Rename tls_crypt_v2_read_keyfile into generic pem_read_key_file
PATCH v2 1/6 Rename tls_crypt_v2_read_keyfile into generic pem_read_key_file
From: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
The function is fairly generic and to avoid duplicating the same functionality move the function to crypto.c and change fixed string to be the same as the pem_name parameter.
--- src/openvpn/crypto.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/openvpn/crypto.h | 12 +++++++++++ src/openvpn/ssl.h | 1 - src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c | 47 ++++------------------------------------- 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/crypto.c +39 -0
@@ -1882,3 +1882,42 @@ cleanup:gc_free (&gc);return ; } + +bool +read_pem_key_file (struct buffer *key,const char *pem_name, +const char *key_file,const char *key_inline) +{ +bool ret = false; +struct buffer key_pem = {0 }; +struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); + +if (strcmp (key_file,INLINE_FILE_TAG )) + { + key_pem =buffer_read_from_file (key_file, &gc); +if (!buf_valid (&key_pem)) + { +msg (M_WARN ,"ERROR: failed to read %s file (%s)" , + pem_name, key_file); + goto cleanup; + } + } +else + { +buf_set_read (&key_pem, (const void *)key_inline,strlen (key_inline) +1 ); + } + +if (!crypto_pem_decode (pem_name, key, &key_pem)) + { +msg (M_WARN ,"ERROR: %s pem decode failed" , pem_name); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = true; +cleanup: +if (strcmp (key_file,INLINE_FILE_TAG )) + { +buf_clear (&key_pem); + } +gc_free (&gc); +return ret; +}
src/openvpn/crypto.h +12 -0
@@ -430,6 +430,18 @@ unsigned int crypto_max_overhead(void);void write_pem_key_file (const char *filename,const char *pem_name); +/** +* Read key material from a PEM encoded files into the key structure +* @param key the key structure that will hold the key material +* @param pem_name the name used in the pem encoding start/end lines +* @param key_file name of the file to read +* @param key_inline a string holding the data in case of an inline key +* @return true if reading into key was successful +*/ +bool +read_pem_key_file (struct buffer *key,const char *pem_name, +const char *key_file,const char *key_inline); +/* Minimum length of the nonce used by the PRNG */ #define NONCE_SECRET_LEN_MIN 16
src/openvpn/ssl.h +0 -1
@@ -634,5 +634,4 @@ void show_available_tls_ciphers(const char *cipher_list, const char *cipher_list_tls13, const char *tls_cert_profile); -#endif /* ifndef OPENVPN_SSL_H */
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c +4 -43
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2.20.1
PATCH v2 2/6 Allow pem_read_key_file to generate a random key
From: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
This is useful for features that can use either a persistent or an ephemeral key.
--- src/openvpn/crypto.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++--- src/openvpn/crypto.h | 4 +++- src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c | 5 +++-- 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/crypto.c +20 -3
@@ -1885,13 +1885,30 @@ cleanup:bool read_pem_key_file (struct buffer *key,const char *pem_name, -const char *key_file,const char *key_inline) +const char *key_file,const char *key_inline, +bool allow_random) {bool ret = false;struct buffer key_pem = {0 };struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); -if (strcmp (key_file,INLINE_FILE_TAG )) + +if (allow_random && key_file ==NULL ) + { +msg (M_INFO ,"Using random %s." , pem_name); +uint8_t rand[BCAP (key)]; +if (!rand_bytes (rand,BCAP (key))) + { +msg (M_WARN ,"ERROR: could not generate random key" ); + } +else + { +buf_write (key, rand,BCAP (key)); + ret = true; + } + goto cleanup; + } +else if (strcmp (key_file,INLINE_FILE_TAG )) { key_pem =buffer_read_from_file (key_file, &gc);if (!buf_valid (&key_pem))
@@ -1914,7 +1931,7 @@ read_pem_key_file(struct buffer *key, const char *pem_name, ret = true; cleanup: -if (strcmp (key_file,INLINE_FILE_TAG )) +if (key_file &&strcmp (key_file,INLINE_FILE_TAG )) {buf_clear (&key_pem); }
src/openvpn/crypto.h +3 -1
@@ -436,11 +436,13 @@ write_pem_key_file(const char *filename, const char *pem_name);* @param pem_name the name used in the pem encoding start/end lines * @param key_file name of the file to read * @param key_inline a string holding the data in case of an inline key +* @param allow_random allow generating a random key if no file is provided * @return true if reading into key was successful */ bool read_pem_key_file (struct buffer *key,const char *pem_name, -const char *key_file,const char *key_inline); +const char *key_file,const char *key_inline, +bool allow_random);/* Minimum length of the nonce used by the PRNG */ #define NONCE_SECRET_LEN_MIN 16
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c +3 -2
@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ tls_crypt_v2_init_client_key(struct key_ctx_bi *key, struct buffer *wkc_buf, + TLS_CRYPT_V2_MAX_WKC_LEN);if (!read_pem_key_file (&client_key, tls_crypt_v2_cli_pem_name, - key_file, key_inline)) + key_file, key_inline, false)) {msg (M_FATAL ,"ERROR: invalid tls-crypt-v2 client key format" ); }
@@ -326,8 +326,9 @@ tls_crypt_v2_init_server_key(struct key_ctx *key_ctx, bool encrypt,struct buffer srv_key_buf;buf_set_write (&srv_key_buf, (void *)&srv_key,sizeof (srv_key)); +if (!read_pem_key_file (&srv_key_buf, tls_crypt_v2_srv_pem_name, - key_file, key_inline)) + key_file, key_inline, false)) {msg (M_FATAL ,"ERROR: invalid tls-crypt-v2 server key format" ); }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v2 3/6 Rewrite auth-token-gen to be based on HMAC based tokens
In reply to Arne SchwabeThe previous auth-token implementation had a serious problem, especially when paired with an unpatched OpenVPN client that keeps trying the auth-token (commit e61b401a).
The auth-token-gen implementation forgot the auth-token on reconnect, this lead to reconnect with auth-token never working.
This new implementation implements the auth-token in a stateles variant. By using HMAC to sign the auth-token the server can verify if a token has been authenticated and by checking the embedded timestamp in the token it can also verify that the auth-token is still valid.
Patch V2: cleaned up code, use refactored read_pem_key_file function
--- doc/openvpn.8 | 27 ++++ src/openvpn/Makefile.am | 1 + src/openvpn/auth_token.c | 260 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/openvpn/auth_token.h | 116 +++++++++++++++++ src/openvpn/init.c | 34 ++++- src/openvpn/openvpn.h | 1 + src/openvpn/options.c | 24 +++- src/openvpn/options.h | 4 + src/openvpn/push.c | 70 +++++++++-- src/openvpn/push.h | 8 ++ src/openvpn/ssl.c | 7 +- src/openvpn/ssl_common.h | 36 +++--- src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c | 182 ++++++++++++--------------- 13 files changed, 635 insertions(+), 135 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/openvpn/auth_token.c create mode 100644 src/openvpn/auth_token.h
doc/openvpn.8 +27 -0
@@ -3720,6 +3720,9 @@ the token authentication internally and it will NOT do any additional authentications against configured external user/password authentication mechanisms. +The tokens implemented by this mechanism include a initial timestamp +and a renew timestamp and are secured by HMAC. + The .B lifetime argument defines how long the generated token is valid. The
@@ -3732,6 +3735,29 @@ authentications and that authentication mechanism does not implement any auth\-token support. .\"********************************************************* .TP +.B \-\-auth\-gen\-token\-secret [file] +Specifies a file that hold a secret for the HMAC used in +.B \-\-auth\-gen\-token +If not present OpenVPN will generate a random secret on startup. This file +should be used if auth-token should valid after restarting a server or if +client should be able to roam between multiple OpenVPN server with their +auth\-token. + +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-auth\-gen\-token\-secret\-genkey +When used together with the +.B \-\-auth\-gen\-token\-secret +option, this option will generate a new secret that can be used +with +.B \-\-auth\-gen\-token\-secret + +.B Note: +this file should be kept secret to the server as anyone +that access to this file will be to generate auth tokens +that the OpenVPN server will accept as valid. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP .B \-\-opt\-verify Clients that connect with options that are incompatible with those of the server will be disconnected.
@@ -6973,6 +6999,7 @@ X509_1_C=KG OpenVPN allows including files in the main configuration for the .B \-\-ca, \-\-cert, \-\-dh, \-\-extra\-certs, \-\-key, \-\-pkcs12, \-\-secret, .B \-\-crl\-verify, \-\-http\-proxy\-user\-pass, \-\-tls\-auth, +.B \-\-auth\-gen\-token\-secret .B \-\-tls\-crypt, and .B \-\-tls\-crypt-v2
src/openvpn/Makefile.am +1 -0
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ sbin_PROGRAMS = openvpn openvpn_SOURCES = \ argv.c argv.h \ + auth_token.c auth_token.h \ base64.c base64.h \ basic.h \ buffer.c buffer.h \
src/openvpn/auth_token.c new file +260 -0
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src/openvpn/auth_token.h new file +116 -0
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src/openvpn/init.c +33 -1
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@#include "ssl_verify.h" #include "tls_crypt.h" #include "forward.h" +#include "auth_token.h" #include "memdbg.h"
@@ -1098,6 +1099,17 @@ do_genkey(const struct options *options)msg (M_USAGE ,"--tls-crypt-v2-genkey type should be \"client\" or \"server\"" ); } + +if (options->auth_token_gen_secret_file) + { +if (!options->auth_token_secret_file) + { +msg (M_USAGE ,"--auth-gen-token-secret-genkey requires a server key " +"to be set via --auth-gen-token-secret to create a shared secret" ); + } +auth_token_write_server_key_file (options->auth_token_secret_file); +return true; + }return false; }
@@ -2490,7 +2502,6 @@ init_crypto_pre(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) rand_ctx_enable_prediction_resistance(); }#endif - }/*
@@ -2614,6 +2625,20 @@ do_init_tls_wrap_key(struct context *c) } +/* +* Initialise the auth-token key context +*/ +static void +do_init_auth_token_key (struct context *c) +{ +if (!c->options.auth_token_generate) +return ; + +auth_token_init_secret (&c->c1.ks.auth_token_key, + c->options.auth_token_secret_file, + c->options.auth_token_secret_file_inline); +} +/* * Initialize the persistent component of OpenVPN's TLS mode, * which is preserved across SIGUSR1 resets.
@@ -2666,6 +2691,9 @@ do_init_crypto_tls_c1(struct context *c)/* initialize tls-auth/crypt/crypt-v2 key */ do_init_tls_wrap_key (c); +/* initialise auth-token crypto support */ +do_init_auth_token_key (c); +#if 0 /* was: #if ENABLE_INLINE_FILES -- Note that enabling this code will break restarts */ if (options->priv_key_file_inline) {
@@ -2838,6 +2866,7 @@ do_init_crypto_tls(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) to.auth_user_pass_file = options->auth_user_pass_file; to.auth_token_generate = options->auth_token_generate; to.auth_token_lifetime = options->auth_token_lifetime; + to.auth_token_key = c->c1.ks.auth_token_key;#endif to.x509_track = options->x509_track;
@@ -4451,6 +4480,9 @@ inherit_context_child(struct context *dest, dest->c1.authname = src->c1.authname; dest->c1.keysize = src->c1.keysize; +/* inherit auth-token */ + dest->c1.ks.auth_token_key = src->c1.ks.auth_token_key; +/* options */ dest->options = src->options;options_detach (&dest->options);
src/openvpn/openvpn.h +1 -0
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ struct key_schedulestruct key_ctx_bi tls_wrap_key;struct key_ctx tls_crypt_v2_server_key;struct buffer tls_crypt_v2_wkc;/**< Wrapped client key */ +struct key_ctx auth_token_key; };/*
src/openvpn/options.c +23 -1
@@ -1286,6 +1286,7 @@ show_p2mp_parms(const struct options *o)SHOW_BOOL (auth_user_pass_verify_script_via_file);SHOW_BOOL (auth_token_generate);SHOW_INT (auth_token_lifetime); +SHOW_STR (auth_token_secret_file);#if PORT_SHARE SHOW_STR (port_share_host);SHOW_STR (port_share_port);
@@ -2334,7 +2335,11 @@ options_postprocess_verify_ce(const struct options *options, const struct connec {msg (M_USAGE ,"--mode server requires --key-method 2" ); } - +if (options->auth_token_generate && !options->renegotiate_seconds) + { +msg (M_USAGE ,"--auth-gen-token needs a non-infinite " +"--renegotiate_seconds setting" ); + } {const bool ccnr = (options->auth_user_pass_verify_script || PLUGIN_OPTION_LIST(options)
@@ -6769,6 +6774,23 @@ add_option(struct options *options, options->auth_token_generate = true; options->auth_token_lifetime = p[1 ] ?positive_atoi (p[1 ]) :0 ; } +else if (streq (p[0 ],"auth-gen-token-secret" ) && p[1 ] && (!p[2 ] + || (p[2 ] &&streq (p[1 ],INLINE_FILE_TAG )))) + { +VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); + options->auth_token_secret_file = p[1 ]; + +if (streq (p[1 ],INLINE_FILE_TAG ) && p[2 ]) + { + options->auth_token_secret_file_inline = p[2 ]; + } + } +else if (streq (p[0 ],"auth-gen-token-secret-genkey" ) && !p[1 ]) + { +VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); + options->auth_token_gen_secret_file = true; + } +else if (streq (p[0 ],"client-connect" ) && p[1 ]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_SCRIPT );
src/openvpn/options.h +4 -0
@@ -459,7 +459,11 @@ struct optionsconst char *auth_user_pass_verify_script;bool auth_user_pass_verify_script_via_file;bool auth_token_generate; +bool auth_token_gen_secret_file;unsigned int auth_token_lifetime; +const char *auth_token_secret_file; +const char *auth_token_secret_file_inline; +#if PORT_SHARE char *port_share_host;char *port_share_port;
src/openvpn/push.c +59 -11
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src/openvpn/push.h +8 -0
@@ -69,6 +69,14 @@ void send_auth_failed(struct context *c, const char *client_reason);void send_restart (struct context *c,const char *kill_msg); +/** +* Sends a push reply message only containin the auth-token to update +* the auth-token on the client +* +* @param multi - The tls_multi structure belonging to the instance to push to +*/ +void send_push_reply_auth_token (struct tls_multi *multi); +#endif #endif /* if P2MP */ #endif /* ifndef PUSH_H */
src/openvpn/ssl.c +2 -5
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@#include "ssl.h" #include "ssl_verify.h" #include "ssl_backend.h" +#include "auth_token.h" #include "memdbg.h"
@@ -1368,11 +1369,7 @@ tls_multi_free(struct tls_multi *multi, bool clear)cert_hash_free (multi->locked_cert_hash_set); -if (multi->auth_token) - { -secure_memzero (multi->auth_token,AUTH_TOKEN_SIZE ); -free (multi->auth_token); - } +wipe_auth_token (multi);free (multi->remote_ciphername);
src/openvpn/ssl_common.h +22 -14
@@ -298,7 +298,6 @@ struct tls_options/** TLS handshake wrapping state */ struct tls_wrap_ctx tls_wrap; -/* frame parameters for TLS control channel */ struct frame frame;/* used for username/password authentication */
@@ -306,10 +305,16 @@ struct tls_optionsbool auth_user_pass_verify_script_via_file;const char *tmp_dir;const char *auth_user_pass_file; -bool auth_token_generate;/**< Generate auth-tokens on successful user/pass auth, -* set via options->auth_token_generate. */ + +#ifdef P2MP_SERVER +bool auth_token_generate;/**< Generate auth-tokens on successful +* user/pass auth,seet via +* options->auth_token_generate. */ unsigned int auth_token_lifetime; +struct key_ctx auth_token_key; +#endif +/* use the client-config-dir as a positive authenticator */ const char *client_config_dir_exclusive;
@@ -368,10 +373,6 @@ struct tls_options/** @} name Index of key_state objects within a tls_session structure */ /** @} addtogroup control_processor */ -#define AUTH_TOKEN_SIZE 32/**< Size of server side generated auth tokens. -* 32 bytes == 256 bits -*/ -/** * Security parameter state of a single session within a VPN tunnel. * @ingroup control_processor
@@ -539,7 +540,21 @@ struct tls_multi* over control channel. */ char *peer_info; +char *auth_token;/**< If server sends a generated auth-token, +* this is the token to use for future +* user/pass authentications in this session. +*/ +char *auth_token_initial; +/**< The first auth-token we sent to a client, for clients that do +* not update their auth-token (older OpenVPN3 core versions) +*/ +#define AUTH_TOKEN_HMAC_OK (1<<0) +/**< Auth-token sent from client has valid hmac */ +#define AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRED (1<<1) +/**< Auth-token sent from client has expired */ #endif +int auth_token_state_flags; +/**< The state of the auth-token sent from the client last time */ /* For P_DATA_V2 */ uint32_t peer_id;
@@ -547,13 +562,6 @@ struct tls_multichar *remote_ciphername;/**< cipher specified in peer's config file */ -char *auth_token;/**< If server sends a generated auth-token, -* this is the token to use for future -* user/pass authentications in this session. -*/ -time_t auth_token_tstamp;/**< timestamp of the generated token */ -bool auth_token_sent;/**< If server uses --auth-gen-token and -* token has been sent to client */ /* * Our session objects. */
src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c +79 -103
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2.20.1
PATCH v2 4/6 Implement a permanent session id in auth-token
In reply to Arne SchwabeFrom: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
This allows an external authentication method
(e.g. management interface) to track the connection and distinguish a reconnection from multiple connections.
Addtionally this now also checks to workaround a problem with OpenVPN 3 core that sometimes uses a username hint from the config instead of using an empty username if the token would be valid with an empty username. Accepting such token can only be explicitly done if the auth keyword to auth-gen-token is present.
Patch V2: Add Empty variants to work around behaviour in openvpn 3
--- doc/openvpn.8 | 26 ++++++- src/openvpn/auth_token.c | 145 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- src/openvpn/auth_token.h | 15 +++- src/openvpn/init.c | 1 + src/openvpn/manage.c | 4 +- src/openvpn/options.c | 14 +++- src/openvpn/options.h | 3 +- src/openvpn/ssl_common.h | 14 +++- src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c | 71 ++++++++++++------- 9 files changed, 251 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
doc/openvpn.8 +25 -1
@@ -3710,7 +3710,7 @@ For a sample script that performs PAM authentication, see in the OpenVPN source distribution. .\"********************************************************* .TP -.B \-\-auth\-gen\-token [lifetime] +.B \-\-auth\-gen\-token [lifetime] [auth] After successful user/password authentication, the OpenVPN server will with this option generate a temporary authentication token and push that to client. On the following
@@ -3733,6 +3733,30 @@ This feature is useful for environments which is configured to use One Time Passwords (OTP) as part of the user/password authentications and that authentication mechanism does not implement any auth\-token support. + +When the auth keyword is present the normal authentication +method will be called even if auth-token succeeds. This allows +the normal to still check the validity of the account and do other +checks. In this mode the environment will have a session_id variable +that hold the session id from auth-gen-token. Also a environment +variable session_state is present. This variable tells whether the +auth-token has succeeded or not. It can have the following values: + + - Initial: No token from client. + - Authenticated: Token is valid and not expired + - Expired: Token is valid but has expired + - Invalid Token is invalid (failed HMAC or wrong length) + - AuthenticatedEmptyUser/ExpiredEmptyUser + The token is not valid with the username send from the client + but would be valid (or expired) if we assume an empty username was used + instead. These two cases are a workaround for behaviour in OpenVPN3. If + this workaround is not needed these two cases should be handled in the + same way as Invalid. + +.B Warning: +Failure to properly handle Invalid/Expired auth-token with the auth +option in use will lead to authentication bypass. + .\"********************************************************* .TP .B \-\-auth\-gen\-token\-secret [file]
src/openvpn/auth_token.c +134 -11
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src/openvpn/auth_token.h +14 -1
@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@* * Format of the auth-token (before base64 encode) * -* uint64 timestamp (4 bytes)|uint64 timestamp (4 bytes)|sha256-hmac(32 bytes) +* session id(12 bytes)|uint64 timestamp (4 bytes)| +* uint64 timestamp (4 bytes)|sha256-hmac(32 bytes) * * The first timestamp is the time the token was initially created and is used to * determine the maximum renewable time of the token. We always include this even
@@ -44,6 +45,10 @@* to determine if this token has been renewed in the acceptable time range * (2 * renogiation timeout) * +* The session is a random string of 12 byte (or 16 in base64) that is not used by +* OpenVPN itself but kept intact so that external logging/managment can track the +* session multiple reconnects/servers +* * The hmac is calculated over the username contactinated with the * raw auth-token bytes to include authentication of the username in the token *
@@ -82,6 +87,14 @@ auth_token_init_secret(struct key_ctx *key_ctx, const char *key_file,void auth_token_write_server_key_file (const char *filename); +/** +* Put the session id, and auth token status into the environment +* if auth-token is enabled +* +*/ +void add_session_token_env (struct tls_session *session,struct tls_multi *multi, +const struct user_pass *up); +/** * Wipes the authentication token out of the memory, frees and cleans up * related buffers and flags
src/openvpn/init.c +1 -0
@@ -2866,6 +2866,7 @@ do_init_crypto_tls(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) to.auth_user_pass_file = options->auth_user_pass_file; to.auth_token_generate = options->auth_token_generate; to.auth_token_lifetime = options->auth_token_lifetime; + to.auth_token_call_auth = options->auth_token_call_auth; to.auth_token_key = c->c1.ks.auth_token_key;#endif
src/openvpn/manage.c +3 -1
@@ -2736,7 +2736,9 @@ env_filter_match(const char *env_str, const int env_filter_level)"ifconfig_pool_netmask=" ,"time_duration=" ,"bytes_sent=" , - "bytes_received=" +"bytes_received=" , +"session_id=" , + "session_state=" };if (env_filter_level ==0 )
src/openvpn/options.c +13 -1
@@ -6768,11 +6768,23 @@ add_option(struct options *options, &options->auth_user_pass_verify_script, p[1], "auth-user-pass-verify", true); } -else if (streq (p[0 ],"auth-gen-token" )) +else if (streq (p[0 ],"auth-gen-token" ) && !p[3 ]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); options->auth_token_generate = true; options->auth_token_lifetime = p[1 ] ?positive_atoi (p[1 ]) :0 ; +if (p[2 ]) + { +if (streq (p[2 ],"auth" )) + { + options->auth_token_call_auth = true; + } +else + { +msg (msglevel,"Invalid argument to auth-gen_token: %s" , p[2 ]); + } + } + }else if (streq (p[0 ],"auth-gen-token-secret" ) && p[1 ] && (!p[2 ] || (p[2 ] &&streq (p[1 ],INLINE_FILE_TAG ))))
src/openvpn/options.h +2 -1
@@ -460,7 +460,8 @@ struct optionsbool auth_user_pass_verify_script_via_file;bool auth_token_generate;bool auth_token_gen_secret_file; -unsigned int auth_token_lifetime; +bool auth_token_call_auth; +int auth_token_lifetime;const char *auth_token_secret_file;const char *auth_token_secret_file_inline;
src/openvpn/ssl_common.h +11 -3
@@ -310,6 +310,7 @@ struct tls_optionsbool auth_token_generate;/**< Generate auth-tokens on successful * user/pass auth,seet via * options->auth_token_generate. */ +bool auth_token_call_auth;/**< always call normal authentication */ unsigned int auth_token_lifetime;struct key_ctx auth_token_key;
@@ -469,7 +470,6 @@ struct tls_session*/ #define KEY_SCAN_SIZE 3 -/** * Security parameter state for a single VPN tunnel. * @ingroup control_processor
@@ -552,10 +552,18 @@ struct tls_multi/**< Auth-token sent from client has valid hmac */ #define AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRED (1<<1)/**< Auth-token sent from client has expired */ -#endif +#define AUTH_TOKEN_VALID_EMPTYUSER (1<<2) +/**< +* Auth-token is only valid for an empty username +* and not the username actually supplied from the client +* +* OpenVPN 3 clients sometimes the empty username with a +* username hint from their config. +*/ int auth_token_state_flags;/**< The state of the auth-token sent from the client last time */ - +#endif +/* For P_DATA_V2 */ uint32_t peer_id;bool use_peer_id;
src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c +48 -23
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2.20.1
PATCH v2 5/6 Sent indication that a session is expired to clients
In reply to Arne SchwabeFrom: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
This allows OpenVPN 3 core to fall back to the original authentication method.
This commit changes man_def_auth_set_client_reason to auth_set_client_reason since it now used in more contexts.
Also remove a FIXME about client_reason not being freed, as it is freed in tls_multi_free with auth_set_client_reason(multi, NULL);
--- src/openvpn/auth_token.c | 3 +++ src/openvpn/ssl.c | 6 ++---- src/openvpn/ssl_common.h | 10 +++++----- src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c | 8 ++++---- src/openvpn/ssl_verify.h | 15 ++++++++++----- 5 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/auth_token.c +3 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@#include "push.h" #include "integer.h" #include "ssl.h" +#include "ssl_verify.h" const char *auth_token_pem_name ="OpenVPN auth-token server key" ;
@@ -356,6 +357,8 @@ verify_auth_token(struct user_pass *up, struct tls_multi *multi,if (ret &AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRED ) { +/* Tell client that the session token is expired */ +auth_set_client_reason (multi,"SESSION: token expired" );msg (M_INFO ,"--auth-token-gen: auth-token from client expired" ); }return ret;
src/openvpn/ssl.c +2 -4
@@ -1349,11 +1349,9 @@ tls_multi_free(struct tls_multi *multi, bool clear)ASSERT (multi); -#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH -man_def_auth_set_client_reason (multi,NULL ); - -#endif #if P2MP_SERVER +auth_set_client_reason (multi,NULL ); +free (multi->peer_info);#endif
src/openvpn/ssl_common.h +5 -5
@@ -525,16 +525,16 @@ struct tls_multistruct cert_hash_set *locked_cert_hash_set;#ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH -/* -* An error message to send to client on AUTH_FAILED -*/ -char *client_reason; -/* Time of last call to tls_authentication_status */ time_t tas_last;#endif #if P2MP_SERVER +/* +* An error message to send to client on AUTH_FAILED +*/ +char *client_reason; +/* * A multi-line string of general-purpose info received from peer * over control channel.
src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c +4 -4
@@ -803,9 +803,8 @@ cleanup:#define ACF_FAILED 3#endif -#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH void -man_def_auth_set_client_reason (struct tls_multi *multi,const char *client_reason) +auth_set_client_reason (struct tls_multi * multi,const char * client_reason) {if (multi->client_reason) {
@@ -814,11 +813,12 @@ man_def_auth_set_client_reason(struct tls_multi *multi, const char *client_reaso }if (client_reason &&strlen (client_reason)) { -/* FIXME: Last alloc will never be freed */ multi->client_reason =string_alloc (client_reason,NULL ); } } +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH +static inline unsigned int man_def_auth_test (const struct key_state *ks) {
@@ -1022,7 +1022,7 @@ tls_authenticate_key(struct tls_multi *multi, const unsigned int mda_key_id, conif (multi) {int i; -man_def_auth_set_client_reason (multi, client_reason); +auth_set_client_reason (multi, client_reason);for (i =0 ; i <KEY_SCAN_SIZE ; ++i) {struct key_state *ks = multi->key_scan[i];
src/openvpn/ssl_verify.h +10 -5
@@ -224,18 +224,23 @@ struct x509_track#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH bool tls_authenticate_key (struct tls_multi *multi,const unsigned int mda_key_id,const bool auth,const char *client_reason); -void man_def_auth_set_client_reason (struct tls_multi *multi,const char *client_reason); +#endif +#ifdef P2MP_SERVER +/** +* Sets the reason why authentication of a client failed. This be will send to the client +* when the AUTH_FAILED message is sent +* An example would be "SESSION: Token expired" +* @param multi The multi tls struct +* @param client_reason The string to send to the client as part of AUTH_FAILED +*/ +void auth_set_client_reason (struct tls_multi * multi,const char * client_reason);#endif static inline const char *tls_client_reason (struct tls_multi *multi) { -#ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH return multi->client_reason; -#else -return NULL ; -#endif }/** Remove any X509_ env variables from env_set es */
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v2 6/6 Implement unit tests for auth-gen-token
In reply to Arne SchwabeFrom: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
Patch V2: adapt unit tests to other V2 patches
--- tests/unit_tests/openvpn/Makefile.am | 18 +- tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_auth_token.c | 375 +++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 392 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_auth_token.c
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/Makefile.am +17 -1
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ if HAVE_LD_WRAP_SUPPORT check_PROGRAMS += argv_testdriver buffer_testdriver endif -check_PROGRAMS += crypto_testdriver packet_id_testdriver +check_PROGRAMS += crypto_testdriver packet_id_testdriver auth_token_testdriver if HAVE_LD_WRAP_SUPPORT check_PROGRAMS += tls_crypt_testdriver endif
@@ -72,3 +72,19 @@ tls_crypt_testdriver_SOURCES = test_tls_crypt.c mock_msg.c \ $(openvpn_srcdir)/packet_id.c \ $(openvpn_srcdir)/platform.c \ $(openvpn_srcdir)/run_command.c + +auth_token_testdriver_CFLAGS = @TEST_CFLAGS@ \ + -I$(openvpn_includedir) -I$(compat_srcdir) -I$(openvpn_srcdir) \ + $(OPTIONAL_CRYPTO_CFLAGS) +auth_token_testdriver_LDFLAGS = @TEST_LDFLAGS@ \ + $(OPTIONAL_CRYPTO_LIBS) + +auth_token_testdriver_SOURCES = test_auth_token.c mock_msg.c \ + $(openvpn_srcdir)/buffer.c \ + $(openvpn_srcdir)/crypto.c \ + $(openvpn_srcdir)/crypto_mbedtls.c \ + $(openvpn_srcdir)/crypto_openssl.c \ + $(openvpn_srcdir)/otime.c \ + $(openvpn_srcdir)/packet_id.c \ + $(openvpn_srcdir)/platform.c \ + $(openvpn_srcdir)/base64.c
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_auth_token.c new file +375 -0
375 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Explanation makes sense, code looks good (just moving, except for the error messages which change to print "*pem_name" instead of static "tls-crypt-v2" always).
Your patch has been applied to the master branch.
commit 784ad902438a6c70f1b9e4f545ac2bbb4230a048
Author: Arne Schwabe Date: Tue Jan 22 16:03:28 2019 +0100
Rename tls_crypt_v2_read_keyfile into generic pem_read_key_file
Acked-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>
Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/search?l=mid&[email protected]...
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>--
kind regards,
Gert Doering
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v2 2/6] Allow pem_read_key_file to generate a random key
In reply to Arne SchwabeQuoted 4 lines · Arne Schwabe
From: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
This is useful for features that can use either a persistent or an ephemeral key.
Agreed, this is valuable. But I generally don't like "hiding" this feature behind an argument to {read,write}_pem_key_file(). I prefer having functions doing explicit things, not "I can do this, or this, or this" depending on the arguments given.
Rather add a generate_random_pem_key() which does just that.
Quoted 27 lines
--- src/openvpn/crypto.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++--- src/openvpn/crypto.h | 4 +++- src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c | 5 +++-- 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)src/openvpn/crypto.c +6
-2@@ -1885,13 +1885,30 @@ cleanup:bool read_pem_key_file (struct buffer *key,const char *pem_name, -const char *key_file,const char *key_inline) +const char *key_file,const char *key_inline, +bool allow_random) {bool ret = false;struct buffer key_pem = {0 };struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); -if (strcmp (key_file,INLINE_FILE_TAG )) + +if (allow_random && key_file ==NULL ) + { +msg (M_INFO ,"Using random %s." , pem_name);
src/openvpn/crypto.c cleanup: · line 1908
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/crypto.c +10
-0+uint8_t rand[BCAP (key)]; +if (!rand_bytes (rand,BCAP (key))) + { +msg (M_WARN ,"ERROR: could not generate random key" ); + } +else + { +buf_write (key, rand,BCAP (key)); + ret = true; + }
The if (rand_bytes(rand, BCAP(key))) logic could be improved when splitting it into a separate function.
if (!rand_bytes(rand, BCAP(key)))
{
msg(...);
return false;
}
buf_write(...);
return true;[...]
src/openvpn/crypto.c read_pem_key_file(struct buffer *key, const char *pem_name, · line 1934
Quoted 2 lines
src/openvpn/crypto.c +1
-1-if (strcmp (key_file,INLINE_FILE_TAG )) +if (key_file &&strcmp (key_file,INLINE_FILE_TAG ))
Is this fixing a bug? I'd recommend putting such fixes in a separate commit.
Signature · 4 lines
kind regards, David Sommerseth OpenVPN Inc
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v2 2/6] Allow pem_read_key_file to generate a random key
In reply to a message not in the archiveQuoted 13 lines · Arne Schwabe
Am 08.02.19 um 13:30 schrieb David Sommerseth:
Quoted 12 lines · Arne Schwabe
Quoted 4 lines
From: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
This is useful for features that can use either a persistent or an ephemeral key.
Agreed, this is valuable. But I generally don't like "hiding" this feature behind an argument to {read,write}_pem_key_file(). I prefer having functions doing explicit things, not "I can do this, or this, or this" depending on the arguments given.
Rather add a
generate_random_pem_key()which does just that.
Quoted 7 lines
That name would completely confusing that is not what it does. It is more really load a key from a file or generate one on the fly.
Should add a small wrapper function that is something
load_key_or_random? I also don't really want to rename the functionread_pem_key_fileas that is the main function of it. Return the ephermal key is just for function that can work with that.
What I find confusing is:
if (!read_pem_key_file(&client_key, tls_crypt_v2_cli_pem_name,
key_file, key_inline, false))
Flip that 'false' to 'true' and you get a different behaviour if key_file == NULL.
In this case I would prefer to have the "which key will I use" logic in auth_token_init_secret(). In the following patch 3/6, you have this:
if (!read_pem_key_file(&server_secret_key, auth_token_pem_name,
key_file, key_inline, true))
I would prefer:
if (NULL == key_file)
{
generate_key_file(...);
....
}
else if (!read_pem_key_file(&server_secret_key, auth_token_pem_name,
key_file, key_inline))
{
....
}This is much more explicit in the behaviour when reading the code, you don't need to parse through the arguments of read_pem_key_file() to understand how it behaves.
This will also not requiring touching tls_crypt_v2_init_client_key() or read_pem_key_file() at all. So this change would even be less intrusive.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
src/openvpn/crypto.c read_pem_key_file(struct buffer *key, const char *pem_name, · line 1934
Quoted 2 lines
src/openvpn/crypto.c +1
-1-if (strcmp (key_file,INLINE_FILE_TAG )) +if (key_file &&strcmp (key_file,INLINE_FILE_TAG ))Is this fixing a bug? I'd recommend putting such fixes in a separate commit.
No,
key_filecan now be null since in this case we generate the random key material.
Fine, then it makes sense where it is :)
Signature · 4 lines
kind regards, David Sommerseth OpenVPN Inc
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v2 3/6] Rewrite auth-token-gen to be based on HMAC based tokens
In reply to Arne SchwabeQuoted 22 lines · Arne Schwabe
The previous auth-token implementation had a serious problem, especially when paired with an unpatched OpenVPN client that keeps trying the auth-token (commit
e61b401a).The auth-token-gen implementation forgot the auth-token on reconnect, this lead to reconnect with auth-token never working.
This new implementation implements the auth-token in a stateles variant. By using HMAC to sign the auth-token the server can verify if a token has been authenticated and by checking the embedded timestamp in the token it can also verify that the auth-token is still valid.
Patch V2: cleaned up code, use refactored
read_pem_key_filefunction--- doc/openvpn.8 | 27 ++++ src/openvpn/Makefile.am | 1 + src/openvpn/auth_token.c | 260 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/openvpn/auth_token.h | 116 +++++++++++++++++ src/openvpn/init.c | 34 ++++- src/openvpn/openvpn.h | 1 + src/openvpn/options.c | 24 +++- src/openvpn/options.h | 4 +
Quoted 9 lines
src/openvpn/push.c | 70 +++++++++-- src/openvpn/push.h | 8 ++ src/openvpn/ssl.c | 7 +- src/openvpn/ssl_common.h | 36 +++--- src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c | 182 ++++++++++++--------------- 13 files changed, 635 insertions(+), 135 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/openvpn/auth_token.c create mode 100644 src/openvpn/auth_token.h
[...snip...]
This review cannot be complete, due to my remarks to the previous commit suggesting not touching read_pem_key_file() at all.
Quoted 15 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +7
-0@@ -6769,6 +6774,23 @@ add_option(struct options *options, options->auth_token_generate = true; options->auth_token_lifetime = p[1 ] ?positive_atoi (p[1 ]) :0 ; } +else if (streq (p[0 ],"auth-gen-token-secret" ) && p[1 ] && (!p[2 ] + || (p[2 ] &&streq (p[1 ],INLINE_FILE_TAG )))) + { +VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); + options->auth_token_secret_file = p[1 ]; + +if (streq (p[1 ],INLINE_FILE_TAG ) && p[2 ])
src/openvpn/options.c add_option(struct options *options, · line 6793
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +10
-0+ { + options->auth_token_secret_file_inline = p[2 ]; + } + } +else if (streq (p[0 ],"auth-gen-token-secret-genkey" ) && !p[1 ]) + { +VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); + options->auth_token_gen_secret_file = true; + } +
I see you add --auth-gen-token-secret and --auth-gen-token-secret-genkey ... I find this a bit confusing ... gen-token-secret-genkey ...
Why not extend --auth-gen-token to take an additional file argument. Today it is defined as:
--auth-gen-token [lifetime]
I suggest:
--auth-gen-token [lifetime] [secret-key]
If you want non-expiring tokens using a secret key, you can set the lifetime value to 0.
Then instead of the --auth-gen-token-secret-genkey .... I suggest renaming that to: --genkey-auth-token-secret
I see that your initial suggetion maps nicely to the same structure we have in --tls-crypt-v2-genkey. But I find auth-gen-token-secret-genkey too long and repetetive without being that explicit on what it does. I think --genkey-auth-token-secret is a bit clearer in what that option does.
Another segment (I'm shuffling things around a bit, sorry about that)
Quoted 7 lines
src/openvpn/init.c +0
-0@@ -1098,6 +1099,17 @@ do_genkey(const struct options *options)msg (M_USAGE ,"--tls-crypt-v2-genkey type should be \"client\" or \"server\"" );
src/openvpn/init.c do_genkey(const struct options *options) · line 1110
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/init.c +9
-0} + +if (options->auth_token_gen_secret_file) + { +if (!options->auth_token_secret_file) + { +msg (M_USAGE ,"--auth-gen-token-secret-genkey requires a server key " +"to be set via --auth-gen-token-secret to create a shared secret" ); + } +auth_token_write_server_key_file (options->auth_token_secret_file);
Any reason we can't just skip this wrapper function and call the line below directly?
write_pem_key_file(filename, auth_token_pem_name);
Otherwise, the rest looks reasonable. But I've only glared at the code for now. I will dig deeper when starting to test the code.
Signature · 4 lines
kind regards, David Sommerseth OpenVPN Inc
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v2 4/6] Implement a permanent session id in auth-token
In reply to Arne SchwabeQuoted 11 lines · Arne Schwabe
From: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
This allows an external authentication method
(e.g. management interface) to track the connection and distinguish a reconnection from multiple connections.Addtionally this now also checks to workaround a problem with OpenVPN 3 core that sometimes uses a username hint from the config instead of using an empty username if the token would be valid with an empty username. Accepting such token can only be explicitly done if the auth keyword to auth-gen-token is present.
Meh .... I'm not sure about this feature at all. I understand the use case for it, but I don't see the full benefit of it. Why? Because if you still want to do partially authentication based on and existing auth-token, why can't you implement the full auth-token pushing in the auth-backend?
And with the trap that incorrectly implementing the "auth" mode, where it would actually by default accept invalid tokens is a no-go from a security perspective.
The background for --auth-gen-token was primarily to make life easier for users using auth-backends NOT supporting auth-tokens and who had issues with tunnel renegotiations.
Extending --auth-gen-token with a secret so it can handle server-side restarts without breaking already authenticated clients is a nice feature. Even the possibility to share this secret among multiple servers providing connection migrations without authentication breakage are all good features.
But pushing this towards a new level where token expiry/validity checks is still pushed towards an external authentication module I find stretching this feature a bit too much. And in particular if the auth backend is not tackling invalidated tokens correctly results in authentication success.
In this case, why can't the auth backend do everything?
Signature · 4 lines
kind regards, David Sommerseth OpenVPN Inc
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v2 5/6] Sent indication that a session is expired to clients
In reply to Arne SchwabeQuoted 31 lines · Arne Schwabe
From: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
This allows OpenVPN 3 core to fall back to the original authentication method.
This commit changes
man_def_auth_set_client_reasontoauth_set_client_reasonsince it now used in more contexts.Also remove a FIXME about
client_reasonnot being freed, as it is freed intls_multi_freewithauth_set_client_reason(multi, NULL);--- src/openvpn/auth_token.c | 3 +++ src/openvpn/ssl.c | 6 ++---- src/openvpn/ssl_common.h | 10 +++++----- src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c | 8 ++++---- src/openvpn/ssl_verify.h | 15 ++++++++++----- 5 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)src/openvpn/auth_token.c +1
-0@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@#include "push.h" #include "integer.h" #include "ssl.h" +#include "ssl_verify.h" const char *auth_token_pem_name ="OpenVPN auth-token server key" ;
src/openvpn/auth_token.c verify_auth_token(struct user_pass *up, struct tls_multi *multi, · line 362
Quoted 6 lines
src/openvpn/auth_token.c +2
-0@@ -356,6 +357,8 @@ verify_auth_token(struct user_pass *up, struct tls_multi *multi,if (ret &AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRED ) { +/* Tell client that the session token is expired */ +auth_set_client_reason (multi,"SESSION: token expired" );msg (M_INFO ,"--auth-token-gen: auth-token from client expired" );
Feature-ACK! Code change looks sane, but need to test this more carefully - where it would be good to have the changes from previous comments implemented.
But, we should fix the incorrect msg() above. It should say --auth-gen-token.
Signature · 4 lines
kind regards, David Sommerseth OpenVPN Inc
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v2 3/6] Rewrite auth-token-gen to be based on HMAC based tokens
In reply to Arne SchwabeThanks for doing this one Arne, this has been on my bucket list for a while. I've given this a reasonable test now and it's working as I'd expect. A few comments from my testing:
src/openvpn/auth_token.c line 205
Quoted 4 lines · Arne Schwabe
src/openvpn/auth_token.c new file +4
-0+/* Accept session tokens that not expired are in the acceptable range +* for renogiations */ +bool in_renog_time = now >= timestamp + && now < timestamp +2 * session->opt->renegotiate_seconds;
I'd like to see the valid time of an auth-token have it's own value, however I understand why you've done this. I can't find a nice way to get through the last active time of a session through to auth without a reasonable refactor. I'd like to see the auth token have the option "--auth-gen-token [inactive timeout] [total timeout]" or something along those lines. So while this isn't an ideal solution, it's good enough.
src/openvpn/auth_token.c line 211
Quoted 5 lines
src/openvpn/auth_token.c new file +5
-0+/* We could still have a client that does not update +* its auth-token, so also allow the initial auth-token */ +bool initialtoken = multi->auth_token_initial + &&memcmp_constant_time (up->password, multi->auth_token_initial, +strlen (multi->auth_token_initial)) ==0 ;
I don't agree with this being in place, only the most recently generated token should be valid imo.
When an auth-token is authenticated, the server log will print out:
Quoted 2 lines
TLS: Username/auth-token authentication succeededfor username is still displayed.
TLS: Username/Password authentication succeededfor username is still displayed.
The second line seems redundant and might cause some confusion. "if (skip_auth)" above this log line is probably enough I think?
Finally, the patch won't build under MSVC without the following change:
Quoted 1 line
+ struct
push_listpush_list= {};
to
Quoted 1 line
+ struct
push_listpush_list= {0};
auth_token.c and auth_token.h will need to be added to the VS solution as well however I'm happy to submit that one myself once this gets acked to save you the trouble.
Cheers,
Eric
--
Eric Thorpe
SparkLabs Developer
https://www.sparklabs.com
https://twitter.com/sparklabs
[email protected]...
Quoted 1,134 lines · Arne Schwabe
The previous auth-token implementation had a serious problem, especially when paired with an unpatched OpenVPN client that keeps trying the auth-token (commit
e61b401a).The auth-token-gen implementation forgot the auth-token on reconnect, this lead to reconnect with auth-token never working.
This new implementation implements the auth-token in a stateles variant. By using HMAC to sign the auth-token the server can verify if a token has been authenticated and by checking the embedded timestamp in the token it can also verify that the auth-token is still valid.
Patch V2: cleaned up code, use refactored
read_pem_key_filefunction--- doc/openvpn.8 | 27 ++++ src/openvpn/Makefile.am | 1 + src/openvpn/auth_token.c | 260 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/openvpn/auth_token.h | 116 +++++++++++++++++ src/openvpn/init.c | 34 ++++- src/openvpn/openvpn.h | 1 + src/openvpn/options.c | 24 +++- src/openvpn/options.h | 4 + src/openvpn/push.c | 70 +++++++++-- src/openvpn/push.h | 8 ++ src/openvpn/ssl.c | 7 +- src/openvpn/ssl_common.h | 36 +++--- src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c | 182 ++++++++++++--------------- 13 files changed, 635 insertions(+), 135 deletions(-)create mode 100644
src/openvpn/auth_token.c
create mode 100644src/openvpn/auth_token.hdoc/openvpn.8 +27
-0@@ -3720,6 +3720,9 @@ the token authentication internally and it will NOT do any additional authentications against configured external user/password authentication mechanisms. +The tokens implemented by this mechanism include a initial timestamp +and a renew timestamp and are secured by HMAC. + The .B lifetime argument defines how long the generated token is valid. The@@ -3732,6 +3735,29 @@ authentications and that authentication mechanism does not implement any auth\-token support. .\"********************************************************* .TP +.B \-\-auth\-gen\-token\-secret [file] +Specifies a file that hold a secret for the HMAC used in +.B \-\-auth\-gen\-token +If not present OpenVPN will generate a random secret on startup. This file +should be used if auth-token should valid after restarting a server or if +client should be able to roam between multiple OpenVPN server with their +auth\-token. + +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-auth\-gen\-token\-secret\-genkey +When used together with the +.B \-\-auth\-gen\-token\-secret +option, this option will generate a new secret that can be used +with +.B \-\-auth\-gen\-token\-secret + +.B Note: +this file should be kept secret to the server as anyone +that access to this file will be to generate auth tokens +that the OpenVPN server will accept as valid. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP .B \-\-opt\-verify Clients that connect with options that are incompatible with those of the server will be disconnected.@@ -6973,6 +6999,7 @@ X509_1_C=KG OpenVPN allows including files in the main configuration for the .B \-\-ca, \-\-cert, \-\-dh, \-\-extra\-certs, \-\-key, \-\-pkcs12, \-\-secret, .B \-\-crl\-verify, \-\-http\-proxy\-user\-pass, \-\-tls\-auth, +.B \-\-auth\-gen\-token\-secret .B \-\-tls\-crypt, and .B \-\-tls\-crypt-v2src/openvpn/Makefile.am +1
-0@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ sbin_PROGRAMS = openvpn openvpn_SOURCES = \ argv.c argv.h \ + auth_token.c auth_token.h \ base64.c base64.h \ basic.h \ buffer.c buffer.h \src/openvpn/auth_token.c new file +260
-0@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@ +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "base64.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "crypto.h" +#include "openvpn.h" +#include "ssl_common.h" +#include "auth_token.h" +#include "push.h" +#include "integer.h" +#include "ssl.h" + +const char *auth_token_pem_name ="OpenVPN auth-token server key" ; + + +/* Size of the data of the token (not b64 encoded and without prefix) */ +#define TOKEN_DATA_LEN (2 * sizeof(int64_t) + 32) + +static struct key_type +auth_token_kt (void ) +{ +struct key_type kt; +/* We do not encrypt our session tokens */ + kt.cipher =NULL ; + kt.digest =md_kt_get ("SHA256" ); + +if (!kt.digest) + { +msg (M_WARN ,"ERROR: --tls-crypt requires HMAC-SHA-256 support." ); +return (struct key_type ) {0 }; + } + + kt.hmac_length =md_kt_size (kt.digest); + +return kt; +} + + +void +auth_token_write_server_key_file (const char *filename) +{ +write_pem_key_file (filename, auth_token_pem_name); +} + +void +auth_token_init_secret (struct key_ctx *key_ctx,const char *key_file, +const char *key_inline) +{ +struct key_type kt =auth_token_kt (); + +struct buffer server_secret_key =alloc_buf (2048 ); + +if (!read_pem_key_file (&server_secret_key, auth_token_pem_name, + key_file, key_inline, true)) + { +msg (M_FATAL ,"ERROR: Cannot load auth-token secret" ); + } + +struct key key; + +if (!buf_read (&server_secret_key, &key,sizeof (key))) + { +msg (M_FATAL ,"ERROR: not enough data in auth-token secret" ); + } +init_key_ctx (key_ctx, &key, &kt, false,"auth-token secret" ); + +free_buf (&server_secret_key); +} + +void +generate_auth_token (const struct user_pass *up,struct tls_multi *multi) +{ +struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); + +int64_t timestamp =htonll ((uint64_t )now); +int64_t initial_timestamp = timestamp; + +hmac_ctx_t *ctx = multi->opt.auth_token_key.hmac; +ASSERT (hmac_ctx_size (ctx) ==256 /8 ); + +if (multi->auth_token) + { +/* Just enough space to fit 8 bytes+ 1 extra to decode a non padded +* base64 string (multiple of 3 bytes). 9 bytes => 12 bytes base64 +* bytes +*/ +char old_tstamp_decode[9 ]; + +/* +* reuse the same session id and timestamp and null terminate it at +* for base64 decode it only decodes the session id part of it +*/ +char *old_tsamp_initial = multi->auth_token +strlen (SESSION_ID_PREFIX ); + + old_tsamp_initial[12 ] ='\0' ; +ASSERT (openvpn_base64_decode (old_tsamp_initial, old_tstamp_decode,9 ) ==9 ); + initial_timestamp = *((uint64_t *)(old_tstamp_decode)); + +/* free the auth-token, we will replace it with a new one */ +free (multi->auth_token); + } +uint8_t hmac_output[256 /8 ]; + +hmac_ctx_reset (ctx); +hmac_ctx_update (ctx, (uint8_t *) up->username, (int )strlen (up->username)); +hmac_ctx_update (ctx, (uint8_t *) &initial_timestamp,sizeof (initial_timestamp)); +hmac_ctx_update (ctx, (uint8_t *) ×tamp,sizeof (timestamp)); +hmac_ctx_final (ctx, hmac_output); + +/* Construct the unencoded session token */ +struct buffer token =alloc_buf_gc ( +2 *sizeof (uint64_t ) +256 /8 , &gc); + +ASSERT (buf_write (&token, &initial_timestamp,sizeof (initial_timestamp))); +ASSERT (buf_write (&token, ×tamp,sizeof (timestamp))); +ASSERT (buf_write (&token, hmac_output,sizeof (hmac_output))); + +char *b64output; +openvpn_base64_encode (BPTR (&token),BLEN (&token), &b64output); + +struct buffer session_token =alloc_buf_gc ( +strlen (SESSION_ID_PREFIX ) +strlen (b64output) +1 , &gc); + +ASSERT (buf_write (&session_token,SESSION_ID_PREFIX ,strlen (SESSION_ID_PREFIX ))); +ASSERT (buf_write (&session_token, b64output, (int )strlen (b64output))); +ASSERT (buf_write_u8 (&session_token,0 )); + +free (b64output); + + multi->auth_token =strdup ((char *)BPTR (&session_token)); + +dmsg (D_SHOW_KEYS ,"Generated token for client: %s" , + multi->auth_token); + +gc_free (&gc); +} + +static bool +check_hmac_token (hmac_ctx_t *ctx,const uint8_t *b64decoded,const char *username) +{ +ASSERT (hmac_ctx_size (ctx) ==256 /8 ); + +uint8_t hmac_output[256 /8 ]; + +hmac_ctx_reset (ctx); +hmac_ctx_update (ctx, (uint8_t *) username, (int )strlen (username)); +hmac_ctx_update (ctx, b64decoded,TOKEN_DATA_LEN -256 /8 ); +hmac_ctx_final (ctx, hmac_output); + +const uint8_t *hmac = b64decoded +TOKEN_DATA_LEN -256 /8 ; +return memcmp_constant_time (&hmac_output, hmac,32 ) ==0 ; +} + +unsigned int +verify_auth_token (struct user_pass *up,struct tls_multi *multi, +struct tls_session *session) +{ +/* +* Base64 is <= input and input is < USER_PASS_LEN, so using USER_PASS_LEN +* is safe here but a bit overkill +*/ +uint8_t b64decoded[USER_PASS_LEN ]; +int decoded_len =openvpn_base64_decode (up->password +strlen (SESSION_ID_PREFIX ), + b64decoded,USER_PASS_LEN ); +/* Ensure that the decoded data is at least the size of the +* timestamp + hmac */ + +if (decoded_len !=TOKEN_DATA_LEN ) + { +msg (M_WARN ,"ERROR: --auth-token wrong size (%d!=%d)" , + decoded_len, (int )TOKEN_DATA_LEN ); +return 0 ; + } + +unsigned int ret =0 ; + + +const uint8_t *tstamp_initial = b64decoded; +const uint8_t *tstamp = tstamp_initial +sizeof (int64_t ); + +uint64_t timestamp =ntohll (*((uint64_t *) (tstamp))); +uint64_t timestamp_initial =ntohll (*((uint64_t *) (tstamp_initial))); + +hmac_ctx_t *ctx = multi->opt.auth_token_key.hmac; +if (check_hmac_token (ctx, b64decoded, up->username)) + { + ret |=AUTH_TOKEN_HMAC_OK ; + } +else + { +msg (M_WARN ,"--auth-token-gen: HMAC on token from client failed (%s)" , + up->username); +return 0 ; + } + +/* Accept session tokens that not expired are in the acceptable range +* for renogiations */ +bool in_renog_time = now >= timestamp + && now < timestamp +2 * session->opt->renegotiate_seconds; + +/* We could still have a client that does not update +* its auth-token, so also allow the initial auth-token */ +bool initialtoken = multi->auth_token_initial + &&memcmp_constant_time (up->password, multi->auth_token_initial, +strlen (multi->auth_token_initial)) ==0 ; + +if (!in_renog_time && !initialtoken) + { + ret |=AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRED ; + } + +/* Sanity check the initial timestamp */ +if (timestamp < timestamp_initial) + { +msg (M_WARN ,"Initial timestamp (%lld) in token from client earlier than " +"current timestamp (%lld). Broken/unsynchronised clock?" , + timestamp_initial, timestamp); + ret |=AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRED ; + } + +if (multi->opt.auth_token_lifetime + && now > timestamp_initial + multi->opt.auth_token_lifetime) + { + ret |=AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRED ; + } + +if (ret &AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRED ) + { +msg (M_INFO ,"--auth-token-gen: auth-token from client expired" ); + } + +return ret; +} + +void +wipe_auth_token (struct tls_multi *multi) +{ +if (multi) + { +if (multi->auth_token) + { +secure_memzero (multi->auth_token,strlen (multi->auth_token)); +free (multi->auth_token); + } +if (multi->auth_token_initial) + { +secure_memzero (multi->auth_token_initial, +strlen (multi->auth_token_initial)); +free (multi->auth_token_initial); + } + multi->auth_token =NULL ; + multi->auth_token_initial =NULL ; + } +}src/openvpn/auth_token.h new file +116
-0@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +/* +* OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks +* over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based +* session authentication and key exchange, +* packet encryption, packet authentication, and +* packet compression. +* +* Copyright (C) 2002-2018 OpenVPN Inc <[email protected]...> +* +* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 +* as published by the Free Software Foundation. +* +* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +* GNU General Public License for more details. +* +* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along +* with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., +* 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. +*/ +#ifndef AUTH_TOKEN_H +#define AUTH_TOKEN_H + +/** +* Generate an auth token based on username and timestamp +* +* The idea of auth token is to be stateless, so that we can verify use it +* even after we have forgotten about it or server has been restarted. +* +* To achieve this even though we cannot trust the client we use HMAC +* to be able to verify the information. +* +* Format of the auth-token (before base64 encode) +* +* uint64 timestamp (4 bytes)|uint64 timestamp (4 bytes)|sha256-hmac(32 bytes) +* +* The first timestamp is the time the token was initially created and is used to +* determine the maximum renewable time of the token. We always include this even +* if tokens do not expire (this value is not used) to keep the code cleaner. +* +* The second timestamp is the time the token was renewed/regenerated and is used +* to determine if this token has been renewed in the acceptable time range +* (2 * renogiation timeout) +* +* The hmac is calculated over the username contactinated with the +* raw auth-token bytes to include authentication of the username in the token +* +* we prepend the session id with SESS_ID_ before sending it to the client +*/ +void +generate_auth_token (const struct user_pass *up,struct tls_multi *multi); + +/** +* Verifies the auth token to be in the format that generate_auth_token +* create and checks if the token is valid. +* +* Also calls generate_auth_token to update the auth-token to extend +* its validity +*/ +unsigned +verify_auth_token (struct user_pass *up,struct tls_multi *multi, +struct tls_session *session); + + + +/** +* Loads an HMAC secret from a file or if no file is present generates a +* epheremal secret for the run time of the server and stores it into ctx +*/ +void +auth_token_init_secret (struct key_ctx *key_ctx,const char *key_file, +const char *key_inline); + + +/** +* Generate a auth-token server secret key, and write to file. +* +* @param filename Filename of the server key file to create. +*/ +void auth_token_write_server_key_file (const char *filename); + + +/** +* Wipes the authentication token out of the memory, frees and cleans up +* related buffers and flags +* +* @param multi Pointer to a multi object holding the auth_token variables +*/ +void wipe_auth_token (struct tls_multi *multi); + +/** +* The prefix given to auth tokens start with, this prefix is special +* cased to not show up in log files in OpenVPN 2 and 3 +* +* We also prefix this with _AT_ to only act on auth token generated by us. +*/ +#define SESSION_ID_PREFIX "SESS_ID_AT_" + +/** +* Return if the password string has the format of a password. +* +* This fuction will always read as many bytes as SESSION_ID_PREFIX is longer +* the caller needs ensure that password memory is at least that long (true for +* calling with struct user_pass) +* @param password +* @return whether the password string starts with the session token prefix +*/ +static inline bool +is_auth_token (const char *password) +{ +return (memcmp_constant_time (SESSION_ID_PREFIX , password, +strlen (SESSION_ID_PREFIX )) ==0 ); +} +#endif /* AUTH_TOKEN_H */ src/openvpn/init.c +33
-1@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@#include "ssl_verify.h" #include "tls_crypt.h" #include "forward.h" +#include "auth_token.h" #include "memdbg.h" @@ -1098,6 +1099,17 @@ do_genkey(const struct options *options)msg (M_USAGE ,"--tls-crypt-v2-genkey type should be \"client\" or \"server\"" ); } + +if (options->auth_token_gen_secret_file) + { +if (!options->auth_token_secret_file) + { +msg (M_USAGE ,"--auth-gen-token-secret-genkey requires a server key " +"to be set via --auth-gen-token-secret to create a shared secret" ); + } +auth_token_write_server_key_file (options->auth_token_secret_file); +return true; + }return false; }@@ -2490,7 +2502,6 @@ init_crypto_pre(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) rand_ctx_enable_prediction_resistance(); }#endif - }/* @@ -2614,6 +2625,20 @@ do_init_tls_wrap_key(struct context *c) } +/* +* Initialise the auth-token key context +*/ +static void +do_init_auth_token_key (struct context *c) +{ +if (!c->options.auth_token_generate) +return ; + +auth_token_init_secret (&c->c1.ks.auth_token_key, + c->options.auth_token_secret_file, + c->options.auth_token_secret_file_inline); +} +/* * Initialize the persistent component of OpenVPN's TLS mode, * which is preserved across SIGUSR1 resets. @@ -2666,6 +2691,9 @@ do_init_crypto_tls_c1(struct context *c)/* initialize tls-auth/crypt/crypt-v2 key */ do_init_tls_wrap_key (c); +/* initialise auth-token crypto support */ +do_init_auth_token_key (c); +#if 0 /* was: #if ENABLE_INLINE_FILES -- Note that enabling this code will break restarts */ if (options->priv_key_file_inline) {@@ -2838,6 +2866,7 @@ do_init_crypto_tls(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) to.auth_user_pass_file = options->auth_user_pass_file; to.auth_token_generate = options->auth_token_generate; to.auth_token_lifetime = options->auth_token_lifetime; + to.auth_token_key = c->c1.ks.auth_token_key;#endif to.x509_track = options->x509_track;@@ -4451,6 +4480,9 @@ inherit_context_child(struct context *dest, dest->c1.authname = src->c1.authname; dest->c1.keysize = src->c1.keysize; +/* inherit auth-token */ + dest->c1.ks.auth_token_key = src->c1.ks.auth_token_key; +/* options */ dest->options = src->options;options_detach (&dest->options);src/openvpn/openvpn.h +1
-0@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ struct key_schedulestruct key_ctx_bi tls_wrap_key;struct key_ctx tls_crypt_v2_server_key;struct buffer tls_crypt_v2_wkc;/**< Wrapped client key */ +struct key_ctx auth_token_key; };/* src/openvpn/options.c +23
-1@@ -1286,6 +1286,7 @@ show_p2mp_parms(const struct options *o)SHOW_BOOL (auth_user_pass_verify_script_via_file);SHOW_BOOL (auth_token_generate);SHOW_INT (auth_token_lifetime); +SHOW_STR (auth_token_secret_file);#if PORT_SHARE SHOW_STR (port_share_host);SHOW_STR (port_share_port);@@ -2334,7 +2335,11 @@ options_postprocess_verify_ce(const struct options *options, const struct connec {msg (M_USAGE ,"--mode server requires --key-method 2" ); } - +if (options->auth_token_generate && !options->renegotiate_seconds) + { +msg (M_USAGE ,"--auth-gen-token needs a non-infinite " +"--renegotiate_seconds setting" ); + } {const bool ccnr = (options->auth_user_pass_verify_script || PLUGIN_OPTION_LIST(options)@@ -6769,6 +6774,23 @@ add_option(struct options *options, options->auth_token_generate = true; options->auth_token_lifetime = p[1 ] ?positive_atoi (p[1 ]) :0 ; } +else if (streq (p[0 ],"auth-gen-token-secret" ) && p[1 ] && (!p[2 ] + || (p[2 ] &&streq (p[1 ],INLINE_FILE_TAG )))) + { +VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); + options->auth_token_secret_file = p[1 ]; + +if (streq (p[1 ],INLINE_FILE_TAG ) && p[2 ]) + { + options->auth_token_secret_file_inline = p[2 ]; + } + } +else if (streq (p[0 ],"auth-gen-token-secret-genkey" ) && !p[1 ]) + { +VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); + options->auth_token_gen_secret_file = true; + } +else if (streq (p[0 ],"client-connect" ) && p[1 ]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_SCRIPT );src/openvpn/options.h +4
-0@@ -459,7 +459,11 @@ struct optionsconst char *auth_user_pass_verify_script;bool auth_user_pass_verify_script_via_file;bool auth_token_generate; +bool auth_token_gen_secret_file;unsigned int auth_token_lifetime; +const char *auth_token_secret_file; +const char *auth_token_secret_file_inline; +#if PORT_SHARE char *port_share_host;char *port_share_port;src/openvpn/push.c +59
-11@@ -324,6 +324,37 @@ send_push_request(struct context *c) }#if P2MP_SERVER +/** +* Prepare push option for auth-token +* @param tls_multi tls multi context of VPN tunnel +* @param gc gc arena for allocating push options +* @param push_list push list to where options are added +* +* @return true on success, false on failure. +*/ +void +prepare_auth_token_push_reply (struct tls_multi *tls_multi,struct gc_arena *gc, +struct push_list *push_list) +{ +/* +* If server uses --auth-gen-token and we have an auth token +* to send to the client +*/ +if (tls_multi->auth_token) + { +push_option_fmt (gc, push_list,M_USAGE , +"auth-token %s" , + tls_multi->auth_token); +if (!tls_multi->auth_token_initial) + { +/* +* Save the initial auth token for clients that ignore +* the updates to the token +*/ + tls_multi->auth_token_initial =strdup (tls_multi->auth_token); + } + } +}/** * Prepare push options, based on local options and available peer info. @@ -334,7 +365,7 @@ send_push_request(struct context *c)* * @return true on success, false on failure. */ -static bool +bool prepare_push_reply (struct context *c,struct gc_arena *gc,struct push_list *push_list) {@@ -382,6 +413,11 @@ prepare_push_reply(struct context *c, struct gc_arena *gc, tls_multi->use_peer_id = true; } } +/* +* If server uses --auth-gen-token and we have an auth token +* to send to the client +*/ +prepare_auth_token_push_reply (tls_multi, gc, push_list);/* Push cipher if client supports Negotiable Crypto Parameters */ if (tls_peer_info_ncp_ver (peer_info) >=2 && o->ncp_enabled)@@ -412,15 +448,6 @@ prepare_push_reply(struct context *c, struct gc_arena *gc,tls_poor_mans_ncp (o, tls_multi->remote_ciphername); } -/* If server uses --auth-gen-token and we have an auth token -* to send to the client -*/ -if (false == tls_multi->auth_token_sent &&NULL != tls_multi->auth_token) - { -push_option_fmt (gc, push_list,M_USAGE , -"auth-token %s" , tls_multi->auth_token); - tls_multi->auth_token_sent = true; - }return true; }@@ -431,6 +458,7 @@ send_push_options(struct context *c, struct buffer *buf, {struct push_entry *e = push_list->head; + e = push_list->head;while (e) {if (e->enable)@@ -463,7 +491,27 @@ send_push_options(struct context *c, struct buffer *buf,return true; } -static bool +void +send_push_reply_auth_token (struct tls_multi *multi) +{ +struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); + + +struct push_list push_list = {}; +prepare_auth_token_push_reply (multi, &gc, &push_list); + +/* prepare auth token should always add the auth-token option */ +struct push_entry *e = push_list.head; +ASSERT (e && e->enable); + +/* Construct a mimimal control channel push reply message */ +struct buffer buf =alloc_buf_gc (PUSH_BUNDLE_SIZE , &gc); +buf_printf (&buf,"%s, %s" , push_reply_cmd, e->option); +send_control_channel_string_dowork (multi,BSTR (&buf),D_PUSH ); +gc_free (&gc); +} + +bool send_push_reply (struct context *c,struct push_list *per_client_push_list) {struct gc_arena gc =gc_new ();src/openvpn/push.h +8
-0@@ -69,6 +69,14 @@ void send_auth_failed(struct context *c, const char *client_reason);void send_restart (struct context *c,const char *kill_msg); +/** +* Sends a push reply message only containin the auth-token to update +* the auth-token on the client +* +* @param multi - The tls_multi structure belonging to the instance to push to +*/ +void send_push_reply_auth_token (struct tls_multi *multi); +#endif #endif /* if P2MP */ #endif /* ifndef PUSH_H */ src/openvpn/ssl.c +2
-5@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@#include "ssl.h" #include "ssl_verify.h" #include "ssl_backend.h" +#include "auth_token.h" #include "memdbg.h" @@ -1368,11 +1369,7 @@ tls_multi_free(struct tls_multi *multi, bool clear)cert_hash_free (multi->locked_cert_hash_set); -if (multi->auth_token) - { -secure_memzero (multi->auth_token,AUTH_TOKEN_SIZE ); -free (multi->auth_token); - } +wipe_auth_token (multi);free (multi->remote_ciphername);src/openvpn/ssl_common.h +22
-14@@ -298,7 +298,6 @@ struct tls_options/** TLS handshake wrapping state */ struct tls_wrap_ctx tls_wrap; -/* frame parameters for TLS control channel */ struct frame frame;/* used for username/password authentication */ @@ -306,10 +305,16 @@ struct tls_optionsbool auth_user_pass_verify_script_via_file;const char *tmp_dir;const char *auth_user_pass_file; -bool auth_token_generate;/**< Generate auth-tokens on successful user/pass auth, -* set via options->auth_token_generate. */ + +#ifdef P2MP_SERVER +bool auth_token_generate;/**< Generate auth-tokens on successful +* user/pass auth,seet via +* options->auth_token_generate. */ unsigned int auth_token_lifetime; +struct key_ctx auth_token_key; +#endif +/* use the client-config-dir as a positive authenticator */ const char *client_config_dir_exclusive;@@ -368,10 +373,6 @@ struct tls_options/** @} name Index of key_state objects within a tls_session structure */ /** @} addtogroup control_processor */ -#define AUTH_TOKEN_SIZE 32/**< Size of server side generated auth tokens. -* 32 bytes == 256 bits -*/ -/** * Security parameter state of a single session within a VPN tunnel. * @ingroup control_processor @@ -539,7 +540,21 @@ struct tls_multi* over control channel. */ char *peer_info; +char *auth_token;/**< If server sends a generated auth-token, +* this is the token to use for future +* user/pass authentications in this session. +*/ +char *auth_token_initial; +/**< The first auth-token we sent to a client, for clients that do +* not update their auth-token (older OpenVPN3 core versions) +*/ +#define AUTH_TOKEN_HMAC_OK (1<<0) +/**< Auth-token sent from client has valid hmac */ +#define AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRED (1<<1) +/**< Auth-token sent from client has expired */ #endif +int auth_token_state_flags; +/**< The state of the auth-token sent from the client last time */ /* For P_DATA_V2 */ uint32_t peer_id;@@ -547,13 +562,6 @@ struct tls_multichar *remote_ciphername;/**< cipher specified in peer's config file */ -char *auth_token;/**< If server sends a generated auth-token, -* this is the token to use for future -* user/pass authentications in this session. -*/ -time_t auth_token_tstamp;/**< timestamp of the generated token */ -bool auth_token_sent;/**< If server uses --auth-gen-token and -* token has been sent to client */ /* * Our session objects. */ src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c +79
-103@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL #include "ssl_verify_openssl.h" #endif +#include "auth_token.h" +#include "push.h" /** Maximum length of common name */ #define TLS_USERNAME_LEN 64@@ -63,28 +65,6 @@ setenv_untrusted(struct tls_session *session)setenv_link_socket_actual (session->opt->es,"untrusted" , &session->untrusted_addr,SA_IP_PORT ); } - -/** -* Wipes the authentication token out of the memory, frees and cleans up related buffers and flags -* -* @param multi Pointer to a multi object holding the auth_token variables -*/ -static void -wipe_auth_token (struct tls_multi *multi) -{ -if (multi) - { -if (multi->auth_token) - { -secure_memzero (multi->auth_token,AUTH_TOKEN_SIZE ); -free (multi->auth_token); - } - multi->auth_token =NULL ; - multi->auth_token_sent = false; - } -} - -/* * Remove authenticated state from all sessions in the given tunnel */ @@ -1253,6 +1233,7 @@ verify_user_pass_management(struct tls_session *session, const struct user_pass }#endif /* ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH */ +/* * Main username/password verification entry point */ @@ -1277,86 +1258,67 @@ verify_user_pass(struct user_pass *up, struct tls_multi *multi,string_mod_remap_name (up->username);string_mod (up->password,CC_PRINT ,CC_CRLF ,'_' ); -/* If server is configured with --auth-gen-token and we have an -* authentication token for this client, this authentication +/* +* If auth token succeeds we skip the auth +* methods unless otherwise specified +*/ +bool skip_auth = false; + +/* +* If server is configured with --auth-gen-token and the client sends +* something that looks like an authentication token, this * round will be done internally using the token instead of * calling any external authentication modules. */ -if (session->opt->auth_token_generate && multi->auth_token_sent - &&NULL != multi->auth_token) +if (session->opt->auth_token_generate &&is_auth_token (up->password)) { -unsigned int ssl_flags = session->opt->ssl_flags; - -/* Ensure that the username has not changed */ -if (!tls_lock_username (multi, up->username)) + multi->auth_token_state_flags =verify_auth_token (up, multi,session); +if (multi->auth_token_state_flags ==AUTH_TOKEN_HMAC_OK ) { -/* auth-token cleared in tls_lock_username() on failure */ - ks->authenticated = false; -return ; +/* +* We do not want the EXPIRED flag here so check +* for equality with AUTH_TOKEN_HMAC_OK +*/ +msg (M_WARN ,"TLS: Username/auth-token authentication " +"succeeded for username '%s'" , + up->username); + skip_auth = true; } - -/* If auth-token lifetime has been enabled, -* ensure the token has not expired -*/ -if (session->opt->auth_token_lifetime >0 - && (multi->auth_token_tstamp + session->opt->auth_token_lifetime) < now) +else { -msg (D_HANDSHAKE ,"Auth-token for client expired\n" );wipe_auth_token (multi); ks->authenticated = false; +msg (M_WARN ,"TLS: Username/auth-token authentication " +"failed for username '%s'" , up->username);return ; } + } +if (!skip_auth) + { -/* The core authentication of the token itself */ -if (memcmp_constant_time (multi->auth_token, up->password, -strlen (multi->auth_token)) !=0 ) +/* call plugin(s) and/or script */ +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH +if (man_def_auth ==KMDA_DEF ) { - ks->authenticated = false; -tls_deauthenticate (multi); - -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"TLS Auth Error: Auth-token verification " -"failed for username '%s' %s" , up->username, - (ssl_flags &SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME ) ?"[CN SET]" :"" ); + man_def_auth =verify_user_pass_management (session, up); } -else +#endif +if (plugin_defined (session->opt->plugins,OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY )) { - ks->authenticated = true; - -if (ssl_flags &SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME ) - { -set_common_name (session, up->username); - } -msg (D_HANDSHAKE ,"TLS: Username/auth-token authentication " -"succeeded for username '%s' %s" , - up->username, - (ssl_flags &SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME ) ?"[CN SET]" :"" ); + s1 =verify_user_pass_plugin (session, up); + } +if (session->opt->auth_user_pass_verify_script) + { + s2 =verify_user_pass_script (session, up); } -return ; - } - -/* call plugin(s) and/or script */ -#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH -if (man_def_auth ==KMDA_DEF ) - { - man_def_auth =verify_user_pass_management (session, up); - } -#endif -if (plugin_defined (session->opt->plugins,OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY )) - { - s1 =verify_user_pass_plugin (session, up); - } -if (session->opt->auth_user_pass_verify_script) - { - s2 =verify_user_pass_script (session, up); - } -/* check sizing of username if it will become our common name */ -if ((session->opt->ssl_flags &SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME ) &&strlen (up->username) >TLS_USERNAME_LEN ) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"TLS Auth Error: --username-as-common name specified and username is longer than the maximum permitted Common Name length of %d characters" ,TLS_USERNAME_LEN ); - s1 =OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR ; +/* check sizing of username if it will become our common name */ +if ((session->opt->ssl_flags &SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME ) &&strlen (up->username) >TLS_USERNAME_LEN ) + { +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"TLS Auth Error: --username-as-common name specified and username is longer than the maximum permitted Common Name length of %d characters" ,TLS_USERNAME_LEN ); + s1 =OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR ; + } } -/* auth succeeded? */ if ((s1 == OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS#ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH @@ -1381,35 +1343,49 @@ verify_user_pass(struct user_pass *up, struct tls_multi *multi, ks->auth_deferred = true; }#endif +if ((session->opt->ssl_flags &SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME )) + { +set_common_name (session, up->username); + } -if ((session->opt->auth_token_generate) && (NULL == multi->auth_token)) +if ((session->opt->auth_token_generate)) { -/* Server is configured with --auth-gen-token but no token has yet -* been generated for this client. Generate one and save it. +/* +* If we accepted a (not expired) token, i.e. +* initial auth via token on new connection, we need +* to store the auth-token in multi->auth_token, so +* the initial timestamp and session id can be extracted from it */ -uint8_t tok[AUTH_TOKEN_SIZE ]; - -if (!rand_bytes (tok,AUTH_TOKEN_SIZE )) +if (multi->auth_token && (multi->auth_token_state_flags &AUTH_TOKEN_HMAC_OK ) + && !(multi->auth_token_state_flags &AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRED )) { -msg (M_FATAL ,"Failed to get enough randomness for " -"authentication token" ); + multi->auth_token =strdup (up->password); } -/* The token should be longer than the input when -* being base64 encoded +/* +* Server is configured with --auth-gen-token but no token has yet +* been generated for this client. Generate one and save it. */ -ASSERT (openvpn_base64_encode (tok,AUTH_TOKEN_SIZE , - &multi->auth_token) >AUTH_TOKEN_SIZE ); - multi->auth_token_tstamp = now; -dmsg (D_SHOW_KEYS ,"Generated token for client: %s" , - multi->auth_token); +generate_auth_token (up, multi); } - -if ((session->opt->ssl_flags &SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME )) +/* +* Auth token already sent to client, update auth-token on client. +* The initial auth-token is sent as part of the push message, for this +* update we need to schedule an extra push message. +*/ +if (multi->auth_token_initial) { -set_common_name (session, up->username); +/* +* We do not explicitly schedule the sending of the +* control message here but control message are only +* postponed when the control channel is not yet fully +* established and furthermore since this is called in +* the middle of authentication, there are other messages +* (new data channel keys) that are sent anyway and will +* trigger schedueling +*/ +send_push_reply_auth_token (multi); } -#ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "TLS: Username/Password authentication %s for username '%s' %s", ks->auth_deferred ? "deferred" : "succeeded",
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v2 3/6] Rewrite auth-token-gen to be based on HMAC based tokens
In reply to a message not in the archiveAm 22.02.19 um 03:42 schrieb Eric Thorpe:
Quoted 10 lines
Thanks for doing this one Arne, this has been on my bucket list for a while. I've given this a reasonable test now and it's working as I'd expect. A few comments from my testing:
src/openvpn/auth_token.c line 205
Quoted 4 lines · Arne Schwabe
src/openvpn/auth_token.c new file +4
-0+/* Accept session tokens that not expired are in the acceptable range +* for renogiations */ +bool in_renog_time = now >= timestamp + && now < timestamp +2 * session->opt->renegotiate_seconds;
Quoted 6 lines
I'd like to see the valid time of an auth-token have it's own value, however I understand why you've done this. I can't find a nice way to get through the last active time of a session through to auth without a reasonable refactor. I'd like to see the auth token have the option "--auth-gen-token [inactive timeout] [total timeout]" or something along those lines. So while this isn't an ideal solution, it's good enough.
I am not really sure what talking about. There are two lifetimes for auth token.
- the total max lifetime of an auth-token session (also specified in the config)
- the max lifetime of an individual auth-token.
The second one is dervived from renegotiate_seconds as setting this lower than this time will break renogiation.
The reason that I did not do any refactoring is a client with auth-token can switch to another server and that server needs to verify that auth-token with the information from the client and its config alone.
Quoted 7 lines
src/openvpn/auth_token.c line 211
Quoted 5 lines
src/openvpn/auth_token.c new file +5
-0+/* We could still have a client that does not update +* its auth-token, so also allow the initial auth-token */ +bool initialtoken = multi->auth_token_initial + &&memcmp_constant_time (up->password, multi->auth_token_initial, +strlen (multi->auth_token_initial)) ==0 ;I don't agree with this being in place, only the most recently generated token should be valid imo.
The reality is that we don't want to exclude all the older OpenVPN3 clients that do not update their token. Without this special, after 2*renogiation time, the clinets will fail.
Quoted 9 lines
When an auth-token is authenticated, the server log will print out:
Quoted 2 lines
TLS: Username/auth-token authentication succeeded for username is still displayed.
TLS: Username/Password authentication succeeded for username is still displayed.The second line seems redundant and might cause some confusion. "if (
skip_auth)" above this log line is probably enough I think?Finally, the patch won't build under MSVC without the following change:
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
+ struct
push_listpush_list= {};to
Quoted 1 line
+ struct
push_listpush_list= {0};
auth_token.candauth_token.hwill need to be added to the VS solution as well however I'm happy to submit that one myself once this gets acked to save you the trouble.
I will look into it.
Arne