overlayfs: Do not lose security.capability xattr over metadata file copy-up
PATCH 1/1 overlayfs: Do not lose security.capability xattr over metadata file copy-up
If a file has been copied up metadata only, and later data is copied up, upper loses any security.capability xattr it has (underlying filesystem clears it as upon file write).
Quoted 1 line
From a user's point of view, this is just a file copy-up and that should
not result in losing security.capability xattr. Hence, before data copy up, save security.capability xattr (if any) and restore it on upper after data copy up is complete.
--- fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++- fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 1 + fs/overlayfs/util.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/overlayfs/util.c +44 -0
@@ -912,3 +912,47 @@ invalid: res = -EINVAL ; goto err_free; } + +size_t ovl_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,char *name,void **value, +size_t *size) +{ +int res; +void *buf =NULL ; + + res =vfs_getxattr (dentry, name,NULL ,0 ); +if (res <0 ) { +if (res == -ENODATA || res == -EOPNOTSUPP ) +return 0 ; + goto fail; + } + +if (res ==0 ) + goto invalid; + + buf =kzalloc (res,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!buf) +return -ENOMEM ; + + res =vfs_getxattr (dentry, name, buf, res); +if (res <0 ) + goto fail; + +if (res ==0 ) + goto invalid; + + *value = buf; + *size = res; + +return res; + +err_free: +kfree (buf); +return res; +fail: +pr_warn_ratelimited ("overlayfs: failed to get xattr %s: err=%i)\n" , name, res); + goto err_free; +invalid: +pr_warn_ratelimited ("overlayfs: invalid xattr %s \n" , name); + res = -EINVAL ; + goto err_free; +}
fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h +1 -0
@@ -277,6 +277,7 @@ int ovl_lock_rename_workdir(struct dentrint ovl_check_metacopy_xattr (struct dentry *dentry);bool ovl_is_metacopy_dentry (struct dentry *dentry);char *ovl_get_redirect_xattr (struct dentry *dentry,int padding); +size_t ovl_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,char *name,void **value,size_t *size);static inline bool ovl_is_impuredir (struct dentry *dentry) {
fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c +23 -1
@@ -742,6 +742,8 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_meta_inode_data(s {struct path upperpath, datapath;int err; +void *capability =NULL ; +size_t cap_size;ovl_path_upper (c->dentry, &upperpath);if (WARN_ON (upperpath.dentry ==NULL ))
@@ -751,9 +753,29 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_meta_inode_data(sif (WARN_ON (datapath.dentry ==NULL ))return -EIO ; +if (c->stat.size) { + cap_size =ovl_getxattr (upperpath.dentry,XATTR_NAME_CAPS , &capability, &cap_size); +if (cap_size <0 ) +return cap_size; + } + err =ovl_copy_up_data (&datapath, &upperpath, c->stat.size); -if (err) +if (err) { +kfree (capability);return err; + } + +/* +* Writing to upper file will clear security.capability xattr. We +* don't want that to happen for normal copy-up operation. +*/ +if (capability) { + err =ovl_do_setxattr (upperpath.dentry,XATTR_NAME_CAPS , capability, cap_size,0 ); +kfree (capability); +if (err) +return err; + } + err =vfs_removexattr (upperpath.dentry,OVL_XATTR_METACOPY );if (err)
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Quoted 10 lines · Amir Goldstein
Quoted 4 lines · On Tue, Jan 29, 2019, 10:50 PM Vivek Goyal <[email protected] wrote:
If a file has been copied up metadata only, and later data is copied up, upper loses any security.capability xattr it has (underlying filesystem clears it as upon file write).
Write also clears suid mode bits
Should we restore these as well? Or do we already and I missed it?
[ Adding linux-unionfs ]
suid mode bit is only cleared if caller does not have CAP_FSETID.
should_remove_suid() {
if (unlikely(kill && !capable(CAP_FSETID) && S_ISREG(mode)))
return kill;
}We do copy up in the context of mounter which is root, often with CAP_FSETID.
So while this is not a widespread problem yet, it is a potential issue. We can fix it if somebody runs into it.
Quoted 24 lines
Quoted 24 lines
From a user's point of view, this is just a file copy-up and that should not result in losing security.capability xattr. Hence, before data copy up, save security.capability xattr (if any) and restore it on upper after data copy up is complete.
Signed-off-by Vivek Goyal <[email protected]>--- fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++- fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 1 + fs/overlayfs/util.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)Index:
rhvgoyal-linux/fs/overlayfs/util.c
===================================================================
---rhvgoyal-linux.orig/fs/overlayfs/util.c2019-01-28
14:42:10.499670636 -0500
+++rhvgoyal-linux/fs/overlayfs/util.c2019-01-29 14:45:49.747395201 -0500fs/overlayfs/util.c +0
-0@@ -912,3 +912,47 @@ invalid: res = -EINVAL ; goto err_free; }
Quoted 8 lines
fs/overlayfs/util.c invalid: · line 918
Quoted 5 lines
fs/overlayfs/util.c +4
-0+ +size_t ovl_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,char *name,void **value, +size_t *size) +{Please add padding arg and use this helper from
ovl_get_redirect_xattr.
Ok, will do.
Vivek