systemd: Fixes Security fix CVE-2018-16864 - CVE-2018-16866
v2 cover systemd: Fixes Security fix CVE-2018-16864 - CVE-2018-16866
Changed in v2:
- Added CVE tag, Upstream-Status tag and Sign-off-by tags.
- removed the verification of the entry length in the header
- squashed CVE-2018-16865 patches into one
- CVE-2018-16866 patch now taken from systemd-stable and includes an additional heap buffer overflow fix.
Marcus Cooper (3):
systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16864
systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16865
systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16866
...-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch | 208 +++++++++++++++++++++ ...rnald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields.patch | 139 ++++++++++++++ ...nal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch | 49 +++++ meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb | 3 + 4 files changed, 399 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
PATCH v2 2/3 systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16865
Affects < v240
--- ...rnald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields.patch | 139 +++++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 140 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields.patch
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields.patch new file +139 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +From 7cad044b72406cbadf048da432c29afea74c3c10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 22:45:02 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] journald: set a limit on the number of fields + +The fix for CVE-2018-16865 is plucked from two commits that have +been pushed to systemd master. + +journald: set a limit on the number of fields (1k) + +We allocate a iovec entry for each field, so with many short entries, +our memory usage and processing time can be large, even with a relatively +small message size. Let's refuse overly long entries. + +CVE-2018-16865 +https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653861 + +What from I can see, the problem is not from an alloca, despite what the CVE +description says, but from the attack multiplication that comes from creating +many very small iovecs: (void* + size_t) for each three bytes of input message. + +Patch backported from systemd master at +052c57f132f04a3cf4148f87561618da1a6908b4. + +journal-remote: set a limit on the number of fields in a message + +Existing use of E2BIG is replaced with ENOBUFS (entry too long), and E2BIG is +reused for the new error condition (too many fields). + +This matches the change done for systemd-journald, hence forming the second +part of the fix for CVE-2018-16865 +(https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653861). + +Patch backported from systemd master at +ef4d6abe7c7fab6cbff975b32e76b09feee56074. +with the changes applied by 7fdb237f5473cb8fc2129e57e8a0039526dcb4fd +removed. + +CVE: CVE-2018-16865 +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Marcus Cooper <[email protected]> +--- + src/basic/journal-importer.c | 5 ++++- + src/basic/journal-importer.h | 3 +++ + src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c | 7 ++++++- + src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c | 5 ++++- + src/journal/journald-native.c | 5 +++++ + 5 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/basic/journal-importer.c b/src/basic/journal-importer.c +index ca203bbbfc..3ac55a66d9 100644 +--- a/src/basic/journal-importer.c ++++ b/src/basic/journal-importer.c +@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ enum { + }; + + static int iovw_put(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw, void* data, size_t len) { ++ if (iovw->count >= ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX) ++ return -E2BIG; ++ + if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(iovw->iovec, iovw->size_bytes, iovw->count + 1)) + return log_oom(); + +@@ -98,7 +101,7 @@ static int get_line(JournalImporter *imp, char **line, size_t *size) { + imp->scanned = imp->filled; + if (imp->scanned >= DATA_SIZE_MAX) { + log_error("Entry is bigger than %u bytes.", DATA_SIZE_MAX); +- return -E2BIG; ++ return -ENOBUFS; + } + + if (imp->passive_fd) +diff --git a/src/basic/journal-importer.h b/src/basic/journal-importer.h +index f49ce734a1..c4ae45d32d 100644 +--- a/src/basic/journal-importer.h ++++ b/src/basic/journal-importer.h +@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ + #define DATA_SIZE_MAX (1024*1024*768u) + #define LINE_CHUNK 8*1024u + ++/* The maximum number of fields in an entry */ ++#define ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX 1024 ++ + struct iovec_wrapper { + struct iovec *iovec; + size_t size_bytes; +diff --git a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c +index 8fda9d1499..3a01fef646 100644 +--- a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c ++++ b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c +@@ -212,7 +212,12 @@ static int process_http_upload( + break; + else if (r < 0) { + log_warning("Failed to process data for connection %p", connection); +- if (r == -E2BIG) ++ if (r == -ENOBUFS) ++ return mhd_respondf(connection, ++ r, MHD_HTTP_PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE, ++ "Entry is above the maximum of %u, aborting connection %p.", ++ DATA_SIZE_MAX, connection); ++ else if (r == -E2BIG) + return mhd_respondf(connection, + r, MHD_HTTP_PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE, + "Entry is too large, maximum is " STRINGIFY(DATA_SIZE_MAX) " bytes."); +diff --git a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c +index beb75a1cb4..67e3a70c06 100644 +--- a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c ++++ b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c +@@ -408,7 +408,10 @@ int journal_remote_handle_raw_source( + log_debug("%zu active sources remaining", s->active); + return 0; + } else if (r == -E2BIG) { +- log_notice_errno(E2BIG, "Entry too big, skipped"); ++ log_notice("Entry with too many fields, skipped"); ++ return 1; ++ } else if (r == -ENOBUFS) { ++ log_notice("Entry too big, skipped"); + return 1; + } else if (r == -EAGAIN) { + return 0; +diff --git a/src/journal/journald-native.c b/src/journal/journald-native.c +index 5ff22a10af..951d092053 100644 +--- a/src/journal/journald-native.c ++++ b/src/journal/journald-native.c +@@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ static int server_process_entry( + } + + /* A property follows */ ++ if (n > ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX) { ++ log_debug("Received an entry that has more than " STRINGIFY(ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX) " fields, ignoring entry."); ++ r = 1; ++ goto finish; ++ } + + /* n existing properties, 1 new, +1 for _TRANSPORT */ + if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(iovec, m, +-- +2.11.0 +
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb +1 -0
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://touchscreen.rules \ file://0002-core-Fix-use-after-free-case-in-load_from_path.patch \ file://0001-meson-rename-Ddebug-to-Ddebug-extra.patch \ file://0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch \ + file://0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields.patch \ " # patches made for musl are only applied on TCLIBC is musl
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
PATCH v2 3/3 systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16866
In reply to Marcus CooperAffects < v240
--- ...nal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch new file +49 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +From ebd06c37d4311db9851f4d3fdd023de3dd590de0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Filipe Brandenburger <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2019 14:53:33 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH] journal: fix out-of-bounds read CVE-2018-16866 + +The original code didn't account for the fact that strchr() would match on the +'\0' character, making it read past the end of the buffer if no non-whitespace +character was present. + +This bug was introduced in commit ec5ff4445cca6a which was first released in +systemd v221 and later fixed in commit 8595102d3ddde6 which was released in +v240, so versions in the range [v221, v240) are affected. + +Patch backported from systemd-stable at f005e73d3723d62a39be661931fcb6347119b52b +also includes a change from systemd master which removes a heap buffer overflow +a6aadf4ae0bae185dc4c414d492a4a781c80ffe5. + +CVE: CVE-2018-16866 +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Marcus Cooper <[email protected]> +--- + src/journal/journald-syslog.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/journal/journald-syslog.c b/src/journal/journald-syslog.c +index 9dea116722..809b318c06 100644 +--- a/src/journal/journald-syslog.c ++++ b/src/journal/journald-syslog.c +@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ size_t syslog_parse_identifier(const char **buf, char **identifier, char **pid) + e = l; + l--; + +- if (p[l-1] == ']') { ++ if (l > 0 && p[l-1] == ']') { + size_t k = l-1; + + for (;;) { +@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ size_t syslog_parse_identifier(const char **buf, char **identifier, char **pid) + if (t) + *identifier = t; + +- if (strchr(WHITESPACE, p[e])) ++ if (p[e] != '\0' && strchr(WHITESPACE, p[e])) + e++; + *buf = p + e; + return e; +-- +2.11.0 +
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb +1 -0
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://touchscreen.rules \ file://0001-meson-rename-Ddebug-to-Ddebug-extra.patch \ file://0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch \ file://0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields.patch \ + file://0026-journal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch \ " # patches made for musl are only applied on TCLIBC is musl
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
PATCH v2 1/3 systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16864
In reply to Marcus CooperAffects < v240
--- ...-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch | 208 +++++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 209 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch new file +208 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@ +From 9cb07e7d82c7c4f28bbaa1478e1387e8ea3d03dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 18:38:39 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] journald: do not store the iovec entry for process + commandline on stack + +This fixes a crash where we would read the commandline, whose length is under +control of the sending program, and then crash when trying to create a stack +allocation for it. + +CVE-2018-16864 +https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653855 + +The message actually doesn't get written to disk, because +journal_file_append_entry() returns -E2BIG. + +Patch backported from systemd master at +084eeb865ca63887098e0945fb4e93c852b91b0f. + +CVE: CVE-2018-16864 +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Marcus Cooper <[email protected]> +--- + src/basic/io-util.c | 10 ++++++++++ + src/basic/io-util.h | 2 ++ + src/coredump/coredump.c | 31 +++++++++++-------------------- + src/journal/journald-server.c | 25 +++++++++++++++---------- + 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/basic/io-util.c b/src/basic/io-util.c +index 1f64cc933b..575398fbe6 100644 +--- a/src/basic/io-util.c ++++ b/src/basic/io-util.c +@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ + #include <unistd.h> + + #include "io-util.h" ++#include "string-util.h" + #include "time-util.h" + + int flush_fd(int fd) { +@@ -252,3 +253,12 @@ ssize_t sparse_write(int fd, const void *p, size_t sz, size_t run_length) { + + return q - (const uint8_t*) p; + } ++ ++char* set_iovec_string_field(struct iovec *iovec, size_t *n_iovec, const char *field, const char *value) { ++ char *x; ++ ++ x = strappend(field, value); ++ if (x) ++ iovec[(*n_iovec)++] = IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(x); ++ return x; ++} +diff --git a/src/basic/io-util.h b/src/basic/io-util.h +index ed189b5820..792a64ad5e 100644 +--- a/src/basic/io-util.h ++++ b/src/basic/io-util.h +@@ -71,3 +71,5 @@ static inline bool FILE_SIZE_VALID_OR_INFINITY(uint64_t l) { + #define IOVEC_MAKE(base, len) (struct iovec) IOVEC_INIT(base, len) + #define IOVEC_INIT_STRING(string) IOVEC_INIT((char*) string, strlen(string)) + #define IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(string) (struct iovec) IOVEC_INIT_STRING(string) ++ ++char* set_iovec_string_field(struct iovec *iovec, size_t *n_iovec, const char *field, const char *value); +diff --git a/src/coredump/coredump.c b/src/coredump/coredump.c +index 20a1cbdd45..18e4f61d72 100644 +--- a/src/coredump/coredump.c ++++ b/src/coredump/coredump.c +@@ -1053,19 +1053,10 @@ static int send_iovec(const struct iovec iovec[], size_t n_iovec, int input_fd) + return 0; + } + +-static char* set_iovec_field(struct iovec *iovec, size_t *n_iovec, const char *field, const char *value) { +- char *x; +- +- x = strappend(field, value); +- if (x) +- iovec[(*n_iovec)++] = IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(x); +- return x; +-} +- + static char* set_iovec_field_free(struct iovec *iovec, size_t *n_iovec, const char *field, char *value) { + char *x; + +- x = set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, field, value); ++ x = set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, field, value); + free(value); + return x; + } +@@ -1115,36 +1106,36 @@ static int gather_pid_metadata( + disable_coredumps(); + } + +- set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_UNIT=", context[CONTEXT_UNIT]); ++ set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_UNIT=", context[CONTEXT_UNIT]); + } + + if (cg_pid_get_user_unit(pid, &t) >= 0) + set_iovec_field_free(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_USER_UNIT=", t); + + /* The next few are mandatory */ +- if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_PID=", context[CONTEXT_PID])) ++ if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_PID=", context[CONTEXT_PID])) + return log_oom(); + +- if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_UID=", context[CONTEXT_UID])) ++ if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_UID=", context[CONTEXT_UID])) + return log_oom(); + +- if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_GID=", context[CONTEXT_GID])) ++ if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_GID=", context[CONTEXT_GID])) + return log_oom(); + +- if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_SIGNAL=", context[CONTEXT_SIGNAL])) ++ if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_SIGNAL=", context[CONTEXT_SIGNAL])) + return log_oom(); + +- if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_RLIMIT=", context[CONTEXT_RLIMIT])) ++ if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_RLIMIT=", context[CONTEXT_RLIMIT])) + return log_oom(); + +- if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_HOSTNAME=", context[CONTEXT_HOSTNAME])) ++ if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_HOSTNAME=", context[CONTEXT_HOSTNAME])) + return log_oom(); + +- if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_COMM=", context[CONTEXT_COMM])) ++ if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_COMM=", context[CONTEXT_COMM])) + return log_oom(); + + if (context[CONTEXT_EXE] && +- !set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_EXE=", context[CONTEXT_EXE])) ++ !set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_EXE=", context[CONTEXT_EXE])) + return log_oom(); + + if (sd_pid_get_session(pid, &t) >= 0) +@@ -1212,7 +1203,7 @@ static int gather_pid_metadata( + iovec[(*n_iovec)++] = IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(t); + + if (safe_atoi(context[CONTEXT_SIGNAL], &signo) >= 0 && SIGNAL_VALID(signo)) +- set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_SIGNAL_NAME=SIG", signal_to_string(signo)); ++ set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_SIGNAL_NAME=SIG", signal_to_string(signo)); + + return 0; /* we successfully acquired all metadata */ + } +diff --git a/src/journal/journald-server.c b/src/journal/journald-server.c +index 4f1550ec5b..31be085c6b 100644 +--- a/src/journal/journald-server.c ++++ b/src/journal/journald-server.c +@@ -753,6 +753,7 @@ static void dispatch_message_real( + pid_t object_pid) { + + char source_time[sizeof("_SOURCE_REALTIME_TIMESTAMP=") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(usec_t)]; ++ _cleanup_free_ char *cmdline1 = NULL, *cmdline2 = NULL; + uid_t journal_uid; + ClientContext *o; + +@@ -769,20 +770,23 @@ static void dispatch_message_real( + IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, c->uid, uid_t, uid_is_valid, UID_FMT, "_UID"); + IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, c->gid, gid_t, gid_is_valid, GID_FMT, "_GID"); + +- IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->comm, "_COMM"); +- IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->exe, "_EXE"); +- IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->cmdline, "_CMDLINE"); +- IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->capeff, "_CAP_EFFECTIVE"); ++ IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->comm, "_COMM"); /* At most TASK_COMM_LENGTH (16 bytes) */ ++ IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->exe, "_EXE"); /* A path, so at most PATH_MAX (4096 bytes) */ + +- IOVEC_ADD_SIZED_FIELD(iovec, n, c->label, c->label_size, "_SELINUX_CONTEXT"); ++ if (c->cmdline) ++ /* At most _SC_ARG_MAX (2MB usually), which is too much to put on stack. ++ * Let's use a heap allocation for this one. */ ++ cmdline1 = set_iovec_string_field(iovec, &n, "_CMDLINE=", c->cmdline); + ++ IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->capeff, "_CAP_EFFECTIVE"); /* Read from /proc/.../status */ ++ IOVEC_ADD_SIZED_FIELD(iovec, n, c->label, c->label_size, "_SELINUX_CONTEXT"); + IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, c->auditid, uint32_t, audit_session_is_valid, "%" PRIu32, "_AUDIT_SESSION"); + IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, c->loginuid, uid_t, uid_is_valid, UID_FMT, "_AUDIT_LOGINUID"); + +- IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->cgroup, "_SYSTEMD_CGROUP"); ++ IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->cgroup, "_SYSTEMD_CGROUP"); /* A path */ + IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->session, "_SYSTEMD_SESSION"); + IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, c->owner_uid, uid_t, uid_is_valid, UID_FMT, "_SYSTEMD_OWNER_UID"); +- IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->unit, "_SYSTEMD_UNIT"); ++ IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->unit, "_SYSTEMD_UNIT"); /* Unit names are bounded by UNIT_NAME_MAX */ + IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->user_unit, "_SYSTEMD_USER_UNIT"); + IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->slice, "_SYSTEMD_SLICE"); + IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->user_slice, "_SYSTEMD_USER_SLICE"); +@@ -803,13 +807,14 @@ static void dispatch_message_real( + IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, o->uid, uid_t, uid_is_valid, UID_FMT, "OBJECT_UID"); + IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, o->gid, gid_t, gid_is_valid, GID_FMT, "OBJECT_GID"); + ++ /* See above for size limits, only ->cmdline may be large, so use a heap allocation for it. */ + IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, o->comm, "OBJECT_COMM"); + IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, o->exe, "OBJECT_EXE"); +- IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, o->cmdline, "OBJECT_CMDLINE"); +- IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, o->capeff, "OBJECT_CAP_EFFECTIVE"); ++ if (o->cmdline) ++ cmdline2 = set_iovec_string_field(iovec, &n, "OBJECT_CMDLINE=", o->cmdline); + ++ IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, o->capeff, "OBJECT_CAP_EFFECTIVE"); + IOVEC_ADD_SIZED_FIELD(iovec, n, o->label, o->label_size, "OBJECT_SELINUX_CONTEXT"); +- + IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, o->auditid, uint32_t, audit_session_is_valid, "%" PRIu32, "OBJECT_AUDIT_SESSION"); + IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, o->loginuid, uid_t, uid_is_valid, UID_FMT, "OBJECT_AUDIT_LOGINUID"); + +-- +2.11.0 +
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb +1 -0
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://touchscreen.rules \ file://0001-sysctl-Don-t-pass-null-directive-argument-to-s.patch \ file://0002-core-Fix-use-after-free-case-in-load_from_path.patch \ file://0001-meson-rename-Ddebug-to-Ddebug-extra.patch \ + file://0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch \ " # patches made for musl are only applied on TCLIBC is musl
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
Maybe it's better to update systemd to latest upstream release?
Alex
Quoted 30 lines · Marcus Cooper
Changed in v2:
- Added CVE tag, Upstream-Status tag and Sign-off-by tags.
- removed the verification of the entry length in the header
- squashed CVE-2018-16865 patches into one
- CVE-2018-16866 patch now taken from systemd-stable and includes an additional heap buffer overflow fix.Marcus Cooper (3):
systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16864
systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16865
systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16866...-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch | 208 +++++++++++++++++++++ ...rnald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields.patch | 139 ++++++++++++++ ...nal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch | 49 +++++ meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb | 3 + 4 files changed, 399 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch--
2.11.0--
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Quoted 3 lines · Alexander Kanavin
Maybe it's better to update systemd to latest upstream release?
Indeed but I would suggest to go to 241 which is in RC stage within week of 240 release
Quoted 38 lines
Alex
Quoted 22 lines · Marcus Cooper
Changed in v2:
- Added CVE tag, Upstream-Status tag and Sign-off-by tags.
- removed the verification of the entry length in the header
- squashed CVE-2018-16865 patches into one
- CVE-2018-16866 patch now taken from systemd-stable and includes an additional heap buffer overflow fix.Marcus Cooper (3):
systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16864
systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16865
systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16866...-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch | 208 +++++++++++++++++++++ ...rnald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields.patch | 139 ++++++++++++++ ...nal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch | 49 +++++ meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb | 3 + 4 files changed, 399 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patchQuoted 8 lines
--
2.11.0--
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Quoted 1 line · Alexander Kanavin
Maybe it's better to update systemd to latest upstream release?
Thud benefits from this : )
Quoted 33 lines
Alex
Quoted 29 lines · Marcus Cooper
Changed in v2:
- Added CVE tag, Upstream-Status tag and Sign-off-by tags.
- removed the verification of the entry length in the header
- squashed CVE-2018-16865 patches into one
- CVE-2018-16866 patch now taken from systemd-stable and includes an additional heap buffer overflow fix.Marcus Cooper (3):
systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16864
systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16865
systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16866...-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch | 208 +++++++++++++++++++++ ...rnald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields.patch | 139 ++++++++++++++ ...nal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch | 49 +++++ meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb | 3 + 4 files changed, 399 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch--
2.11.0--
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