systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16864
PATCH 1/3 systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16864
Affects < v240
--- ...-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch | 204 +++++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 205 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch new file +204 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ +From fe19f5a9d0d8b9977e9507a9b66c3cc66744cd38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 18:38:39 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] journald: do not store the iovec entry for process + commandline on stack + +This fixes a crash where we would read the commandline, whose length is under +control of the sending program, and then crash when trying to create a stack +allocation for it. + +CVE-2018-16864 +https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653855 + +The message actually doesn't get written to disk, because +journal_file_append_entry() returns -E2BIG. + +Patch backported from systemd master at +084eeb865ca63887098e0945fb4e93c852b91b0f. +--- + src/basic/io-util.c | 10 ++++++++++ + src/basic/io-util.h | 2 ++ + src/coredump/coredump.c | 31 +++++++++++-------------------- + src/journal/journald-server.c | 25 +++++++++++++++---------- + 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/basic/io-util.c b/src/basic/io-util.c +index 1f64cc933b..575398fbe6 100644 +--- a/src/basic/io-util.c ++++ b/src/basic/io-util.c +@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ + #include <unistd.h> + + #include "io-util.h" ++#include "string-util.h" + #include "time-util.h" + + int flush_fd(int fd) { +@@ -252,3 +253,12 @@ ssize_t sparse_write(int fd, const void *p, size_t sz, size_t run_length) { + + return q - (const uint8_t*) p; + } ++ ++char* set_iovec_string_field(struct iovec *iovec, size_t *n_iovec, const char *field, const char *value) { ++ char *x; ++ ++ x = strappend(field, value); ++ if (x) ++ iovec[(*n_iovec)++] = IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(x); ++ return x; ++} +diff --git a/src/basic/io-util.h b/src/basic/io-util.h +index ed189b5820..792a64ad5e 100644 +--- a/src/basic/io-util.h ++++ b/src/basic/io-util.h +@@ -71,3 +71,5 @@ static inline bool FILE_SIZE_VALID_OR_INFINITY(uint64_t l) { + #define IOVEC_MAKE(base, len) (struct iovec) IOVEC_INIT(base, len) + #define IOVEC_INIT_STRING(string) IOVEC_INIT((char*) string, strlen(string)) + #define IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(string) (struct iovec) IOVEC_INIT_STRING(string) ++ ++char* set_iovec_string_field(struct iovec *iovec, size_t *n_iovec, const char *field, const char *value); +diff --git a/src/coredump/coredump.c b/src/coredump/coredump.c +index 20a1cbdd45..18e4f61d72 100644 +--- a/src/coredump/coredump.c ++++ b/src/coredump/coredump.c +@@ -1053,19 +1053,10 @@ static int send_iovec(const struct iovec iovec[], size_t n_iovec, int input_fd) + return 0; + } + +-static char* set_iovec_field(struct iovec *iovec, size_t *n_iovec, const char *field, const char *value) { +- char *x; +- +- x = strappend(field, value); +- if (x) +- iovec[(*n_iovec)++] = IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(x); +- return x; +-} +- + static char* set_iovec_field_free(struct iovec *iovec, size_t *n_iovec, const char *field, char *value) { + char *x; + +- x = set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, field, value); ++ x = set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, field, value); + free(value); + return x; + } +@@ -1115,36 +1106,36 @@ static int gather_pid_metadata( + disable_coredumps(); + } + +- set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_UNIT=", context[CONTEXT_UNIT]); ++ set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_UNIT=", context[CONTEXT_UNIT]); + } + + if (cg_pid_get_user_unit(pid, &t) >= 0) + set_iovec_field_free(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_USER_UNIT=", t); + + /* The next few are mandatory */ +- if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_PID=", context[CONTEXT_PID])) ++ if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_PID=", context[CONTEXT_PID])) + return log_oom(); + +- if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_UID=", context[CONTEXT_UID])) ++ if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_UID=", context[CONTEXT_UID])) + return log_oom(); + +- if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_GID=", context[CONTEXT_GID])) ++ if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_GID=", context[CONTEXT_GID])) + return log_oom(); + +- if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_SIGNAL=", context[CONTEXT_SIGNAL])) ++ if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_SIGNAL=", context[CONTEXT_SIGNAL])) + return log_oom(); + +- if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_RLIMIT=", context[CONTEXT_RLIMIT])) ++ if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_RLIMIT=", context[CONTEXT_RLIMIT])) + return log_oom(); + +- if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_HOSTNAME=", context[CONTEXT_HOSTNAME])) ++ if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_HOSTNAME=", context[CONTEXT_HOSTNAME])) + return log_oom(); + +- if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_COMM=", context[CONTEXT_COMM])) ++ if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_COMM=", context[CONTEXT_COMM])) + return log_oom(); + + if (context[CONTEXT_EXE] && +- !set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_EXE=", context[CONTEXT_EXE])) ++ !set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_EXE=", context[CONTEXT_EXE])) + return log_oom(); + + if (sd_pid_get_session(pid, &t) >= 0) +@@ -1212,7 +1203,7 @@ static int gather_pid_metadata( + iovec[(*n_iovec)++] = IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(t); + + if (safe_atoi(context[CONTEXT_SIGNAL], &signo) >= 0 && SIGNAL_VALID(signo)) +- set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_SIGNAL_NAME=SIG", signal_to_string(signo)); ++ set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_SIGNAL_NAME=SIG", signal_to_string(signo)); + + return 0; /* we successfully acquired all metadata */ + } +diff --git a/src/journal/journald-server.c b/src/journal/journald-server.c +index 4f1550ec5b..31be085c6b 100644 +--- a/src/journal/journald-server.c ++++ b/src/journal/journald-server.c +@@ -753,6 +753,7 @@ static void dispatch_message_real( + pid_t object_pid) { + + char source_time[sizeof("_SOURCE_REALTIME_TIMESTAMP=") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(usec_t)]; ++ _cleanup_free_ char *cmdline1 = NULL, *cmdline2 = NULL; + uid_t journal_uid; + ClientContext *o; + +@@ -769,20 +770,23 @@ static void dispatch_message_real( + IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, c->uid, uid_t, uid_is_valid, UID_FMT, "_UID"); + IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, c->gid, gid_t, gid_is_valid, GID_FMT, "_GID"); + +- IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->comm, "_COMM"); +- IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->exe, "_EXE"); +- IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->cmdline, "_CMDLINE"); +- IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->capeff, "_CAP_EFFECTIVE"); ++ IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->comm, "_COMM"); /* At most TASK_COMM_LENGTH (16 bytes) */ ++ IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->exe, "_EXE"); /* A path, so at most PATH_MAX (4096 bytes) */ + +- IOVEC_ADD_SIZED_FIELD(iovec, n, c->label, c->label_size, "_SELINUX_CONTEXT"); ++ if (c->cmdline) ++ /* At most _SC_ARG_MAX (2MB usually), which is too much to put on stack. ++ * Let's use a heap allocation for this one. */ ++ cmdline1 = set_iovec_string_field(iovec, &n, "_CMDLINE=", c->cmdline); + ++ IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->capeff, "_CAP_EFFECTIVE"); /* Read from /proc/.../status */ ++ IOVEC_ADD_SIZED_FIELD(iovec, n, c->label, c->label_size, "_SELINUX_CONTEXT"); + IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, c->auditid, uint32_t, audit_session_is_valid, "%" PRIu32, "_AUDIT_SESSION"); + IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, c->loginuid, uid_t, uid_is_valid, UID_FMT, "_AUDIT_LOGINUID"); + +- IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->cgroup, "_SYSTEMD_CGROUP"); ++ IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->cgroup, "_SYSTEMD_CGROUP"); /* A path */ + IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->session, "_SYSTEMD_SESSION"); + IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, c->owner_uid, uid_t, uid_is_valid, UID_FMT, "_SYSTEMD_OWNER_UID"); +- IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->unit, "_SYSTEMD_UNIT"); ++ IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->unit, "_SYSTEMD_UNIT"); /* Unit names are bounded by UNIT_NAME_MAX */ + IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->user_unit, "_SYSTEMD_USER_UNIT"); + IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->slice, "_SYSTEMD_SLICE"); + IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->user_slice, "_SYSTEMD_USER_SLICE"); +@@ -803,13 +807,14 @@ static void dispatch_message_real( + IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, o->uid, uid_t, uid_is_valid, UID_FMT, "OBJECT_UID"); + IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, o->gid, gid_t, gid_is_valid, GID_FMT, "OBJECT_GID"); + ++ /* See above for size limits, only ->cmdline may be large, so use a heap allocation for it. */ + IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, o->comm, "OBJECT_COMM"); + IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, o->exe, "OBJECT_EXE"); +- IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, o->cmdline, "OBJECT_CMDLINE"); +- IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, o->capeff, "OBJECT_CAP_EFFECTIVE"); ++ if (o->cmdline) ++ cmdline2 = set_iovec_string_field(iovec, &n, "OBJECT_CMDLINE=", o->cmdline); + ++ IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, o->capeff, "OBJECT_CAP_EFFECTIVE"); + IOVEC_ADD_SIZED_FIELD(iovec, n, o->label, o->label_size, "OBJECT_SELINUX_CONTEXT"); +- + IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, o->auditid, uint32_t, audit_session_is_valid, "%" PRIu32, "OBJECT_AUDIT_SESSION"); + IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, o->loginuid, uid_t, uid_is_valid, UID_FMT, "OBJECT_AUDIT_LOGINUID"); + +-- +2.11.0 +
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb +1 -0
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://touchscreen.rules \ file://0001-sysctl-Don-t-pass-null-directive-argument-to-s.patch \ file://0002-core-Fix-use-after-free-case-in-load_from_path.patch \ file://0001-meson-rename-Ddebug-to-Ddebug-extra.patch \ + file://0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch \ " # patches made for musl are only applied on TCLIBC is musl
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
PATCH 2/3 systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16865
Affects < v240
--- ...ld-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch | 56 +++++++++++++++ ...ote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 142 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-remote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch new file +56 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +From 4566aaf97f5b4143b930d75628f3abc905249dcd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 22:45:02 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] journald: set a limit on the number of fields (1k) + +We allocate a iovec entry for each field, so with many short entries, +our memory usage and processing time can be large, even with a relatively +small message size. Let's refuse overly long entries. + +CVE-2018-16865 +https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653861 + +What from I can see, the problem is not from an alloca, despite what the CVE +description says, but from the attack multiplication that comes from creating +many very small iovecs: (void* + size_t) for each three bytes of input message. + +Patch backported from systemd master at +052c57f132f04a3cf4148f87561618da1a6908b4. +--- + src/basic/journal-importer.h | 3 +++ + src/journal/journald-native.c | 5 +++++ + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/basic/journal-importer.h b/src/basic/journal-importer.h +index f49ce734a1..c4ae45d32d 100644 +--- a/src/basic/journal-importer.h ++++ b/src/basic/journal-importer.h +@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ + #define DATA_SIZE_MAX (1024*1024*768u) + #define LINE_CHUNK 8*1024u + ++/* The maximum number of fields in an entry */ ++#define ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX 1024 ++ + struct iovec_wrapper { + struct iovec *iovec; + size_t size_bytes; +diff --git a/src/journal/journald-native.c b/src/journal/journald-native.c +index 5ff22a10af..951d092053 100644 +--- a/src/journal/journald-native.c ++++ b/src/journal/journald-native.c +@@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ static int server_process_entry( + } + + /* A property follows */ ++ if (n > ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX) { ++ log_debug("Received an entry that has more than " STRINGIFY(ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX) " fields, ignoring entry."); ++ r = 1; ++ goto finish; ++ } + + /* n existing properties, 1 new, +1 for _TRANSPORT */ + if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(iovec, m, +-- +2.11.0 +
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-remote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch new file +84 -0
84 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb +2 -0
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ SRC_URI += "file://touchscreen.rules \ file://0002-core-Fix-use-after-free-case-in-load_from_path.patch \ file://0001-meson-rename-Ddebug-to-Ddebug-extra.patch \ file://0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch \ + file://0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch \ + file://0026-journal-remote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch \ " # patches made for musl are only applied on TCLIBC is musl
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
PATCH 3/3 systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16866
In reply to Marcus CooperAffects < v240
--- .../0027-journal-fix-syslog_parse_identifier.patch | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++ ...not-remove-multiple-spaces-after-identifi.patch | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 163 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0027-journal-fix-syslog_parse_identifier.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0028-journal-do-not-remove-multiple-spaces-after-identifi.patch
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0027-journal-fix-syslog_parse_identifier.patch new file +77 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +From 8ccebb04e07628f7fe10131d6cd4f19d6a0d8f45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Yu Watanabe <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 8 Aug 2018 15:06:36 +0900 +Subject: [PATCH] journal: fix syslog_parse_identifier() + +Fixes #9829. + +An out of bounds read was discovered in systemd-journald in the way it +parses log messages that terminate with a colon ':'. A local attacker +can use this flaw to disclose process memory data. + +Patch backported from systemd master at +a6aadf4ae0bae185dc4c414d492a4a781c80ffe5. + +This matches the change done for systemd-journald, hence forming the first +part of the fix for CVE-2018-16866. +--- + src/journal/journald-syslog.c | 6 +++--- + src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c | 10 ++++++++-- + 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/journal/journald-syslog.c b/src/journal/journald-syslog.c +index 9dea116722..97711ac7a3 100644 +--- a/src/journal/journald-syslog.c ++++ b/src/journal/journald-syslog.c +@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ size_t syslog_parse_identifier(const char **buf, char **identifier, char **pid) + e = l; + l--; + +- if (p[l-1] == ']') { ++ if (l > 0 && p[l-1] == ']') { + size_t k = l-1; + + for (;;) { +@@ -219,8 +219,8 @@ size_t syslog_parse_identifier(const char **buf, char **identifier, char **pid) + if (t) + *identifier = t; + +- if (strchr(WHITESPACE, p[e])) +- e++; ++ e += strspn(p + e, WHITESPACE); ++ + *buf = p + e; + return e; + } +diff --git a/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c b/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c +index 9ba86f6c8a..05f759817e 100644 +--- a/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c ++++ b/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c +@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ + #include "macro.h" + #include "string-util.h" + +-static void test_syslog_parse_identifier(const char* str, +- const char *ident, const char*pid, int ret) { ++static void test_syslog_parse_identifier(const char *str, ++ const char *ident, const char *pid, int ret) { + const char *buf = str; + _cleanup_free_ char *ident2 = NULL, *pid2 = NULL; + int ret2; +@@ -21,7 +21,13 @@ static void test_syslog_parse_identifier(const char* str, + int main(void) { + test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu[111]: xxx", "pidu", "111", 11); + test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu: xxx", "pidu", NULL, 6); ++ test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu: xxx", "pidu", NULL, 7); + test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu xxx", NULL, NULL, 0); ++ test_syslog_parse_identifier(":", "", NULL, 1); ++ test_syslog_parse_identifier(": ", "", NULL, 3); ++ test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu:", "pidu", NULL, 5); ++ test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu: ", "pidu", NULL, 6); ++ test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu : ", NULL, NULL, 0); + + return 0; + } +-- +2.11.0 +
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0028-journal-do-not-remove-multiple-spaces-after-identifi.patch new file +84 -0
84 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb +2 -0
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ SRC_URI += "file://touchscreen.rules \ file://0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch \ file://0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch \ file://0026-journal-remote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch \ + file://0027-journal-fix-syslog_parse_identifier.patch \ + file://0028-journal-do-not-remove-multiple-spaces-after-identifi.patch \ " # patches made for musl are only applied on TCLIBC is musl
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
Quoted 10 lines · Marcus Cooper
+++
b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patchmeta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch new file +8
-0@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ +From fe19f5a9d0d8b9977e9507a9b66c3cc66744cd38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 18:38:39 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] journald: do not store the iovec entry for process + commandline on stack + +This fixes a crash where we would read the commandline, whose length is under +control of the sending program, and then crash when trying to create a stack
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch line 18
Quoted 10 lines
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch new file +10
-0+allocation for it. + +CVE-2018-16864 +https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653855 + +The message actually doesn't get written to disk, because +journal_file_append_entry() returns -E2BIG. + +Patch backported from systemd master at +084eeb865ca63887098e0945fb4e93c852b91b0f.
These patches need a CVE tag (CVE: CVE-2018-16864), and Upstream-Status tag (Backport), and your Signed-off-by.
Ross
Quoted 23 lines · Ross
Quoted 21 lines · Marcus Cooper
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store- the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch
(quoted diff) +1
-0@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ +From fe19f5a9d0d8b9977e9507a9b66c3cc66744cd38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= < [email protected]>(quoted diff) +2
-0+Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 18:38:39 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] journald: do not store the iovec entry forprocess
+ commandline on stack(quoted diff) +2
-0+ +This fixes a crash where we would read the commandline, whoselength is under
+control of the sending program, and then crash when trying to create a stackmeta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch new file +5
-0+allocation for it. + +CVE-2018-16864 +https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653855 +
Quoted 8 lines
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch line 18
Quoted 5 lines
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch new file +5
-0+The message actually doesn't get written to disk, because +journal_file_append_entry() returns -E2BIG. + +Patch backported from systemd master at +084eeb865ca63887098e0945fb4e93c852b91b0f.These patches need a CVE tag (CVE: CVE-2018-16864), and Upstream-Status tag (Backport), and your Signed-off-by.
This managed to sneak past me, can you send a follow up patch to fix this please?
Cheers,
Richard