound/pci/cs46xx/dsp_spos.c | 3 + sound/usb/mixer.c | 10 +++- sound/usb/quirks-table.h | 3 + 51 files changed, 352 insertions(+), 91 deletions(-)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 12/47 netrom: fix locking in nr_find_socket()
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7314f5480f3e37e570104dc5e0f28823ef849e72 ]
nr_find_socket(), nr_find_peer() and nr_find_listener() lock the sock after finding it in the global list. However, the call path requires BH disabled for the sock lock consistently.
Actually the locking is unnecessary at this point, we can just hold the sock refcnt to make sure it is not gone after we unlock the global list, and lock it later only when needed.
--- net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 15 ++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/netrom/af_netrom.c +10 -5
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static struct sock *nr_find_listener(ax2sk_for_each (s, &nr_list)if (!ax25cmp (&nr_sk (s)->source_addr, addr) && s->sk_state ==TCP_LISTEN ) { -bh_lock_sock (s); +sock_hold (s); goto found; } s =NULL ;
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static struct sock *nr_find_socket(unsigstruct nr_sock *nr =nr_sk (s);if (nr->my_index == index && nr->my_id == id) { -bh_lock_sock (s); +sock_hold (s); goto found; } }
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ static struct sock *nr_find_peer(unsigneif (nr->your_index == index && nr->your_id == id && !ax25cmp (&nr->dest_addr, dest)) { -bh_lock_sock (s); +sock_hold (s); goto found; } }
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ static unsigned short nr_find_next_circuif (i !=0 && j !=0 ) {if ((sk=nr_find_socket (i, j)) ==NULL )break ; -bh_unlock_sock (sk); +sock_put (sk); } id++;
@@ -918,6 +918,7 @@ int nr_rx_frame(struct sk_buff *skb, str }if (sk !=NULL ) { +bh_lock_sock (sk);skb_reset_transport_header (skb);if (frametype ==NR_CONNACK && skb->len ==22 )
@@ -927,6 +928,7 @@ int nr_rx_frame(struct sk_buff *skb, str ret =nr_process_rx_frame (sk, skb);bh_unlock_sock (sk); +sock_put (sk);return ret; }
@@ -958,10 +960,12 @@ int nr_rx_frame(struct sk_buff *skb, str (make = nr_make_new(sk)) == NULL) {nr_transmit_refusal (skb,0 );if (sk) -bh_unlock_sock (sk); +sock_put (sk);return 0 ; } +bh_lock_sock (sk); + window = skb->data[20 ]; skb->sk = make;
@@ -1014,6 +1018,7 @@ int nr_rx_frame(struct sk_buff *skb, str sk->sk_data_ready (sk);bh_unlock_sock (sk); +sock_put (sk);nr_insert_socket (make);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 21/47 usb: r8a66597: Fix a possible concurrency use-after-free bug in r8a66597_endpoint_disable()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jia-Ju Bai <[email protected]>
commit c85400f886e3d41e69966470879f635a2b50084c upstream.
The function r8a66597_endpoint_disable() and r8a66597_urb_enqueue() may be concurrently executed.
The two functions both access a possible shared variable "hep->hcpriv".
This shared variable is freed by r8a66597_endpoint_disable() via the call path:r8a66597_endpoint_disable
kfree(hep->hcpriv) (line 1995 in Linux-4.19)
This variable is read by r8a66597_urb_enqueue() via the call path:r8a66597_urb_enqueue
spin_lock_irqsave(&r8a66597->lock)
init_pipe_info
enable_r8a66597_pipe
pipe = hep->hcpriv (line 802 in Linux-4.19)The read operation is protected by a spinlock, but the free operation is not protected by this spinlock, thus a concurrency use-after-free bug may occur.
To fix this bug, the spin-lock and spin-unlock function calls in r8a66597_endpoint_disable() are moved to protect the free operation.
--- drivers/usb/host/r8a66597-hcd.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/host/r8a66597-hcd.c +4 -1
@@ -1990,6 +1990,8 @@ static int r8a66597_urb_dequeue(struct ustatic void r8a66597_endpoint_disable (struct usb_hcd *hcd,struct usb_host_endpoint *hep) +__acquires(r8a66597->lock) +__releases(r8a66597->lock) {struct r8a66597 *r8a66597 =hcd_to_r8a66597 (hcd);struct r8a66597_pipe *pipe = (struct r8a66597_pipe *)hep->hcpriv;
@@ -2002,13 +2004,14 @@ static void r8a66597_endpoint_disable(streturn ; pipenum = pipe->info.pipenum; +spin_lock_irqsave (&r8a66597->lock, flags);if (pipenum ==0 ) {kfree (hep->hcpriv); hep->hcpriv =NULL ; +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&r8a66597->lock, flags);return ; } -spin_lock_irqsave (&r8a66597->lock, flags);pipe_stop (r8a66597, pipe);pipe_irq_disable (r8a66597, pipenum);disable_irq_empty (r8a66597, pipenum);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 23/47 ext4: fix possible use after free in ext4_quota_enable
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pan Bian <[email protected]>
commit 61157b24e60fb3cd1f85f2c76a7b1d628f970144 upstream.
The function frees qf_inode via iput but then pass qf_inode to lockdep_set_quota_inode on the failure path. This may result in a use-after-free bug. The patch frees df_inode only when it is never used.
--- fs/ext4/super.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/super.c +1 -1
@@ -5389,9 +5389,9 @@ static int ext4_quota_enable(struct supe qf_inode->i_flags |=S_NOQUOTA ;lockdep_set_quota_inode (qf_inode,I_DATA_SEM_QUOTA ); err =dquot_enable (qf_inode, type, format_id, flags); -iput (qf_inode);if (err)lockdep_set_quota_inode (qf_inode,I_DATA_SEM_NORMAL ); +iput (qf_inode);return err; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 24/47 ext4: missing unlock/put_page() in ext4_try_to_write_inline_data()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maurizio Lombardi <[email protected]>
commit 132d00becb31e88469334e1e62751c81345280e0 upstream.
In case of error, ext4_try_to_write_inline_data() should unlock and release the page it holds.
--- fs/ext4/inline.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/inline.c +4 -1
@@ -696,8 +696,11 @@ int ext4_try_to_write_inline_data(structif (!PageUptodate (page)) { ret =ext4_read_inline_page (inode, page); -if (ret <0 ) +if (ret <0 ) { +unlock_page (page); +put_page (page); goto out_up_read; + } } ret =1 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 26/47 cdc-acm: fix abnormal DATA RX issue for Mediatek Preloader.
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Macpaul Lin <[email protected]>
commit eafb27fa5283599ce6c5492ea18cf636a28222bb upstream.
Mediatek Preloader is a proprietary embedded boot loader for loading Little Kernel and Linux into device DRAM.
This boot loader also handle firmware update. Mediatek Preloader will be enumerated as a virtual COM port when the device is connected to Windows or Linux OS via CDC-ACM class driver. When the USB enumeration has been done, Mediatek Preloader will send out handshake command "READY" to PC actively instead of waiting command from the download tool.
Since Linux 4.12, the commit "tty: reset termios state on device registration" (93857edd9829e144acb6c7e72d593f6e01aead66) causes Mediatek Preloader receiving some abnoraml command like "READYXX" as it sent. This will be recognized as an incorrect response. The behavior change also causes the download handshake fail. This change only affects subsequent connects if the reconnected device happens to get the same minor number.
By disabling the ECHO termios flag could avoid this problem. However, it cannot be done by user space configuration when download tool open /dev/ttyACM0. This is because the device running Mediatek Preloader will send handshake command "READY" immediately once the CDC-ACM driver is ready.
This patch wants to fix above problem by introducing "DISABLE_ECHO" property in driver_info. When Mediatek Preloader is connected, the CDC-ACM driver could disable ECHO flag in termios to avoid the problem.
--- drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c | 10 ++++++++++ drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c +10 -0
@@ -502,6 +502,13 @@ static int acm_tty_install(struct tty_drif (retval) goto error_init_termios; +/* +* Suppress initial echoing for some devices which might send data +* immediately after acm driver has been installed. +*/ +if (acm->quirks &DISABLE_ECHO ) + tty->termios.c_lflag &= ~ECHO ; + tty->driver_data = acm;return 0 ;
@@ -1694,6 +1701,9 @@ static const struct usb_device_id acm_id { USB_DEVICE(0x0e8d, 0x0003), /* FIREFLY, MediaTek Inc; [email protected] */ .driver_info =NO_UNION_NORMAL ,/* has no union descriptor */ }, + { USB_DEVICE(0x0e8d, 0x2000), /* MediaTek Inc Preloader */ + .driver_info = DISABLE_ECHO, /* DISABLE ECHO in termios flag */ + }, { USB_DEVICE(0x0e8d, 0x3329), /* MediaTek Inc GPS */ .driver_info = NO_UNION_NORMAL, /* has no union descriptor */ },
drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.h +1 -0
@@ -135,3 +135,4 @@ struct acm {#define QUIRK_CONTROL_LINE_STATE BIT(6)#define CLEAR_HALT_CONDITIONS BIT(7)#define SEND_ZERO_PACKET BIT(8) +#define DISABLE_ECHO BIT(9)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 28/47 MIPS: Ensure pmd_present() returns false after pmd_mknotpresent()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Huacai Chen <[email protected]>
commit 92aa0718c9fa5160ad2f0e7b5bffb52f1ea1e51a upstream.
This patch is borrowed from ARM64 to ensure pmd_present() returns false after pmd_mknotpresent(). This is needed for THP.
References: 5bb1cc0ff9a6 ("arm64: Ensure pmd_present() returns false after pmd_mknotpresent()")
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/21135/
--- arch/mips/include/asm/pgtable-64.h | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
arch/mips/include/asm/pgtable-64.h +5 -0
@@ -189,6 +189,11 @@ static inline int pmd_bad(pmd_t pmd)static inline int pmd_present (pmd_t pmd) { +#ifdef CONFIG_MIPS_HUGE_TLB_SUPPORT +if (unlikely (pmd_val (pmd) & _PAGE_HUGE)) +return pmd_val (pmd) & _PAGE_PRESENT; +#endif +return pmd_val (pmd) != (unsigned long ) invalid_pte_table; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 30/47 CIFS: Fix error mapping for SMB2_LOCK command which caused OFD lock problem
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Georgy A Bystrenin <[email protected]>
commit 9a596f5b39593414c0ec80f71b94a226286f084e upstream.
While resolving a bug with locks on samba shares found a strange behavior. When a file locked by one node and we trying to lock it from another node it fail with errno 5 (EIO) but in that case errno must be set to (EACCES | EAGAIN).
This isn't happening when we try to lock file second time on same node. In this case it returns EACCES as expected.
Also this issue not reproduces when we use SMB1 protocol (vers=1.0 in mount options).
Further investigation showed that the mapping from status_to_posix_error is different for SMB1 and SMB2+ implementations.
For SMB1 mapping is [NT_STATUS_LOCK_NOT_GRANTED to ERRlock] (See fs/cifs/netmisc.c line 66)
but for SMB2+ mapping is [STATUS_LOCK_NOT_GRANTED to -EIO] (see fs/cifs/smb2maperror.c line 383)
Quick changes in SMB2+ mapping from EIO to EACCES has fixed issue.
BUG: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201971
--- fs/cifs/smb2maperror.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/cifs/smb2maperror.c +2 -2
@@ -377,8 +377,8 @@ static const struct status_to_posix_erro {STATUS_NONEXISTENT_EA_ENTRY, -EIO, "STATUS_NONEXISTENT_EA_ENTRY"}, {STATUS_NO_EAS_ON_FILE, -ENODATA, "STATUS_NO_EAS_ON_FILE"}, {STATUS_EA_CORRUPT_ERROR, -EIO, "STATUS_EA_CORRUPT_ERROR"}, - {STATUS_FILE_LOCK_CONFLICT, -EIO, "STATUS_FILE_LOCK_CONFLICT"}, - {STATUS_LOCK_NOT_GRANTED, -EIO, "STATUS_LOCK_NOT_GRANTED"}, + {STATUS_FILE_LOCK_CONFLICT, -EACCES, "STATUS_FILE_LOCK_CONFLICT"}, + {STATUS_LOCK_NOT_GRANTED, -EACCES, "STATUS_LOCK_NOT_GRANTED"}, {STATUS_DELETE_PENDING, -ENOENT, "STATUS_DELETE_PENDING"}, {STATUS_CTL_FILE_NOT_SUPPORTED, -ENOSYS, "STATUS_CTL_FILE_NOT_SUPPORTED"},
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 13/47 packet: validate address length
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 99137b7888f4058087895d035d81c6b2d31015c5 ]
Packet sockets with SOCK_DGRAM may pass an address for use in dev_hard_header. Ensure that it is of sufficient length.
--- net/packet/af_packet.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
net/packet/af_packet.c +4 -0
@@ -2275,6 +2275,8 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_soc proto = saddr->sll_protocol; addr = saddr->sll_addr; dev =dev_get_by_index (sock_net (&po->sk), saddr->sll_ifindex); +if (addr && dev && saddr->sll_halen < dev->addr_len) + goto out; } err = -ENXIO ;
@@ -2436,6 +2438,8 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *soc proto = saddr->sll_protocol; addr = saddr->sll_addr; dev =dev_get_by_index (sock_net (sk), saddr->sll_ifindex); +if (addr && dev && saddr->sll_halen < dev->addr_len) + goto out; } err = -ENXIO ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 32/47 fork: record start_time late
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Herrmann <[email protected]>
commit 7b55851367136b1efd84d98fea81ba57a98304cf upstream.
This changes the fork(2) syscall to record the process start_time after initializing the basic task structure but still before making the new process visible to user-space.
Technically, we could record the start_time anytime during fork(2). But this might lead to scenarios where a start_time is recorded long before a process becomes visible to user-space. For instance, with userfaultfd(2) and TLS, user-space can delay the execution of fork(2) for an indefinite amount of time (and will, if this causes network access, or similar).
By recording the start_time late, it much closer reflects the point in time where the process becomes live and can be observed by other processes.
Lastly, this makes it much harder for user-space to predict and control the start_time they get assigned. Previously, user-space could fork a process and stall it in copy_thread_tls() before its pid is allocated, but after its start_time is recorded. This can be misused to later-on cycle through PIDs and resume the stalled fork(2) yielding a process that has the same pid and start_time as a process that existed before. This can be used to circumvent security systems that identify processes by their pid+start_time combination.
Even though user-space was always aware that start_time recording is flaky (but several projects are known to still rely on start_time-based identification), changing the start_time to be recorded late will help mitigate existing attacks and make it much harder for user-space to control the start_time a process gets assigned.
--- kernel/fork.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/fork.c +11 -2
@@ -1321,8 +1321,6 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(posix_cpu_timers_init (p); - p->start_time =ktime_get_ns (); - p->real_start_time =ktime_get_boot_ns (); p->io_context =NULL ; p->audit_context =NULL ;if (clone_flags &CLONE_THREAD )
@@ -1487,6 +1485,17 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(spin_lock (¤t->sighand->siglock);/* +* From this point on we must avoid any synchronous user-space +* communication until we take the tasklist-lock. In particular, we do +* not want user-space to be able to predict the process start-time by +* stalling fork(2) after we recorded the start_time but before it is +* visible to the system. +*/ + + p->start_time =ktime_get_ns (); + p->real_start_time =ktime_get_boot_ns (); + +/* * Copy seccomp details explicitly here, in case they were changed * before holding sighand lock. */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 33/47 sunrpc: fix cache_head leak due to queued request
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
commit 4ecd55ea074217473f94cfee21bb72864d39f8d7 upstream.
After commit d202cce8963d, an expired cache_head can be removed from the cache_detail's hash.
However, the expired cache_head may be waiting for a reply from a previously submitted request. Such a cache_head has an increased refcounter and therefore it won't be freed after cache_put(freeme).
Because the cache_head was removed from the hash it cannot be found during cache_clean() and can be leaked forever, together with stalled cache_request and other taken resources.
In our case we noticed it because an entry in the export cache was holding a reference on a filesystem.
Fixes d202cce8963d ("sunrpc: never return expired entries in sunrpc_cache_lookup")
--- net/sunrpc/cache.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/sunrpc/cache.c +8 -1
@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@ static void cache_init(struct cache_head h->last_refresh = now; } +static void cache_fresh_locked (struct cache_head *head,time_t expiry); +static void cache_fresh_unlocked (struct cache_head *head, +struct cache_detail *detail); +struct cache_head *sunrpc_cache_lookup (struct cache_detail *detail,struct cache_head *key,int hash) {
@@ -94,6 +98,7 @@ struct cache_head *sunrpc_cache_lookup(s *hp = tmp->next; tmp->next =NULL ; detail->entries --; +cache_fresh_locked (tmp,0 ); freeme = tmp;break ; }
@@ -109,8 +114,10 @@ struct cache_head *sunrpc_cache_lookup(scache_get (new);write_unlock (&detail->hash_lock); -if (freeme) +if (freeme) { +cache_fresh_unlocked (freeme, detail);cache_put (freeme, detail); + }return new; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (sunrpc_cache_lookup);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 34/47 sunrpc: use SVC_NET() in svcauth_gss_* functions
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
commit b8be5674fa9a6f3677865ea93f7803c4212f3e10 upstream.
--- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c +4 -4
@@ -1102,7 +1102,7 @@ static int svcauth_gss_legacy_init(strucstruct kvec *resv = &rqstp->rq_res.head[0 ];struct rsi *rsip, rsikey;int ret; -struct sunrpc_net *sn =net_generic (rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_net, sunrpc_net_id); +struct sunrpc_net *sn =net_generic (SVC_NET (rqstp), sunrpc_net_id);memset (&rsikey,0 ,sizeof (rsikey)); ret = gss_read_verf(gc, argv, authp,
@@ -1213,7 +1213,7 @@ static int svcauth_gss_proxy_init(structuint64_t handle;int status;int ret; -struct net *net = rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_net; +struct net *net =SVC_NET (rqstp);struct sunrpc_net *sn =net_generic (net, sunrpc_net_id);memset (&ud,0 ,sizeof (ud));
@@ -1403,7 +1403,7 @@ svcauth_gss_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqst__be32 *rpcstart;__be32 *reject_stat = resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len;int ret; -struct sunrpc_net *sn =net_generic (rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_net, sunrpc_net_id); +struct sunrpc_net *sn =net_generic (SVC_NET (rqstp), sunrpc_net_id);dprintk ("RPC: svcauth_gss: argv->iov_len = %zd\n" , argv->iov_len);
@@ -1691,7 +1691,7 @@ svcauth_gss_release(struct svc_rqst *rqsstruct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &gsd->clcred;struct xdr_buf *resbuf = &rqstp->rq_res;int stat = -EINVAL ; -struct sunrpc_net *sn =net_generic (rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_net, sunrpc_net_id); +struct sunrpc_net *sn =net_generic (SVC_NET (rqstp), sunrpc_net_id);if (gc->gc_proc !=RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA ) goto out;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 36/47 ALSA: usb-audio: Avoid access before bLength check in build_audio_procunit()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit f4351a199cc120ff9d59e06d02e8657d08e6cc46 upstream.
The parser for the processing unit reads bNrInPins field before the bLength sanity check, which may lead to an out-of-bound access when a malformed descriptor is given. Fix it by assignment after the bLength check.
--- sound/usb/mixer.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
sound/usb/mixer.c +8 -2
@@ -1799,7 +1799,7 @@ static int build_audio_procunit(struct m char *name) {struct uac_processing_unit_descriptor *desc = raw_desc; -int num_ins = desc->bNrInPins; +int num_ins;struct usb_mixer_elem_info *cval;struct snd_kcontrol *kctl;int i, err, nameid, type, len;
@@ -1814,7 +1814,13 @@ static int build_audio_procunit(struct m 0, NULL, default_value_info }; -if (desc->bLength <13 || desc->bLength <13 + num_ins || +if (desc->bLength <13 ) { +usb_audio_err (state->chip,"invalid %s descriptor (id %d)\n" , name, unitid); +return -EINVAL ; + } + + num_ins = desc->bNrInPins; +if (desc->bLength <13 + num_ins || desc->bLength < num_ins +uac_processing_unit_bControlSize (desc, state->mixer->protocol)) {usb_audio_err (state->chip,"invalid %s descriptor (id %d)\n" , name, unitid);return -EINVAL ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 37/47 ALSA: usb-audio: Fix an out-of-bound read in create_composite_quirks
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hui Peng <[email protected]>
commit cbb2ebf70daf7f7d97d3811a2ff8e39655b8c184 upstream.
In create_composite_quirk, the terminating condition of for loops is quirk->ifnum < 0. So any composite quirks should end with struct snd_usb_audio_quirk object with ifnum < 0.
for (quirk = quirk_comp->data; quirk->ifnum >= 0; ++quirk) {
.....
}the data field of Bower's & Wilkins PX headphones usb device device quirks do not end with {.ifnum = -1}, wihch may result in out-of-bound read.
This Patch fix the bug by adding an ending quirk object.
--- sound/usb/quirks-table.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
sound/usb/quirks-table.h +3 -0
@@ -3356,6 +3356,9 @@ AU0828_DEVICE(0x2040, 0x7270, "Hauppauge } } }, + { + .ifnum = -1 + }, } } },
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 38/47 dlm: fixed memory leaks after failed ls_remove_names allocation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
commit b982896cdb6e6a6b89d86dfb39df489d9df51e14 upstream.
If allocation fails on last elements of array need to free already allocated elements.
v2: just move existing out_rsbtbl label to right place
Fixes 789924ba635f ("dlm: fix race between remove and lookup")
Cc: [email protected] # 3.6
--- fs/dlm/lockspace.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/dlm/lockspace.c +1 -1
@@ -673,11 +673,11 @@ static int new_lockspace(const char *namkfree (ls->ls_recover_buf); out_lkbidr:idr_destroy (&ls->ls_lkbidr); + out_rsbtbl:for (i =0 ; i <DLM_REMOVE_NAMES_MAX ; i++) {if (ls->ls_remove_names[i])kfree (ls->ls_remove_names[i]); } - out_rsbtbl:vfree (ls->ls_rsbtbl); out_lsfree:if (do_unreg)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 39/47 dlm: possible memory leak on error path in create_lkb()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
commit 23851e978f31eda8b2d01bd410d3026659ca06c7 upstream.
Fixes 3d6aa675fff9 ("dlm: keep lkbs in idr")
Cc: [email protected] # 3.1
--- fs/dlm/lock.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/dlm/lock.c +1 -0
@@ -1210,6 +1210,7 @@ static int create_lkb(struct dlm_ls *ls,if (rv <0 ) {log_error (ls,"create_lkb idr error %d" , rv); +dlm_free_lkb (lkb);return rv; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 40/47 dlm: lost put_lkb on error path in receive_convert() and receive_unlock()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
commit c0174726c3976e67da8649ac62cae43220ae173a upstream.
Fixes 6d40c4a708e0 ("dlm: improve error and debug messages")
Cc: [email protected] # 3.5
--- fs/dlm/lock.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
fs/dlm/lock.c +2 -0
@@ -4178,6 +4178,7 @@ static int receive_convert(struct dlm_ls (unsigned long long )lkb->lkb_recover_seq, ms->m_header.h_nodeid, ms->m_lkid); error = -ENOENT ; +dlm_put_lkb (lkb); goto fail; }
@@ -4231,6 +4232,7 @@ static int receive_unlock(struct dlm_ls lkb->lkb_id, lkb->lkb_remid, ms->m_header.h_nodeid, ms->m_lkid); error = -ENOENT ; +dlm_put_lkb (lkb); goto fail; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 14/47 packet: validate address length if non-zero
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6b8d95f1795c42161dc0984b6863e95d6acf24ed ]
Validate packet socket address length if a length is given. Zero length is equivalent to not setting an address.
--- net/packet/af_packet.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/packet/af_packet.c +2 -2
@@ -2273,7 +2273,7 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_soc sll_addr))) goto out; proto = saddr->sll_protocol; - addr = saddr->sll_addr; + addr = saddr->sll_halen ? saddr->sll_addr :NULL ; dev =dev_get_by_index (sock_net (&po->sk), saddr->sll_ifindex);if (addr && dev && saddr->sll_halen < dev->addr_len) goto out;
@@ -2436,7 +2436,7 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *socif (msg->msg_namelen < (saddr->sll_halen + offsetof(struct sockaddr_ll , sll_addr))) goto out; proto = saddr->sll_protocol; - addr = saddr->sll_addr; + addr = saddr->sll_halen ? saddr->sll_addr :NULL ; dev =dev_get_by_index (sock_net (sk), saddr->sll_ifindex);if (addr && dev && saddr->sll_halen < dev->addr_len) goto out;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 43/47 b43: Fix error in cordic routine
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Larry Finger <[email protected]>
commit 8ea3819c0bbef57a51d8abe579e211033e861677 upstream.
The cordic routine for calculating sines and cosines that was added in commit 6f98e62a9f1b ("b43: update cordic code to match current specs") contains an error whereby a quantity declared u32 can in fact go negative.
This problem was detected by Priit Laes who is switching b43 to use the routine in the library functions of the kernel.
--- drivers/net/wireless/b43/phy_common.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/b43/phy_common.c +1 -1
@@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ struct b43_c32 b43_cordic(int theta)u8 i;s32 tmp;s8 signx =1 ; -u32 angle =0 ; +s32 angle =0 ;struct b43_c32 ret = { .i =39797 , .q =0 , };while (theta > (180 <<16 ))
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 44/47 9p/net: put a lower bound on msize
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dominique Martinet <[email protected]>
commit 574d356b7a02c7e1b01a1d9cba8a26b3c2888f45 upstream.
If the requested msize is too small (either from command line argument or from the server version reply), we won't get any work done. If it's *really* too small, nothing will work, and this got caught by syzbot recently (on a new kmem_cache_create_usercopy() call)
Just set a minimum msize to 4k in both code paths, until someone complains they have a use-case for a smaller msize.
We need to check in both mount option and server reply individually because the msize for the first version request would be unchecked with just a global check on clnt->msize.
--- net/9p/client.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
net/9p/client.c +21 -0
@@ -155,6 +155,12 @@ static int parse_opts(char *opts, struct ret = r;continue ; } +if (option <4096 ) { +p9_debug (P9_DEBUG_ERROR , +"msize should be at least 4k\n" ); + ret = -EINVAL ; +continue ; + } clnt->msize = option;break ;case Opt_trans:
@@ -979,10 +985,18 @@ static int p9_client_version(struct p9_celse if (!strncmp (version,"9P2000" ,6 )) c->proto_version = p9_proto_legacy;else { +p9_debug (P9_DEBUG_ERROR , +"server returned an unknown version: %s\n" , version); err = -EREMOTEIO ; goto error; } +if (msize <4096 ) { +p9_debug (P9_DEBUG_ERROR , +"server returned a msize < 4096: %d\n" , msize); + err = -EREMOTEIO ; + goto error; + }if (msize < c->msize) c->msize = msize;
@@ -1047,6 +1061,13 @@ struct p9_client *p9_client_create(constif (clnt->msize > clnt->trans_mod->maxsize) clnt->msize = clnt->trans_mod->maxsize; +if (clnt->msize <4096 ) { +p9_debug (P9_DEBUG_ERROR , +"Please specify a msize of at least 4k\n" ); + err = -EINVAL ; + goto free_client; + } + err =p9_client_version (clnt);if (err) goto close_trans;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 45/47 ceph: dont update importing caps mseq when handing cap export
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yan, Zheng <[email protected]>
commit 3c1392d4c49962a31874af14ae9ff289cb2b3851 upstream.
Updating mseq makes client think importer mds has accepted all prior cap messages and importer mds knows what caps client wants. Actually some cap messages may have been dropped because of mseq mismatch.
If mseq is left untouched, importing cap's mds_wanted later will get reset by cap import message.
--- fs/ceph/caps.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
fs/ceph/caps.c +0 -1
@@ -2830,7 +2830,6 @@ retry: tcap->cap_id = t_cap_id; tcap->seq = t_seq -1 ; tcap->issue_seq = t_seq -1 ; - tcap->mseq = t_mseq; tcap->issued |= issued; tcap->implemented |= issued;if (cap == ci->i_auth_cap)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 46/47 genwqe: Fix size check
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
commit fdd669684655c07dacbdb0d753fd13833de69a33 upstream.
Calling the test program genwqe_cksum with the default buffer size of 2MB triggers the following kernel warning on s390:
WARNING: CPU: 30 PID: 9311 at mm/page_alloc.c:3189 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x45c/0xbe0
CPU: 30 PID: 9311 Comm: genwqe_cksum Kdump: loaded Not tainted 3.10.0-957.el7.s390x #1
task: 00000005e5d13980 ti: 00000005e7c6c000 task.ti: 00000005e7c6c000
Krnl PSW : 0704c00180000000 00000000002780ac (__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x45c/0xbe0)
R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:0 PM:0 EA:3
Krnl GPRS: 00000000002932b8 0000000000b73d7c 0000000000000010 0000000000000009
0000000000000041 00000005e7c6f9b8 0000000000000001 00000000000080d0
0000000000000000 0000000000b70500 0000000000000001 0000000000000000
0000000000b70528 00000000007682c0 0000000000277df2 00000005e7c6f9a0
Krnl Code: 000000000027809e: de7195001000 ed 1280(114,%r9),0(%r1)
00000000002780a4: a774fead brc 7,277dfe
#00000000002780a8: a7f40001 brc 15,2780aa
>00000000002780ac: 92011000 mvi 0(%r1),1
00000000002780b0: a7f4fea7 brc 15,277dfe
00000000002780b4: 9101c6b6 tm 1718(%r12),1
00000000002780b8: a784ff3a brc 8,277f2c
00000000002780bc: a7f4fe2e brc 15,277d18
Call Trace:
([<0000000000277df2>] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x1a2/0xbe0)
[<000000000013afae>] s390_dma_alloc+0xfe/0x310
[<000003ff8065f362>] __genwqe_alloc_consistent+0xfa/0x148 [genwqe_card]
[<000003ff80658f7a>] genwqe_mmap+0xca/0x248 [genwqe_card]
[<00000000002b2712>] mmap_region+0x4e2/0x778
[<00000000002b2c54>] do_mmap+0x2ac/0x3e0
[<0000000000292d7e>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0xd6/0x118
[<00000000002b081c>] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0xdc/0x268
[<00000000002b0a34>] SyS_old_mmap+0x8c/0xb0
[<000000000074e518>] sysc_tracego+0x14/0x1e
[<000003ffacf87dc6>] 0x3ffacf87dc6turns out the check in __genwqe_alloc_consistent uses "> MAX_ORDER" while the mm code uses ">= MAX_ORDER". Fix genwqe.
--- drivers/misc/genwqe/card_utils.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/misc/genwqe/card_utils.c +1 -1
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ u32 genwqe_crc32(u8 *buff, size_t len, uvoid *__genwqe_alloc_consistent (struct genwqe_dev *cd,size_t size,dma_addr_t *dma_handle) { -if (get_order (size) >MAX_ORDER ) +if (get_order (size) >=MAX_ORDER )return NULL ;return pci_alloc_consistent (cd->pci_dev, size, dma_handle);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 15/47 sctp: initialize sin6_flowinfo for ipv6 addrs in sctp_inet6addr_event
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Xin Long <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4a2eb0c37b4759416996fbb4c45b932500cf06d3 ]
syzbot reported a kernel-infoleak, which is caused by an uninitialized field(sin6_flowinfo) of addr->a.v6 in sctp_inet6addr_event(). The call trace is as below:
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0x19a/0x230 lib/usercopy.c:33
CPU: 1 PID: 8164 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc3+ #95
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x32d/0x480 lib/dump_stack.c:113
kmsan_report+0x12c/0x290 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:683
kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x32a/0xa50 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:743
kmsan_copy_to_user+0x78/0xd0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:634
_copy_to_user+0x19a/0x230 lib/usercopy.c:33
copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:183 [inline]
sctp_getsockopt_local_addrs net/sctp/socket.c:5998 [inline]
sctp_getsockopt+0x15248/0x186f0 net/sctp/socket.c:7477
sock_common_getsockopt+0x13f/0x180 net/core/sock.c:2937
__sys_getsockopt+0x489/0x550 net/socket.c:1939
__do_sys_getsockopt net/socket.c:1950 [inline]
__se_sys_getsockopt+0xe1/0x100 net/socket.c:1947
__x64_sys_getsockopt+0x62/0x80 net/socket.c:1947
do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7sin6_flowinfo is not really used by SCTP, so it will be fixed by simply setting it to 0.
The issue exists since very beginning.
Thanks Alexander for the reproducer provided.
--- net/sctp/ipv6.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/sctp/ipv6.c +1 -0
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ static int sctp_inet6addr_event(struct nif (addr) { addr->a.v6.sin6_family =AF_INET6 ; addr->a.v6.sin6_port =0 ; + addr->a.v6.sin6_flowinfo =0 ; addr->a.v6.sin6_addr = ifa->addr; addr->a.v6.sin6_scope_id = ifa->idev->dev->ifindex; addr->valid =1 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 16/47 vhost: make sure used idx is seen before log in vhost_add_used_n()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 841df922417eb82c835e93d4b93eb6a68c99d599 ]
We miss a write barrier that guarantees used idx is updated and seen before log. This will let userspace sync and copy used ring before used idx is update. Fix this by adding a barrier before log_write().
--- drivers/vhost/vhost.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/vhost/vhost.c +2 -0
@@ -1409,6 +1409,8 @@ int vhost_add_used_n(struct vhost_virtqureturn -EFAULT ; }if (unlikely (vq->log_used)) { +/* Make sure used idx is seen before log. */ +smp_wmb ();/* Log used index update. */ log_write(vq->log_base, vq->log_addr + offsetof(struct vring_used, idx),
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 17/47 VSOCK: Send reset control packet when socket is partially bound
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jorgen Hansen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a915b982d8f5e4295f64b8dd37ce753874867e88 ]
If a server side socket is bound to an address, but not in the listening state yet, incoming connection requests should receive a reset control packet in response. However, the function used to send the reset silently drops the reset packet if the sending socket isn't bound to a remote address (as is the case for a bound socket not yet in the listening state). This change fixes this by using the src of the incoming packet as destination for the reset packet in this case.
--- net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c +50 -17
@@ -273,6 +273,31 @@ vmci_transport_send_control_pkt_bh(struc }static int +vmci_transport_alloc_send_control_pkt (struct sockaddr_vm *src, +struct sockaddr_vm *dst, +enum vmci_transport_packet_type type, +u64 size, +u64 mode, +struct vmci_transport_waiting_info *wait, +u16 proto, +struct vmci_handle handle) +{ +struct vmci_transport_packet *pkt; +int err; + + pkt =kmalloc (sizeof (*pkt),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!pkt) +return -ENOMEM ; + + err =__vmci_transport_send_control_pkt (pkt, src, dst, type, size, + mode, wait, proto, handle, + true); +kfree (pkt); + +return err; +} + +static int vmci_transport_send_control_pkt(struct sock *sk, enum vmci_transport_packet_type type, u64 size,
@@ -281,9 +306,7 @@ vmci_transport_send_control_pkt(struct s u16 proto, struct vmci_handle handle) { -struct vmci_transport_packet *pkt;struct vsock_sock *vsk; -int err; vsk =vsock_sk (sk);
@@ -293,17 +316,10 @@ vmci_transport_send_control_pkt(struct sif (!vsock_addr_bound (&vsk->remote_addr))return -EINVAL ; - pkt =kmalloc (sizeof (*pkt),GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!pkt) -return -ENOMEM ; - - err =__vmci_transport_send_control_pkt (pkt, &vsk->local_addr, - &vsk->remote_addr, type, size, - mode, wait, proto, handle, - true); -kfree (pkt); - -return err; +return vmci_transport_alloc_send_control_pkt (&vsk->local_addr, + &vsk->remote_addr, + type, size, mode, + wait, proto, handle); } static int vmci_transport_send_reset_bh(struct sockaddr_vm *dst,
@@ -321,12 +337,29 @@ static int vmci_transport_send_reset_bh(static int vmci_transport_send_reset (struct sock *sk,struct vmci_transport_packet *pkt) { +struct sockaddr_vm *dst_ptr; +struct sockaddr_vm dst; +struct vsock_sock *vsk; +if (pkt->type ==VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_RST )return 0 ; -return vmci_transport_send_control_pkt (sk, -VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_RST , -0 ,0 ,NULL ,VSOCK_PROTO_INVALID , -VMCI_INVALID_HANDLE ); + + vsk =vsock_sk (sk); + +if (!vsock_addr_bound (&vsk->local_addr)) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (vsock_addr_bound (&vsk->remote_addr)) { + dst_ptr = &vsk->remote_addr; + }else { +vsock_addr_init (&dst, pkt->dg.src.context, + pkt->src_port); + dst_ptr = &dst; + } +return vmci_transport_alloc_send_control_pkt (&vsk->local_addr, dst_ptr, +VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_RST , +0 ,0 ,NULL ,VSOCK_PROTO_INVALID , +VMCI_INVALID_HANDLE ); }static int vmci_transport_send_negotiate (struct sock *sk,size_t size)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 18/47 xen/netfront: tolerate frags with no data
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d81c5054a5d1d4999c7cdead7636b6cd4af83d36 ]
At least old Xen net backends seem to send frags with no real data sometimes. In case such a fragment happens to occur with the frag limit already reached the frontend will BUG currently even if this situation is easily recoverable.
Modify the BUG_ON() condition accordingly.
--- drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/xen-netfront.c +1 -1
@@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ static RING_IDX xennet_fill_frags(structif (skb_shinfo (skb)->nr_frags ==MAX_SKB_FRAGS ) {unsigned int pull_to =NETFRONT_SKB_CB (skb)->pull_to; -BUG_ON (pull_to <=skb_headlen (skb)); +BUG_ON (pull_to <skb_headlen (skb));__pskb_pull_tail (skb, pull_to -skb_headlen (skb)); }BUG_ON (skb_shinfo (skb)->nr_frags >=MAX_SKB_FRAGS );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 20/47 USB: serial: pl2303: add ids for Hewlett-Packard HP POS pole displays
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Scott Chen <[email protected]>
commit 8d503f206c336677954160ac62f0c7d9c219cd89 upstream.
Add device ids to pl2303 for the HP POS pole displays:
LM920: 03f0:026b TD620: 03f0:0956 LD960TA: 03f0:4439 LD220TA: 03f0:4349 LM940: 03f0:5039
--- drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.c | 5 +++++ drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.h | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.c +5 -0
@@ -84,9 +84,14 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_tab { USB_DEVICE(YCCABLE_VENDOR_ID, YCCABLE_PRODUCT_ID) }, { USB_DEVICE(SUPERIAL_VENDOR_ID, SUPERIAL_PRODUCT_ID) }, { USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LD220_PRODUCT_ID) }, + { USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LD220TA_PRODUCT_ID) }, { USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LD960_PRODUCT_ID) }, + { USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LD960TA_PRODUCT_ID) }, { USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LCM220_PRODUCT_ID) }, { USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LCM960_PRODUCT_ID) }, + { USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LM920_PRODUCT_ID) }, + { USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LM940_PRODUCT_ID) }, + { USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_TD620_PRODUCT_ID) }, { USB_DEVICE(CRESSI_VENDOR_ID, CRESSI_EDY_PRODUCT_ID) }, { USB_DEVICE(ZEAGLE_VENDOR_ID, ZEAGLE_N2ITION3_PRODUCT_ID) }, { USB_DEVICE(SONY_VENDOR_ID, SONY_QN3USB_PRODUCT_ID) },
drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.h +5 -0
@@ -121,10 +121,15 @@/* Hewlett-Packard POS Pole Displays */ #define HP_VENDOR_ID 0x03f0 +#define HP_LM920_PRODUCT_ID 0x026b +#define HP_TD620_PRODUCT_ID 0x0956#define HP_LD960_PRODUCT_ID 0x0b39#define HP_LCM220_PRODUCT_ID 0x3139#define HP_LCM960_PRODUCT_ID 0x3239#define HP_LD220_PRODUCT_ID 0x3524 +#define HP_LD220TA_PRODUCT_ID 0x4349 +#define HP_LD960TA_PRODUCT_ID 0x4439 +#define HP_LM940_PRODUCT_ID 0x5039/* Cressi Edy (diving computer) PC interface */ #define CRESSI_VENDOR_ID 0x04b8
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 11/47 isdn: fix kernel-infoleak in capi_unlocked_ioctl
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d63967e475ae10f286dbd35e189cb241e0b1f284 ]
Since capi_ioctl() copies 64 bytes after calling capi20_get_manufacturer() we need to ensure to not leak information to user.
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0x16b/0x1f0 lib/usercopy.c:32 CPU: 0 PID: 11245 Comm: syz-executor633 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #2 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613 kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x9d4/0xb00 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:704 kmsan_copy_to_user+0xab/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:601 _copy_to_user+0x16b/0x1f0 lib/usercopy.c:32 capi_ioctl include/linux/uaccess.h:177 [inline] capi_unlocked_ioctl+0x1a0b/0x1bf0 drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:939 do_vfs_ioctl+0xebd/0x2bf0 fs/ioctl.c:46 ksys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:713 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:720 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0x1da/0x270 fs/ioctl.c:718 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x4a/0x70 fs/ioctl.c:718 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 RIP: 0033:0x440019 Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fb 13 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffdd4659fb8 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 0000000000440019 RDX: 0000000020000080 RSI: 00000000c0044306 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000004002c8 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 00000000004018a0 R13: 0000000000401930 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Local variable description: ----data.i@capi_unlocked_ioctl Variable was created at:
capi_ioctl drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:747 [inline] capi_unlocked_ioctl+0x82/0x1bf0 drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:939 do_vfs_ioctl+0xebd/0x2bf0 fs/ioctl.c:46
Bytes 12-63 of 64 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 64 starts at ffff88807ac5fce8 Data copied to user address 0000000020000080
--- drivers/isdn/capi/kcapi.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/isdn/capi/kcapi.c +2 -2
@@ -851,7 +851,7 @@ u16 capi20_get_manufacturer(u32 contr, uu16 ret;if (contr ==0 ) { -strlcpy (buf, capi_manufakturer,CAPI_MANUFACTURER_LEN ); +strncpy (buf, capi_manufakturer,CAPI_MANUFACTURER_LEN );return CAPI_NOERROR ; }
@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ u16 capi20_get_manufacturer(u32 contr, u ctr =get_capi_ctr_by_nr (contr);if (ctr && ctr->state ==CAPI_CTR_RUNNING ) { -strlcpy (buf, ctr->manu,CAPI_MANUFACTURER_LEN ); +strncpy (buf, ctr->manu,CAPI_MANUFACTURER_LEN ); ret =CAPI_NOERROR ; }else ret =CAPI_REGNOTINSTALLED ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 19/47 sock: Make sock->sk_stamp thread-safe
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Deepa Dinamani <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3a0ed3e9619738067214871e9cb826fa23b2ddb9 ]
Al Viro mentioned (Message-ID <[email protected]>) that there is probably a race condition lurking in accesses of sk_stamp on 32-bit machines.
sock->sk_stamp is of type ktime_t which is always an s64. On a 32 bit architecture, we might run into situations of unsafe access as the access to the field becomes non atomic.
Use seqlocks for synchronization.
This allows us to avoid using spinlocks for readers as readers do not need mutual exclusion.
Another approach to solve this is to require sk_lock for all modifications of the timestamps. The current approach allows for timestamps to have their own lock: sk_stamp_lock. This allows for the patch to not compete with already existing critical sections, and side effects are limited to the paths in the patch.
The addition of the new field maintains the data locality optimizations from
commit 9115e8cd2a0c ("net: reorganize struct sock for better data locality")
Note that all the instances of the sk_stamp accesses are either through the ioctl or the syscall recvmsg.
--- include/net/sock.h | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- net/compat.c | 15 +++++++++------ net/core/sock.c | 3 +++ net/sunrpc/svcsock.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
include/net/sock.h +34 -2
@@ -279,6 +279,7 @@ struct cg_proto;* @sk_protinfo: private area, net family specific, when not using slab * @sk_timer: sock cleanup timer * @sk_stamp: time stamp of last packet received +* @sk_stamp_seq: lock for accessing sk_stamp on 32 bit architectures only * @sk_tsflags: SO_TIMESTAMPING socket options * @sk_tskey: counter to disambiguate concurrent tstamp requests * @sk_socket: Identd and reporting IO signals
@@ -411,6 +412,9 @@ struct sock {void *sk_protinfo;struct timer_list sk_timer;ktime_t sk_stamp; +#if BITS_PER_LONG ==32 +seqlock_t sk_stamp_seq; +#endif u16 sk_tsflags;u32 sk_tskey;struct socket *sk_socket;
@@ -2161,6 +2165,34 @@ static inline int sock_intr_errno(long treturn timeo ==MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT ? -ERESTARTSYS : -EINTR ; } +static inline ktime_t sock_read_timestamp (struct sock *sk) +{ +#if BITS_PER_LONG ==32 +unsigned int seq; +ktime_t kt; + +do { + seq =read_seqbegin (&sk->sk_stamp_seq); + kt = sk->sk_stamp; + }while (read_seqretry (&sk->sk_stamp_seq, seq)); + +return kt; +#else +return sk->sk_stamp; +#endif +} + +static inline void sock_write_timestamp (struct sock *sk,ktime_t kt) +{ +#if BITS_PER_LONG ==32 +write_seqlock (&sk->sk_stamp_seq); + sk->sk_stamp = kt; +write_sequnlock (&sk->sk_stamp_seq); +#else + sk->sk_stamp = kt; +#endif +} +void __sock_recv_timestamp (struct msghdr *msg,struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb); void __sock_recv_wifi_status(struct msghdr *msg, struct sock *sk,
@@ -2185,7 +2217,7 @@ sock_recv_timestamp(struct msghdr *msg, (sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RAW_HARDWARE)))__sock_recv_timestamp (msg, sk, skb); else - sk->sk_stamp = kt; +sock_write_timestamp (sk ,kt );if (sock_flag (sk,SOCK_WIFI_STATUS ) && skb->wifi_acked_valid)__sock_recv_wifi_status (msg, sk, skb);
@@ -2205,7 +2237,7 @@ static inline void sock_recv_ts_and_dropif (sk->sk_flags &FLAGS_TS_OR_DROPS || sk->sk_tsflags &TSFLAGS_ANY )__sock_recv_ts_and_drops (msg, sk, skb);else - sk->sk_stamp = skb->tstamp; +sock_write_timestamp (sk, skb->tstamp); }void __sock_tx_timestamp (const struct sock *sk,__u8 *tx_flags);
net/compat.c +9 -6
@@ -472,12 +472,14 @@ int compat_sock_get_timestamp(struct soc err = -ENOENT ;if (!sock_flag (sk,SOCK_TIMESTAMP ))sock_enable_timestamp (sk,SOCK_TIMESTAMP ); - tv =ktime_to_timeval (sk->sk_stamp); + tv =ktime_to_timeval (sock_read_timestamp (sk)); +if (tv.tv_sec ==-1 )return err;if (tv.tv_sec ==0 ) { - sk->sk_stamp =ktime_get_real (); - tv =ktime_to_timeval (sk->sk_stamp); +ktime_t kt =ktime_get_real (); +sock_write_timestamp (sk, kt); + tv =ktime_to_timeval (kt); } err =0 ; if (put_user(tv.tv_sec, &ctv->tv_sec) ||
@@ -500,12 +502,13 @@ int compat_sock_get_timestampns(struct s err = -ENOENT ;if (!sock_flag (sk,SOCK_TIMESTAMP ))sock_enable_timestamp (sk,SOCK_TIMESTAMP ); - ts =ktime_to_timespec (sk->sk_stamp); + ts =ktime_to_timespec (sock_read_timestamp (sk));if (ts.tv_sec ==-1 )return err;if (ts.tv_sec ==0 ) { - sk->sk_stamp =ktime_get_real (); - ts =ktime_to_timespec (sk->sk_stamp); +ktime_t kt =ktime_get_real (); +sock_write_timestamp (sk, kt); + ts =ktime_to_timespec (kt); } err =0 ; if (put_user(ts.tv_sec, &ctv->tv_sec) ||
net/core/sock.c +3 -0
@@ -2332,6 +2332,9 @@ void sock_init_data(struct socket *sock, sk->sk_sndtimeo =MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT ; sk->sk_stamp =ktime_set (-1L ,0 ); +#if BITS_PER_LONG ==32 +seqlock_init (&sk->sk_stamp_seq); +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL sk->sk_napi_id =0 ;
net/sunrpc/svcsock.c +1 -1
@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ static int svc_udp_recvfrom(struct svc_r/* Don't enable netstamp, sunrpc doesn't need that much accuracy */ } - svsk->sk_sk->sk_stamp = skb->tstamp; +sock_write_timestamp (svsk->sk_sk, skb->tstamp);set_bit (XPT_DATA , &svsk->sk_xprt.xpt_flags);/* there may be more data... */ len = skb->len -sizeof (struct udphdr );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 47/47 power: supply: olpc_battery: correct the temperature units
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lubomir Rintel <[email protected]>
commit ed54ffbe554f0902689fd6d1712bbacbacd11376 upstream.
According to [1] and [2], the temperature values are in tenths of degree Celsius. Exposing the Celsius value makes the battery appear on fire:
$ upower -i /org/freedesktop/UPower/devices/battery_olpc_battery
...
temperature: 236.9 degrees CTested on OLPC XO-1 and OLPC XO-1.75 laptops.
[1] include/linux/power_supply.h
[2] Documentation/power/power_supply_class.txt
--- drivers/power/olpc_battery.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/power/olpc_battery.c +2 -2
@@ -425,14 +425,14 @@ static int olpc_bat_get_property(structif (ret)return ret; - val->intval = (s16 )be16_to_cpu (ec_word) *100 /256 ; + val->intval = (s16 )be16_to_cpu (ec_word) *10 /256 ;break ;case POWER_SUPPLY_PROP_TEMP_AMBIENT : ret =olpc_ec_cmd (EC_AMB_TEMP ,NULL ,0 , (void *)&ec_word,2 );if (ret)return ret; - val->intval = (int )be16_to_cpu (ec_word) *100 /256 ; + val->intval = (int )be16_to_cpu (ec_word) *10 /256 ;break ;case POWER_SUPPLY_PROP_CHARGE_COUNTER : ret =olpc_ec_cmd (EC_BAT_ACR ,NULL ,0 , (void *)&ec_word,2 );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 41/47 dlm: memory leaks on error path in dlm_user_request()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
commit d47b41aceeadc6b58abc9c7c6485bef7cfb75636 upstream.
According to comment in dlm_user_request() ua should be freed in dlm_free_lkb() after successful attach to lkb.
However ua is attached to lkb not in set_lock_args() but later, inside request_lock().
Fixes 597d0cae0f99 ("[DLM] dlm: user locks")
Cc: [email protected] # 2.6.19
--- fs/dlm/lock.c | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
fs/dlm/lock.c +7 -7
@@ -5795,20 +5795,20 @@ int dlm_user_request(struct dlm_ls *ls, goto out; } } - -/* After ua is attached to lkb it will be freed by dlm_free_lkb(). -When DLM_IFL_USER is set, the dlm knows that this is a userspace -lock and that lkb_astparam is the dlm_user_args structure. */ - error =set_lock_args (mode, &ua->lksb, flags, namelen, timeout_cs, fake_astfn, ua, fake_bastfn, &args); - lkb->lkb_flags |=DLM_IFL_USER ; -if (error) { +kfree (ua->lksb.sb_lvbptr); + ua->lksb.sb_lvbptr =NULL ; +kfree (ua);__put_lkb (ls, lkb); goto out; } +/* After ua is attached to lkb it will be freed by dlm_free_lkb(). +When DLM_IFL_USER is set, the dlm knows that this is a userspace +lock and that lkb_astparam is the dlm_user_args structure. */ + lkb->lkb_flags |=DLM_IFL_USER ; error =request_lock (ls, lkb, name, namelen, &args);switch (error) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 42/47 gfs2: Fix loop in gfs2_rbm_find
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>
commit 2d29f6b96d8f80322ed2dd895bca590491c38d34 upstream.
Fix the resource group wrap-around logic in gfs2_rbm_find that commit e579ed4f44 broke. The bug can lead to unnecessary repeated scanning of the same bitmaps; there is a risk that future changes will turn this into an endless loop.
--- fs/gfs2/rgrp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/gfs2/rgrp.c +1 -1
@@ -1671,9 +1671,9 @@ static int gfs2_rbm_find(struct gfs2_rbm goto next_iter; }if (ret == -E2BIG ) { + n += rbm->bii - initial_bii; rbm->bii =0 ; rbm->offset =0 ; - n += (rbm->bii - initial_bii); goto res_covered_end_of_rgrp; }return ret;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 35/47 ALSA: cs46xx: Potential NULL dereference in probe
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
commit 1524f4e47f90b27a3ac84efbdd94c63172246a6f upstream.
The "chip->dsp_spos_instance" can be NULL on some of the ealier error paths in snd_cs46xx_create().
--- sound/pci/cs46xx/dsp_spos.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
sound/pci/cs46xx/dsp_spos.c +3 -0
@@ -899,6 +899,9 @@ int cs46xx_dsp_proc_done (struct snd_cs4struct dsp_spos_instance * ins = chip->dsp_spos_instance;int i; +if (!ins) +return 0 ; +snd_info_free_entry (ins->proc_sym_info_entry); ins->proc_sym_info_entry =NULL ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 31/47 scsi: zfcp: fix posting too many status read buffers leading to adapter shutdown
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steffen Maier <[email protected]>
commit 60a161b7e5b2a252ff0d4c622266a7d8da1120ce upstream.
Suppose adapter (open) recovery is between opened QDIO queues and before (the end of) initial posting of status read buffers (SRBs). This time window can be seconds long due to FSF_PROT_HOST_CONNECTION_INITIALIZING causing by design looping with exponential increase sleeps in the function performing exchange config data during recovery [zfcp_erp_adapter_strat_fsf_xconf()]. Recovery triggered by local link up.
Suppose an event occurs for which the FCP channel would send an unsolicited notification to zfcp by means of a previously posted SRB. We saw it with local cable pull (link down) in multi-initiator zoning with multiple NPIV-enabled subchannels of the same shared FCP channel.
As soon as zfcp_erp_adapter_strategy_open_fsf() starts posting the initial status read buffers from within the adapter's ERP thread, the channel does send an unsolicited notification.
Since v2.6.27 commit d26ab06ede83 ("[SCSI] zfcp: receiving an unsolicted status can lead to I/O stall"), zfcp_fsf_status_read_handler() schedules adapter->stat_work to re-fill the just consumed SRB from a work item.
Now the ERP thread and the work item post SRBs in parallel. Both contexts call the helper function zfcp_status_read_refill(). The tracking of missing (to be posted / re-filled) SRBs is not thread-safe due to separate atomic_read() and atomic_dec(), in order to depend on posting success. Hence, both contexts can see atomic_read(&adapter->stat_miss) == 1. One of the two contexts posts one too many SRB. Zfcp gets QDIO_ERROR_SLSB_STATE on the output queue (trace tag "qdireq1") leading to zfcp_erp_adapter_shutdown() in zfcp_qdio_handler_error().
An obvious and seemingly clean fix would be to schedule stat_work from the ERP thread and wait for it to finish. This would serialize all SRB re-fills. However, we already have another work item wait on the ERP
thread: adapter->scan_work runs zfcp_fc_scan_ports() which calls zfcp_fc_eval_gpn_ft(). The latter calls zfcp_erp_wait() to wait for all the open port recoveries during zfcp auto port scan, but in fact it waits for any pending recovery including an adapter recovery. This approach leads to a deadlock. [see also v3.19 commit 18f87a67e6d6 ("zfcp: auto port scan resiliency"); v2.6.37 commit d3e1088d6873
("[SCSI] zfcp: No ERP escalation on gpn_ft eval");
v2.6.28 commit fca55b6fb587
("[SCSI] zfcp: fix deadlock between wq triggered port scan and ERP") fixing v2.6.27 commit c57a39a45a76
("[SCSI] zfcp: wait until adapter is finished with ERP during auto-port"); v2.6.27 commit cc8c282963bd
("[SCSI] zfcp: Automatically attach remote ports")]
Instead make the accounting of missing SRBs atomic for parallel execution in both the ERP thread and adapter->stat_work.
--- drivers/s390/scsi/zfcp_aux.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/scsi/zfcp_aux.c +3 -3
@@ -275,16 +275,16 @@ static void zfcp_free_low_mem_buffers(st*/ int zfcp_status_read_refill (struct zfcp_adapter *adapter) { -while (atomic_read (&adapter->stat_miss) >0 ) +while (atomic_add_unless (&adapter->stat_miss,-1 ,0 ))if (zfcp_fsf_status_read (adapter->qdio)) { +atomic_inc (&adapter->stat_miss);/* undo add -1 */ if (atomic_read (&adapter->stat_miss) >= adapter->stat_read_buf_num) {zfcp_erp_adapter_reopen (adapter,0 ,"axsref1" );return 1 ; }break ; - }else -atomic_dec (&adapter->stat_miss); + }return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 29/47 MIPS: Align kernel load address to 64KB
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Huacai Chen <[email protected]>
commit bec0de4cfad21bd284dbddee016ed1767a5d2823 upstream.
KEXEC needs the new kernel's load address to be aligned on a page boundary (see sanity_check_segment_list()), but on MIPS the default vmlinuz load address is only explicitly aligned to 16 bytes.
Since the largest PAGE_SIZE supported by MIPS kernels is 64KB, increase the alignment calculated by calc_vmlinuz_load_addr to 64KB.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/21131/
--- arch/mips/boot/compressed/calc_vmlinuz_load_addr.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/mips/boot/compressed/calc_vmlinuz_load_addr.c +4 -3
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#include <stdint.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> +#include "../../../../include/linux/sizes.h" int main (int argc,char *argv[]) {
@@ -45,11 +46,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) vmlinuz_load_addr = vmlinux_load_addr + vmlinux_size;/* -* Align with 16 bytes: "greater than that used for any standard data -* types by a MIPS compiler." -- See MIPS Run Linux (Second Edition). +* Align with 64KB: KEXEC needs load sections to be aligned to PAGE_SIZE, +* which may be as large as 64KB depending on the kernel configuration. */ - vmlinuz_load_addr += (16 - vmlinux_size %16 ); + vmlinuz_load_addr += (SZ_64K - vmlinux_size %SZ_64K );printf ("0x%llx\n" , vmlinuz_load_addr);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 27/47 media: vivid: free bitmap_cap when updating std/timings/etc.
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
commit 560ccb75c2caa6b1039dec1a53cd2ef526f5bf03 upstream.
When vivid_update_format_cap() is called it should free any overlay bitmap since the compose size will change.
--- drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-vid-cap.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-vid-cap.c +2 -0
@@ -454,6 +454,8 @@ void vivid_update_format_cap(struct vivitpg_s_rgb_range (&dev->tpg,v4l2_ctrl_g_ctrl (dev->rgb_range_cap));break ; } +vfree (dev->bitmap_cap); + dev->bitmap_cap =NULL ;vivid_update_quality (dev);tpg_reset_source (&dev->tpg, dev->src_rect.width, dev->src_rect.height, dev->field_cap); dev->crop_cap = dev->src_rect;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 25/47 ext4: force inode writes when nfsd calls commit_metadata()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit fde872682e175743e0c3ef939c89e3c6008a1529 upstream.
Some time back, nfsd switched from calling vfs_fsync() to using a new commit_metadata() hook in export_operations(). If the file system did not provide a commit_metadata() hook, it fell back to using sync_inode_metadata(). Unfortunately doesn't work on all file systems. In particular, it doesn't work on ext4 due to how the inode gets journalled --- the VFS writeback code will not always call ext4_write_inode().
So we need to provide our own ext4_nfs_commit_metdata() method which calls ext4_write_inode() directly.
Google-Bug-Id: 121195940
--- fs/ext4/super.c | 11 +++++++++++ include/trace/events/ext4.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
fs/ext4/super.c +11 -0
@@ -1034,6 +1034,16 @@ static struct dentry *ext4_fh_to_parent( ext4_nfs_get_inode); } +static int ext4_nfs_commit_metadata (struct inode *inode) +{ +struct writeback_control wbc = { + .sync_mode =WB_SYNC_ALL + }; + +trace_ext4_nfs_commit_metadata (inode); +return ext4_write_inode (inode, &wbc); +} +/* * Try to release metadata pages (indirect blocks, directories) which are * mapped via the block device. Since these pages could have journal heads
@@ -1135,6 +1145,7 @@ static const struct export_operations ex .fh_to_dentry = ext4_fh_to_dentry, .fh_to_parent = ext4_fh_to_parent, .get_parent = ext4_get_parent, + .commit_metadata = ext4_nfs_commit_metadata, };enum {
include/trace/events/ext4.h +20 -0
@@ -195,6 +195,26 @@ TRACE_EVENT(ext4_drop_inode, (unsigned long) __entry->ino, __entry->drop) ); +TRACE_EVENT (ext4_nfs_commit_metadata, + TP_PROTO(struct inode *inode), + +TP_ARGS (inode), + +TP_STRUCT__entry ( + __field( dev_t, dev ) +__field ( ino_t, ino ) + ), + +TP_fast_assign ( + __entry->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; + __entry->ino = inode->i_ino; + ), + +TP_printk ("dev %d,%d ino %lu" , +MAJOR (__entry->dev),MINOR (__entry->dev), + (unsigned long ) __entry->ino) +); + TRACE_EVENT(ext4_mark_inode_dirty, TP_PROTO(struct inode *inode, unsigned long IP),
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 22/47 KVM: x86: Use jmp to invoke kvm_spurious_fault() from .fixup
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
commit e81434995081fd7efb755fd75576b35dbb0850b1 upstream.
____kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot() provides a generic exception fixup handler that is used to cleanly handle faults on VMX/SVM instructions during reboot (or at least try to). If there isn't a reboot in progress, ____kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot() treats any exception as fatal to KVM and invokes kvm_spurious_fault(), which in turn generates a BUG() to get a stack trace and die.
When it was originally added by commit 4ecac3fd6dc2 ("KVM: Handle virtualization instruction #UD faults during reboot"), the "call" to kvm_spurious_fault() was handcoded as PUSH+JMP, where the PUSH'd value is the RIP of the faulting instructing.
The PUSH+JMP trickery is necessary because the exception fixup handler code lies outside of its associated function, e.g. right after the function. An actual CALL from the .fixup code would show a slightly bogus stack trace, e.g. an extra "random" function would be inserted into the trace, as the return RIP on the stack would point to no known function (and the unwinder will likely try to guess who owns the RIP).
Unfortunately, the JMP was replaced with a CALL when the macro was reworked to not spin indefinitely during reboot (commit b7c4145ba2eb "KVM: Don't spin on virt instruction faults during reboot"). This causes the aforementioned behavior where a bogus function is inserted into the stack trace, e.g. my builds like to blame free_kvm_area().
Revert the CALL back to a JMP. The changelog for commit b7c4145ba2eb ("KVM: Don't spin on virt instruction faults during reboot") contains nothing that indicates the switch to CALL was deliberate. This is backed up by the fact that the PUSH <insn RIP> was left intact.
Note that an alternative to the PUSH+JMP magic would be to JMP back to the "real" code and CALL from there, but that would require adding a JMP in the non-faulting path to avoid calling kvm_spurious_fault() and would add no value, i.e. the stack trace would be the same.
Using CALL:
------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at /home/sean/go/src/kernel.org/linux/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:356! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 4 PID: 1057 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc6+ #75 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:kvm_spurious_fault+0x5/0x10 [kvm] Code: <0f> 0b 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 55 49 89 fd 41 RSP: 0018:ffffc900004bbcc8 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffffffffff RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff888273fd8000 R08: 00000000000003e8 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000784 R12: ffffc90000371fb0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000026d763cf4 R15: ffff888273fd8000 FS: 00007f3d69691700(0000) GS:ffff888277800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055f89bc56fe0 CR3: 0000000271a5a001 CR4: 0000000000362ee0 Call Trace: free_kvm_area+0x1044/0x43ea [kvm_intel] ? vmx_vcpu_run+0x156/0x630 [kvm_intel] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x447/0x1a40 [kvm] ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x368/0x5c0 [kvm] ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x368/0x5c0 [kvm] ? __set_task_blocked+0x38/0x90 ? __set_current_blocked+0x50/0x60 ? __fpu__restore_sig+0x97/0x490 ? do_vfs_ioctl+0xa1/0x620 ? __x64_sys_futex+0x89/0x180 ? ksys_ioctl+0x66/0x70 ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 ? do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x100 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Modules linked in: vhost_net vhost tap kvm_intel kvm irqbypass bridge stp llc ---[ end trace 9775b14b123b1713 ]---
Using JMP:
------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at /home/sean/go/src/kernel.org/linux/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:356! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 6 PID: 1067 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc6+ #75 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:kvm_spurious_fault+0x5/0x10 [kvm] Code: <0f> 0b 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 55 49 89 fd 41 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000497cd0 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffffffffff RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff88827058bd40 R08: 00000000000003e8 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000784 R12: ffffc90000369fb0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000003c8fc6642 R15: ffff88827058bd40 FS: 00007f3d7219e700(0000) GS:ffff888277900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f3d64001000 CR3: 0000000271c6b004 CR4: 0000000000362ee0 Call Trace: vmx_vcpu_run+0x156/0x630 [kvm_intel] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x447/0x1a40 [kvm] ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x368/0x5c0 [kvm] ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x368/0x5c0 [kvm] ? __set_task_blocked+0x38/0x90 ? __set_current_blocked+0x50/0x60 ? __fpu__restore_sig+0x97/0x490 ? do_vfs_ioctl+0xa1/0x620 ? __x64_sys_futex+0x89/0x180 ? ksys_ioctl+0x66/0x70 ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 ? do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x100 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Modules linked in: vhost_net vhost tap kvm_intel kvm irqbypass bridge stp llc ---[ end trace f9daedb85ab3ddba ]---
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -1
@@ -1044,7 +1044,7 @@ asmlinkage void kvm_spurious_fault(void)"cmpb $0, kvm_rebooting \n\t" \"jne 668b \n\t" \ __ASM_SIZE(push) " $666b \n\t" \ -"call kvm_spurious_fault \n\t" \ +"jmp kvm_spurious_fault \n\t" \".popsection \n\t" \ _ASM_EXTABLE(666b ,667b )
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 8/47 ax25: fix a use-after-free in ax25_fillin_cb()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c433570458e49bccea5c551df628d058b3526289 ]
There are multiple issues here:
1. After freeing dev->ax25_ptr, we need to set it to NULL otherwise we may use a dangling pointer.
2. There is a race between ax25_setsockopt() and device notifier as reported by syzbot. Close it by holding RTNL lock.
3. We need to test if dev->ax25_ptr is NULL before using it.
--- net/ax25/af_ax25.c | 11 +++++++++-- net/ax25/ax25_dev.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ax25/af_ax25.c +9 -2
@@ -655,15 +655,22 @@ static int ax25_setsockopt(struct socketbreak ; } - dev =dev_get_by_name (&init_net, devname); +rtnl_lock (); + dev =__dev_get_by_name (&init_net, devname);if (!dev) { +rtnl_unlock (); res = -ENODEV ;break ; } ax25->ax25_dev =ax25_dev_ax25dev (dev); +if (!ax25->ax25_dev) { +rtnl_unlock (); + res = -ENODEV ; +break ; + }ax25_fillin_cb (ax25, ax25->ax25_dev); -dev_put (dev); +rtnl_unlock ();break ;default :
net/ax25/ax25_dev.c +2 -0
@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ void ax25_dev_device_down(struct net_devif ((s = ax25_dev_list) == ax25_dev) { ax25_dev_list = s->next;spin_unlock_bh (&ax25_dev_lock); + dev->ax25_ptr =NULL ;dev_put (dev);kfree (ax25_dev);return ;
@@ -125,6 +126,7 @@ void ax25_dev_device_down(struct net_devif (s->next == ax25_dev) { s->next = ax25_dev->next;spin_unlock_bh (&ax25_dev_lock); + dev->ax25_ptr =NULL ;dev_put (dev);kfree (ax25_dev);return ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 4/47 mmc: omap_hsmmc: fix DMA API warning
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Russell King <[email protected]>
commit 0b479790684192ab7024ce6a621f93f6d0a64d92 upstream.
While booting with rootfs on MMC, the following warning is encountered on OMAP4430:
omap-dma-engine 4a056000.dma-controller: DMA-API: mapping sg segment longer than device claims to support [len=69632] [max=65536]
This is because the DMA engine has a default maximum segment size of 64K but HSMMC sets:
mmc->max_blk_size = 512; /* Block Length at max can be 1024 */
mmc->max_blk_count = 0xFFFF; /* No. of Blocks is 16 bits */
mmc->max_req_size = mmc->max_blk_size * mmc->max_blk_count;
mmc->max_seg_size = mmc->max_req_size;which ends up telling the block layer that we support a maximum segment size of 65535*512, which exceeds the advertised DMA engine capabilities.
Fix this by clamping the maximum segment size to the lower of the maximum request size and of the DMA engine device used for either DMA channel.
--- drivers/mmc/host/omap_hsmmc.c | 12 +++++++++++- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mmc/host/omap_hsmmc.c +11 -1
@@ -2141,7 +2141,6 @@ static int omap_hsmmc_probe(struct platf mmc->max_blk_size =512 ;/* Block Length at max can be 1024 */ mmc->max_blk_count =0xFFFF ;/* No. of Blocks is 16 bits */ mmc->max_req_size = mmc->max_blk_size * mmc->max_blk_count; - mmc->max_seg_size = mmc->max_req_size; mmc->caps |=MMC_CAP_MMC_HIGHSPEED |MMC_CAP_SD_HIGHSPEED |MMC_CAP_WAIT_WHILE_BUSY |MMC_CAP_ERASE ;
@@ -2198,6 +2197,17 @@ static int omap_hsmmc_probe(struct platf goto err_irq; } +/* +* Limit the maximum segment size to the lower of the request size +* and the DMA engine device segment size limits. In reality, with +* 32-bit transfers, the DMA engine can do longer segments than this +* but there is no way to represent that in the DMA model - if we +* increase this figure here, we get warnings from the DMA API debug. +*/ + mmc->max_seg_size =min3 (mmc->max_req_size, +dma_get_max_seg_size (host->rx_chan->device->dev), +dma_get_max_seg_size (host->tx_chan->device->dev)); +/* Request IRQ for MMC operations */ ret =devm_request_irq (&pdev->dev, host->irq, omap_hsmmc_irq,0 ,mmc_hostname (mmc), host);
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.18.132 release. There are 47 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun Jan 13 13:09:31 UTC 2019. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 9 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/stable-review/patch-3.18.132-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-3.18.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks,
-- Shuah
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.18.132 release. There are 47 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun Jan 13 13:09:31 UTC 2019. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/stable-review/patch-3.18.132-rc1.gz
Quoted 8 lines
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
linux-3.18.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Built and booted on the OnePlus 3, no userspace regressions.
Signature · 2 lines
Harsh Shandilya PRJKT Development LLC
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.18.132 release. There are 47 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun Jan 13 13:09:31 UTC 2019. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Build results:
total: 155 pass: 155 fail: 0 Qemu test results: total: 217 pass: 202 fail: 15 Failed tests: sparc32:SPARCClassic:nosmp:scsi:hd sparc32:SPARCbook:nosmp:scsi:cd sparc32:LX:nosmp:noapc:scsi:hd sparc32:SS-4:nosmp:initrd sparc32:SS-5:nosmp:scsi:hd sparc32:SS-10:nosmp:scsi:cd sparc32:SS-20:nosmp:scsi:hd sparc32:SS-600MP:nosmp:scsi:hd sparc32:Voyager:nosmp:noapc:scsi:hd sparc32:SS-4:smp:scsi:hd sparc32:SS-5:smp:scsi:cd sparc32:SS-10:smp:scsi:hd sparc32:SS-20:smp:scsi:hd sparc32:SS-600MP:smp:scsi:hd sparc32:Voyager:smp:noapc:scsi:hd
The failed sparc32 tests are really nothing new, but were discovered due to more extensive testing. Observed behavior is a boot hang. sparc32 images in v3.18.y (and v3.16.y) have probably been non-functional since commit 16c193364b4d ("sparc: Harden signal return frame checks."). The problem was fixed upstream with commit 07b5ab3f71d3 ("sparc32: Fix inverted invalid_frame_pointer checks on sigreturns"), and applying the same commit to v3.18.y (and v3.16.y) fixes the problem.
Guenter
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 32 lines · Guenter Roeck
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.18.132 release. There are 47 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun Jan 13 13:09:31 UTC 2019. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Build results:
total: 155 pass: 155 fail: 0 Qemu test results: total: 217 pass: 202 fail: 15 Failed tests: sparc32:SPARCClassic:nosmp:scsi:hd sparc32:SPARCbook:nosmp:scsi:cd sparc32:LX:nosmp:noapc:scsi:hd sparc32:SS-4:nosmp:initrd sparc32:SS-5:nosmp:scsi:hd sparc32:SS-10:nosmp:scsi:cd sparc32:SS-20:nosmp:scsi:hd sparc32:SS-600MP:nosmp:scsi:hd sparc32:Voyager:nosmp:noapc:scsi:hd sparc32:SS-4:smp:scsi:hd sparc32:SS-5:smp:scsi:cd sparc32:SS-10:smp:scsi:hd sparc32:SS-20:smp:scsi:hd sparc32:SS-600MP:smp:scsi:hd sparc32:Voyager:smp:noapc:scsi:hd
Quoted 7 lines
The failed sparc32 tests are really nothing new, but were discovered due to more extensive testing. Observed behavior is a boot hang. sparc32 images in v3.18.y (and v3.16.y) have probably been non-functional since commit
16c193364b4d("sparc: Harden signal return frame checks."). The problem was fixed upstream with commit07b5ab3f71d3("sparc32: Fix invertedinvalid_frame_pointerchecks on sigreturns"), and applying the same commit to v3.18.y (and v3.16.y) fixes the problem.
I'll queue that patch up after this release, thanks.
And thanks for the results of all of the other kernel trees as well.
greg k-h