5.0.4-stable review
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 171/238 arm64: Fix HCR.TGE status for NMI contexts
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Julien Thierry <[email protected]>
commit 5870970b9a828d8693aa6d15742573289d7dbcd0 upstream.
When using VHE, the host needs to clear HCR_EL2.TGE bit in order to interact with guest TLBs, switching from EL2&0 translation regime to EL1&0.
However, some non-maskable asynchronous event could happen while TGE is cleared like SDEI. Because of this address translation operations relying on EL2&0 translation regime could fail (tlb invalidation, userspace access, ...).
Fix this by properly setting HCR_EL2.TGE when entering NMI context and clear it if necessary when returning to the interrupted context.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/hardirq.h | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/irq.c | 3 +++ include/linux/hardirq.h | 7 +++++++ 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/hardirq.h +31 -0
@@ -17,8 +17,12 @@#define __ASM_HARDIRQ_H#include <linux/cache.h> +#include <linux/percpu.h> #include <linux/threads.h> +#include <asm/barrier.h> #include <asm/irq.h> +#include <asm/kvm_arm.h> +#include <asm/sysreg.h> #define NR_IPI 7
@@ -37,6 +41,33 @@ u64 smp_irq_stat_cpu(unsigned int cpu);#define __ARCH_IRQ_EXIT_IRQS_DISABLED 1 +struct nmi_ctx { +u64 hcr; +}; + +DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct nmi_ctx, nmi_contexts); + +#define arch_nmi_enter () \ + do { \ + if (is_kernel_in_hyp_mode()) { \ + struct nmi_ctx *nmi_ctx = this_cpu_ptr(&nmi_contexts); \ + nmi_ctx->hcr = read_sysreg(hcr_el2); \ + if (!(nmi_ctx->hcr & HCR_TGE)) { \ + write_sysreg(nmi_ctx->hcr | HCR_TGE, hcr_el2); \ + isb(); \ + } \ + } \ + } while (0) + +#define arch_nmi_exit () \ + do { \ + if (is_kernel_in_hyp_mode()) { \ + struct nmi_ctx *nmi_ctx = this_cpu_ptr(&nmi_contexts); \ + if (!(nmi_ctx->hcr & HCR_TGE)) \ + write_sysreg(nmi_ctx->hcr, hcr_el2); \ + } \ + } while (0) +static inline void ack_bad_irq (unsigned int irq) {extern unsigned long irq_err_count;
arch/arm64/kernel/irq.c +3 -0
@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@unsigned long irq_err_count; +/* Only access this in an NMI enter/exit */ +DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct nmi_ctx, nmi_contexts); + DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long *, irq_stack_ptr);int arch_show_interrupts (struct seq_file *p,int prec)
include/linux/hardirq.h +7 -0
@@ -60,8 +60,14 @@ extern void irq_enter(void);*/ extern void irq_exit (void ); +#ifndef arch_nmi_enter +#define arch_nmi_enter () do { } while (0) +#define arch_nmi_exit () do { } while (0) +#endif +#define nmi_enter () \ do { \ + arch_nmi_enter(); \ printk_nmi_enter(); \ lockdep_off(); \ ftrace_nmi_enter(); \
@@ -80,6 +86,7 @@ extern void irq_exit(void);ftrace_nmi_exit (); \lockdep_on (); \printk_nmi_exit (); \ +arch_nmi_exit (); \ } while (0)#endif /* LINUX_HARDIRQ_H */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 1/238 9p: use inode->i_lock to protect i_size_write() under 32-bit
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
commit 5e3cc1ee1405a7eb3487ed24f786dec01b4cbe1f upstream.
Use inode->i_lock to protect i_size_write(), else i_size_read() in generic_fillattr() may loop infinitely in read_seqcount_begin() when multiple processes invoke v9fs_vfs_getattr() or v9fs_vfs_getattr_dotl() simultaneously under 32-bit SMP environment, and a soft lockup will be triggered as show below:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#5 stuck for 22s! [stat:2217] Modules linked in: CPU: 5 PID: 2217 Comm: stat Not tainted 5.0.0-rc1-00005-g7f702faf5a9e #4 Hardware name: Generic DT based system PC is at generic_fillattr+0x104/0x108 LR is at 0xec497f00 pc : [<802b8898>] lr : [<ec497f00>] psr: 200c0013 sp : ec497e20 ip : ed608030 fp : ec497e3c r10: 00000000 r9 : ec497f00 r8 : ed608030 r7 : ec497ebc r6 : ec497f00 r5 : ee5c1550 r4 : ee005780 r3 : 0000052d r2 : 00000000 r1 : ec497f00 r0 : ed608030 Flags: nzCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none Control: 10c5387d Table: ac48006a DAC: 00000051 CPU: 5 PID: 2217 Comm: stat Not tainted 5.0.0-rc1-00005-g7f702faf5a9e #4 Hardware name: Generic DT based system Backtrace: [<8010d974>] (dump_backtrace) from [<8010dc88>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) [<8010dc68>] (show_stack) from [<80a1d194>] (dump_stack+0xb0/0xdc) [<80a1d0e4>] (dump_stack) from [<80109f34>] (show_regs+0x1c/0x20) [<80109f18>] (show_regs) from [<801d0a80>] (watchdog_timer_fn+0x280/0x2f8) [<801d0800>] (watchdog_timer_fn) from [<80198658>] (__hrtimer_run_queues+0x18c/0x380) [<801984cc>] (__hrtimer_run_queues) from [<80198e60>] (hrtimer_run_queues+0xb8/0xf0) [<80198da8>] (hrtimer_run_queues) from [<801973e8>] (run_local_timers+0x28/0x64) [<801973c0>] (run_local_timers) from [<80197460>] (update_process_times+0x3c/0x6c) [<80197424>] (update_process_times) from [<801ab2b8>] (tick_nohz_handler+0xe0/0x1bc) [<801ab1d8>] (tick_nohz_handler) from [<80843050>] (arch_timer_handler_virt+0x38/0x48) [<80843018>] (arch_timer_handler_virt) from [<80180a64>] (handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x8c/0x240) [<801809d8>] (handle_percpu_devid_irq) from [<8017ac20>] (generic_handle_irq+0x34/0x44) [<8017abec>] (generic_handle_irq) from [<8017b344>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc4) [<8017b2d8>] (__handle_domain_irq) from [<801022e0>] (gic_handle_irq+0x4c/0x88) [<80102294>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<80101a30>] (__irq_svc+0x70/0x98) [<802b8794>] (generic_fillattr) from [<8056b284>] (v9fs_vfs_getattr_dotl+0x74/0xa4) [<8056b210>] (v9fs_vfs_getattr_dotl) from [<802b8904>] (vfs_getattr_nosec+0x68/0x7c) [<802b889c>] (vfs_getattr_nosec) from [<802b895c>] (vfs_getattr+0x44/0x48) [<802b8918>] (vfs_getattr) from [<802b8a74>] (vfs_statx+0x9c/0xec) [<802b89d8>] (vfs_statx) from [<802b9428>] (sys_lstat64+0x48/0x78) [<802b93e0>] (sys_lstat64) from [<80101000>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x28)
[[email protected]: updated comment to not refer to a function in another subsystem]
--- fs/9p/v9fs_vfs.h | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/9p/vfs_file.c | 6 +++++- fs/9p/vfs_inode.c | 23 +++++++++++------------ fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c | 27 ++++++++++++++------------- fs/9p/vfs_super.c | 4 ++-- 5 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
fs/9p/v9fs_vfs.h +21 -2
@@ -40,6 +40,9 @@*/ #define P9_LOCK_TIMEOUT (30*HZ) +/* flags for v9fs_stat2inode() & v9fs_stat2inode_dotl() */ +#define V9FS_STAT2INODE_KEEP_ISIZE 1 +extern struct file_system_type v9fs_fs_type;extern const struct address_space_operations v9fs_addr_operations;extern const struct file_operations v9fs_file_operations;
@@ -61,8 +64,10 @@ int v9fs_init_inode(struct v9fs_session_ struct inode *inode, umode_t mode, dev_t);void v9fs_evict_inode (struct inode *inode);ino_t v9fs_qid2ino (struct p9_qid *qid); -void v9fs_stat2inode (struct p9_wstat *,struct inode *,struct super_block *); -void v9fs_stat2inode_dotl (struct p9_stat_dotl *,struct inode *); +void v9fs_stat2inode (struct p9_wstat *stat,struct inode *inode, +struct super_block *sb,unsigned int flags); +void v9fs_stat2inode_dotl (struct p9_stat_dotl *stat,struct inode *inode, +unsigned int flags);int v9fs_dir_release (struct inode *inode,struct file *filp);int v9fs_file_open (struct inode *inode,struct file *file);void v9fs_inode2stat (struct inode *inode,struct p9_wstat *stat);
@@ -83,4 +88,18 @@ static inline void v9fs_invalidate_inode }int v9fs_open_to_dotl_flags (int flags); + +static inline void v9fs_i_size_write (struct inode *inode,loff_t i_size) +{ +/* +* 32-bit need the lock, concurrent updates could break the +* sequences and make i_size_read() loop forever. +* 64-bit updates are atomic and can skip the locking. +*/ +if (sizeof (i_size) >sizeof (long )) +spin_lock (&inode->i_lock); +i_size_write (inode, i_size); +if (sizeof (i_size) >sizeof (long )) +spin_unlock (&inode->i_lock); +}#endif
fs/9p/vfs_file.c +5 -1
@@ -446,7 +446,11 @@ v9fs_file_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, i_size =i_size_read (inode);if (iocb->ki_pos > i_size) {inode_add_bytes (inode, iocb->ki_pos - i_size); -i_size_write (inode, iocb->ki_pos); +/* +* Need to serialize against i_size_write() in +* v9fs_stat2inode() +*/ +v9fs_i_size_write (inode, iocb->ki_pos); }return retval; }
fs/9p/vfs_inode.c +11 -12
@@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ static struct inode *v9fs_qid_iget(strucif (retval) goto error; -v9fs_stat2inode (st, inode, sb); +v9fs_stat2inode (st, inode, sb,0 );v9fs_cache_inode_get_cookie (inode);unlock_new_inode (inode);return inode;
@@ -1092,7 +1092,7 @@ v9fs_vfs_getattr(const struct path *pathif (IS_ERR (st))return PTR_ERR (st); -v9fs_stat2inode (st,d_inode (dentry), dentry->d_sb); +v9fs_stat2inode (st,d_inode (dentry), dentry->d_sb,0 );generic_fillattr (d_inode (dentry), stat);p9stat_free (st);
@@ -1170,12 +1170,13 @@ static int v9fs_vfs_setattr(struct dentr* @stat: Plan 9 metadata (mistat) structure * @inode: inode to populate * @sb: superblock of filesystem +* @flags: control flags (e.g. V9FS_STAT2INODE_KEEP_ISIZE) * */ void v9fs_stat2inode (struct p9_wstat *stat,struct inode *inode, -struct super_block *sb) +struct super_block *sb,unsigned int flags) {umode_t mode;char ext[32 ];
@@ -1216,10 +1217,11 @@ v9fs_stat2inode(struct p9_wstat *stat, s mode =p9mode2perm (v9ses, stat); mode |= inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO ; inode->i_mode = mode; -i_size_write (inode, stat->length); +if (!(flags &V9FS_STAT2INODE_KEEP_ISIZE )) +v9fs_i_size_write (inode, stat->length);/* not real number of blocks, but 512 byte ones ... */ - inode->i_blocks = (i_size_read (inode) +512 -1 ) >>9 ; + inode->i_blocks = (stat->length +512 -1 ) >>9 ; v9inode->cache_validity &= ~V9FS_INO_INVALID_ATTR ; }
@@ -1416,9 +1418,9 @@ int v9fs_refresh_inode(struct p9_fid *fi {int umode;dev_t rdev; -loff_t i_size;struct p9_wstat *st;struct v9fs_session_info *v9ses; +unsigned int flags; v9ses =v9fs_inode2v9ses (inode); st =p9_client_stat (fid);
@@ -1431,16 +1433,13 @@ int v9fs_refresh_inode(struct p9_fid *fiif ((inode->i_mode &S_IFMT ) != (umode &S_IFMT )) goto out; -spin_lock (&inode->i_lock);/* * We don't want to refresh inode->i_size, * because we may have cached data */ - i_size = inode->i_size; -v9fs_stat2inode (st, inode, inode->i_sb); -if (v9ses->cache ==CACHE_LOOSE || v9ses->cache ==CACHE_FSCACHE ) - inode->i_size = i_size; -spin_unlock (&inode->i_lock); + flags = (v9ses->cache ==CACHE_LOOSE || v9ses->cache ==CACHE_FSCACHE ) ? +V9FS_STAT2INODE_KEEP_ISIZE :0 ; +v9fs_stat2inode (st, inode, inode->i_sb, flags); out:p9stat_free (st);kfree (st);
fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c +14 -13
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ static struct inode *v9fs_qid_iget_dotl(if (retval) goto error; -v9fs_stat2inode_dotl (st, inode); +v9fs_stat2inode_dotl (st, inode,0 );v9fs_cache_inode_get_cookie (inode); retval =v9fs_get_acl (inode, fid);if (retval)
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ v9fs_vfs_getattr_dotl(const struct pathif (IS_ERR (st))return PTR_ERR (st); -v9fs_stat2inode_dotl (st,d_inode (dentry)); +v9fs_stat2inode_dotl (st,d_inode (dentry),0 );generic_fillattr (d_inode (dentry), stat);/* Change block size to what the server returned */ stat->blksize = st->st_blksize;
@@ -607,11 +607,13 @@ int v9fs_vfs_setattr_dotl(struct dentry* v9fs_stat2inode_dotl - populate an inode structure with stat info * @stat: stat structure * @inode: inode to populate +* @flags: ctrl flags (e.g. V9FS_STAT2INODE_KEEP_ISIZE) * */ void -v9fs_stat2inode_dotl (struct p9_stat_dotl *stat,struct inode *inode) +v9fs_stat2inode_dotl (struct p9_stat_dotl *stat,struct inode *inode, +unsigned int flags) {umode_t mode;struct v9fs_inode *v9inode =V9FS_I (inode);
@@ -631,7 +633,8 @@ v9fs_stat2inode_dotl(struct p9_stat_dotl mode |= inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO ; inode->i_mode = mode; -i_size_write (inode, stat->st_size); +if (!(flags &V9FS_STAT2INODE_KEEP_ISIZE )) +v9fs_i_size_write (inode, stat->st_size); inode->i_blocks = stat->st_blocks; }else {if (stat->st_result_mask &P9_STATS_ATIME ) {
@@ -661,8 +664,9 @@ v9fs_stat2inode_dotl(struct p9_stat_dotl }if (stat->st_result_mask &P9_STATS_RDEV ) inode->i_rdev =new_decode_dev (stat->st_rdev); -if (stat->st_result_mask &P9_STATS_SIZE ) -i_size_write (inode, stat->st_size); +if (!(flags &V9FS_STAT2INODE_KEEP_ISIZE ) && + stat->st_result_mask &P9_STATS_SIZE ) +v9fs_i_size_write (inode, stat->st_size);if (stat->st_result_mask &P9_STATS_BLOCKS ) inode->i_blocks = stat->st_blocks; }
@@ -928,9 +932,9 @@ v9fs_vfs_get_link_dotl(struct dentry *deint v9fs_refresh_inode_dotl (struct p9_fid *fid,struct inode *inode) { -loff_t i_size;struct p9_stat_dotl *st;struct v9fs_session_info *v9ses; +unsigned int flags; v9ses =v9fs_inode2v9ses (inode); st =p9_client_getattr_dotl (fid,P9_STATS_ALL );
@@ -942,16 +946,13 @@ int v9fs_refresh_inode_dotl(struct p9_fiif ((inode->i_mode &S_IFMT ) != (st->st_mode &S_IFMT )) goto out; -spin_lock (&inode->i_lock);/* * We don't want to refresh inode->i_size, * because we may have cached data */ - i_size = inode->i_size; -v9fs_stat2inode_dotl (st, inode); -if (v9ses->cache ==CACHE_LOOSE || v9ses->cache ==CACHE_FSCACHE ) - inode->i_size = i_size; -spin_unlock (&inode->i_lock); + flags = (v9ses->cache ==CACHE_LOOSE || v9ses->cache ==CACHE_FSCACHE ) ? +V9FS_STAT2INODE_KEEP_ISIZE :0 ; +v9fs_stat2inode_dotl (st, inode, flags); out:kfree (st);return 0 ;
fs/9p/vfs_super.c +2 -2
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static struct dentry *v9fs_mount(struct goto release_sb; }d_inode (root)->i_ino =v9fs_qid2ino (&st->qid); -v9fs_stat2inode_dotl (st,d_inode (root)); +v9fs_stat2inode_dotl (st,d_inode (root),0 );kfree (st); }else {struct p9_wstat *st =NULL ;
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ static struct dentry *v9fs_mount(struct }d_inode (root)->i_ino =v9fs_qid2ino (&st->qid); -v9fs_stat2inode (st,d_inode (root), sb); +v9fs_stat2inode (st,d_inode (root), sb,0 );p9stat_free (st);kfree (st);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 10/238 stm class: Prevent division by zero
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
commit bf7cbaae0831252b416f375ca9b1027ecd4642dd upstream.
Using STP_POLICY_ID_SET ioctl command with dummy_stm device, or any STM device that supplies zero mmio channel size, will trigger a division by zero bug in the kernel.
Prevent this by disallowing channel widths other than 1 for such devices.
--- drivers/hwtracing/stm/core.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/hwtracing/stm/core.c +5 -3
@@ -732,7 +732,7 @@ static int stm_char_policy_set_ioctl(strstruct stm_device *stm = stmf->stm;struct stp_policy_id *id;char *ids[] = {NULL ,NULL }; -int ret = -EINVAL ; +int ret = -EINVAL , wlimit =1 ;u32 size;if (stmf->output.nr_chans)
@@ -760,8 +760,10 @@ static int stm_char_policy_set_ioctl(strif (id->__reserved_0 || id->__reserved_1) goto err_free; -if (id->width <1 || - id->width >PAGE_SIZE / stm->data->sw_mmiosz) +if (stm->data->sw_mmiosz) + wlimit =PAGE_SIZE / stm->data->sw_mmiosz; + +if (id->width <1 || id->width > wlimit) goto err_free; ids[0 ] = id->id;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 11/238 stm class: Fix an endless loop in channel allocation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhi Jin <[email protected]>
commit a1d75dad3a2c689e70a1c4e0214cca9de741d0aa upstream.
There is a bug in the channel allocation logic that leads to an endless loop when looking for a contiguous range of channels in a range with a mixture of free and occupied channels. For example, opening three consequtive channels, closing the first two and requesting 4 channels in a row will trigger this soft lockup. The bug is that the search loop forgets to skip over the range once it detects that one channel in that range is occupied.
Restore the original intent to the logic by fixing the omission.
--- drivers/hwtracing/stm/core.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/hwtracing/stm/core.c +3 -0
@@ -244,6 +244,9 @@ static int find_free_channels(unsigned l ;if (i == width)return pos; + +/* step over [pos..pos+i) to continue search */ + pos += i; }return -1 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 12/238 crypto: caam - fix hash context DMA unmap size
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Franck LENORMAND <[email protected]>
commit 65055e2108847af5e577cc7ce6bde45ea136d29a upstream.
When driver started using state->caam_ctxt for storing both running hash and final hash, it was not updated to handle different DMA unmap lengths.
--- drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c +5 -3
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ struct caam_hash_ctx {struct caam_hash_state {dma_addr_t buf_dma;dma_addr_t ctx_dma; +int ctx_dma_len;u8 buf_0[CAAM_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE ]____cacheline_aligned ;int buflen_0;u8 buf_1[CAAM_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE ]____cacheline_aligned ;
@@ -165,6 +166,7 @@ static inline int map_seq_out_ptr_ctx(u3 struct caam_hash_state *state, int ctx_len) { + state->ctx_dma_len = ctx_len; state->ctx_dma =dma_map_single (jrdev, state->caam_ctx, ctx_len,DMA_FROM_DEVICE );if (dma_mapping_error (jrdev, state->ctx_dma)) {
@@ -218,6 +220,7 @@ static inline int ctx_map_to_sec4_sg(str struct caam_hash_state *state, int ctx_len, struct sec4_sg_entry *sec4_sg, u32 flag) { + state->ctx_dma_len = ctx_len; state->ctx_dma =dma_map_single (jrdev, state->caam_ctx, ctx_len, flag);if (dma_mapping_error (jrdev, state->ctx_dma)) {dev_err (jrdev,"unable to map ctx\n" );
@@ -468,12 +471,10 @@ static inline void ahash_unmap_ctx(strucstruct ahash_edesc *edesc, struct ahash_request *req, int dst_len, u32 flag) { - struct crypto_ahash *ahash = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req); -struct caam_hash_ctx *ctx =crypto_ahash_ctx (ahash); struct caam_hash_state *state = ahash_request_ctx(req);if (state->ctx_dma) { -dma_unmap_single (dev, state->ctx_dma, ctx->ctx_len, flag); +dma_unmap_single (dev, state->ctx_dma, state->ctx_dma_len, flag); state->ctx_dma =0 ; }ahash_unmap (dev, edesc, req, dst_len);
@@ -1446,6 +1447,7 @@ static int ahash_init(struct ahash_reque state->final = ahash_final_no_ctx; state->ctx_dma =0 ; + state->ctx_dma_len =0 ; state->current_buf =0 ; state->buf_dma =0 ; state->buflen_0 =0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 13/238 crypto: ccree - fix missing break in switch statement
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
commit b5be853181a8d4a6e20f2073ccd273d6280cad88 upstream.
Add missing break statement in order to prevent the code from falling through to case S_DIN_to_DES.
This bug was found thanks to the ongoing efforts to enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough.
--- drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_cipher.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_cipher.c +1 -0
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ static int validate_keys_sizes(struct ccdefault :break ; } +break ;case S_DIN_to_DES:if (size ==DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE || size ==DES_KEY_SIZE )return 0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 15/238 crypto: caam - fix DMA mapping of stack memory
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Horia Geantă <[email protected]>
commit c19650d6ea99bcd903d3e55dd61860026c701339 upstream.
Roland reports the following issue and provides a root cause analysis:
"On a v4.19 i.MX6 system with IMA and CONFIG_DMA_API_DEBUG enabled, a warning is generated when accessing files on a filesystem for which IMA measurement is enabled:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at kernel/dma/debug.c:1181 check_for_stack.part.9+0xd0/0x120
caam_jr 2101000.jr0: DMA-API: device driver maps memory from stack [addr=b668049e]
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: switch_root Not tainted 4.19.0-20181214-1 #2
Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree)
Backtrace:
[<c010efb8>] (dump_backtrace) from [<c010f2d0>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[<c010f2b0>] (show_stack) from [<c08b04f4>] (dump_stack+0xa0/0xcc)
[<c08b0454>] (dump_stack) from [<c012b610>] (__warn+0xf0/0x108)
[<c012b520>] (__warn) from [<c012b680>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x58/0x74)
[<c012b62c>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c0199acc>] (check_for_stack.part.9+0xd0/0x120)
[<c01999fc>] (check_for_stack.part.9) from [<c019a040>] (debug_dma_map_page+0x144/0x174)
[<c0199efc>] (debug_dma_map_page) from [<c065f7f4>] (ahash_final_ctx+0x5b4/0xcf0)
[<c065f240>] (ahash_final_ctx) from [<c065b3c4>] (ahash_final+0x1c/0x20)
[<c065b3a8>] (ahash_final) from [<c03fe278>] (crypto_ahash_op+0x38/0x80)
[<c03fe240>] (crypto_ahash_op) from [<c03fe2e0>] (crypto_ahash_final+0x20/0x24)
[<c03fe2c0>] (crypto_ahash_final) from [<c03f19a8>] (ima_calc_file_hash+0x29c/0xa40)
[<c03f170c>] (ima_calc_file_hash) from [<c03f2b24>] (ima_collect_measurement+0x1dc/0x240)
[<c03f2948>] (ima_collect_measurement) from [<c03f0a60>] (process_measurement+0x4c4/0x6b8)
[<c03f059c>] (process_measurement) from [<c03f0cdc>] (ima_file_check+0x88/0xa4)
[<c03f0c54>] (ima_file_check) from [<c02d8adc>] (path_openat+0x5d8/0x1364)
[<c02d8504>] (path_openat) from [<c02dad24>] (do_filp_open+0x84/0xf0)
[<c02daca0>] (do_filp_open) from [<c02cf50c>] (do_open_execat+0x84/0x1b0)
[<c02cf488>] (do_open_execat) from [<c02d1058>] (__do_execve_file+0x43c/0x890)
[<c02d0c1c>] (__do_execve_file) from [<c02d1770>] (sys_execve+0x44/0x4c)
[<c02d172c>] (sys_execve) from [<c0101000>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x28)
---[ end trace 3455789a10e3aefd ]---The cause is that the struct ahash_request *req is created as a stack-local variable up in the stack (presumably somewhere in the IMA implementation), then passed down into the CAAM driver, which tries to dma_single_map the req->result (indirectly via map_seq_out_ptr_result) in order to make that buffer available for the CAAM to store the result of the following hash operation.
The calling code doesn't know how req will be used by the CAAM driver, and there could be other such occurrences where stack memory is passed down to the CAAM driver. Therefore we should rather fix this issue in the CAAM driver where the requirements are known."
Fix this problem by:
-instructing the crypto engine to write the final hash in state->caam_ctx -subsequently memcpy-ing the final hash into req->result
--- drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c | 85 ++++++++++------------------------------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c +21 -64
@@ -180,18 +180,6 @@ static inline int map_seq_out_ptr_ctx(u3return 0 ; } -/* Map req->result, and append seq_out_ptr command that points to it */ -static inline dma_addr_t map_seq_out_ptr_result (u32 *desc,struct device *jrdev, -u8 *result,int digestsize) -{ -dma_addr_t dst_dma; - - dst_dma =dma_map_single (jrdev, result, digestsize,DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); -append_seq_out_ptr (desc, dst_dma, digestsize,0 ); - -return dst_dma; -} -/* Map current buffer in state (if length > 0) and put it in link table */ static inline int buf_map_to_sec4_sg(struct device *jrdev, struct sec4_sg_entry *sec4_sg,
@@ -429,7 +417,6 @@ static int ahash_setkey(struct crypto_ah/* * ahash_edesc - s/w-extended ahash descriptor -* @dst_dma: physical mapped address of req->result * @sec4_sg_dma: physical mapped address of h/w link table * @src_nents: number of segments in input scatterlist * @sec4_sg_bytes: length of dma mapped sec4_sg space
@@ -437,7 +424,6 @@ static int ahash_setkey(struct crypto_ah* @sec4_sg: h/w link table */ struct ahash_edesc { -dma_addr_t dst_dma;dma_addr_t sec4_sg_dma;int src_nents;int sec4_sg_bytes;
@@ -453,8 +439,6 @@ static inline void ahash_unmap(struct deif (edesc->src_nents)dma_unmap_sg (dev, req->src, edesc->src_nents,DMA_TO_DEVICE ); -if (edesc->dst_dma) -dma_unmap_single (dev, edesc->dst_dma, dst_len,DMA_FROM_DEVICE );if (edesc->sec4_sg_bytes) dma_unmap_single(dev, edesc->sec4_sg_dma,
@@ -487,9 +471,9 @@ static void ahash_done(struct device *jrstruct ahash_edesc *edesc;struct crypto_ahash *ahash =crypto_ahash_reqtfm (req);int digestsize =crypto_ahash_digestsize (ahash); +struct caam_hash_state *state =ahash_request_ctx (req);#ifdef DEBUG struct caam_hash_ctx *ctx =crypto_ahash_ctx (ahash); -struct caam_hash_state *state =ahash_request_ctx (req);dev_err (jrdev,"%s %d: err 0x%x\n" , __func__, __LINE__, err);#endif
@@ -498,17 +482,14 @@ static void ahash_done(struct device *jrif (err)caam_jr_strstatus (jrdev, err); -ahash_unmap (jrdev, edesc, req, digestsize); +ahash_unmap_ctx (jrdev, edesc, req, digestsize,DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); +memcpy (req->result, state->caam_ctx, digestsize);kfree (edesc);#ifdef DEBUG print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "ctx@"__stringify(__LINE__)": ",DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS ,16 ,4 , state->caam_ctx, ctx->ctx_len,1 ); -if (req->result) - print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "result@"__stringify(__LINE__)": ", -DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS ,16 ,4 , req->result, - digestsize,1 );#endif req->base.complete (&req->base, err);
@@ -556,9 +537,9 @@ static void ahash_done_ctx_src(struct destruct ahash_edesc *edesc;struct crypto_ahash *ahash =crypto_ahash_reqtfm (req);int digestsize =crypto_ahash_digestsize (ahash); +struct caam_hash_state *state =ahash_request_ctx (req);#ifdef DEBUG struct caam_hash_ctx *ctx =crypto_ahash_ctx (ahash); -struct caam_hash_state *state =ahash_request_ctx (req);dev_err (jrdev,"%s %d: err 0x%x\n" , __func__, __LINE__, err);#endif
@@ -567,17 +548,14 @@ static void ahash_done_ctx_src(struct deif (err)caam_jr_strstatus (jrdev, err); -ahash_unmap_ctx (jrdev, edesc, req, digestsize,DMA_TO_DEVICE ); +ahash_unmap_ctx (jrdev, edesc, req, digestsize,DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL ); +memcpy (req->result, state->caam_ctx, digestsize);kfree (edesc);#ifdef DEBUG print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "ctx@"__stringify(__LINE__)": ",DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS ,16 ,4 , state->caam_ctx, ctx->ctx_len,1 ); -if (req->result) - print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "result@"__stringify(__LINE__)": ", -DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS ,16 ,4 , req->result, - digestsize,1 );#endif req->base.complete (&req->base, err);
@@ -838,7 +816,7 @@ static int ahash_final_ctx(struct ahash_ edesc->sec4_sg_bytes = sec4_sg_bytes; ret =ctx_map_to_sec4_sg (jrdev, state, ctx->ctx_len, - edesc->sec4_sg,DMA_TO_DEVICE ); + edesc->sec4_sg,DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL );if (ret) goto unmap_ctx;
@@ -858,14 +836,7 @@ static int ahash_final_ctx(struct ahash_append_seq_in_ptr (desc, edesc->sec4_sg_dma, ctx->ctx_len + buflen,LDST_SGF ); - - edesc->dst_dma =map_seq_out_ptr_result (desc, jrdev, req->result, - digestsize); -if (dma_mapping_error (jrdev, edesc->dst_dma)) { -dev_err (jrdev,"unable to map dst\n" ); - ret = -ENOMEM ; - goto unmap_ctx; - } +append_seq_out_ptr (desc, state->ctx_dma, digestsize,0 );#ifdef DEBUG print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "jobdesc@"__stringify(__LINE__)": ",
@@ -878,7 +849,7 @@ static int ahash_final_ctx(struct ahash_return -EINPROGRESS ; unmap_ctx: -ahash_unmap_ctx (jrdev, edesc, req, digestsize,DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); +ahash_unmap_ctx (jrdev, edesc, req, digestsize,DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL );kfree (edesc);return ret; }
@@ -932,7 +903,7 @@ static int ahash_finup_ctx(struct ahash_ edesc->src_nents = src_nents; ret =ctx_map_to_sec4_sg (jrdev, state, ctx->ctx_len, - edesc->sec4_sg,DMA_TO_DEVICE ); + edesc->sec4_sg,DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL );if (ret) goto unmap_ctx;
@@ -946,13 +917,7 @@ static int ahash_finup_ctx(struct ahash_if (ret) goto unmap_ctx; - edesc->dst_dma =map_seq_out_ptr_result (desc, jrdev, req->result, - digestsize); -if (dma_mapping_error (jrdev, edesc->dst_dma)) { -dev_err (jrdev,"unable to map dst\n" ); - ret = -ENOMEM ; - goto unmap_ctx; - } +append_seq_out_ptr (desc, state->ctx_dma, digestsize,0 );#ifdef DEBUG print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "jobdesc@"__stringify(__LINE__)": ",
@@ -965,7 +930,7 @@ static int ahash_finup_ctx(struct ahash_return -EINPROGRESS ; unmap_ctx: -ahash_unmap_ctx (jrdev, edesc, req, digestsize,DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); +ahash_unmap_ctx (jrdev, edesc, req, digestsize,DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL );kfree (edesc);return ret; }
@@ -1024,10 +989,8 @@ static int ahash_digest(struct ahash_req desc = edesc->hw_desc; - edesc->dst_dma =map_seq_out_ptr_result (desc, jrdev, req->result, - digestsize); -if (dma_mapping_error (jrdev, edesc->dst_dma)) { -dev_err (jrdev,"unable to map dst\n" ); + ret =map_seq_out_ptr_ctx (desc, jrdev, state, digestsize); +if (ret) {ahash_unmap (jrdev, edesc, req, digestsize);kfree (edesc);return -ENOMEM ;
@@ -1042,7 +1005,7 @@ static int ahash_digest(struct ahash_reqif (!ret) { ret = -EINPROGRESS ; }else { -ahash_unmap (jrdev, edesc, req, digestsize); +ahash_unmap_ctx (jrdev, edesc, req, digestsize,DMA_FROM_DEVICE );kfree (edesc); }
@@ -1084,12 +1047,9 @@ static int ahash_final_no_ctx(struct ahaappend_seq_in_ptr (desc, state->buf_dma, buflen,0 ); } - edesc->dst_dma =map_seq_out_ptr_result (desc, jrdev, req->result, - digestsize); -if (dma_mapping_error (jrdev, edesc->dst_dma)) { -dev_err (jrdev,"unable to map dst\n" ); + ret =map_seq_out_ptr_ctx (desc, jrdev, state, digestsize); +if (ret) goto unmap; - }#ifdef DEBUG print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "jobdesc@"__stringify(__LINE__)": ",
@@ -1100,7 +1060,7 @@ static int ahash_final_no_ctx(struct ahaif (!ret) { ret = -EINPROGRESS ; }else { -ahash_unmap (jrdev, edesc, req, digestsize); +ahash_unmap_ctx (jrdev, edesc, req, digestsize,DMA_FROM_DEVICE );kfree (edesc); }
@@ -1299,12 +1259,9 @@ static int ahash_finup_no_ctx(struct aha goto unmap; } - edesc->dst_dma =map_seq_out_ptr_result (desc, jrdev, req->result, - digestsize); -if (dma_mapping_error (jrdev, edesc->dst_dma)) { -dev_err (jrdev,"unable to map dst\n" ); + ret =map_seq_out_ptr_ctx (desc, jrdev, state, digestsize); +if (ret) goto unmap; - }#ifdef DEBUG print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "jobdesc@"__stringify(__LINE__)": ",
@@ -1315,7 +1272,7 @@ static int ahash_finup_no_ctx(struct ahaif (!ret) { ret = -EINPROGRESS ; }else { -ahash_unmap (jrdev, edesc, req, digestsize); +ahash_unmap_ctx (jrdev, edesc, req, digestsize,DMA_FROM_DEVICE );kfree (edesc); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 16/238 crypto: ccree - fix free of unallocated mlli buffer
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hadar Gat <[email protected]>
commit a49411959ea6d4915a9fd2a7eb5ba220e6284e9a upstream.
In cc_unmap_aead_request(), call dma_pool_free() for mlli buffer only if an item is allocated from the pool and not always if there is a pool allocated.
This fixes a kernel panic when trying to free a non-allocated item.
--- drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c +4 -4
@@ -614,10 +614,10 @@ void cc_unmap_aead_request(struct device hw_iv_size, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); } -/*In case a pool was set, a table was -*allocated and should be released -*/ -if (areq_ctx->mlli_params.curr_pool) { +/* Release pool */ +if ((areq_ctx->assoc_buff_type ==CC_DMA_BUF_MLLI || + areq_ctx->data_buff_type ==CC_DMA_BUF_MLLI ) && + (areq_ctx->mlli_params.mlli_virt_addr)) {dev_dbg (dev,"free MLLI buffer: dma=%pad virt=%pK\n" , &areq_ctx->mlli_params.mlli_dma_addr, areq_ctx->mlli_params.mlli_virt_addr);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 18/238 crypto: ccree - dont copy zero size ciphertext
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
commit 2b5ac17463dcb2411fed506edcf259a89bb538ba upstream.
For decryption in CBC mode we need to save the last ciphertext block for use as the next IV. However, we were trying to do this also with zero sized ciphertext resulting in a panic.
Fix this by only doing the copy if the ciphertext length is at least of IV size.
--- drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_cipher.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_cipher.c +2 -1
@@ -801,7 +801,8 @@ static int cc_cipher_decrypt(struct skcimemset (req_ctx,0 ,sizeof (*req_ctx)); -if (ctx_p->cipher_mode ==DRV_CIPHER_CBC ) { +if ((ctx_p->cipher_mode ==DRV_CIPHER_CBC ) && + (req->cryptlen >= ivsize)) {/* Allocate and save the last IV sized bytes of the source, * which will be lost in case of in-place decryption.
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 2/238 9p/net: fix memory leak in p9_client_create
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: zhengbin <[email protected]>
commit bb06c388fa20ae24cfe80c52488de718a7e3a53f upstream.
If msize is less than 4096, we should close and put trans, destroy tagpool, not just free client. This patch fixes that.
--- net/9p/client.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/9p/client.c +1 -1
@@ -1061,7 +1061,7 @@ struct p9_client *p9_client_create(constp9_debug (P9_DEBUG_ERROR ,"Please specify a msize of at least 4k\n" ); err = -EINVAL ; - goto free_client; + goto close_trans; } err =p9_client_version (clnt);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 4/238 ASoC: codecs: pcm186x: fix wrong usage of DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Codrin Ciubotariu <[email protected]>
commit fcf4daabf08079e6d09958a2992e7446ef8d0438 upstream.
According to DS, the gain is between -12 dB and 40 dB, with a 0.5 dB step. Tested on pcm1863.
--- sound/soc/codecs/pcm186x.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/soc/codecs/pcm186x.c +1 -1
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ struct pcm186x_priv {bool is_master_mode; }; -static const DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(pcm186x_pga_tlv, -1200, 4000, 50); +static const DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(pcm186x_pga_tlv, -1200, 50, 0);static const struct snd_kcontrol_new pcm1863_snd_controls[] = { SOC_DOUBLE_R_S_TLV("ADC Capture Volume", PCM186X_PGA_VAL_CH1_L,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 5/238 ASoC: codecs: pcm186x: Fix energysense SLEEP bit
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Codrin Ciubotariu <[email protected]>
commit 05bd7fcdd06b19a10f069af1bea3ad9abac038d7 upstream.
The ADCs are sleeping when the SLEEP bit is set and running when it's cleared, so the bit should be inverted.
Tested on pcm1863.
--- sound/soc/codecs/pcm186x.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
sound/soc/codecs/pcm186x.c +3 -3
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static const struct snd_soc_dapm_widget* Put the codec into SLEEP mode when not in use, allowing the * Energysense mechanism to operate. */ - SND_SOC_DAPM_ADC("ADC", "HiFi Capture", PCM186X_POWER_CTRL, 1, 0), + SND_SOC_DAPM_ADC("ADC", "HiFi Capture", PCM186X_POWER_CTRL, 1, 1), };static const struct snd_soc_dapm_widget pcm1865_dapm_widgets[] = {
@@ -184,8 +184,8 @@ static const struct snd_soc_dapm_widget* Put the codec into SLEEP mode when not in use, allowing the * Energysense mechanism to operate. */ -SND_SOC_DAPM_ADC ("ADC1" ,"HiFi Capture 1" ,PCM186X_POWER_CTRL ,1 ,0 ), - SND_SOC_DAPM_ADC("ADC2", "HiFi Capture 2", PCM186X_POWER_CTRL, 1, 0), +SND_SOC_DAPM_ADC ("ADC1" ,"HiFi Capture 1" ,PCM186X_POWER_CTRL ,1 ,1 ), + SND_SOC_DAPM_ADC("ADC2", "HiFi Capture 2", PCM186X_POWER_CTRL, 1, 1), }; static const struct snd_soc_dapm_route pcm1863_dapm_routes[] = {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 6/238 iio: adc: exynos-adc: Fix NULL pointer exception on unbind
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
commit 2ea8bab4dd2a9014e723b28091831fa850b82d83 upstream.
Fix NULL pointer exception on device unbind when device tree does not contain "has-touchscreen" property. In such case the input device is not registered so it should not be unregistered.
$ echo "12d10000.adc" > /sys/bus/platform/drivers/exynos-adc/unbind
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000474
...
(input_unregister_device) from [<c0772060>] (exynos_adc_remove+0x20/0x80)
(exynos_adc_remove) from [<c0587d5c>] (platform_drv_remove+0x20/0x40)
(platform_drv_remove) from [<c05860f0>] (device_release_driver_internal+0xdc/0x1ac)
(device_release_driver_internal) from [<c0583ecc>] (unbind_store+0x60/0xd4)
(unbind_store) from [<c031b89c>] (kernfs_fop_write+0x100/0x1e0)
(kernfs_fop_write) from [<c029709c>] (__vfs_write+0x2c/0x17c)
(__vfs_write) from [<c0297374>] (vfs_write+0xa4/0x184)
(vfs_write) from [<c0297594>] (ksys_write+0x4c/0xac)
(ksys_write) from [<c0101000>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x28)--- drivers/iio/adc/exynos_adc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iio/adc/exynos_adc.c +1 -1
@@ -929,7 +929,7 @@ static int exynos_adc_remove(struct platstruct iio_dev *indio_dev =platform_get_drvdata (pdev);struct exynos_adc *info =iio_priv (indio_dev); -if (IS_REACHABLE (CONFIG_INPUT )) { +if (IS_REACHABLE (CONFIG_INPUT ) && info->input) {free_irq (info->tsirq, info);input_unregister_device (info->input); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 8/238 mei: hbm: clean the feature flags on link reset
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexander Usyskin <[email protected]>
commit 37fd0b623023484ef6df79ed46f21f06ecc611ff upstream.
The list of supported functions can be altered upon link reset, clean the flags to allow correct selections of supported features.
--- drivers/misc/mei/hbm.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/misc/mei/hbm.c +7 -0
@@ -1029,29 +1029,36 @@ static void mei_hbm_config_features(stru dev->version.minor_version >= HBM_MINOR_VERSION_PGI) dev->hbm_f_pg_supported = 1; + dev->hbm_f_dc_supported =0 ;if (dev->version.major_version >=HBM_MAJOR_VERSION_DC ) dev->hbm_f_dc_supported =1 ; + dev->hbm_f_ie_supported =0 ;if (dev->version.major_version >=HBM_MAJOR_VERSION_IE ) dev->hbm_f_ie_supported =1 ;/* disconnect on connect timeout instead of link reset */ + dev->hbm_f_dot_supported =0 ;if (dev->version.major_version >=HBM_MAJOR_VERSION_DOT ) dev->hbm_f_dot_supported =1 ;/* Notification Event Support */ + dev->hbm_f_ev_supported =0 ;if (dev->version.major_version >=HBM_MAJOR_VERSION_EV ) dev->hbm_f_ev_supported =1 ;/* Fixed Address Client Support */ + dev->hbm_f_fa_supported =0 ;if (dev->version.major_version >=HBM_MAJOR_VERSION_FA ) dev->hbm_f_fa_supported =1 ;/* OS ver message Support */ + dev->hbm_f_os_supported =0 ;if (dev->version.major_version >=HBM_MAJOR_VERSION_OS ) dev->hbm_f_os_supported =1 ;/* DMA Ring Support */ + dev->hbm_f_dr_supported =0 ;if (dev->version.major_version >HBM_MAJOR_VERSION_DR || (dev->version.major_version ==HBM_MAJOR_VERSION_DR && dev->version.minor_version >=HBM_MINOR_VERSION_DR ))
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 9/238 mei: bus: move hw module get/put to probe/release
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexander Usyskin <[email protected]>
commit b5958faa34e2f99f3475ad89c52d98dfea079d33 upstream.
Fix unbalanced module reference counting during internal reset, which prevents the drivers unloading.
Tracking mei_me/txe modules on mei client bus via mei_cldev_enable/disable is error prone due to possible internal reset flow, where clients are disconnected underneath. Moving reference counting to probe and release of mei bus client driver solves this issue in simplest way, as each client provides only a single connection to a client bus driver.
--- drivers/misc/mei/bus.c | 21 ++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/misc/mei/bus.c +10 -11
@@ -541,17 +541,9 @@ int mei_cldev_enable(struct mei_cl_devic goto out; } -if (!mei_cl_bus_module_get (cldev)) { -dev_err (&cldev->dev,"get hw module failed" ); - ret = -ENODEV ; - goto out; - } - ret =mei_cl_connect (cl, cldev->me_cl,NULL ); -if (ret <0 ) { +if (ret <0 )dev_err (&cldev->dev,"cannot connect\n" ); -mei_cl_bus_module_put (cldev); - } out:mutex_unlock (&bus->device_lock);
@@ -614,7 +606,6 @@ int mei_cldev_disable(struct mei_cl_deviif (err <0 )dev_err (bus->dev,"Could not disconnect from the ME client\n" ); -mei_cl_bus_module_put (cldev); out:/* Flush queues and remove any pending read */ mei_cl_flush_queues (cl,NULL );
@@ -725,9 +716,16 @@ static int mei_cl_device_probe(struct deif (!id)return -ENODEV ; +if (!mei_cl_bus_module_get (cldev)) { +dev_err (&cldev->dev,"get hw module failed" ); +return -ENODEV ; + } + ret = cldrv->probe (cldev, id); -if (ret) +if (ret) { +mei_cl_bus_module_put (cldev);return ret; + }__module_get (THIS_MODULE );return 0 ;
@@ -755,6 +753,7 @@ static int mei_cl_device_remove(struct dmei_cldev_unregister_callbacks (cldev); +mei_cl_bus_module_put (cldev);module_put (THIS_MODULE ); dev->driver =NULL ;return ret;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainercover 5.0.4-stable review
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.0.4 release. There are 238 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun Mar 24 11:11:13 UTC 2019. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.0.4-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.0.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 5.0.4-rc1
Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
SUNRPC: Respect RPC call timeouts when retrying transmission
Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
SUNRPC: Fix up RPC back channel transmission
Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
SUNRPC: Prevent thundering herd when the socket is not connected
Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
s390/setup: fix boot crash for machine without EDAT-1
Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
net: dsa: lantiq_gswip: fix OF child-node lookups
Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
net: dsa: lantiq_gswip: fix use-after-free on failed probe
Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM: nVMX: Check a single byte for VMCS "launched" in nested early checks
Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM: nVMX: Ignore limit checks on VMX instructions using flat segments
Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM: nVMX: Apply addr size mask to effective address for VMX instructions
Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM: nVMX: Sign extend displacements of VMX instr's mem operands
Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM: x86/mmu: Do not cache MMIO accesses while memslots are in flux
Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM: x86/mmu: Detect MMIO generation wrap in any address space
Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM: VMX: Zero out *all* general purpose registers after VM-Exit
Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM: VMX: Compare only a single byte for VMCS' "launched" in vCPU-run
Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM: Call kvm_arch_memslots_updated() before updating memslots
Harry Wentland <[email protected]>
drm/amd/display: don't call dm_pp_ function from an fpu block
Evan Quan <[email protected]>
drm/amd/powerplay: correct power reading on fiji
Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
drm/radeon/evergreen_cs: fix missing break in switch statement
Noralf Trønnes <[email protected]>
drm/fb-helper: generic: Fix drm_fbdev_client_restore()
Steve Longerbeam <[email protected]>
media: imx: csi: Stop upstream before disabling IDMA channel
Steve Longerbeam <[email protected]>
media: imx: csi: Disable CSI immediately after last EOF
Steve Longerbeam <[email protected]>
media: imx-csi: Input connections to CSI should be optional
Lucas A. M. Magalhães <[email protected]>
media: vimc: Add vimc-streamer for stream control
Sakari Ailus <[email protected]>
media: uvcvideo: Avoid NULL pointer dereference at the end of streaming
Chen-Yu Tsai <[email protected]>
media: sun6i: Fix CSI regmap's max_register
French, Nicholas A <[email protected]>
media: lgdt330x: fix lock status reporting
Steve Longerbeam <[email protected]>
media: imx: prpencvf: Stop upstream before disabling IDMA channel
Zhang, Jun <[email protected]>
rcu: Do RCU GP kthread self-wakeup from softirq and interrupt
Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
tpm: Unify the send callback behaviour
Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
tpm/tpm_crb: Avoid unaligned reads in crb_recv()
Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>
x86/ftrace: Fix warning and considate ftrace_jmp_replace() and ftrace_call_replace()
Pavel Tatashin <[email protected]>
x86/kvmclock: set offset for kvm unstable clock
Aditya Pakki <[email protected]>
md: Fix failed allocation of md_register_thread
Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
perf intel-pt: Fix divide by zero when TSC is not available
Kan Liang <[email protected]>
perf/x86/intel/uncore: Fix client IMC events return huge result
Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
perf intel-pt: Fix overlap calculation for padding
Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
perf auxtrace: Define auxtrace record alignment
Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
perf tools: Fix split_kallsyms_for_kcore() for trampoline symbols
Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
perf intel-pt: Fix CYC timestamp calculation after OVF
Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
x86/unwind/orc: Fix ORC unwind table alignment
Nicolas Pitre <[email protected]>
vt: perform safe console erase in the right order
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
stable-kernel-rules.rst: add link to networking patch queue
Coly Li <[email protected]>
bcache: use (REQ_META|REQ_PRIO) to indicate bio for metadata
Tang Junhui <[email protected]>
bcache: treat stale && dirty keys as bad keys
Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>
bcache: never writeback a discard operation
Viresh Kumar <[email protected]>
PM / OPP: Update performance state when freq == old_freq
Viresh Kumar <[email protected]>
PM / wakeup: Rework wakeup source timer cancellation
J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
svcrpc: fix UDP on servers with lots of threads
Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
NFSv4.1: Reinitialise sequence results before retransmitting a request
Yihao Wu <[email protected]>
nfsd: fix wrong check in write_v4_end_grace()
NeilBrown <[email protected]>
nfsd: fix memory corruption caused by readdir
J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
nfsd: fix performance-limiting session calculation
Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
NFS: Don't recoalesce on error in nfs_pageio_complete_mirror()
Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
NFS: Fix an I/O request leakage in nfs_do_recoalesce
Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
NFS: Fix I/O request leakages
Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
cpuidle: governor: Add new governors to cpuidle_governors again
Pavel Machek <[email protected]>
cpcap-charger: generate events for userspace
Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
mfd: sm501: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
Cody P Schafer <[email protected]>
media: cx25840: mark pad sig_types to fix cx231xx init
Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
dm integrity: limit the rate of error messages
NeilBrown <[email protected]>
dm: fix to_sector() for 32bit
Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
ipmi_si: Fix crash when using hard-coded device
Ben Gardon <[email protected]>
Revert "KVM/MMU: Flush tlb directly in the kvm_zap_gfn_range()"
Dave Martin <[email protected]>
arm64: KVM: Fix architecturally invalid reset value for FPEXC32_EL2
Will Deacon <[email protected]>
arm64: debug: Ensure debug handlers check triggering exception level
Will Deacon <[email protected]>
arm64: debug: Don't propagate UNKNOWN FAR into si_code for debug signals
Julien Thierry <[email protected]>
arm64: Fix HCR.TGE status for NMI contexts
Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
ARM: s3c24xx: Fix boolean expressions in osiris_dvs_notify
Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
powerpc/traps: Fix the message printed when stack overflows
Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
powerpc/traps: fix recoverability of machine check handling on book3s/32
Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
powerpc/smp: Fix NMI IPI xmon timeout
Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
powerpc/smp: Fix NMI IPI timeout
Aneesh Kumar K.V <[email protected]>
powerpc/hugetlb: Don't do runtime allocation of 16G pages in LPAR configuration
Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
powerpc/ptrace: Simplify vr_get/set() to avoid GCC warning
Mark Cave-Ayland <[email protected]>
powerpc: Fix 32-bit KVM-PR lockup and host crash with MacOS guest
Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
powerpc/64s/hash: Fix assert_slb_presence() use of the slbfee. instruction
Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
powerpc/powernv: Don't reprogram SLW image on every KVM guest entry/exit
Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
powerpc/kvm: Save and restore host AMR/IAMR/UAMOR
Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
powerpc/83xx: Also save/restore SPRG4-7 during suspend
Jordan Niethe <[email protected]>
powerpc/powernv: Make opal log only readable by root
Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
powerpc/wii: properly disable use of BATs when requested.
Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
powerpc/32: Clear on-stack exception marker upon exception return
J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
security/selinux: fix SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS on reused superblock
Xin Long <[email protected]>
selinux: add the missing walk_size + len check in selinux_sctp_bind_connect
zhangyi (F) <[email protected]>
jbd2: fix compile warning when using JBUFFER_TRACE
zhangyi (F) <[email protected]>
jbd2: clear dirty flag when revoking a buffer from an older transaction
Jay Dolan <[email protected]>
serial: 8250_pci: Have ACCES cards that use the four port Pericom PI7C9X7954 chip use the pci_pericom_setup()
Jay Dolan <[email protected]>
serial: 8250_pci: Fix number of ports for ACCES serial cards
Lubomir Rintel <[email protected]>
serial: 8250_of: assume reg-shift of 2 for mrvl,mmp-uart
Anssi Hannula <[email protected]>
serial: uartps: Fix stuck ISR if RX disabled with non-empty FIFO
Phuong Nguyen <[email protected]>
dmaengine: usb-dmac: Make DMAC system sleep callbacks explicit
Nikolaus Voss <[email protected]>
usb: typec: tps6598x: handle block writes separately with plain-I2C adapters
Dmitry Osipenko <[email protected]>
usb: chipidea: tegra: Fix missed ci_hdrc_remove_device()
Paul Cercueil <[email protected]>
clk: ingenic: Fix doc of ingenic_cgu_div_info
Paul Cercueil <[email protected]>
clk: ingenic: Fix round_rate misbehaving with non-integer dividers
Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
clk: samsung: exynos5: Fix kfree() of const memory on setting driver_override
Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
clk: samsung: exynos5: Fix possible NULL pointer exception on platform_device_alloc() failure
Tony Lindgren <[email protected]>
clk: clk-twl6040: Fix imprecise external abort for pdmclk
Kunihiko Hayashi <[email protected]>
clk: uniphier: Fix update register for CPU-gear
Jan Kara <[email protected]>
ext2: Fix underflow in ext2_max_size()
Vaibhav Jain <[email protected]>
cxl: Wrap iterations over afu slices inside 'afu_list_lock'
Michael J. Ruhl <[email protected]>
IB/rdmavt: Fix concurrency panics in QP post_send and modify to error
Mike Marciniszyn <[email protected]>
IB/rdmavt: Fix loopback send with invalidate ordering
Michael J. Ruhl <[email protected]>
IB/hfi1: Close race condition on user context disable and close
Thomas Petazzoni <[email protected]>
PCI: pci-bridge-emul: Extend pci_bridge_emul_init() with flags
Thomas Petazzoni <[email protected]>
PCI: pci-bridge-emul: Create per-bridge copy of register behavior
Mika Westerberg <[email protected]>
PCI: pciehp: Disable Data Link Layer State Changed event on suspend
Lucas Stach <[email protected]>
PCI: dwc: skip MSI init if MSIs have been explicitly disabled
Bjorn Andersson <[email protected]>
PCI: qcom: Don't deassert reset GPIO during probe
Dongdong Liu <[email protected]>
PCI/DPC: Fix print AER status in DPC event handling
Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]>
PCI/ASPM: Use LTR if already enabled by platform
Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
swiotlb: Add is_swiotlb_active() function
Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
swiotlb: Introduce swiotlb_max_mapping_size()
Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
dma: Introduce dma_max_mapping_size()
Jan Kara <[email protected]>
ext4: fix crash during online resizing
yangerkun <[email protected]>
ext4: add mask of ext4 flags to swap
yangerkun <[email protected]>
ext4: update quota information while swapping boot loader inode
Mark Walton <[email protected]>
gpio: pca953x: Fix dereference of irq data in shutdown
Loic Poulain <[email protected]>
media: i2c: ov5640: Fix post-reset delay
Sowjanya Komatineni <[email protected]>
i2c: tegra: update maximum transfer size
Sowjanya Komatineni <[email protected]>
i2c: tegra: fix maximum transfer size
QiaoChong <[email protected]>
parport_pc: fix find_superio io compare code, should use equal test.
Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
intel_th: Don't reference unassigned outputs
Heikki Krogerus <[email protected]>
device property: Fix the length used in PROPERTY_ENTRY_STRING()
Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]>
nvmem: core: don't check the return value of notifier chain call
Zev Weiss <[email protected]>
kernel/sysctl.c: add missing range check in do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv
Jan Stancek <[email protected]>
mm/memory.c: do_fault: avoid usage of stale vm_area_struct
Roman Penyaev <[email protected]>
mm/vmalloc: fix size check for remap_vmalloc_range_partial()
zhongjiang <[email protected]>
mm: hwpoison: fix thp split handing in soft_offline_in_use_page()
yangerkun <[email protected]>
ext4: cleanup pagecache before swap i_data
yangerkun <[email protected]>
ext4: fix check of inode in swap_inode_boot_loader
Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
cpufreq: pxa2xx: remove incorrect __init annotation
Yangtao Li <[email protected]>
cpufreq: tegra124: add missing of_node_put()
Viresh Kumar <[email protected]>
cpufreq: kryo: Release OPP tables on module removal
Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
x86/kprobes: Prohibit probing on optprobe template code
Doug Berger <[email protected]>
irqchip/brcmstb-l2: Use _irqsave locking variants in non-interrupt code
Zenghui Yu <[email protected]>
irqchip/gic-v3-its: Avoid parsing _indirect_ twice for Device table
Lubomir Rintel <[email protected]>
libertas_tf: don't set URB_ZERO_PACKET on IN USB transfer
Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
soc: qcom: rpmh: Avoid accessing freed memory from batch API
Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Btrfs: fix deadlock between clone/dedupe and rename
Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Btrfs: fix corruption reading shared and compressed extents after hole punching
Dan Robertson <[email protected]>
btrfs: init csum_list before possible free
Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
btrfs: ensure that a DUP or RAID1 block group has exactly two stripes
Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
btrfs: drop the lock on error in btrfs_dev_replace_cancel
Anand Jain <[email protected]>
btrfs: scrub: fix circular locking dependency warning
Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Btrfs: setup a nofs context for memory allocation at __btrfs_set_acl
Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Btrfs: setup a nofs context for memory allocation at btrfs_create_tree()
Finn Thain <[email protected]>
m68k: Add -ffreestanding to CFLAGS
Vivek Goyal <[email protected]>
ovl: Do not lose security.capability xattr over metadata file copy-up
Vivek Goyal <[email protected]>
ovl: During copy up, first copy up data and then xattrs
Jann Horn <[email protected]>
splice: don't merge into linked buffers
Varad Gautam <[email protected]>
fs/devpts: always delete dcache dentry-s in dput()
Quinn Tran <[email protected]>
scsi: qla2xxx: Use complete switch scan for RSCN events
Giridhar Malavali <[email protected]>
scsi: qla2xxx: Avoid PCI IRQ affinity mapping when multiqueue is not supported
Himanshu Madhani <[email protected]>
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix LUN discovery if loop id is not assigned yet by firmware
Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
scsi: target/iscsi: Avoid iscsit_release_commands_from_conn() deadlock
Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
scsi: sd: Optimal I/O size should be a multiple of physical block size
Sagar Biradar <[email protected]>
scsi: aacraid: Fix performance issue on logical drives
Felipe Franciosi <[email protected]>
scsi: virtio_scsi: don't send sc payload with tmfs
Halil Pasic <[email protected]>
s390/virtio: handle find on invalid queue gracefully
Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
s390/setup: fix early warning messages
Pierre Morel <[email protected]>
s390: vfio_ap: link the vfio_ap devices to the vfio_ap bus subsystem
Samuel Holland <[email protected]>
clocksource/drivers/arch_timer: Workaround for Allwinner A64 timer instability
Stuart Menefy <[email protected]>
clocksource/drivers/exynos_mct: Clear timer interrupt when shutdown
Stuart Menefy <[email protected]>
clocksource/drivers/exynos_mct: Move one-shot check from tick clear to ISR
Felix Fietkau <[email protected]>
mt76: fix corrupted software generated tx CCMP PN
Stuart Menefy <[email protected]>
regulator: s2mpa01: Fix step values for some LDOs
Mark Zhang <[email protected]>
regulator: max77620: Initialize values for DT properties
Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
regulator: s2mps11: Fix steps for buck7, buck8 and LDO35
Russell King <[email protected]>
spi: spi-gpio: fix SPI_CS_HIGH capability
Vignesh R <[email protected]>
spi: omap2-mcspi: Fix DMA and FIFO event trigger size mismatch
Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
spi: pxa2xx: Setup maximum supported DMA transfer length
Vignesh R <[email protected]>
spi: ti-qspi: Fix mmap read when more than one CS in use
Jiong Wu <[email protected]>
mmc:fix a bug when max_discard is 0
Takeshi Saito <[email protected]>
mmc: renesas_sdhi: Fix card initialization failure in high speed mode
BOUGH CHEN <[email protected]>
mmc: sdhci-esdhc-imx: fix HS400 timing issue
Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
ACPI / device_sysfs: Avoid OF modalias creation for removed device
Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
xen: fix dom0 boot on huge systems
Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
vmw_balloon: release lock on error in vmballoon_reset()
Jann Horn <[email protected]>
tracing/perf: Use strndup_user() instead of buggy open-coded version
zhangyi (F) <[email protected]>
tracing: Do not free iter->trace in fail path of tracing_open_pipe()
Tom Zanussi <[email protected]>
tracing: Use strncpy instead of memcpy for string keys in hist triggers
Steve French <[email protected]>
smb3: make default i/o size for smb3 mounts larger
Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
CIFS: Fix read after write for files with read caching
Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
CIFS: Do not skip SMB2 message IDs on send failures
Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
CIFS: Do not reset lease state to NONE on lease break
Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
CIFS: Fix leaking locked VFS cache pages in writeback retry
Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
crypto: arm64/aes-ccm - fix bugs in non-NEON fallback routine
Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
crypto: arm64/aes-ccm - fix logical bug in AAD MAC handling
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: x86/morus - fix handling chunked inputs and MAY_SLEEP
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: x86/aesni-gcm - fix crash on empty plaintext
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: x86/aegis - fix handling chunked inputs and MAY_SLEEP
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: testmgr - skip crc32c context test for ahash algorithms
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: skcipher - set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: pcbc - remove bogus memcpy()s with src == dest
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: morus - fix handling chunked inputs
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: hash - set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails
Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
crypto: arm64/crct10dif - revert to C code for short inputs
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: arm64/aes-neonbs - fix returning final keystream block
Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
crypto: arm/crct10dif - revert to C code for short inputs
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: aegis - fix handling chunked inputs
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: aead - set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails
Al Viro <[email protected]>
fix cgroup_do_mount() handling of failure exits
Oliver O'Halloran <[email protected]>
libnvdimm: Fix altmap reservation size calculation
Dan Williams <[email protected]>
libnvdimm/pmem: Honor force_raw for legacy pmem regions
Wei Yang <[email protected]>
libnvdimm, pfn: Fix over-trim in trim_pfn_device()
Dan Williams <[email protected]>
libnvdimm/label: Clear 'updating' flag after label-set update
Dan Williams <[email protected]>
nfit/ars: Attempt short-ARS even in the no_init_ars case
Dan Williams <[email protected]>
nfit/ars: Attempt a short-ARS whenever the ARS state is idle at boot
Dan Williams <[email protected]>
acpi/nfit: Fix bus command validation
Dexuan Cui <[email protected]>
nfit: acpi_nfit_ctl(): Check out_obj->type in the right place
Dan Williams <[email protected]>
nfit: Fix nfit_intel_shutdown_status() command submission
Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
dax: Flush partial PMDs correctly
Zhang Zhijie <[email protected]>
crypto: rockchip - update new iv to device in multiple operations
Zhang Zhijie <[email protected]>
crypto: rockchip - fix scatterlist nents error
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: ahash - fix another early termination in hash walk
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: ofb - fix handling partial blocks and make thread-safe
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: cfb - remove bogus memcpy() with src == dest
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: cfb - add missing 'chunksize' property
Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
crypto: ccree - don't copy zero size ciphertext
Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
crypto: ccree - unmap buffer before copying IV
Hadar Gat <[email protected]>
crypto: ccree - fix free of unallocated mlli buffer
Horia Geantă <[email protected]>
crypto: caam - fix DMA mapping of stack memory
Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]>
crypto: caam - fixed handling of sg list
Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
crypto: ccree - fix missing break in switch statement
Franck LENORMAND <[email protected]>
crypto: caam - fix hash context DMA unmap size
Zhi Jin <[email protected]>
stm class: Fix an endless loop in channel allocation
Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
stm class: Prevent division by zero
Alexander Usyskin <[email protected]>
mei: bus: move hw module get/put to probe/release
Alexander Usyskin <[email protected]>
mei: hbm: clean the feature flags on link reset
Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
iio: adc: exynos-adc: Use proper number of channels for Exynos4x12
Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
iio: adc: exynos-adc: Fix NULL pointer exception on unbind
Codrin Ciubotariu <[email protected]>
ASoC: codecs: pcm186x: Fix energysense SLEEP bit
Codrin Ciubotariu <[email protected]>
ASoC: codecs: pcm186x: fix wrong usage of DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE()
S.j. Wang <[email protected]>
ASoC: fsl_esai: fix register setting issue in RIGHT_J mode
zhengbin <[email protected]>
9p/net: fix memory leak in p9_client_create
Hou Tao <[email protected]>
9p: use inode->i_lock to protect i_size_write() under 32-bit
-------------
Diffstat:
Documentation/DMA-API.txt | 8 + Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.txt | 2 + .../bindings/iio/adc/samsung,exynos-adc.txt | 4 +- Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst | 3 + Makefile | 4 +- arch/arm/crypto/crct10dif-ce-core.S | 14 +- arch/arm/crypto/crct10dif-ce-glue.c | 23 +- arch/arm/mach-s3c24xx/mach-osiris-dvs.c | 8 +- arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-core.S | 5 +- arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c | 4 +- arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-core.S | 8 +- arch/arm64/crypto/crct10dif-ce-glue.c | 25 +-- arch/arm64/include/asm/hardirq.h | 31 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/irq.c | 3 + arch/arm64/kernel/kgdb.c | 14 +- arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c | 6 + arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 9 +- arch/m68k/Makefile | 5 +- arch/mips/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hugetlb.h | 8 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/powernv.h | 2 + arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_32.S | 9 + arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c | 10 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/smp.c | 90 +++----- arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c | 12 +- arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S | 26 ++- arch/powerpc/mm/slb.c | 5 + arch/powerpc/platforms/83xx/suspend-asm.S | 34 ++- arch/powerpc/platforms/embedded6xx/wii.c | 4 + arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/idle.c | 27 +-- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-msglog.c | 2 +- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/smp.c | 25 +++ arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +- arch/s390/kernel/setup.c | 31 ++- arch/x86/crypto/aegis128-aesni-glue.c | 38 ++-- arch/x86/crypto/aegis128l-aesni-glue.c | 38 ++-- arch/x86/crypto/aegis256-aesni-glue.c | 38 ++-- arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c | 13 +- arch/x86/crypto/morus1280_glue.c | 40 ++-- arch/x86/crypto/morus640_glue.c | 39 ++-- arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c | 1 + arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.h | 12 +- arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snb.c | 4 +- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c | 42 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c | 5 + arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 6 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 39 ++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 43 +++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 16 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 7 +- arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c | 13 +- crypto/aead.c | 4 +- crypto/aegis128.c | 14 +- crypto/aegis128l.c | 14 +- crypto/aegis256.c | 14 +- crypto/ahash.c | 42 ++-- crypto/cfb.c | 14 +- crypto/morus1280.c | 13 +- crypto/morus640.c | 13 +- crypto/ofb.c | 91 ++++---- crypto/pcbc.c | 14 +- crypto/shash.c | 18 +- crypto/skcipher.c | 27 ++- crypto/testmgr.c | 14 +- crypto/testmgr.h | 53 ++++- drivers/acpi/device_sysfs.c | 6 +- drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c | 84 ++++---- drivers/base/power/wakeup.c | 8 +- drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si.h | 4 +- drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_hardcode.c | 236 +++++++++++++++------ drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c | 28 ++- drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_mem_io.c | 5 +- drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_platform.c | 29 ++- drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_port_io.c | 5 +- drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/st33zp24.c | 2 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 11 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm_atmel.c | 2 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c | 22 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_atmel.c | 6 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c | 2 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_nuvoton.c | 2 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c | 8 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c | 2 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm_nsc.c | 2 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c | 2 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c | 3 +- drivers/char/tpm/xen-tpmfront.c | 2 +- drivers/clk/clk-twl6040.c | 53 ++++- drivers/clk/ingenic/cgu.c | 10 +- drivers/clk/ingenic/cgu.h | 2 +- drivers/clk/samsung/clk-exynos5-subcmu.c | 13 +- drivers/clk/uniphier/clk-uniphier-cpugear.c | 2 +- drivers/clocksource/Kconfig | 10 + drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c | 55 +++++ drivers/clocksource/exynos_mct.c | 23 +- drivers/cpufreq/pxa2xx-cpufreq.c | 4 +- drivers/cpufreq/qcom-cpufreq-kryo.c | 20 +- drivers/cpufreq/tegra124-cpufreq.c | 2 + drivers/cpuidle/governor.c | 1 + drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c | 1 + drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c | 93 +++----- drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c | 8 +- drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_cipher.c | 7 +- drivers/crypto/rockchip/rk3288_crypto.c | 2 +- drivers/crypto/rockchip/rk3288_crypto.h | 4 +- drivers/crypto/rockchip/rk3288_crypto_ablkcipher.c | 39 +++- drivers/crypto/rockchip/rk3288_crypto_ahash.c | 2 +- drivers/dma/sh/usb-dmac.c | 2 + drivers/gpio/gpio-pca953x.c | 3 +- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/calcs/dcn_calcs.c | 8 +- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/hwmgr/smu7_hwmgr.c | 6 +- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_fb_helper.c | 4 +- drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/evergreen_cs.c | 1 + drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/gth.c | 4 + drivers/hwtracing/stm/core.c | 11 +- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-tegra.c | 8 +- drivers/iio/adc/exynos_adc.c | 19 +- drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/hfi.h | 2 +- drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/init.c | 14 +- drivers/infiniband/sw/rdmavt/qp.c | 59 ++++-- drivers/irqchip/irq-brcmstb-l2.c | 10 +- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c | 2 + drivers/md/bcache/extents.c | 13 +- drivers/md/bcache/request.c | 7 +- drivers/md/bcache/writeback.h | 3 + drivers/md/dm-integrity.c | 8 +- drivers/md/raid10.c | 2 + drivers/md/raid5.c | 2 + drivers/media/dvb-frontends/lgdt330x.c | 2 +- drivers/media/i2c/cx25840/cx25840-core.c | 3 +- drivers/media/i2c/cx25840/cx25840-core.h | 1 - drivers/media/i2c/ov5640.c | 2 +- drivers/media/platform/sunxi/sun6i-csi/sun6i_csi.c | 2 +- drivers/media/platform/vimc/Makefile | 3 +- drivers/media/platform/vimc/vimc-capture.c | 18 +- drivers/media/platform/vimc/vimc-common.c | 35 --- drivers/media/platform/vimc/vimc-common.h | 15 +- drivers/media/platform/vimc/vimc-debayer.c | 26 +-- drivers/media/platform/vimc/vimc-scaler.c | 28 +-- drivers/media/platform/vimc/vimc-sensor.c | 56 ++--- drivers/media/platform/vimc/vimc-streamer.c | 188 ++++++++++++++++ drivers/media/platform/vimc/vimc-streamer.h | 38 ++++ drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_video.c | 8 + drivers/mfd/sm501.c | 3 + drivers/misc/cxl/guest.c | 2 + drivers/misc/cxl/pci.c | 39 +++- drivers/misc/mei/bus.c | 21 +- drivers/misc/mei/hbm.c | 7 + drivers/misc/vmw_balloon.c | 5 +- drivers/mmc/core/core.c | 4 +- drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c | 11 +- drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-esdhc-imx.c | 1 + drivers/net/dsa/lantiq_gswip.c | 21 +- drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas_tf/if_usb.c | 2 - drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt76x02_mac.c | 2 +- drivers/nvdimm/label.c | 23 +- drivers/nvdimm/namespace_devs.c | 4 + drivers/nvdimm/pfn_devs.c | 4 +- drivers/nvmem/core.c | 4 +- drivers/opp/core.c | 2 +- drivers/parport/parport_pc.c | 2 +- drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-designware-host.c | 2 +- drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-qcom.c | 2 +- drivers/pci/controller/pci-aardvark.c | 2 +- drivers/pci/controller/pci-mvebu.c | 2 +- drivers/pci/hotplug/pciehp_hpc.c | 17 +- drivers/pci/pci-bridge-emul.c | 86 +++++--- drivers/pci/pci-bridge-emul.h | 13 +- drivers/pci/pcie/dpc.c | 27 ++- drivers/pci/probe.c | 36 ++-- drivers/power/supply/cpcap-charger.c | 1 + drivers/regulator/max77620-regulator.c | 10 +- drivers/regulator/s2mpa01.c | 10 +- drivers/regulator/s2mps11.c | 6 +- drivers/s390/crypto/vfio_ap_drv.c | 44 +++- drivers/s390/crypto/vfio_ap_ops.c | 4 +- drivers/s390/crypto/vfio_ap_private.h | 1 + drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw.c | 4 +- drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c | 13 +- drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_init.c | 99 +-------- drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_isr.c | 2 +- drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_os.c | 2 +- drivers/scsi/sd.c | 59 +++++- drivers/scsi/virtio_scsi.c | 2 - drivers/soc/qcom/rpmh.c | 34 +-- drivers/spi/spi-gpio.c | 4 +- drivers/spi/spi-omap2-mcspi.c | 4 +- drivers/spi/spi-pxa2xx.c | 1 + drivers/spi/spi-ti-qspi.c | 6 +- drivers/staging/media/imx/imx-ic-prpencvf.c | 26 ++- drivers/staging/media/imx/imx-media-csi.c | 44 ++-- drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c | 4 +- drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_of.c | 4 + drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_pci.c | 141 ++++++++++-- drivers/tty/serial/xilinx_uartps.c | 8 +- drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 15 +- drivers/usb/chipidea/ci_hdrc_tegra.c | 1 + drivers/usb/typec/tps6598x.c | 26 ++- fs/9p/v9fs_vfs.h | 23 +- fs/9p/vfs_file.c | 6 +- fs/9p/vfs_inode.c | 23 +- fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c | 27 +-- fs/9p/vfs_super.c | 4 +- fs/btrfs/acl.c | 9 + fs/btrfs/dev-replace.c | 1 + fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 8 + fs/btrfs/extent_io.c | 4 +- fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 21 +- fs/btrfs/scrub.c | 24 +-- fs/btrfs/volumes.c | 4 +- fs/cifs/cifs_fs_sb.h | 1 + fs/cifs/cifsfs.c | 1 + fs/cifs/cifsglob.h | 20 ++ fs/cifs/cifssmb.c | 17 +- fs/cifs/connect.c | 26 ++- fs/cifs/file.c | 12 +- fs/cifs/inode.c | 2 +- fs/cifs/smb2misc.c | 17 +- fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 28 ++- fs/cifs/smb2transport.c | 14 +- fs/cifs/transport.c | 6 +- fs/dax.c | 19 +- fs/devpts/inode.c | 1 + fs/ext2/super.c | 39 ++-- fs/ext4/ext4.h | 3 + fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 100 ++++++--- fs/ext4/resize.c | 3 +- fs/jbd2/transaction.c | 33 +-- fs/kernfs/mount.c | 8 +- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 12 +- fs/nfs/pagelist.c | 29 ++- fs/nfsd/nfs3proc.c | 16 +- fs/nfsd/nfs3xdr.c | 1 + fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 8 +- fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c | 2 +- fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 59 ++++-- fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 2 + fs/overlayfs/util.c | 55 +++-- fs/pipe.c | 14 ++ fs/splice.c | 4 + include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 2 +- include/linux/device-mapper.h | 2 +- include/linux/dma-mapping.h | 8 + include/linux/hardirq.h | 7 + include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 +- include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h | 1 + include/linux/property.h | 2 +- include/linux/swiotlb.h | 11 + kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 9 +- kernel/dma/direct.c | 11 + kernel/dma/mapping.c | 14 ++ kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 14 ++ kernel/rcu/tree.c | 19 +- kernel/sysctl.c | 11 +- kernel/trace/trace.c | 1 - kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c | 16 +- kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c | 5 +- mm/memory-failure.c | 14 +- mm/memory.c | 5 +- mm/vmalloc.c | 2 +- net/9p/client.c | 2 +- net/sunrpc/clnt.c | 124 ++++++----- net/sunrpc/svcsock.c | 20 +- security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 +- sound/soc/codecs/pcm186x.c | 8 +- sound/soc/fsl/fsl_esai.c | 7 +- tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c | 4 +- tools/perf/util/auxtrace.h | 3 + .../perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-decoder.c | 37 +++- tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c | 2 + tools/perf/util/symbol.c | 2 + virt/kvm/arm/mmu.c | 2 +- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 7 +- 278 files changed, 3049 insertions(+), 1609 deletions(-)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 20/238 crypto: cfb - remove bogus memcpy() with src == dest
5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 6c2e322b3621dc8be72e5c86d4fdb587434ba625 upstream.
The memcpy() in crypto_cfb_decrypt_inplace() uses walk->iv as both the source and destination, which has undefined behavior. It is unneeded because walk->iv is already used to hold the previous ciphertext block; thus, walk->iv is already updated to its final value. So, remove it.
Also, note that in-place decryption is the only case where the previous ciphertext block is not directly available. Therefore, as a related cleanup I also updated crypto_cfb_encrypt_segment() to directly use the previous ciphertext block rather than save it into walk->iv. This makes it consistent with in-place encryption and out-of-place decryption; now only in-place decryption is different, because it has to be.
--- crypto/cfb.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
crypto/cfb.c +4 -4
@@ -77,12 +77,14 @@ static int crypto_cfb_encrypt_segment(stdo {crypto_cfb_encrypt_one (tfm, iv, dst);crypto_xor (dst, src, bsize); -memcpy (iv, dst, bsize); + iv = dst; src += bsize; dst += bsize; }while ((nbytes -= bsize) >= bsize); +memcpy (walk->iv, iv, bsize); +return nbytes; }
@@ -162,7 +164,7 @@ static int crypto_cfb_decrypt_inplace(stconst unsigned int bsize =crypto_cfb_bsize (tfm);unsigned int nbytes = walk->nbytes;u8 *src = walk->src.virt.addr; -u8 *iv = walk->iv; +u8 *const iv = walk->iv;u8 tmp[MAX_CIPHER_BLOCKSIZE ]; do {
@@ -172,8 +174,6 @@ static int crypto_cfb_decrypt_inplace(st src += bsize; }while ((nbytes -= bsize) >= bsize); -memcpy (walk->iv, iv, bsize); -return nbytes; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 30/238 nfit/ars: Attempt short-ARS even in the no_init_ars case
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
commit fa3ed4d981b1fc19acdd07fcb152a4bd3706892b upstream.
The no_init_ars option is meant to prevent long-ARS, but short-ARS should be allowed to grab any immediate results.
--- drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c +3 -2
@@ -3013,11 +3013,12 @@ static int ars_register(struct acpi_nfit {int rc; -if (no_init_ars ||test_bit (ARS_FAILED , &nfit_spa->ars_state)) +if (test_bit (ARS_FAILED , &nfit_spa->ars_state))return acpi_nfit_register_region (acpi_desc, nfit_spa);set_bit (ARS_REQ_SHORT , &nfit_spa->ars_state); -set_bit (ARS_REQ_LONG , &nfit_spa->ars_state); +if (!no_init_ars) +set_bit (ARS_REQ_LONG , &nfit_spa->ars_state);switch (acpi_nfit_query_poison (acpi_desc)) {case 0 :
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 31/238 libnvdimm/label: Clear updating flag after label-set update
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
commit 966d23a006ca7b44ac8cf4d0c96b19785e0c3da0 upstream.
The UEFI 2.7 specification sets expectations that the 'updating' flag is eventually cleared. To date, the libnvdimm core has never adhered to that protocol. The policy of the core matches the policy of other multi-device info-block formats like MD-Software-RAID that expect administrator intervention on inconsistent info-blocks, not automatic invalidation.
However, some pre-boot environments may unfortunately attempt to "clean up" the labels and invalidate a set when it fails to find at least one "non-updating" label in the set. Clear the updating flag after set updates to minimize the window of vulnerability to aggressive pre-boot environments.
Ideally implementations would not write to the label area outside of creating namespaces.
Note that this only minimizes the window, it does not close it as the system can still crash while clearing the flag and the set can be subsequently deleted / invalidated by the pre-boot environment.
--- drivers/nvdimm/label.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/nvdimm/label.c +18 -5
@@ -755,7 +755,7 @@ static const guid_t *to_abstraction_guidstatic int __pmem_label_update (struct nd_region *nd_region,struct nd_mapping *nd_mapping,struct nd_namespace_pmem *nspm, -int pos) +int pos,unsigned long flags) {struct nd_namespace_common *ndns = &nspm->nsio.common;struct nd_interleave_set *nd_set = nd_region->nd_set;
@@ -796,7 +796,7 @@ static int __pmem_label_update(struct ndmemcpy (nd_label->uuid, nspm->uuid,NSLABEL_UUID_LEN );if (nspm->alt_name)memcpy (nd_label->name, nspm->alt_name,NSLABEL_NAME_LEN ); - nd_label->flags =__cpu_to_le32 (NSLABEL_FLAG_UPDATING ); + nd_label->flags =__cpu_to_le32 (flags); nd_label->nlabel =__cpu_to_le16 (nd_region->ndr_mappings); nd_label->position =__cpu_to_le16 (pos); nd_label->isetcookie =__cpu_to_le64 (cookie);
@@ -1249,13 +1249,13 @@ static int del_labels(struct nd_mappingint nd_pmem_namespace_label_update (struct nd_region *nd_region,struct nd_namespace_pmem *nspm,resource_size_t size) { -int i; +int i, rc;for (i =0 ; i < nd_region->ndr_mappings; i++) {struct nd_mapping *nd_mapping = &nd_region->mapping[i];struct nvdimm_drvdata *ndd =to_ndd (nd_mapping);struct resource *res; -int rc, count =0 ; +int count =0 ;if (size ==0 ) { rc =del_labels (nd_mapping, nspm->uuid);
@@ -1273,7 +1273,20 @@ int nd_pmem_namespace_label_update(strucif (rc <0 )return rc; - rc =__pmem_label_update (nd_region, nd_mapping, nspm, i); + rc =__pmem_label_update (nd_region, nd_mapping, nspm, i, +NSLABEL_FLAG_UPDATING ); +if (rc) +return rc; + } + +if (size ==0 ) +return 0 ; + +/* Clear the UPDATING flag per UEFI 2.7 expectations */ +for (i =0 ; i < nd_region->ndr_mappings; i++) { +struct nd_mapping *nd_mapping = &nd_region->mapping[i]; + + rc =__pmem_label_update (nd_region, nd_mapping, nspm, i,0 );if (rc)return rc; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 32/238 libnvdimm, pfn: Fix over-trim in trim_pfn_device()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wei Yang <[email protected]>
commit f101ada7da6551127d192c2f1742c1e9e0f62799 upstream.
When trying to see whether current nd_region intersects with others, trim_pfn_device() has already calculated the *size* to be expanded to SECTION size.
Do not double append 'adjust' to 'size' when calculating whether the end of a region collides with the next pmem region.
--- drivers/nvdimm/pfn_devs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/nvdimm/pfn_devs.c +1 -1
@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ static void trim_pfn_device(struct nd_pfif (region_intersects (start, size,IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM ,IORES_DESC_NONE ) ==REGION_MIXED || !IS_ALIGNED (end, nd_pfn->align) - ||nd_region_conflict (nd_region, start, size + adjust)) + ||nd_region_conflict (nd_region, start, size)) *end_trunc = end -phys_pmem_align_down (nd_pfn, end); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 33/238 libnvdimm/pmem: Honor force_raw for legacy pmem regions
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
commit fa7d2e639cd90442d868dfc6ca1d4cc9d8bf206e upstream.
For recovery, where non-dax access is needed to a given physical address range, and testing, allow the 'force_raw' attribute to override the default establishment of a dev_pagemap.
Otherwise without this capability it is possible to end up with a namespace that can not be activated due to corrupted info-block, and one that can not be repaired due to a section collision.
--- drivers/nvdimm/namespace_devs.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/nvdimm/namespace_devs.c +4 -0
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ bool nd_is_uuid_unique(struct device *debool pmem_should_map_pages (struct device *dev) {struct nd_region *nd_region =to_nd_region (dev->parent); +struct nd_namespace_common *ndns =to_ndns (dev);struct nd_namespace_io *nsio;if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ZONE_DEVICE ))
@@ -149,6 +150,9 @@ bool pmem_should_map_pages(struct deviceif (is_nd_pfn (dev) ||is_nd_btt (dev))return false; +if (ndns->force_raw) +return false; + nsio =to_nd_namespace_io (dev); if (region_intersects(nsio->res.start, resource_size(&nsio->res), IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 34/238 libnvdimm: Fix altmap reservation size calculation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Oliver O'Halloran <[email protected]>
commit 07464e88365e9236febaca9ed1a2e2006d8bc952 upstream.
Libnvdimm reserves the first 8K of pfn and devicedax namespaces to store a superblock describing the namespace. This 8K reservation is contained within the altmap area which the kernel uses for the vmemmap backing for the pages within the namespace. The altmap allows for some pages at the start of the altmap area to be reserved and that mechanism is used to protect the superblock from being re-used as vmemmap backing.
The number of PFNs to reserve is calculated using:
PHYS_PFN(SZ_8K)
Which is implemented as:
#define PHYS_PFN(x) ((unsigned long)((x) >> PAGE_SHIFT))
So on systems where PAGE_SIZE is greater than 8K the reservation size is truncated to zero and the superblock area is re-used as vmemmap backing. As a result all the namespace information stored in the superblock (i.e. if it's a PFN or DAX namespace) is lost and the namespace needs to be re-created to get access to the contents.
This patch fixes this by using PFN_UP() rather than PHYS_PFN() to ensure that at least one page is reserved. On systems with a 4K pages size this patch should have no effect.
--- drivers/nvdimm/pfn_devs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/nvdimm/pfn_devs.c +1 -1
@@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ static unsigned long init_altmap_base(restatic unsigned long init_altmap_reserve (resource_size_t base) { -unsigned long reserve =PHYS_PFN (SZ_8K ); +unsigned long reserve =PFN_UP (SZ_8K );unsigned long base_pfn =PHYS_PFN (base); reserve += base_pfn -PFN_SECTION_ALIGN_DOWN (base_pfn);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 35/238 fix cgroup_do_mount() handling of failure exits
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
commit 399504e21a10be16dd1408ba0147367d9d82a10c upstream.
same story as with last May fixes in sysfs (7b745a4e4051 "unfuck sysfs_mount()"); new_sb is left uninitialized in case of early errors in kernfs_mount_ns() and papering over it by treating any error from kernfs_mount_ns() as equivalent to !new_ns ends up conflating the cases when objects had never been transferred to a superblock with ones when that has happened and resulting new superblock had been dropped. Easily fixed (same way as in sysfs case). Additionally, there's a superblock leak on kernfs_node_dentry() failure *and* a dentry leak inside kernfs_node_dentry() itself - the latter on probably impossible errors, but the former not impossible to trigger (as the matter of fact, injecting allocation failures at that point *does* trigger it).
--- fs/kernfs/mount.c | 8 ++++++-- kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 9 ++++++--- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/kernfs/mount.c +6 -2
@@ -196,8 +196,10 @@ struct dentry *kernfs_node_dentry(structreturn dentry; knparent =find_next_ancestor (kn,NULL ); -if (WARN_ON (!knparent)) +if (WARN_ON (!knparent)) { +dput (dentry);return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); + } do { struct dentry *dtmp;
@@ -206,8 +208,10 @@ struct dentry *kernfs_node_dentry(structif (kn == knparent)return dentry; kntmp =find_next_ancestor (kn, knparent); -if (WARN_ON (!kntmp)) +if (WARN_ON (!kntmp)) { +dput (dentry);return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); + } dtmp =lookup_one_len_unlocked (kntmp->name, dentry,strlen (kntmp->name));dput (dentry);
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c +6 -3
@@ -2033,7 +2033,7 @@ struct dentry *cgroup_do_mount(struct fi struct cgroup_namespace *ns) {struct dentry *dentry; -bool new_sb; +bool new_sb = false; dentry =kernfs_mount (fs_type, flags, root->kf_root, magic, &new_sb);
@@ -2043,6 +2043,7 @@ struct dentry *cgroup_do_mount(struct fi*/ if (!IS_ERR (dentry) && ns != &init_cgroup_ns) {struct dentry *nsdentry; +struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;struct cgroup *cgrp;mutex_lock (&cgroup_mutex);
@@ -2053,12 +2054,14 @@ struct dentry *cgroup_do_mount(struct fispin_unlock_irq (&css_set_lock);mutex_unlock (&cgroup_mutex); - nsdentry =kernfs_node_dentry (cgrp->kn, dentry->d_sb); + nsdentry =kernfs_node_dentry (cgrp->kn, sb);dput (dentry); +if (IS_ERR (nsdentry)) +deactivate_locked_super (sb); dentry = nsdentry; } -if (IS_ERR (dentry) || !new_sb) +if (!new_sb)cgroup_put (&root->cgrp);return dentry;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 36/238 crypto: aead - set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 6ebc97006b196aafa9df0497fdfa866cf26f259b upstream.
Some algorithms have a ->setkey() method that is not atomic, in the sense that setting a key can fail after changes were already made to the tfm context. In this case, if a key was already set the tfm can end up in a state that corresponds to neither the old key nor the new key.
For example, in gcm.c, if the kzalloc() fails due to lack of memory, then the CTR part of GCM will have the new key but GHASH will not.
It's not feasible to make all ->setkey() methods atomic, especially ones that have to key multiple sub-tfms. Therefore, make the crypto API set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails, to prevent the tfm from being used until a new key is set.
[Cc stable mainly because when introducing the NEED_KEY flag I changed
AF_ALG to rely on it; and unlike in-kernel crypto API users, AF_ALG previously didn't have this problem. So these "incompletely keyed" states became theoretically accessible via AF_ALG -- though, the opportunities for causing real mischief seem pretty limited.]
--- crypto/aead.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
crypto/aead.c +3 -1
@@ -61,8 +61,10 @@ int crypto_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aeaelse err =crypto_aead_alg (tfm)->setkey (tfm, key, keylen); -if (err) +if (unlikely (err)) { +crypto_aead_set_flags (tfm,CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY );return err; + }crypto_aead_clear_flags (tfm,CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY );return 0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 38/238 crypto: arm/crct10dif - revert to C code for short inputs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
commit 62fecf295e3c48be1b5f17c440b93875b9adb4d6 upstream.
The SIMD routine ported from x86 used to have a special code path for inputs < 16 bytes, which got lost somewhere along the way. Instead, the current glue code aligns the input pointer to permit the NEON routine to use special versions of the vld1 instructions that assume 16 byte alignment, but this could result in inputs of less than 16 bytes to be passed in. This not only fails the new extended tests that Eric has implemented, it also results in the code reading past the end of the input, which could potentially result in crashes when dealing with less than 16 bytes of input at the end of a page which is followed by an unmapped page.
So update the glue code to only invoke the NEON routine if the input is at least 16 bytes.
--- arch/arm/crypto/crct10dif-ce-core.S | 14 +++++++------- arch/arm/crypto/crct10dif-ce-glue.c | 23 ++++++----------------- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
arch/arm/crypto/crct10dif-ce-core.S +7 -7
@@ -124,10 +124,10 @@ ENTRY(crc_t10dif_pmull) vext.8 q10, qzr, q0, #4 // receive the initial 64B data, xor the initial crc value - vld1.64 {q0-q1}, [arg2, :128]! - vld1.64 {q2-q3}, [arg2, :128]! - vld1.64 {q4-q5}, [arg2, :128]! - vld1.64 {q6-q7}, [arg2, :128]! + vld1.64 {q0-q1}, [arg2]! + vld1.64 {q2-q3}, [arg2]! + vld1.64 {q4-q5}, [arg2]! + vld1.64 {q6-q7}, [arg2]! CPU_LE( vrev64.8 q0, q0 ) CPU_LE( vrev64.8 q1, q1 ) CPU_LE( vrev64.8 q2, q2 )
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ CPU_LE( vrev64.8 q7, q7 ) _fold_64_B_loop: .macro fold64, reg1, reg2 - vld1.64 {q11-q12}, [arg2, :128]! + vld1.64 {q11-q12}, [arg2]! vmull.p64 q8, \reg1\()h, d21 vmull.p64 \reg1, \reg1\()l, d20
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ _16B_reduction_loop: vmull.p64 q7, d15, d21 veor.8 q7, q7, q8 - vld1.64 {q0}, [arg2, :128]! + vld1.64 {q0}, [arg2]! CPU_LE( vrev64.8 q0, q0 ) vswp d0, d1 veor.8 q7, q7, q0
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ _less_than_128: vmov.i8 q0, #0 vmov s3, arg1_low32 // get the initial crc value - vld1.64 {q7}, [arg2, :128]! + vld1.64 {q7}, [arg2]! CPU_LE( vrev64.8 q7, q7 ) vswp d14, d15 veor.8 q7, q7, q0
arch/arm/crypto/crct10dif-ce-glue.c +6 -17
@@ -35,26 +35,15 @@ static int crct10dif_update(struct shash unsigned int length) {u16 *crc =shash_desc_ctx (desc); -unsigned int l; -if (!may_use_simd ()) { - *crc =crc_t10dif_generic (*crc, data, length); +if (length >=CRC_T10DIF_PMULL_CHUNK_SIZE &&may_use_simd ()) { +kernel_neon_begin (); + *crc =crc_t10dif_pmull (*crc, data, length); +kernel_neon_end (); }else { -if (unlikely ((u32 )data %CRC_T10DIF_PMULL_CHUNK_SIZE )) { - l =min_t (u32, length,CRC_T10DIF_PMULL_CHUNK_SIZE - - ((u32 )data %CRC_T10DIF_PMULL_CHUNK_SIZE )); - - *crc =crc_t10dif_generic (*crc, data, l); - - length -= l; - data += l; - } -if (length >0 ) { -kernel_neon_begin (); - *crc =crc_t10dif_pmull (*crc, data, length); -kernel_neon_end (); - } + *crc =crc_t10dif_generic (*crc, data, length); } +return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 21/238 crypto: ofb - fix handling partial blocks and make thread-safe
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit b3e3e2db7de4a1ffe8845876c3520b866cd48de1 upstream.
Fix multiple bugs in the OFB implementation:
1. It stored the per-request state 'cnt' in the tfm context, which can be used by multiple threads concurrently (e.g. via AF_ALG).
2. It didn't support messages not a multiple of the block cipher size, despite being a stream cipher.
3. It didn't set cra_blocksize to 1 to indicate it is a stream cipher.
To fix these, set the 'chunksize' property to the cipher block size to guarantee that when walking through the scatterlist, a partial block can only occur at the end. Then change the implementation to XOR a block at a time at first, then XOR the partial block at the end if needed. This is the same way CTR and CFB are implemented. As a bonus, this also improves performance in most cases over the current approach.
--- crypto/ofb.c | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------------- crypto/testmgr.h | 28 +++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
crypto/ofb.c +37 -54
@@ -5,9 +5,6 @@* * Copyright (C) 2018 ARM Limited or its affiliates. * All rights reserved. -* -* Based loosely on public domain code gleaned from libtomcrypt -* (https://github.com/libtom/libtomcrypt). */ #include <crypto/algapi.h>
@@ -21,7 +18,6 @@struct crypto_ofb_ctx {struct crypto_cipher *child; -int cnt; };
@@ -41,58 +37,40 @@ static int crypto_ofb_setkey(struct crypreturn err; } -static int crypto_ofb_encrypt_segment (struct crypto_ofb_ctx *ctx, -struct skcipher_walk *walk, -struct crypto_cipher *tfm) -{ -int bsize =crypto_cipher_blocksize (tfm); -int nbytes = walk->nbytes; - -u8 *src = walk->src.virt.addr; -u8 *dst = walk->dst.virt.addr; -u8 *iv = walk->iv; - -do { -if (ctx->cnt == bsize) { -if (nbytes < bsize) -break ; -crypto_cipher_encrypt_one (tfm, iv, iv); - ctx->cnt =0 ; - } - *dst = *src ^ iv[ctx->cnt]; - src++; - dst++; - ctx->cnt++; - }while (--nbytes); -return nbytes; -} - -static int crypto_ofb_encrypt (struct skcipher_request *req) +static int crypto_ofb_crypt (struct skcipher_request *req) { -struct skcipher_walk walk;struct crypto_skcipher *tfm =crypto_skcipher_reqtfm (req); -unsigned int bsize;struct crypto_ofb_ctx *ctx =crypto_skcipher_ctx (tfm); -struct crypto_cipher *child = ctx->child; -int ret =0 ; +struct crypto_cipher *cipher = ctx->child; +const unsigned int bsize =crypto_cipher_blocksize (cipher); +struct skcipher_walk walk; +int err; - bsize =crypto_cipher_blocksize (child); - ctx->cnt = bsize; + err =skcipher_walk_virt (&walk, req, false); - ret =skcipher_walk_virt (&walk, req, false); +while (walk.nbytes >= bsize) { +const u8 *src = walk.src.virt.addr; +u8 *dst = walk.dst.virt.addr; +u8 *const iv = walk.iv; +unsigned int nbytes = walk.nbytes; + +do { +crypto_cipher_encrypt_one (cipher, iv, iv); +crypto_xor_cpy (dst, src, iv, bsize); + dst += bsize; + src += bsize; + }while ((nbytes -= bsize) >= bsize); -while (walk.nbytes) { - ret =crypto_ofb_encrypt_segment (ctx, &walk, child); - ret =skcipher_walk_done (&walk, ret); + err =skcipher_walk_done (&walk, nbytes); } -return ret; -} - -/* OFB encrypt and decrypt are identical */ -static int crypto_ofb_decrypt (struct skcipher_request *req) -{ -return crypto_ofb_encrypt (req); +if (walk.nbytes) { +crypto_cipher_encrypt_one (cipher, walk.iv, walk.iv); +crypto_xor_cpy (walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, walk.iv, + walk.nbytes); + err =skcipher_walk_done (&walk,0 ); + } +return err; }static int crypto_ofb_init_tfm (struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
@@ -165,13 +143,18 @@ static int crypto_ofb_create(struct crypif (err) goto err_drop_spawn; +/* OFB mode is a stream cipher. */ + inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize =1 ; + +/* +* To simplify the implementation, configure the skcipher walk to only +* give a partial block at the very end, never earlier. +*/ + inst->alg.chunksize = alg->cra_blocksize; + inst->alg.base.cra_priority = alg->cra_priority; - inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize; inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask; -/* We access the data as u32s when xoring. */ - inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask |= __alignof__(u32 ) -1 ; - inst->alg.ivsize = alg->cra_blocksize; inst->alg.min_keysize = alg->cra_cipher.cia_min_keysize; inst->alg.max_keysize = alg->cra_cipher.cia_max_keysize;
@@ -182,8 +165,8 @@ static int crypto_ofb_create(struct cryp inst->alg.exit = crypto_ofb_exit_tfm; inst->alg.setkey = crypto_ofb_setkey; - inst->alg.encrypt = crypto_ofb_encrypt; - inst->alg.decrypt = crypto_ofb_decrypt; + inst->alg.encrypt = crypto_ofb_crypt; + inst->alg.decrypt = crypto_ofb_crypt; inst->free = crypto_ofb_free;
crypto/testmgr.h +26 -2
@@ -16681,8 +16681,7 @@ static const struct cipher_testvec aes_c };static const struct cipher_testvec aes_ofb_tv_template[] = { -/* From NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Appendix F.5 */ - { + {/* From NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Appendix F.5 */ .key ="\x2b\x7e\x15\x16\x28\xae\xd2\xa6" "\xab\xf7\x15\x88\x09\xcf\x4f\x3c" , .klen =16 ,
@@ -16705,6 +16704,31 @@ static const struct cipher_testvec aes_o "\x30\x4c\x65\x28\xf6\x59\xc7\x78" "\x66\xa5\x10\xd9\xc1\xd6\xae\x5e", .len = 64, + .also_non_np = 1, + .np = 2, + .tap = { 31, 33 }, + }, { /* > 16 bytes, not a multiple of 16 bytes */ + .key ="\x2b\x7e\x15\x16\x28\xae\xd2\xa6" +"\xab\xf7\x15\x88\x09\xcf\x4f\x3c" , + .klen = 16, + .iv = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07" +"\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f" , + .ptext = "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96" +"\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a" +"\xae" , + .ctext = "\x3b\x3f\xd9\x2e\xb7\x2d\xad\x20" +"\x33\x34\x49\xf8\xe8\x3c\xfb\x4a" +"\x77" , + .len = 17, + }, { /* < 16 bytes */ + .key ="\x2b\x7e\x15\x16\x28\xae\xd2\xa6" +"\xab\xf7\x15\x88\x09\xcf\x4f\x3c" , + .klen = 16, + .iv = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07" +"\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f" , + .ptext = "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f", + .ctext = "\x3b\x3f\xd9\x2e\xb7\x2d\xad", + .len = 7, } };
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 40/238 crypto: arm64/crct10dif - revert to C code for short inputs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
commit d72b9d4acd548251f55b16843fc7a05dc5c80de8 upstream.
The SIMD routine ported from x86 used to have a special code path for inputs < 16 bytes, which got lost somewhere along the way. Instead, the current glue code aligns the input pointer to 16 bytes, which is not really necessary on this architecture (although it could be beneficial to performance to expose aligned data to the the NEON routine), but this could result in inputs of less than 16 bytes to be passed in. This not only fails the new extended tests that Eric has implemented, it also results in the code reading past the end of the input, which could potentially result in crashes when dealing with less than 16 bytes of input at the end of a page which is followed by an unmapped page.
So update the glue code to only invoke the NEON routine if the input is at least 16 bytes.
--- arch/arm64/crypto/crct10dif-ce-glue.c | 25 ++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/crypto/crct10dif-ce-glue.c +6 -19
@@ -39,26 +39,13 @@ static int crct10dif_update(struct shash unsigned int length) {u16 *crc =shash_desc_ctx (desc); -unsigned int l; -if (unlikely ((u64 )data %CRC_T10DIF_PMULL_CHUNK_SIZE )) { - l =min_t (u32, length,CRC_T10DIF_PMULL_CHUNK_SIZE - - ((u64 )data %CRC_T10DIF_PMULL_CHUNK_SIZE )); - - *crc =crc_t10dif_generic (*crc, data, l); - - length -= l; - data += l; - } - -if (length >0 ) { -if (may_use_simd ()) { -kernel_neon_begin (); - *crc =crc_t10dif_pmull (*crc, data, length); -kernel_neon_end (); - }else { - *crc =crc_t10dif_generic (*crc, data, length); - } +if (length >=CRC_T10DIF_PMULL_CHUNK_SIZE &&may_use_simd ()) { +kernel_neon_begin (); + *crc =crc_t10dif_pmull (*crc, data, length); +kernel_neon_end (); + }else { + *crc =crc_t10dif_generic (*crc, data, length); }return 0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 41/238 crypto: hash - set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit ba7d7433a0e998c902132bd47330e355a1eaa894 upstream.
Some algorithms have a ->setkey() method that is not atomic, in the sense that setting a key can fail after changes were already made to the tfm context. In this case, if a key was already set the tfm can end up in a state that corresponds to neither the old key nor the new key.
It's not feasible to make all ->setkey() methods atomic, especially ones that have to key multiple sub-tfms. Therefore, make the crypto API set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails and the algorithm requires a key, to prevent the tfm from being used until a new key is set.
Note: we can't set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY for OPTIONAL_KEY algorithms, so ->setkey() for those must nevertheless be atomic. That's fine for now since only the crc32 and crc32c algorithms set OPTIONAL_KEY, and it's not intended that OPTIONAL_KEY be used much.
[Cc stable mainly because when introducing the NEED_KEY flag I changed
AF_ALG to rely on it; and unlike in-kernel crypto API users, AF_ALG previously didn't have this problem. So these "incompletely keyed" states became theoretically accessible via AF_ALG -- though, the opportunities for causing real mischief seem pretty limited.]
--- crypto/ahash.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++--------- crypto/shash.c | 18 +++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
crypto/ahash.c +19 -9
@@ -190,6 +190,21 @@ static int ahash_setkey_unaligned(structreturn ret; } +static int ahash_nosetkey (struct crypto_ahash *tfm,const u8 *key, +unsigned int keylen) +{ +return -ENOSYS ; +} + +static void ahash_set_needkey (struct crypto_ahash *tfm) +{ +const struct hash_alg_common *alg =crypto_hash_alg_common (tfm); + +if (tfm->setkey != ahash_nosetkey && + !(alg->base.cra_flags &CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY )) +crypto_ahash_set_flags (tfm,CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY ); +} +int crypto_ahash_setkey (struct crypto_ahash *tfm,const u8 *key,unsigned int keylen) {
@@ -201,20 +216,16 @@ int crypto_ahash_setkey(struct crypto_ahelse err = tfm->setkey (tfm, key, keylen); -if (err) +if (unlikely (err)) { +ahash_set_needkey (tfm);return err; + }crypto_ahash_clear_flags (tfm,CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY );return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (crypto_ahash_setkey); -static int ahash_nosetkey (struct crypto_ahash *tfm,const u8 *key, -unsigned int keylen) -{ -return -ENOSYS ; -} -static inline unsigned int ahash_align_buffer_size (unsigned len,unsigned long mask) {
@@ -489,8 +500,7 @@ static int crypto_ahash_init_tfm(structif (alg->setkey) { hash->setkey = alg->setkey; -if (!(alg->halg.base.cra_flags &CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY )) -crypto_ahash_set_flags (hash,CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY ); +ahash_set_needkey (hash); }return 0 ;
crypto/shash.c +13 -5
@@ -53,6 +53,13 @@ static int shash_setkey_unaligned(structreturn err; } +static void shash_set_needkey (struct crypto_shash *tfm,struct shash_alg *alg) +{ +if (crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey (alg) && + !(alg->base.cra_flags &CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY )) +crypto_shash_set_flags (tfm,CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY ); +} +int crypto_shash_setkey (struct crypto_shash *tfm,const u8 *key,unsigned int keylen) {
@@ -65,8 +72,10 @@ int crypto_shash_setkey(struct crypto_shelse err = shash->setkey (tfm, key, keylen); -if (err) +if (unlikely (err)) { +shash_set_needkey (tfm, shash);return err; + }crypto_shash_clear_flags (tfm,CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY );return 0 ;
@@ -373,7 +382,8 @@ int crypto_init_shash_ops_async(struct c crt->final = shash_async_final; crt->finup = shash_async_finup; crt->digest = shash_async_digest; - crt->setkey = shash_async_setkey; +if (crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey (alg)) + crt->setkey = shash_async_setkey;crypto_ahash_set_flags (crt,crypto_shash_get_flags (shash) &CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY );
@@ -395,9 +405,7 @@ static int crypto_shash_init_tfm(struct hash->descsize = alg->descsize; -if (crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey (alg) && - !(alg->base.cra_flags &CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY )) -crypto_shash_set_flags (hash,CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY ); +shash_set_needkey (hash, alg);return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 42/238 crypto: morus - fix handling chunked inputs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit d644f1c8746ed24f81075480f9e9cb3777ae8d65 upstream.
The generic MORUS implementations all fail the improved AEAD tests because they produce the wrong result with some data layouts. The issue is that they assume that if the skcipher_walk API gives 'nbytes' not aligned to the walksize (a.k.a. walk.stride), then it is the end of the data. In fact, this can happen before the end. Fix them.
--- crypto/morus1280.c | 13 +++++++------ crypto/morus640.c | 13 +++++++------ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
crypto/morus1280.c +7 -6
@@ -366,18 +366,19 @@ static void crypto_morus1280_process_cry const struct morus1280_ops *ops) {struct skcipher_walk walk; -u8 *dst; -const u8 *src; ops->skcipher_walk_init (&walk, req, false);while (walk.nbytes) { - src = walk.src.virt.addr; - dst = walk.dst.virt.addr; +unsigned int nbytes = walk.nbytes; - ops->crypt_chunk (state, dst, src, walk.nbytes); +if (nbytes < walk.total) + nbytes =round_down (nbytes, walk.stride); -skcipher_walk_done (&walk,0 ); + ops->crypt_chunk (state, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, + nbytes); + +skcipher_walk_done (&walk, walk.nbytes - nbytes); } }
crypto/morus640.c +7 -6
@@ -365,18 +365,19 @@ static void crypto_morus640_process_cryp const struct morus640_ops *ops) {struct skcipher_walk walk; -u8 *dst; -const u8 *src; ops->skcipher_walk_init (&walk, req, false);while (walk.nbytes) { - src = walk.src.virt.addr; - dst = walk.dst.virt.addr; +unsigned int nbytes = walk.nbytes; - ops->crypt_chunk (state, dst, src, walk.nbytes); +if (nbytes < walk.total) + nbytes =round_down (nbytes, walk.stride); -skcipher_walk_done (&walk,0 ); + ops->crypt_chunk (state, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, + nbytes); + +skcipher_walk_done (&walk, walk.nbytes - nbytes); } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 43/238 crypto: pcbc - remove bogus memcpy()s with src == dest
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 251b7aea34ba3c4d4fdfa9447695642eb8b8b098 upstream.
The memcpy()s in the PCBC implementation use walk->iv as both the source and destination, which has undefined behavior. These memcpy()'s are actually unneeded, because walk->iv is already used to hold the previous plaintext block XOR'd with the previous ciphertext block. Thus, walk->iv is already updated to its final value.
So remove the broken and unnecessary memcpy()s.
--- crypto/pcbc.c | 14 ++++---------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
crypto/pcbc.c +4 -10
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static int crypto_pcbc_encrypt_segment(sunsigned int nbytes = walk->nbytes;u8 *src = walk->src.virt.addr;u8 *dst = walk->dst.virt.addr; -u8 *iv = walk->iv; +u8 *const iv = walk->iv; do { crypto_xor(iv, src, bsize);
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ static int crypto_pcbc_encrypt_inplace(sint bsize =crypto_cipher_blocksize (tfm);unsigned int nbytes = walk->nbytes;u8 *src = walk->src.virt.addr; -u8 *iv = walk->iv; +u8 *const iv = walk->iv;u8 tmpbuf[MAX_CIPHER_BLOCKSIZE ]; do {
@@ -84,8 +84,6 @@ static int crypto_pcbc_encrypt_inplace(s src += bsize; }while ((nbytes -= bsize) >= bsize); -memcpy (walk->iv, iv, bsize); -return nbytes; }
@@ -121,7 +119,7 @@ static int crypto_pcbc_decrypt_segment(sunsigned int nbytes = walk->nbytes;u8 *src = walk->src.virt.addr;u8 *dst = walk->dst.virt.addr; -u8 *iv = walk->iv; +u8 *const iv = walk->iv; do { crypto_cipher_decrypt_one(tfm, dst, src);
@@ -132,8 +130,6 @@ static int crypto_pcbc_decrypt_segment(s dst += bsize; }while ((nbytes -= bsize) >= bsize); -memcpy (walk->iv, iv, bsize); -return nbytes; }
@@ -144,7 +140,7 @@ static int crypto_pcbc_decrypt_inplace(sint bsize =crypto_cipher_blocksize (tfm);unsigned int nbytes = walk->nbytes;u8 *src = walk->src.virt.addr; -u8 *iv = walk->iv; +u8 *const iv = walk->iv;u8 tmpbuf[MAX_CIPHER_BLOCKSIZE ]__aligned(__alignof__(u32)) ; do {
@@ -156,8 +152,6 @@ static int crypto_pcbc_decrypt_inplace(s src += bsize; }while ((nbytes -= bsize) >= bsize); -memcpy (walk->iv, iv, bsize); -return nbytes; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 44/238 crypto: skcipher - set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit b1f6b4bf416b49f00f3abc49c639371cdecaaad1 upstream.
Some algorithms have a ->setkey() method that is not atomic, in the sense that setting a key can fail after changes were already made to the tfm context. In this case, if a key was already set the tfm can end up in a state that corresponds to neither the old key nor the new key.
For example, in lrw.c, if gf128mul_init_64k_bbe() fails due to lack of memory, then priv::table will be left NULL. After that, encryption with that tfm will cause a NULL pointer dereference.
It's not feasible to make all ->setkey() methods atomic, especially ones that have to key multiple sub-tfms. Therefore, make the crypto API set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails and the algorithm requires a key, to prevent the tfm from being used until a new key is set.
[Cc stable mainly because when introducing the NEED_KEY flag I changed
AF_ALG to rely on it; and unlike in-kernel crypto API users, AF_ALG previously didn't have this problem. So these "incompletely keyed" states became theoretically accessible via AF_ALG -- though, the opportunities for causing real mischief seem pretty limited.]
--- crypto/skcipher.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
crypto/skcipher.c +18 -9
@@ -585,6 +585,12 @@ static unsigned int crypto_skcipher_extsreturn crypto_alg_extsize (alg); } +static void skcipher_set_needkey (struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) +{ +if (tfm->keysize) +crypto_skcipher_set_flags (tfm,CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY ); +} +static int skcipher_setkey_blkcipher (struct crypto_skcipher *tfm,const u8 *key,unsigned int keylen) {
@@ -598,8 +604,10 @@ static int skcipher_setkey_blkcipher(str err =crypto_blkcipher_setkey (blkcipher, key, keylen);crypto_skcipher_set_flags (tfm,crypto_blkcipher_get_flags (blkcipher) &CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK ); -if (err) +if (unlikely (err)) { +skcipher_set_needkey (tfm);return err; + }crypto_skcipher_clear_flags (tfm,CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY );return 0 ;
@@ -677,8 +685,7 @@ static int crypto_init_skcipher_ops_blkc skcipher->ivsize =crypto_blkcipher_ivsize (blkcipher); skcipher->keysize = calg->cra_blkcipher.max_keysize; -if (skcipher->keysize) -crypto_skcipher_set_flags (skcipher,CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY ); +skcipher_set_needkey (skcipher);return 0 ; }
@@ -698,8 +705,10 @@ static int skcipher_setkey_ablkcipher(stcrypto_skcipher_set_flags (tfm,crypto_ablkcipher_get_flags (ablkcipher) &CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK ); -if (err) +if (unlikely (err)) { +skcipher_set_needkey (tfm);return err; + }crypto_skcipher_clear_flags (tfm,CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY );return 0 ;
@@ -776,8 +785,7 @@ static int crypto_init_skcipher_ops_ablksizeof (struct ablkcipher_request ); skcipher->keysize = calg->cra_ablkcipher.max_keysize; -if (skcipher->keysize) -crypto_skcipher_set_flags (skcipher,CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY ); +skcipher_set_needkey (skcipher);return 0 ; }
@@ -820,8 +828,10 @@ static int skcipher_setkey(struct cryptoelse err = cipher->setkey (tfm, key, keylen); -if (err) +if (unlikely (err)) { +skcipher_set_needkey (tfm);return err; + }crypto_skcipher_clear_flags (tfm,CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY );return 0 ;
@@ -852,8 +862,7 @@ static int crypto_skcipher_init_tfm(stru skcipher->ivsize = alg->ivsize; skcipher->keysize = alg->max_keysize; -if (skcipher->keysize) -crypto_skcipher_set_flags (skcipher,CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY ); +skcipher_set_needkey (skcipher);if (alg->exit) skcipher->base.exit = crypto_skcipher_exit_tfm;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 45/238 crypto: testmgr - skip crc32c context test for ahash algorithms
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit eb5e6730db98fcc4b51148b4a819fa4bf864ae54 upstream.
Instantiating "cryptd(crc32c)" causes a crypto self-test failure because the crypto_alloc_shash() in alg_test_crc32c() fails. This is because cryptd(crc32c) is an ahash algorithm, not a shash algorithm; so it can only be accessed through the ahash API, unlike shash algorithms which can be accessed through both the ahash and shash APIs.
As the test is testing the shash descriptor format which is only applicable to shash algorithms, skip it for ahash algorithms.
(Note that it's still important to fix crypto self-test failures even
for weird algorithm instantiations like cryptd(crc32c) that no one would really use; in fips_enabled mode unprivileged users can use them to panic the kernel, and also they prevent treating a crypto self-test failure as a bug when fuzzing the kernel.)
--- crypto/testmgr.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
crypto/testmgr.c +10 -4
@@ -1894,14 +1894,21 @@ static int alg_test_crc32c(const struct err =alg_test_hash (desc, driver, type, mask);if (err) - goto out; +return err; tfm =crypto_alloc_shash (driver, type, mask);if (IS_ERR (tfm)) { +if (PTR_ERR (tfm) == -ENOENT ) { +/* +* This crc32c implementation is only available through +* ahash API, not the shash API, so the remaining part +* of the test is not applicable to it. +*/ +return 0 ; + }printk (KERN_ERR "alg: crc32c: Failed to load transform for %s: " "%ld\n" , driver,PTR_ERR (tfm)); - err =PTR_ERR (tfm); - goto out; +return PTR_ERR (tfm); } do {
@@ -1928,7 +1935,6 @@ static int alg_test_crc32c(const structcrypto_free_shash (tfm); -out:return err; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 46/238 crypto: x86/aegis - fix handling chunked inputs and MAY_SLEEP
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit ba6771c0a0bc2fac9d6a8759bab8493bd1cffe3b upstream.
The x86 AEGIS implementations all fail the improved AEAD tests because they produce the wrong result with some data layouts. The issue is that they assume that if the skcipher_walk API gives 'nbytes' not aligned to the walksize (a.k.a. walk.stride), then it is the end of the data. In fact, this can happen before the end.
Also, when the CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP flag is given, they can incorrectly sleep in the skcipher_walk_*() functions while preemption has been disabled by kernel_fpu_begin().
Fix these bugs.
--- arch/x86/crypto/aegis128-aesni-glue.c | 38 +++++++++++++-------------------- arch/x86/crypto/aegis128l-aesni-glue.c | 38 +++++++++++++-------------------- arch/x86/crypto/aegis256-aesni-glue.c | 38 +++++++++++++-------------------- 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
arch/x86/crypto/aegis128-aesni-glue.c +15 -23
@@ -119,31 +119,20 @@ static void crypto_aegis128_aesni_proces }static void crypto_aegis128_aesni_process_crypt ( -struct aegis_state *state,struct aead_request *req, +struct aegis_state *state,struct skcipher_walk *walk,const struct aegis_crypt_ops *ops) { -struct skcipher_walk walk; -u8 *src, *dst; -unsigned int chunksize, base; - - ops->skcipher_walk_init (&walk, req, false); - -while (walk.nbytes) { - src = walk.src.virt.addr; - dst = walk.dst.virt.addr; - chunksize = walk.nbytes; - - ops->crypt_blocks (state, chunksize, src, dst); - - base = chunksize & ~(AEGIS128_BLOCK_SIZE -1 ); - src += base; - dst += base; - chunksize &=AEGIS128_BLOCK_SIZE -1 ; - -if (chunksize >0 ) - ops->crypt_tail (state, chunksize, src, dst); +while (walk->nbytes >=AEGIS128_BLOCK_SIZE ) { + ops->crypt_blocks (state, +round_down (walk->nbytes,AEGIS128_BLOCK_SIZE ), + walk->src.virt.addr, walk->dst.virt.addr); +skcipher_walk_done (walk, walk->nbytes %AEGIS128_BLOCK_SIZE ); + } -skcipher_walk_done (&walk,0 ); +if (walk->nbytes) { + ops->crypt_tail (state, walk->nbytes, walk->src.virt.addr, + walk->dst.virt.addr); +skcipher_walk_done (walk,0 ); } }
@@ -186,13 +175,16 @@ static void crypto_aegis128_aesni_crypt( {struct crypto_aead *tfm =crypto_aead_reqtfm (req);struct aegis_ctx *ctx =crypto_aegis128_aesni_ctx (tfm); +struct skcipher_walk walk;struct aegis_state state; + ops->skcipher_walk_init (&walk, req, true); +kernel_fpu_begin ();crypto_aegis128_aesni_init (&state, ctx->key.bytes, req->iv);crypto_aegis128_aesni_process_ad (&state, req->src, req->assoclen); -crypto_aegis128_aesni_process_crypt (&state, req, ops); +crypto_aegis128_aesni_process_crypt (&state, &walk, ops);crypto_aegis128_aesni_final (&state, tag_xor, req->assoclen, cryptlen);kernel_fpu_end ();
arch/x86/crypto/aegis128l-aesni-glue.c +15 -23
@@ -119,31 +119,20 @@ static void crypto_aegis128l_aesni_proce }static void crypto_aegis128l_aesni_process_crypt ( -struct aegis_state *state,struct aead_request *req, +struct aegis_state *state,struct skcipher_walk *walk,const struct aegis_crypt_ops *ops) { -struct skcipher_walk walk; -u8 *src, *dst; -unsigned int chunksize, base; - - ops->skcipher_walk_init (&walk, req, false); - -while (walk.nbytes) { - src = walk.src.virt.addr; - dst = walk.dst.virt.addr; - chunksize = walk.nbytes; - - ops->crypt_blocks (state, chunksize, src, dst); - - base = chunksize & ~(AEGIS128L_BLOCK_SIZE -1 ); - src += base; - dst += base; - chunksize &=AEGIS128L_BLOCK_SIZE -1 ; - -if (chunksize >0 ) - ops->crypt_tail (state, chunksize, src, dst); +while (walk->nbytes >=AEGIS128L_BLOCK_SIZE ) { + ops->crypt_blocks (state,round_down (walk->nbytes, +AEGIS128L_BLOCK_SIZE ), + walk->src.virt.addr, walk->dst.virt.addr); +skcipher_walk_done (walk, walk->nbytes %AEGIS128L_BLOCK_SIZE ); + } -skcipher_walk_done (&walk,0 ); +if (walk->nbytes) { + ops->crypt_tail (state, walk->nbytes, walk->src.virt.addr, + walk->dst.virt.addr); +skcipher_walk_done (walk,0 ); } }
@@ -186,13 +175,16 @@ static void crypto_aegis128l_aesni_crypt {struct crypto_aead *tfm =crypto_aead_reqtfm (req);struct aegis_ctx *ctx =crypto_aegis128l_aesni_ctx (tfm); +struct skcipher_walk walk;struct aegis_state state; + ops->skcipher_walk_init (&walk, req, true); +kernel_fpu_begin ();crypto_aegis128l_aesni_init (&state, ctx->key.bytes, req->iv);crypto_aegis128l_aesni_process_ad (&state, req->src, req->assoclen); -crypto_aegis128l_aesni_process_crypt (&state, req, ops); +crypto_aegis128l_aesni_process_crypt (&state, &walk, ops);crypto_aegis128l_aesni_final (&state, tag_xor, req->assoclen, cryptlen);kernel_fpu_end ();
arch/x86/crypto/aegis256-aesni-glue.c +15 -23
@@ -119,31 +119,20 @@ static void crypto_aegis256_aesni_proces }static void crypto_aegis256_aesni_process_crypt ( -struct aegis_state *state,struct aead_request *req, +struct aegis_state *state,struct skcipher_walk *walk,const struct aegis_crypt_ops *ops) { -struct skcipher_walk walk; -u8 *src, *dst; -unsigned int chunksize, base; - - ops->skcipher_walk_init (&walk, req, false); - -while (walk.nbytes) { - src = walk.src.virt.addr; - dst = walk.dst.virt.addr; - chunksize = walk.nbytes; - - ops->crypt_blocks (state, chunksize, src, dst); - - base = chunksize & ~(AEGIS256_BLOCK_SIZE -1 ); - src += base; - dst += base; - chunksize &=AEGIS256_BLOCK_SIZE -1 ; - -if (chunksize >0 ) - ops->crypt_tail (state, chunksize, src, dst); +while (walk->nbytes >=AEGIS256_BLOCK_SIZE ) { + ops->crypt_blocks (state, +round_down (walk->nbytes,AEGIS256_BLOCK_SIZE ), + walk->src.virt.addr, walk->dst.virt.addr); +skcipher_walk_done (walk, walk->nbytes %AEGIS256_BLOCK_SIZE ); + } -skcipher_walk_done (&walk,0 ); +if (walk->nbytes) { + ops->crypt_tail (state, walk->nbytes, walk->src.virt.addr, + walk->dst.virt.addr); +skcipher_walk_done (walk,0 ); } }
@@ -186,13 +175,16 @@ static void crypto_aegis256_aesni_crypt( {struct crypto_aead *tfm =crypto_aead_reqtfm (req);struct aegis_ctx *ctx =crypto_aegis256_aesni_ctx (tfm); +struct skcipher_walk walk;struct aegis_state state; + ops->skcipher_walk_init (&walk, req, true); +kernel_fpu_begin ();crypto_aegis256_aesni_init (&state, ctx->key, req->iv);crypto_aegis256_aesni_process_ad (&state, req->src, req->assoclen); -crypto_aegis256_aesni_process_crypt (&state, req, ops); +crypto_aegis256_aesni_process_crypt (&state, &walk, ops);crypto_aegis256_aesni_final (&state, tag_xor, req->assoclen, cryptlen);kernel_fpu_end ();
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 47/238 crypto: x86/aesni-gcm - fix crash on empty plaintext
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 3af349639597fea582a93604734d717e59a0e223 upstream.
gcmaes_crypt_by_sg() dereferences the NULL pointer returned by scatterwalk_ffwd() when encrypting an empty plaintext and the source scatterlist ends immediately after the associated data.
Fix it by only fast-forwarding to the src/dst data scatterlists if the data length is nonzero.
This bug is reproduced by the "rfc4543(gcm(aes))" test vectors when run with the new AEAD test manager.
--- arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c | 13 ++++++++----- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c +8 -5
@@ -821,11 +821,14 @@ static int gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(bool enc,scatterwalk_map_and_copy (assoc, req->src,0 , assoclen,0 ); } - src_sg =scatterwalk_ffwd (src_start, req->src, req->assoclen); -scatterwalk_start (&src_sg_walk, src_sg); -if (req->src != req->dst) { - dst_sg =scatterwalk_ffwd (dst_start, req->dst, req->assoclen); -scatterwalk_start (&dst_sg_walk, dst_sg); +if (left) { + src_sg =scatterwalk_ffwd (src_start, req->src, req->assoclen); +scatterwalk_start (&src_sg_walk, src_sg); +if (req->src != req->dst) { + dst_sg =scatterwalk_ffwd (dst_start, req->dst, + req->assoclen); +scatterwalk_start (&dst_sg_walk, dst_sg); + } }kernel_fpu_begin ();
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 22/238 crypto: ahash - fix another early termination in hash walk
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 77568e535af7c4f97eaef1e555bf0af83772456c upstream.
Hash algorithms with an alignmask set, e.g. "xcbc(aes-aesni)" and "michael_mic", fail the improved hash tests because they sometimes produce the wrong digest. The bug is that in the case where a scatterlist element crosses pages, not all the data is actually hashed because the scatterlist walk terminates too early. This happens because the 'nbytes' variable in crypto_hash_walk_done() is assigned the number of bytes remaining in the page, then later interpreted as the number of bytes remaining in the scatterlist element. Fix it.
--- crypto/ahash.c | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
crypto/ahash.c +7 -7
@@ -86,17 +86,17 @@ static int hash_walk_new_entry(struct crint crypto_hash_walk_done (struct crypto_hash_walk *walk,int err) {unsigned int alignmask = walk->alignmask; -unsigned int nbytes = walk->entrylen; walk->data -= walk->offset; -if (nbytes && walk->offset & alignmask && !err) { - walk->offset =ALIGN (walk->offset, alignmask +1 ); - nbytes =min (nbytes, - ((unsigned int )(PAGE_SIZE )) - walk->offset); - walk->entrylen -= nbytes; +if (walk->entrylen && (walk->offset & alignmask) && !err) { +unsigned int nbytes; + walk->offset =ALIGN (walk->offset, alignmask +1 ); + nbytes =min (walk->entrylen, + (unsigned int )(PAGE_SIZE - walk->offset));if (nbytes) { + walk->entrylen -= nbytes; walk->data += walk->offset;return nbytes; }
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ int crypto_hash_walk_done(struct crypto_if (err)return err; -if (nbytes) { +if (walk->entrylen) { walk->offset =0 ; walk->pg++;return hash_walk_next (walk);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 49/238 crypto: arm64/aes-ccm - fix logical bug in AAD MAC handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
commit eaf46edf6ea89675bd36245369c8de5063a0272c upstream.
The NEON MAC calculation routine fails to handle the case correctly where there is some data in the buffer, and the input fills it up exactly. In this case, we enter the loop at the end with w8 == 0, while a negative value is assumed, and so the loop carries on until the increment of the 32-bit counter wraps around, which is quite obviously wrong.
So omit the loop altogether in this case, and exit right away.
--- arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-core.S | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-core.S +3 -2
@@ -74,12 +74,13 @@ ENTRY(ce_aes_ccm_auth_data) beq 10f ext v0.16b, v0.16b, v0.16b, #1 /* rotate out the mac bytes */ b 7b -8: mov w7, w8 +8: cbz w8, 91f + mov w7, w8 add w8, w8, #16 9: ext v1.16b, v1.16b, v1.16b, #1 adds w7, w7, #1 bne 9b - eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v1.16b +91: eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v1.16b st1 {v0.16b}, [x0] 10: str w8, [x3] ret
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 51/238 CIFS: Fix leaking locked VFS cache pages in writeback retry
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
commit 165df9a080b6863ae286fa01780c13d87cd81076 upstream.
If we don't find a writable file handle when retrying writepages we break of the loop and do not unlock and put pages neither from wdata2 nor from the original wdata. Fix this by walking through all the remaining pages and cleanup them properly.
--- fs/cifs/cifssmb.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c +13 -4
@@ -2125,12 +2125,13 @@ cifs_writev_requeue(struct cifs_writedat wdata2->cfile =find_writable_file (CIFS_I (inode), false);if (!wdata2->cfile) { -cifs_dbg (VFS ,"No writable handles for inode\n" ); +cifs_dbg (VFS ,"No writable handle to retry writepages\n" ); rc = -EBADF ; -break ; + }else { + wdata2->pid = wdata2->cfile->pid; + rc = server->ops->async_writev (wdata2, + cifs_writedata_release); } - wdata2->pid = wdata2->cfile->pid; - rc = server->ops->async_writev (wdata2, cifs_writedata_release);for (j =0 ; j < nr_pages; j++) {unlock_page (wdata2->pages[j]);
@@ -2145,6 +2146,7 @@ cifs_writev_requeue(struct cifs_writedatkref_put (&wdata2->refcount, cifs_writedata_release);if (is_retryable_error (rc))continue ; + i += nr_pages;break ; }
@@ -2152,6 +2154,13 @@ cifs_writev_requeue(struct cifs_writedat i += nr_pages; }while (i < wdata->nr_pages); +/* cleanup remaining pages from the original wdata */ +for (; i < wdata->nr_pages; i++) { +SetPageError (wdata->pages[i]); +end_page_writeback (wdata->pages[i]); +put_page (wdata->pages[i]); + } +if (rc !=0 && !is_retryable_error (rc))mapping_set_error (inode->i_mapping, rc);kref_put (&wdata->refcount, cifs_writedata_release);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 52/238 CIFS: Do not reset lease state to NONE on lease break
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
commit 7b9b9edb49ad377b1e06abf14354c227e9ac4b06 upstream.
Currently on lease break the client sets a caching level twice:
when oplock is detected and when oplock is processed. While the 1st attempt sets the level to the value provided by the server, the 2nd one resets the level to None unconditionally. This happens because the oplock/lease processing code was changed to avoid races between page cache flushes and oplock breaks. The commit c11f1df5003d534 ("cifs: Wait for writebacks to complete before attempting write.") fixed the races for oplocks but didn't apply the same changes for leases resulting in overwriting the server granted value to None. Fix this by properly processing lease breaks.
--- fs/cifs/smb2misc.c | 17 ++++++++++++++--- fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/cifs/smb2misc.c +14 -3
@@ -517,7 +517,6 @@ smb2_tcon_has_lease(struct cifs_tcon *tc__u8 lease_state;struct list_head *tmp;struct cifsFileInfo *cfile; -struct TCP_Server_Info *server = tcon->ses->server;struct cifs_pending_open *open;struct cifsInodeInfo *cinode; int ack_req = le32_to_cpu(rsp->Flags &
@@ -537,13 +536,25 @@ smb2_tcon_has_lease(struct cifs_tcon *tccifs_dbg (FYI ,"lease key match, lease break 0x%x\n" ,le32_to_cpu (rsp->NewLeaseState)); - server->ops->set_oplock_level (cinode, lease_state,0 ,NULL ); -if (ack_req) cfile->oplock_break_cancelled = false;else cfile->oplock_break_cancelled = true; +set_bit (CIFS_INODE_PENDING_OPLOCK_BREAK , &cinode->flags); + +/* +* Set or clear flags depending on the lease state being READ. +* HANDLE caching flag should be added when the client starts +* to defer closing remote file handles with HANDLE leases. +*/ +if (lease_state &SMB2_LEASE_READ_CACHING_HE ) +set_bit (CIFS_INODE_DOWNGRADE_OPLOCK_TO_L2 , + &cinode->flags); +else +clear_bit (CIFS_INODE_DOWNGRADE_OPLOCK_TO_L2 , + &cinode->flags); +queue_work (cifsoplockd_wq, &cfile->oplock_break);kfree (lw);return true;
fs/cifs/smb2ops.c +12 -3
@@ -2595,6 +2595,15 @@ smb2_downgrade_oplock(struct TCP_Server_ }static void +smb21_downgrade_oplock (struct TCP_Server_Info *server, +struct cifsInodeInfo *cinode,bool set_level2) +{ + server->ops->set_oplock_level (cinode, + set_level2 ?SMB2_LEASE_READ_CACHING_HE : +0 ,0 ,NULL ); +} + +static void smb2_set_oplock_level (struct cifsInodeInfo *cinode,__u32 oplock,unsigned int epoch,bool *purge_cache) {
@@ -3646,7 +3655,7 @@ struct smb_version_operations smb21_oper .print_stats = smb2_print_stats, .is_oplock_break = smb2_is_valid_oplock_break, .handle_cancelled_mid = smb2_handle_cancelled_mid, - .downgrade_oplock = smb2_downgrade_oplock, + .downgrade_oplock = smb21_downgrade_oplock, .need_neg = smb2_need_neg, .negotiate = smb2_negotiate, .negotiate_wsize = smb2_negotiate_wsize,
@@ -3743,7 +3752,7 @@ struct smb_version_operations smb30_oper .dump_share_caps = smb2_dump_share_caps, .is_oplock_break = smb2_is_valid_oplock_break, .handle_cancelled_mid = smb2_handle_cancelled_mid, - .downgrade_oplock = smb2_downgrade_oplock, + .downgrade_oplock = smb21_downgrade_oplock, .need_neg = smb2_need_neg, .negotiate = smb2_negotiate, .negotiate_wsize = smb3_negotiate_wsize,
@@ -3848,7 +3857,7 @@ struct smb_version_operations smb311_ope .dump_share_caps = smb2_dump_share_caps, .is_oplock_break = smb2_is_valid_oplock_break, .handle_cancelled_mid = smb2_handle_cancelled_mid, - .downgrade_oplock = smb2_downgrade_oplock, + .downgrade_oplock = smb21_downgrade_oplock, .need_neg = smb2_need_neg, .negotiate = smb2_negotiate, .negotiate_wsize = smb3_negotiate_wsize,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 53/238 CIFS: Do not skip SMB2 message IDs on send failures
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
commit c781af7e0c1fed9f1d0e0ec31b86f5b21a8dca17 upstream.
When we hit failures during constructing MIDs or sending PDUs through the network, we end up not using message IDs assigned to the packet. The next SMB packet will skip those message IDs and continue with the next one. This behavior may lead to a server not granting us credits until we use the skipped IDs. Fix this by reverting the current ID to the original value if any errors occur before we push the packet through the network stack.
This patch fixes the generic/310 test from the xfs-tests.
--- fs/cifs/cifsglob.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 13 +++++++++++++ fs/cifs/smb2transport.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- fs/cifs/transport.c | 6 +++++- 4 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/cifs/cifsglob.h +19 -0
@@ -236,6 +236,8 @@ struct smb_version_operations {int * (*get_credits_field)(struct TCP_Server_Info *,const int );unsigned int (*get_credits)(struct mid_q_entry *);__u64 (*get_next_mid)(struct TCP_Server_Info *); +void (*revert_current_mid)(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, +const unsigned int val);/* data offset from read response message */ unsigned int (*read_data_offset)(char *);/*
@@ -770,6 +772,22 @@ get_next_mid(struct TCP_Server_Info *serreturn cpu_to_le16 (mid); } +static inline void +revert_current_mid (struct TCP_Server_Info *server,const unsigned int val) +{ +if (server->ops->revert_current_mid) + server->ops->revert_current_mid (server, val); +} + +static inline void +revert_current_mid_from_hdr (struct TCP_Server_Info *server, +const struct smb2_sync_hdr *shdr) +{ +unsigned int num =le16_to_cpu (shdr->CreditCharge); + +return revert_current_mid (server, num >0 ? num :1 ); +} +static inline __u16 get_mid (const struct smb_hdr *smb) {
@@ -1422,6 +1440,7 @@ struct mid_q_entry {struct kref refcount;struct TCP_Server_Info *server;/* server corresponding to this mid */ __u64 mid;/* multiplex id */ +__u16 credits;/* number of credits consumed by this mid */ __u32 pid;/* process id */ __u32 sequence_number;/* for CIFS signing */ unsigned long when_alloc;/* when mid was created */
fs/cifs/smb2ops.c +13 -0
@@ -219,6 +219,15 @@ smb2_get_next_mid(struct TCP_Server_Inforeturn mid; } +static void +smb2_revert_current_mid (struct TCP_Server_Info *server,const unsigned int val) +{ +spin_lock (&GlobalMid_Lock); +if (server->CurrentMid >= val) + server->CurrentMid -= val; +spin_unlock (&GlobalMid_Lock); +} +static struct mid_q_entry *smb2_find_mid (struct TCP_Server_Info *server,char *buf) {
@@ -3550,6 +3559,7 @@ struct smb_version_operations smb20_oper .get_credits = smb2_get_credits, .wait_mtu_credits = cifs_wait_mtu_credits, .get_next_mid = smb2_get_next_mid, + .revert_current_mid = smb2_revert_current_mid, .read_data_offset = smb2_read_data_offset, .read_data_length = smb2_read_data_length, .map_error = map_smb2_to_linux_error,
@@ -3645,6 +3655,7 @@ struct smb_version_operations smb21_oper .get_credits = smb2_get_credits, .wait_mtu_credits = smb2_wait_mtu_credits, .get_next_mid = smb2_get_next_mid, + .revert_current_mid = smb2_revert_current_mid, .read_data_offset = smb2_read_data_offset, .read_data_length = smb2_read_data_length, .map_error = map_smb2_to_linux_error,
@@ -3741,6 +3752,7 @@ struct smb_version_operations smb30_oper .get_credits = smb2_get_credits, .wait_mtu_credits = smb2_wait_mtu_credits, .get_next_mid = smb2_get_next_mid, + .revert_current_mid = smb2_revert_current_mid, .read_data_offset = smb2_read_data_offset, .read_data_length = smb2_read_data_length, .map_error = map_smb2_to_linux_error,
@@ -3846,6 +3858,7 @@ struct smb_version_operations smb311_ope .get_credits = smb2_get_credits, .wait_mtu_credits = smb2_wait_mtu_credits, .get_next_mid = smb2_get_next_mid, + .revert_current_mid = smb2_revert_current_mid, .read_data_offset = smb2_read_data_offset, .read_data_length = smb2_read_data_length, .map_error = map_smb2_to_linux_error,
fs/cifs/smb2transport.c +12 -2
@@ -576,6 +576,7 @@ smb2_mid_entry_alloc(const struct smb2_s struct TCP_Server_Info *server) {struct mid_q_entry *temp; +unsigned int credits =le16_to_cpu (shdr->CreditCharge);if (server ==NULL ) {cifs_dbg (VFS ,"Null TCP session in smb2_mid_entry_alloc\n" );
@@ -586,6 +587,7 @@ smb2_mid_entry_alloc(const struct smb2_smemset (temp,0 ,sizeof (struct mid_q_entry ));kref_init (&temp->refcount); temp->mid =le64_to_cpu (shdr->MessageId); + temp->credits = credits >0 ? credits :1 ; temp->pid = current->pid; temp->command = shdr->Command;/* Always LE */ temp->when_alloc = jiffies;
@@ -674,13 +676,18 @@ smb2_setup_request(struct cifs_ses *ses,smb2_seq_num_into_buf (ses->server, shdr); rc =smb2_get_mid_entry (ses, shdr, &mid); -if (rc) +if (rc) { +revert_current_mid_from_hdr (ses->server, shdr);return ERR_PTR (rc); + } + rc =smb2_sign_rqst (rqst, ses->server);if (rc) { +revert_current_mid_from_hdr (ses->server, shdr);cifs_delete_mid (mid);return ERR_PTR (rc); } +return mid; }
@@ -695,11 +702,14 @@ smb2_setup_async_request(struct TCP_Servsmb2_seq_num_into_buf (server, shdr); mid =smb2_mid_entry_alloc (shdr, server); -if (mid ==NULL ) +if (mid ==NULL ) { +revert_current_mid_from_hdr (server, shdr);return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); + } rc =smb2_sign_rqst (rqst, server);if (rc) { +revert_current_mid_from_hdr (server, shdr);DeleteMidQEntry (mid);return ERR_PTR (rc); }
fs/cifs/transport.c +5 -1
@@ -647,6 +647,7 @@ cifs_call_async(struct TCP_Server_Info *cifs_in_send_dec (server);if (rc <0 ) { +revert_current_mid (server, mid->credits); server->sequence_number -=2 ;cifs_delete_mid (mid); }
@@ -868,6 +869,7 @@ compound_send_recv(const unsigned int xifor (i =0 ; i < num_rqst; i++) { midQ[i] = ses->server->ops->setup_request (ses, &rqst[i]);if (IS_ERR (midQ[i])) { +revert_current_mid (ses->server, i);for (j =0 ; j < i; j++)cifs_delete_mid (midQ[j]);mutex_unlock (&ses->server->srv_mutex);
@@ -897,8 +899,10 @@ compound_send_recv(const unsigned int xifor (i =0 ; i < num_rqst; i++)cifs_save_when_sent (midQ[i]); -if (rc <0 ) +if (rc <0 ) { +revert_current_mid (ses->server, num_rqst); ses->server->sequence_number -=2 ; + }mutex_unlock (&ses->server->srv_mutex);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 23/238 crypto: rockchip - fix scatterlist nents error
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhang Zhijie <[email protected]>
commit 4359669a087633132203c52d67dd8c31e09e7b2e upstream.
In some cases, the nents of src scatterlist is different from dst scatterlist. So two variables are used to handle the nents of src&dst scatterlist.
--- drivers/crypto/rockchip/rk3288_crypto.c | 2 +- drivers/crypto/rockchip/rk3288_crypto.h | 3 ++- drivers/crypto/rockchip/rk3288_crypto_ablkcipher.c | 5 +++-- drivers/crypto/rockchip/rk3288_crypto_ahash.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/rockchip/rk3288_crypto.c +1 -1
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ static int rk_load_data(struct rk_crypto count = (dev->left_bytes >PAGE_SIZE ) ?PAGE_SIZE : dev->left_bytes; -if (!sg_pcopy_to_buffer (dev->first, dev->nents, +if (!sg_pcopy_to_buffer (dev->first, dev->src_nents, dev->addr_vir, count, dev->total - dev->left_bytes)) { dev_err(dev->dev, "[%s:%d] pcopy err\n",
drivers/crypto/rockchip/rk3288_crypto.h +2 -1
@@ -207,7 +207,8 @@ struct rk_crypto_info {void *addr_vir;int aligned;int align_size; -size_t nents; +size_t src_nents; +size_t dst_nents;unsigned int total;unsigned int count;dma_addr_t addr_in;
drivers/crypto/rockchip/rk3288_crypto_ablkcipher.c +3 -2
@@ -260,8 +260,9 @@ static int rk_ablk_start(struct rk_crypt dev->total = req->nbytes; dev->sg_src = req->src; dev->first = req->src; - dev->nents =sg_nents (req->src); + dev->src_nents =sg_nents (req->src); dev->sg_dst = req->dst; + dev->dst_nents =sg_nents (req->dst); dev->aligned =1 ;spin_lock_irqsave (&dev->lock, flags);
@@ -297,7 +298,7 @@ static int rk_ablk_rx(struct rk_crypto_i dev->unload_data (dev);if (!dev->aligned) { -if (!sg_pcopy_from_buffer (req->dst, dev->nents, +if (!sg_pcopy_from_buffer (req->dst, dev->dst_nents, dev->addr_vir, dev->count, dev->total - dev->left_bytes - dev->count)) {
drivers/crypto/rockchip/rk3288_crypto_ahash.c +1 -1
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ static int rk_ahash_start(struct rk_cryp dev->sg_dst =NULL ; dev->sg_src = req->src; dev->first = req->src; - dev->nents =sg_nents (req->src); + dev->src_nents =sg_nents (req->src); rctx =ahash_request_ctx (req); rctx->mode =0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 24/238 crypto: rockchip - update new iv to device in multiple operations
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhang Zhijie <[email protected]>
commit c1c214adcb56d36433480c8fedf772498e7e539c upstream.
For chain mode in cipher(eg. AES-CBC/DES-CBC), the iv is continuously updated in the operation. The new iv value should be written to device register by software.
--- drivers/crypto/rockchip/rk3288_crypto.h | 1 drivers/crypto/rockchip/rk3288_crypto_ablkcipher.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+)
drivers/crypto/rockchip/rk3288_crypto.h +1 -0
@@ -245,6 +245,7 @@ struct rk_cipher_ctx {struct rk_crypto_info *dev;unsigned int keylen;u32 mode; +u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE ]; };enum alg_type {
drivers/crypto/rockchip/rk3288_crypto_ablkcipher.c +34 -0
@@ -242,6 +242,17 @@ static void crypto_dma_start(struct rk_cstatic int rk_set_data_start (struct rk_crypto_info *dev) {int err; +struct ablkcipher_request *req = +ablkcipher_request_cast (dev->async_req); +struct crypto_ablkcipher *tfm =crypto_ablkcipher_reqtfm (req); +struct rk_cipher_ctx *ctx =crypto_ablkcipher_ctx (tfm); +u32 ivsize =crypto_ablkcipher_ivsize (tfm); +u8 *src_last_blk =page_address (sg_page (dev->sg_src)) + + dev->sg_src->offset + dev->sg_src->length - ivsize; + +/* store the iv that need to be updated in chain mode */ +if (ctx->mode &RK_CRYPTO_DEC ) +memcpy (ctx->iv, src_last_blk, ivsize); err = dev->load_data (dev, dev->sg_src, dev->sg_dst);if (!err)
@@ -286,6 +297,28 @@ static void rk_iv_copyback(struct rk_crymemcpy_fromio (req->info, dev->reg +RK_CRYPTO_AES_IV_0 , ivsize); } +static void rk_update_iv (struct rk_crypto_info *dev) +{ +struct ablkcipher_request *req = +ablkcipher_request_cast (dev->async_req); +struct crypto_ablkcipher *tfm =crypto_ablkcipher_reqtfm (req); +struct rk_cipher_ctx *ctx =crypto_ablkcipher_ctx (tfm); +u32 ivsize =crypto_ablkcipher_ivsize (tfm); +u8 *new_iv =NULL ; + +if (ctx->mode &RK_CRYPTO_DEC ) { + new_iv = ctx->iv; + }else { + new_iv =page_address (sg_page (dev->sg_dst)) + + dev->sg_dst->offset + dev->sg_dst->length - ivsize; + } + +if (ivsize ==DES_BLOCK_SIZE ) +memcpy_toio (dev->reg +RK_CRYPTO_TDES_IV_0 , new_iv, ivsize); +else if (ivsize ==AES_BLOCK_SIZE ) +memcpy_toio (dev->reg +RK_CRYPTO_AES_IV_0 , new_iv, ivsize); +} +/* return: * true some err was occurred * fault no err, continue
@@ -307,6 +340,7 @@ static int rk_ablk_rx(struct rk_crypto_i } }if (dev->left_bytes) { +rk_update_iv (dev);if (dev->aligned) {if (sg_is_last (dev->sg_src)) { dev_err(dev->dev, "[%s:%d] Lack of data\n",
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 25/238 dax: Flush partial PMDs correctly
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
commit e4b3448bc346fedf36db64124a664a959995b085 upstream.
The radix tree would rewind the index in an iterator to the lowest index of a multi-slot entry. The XArray iterators instead leave the index unchanged, but I overlooked that when converting DAX from the radix tree to the XArray. Adjust the index that we use for flushing to the start of the PMD range.
--- fs/dax.c | 19 +++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
fs/dax.c +9 -10
@@ -843,9 +843,8 @@ unlock_pte:static int dax_writeback_one (struct xa_state *xas,struct dax_device *dax_dev,struct address_space *mapping,void *entry) { -unsigned long pfn; +unsigned long pfn, index, count;long ret =0 ; -size_t size;/* * A page got tagged dirty in DAX mapping? Something is seriously
@@ -894,17 +893,18 @@ static int dax_writeback_one(struct xa_sxas_unlock_irq (xas);/* -* Even if dax_writeback_mapping_range() was given a wbc->range_start -* in the middle of a PMD, the 'index' we are given will be aligned to -* the start index of the PMD, as will the pfn we pull from 'entry'. +* If dax_writeback_mapping_range() was given a wbc->range_start +* in the middle of a PMD, the 'index' we use needs to be +* aligned to the start of the PMD. * This allows us to flush for PMD_SIZE and not have to worry about * partial PMD writebacks. */ pfn =dax_to_pfn (entry); - size =PAGE_SIZE <<dax_entry_order (entry); + count =1UL <<dax_entry_order (entry); + index = xas->xa_index & ~(count -1 ); -dax_entry_mkclean (mapping, xas->xa_index, pfn); -dax_flush (dax_dev,page_address (pfn_to_page (pfn)), size); +dax_entry_mkclean (mapping, index, pfn); +dax_flush (dax_dev,page_address (pfn_to_page (pfn)), count *PAGE_SIZE );/* * After we have flushed the cache, we can clear the dirty tag. There * cannot be new dirty data in the pfn after the flush has completed as
@@ -917,8 +917,7 @@ static int dax_writeback_one(struct xa_sxas_clear_mark (xas,PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY );dax_wake_entry (xas, entry, false); -trace_dax_writeback_one (mapping->host, xas->xa_index, - size >>PAGE_SHIFT ); +trace_dax_writeback_one (mapping->host, index, count);return ret; put_unlocked:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 26/238 nfit: Fix nfit_intel_shutdown_status() command submission
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
commit f596c8844fe1d0022007ae6c7a377361fb653eff upstream.
The implementation is broken in all the ways the unit test did not touch:
1/ The local definition of in_buf and in_obj violated C99 initializer
expectations for zeroing. By only initializing 2 out of the three struct members the compiler was free to zero-initialize the remaining entry even though the aliased location in the union was initialized.
2/ The implementation made assumptions about the state of the 'smart'
payload after command execution that are satisfied by acpi_nfit_ctl(), but not acpi_evaluate_dsm().
3/ populate_shutdown_status() is skipped on Intel NVDIMMs due to the early
return for skipping the common _LS{I,R,W} enabling.
4/ The input length should be zero.
This breakage was missed due to the unit test implementation only testing the case where nfit_intel_shutdown_status() returns a valid payload.
Much of this complexity would be saved if acpi_nfit_ctl() could be used, but that currently requires a 'struct nvdimm *' argument and one is not created until later in the init process. The health result is needed before the device is created because the payload gates whether the nmemX/nfit/dirty_shutdown property is visible in sysfs.
--- drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c +25 -18
@@ -1759,14 +1759,14 @@ static bool acpi_nvdimm_has_method(struc__weak void nfit_intel_shutdown_status (struct nfit_mem *nfit_mem) { +struct device *dev = &nfit_mem->adev->dev;struct nd_intel_smart smart = {0 };union acpi_object in_buf = { - .type =ACPI_TYPE_BUFFER , - .buffer.pointer = (char *) &smart, - .buffer.length =sizeof (smart), + .buffer.type =ACPI_TYPE_BUFFER , + .buffer.length =0 , };union acpi_object in_obj = { - .type =ACPI_TYPE_PACKAGE , + .package.type =ACPI_TYPE_PACKAGE , .package.count =1 , .package.elements = &in_buf, };
@@ -1781,8 +1781,15 @@ __weak void nfit_intel_shutdown_status(sreturn ; out_obj =acpi_evaluate_dsm (handle, guid, revid, func, &in_obj); -if (!out_obj) +if (!out_obj || out_obj->type !=ACPI_TYPE_BUFFER + || out_obj->buffer.length <sizeof (smart)) { +dev_dbg (dev->parent,"%s: failed to retrieve initial health\n" , +dev_name (dev)); +ACPI_FREE (out_obj);return ; + } +memcpy (&smart, out_obj->buffer.pointer,sizeof (smart)); +ACPI_FREE (out_obj);if (smart.flags &ND_INTEL_SMART_SHUTDOWN_VALID ) {if (smart.shutdown_state)
@@ -1793,7 +1800,6 @@ __weak void nfit_intel_shutdown_status(sset_bit (NFIT_MEM_DIRTY_COUNT , &nfit_mem->flags); nfit_mem->dirty_shutdown = smart.shutdown_count; } -ACPI_FREE (out_obj); }static void populate_shutdown_status (struct nfit_mem *nfit_mem)
@@ -1915,18 +1921,19 @@ static int acpi_nfit_add_dimm(struct acp | 1 << ND_CMD_SET_CONFIG_DATA;if (family ==NVDIMM_FAMILY_INTEL && (dsm_mask & label_mask) == label_mask) -return 0 ; - -if (acpi_nvdimm_has_method (adev_dimm,"_LSI" ) - &&acpi_nvdimm_has_method (adev_dimm,"_LSR" )) { -dev_dbg (dev,"%s: has _LSR\n" ,dev_name (&adev_dimm->dev)); -set_bit (NFIT_MEM_LSR , &nfit_mem->flags); - } - -if (test_bit (NFIT_MEM_LSR , &nfit_mem->flags) - &&acpi_nvdimm_has_method (adev_dimm,"_LSW" )) { -dev_dbg (dev,"%s: has _LSW\n" ,dev_name (&adev_dimm->dev)); -set_bit (NFIT_MEM_LSW , &nfit_mem->flags); +/* skip _LS{I,R,W} enabling */ ; +else { +if (acpi_nvdimm_has_method (adev_dimm,"_LSI" ) + &&acpi_nvdimm_has_method (adev_dimm,"_LSR" )) { +dev_dbg (dev,"%s: has _LSR\n" ,dev_name (&adev_dimm->dev)); +set_bit (NFIT_MEM_LSR , &nfit_mem->flags); + } + +if (test_bit (NFIT_MEM_LSR , &nfit_mem->flags) + &&acpi_nvdimm_has_method (adev_dimm,"_LSW" )) { +dev_dbg (dev,"%s: has _LSW\n" ,dev_name (&adev_dimm->dev)); +set_bit (NFIT_MEM_LSW , &nfit_mem->flags); + } }populate_shutdown_status (nfit_mem);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 28/238 acpi/nfit: Fix bus command validation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
commit ebe9f6f19d80d8978d16078dff3d5bd93ad8d102 upstream.
Commit 11189c1089da "acpi/nfit: Fix command-supported detection" broke ND_CMD_CALL for bus-level commands. The "func = cmd" assumption is only valid for:
ND_CMD_ARS_CAP
ND_CMD_ARS_START
ND_CMD_ARS_STATUS
ND_CMD_CLEAR_ERROR
The function number otherwise needs to be pulled from the command payload for:
NFIT_CMD_TRANSLATE_SPA
NFIT_CMD_ARS_INJECT_SET
NFIT_CMD_ARS_INJECT_CLEAR
NFIT_CMD_ARS_INJECT_GET
Update cmd_to_func() for the bus case and call it in the common path.
--- drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c | 22 ++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c +12 -10
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ static int cmd_to_func(struct nfit_mem *if (call_pkg) {int i; -if (nfit_mem->family != call_pkg->nd_family) +if (nfit_mem && nfit_mem->family != call_pkg->nd_family)return -ENOTTY ;for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (call_pkg->nd_reserved2); i++)
@@ -424,6 +424,10 @@ static int cmd_to_func(struct nfit_mem *return call_pkg->nd_command; } +/* In the !call_pkg case, bus commands == bus functions */ +if (!nfit_mem) +return cmd; +/* Linux ND commands == NVDIMM_FAMILY_INTEL function numbers */ if (nfit_mem->family ==NVDIMM_FAMILY_INTEL )return cmd;
@@ -454,17 +458,18 @@ int acpi_nfit_ctl(struct nvdimm_bus_descif (cmd_rc) *cmd_rc = -EINVAL ; +if (cmd ==ND_CMD_CALL ) + call_pkg = buf; + func =cmd_to_func (nfit_mem, cmd, call_pkg); +if (func <0 ) +return func; +if (nvdimm) {struct acpi_device *adev = nfit_mem->adev;if (!adev)return -ENOTTY ; -if (cmd ==ND_CMD_CALL ) - call_pkg = buf; - func =cmd_to_func (nfit_mem, cmd, call_pkg); -if (func <0 ) -return func; dimm_name =nvdimm_name (nvdimm); cmd_name =nvdimm_cmd_name (cmd); cmd_mask =nvdimm_cmd_mask (nvdimm);
@@ -475,12 +480,9 @@ int acpi_nfit_ctl(struct nvdimm_bus_desc }else {struct acpi_device *adev =to_acpi_dev (acpi_desc); - func = cmd; cmd_name =nvdimm_bus_cmd_name (cmd); cmd_mask = nd_desc->cmd_mask; - dsm_mask = cmd_mask; -if (cmd ==ND_CMD_CALL ) - dsm_mask = nd_desc->bus_dsm_mask; + dsm_mask = nd_desc->bus_dsm_mask; desc =nd_cmd_bus_desc (cmd); guid =to_nfit_uuid (NFIT_DEV_BUS ); handle = adev->handle;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 19/238 crypto: cfb - add missing chunksize property
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 394a9e044702e6a8958a5e89d2a291605a587a2a upstream.
Like some other block cipher mode implementations, the CFB implementation assumes that while walking through the scatterlist, a partial block does not occur until the end. But the walk is incorrectly being done with a blocksize of 1, as 'cra_blocksize' is set to 1 (since CFB is a stream cipher) but no 'chunksize' is set. This bug causes incorrect encryption/decryption for some scatterlist layouts.
Fix it by setting the 'chunksize'. Also extend the CFB test vectors to cover this bug as well as cases where the message length is not a multiple of the block size.
--- crypto/cfb.c | 6 ++++++ crypto/testmgr.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
crypto/cfb.c +6 -0
@@ -298,6 +298,12 @@ static int crypto_cfb_create(struct cryp inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize =1 ; inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask; +/* +* To simplify the implementation, configure the skcipher walk to only +* give a partial block at the very end, never earlier. +*/ + inst->alg.chunksize = alg->cra_blocksize; + inst->alg.ivsize = alg->cra_blocksize; inst->alg.min_keysize = alg->cra_cipher.cia_min_keysize; inst->alg.max_keysize = alg->cra_cipher.cia_max_keysize;
crypto/testmgr.h +25 -0
@@ -12870,6 +12870,31 @@ static const struct cipher_testvec aes_c "\x75\xa3\x85\x74\x1a\xb9\xce\xf8" "\x20\x31\x62\x3d\x55\xb1\xe4\x71", .len = 64, + .also_non_np = 1, + .np = 2, + .tap = { 31, 33 }, + }, { /* > 16 bytes, not a multiple of 16 bytes */ + .key ="\x2b\x7e\x15\x16\x28\xae\xd2\xa6" +"\xab\xf7\x15\x88\x09\xcf\x4f\x3c" , + .klen = 16, + .iv = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07" +"\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f" , + .ptext = "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96" +"\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a" +"\xae" , + .ctext = "\x3b\x3f\xd9\x2e\xb7\x2d\xad\x20" +"\x33\x34\x49\xf8\xe8\x3c\xfb\x4a" +"\xc8" , + .len = 17, + }, { /* < 16 bytes */ + .key ="\x2b\x7e\x15\x16\x28\xae\xd2\xa6" +"\xab\xf7\x15\x88\x09\xcf\x4f\x3c" , + .klen = 16, + .iv = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07" +"\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f" , + .ptext = "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f", + .ctext = "\x3b\x3f\xd9\x2e\xb7\x2d\xad", + .len = 7, }, };
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 55/238 smb3: make default i/o size for smb3 mounts larger
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steve French <[email protected]>
commit e8506d25f740fd058791cc12a6dfa9386ada6b96 upstream.
We negotiate rsize mounts (and it can be overridden by user) to typically 4MB, so using larger default I/O sizes from userspace (changing to 1MB default i/o size returned by stat) the performance is much better (and not just for long latency network connections) in most use cases for SMB3 than the default I/O size (which ends up being 128K for cp and can be even smaller for cp). This can be 4x slower or worse depending on network latency.
By changing inode->blocksize from 32K (which was perhaps ok for very old SMB1/CIFS) to a larger value, 1MB (but still less than max size negotiated with the server which is 4MB, in order to minimize risk) it significantly increases performance for the noncached case, and slightly increases it for the cached case. This can be changed by the user on mount (specifying bsize= values from 16K to 16MB) to tune better for performance
for applications that depend on blocksize.
--- fs/cifs/cifs_fs_sb.h | 1 + fs/cifs/cifsfs.c | 1 + fs/cifs/cifsglob.h | 1 + fs/cifs/connect.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/cifs/inode.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/cifs/cifs_fs_sb.h +1 -0
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ struct cifs_sb_info {spinlock_t tlink_tree_lock;struct tcon_link *master_tlink;struct nls_table *local_nls; +unsigned int bsize;unsigned int rsize;unsigned int wsize;unsigned long actimeo;/* attribute cache timeout (jiffies) */
fs/cifs/cifsfs.c +1 -0
@@ -554,6 +554,7 @@ cifs_show_options(struct seq_file *s, stseq_printf (s,",rsize=%u" , cifs_sb->rsize);seq_printf (s,",wsize=%u" , cifs_sb->wsize); +seq_printf (s,",bsize=%u" , cifs_sb->bsize);seq_printf (s,",echo_interval=%lu" , tcon->ses->server->echo_interval /HZ );if (tcon->snapshot_time)
fs/cifs/cifsglob.h +1 -0
@@ -559,6 +559,7 @@ struct smb_vol { bool resilient:1; /* noresilient not required since not fored for CA */ bool domainauto:1; bool rdma:1; +unsigned int bsize;unsigned int rsize;unsigned int wsize; bool sockopt_tcp_nodelay:1;
fs/cifs/connect.c +24 -2
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ enum { Opt_backupuid, Opt_backupgid, Opt_uid, Opt_cruid, Opt_gid, Opt_file_mode, Opt_dirmode, Opt_port, - Opt_rsize, Opt_wsize, Opt_actimeo, + Opt_blocksize, Opt_rsize, Opt_wsize, Opt_actimeo, Opt_echo_interval, Opt_max_credits, Opt_snapshot,
@@ -204,6 +204,7 @@ static const match_table_t cifs_mount_op { Opt_dirmode, "dirmode=%s" }, { Opt_dirmode, "dir_mode=%s" }, { Opt_port, "port=%s" }, + { Opt_blocksize, "bsize=%s" }, { Opt_rsize, "rsize=%s" }, { Opt_wsize, "wsize=%s" }, { Opt_actimeo, "actimeo=%s" },
@@ -1571,7 +1572,7 @@ cifs_parse_mount_options(const char *mou vol->cred_uid =current_uid (); vol->linux_uid =current_uid (); vol->linux_gid =current_gid (); - + vol->bsize =1024 *1024 ;/* can improve cp performance significantly */ /* * default to SFM style remapping of seven reserved characters * unless user overrides it or we negotiate CIFS POSIX where
@@ -1944,6 +1945,26 @@ cifs_parse_mount_options(const char *mou } port = (unsigned short )option;break ; +case Opt_blocksize: +if (get_option_ul (args, &option)) { +cifs_dbg (VFS ,"%s: Invalid blocksize value\n" , + __func__); + goto cifs_parse_mount_err; + } +/* +* inode blocksize realistically should never need to be +* less than 16K or greater than 16M and default is 1MB. +* Note that small inode block sizes (e.g. 64K) can lead +* to very poor performance of common tools like cp and scp +*/ +if ((option <CIFS_MAX_MSGSIZE ) || + (option > (4 *SMB3_DEFAULT_IOSIZE ))) { +cifs_dbg (VFS ,"%s: Invalid blocksize\n" , + __func__); + goto cifs_parse_mount_err; + } + vol->bsize = option; +break ;case Opt_rsize:if (get_option_ul (args, &option)) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Invalid rsize value\n",
@@ -3839,6 +3860,7 @@ int cifs_setup_cifs_sb(struct smb_vol *pspin_lock_init (&cifs_sb->tlink_tree_lock); cifs_sb->tlink_tree =RB_ROOT ; + cifs_sb->bsize = pvolume_info->bsize;/* * Temporarily set r/wsize for matching superblock. If we end up using * new sb then client will later negotiate it downward if needed.
fs/cifs/inode.c +1 -1
@@ -2080,7 +2080,7 @@ int cifs_getattr(const struct path *pathreturn rc;generic_fillattr (inode, stat); - stat->blksize =CIFS_MAX_MSGSIZE ; + stat->blksize = cifs_sb->bsize; stat->ino =CIFS_I (inode)->uniqueid;/* old CIFS Unix Extensions doesn't return create time */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 64/238 mmc:fix a bug when max_discard is 0
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jiong Wu <[email protected]>
commit d4721339dcca7def04909a8e60da43c19a24d8bf upstream.
The original purpose of the code I fix is to replace max_discard with max_trim if max_trim is less than max_discard. When max_discard is 0 we should replace max_discard with max_trim as well, because max_discard equals 0 happens only when the max_do_calc_max_discard process is overflowed, so if mmc_can_trim(card) is true, max_discard should be replaced by an available max_trim.
However, in the original code, there are two lines of code interfere the right process.
1) if (max_discard && mmc_can_trim(card))
when max_discard is 0, it skips the process checking if max_discard needs to be replaced with max_trim.
2) if (max_trim < max_discard)
the condition is false when max_discard is 0. it also skips the process that replaces max_discard with max_trim, in fact, we should replace the 0-valued max_discard with max_trim.
--- drivers/mmc/core/core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/mmc/core/core.c +2 -2
@@ -2381,9 +2381,9 @@ unsigned int mmc_calc_max_discard(structreturn card->pref_erase; max_discard =mmc_do_calc_max_discard (card,MMC_ERASE_ARG ); -if (max_discard &&mmc_can_trim (card)) { +if (mmc_can_trim (card)) { max_trim =mmc_do_calc_max_discard (card,MMC_TRIM_ARG ); -if (max_trim < max_discard) +if (max_trim < max_discard || max_discard ==0 ) max_discard = max_trim; }else if (max_discard < card->erase_size) { max_discard =0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 65/238 spi: ti-qspi: Fix mmap read when more than one CS in use
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vignesh R <[email protected]>
commit 673c865efbdc5fec3cc525c46d71844d42c60072 upstream.
Commit 4dea6c9b0b64 ("spi: spi-ti-qspi: add mmap mode read support") has has got order of parameter wrong when calling regmap_update_bits() to select CS for mmap access. Mask and value arguments are interchanged. Code will work on a system with single slave, but fails when more than one CS is in use. Fix this by correcting the order of parameters when calling regmap_update_bits().
--- drivers/spi/spi-ti-qspi.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/spi/spi-ti-qspi.c +3 -3
@@ -490,8 +490,8 @@ static void ti_qspi_enable_memory_map(stti_qspi_write (qspi,MM_SWITCH ,QSPI_SPI_SWITCH_REG );if (qspi->ctrl_base) {regmap_update_bits (qspi->ctrl_base, qspi->ctrl_reg, -MEM_CS_EN (spi->chip_select), -MEM_CS_MASK ); +MEM_CS_MASK , +MEM_CS_EN (spi->chip_select)); } qspi->mmap_enabled = true; }
@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ static void ti_qspi_disable_memory_map(sti_qspi_write (qspi,0 ,QSPI_SPI_SWITCH_REG );if (qspi->ctrl_base)regmap_update_bits (qspi->ctrl_base, qspi->ctrl_reg, -0 ,MEM_CS_MASK ); +MEM_CS_MASK ,0 ); qspi->mmap_enabled = false; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 66/238 spi: pxa2xx: Setup maximum supported DMA transfer length
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
commit ef070b4e4aa25bb5f8632ad196644026c11903bf upstream.
When the commit b6ced294fb61
("spi: pxa2xx: Switch to SPI core DMA mapping functionality")
switches to SPI core provided DMA helpers, it missed to setup maximum supported DMA transfer length for the controller and thus users mistakenly try to send more data than supported with the following warning:
ili9341 spi-PRP0001:01: DMA disabled for transfer length 153600 greater than 65536
Setup maximum supported DMA transfer length in order to make users know the limit.
--- drivers/spi/spi-pxa2xx.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/spi/spi-pxa2xx.c +1 -0
@@ -1696,6 +1696,7 @@ static int pxa2xx_spi_probe(struct platf platform_info->enable_dma = false; }else { master->can_dma = pxa2xx_spi_can_dma; + master->max_dma_len =MAX_DMA_LEN ; } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 67/238 spi: omap2-mcspi: Fix DMA and FIFO event trigger size mismatch
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vignesh R <[email protected]>
commit baf8b9f8d260c55a86405f70a384c29cda888476 upstream.
Commit b682cffa3ac6 ("spi: omap2-mcspi: Set FIFO DMA trigger level to word length") broke SPI transfers where bits_per_word != 8. This is because of mimsatch between McSPI FIFO level event trigger size (SPI word length) and DMA request size(word length * maxburst). This leads to data corruption, lockup and errors like:
spi1.0: EOW timed out
Fix this by setting DMA maxburst size to 1 so that McSPI FIFO level event trigger size matches DMA request size.
--- drivers/spi/spi-omap2-mcspi.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/spi/spi-omap2-mcspi.c +2 -2
@@ -623,8 +623,8 @@ omap2_mcspi_txrx_dma(struct spi_device * cfg.dst_addr = cs->phys +OMAP2_MCSPI_TX0 ; cfg.src_addr_width = width; cfg.dst_addr_width = width; - cfg.src_maxburst = es; - cfg.dst_maxburst = es; + cfg.src_maxburst =1 ; + cfg.dst_maxburst =1 ; rx = xfer->rx_buf; tx = xfer->tx_buf;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 69/238 regulator: s2mps11: Fix steps for buck7, buck8 and LDO35
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
commit 56b5d4ea778c1b0989c5cdb5406d4a488144c416 upstream.
LDO35 uses 25 mV step, not 50 mV. Bucks 7 and 8 use 12.5 mV step instead of 6.25 mV. Wrong step caused over-voltage (LDO35) or under-voltage (buck7 and 8) if regulators were used (e.g. on Exynos5420 Arndale Octa board).
--- drivers/regulator/s2mps11.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/regulator/s2mps11.c +3 -3
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ static const struct regulator_desc s2mpsregulator_desc_s2mps11_ldo (32 ,STEP_50_MV ),regulator_desc_s2mps11_ldo (33 ,STEP_50_MV ),regulator_desc_s2mps11_ldo (34 ,STEP_50_MV ), -regulator_desc_s2mps11_ldo (35 ,STEP_50_MV ), +regulator_desc_s2mps11_ldo (35 ,STEP_25_MV ),regulator_desc_s2mps11_ldo (36 ,STEP_50_MV ),regulator_desc_s2mps11_ldo (37 ,STEP_50_MV ), regulator_desc_s2mps11_ldo(38, STEP_50_MV),
@@ -372,8 +372,8 @@ static const struct regulator_desc s2mpsregulator_desc_s2mps11_buck1_4 (4 ), regulator_desc_s2mps11_buck5,regulator_desc_s2mps11_buck67810 (6 ,MIN_600_MV ,STEP_6_25_MV ), -regulator_desc_s2mps11_buck67810 (7 ,MIN_600_MV ,STEP_6_25_MV ), -regulator_desc_s2mps11_buck67810 (8 ,MIN_600_MV ,STEP_6_25_MV ), +regulator_desc_s2mps11_buck67810 (7 ,MIN_600_MV ,STEP_12_5_MV ), +regulator_desc_s2mps11_buck67810 (8 ,MIN_600_MV ,STEP_12_5_MV ), regulator_desc_s2mps11_buck9, regulator_desc_s2mps11_buck67810(10, MIN_750_MV, STEP_12_5_MV), };
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 70/238 regulator: max77620: Initialize values for DT properties
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mark Zhang <[email protected]>
commit 0ab66b3c326ef8f77dae9f528118966365757c0c upstream.
If regulator DT node doesn't exist, its of_parse_cb callback function isn't called. Then all values for DT properties are filled with zero. This leads to wrong register update for FPS and POK settings.
--- drivers/regulator/max77620-regulator.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/regulator/max77620-regulator.c +9 -1
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@/* * Maxim MAX77620 Regulator driver * -* Copyright (c) 2016, NVIDIA CORPORATION. All rights reserved. +* Copyright (c) 2016-2018, NVIDIA CORPORATION. All rights reserved. * * Author: Mallikarjun Kasoju <[email protected]> * Laxman Dewangan <[email protected]>
@@ -803,6 +803,14 @@ static int max77620_regulator_probe(stru rdesc = &rinfo[id].desc; pmic->rinfo[id] = &max77620_regs_info[id]; pmic->enable_power_mode[id] =MAX77620_POWER_MODE_NORMAL ; + pmic->reg_pdata[id].active_fps_src =-1 ; + pmic->reg_pdata[id].active_fps_pd_slot =-1 ; + pmic->reg_pdata[id].active_fps_pu_slot =-1 ; + pmic->reg_pdata[id].suspend_fps_src =-1 ; + pmic->reg_pdata[id].suspend_fps_pd_slot =-1 ; + pmic->reg_pdata[id].suspend_fps_pu_slot =-1 ; + pmic->reg_pdata[id].power_ok =-1 ; + pmic->reg_pdata[id].ramp_rate_setting =-1 ; ret =max77620_read_slew_rate (pmic, id);if (ret <0 )
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 71/238 regulator: s2mpa01: Fix step values for some LDOs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stuart Menefy <[email protected]>
commit 28c4f730d2a44f2591cb104091da29a38dac49fe upstream.
The step values for some of the LDOs appears to be incorrect, resulting in incorrect voltages (or at least, ones which are different from the Samsung 3.4 vendor kernel).
--- drivers/regulator/s2mpa01.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/regulator/s2mpa01.c +5 -5
@@ -298,13 +298,13 @@ static const struct regulator_desc regulregulator_desc_ldo (2 ,STEP_50_MV ),regulator_desc_ldo (3 ,STEP_50_MV ),regulator_desc_ldo (4 ,STEP_50_MV ), -regulator_desc_ldo (5 ,STEP_50_MV ), +regulator_desc_ldo (5 ,STEP_25_MV ),regulator_desc_ldo (6 ,STEP_25_MV ),regulator_desc_ldo (7 ,STEP_50_MV ),regulator_desc_ldo (8 ,STEP_50_MV ),regulator_desc_ldo (9 ,STEP_50_MV ),regulator_desc_ldo (10 ,STEP_50_MV ), -regulator_desc_ldo (11 ,STEP_25_MV ), +regulator_desc_ldo (11 ,STEP_50_MV ),regulator_desc_ldo (12 ,STEP_50_MV ),regulator_desc_ldo (13 ,STEP_50_MV ), regulator_desc_ldo(14, STEP_50_MV),
@@ -315,11 +315,11 @@ static const struct regulator_desc regulregulator_desc_ldo (19 ,STEP_50_MV ),regulator_desc_ldo (20 ,STEP_50_MV ),regulator_desc_ldo (21 ,STEP_50_MV ), -regulator_desc_ldo (22 ,STEP_25_MV ), -regulator_desc_ldo (23 ,STEP_25_MV ), +regulator_desc_ldo (22 ,STEP_50_MV ), +regulator_desc_ldo (23 ,STEP_50_MV ),regulator_desc_ldo (24 ,STEP_50_MV ),regulator_desc_ldo (25 ,STEP_50_MV ), -regulator_desc_ldo (26 ,STEP_50_MV ), +regulator_desc_ldo (26 ,STEP_25_MV ),regulator_desc_buck1_4 (1 ),regulator_desc_buck1_4 (2 ), regulator_desc_buck1_4(3),
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 72/238 mt76: fix corrupted software generated tx CCMP PN
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Felix Fietkau <[email protected]>
commit 906d2d3f874a54183df5a609fda180adf0462428 upstream.
Since ccmp_pn is u8 *, the second half needs to start at array index 4 instead of 0. Fixes a connection stall after a certain amount of traffic
--- drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt76x02_mac.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt76x02_mac.c +1 -1
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ void mt76x02_mac_write_txwi(struct mt76x ccmp_pn[6 ] = pn >>32 ; ccmp_pn[7 ] = pn >>40 ; txwi->iv = *((__le32 *)&ccmp_pn[0 ]); - txwi->eiv = *((__le32 *)&ccmp_pn[1 ]); + txwi->eiv = *((__le32 *)&ccmp_pn[4 ]); }spin_lock_bh (&dev->mt76.lock);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 73/238 clocksource/drivers/exynos_mct: Move one-shot check from tick clear to ISR
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stuart Menefy <[email protected]>
commit a5719a40aef956ba704f2aa1c7b977224d60fa96 upstream.
When a timer tick occurs and the clock is in one-shot mode, the timer needs to be stopped to prevent it triggering subsequent interrupts. Currently this code is in exynos4_mct_tick_clear(), but as it is only needed when an ISR occurs move it into exynos4_mct_tick_isr(), leaving exynos4_mct_tick_clear() just doing what its name suggests it should.
--- drivers/clocksource/exynos_mct.c | 22 +++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/clocksource/exynos_mct.c +11 -11
@@ -388,6 +388,13 @@ static void exynos4_mct_tick_start(unsigexynos4_mct_write (tmp, mevt->base +MCT_L_TCON_OFFSET ); } +static void exynos4_mct_tick_clear (struct mct_clock_event_device *mevt) +{ +/* Clear the MCT tick interrupt */ +if (readl_relaxed (reg_base + mevt->base +MCT_L_INT_CSTAT_OFFSET ) &1 ) +exynos4_mct_write (0x1 , mevt->base +MCT_L_INT_CSTAT_OFFSET ); +} +static int exynos4_tick_set_next_event (unsigned long cycles,struct clock_event_device *evt) {
@@ -420,8 +427,11 @@ static int set_state_periodic(struct cloreturn 0 ; } -static void exynos4_mct_tick_clear (struct mct_clock_event_device *mevt) +static irqreturn_t exynos4_mct_tick_isr (int irq,void *dev_id) { +struct mct_clock_event_device *mevt = dev_id; +struct clock_event_device *evt = &mevt->evt; +/* * This is for supporting oneshot mode. * Mct would generate interrupt periodically
@@ -430,16 +440,6 @@ static void exynos4_mct_tick_clear(strucif (!clockevent_state_periodic (&mevt->evt))exynos4_mct_tick_stop (mevt); -/* Clear the MCT tick interrupt */ -if (readl_relaxed (reg_base + mevt->base +MCT_L_INT_CSTAT_OFFSET ) &1 ) -exynos4_mct_write (0x1 , mevt->base +MCT_L_INT_CSTAT_OFFSET ); -} - -static irqreturn_t exynos4_mct_tick_isr (int irq,void *dev_id) -{ -struct mct_clock_event_device *mevt = dev_id; -struct clock_event_device *evt = &mevt->evt; -exynos4_mct_tick_clear (mevt); evt->event_handler (evt);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 56/238 tracing: Use strncpy instead of memcpy for string keys in hist triggers
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tom Zanussi <[email protected]>
commit 9f0bbf3115ca9f91f43b7c74e9ac7d79f47fc6c2 upstream.
Because there may be random garbage beyond a string's null terminator, it's not correct to copy the the complete character array for use as a hist trigger key. This results in multiple histogram entries for the 'same' string key.
So, in the case of a string key, use strncpy instead of memcpy to avoid copying in the extra bytes.
Before, using the gdbus entries in the following hist trigger as an example:
# echo 'hist:key=comm' > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/sched/sched_waking/trigger # cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/sched/sched_waking/hist
...
{ comm: ImgDecoder #4 } hitcount: 203
{ comm: gmain } hitcount: 213
{ comm: gmain } hitcount: 216
{ comm: StreamTrans #73 } hitcount: 221
{ comm: mozStorage #3 } hitcount: 230
{ comm: gdbus } hitcount: 233
{ comm: StyleThread#5 } hitcount: 253
{ comm: gdbus } hitcount: 256
{ comm: gdbus } hitcount: 260
{ comm: StyleThread#4 } hitcount: 271...
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/sched/sched_waking/hist | egrep gdbus | wc -l 51
After:
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/sched/sched_waking/hist | egrep gdbus | wc -l 1
--- kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c +3 -2
@@ -4695,9 +4695,10 @@ static inline void add_to_key(char *comp/* ensure NULL-termination */ if (size > key_field->size -1 ) size = key_field->size -1 ; - } -memcpy (compound_key + key_field->offset, key, size); +strncpy (compound_key + key_field->offset, (char *)key, size); + }else +memcpy (compound_key + key_field->offset, key, size); } static void
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 74/238 clocksource/drivers/exynos_mct: Clear timer interrupt when shutdown
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stuart Menefy <[email protected]>
commit d2f276c8d3c224d5b493c42b6cf006ae4e64fb1c upstream.
When shutting down the timer, ensure that after we have stopped the timer any pending interrupts are cleared. This fixes a problem when suspending, as interrupts are disabled before the timer is stopped, so the timer interrupt may still be asserted, preventing the system entering a low power state when the wfi is executed.
--- drivers/clocksource/exynos_mct.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/clocksource/exynos_mct.c +1 -0
@@ -411,6 +411,7 @@ static int set_state_shutdown(struct clo mevt = container_of(evt, struct mct_clock_event_device, evt);exynos4_mct_tick_stop (mevt); +exynos4_mct_tick_clear (mevt);return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 75/238 clocksource/drivers/arch_timer: Workaround for Allwinner A64 timer instability
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Samuel Holland <[email protected]>
commit c950ca8c35eeb32224a63adc47e12f9e226da241 upstream.
The Allwinner A64 SoC is known[1] to have an unstable architectural timer, which manifests itself most obviously in the time jumping forward a multiple of 95 years[2][3]. This coincides with 2^56 cycles at a timer frequency of 24 MHz, implying that the time went slightly backward (and this was interpreted by the kernel as it jumping forward and wrapping around past the epoch).
Investigation revealed instability in the low bits of CNTVCT at the point a high bit rolls over. This leads to power-of-two cycle forward and backward jumps. (Testing shows that forward jumps are about twice as likely as backward jumps.) Since the counter value returns to normal after an indeterminate read, each "jump" really consists of both a forward and backward jump from the software perspective.
Unless the kernel is trapping CNTVCT reads, a userspace program is able to read the register in a loop faster than it changes. A test program running on all 4 CPU cores that reported jumps larger than 100 ms was run for 13.6 hours and reported the following:
Count | Event
-------+---------------------------
9940 | jumped backward 699ms
268 | jumped backward 1398ms
1 | jumped backward 2097ms
16020 | jumped forward 175ms
6443 | jumped forward 699ms
2976 | jumped forward 1398ms
9 | jumped forward 356516ms
9 | jumped forward 357215ms
4 | jumped forward 714430ms
1 | jumped forward 3578440msThis works out to a jump larger than 100 ms about every 5.5 seconds on each CPU core.
The largest jump (almost an hour!) was the following sequence of reads:
0x0000007fffffffff → 0x00000093feffffff → 0x0000008000000000
Note that the middle bits don't necessarily all read as all zeroes or all ones during the anomalous behavior; however the low 10 bits checked by the function in this patch have never been observed with any other value.
Also note that smaller jumps are much more common, with backward jumps of 2048 (2^11) cycles observed over 400 times per second on each core. (Of course, this is partially explained by lower bits rolling over more frequently.) Any one of these could have caused the 95 year time skip.
Similar anomalies were observed while reading CNTPCT (after patching the kernel to allow reads from userspace). However, the CNTPCT jumps are much less frequent, and only small jumps were observed. The same program as before (except now reading CNTPCT) observed after 72 hours:
Count | Event
-------+---------------------------
17 | jumped backward 699ms
52 | jumped forward 175ms
2831 | jumped forward 699ms
5 | jumped forward 1398msFurther investigation showed that the instability in CNTPCT/CNTVCT also affected the respective timer's TVAL register. The following values were observed immediately after writing CNVT_TVAL to 0x10000000:
CNTVCT | CNTV_TVAL | CNTV_CVAL | CNTV_TVAL Error
--------------------+------------+--------------------+-----------------
0x000000d4a2d8bfff | 0x10003fff | 0x000000d4b2d8bfff | +0x00004000 0x000000d4a2d94000 | 0x0fffffff | 0x000000d4b2d97fff | -0x00004000 0x000000d4a2d97fff | 0x10003fff | 0x000000d4b2d97fff | +0x00004000 0x000000d4a2d9c000 | 0x0fffffff | 0x000000d4b2d9ffff | -0x00004000
The pattern of errors in CNTV_TVAL seemed to depend on exactly which value was written to it. For example, after writing 0x10101010:
CNTVCT | CNTV_TVAL | CNTV_CVAL | CNTV_TVAL Error
--------------------+------------+--------------------+-----------------
0x000001ac3effffff | 0x1110100f | 0x000001ac4f10100f | +0x1000000 0x000001ac40000000 | 0x1010100f | 0x000001ac5110100f | -0x1000000 0x000001ac58ffffff | 0x1110100f | 0x000001ac6910100f | +0x1000000 0x000001ac66000000 | 0x1010100f | 0x000001ac7710100f | -0x1000000 0x000001ac6affffff | 0x1110100f | 0x000001ac7b10100f | +0x1000000 0x000001ac6e000000 | 0x1010100f | 0x000001ac7f10100f | -0x1000000
I was also twice able to reproduce the issue covered by Allwinner's workaround[4], that writing to TVAL sometimes fails, and both CVAL and TVAL are left with entirely bogus values. One was the following values:
CNTVCT | CNTV_TVAL | CNTV_CVAL
--------------------+------------+--------------------------------------
0x000000d4a2d6014c | 0x8fbd5721 | 0x000000d132935fff (615s in the past)
========================================================================
Because the CPU can read the CNTPCT/CNTVCT registers faster than they change, performing two reads of the register and comparing the high bits (like other workarounds) is not a workable solution. And because the timer can jump both forward and backward, no pair of reads can distinguish a good value from a bad one. The only way to guarantee a good value from consecutive reads would be to read _three_ times, and take the middle value only if the three values are 1) each unique and
2) increasing. This takes at minimum 3 counter cycles (125 ns), or more if an anomaly is detected.
However, since there is a distinct pattern to the bad values, we can optimize the common case (1022/1024 of the time) to a single read by simply ignoring values that match the error pattern. This still takes no more than 3 cycles in the worst case, and requires much less code. As an additional safety check, we still limit the loop iteration to the number of max-frequency (1.2 GHz) CPU cycles in three 24 MHz counter periods.
For the TVAL registers, the simple solution is to not use them. Instead, read or write the CVAL and calculate the TVAL value in software.
Although the manufacturer is aware of at least part of the erratum[4], there is no official name for it. For now, use the kernel-internal name "UNKNOWN1".
[1]: https://github.com/armbian/build/commit/a08cd6fe7ae9
[2]: https://forum.armbian.com/topic/3458-a64-datetime-clock-issue/
[3]: https://irclog.whitequark.org/linux-sunxi/2018-01-26
[4]: https://github.com/Allwinner-Homlet/H6-BSP4.9-linux/blob/master/drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c#L272
--- Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.txt | 2 + drivers/clocksource/Kconfig | 10 ++++++ drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 67 insertions(+)
Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.txt +2 -0
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ stable kernels. | Implementor | Component | Erratum ID | Kconfig | +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+ +| Allwinner | A64/R18 | UNKNOWN1 | SUN50I_ERRATUM_UNKNOWN1 | +| | | | | | ARM | Cortex-A53 | #826319 | ARM64_ERRATUM_826319 | | ARM | Cortex-A53 | #827319 | ARM64_ERRATUM_827319 | | ARM | Cortex-A53 | #824069 | ARM64_ERRATUM_824069 |
drivers/clocksource/Kconfig +10 -0
@@ -360,6 +360,16 @@ config ARM64_ERRATUM_858921 The workaround will be dynamically enabled when an affected core is detected. +config SUN50I_ERRATUM_UNKNOWN1 + bool "Workaround for Allwinner A64 erratum UNKNOWN1" + default y + depends on ARM_ARCH_TIMER && ARM64 && ARCH_SUNXI + select ARM_ARCH_TIMER_OOL_WORKAROUND + help + This option enables a workaround for instability in the timer on + the Allwinner A64 SoC. The workaround will only be active if the + allwinner,erratum-unknown1 property is found in the timer node. + config ARM_GLOBAL_TIMER bool "Support for the ARM global timer" if COMPILE_TEST select TIMER_OF if OF
drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c +55 -0
67 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 76/238 s390: vfio_ap: link the vfio_ap devices to the vfio_ap bus subsystem
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pierre Morel <[email protected]>
commit 36360658eb5a6cf04bb9f2704d1e4ce54037ec99 upstream.
Libudev relies on having a subsystem link for non-root devices. To avoid libudev (and potentially other userspace tools) choking on the matrix device let us introduce a matrix bus and with it the matrix bus subsytem. Also make the matrix device reside within the matrix bus.
Doing this we remove the forced link from the matrix device to the vfio_ap driver and the device_type we do not need anymore.
Since the associated matrix driver is not the vfio_ap driver any more, we have to change the search for the devices on the vfio_ap driver in the function vfio_ap_verify_queue_reserved.
--- drivers/s390/crypto/vfio_ap_drv.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- drivers/s390/crypto/vfio_ap_ops.c | 4 +-- drivers/s390/crypto/vfio_ap_private.h | 1 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/crypto/vfio_ap_drv.c +35 -9
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@#include "vfio_ap_private.h" #define VFIO_AP_ROOT_NAME "vfio_ap" -#define VFIO_AP_DEV_TYPE_NAME "ap_matrix"#define VFIO_AP_DEV_NAME "matrix"MODULE_AUTHOR ("IBM Corporation" );
@@ -24,10 +23,6 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");static struct ap_driver vfio_ap_drv; -static struct device_type vfio_ap_dev_type = { - .name =VFIO_AP_DEV_TYPE_NAME , -}; -struct ap_matrix_dev *matrix_dev;/* Only type 10 adapters (CEX4 and later) are supported
@@ -62,6 +57,22 @@ static void vfio_ap_matrix_dev_release(skfree (matrix_dev); } +static int matrix_bus_match (struct device *dev,struct device_driver *drv) +{ +return 1 ; +} + +static struct bus_type matrix_bus = { + .name ="matrix" , + .match = &matrix_bus_match, +}; + +static struct device_driver matrix_driver = { + .name ="vfio_ap" , + .bus = &matrix_bus, + .suppress_bind_attrs = true, +}; +static int vfio_ap_matrix_dev_create (void ) {int ret;
@@ -71,6 +82,10 @@ static int vfio_ap_matrix_dev_create(voiif (IS_ERR (root_device))return PTR_ERR (root_device); + ret =bus_register (&matrix_bus); +if (ret) + goto bus_register_err; + matrix_dev =kzalloc (sizeof (*matrix_dev),GFP_KERNEL );if (!matrix_dev) { ret = -ENOMEM ;
@@ -87,30 +102,41 @@ static int vfio_ap_matrix_dev_create(voimutex_init (&matrix_dev->lock);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&matrix_dev->mdev_list); - matrix_dev->device.type = &vfio_ap_dev_type;dev_set_name (&matrix_dev->device,"%s" ,VFIO_AP_DEV_NAME ); matrix_dev->device.parent = root_device; + matrix_dev->device.bus = &matrix_bus; matrix_dev->device.release = vfio_ap_matrix_dev_release; - matrix_dev->device.driver = &vfio_ap_drv.driver; + matrix_dev->vfio_ap_drv = &vfio_ap_drv; ret =device_register (&matrix_dev->device);if (ret) goto matrix_reg_err; + ret =driver_register (&matrix_driver); +if (ret) + goto matrix_drv_err; +return 0 ; +matrix_drv_err: +device_unregister (&matrix_dev->device); matrix_reg_err:put_device (&matrix_dev->device); matrix_alloc_err: +bus_unregister (&matrix_bus); +bus_register_err:root_device_unregister (root_device); -return ret; }static void vfio_ap_matrix_dev_destroy (void ) { +struct device *root_device = matrix_dev->device.parent; + +driver_unregister (&matrix_driver);device_unregister (&matrix_dev->device); -root_device_unregister (matrix_dev->device.parent); +bus_unregister (&matrix_bus); +root_device_unregister (root_device); }static int __init vfio_ap_init (void )
drivers/s390/crypto/vfio_ap_ops.c +2 -2
@@ -198,8 +198,8 @@ static int vfio_ap_verify_queue_reserved qres.apqi = apqi; qres.reserved = false; - ret =driver_for_each_device (matrix_dev->device.driver,NULL , &qres, - vfio_ap_has_queue); + ret =driver_for_each_device (&matrix_dev->vfio_ap_drv->driver,NULL , + &qres, vfio_ap_has_queue);if (ret)return ret;
drivers/s390/crypto/vfio_ap_private.h +1 -0
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ struct ap_matrix_dev {struct ap_config_info info;struct list_head mdev_list;struct mutex lock; +struct ap_driver *vfio_ap_drv; };extern struct ap_matrix_dev *matrix_dev;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 77/238 s390/setup: fix early warning messages
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
commit 8727638426b0aea59d7f904ad8ddf483f9234f88 upstream.
The setup_lowcore() function creates a new prefix page for the boot CPU. The PSW mask for the system_call, external interrupt, i/o interrupt and the program check handler have the DAT bit set in this new prefix page.
At the time setup_lowcore is called the system still runs without virtual address translation, the paging_init() function creates the kernel page table and loads the CR13 with the kernel ASCE.
Any code between setup_lowcore() and the end of paging_init() that has a BUG or WARN statement will create a program check that can not be handled correctly as there is no kernel page table yet.
To allow early WARN statements initially setup the lowcore with DAT off and set the DAT bit only after paging_init() has completed.
--- arch/s390/kernel/setup.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/s390/kernel/setup.c +23 -9
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ void __init arch_call_rest_init(void) : : [_frame] "a" (frame)); } -static void __init setup_lowcore (void ) +static void __init setup_lowcore_dat_off (void ) {struct lowcore *lc;
@@ -380,19 +380,16 @@ static void __init setup_lowcore(void) lc =memblock_alloc_low (sizeof (*lc),sizeof (*lc)); lc->restart_psw.mask =PSW_KERNEL_BITS ; lc->restart_psw.addr = (unsigned long ) restart_int_handler; - lc->external_new_psw.mask =PSW_KERNEL_BITS | -PSW_MASK_DAT |PSW_MASK_MCHECK ; + lc->external_new_psw.mask =PSW_KERNEL_BITS |PSW_MASK_MCHECK ; lc->external_new_psw.addr = (unsigned long ) ext_int_handler; lc->svc_new_psw.mask =PSW_KERNEL_BITS | -PSW_MASK_DAT |PSW_MASK_IO |PSW_MASK_EXT |PSW_MASK_MCHECK ; +PSW_MASK_IO |PSW_MASK_EXT |PSW_MASK_MCHECK ; lc->svc_new_psw.addr = (unsigned long ) system_call; - lc->program_new_psw.mask =PSW_KERNEL_BITS | -PSW_MASK_DAT |PSW_MASK_MCHECK ; + lc->program_new_psw.mask =PSW_KERNEL_BITS |PSW_MASK_MCHECK ; lc->program_new_psw.addr = (unsigned long ) pgm_check_handler; lc->mcck_new_psw.mask =PSW_KERNEL_BITS ; lc->mcck_new_psw.addr = (unsigned long ) mcck_int_handler; - lc->io_new_psw.mask =PSW_KERNEL_BITS | -PSW_MASK_DAT |PSW_MASK_MCHECK ; + lc->io_new_psw.mask =PSW_KERNEL_BITS |PSW_MASK_MCHECK ; lc->io_new_psw.addr = (unsigned long ) io_int_handler; lc->clock_comparator = clock_comparator_max; lc->nodat_stack = ((unsigned long ) &init_thread_union)
@@ -452,6 +449,17 @@ static void __init setup_lowcore(void) lowcore_ptr[0 ] = lc; } +static void __init setup_lowcore_dat_on (void ) +{ +struct lowcore *lc; + + lc = lowcore_ptr[0 ]; + lc->external_new_psw.mask |=PSW_MASK_DAT ; + lc->svc_new_psw.mask |=PSW_MASK_DAT ; + lc->program_new_psw.mask |=PSW_MASK_DAT ; + lc->io_new_psw.mask |=PSW_MASK_DAT ; +} +static struct resource code_resource = { .name ="Kernel code" , .flags =IORESOURCE_BUSY |IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM ,
@@ -1072,7 +1080,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)#endif setup_resources (); -setup_lowcore (); +setup_lowcore_dat_off ();smp_fill_possible_mask ();cpu_detect_mhz_feature ();cpu_init ();
@@ -1085,6 +1093,12 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)*/ paging_init (); +/* +* After paging_init created the kernel page table, the new PSWs +* in lowcore can now run with DAT enabled. +*/ +setup_lowcore_dat_on (); +/* Setup default console */ conmode_default ();set_preferred_console ();
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 78/238 s390/virtio: handle find on invalid queue gracefully
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Halil Pasic <[email protected]>
commit 3438b2c039b4bf26881786a1f3450f016d66ad11 upstream.
A queue with a capacity of zero is clearly not a valid virtio queue. Some emulators report zero queue size if queried with an invalid queue index. Instead of crashing in this case let us just return -ENOENT. To make that work properly, let us fix the notifier cleanup logic as well.
--- drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw.c +3 -1
@@ -272,6 +272,8 @@ static void virtio_ccw_drop_indicators(s {struct virtio_ccw_vq_info *info; +if (!vcdev->airq_info) +return ;list_for_each_entry (info, &vcdev->virtqueues, node)drop_airq_indicator (info->vq, vcdev->airq_info); }
@@ -413,7 +415,7 @@ static int virtio_ccw_read_vq_conf(struc ret =ccw_io_helper (vcdev, ccw,VIRTIO_CCW_DOING_READ_VQ_CONF );if (ret)return ret; -return vcdev->config_block->num; +return vcdev->config_block->num ?: -ENOENT ; }static void virtio_ccw_del_vq (struct virtqueue *vq,struct ccw1 *ccw)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 80/238 scsi: aacraid: Fix performance issue on logical drives
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sagar Biradar <[email protected]>
commit 0015437cc046e5ec2b57b00ff8312b8d432eac7c upstream.
Fix performance issue where the queue depth for SmartIOC logical volumes is set to 1, and allow the usual logical volume code to be executed
--- drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c | 13 ++++++++----- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c +8 -5
@@ -413,13 +413,16 @@ static int aac_slave_configure(struct scif (chn <AAC_MAX_BUSES && tid <AAC_MAX_TARGETS && aac->sa_firmware) { devtype = aac->hba_map[chn][tid].devtype; -if (devtype ==AAC_DEVTYPE_NATIVE_RAW ) +if (devtype ==AAC_DEVTYPE_NATIVE_RAW ) { depth = aac->hba_map[chn][tid].qd_limit; -else if (devtype ==AAC_DEVTYPE_ARC_RAW ) + set_timeout =1 ; + goto common_config; + } +if (devtype ==AAC_DEVTYPE_ARC_RAW ) { set_qd_dev_type = true; - - set_timeout =1 ; - goto common_config; + set_timeout =1 ; + goto common_config; + } }if (aac->jbod && (sdev->type ==TYPE_DISK ))
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 81/238 scsi: sd: Optimal I/O size should be a multiple of physical block size
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
commit a83da8a4509d3ebfe03bb7fffce022e4d5d4764f upstream.
It was reported that some devices report an OPTIMAL TRANSFER LENGTH of 0xFFFF blocks. That looks bogus, especially for a device with a 4096-byte physical block size.
Ignore OPTIMAL TRANSFER LENGTH if it is not a multiple of the device's reported physical block size.
To make the sanity checking conditionals more readable--and to facilitate printing warnings--relocate the checking to a helper function. No functional change aside from the printks.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199759
--- drivers/scsi/sd.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/sd.c +50 -9
@@ -3047,6 +3047,55 @@ static void sd_read_security(struct scsi sdkp->security =1 ; } +/* +* Determine the device's preferred I/O size for reads and writes +* unless the reported value is unreasonably small, large, not a +* multiple of the physical block size, or simply garbage. +*/ +static bool sd_validate_opt_xfer_size (struct scsi_disk *sdkp, +unsigned int dev_max) +{ +struct scsi_device *sdp = sdkp->device; +unsigned int opt_xfer_bytes = +logical_to_bytes (sdp, sdkp->opt_xfer_blocks); + +if (sdkp->opt_xfer_blocks > dev_max) { +sd_first_printk (KERN_WARNING , sdkp, +"Optimal transfer size %u logical blocks " \ +"> dev_max (%u logical blocks)\n" , + sdkp->opt_xfer_blocks, dev_max); +return false; + } + +if (sdkp->opt_xfer_blocks >SD_DEF_XFER_BLOCKS ) { +sd_first_printk (KERN_WARNING , sdkp, +"Optimal transfer size %u logical blocks " \ +"> sd driver limit (%u logical blocks)\n" , + sdkp->opt_xfer_blocks,SD_DEF_XFER_BLOCKS ); +return false; + } + +if (opt_xfer_bytes <PAGE_SIZE ) { +sd_first_printk (KERN_WARNING , sdkp, +"Optimal transfer size %u bytes < " \ +"PAGE_SIZE (%u bytes)\n" , + opt_xfer_bytes, (unsigned int )PAGE_SIZE ); +return false; + } + +if (opt_xfer_bytes & (sdkp->physical_block_size -1 )) { +sd_first_printk (KERN_WARNING , sdkp, +"Optimal transfer size %u bytes not a " \ +"multiple of physical block size (%u bytes)\n" , + opt_xfer_bytes, sdkp->physical_block_size); +return false; + } + +sd_first_printk (KERN_INFO , sdkp,"Optimal transfer size %u bytes\n" , + opt_xfer_bytes); +return true; +} +/** * sd_revalidate_disk - called the first time a new disk is seen, * performs disk spin up, read_capacity, etc.
@@ -3125,15 +3174,7 @@ static int sd_revalidate_disk(struct gen dev_max =min_not_zero (dev_max, sdkp->max_xfer_blocks); q->limits.max_dev_sectors =logical_to_sectors (sdp, dev_max); -/* -* Determine the device's preferred I/O size for reads and writes -* unless the reported value is unreasonably small, large, or -* garbage. -*/ -if (sdkp->opt_xfer_blocks && - sdkp->opt_xfer_blocks <= dev_max && - sdkp->opt_xfer_blocks <=SD_DEF_XFER_BLOCKS && -logical_to_bytes (sdp, sdkp->opt_xfer_blocks) >=PAGE_SIZE ) { +if (sd_validate_opt_xfer_size (sdkp, dev_max)) { q->limits.io_opt =logical_to_bytes (sdp, sdkp->opt_xfer_blocks); rw_max =logical_to_sectors (sdp, sdkp->opt_xfer_blocks); }else
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 82/238 scsi: target/iscsi: Avoid iscsit_release_commands_from_conn() deadlock
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
commit 32e36bfbcf31452a854263e7c7f32fbefc4b44d8 upstream.
When using SCSI passthrough in combination with the iSCSI target driver then cmd->t_state_lock may be obtained from interrupt context. Hence, all code that obtains cmd->t_state_lock from thread context must disable interrupts first. This patch avoids that lockdep reports the following:
WARNING: inconsistent lock state
4.18.0-dbg+ #1 Not tainted
--------------------------------
inconsistent {HARDIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-HARDIRQ-W} usage.
iscsi_ttx/1800 [HC1[1]:SC0[2]:HE0:SE0] takes:000000006e7b0ceb (&(&cmd->t_state_lock)->rlock){?...}, at: target_complete_cmd+0x47/0x2c0 [target_core_mod] {HARDIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at:
lock_acquire+0xd2/0x260 _raw_spin_lock+0x32/0x50 iscsit_close_connection+0x97e/0x1020 [iscsi_target_mod] iscsit_take_action_for_connection_exit+0x108/0x200 [iscsi_target_mod] iscsi_target_rx_thread+0x180/0x190 [iscsi_target_mod] kthread+0x1cf/0x1f0 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 irq event stamp: 1281 hardirqs last enabled at (1279): [<ffffffff970ade79>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa9/0x160 hardirqs last disabled at (1281): [<ffffffff97a008a5>] interrupt_entry+0xb5/0xd0 softirqs last enabled at (1278): [<ffffffff977cd9a1>] lock_sock_nested+0x51/0xc0 softirqs last disabled at (1280): [<ffffffffc07a6e04>] ip6_finish_output2+0x124/0xe40 [ipv6]
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
---- lock(&(&cmd->t_state_lock)->rlock);
<Interrupt>
lock(&(&cmd->t_state_lock)->rlock);
--- drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c +2 -2
@@ -4040,9 +4040,9 @@ static void iscsit_release_commands_fromstruct se_cmd *se_cmd = &cmd->se_cmd;if (se_cmd->se_tfo !=NULL ) { -spin_lock (&se_cmd->t_state_lock); +spin_lock_irq (&se_cmd->t_state_lock); se_cmd->transport_state |=CMD_T_FABRIC_STOP ; -spin_unlock (&se_cmd->t_state_lock); +spin_unlock_irq (&se_cmd->t_state_lock); } }spin_unlock_bh (&conn->cmd_lock);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 83/238 scsi: qla2xxx: Fix LUN discovery if loop id is not assigned yet by firmware
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Himanshu Madhani <[email protected]>
commit ec322937a7f152d68755dc8316523bf6f831b48f upstream.
This patch fixes LUN discovery when loop ID is not yet assigned by the firmware during driver load/sg_reset operations. Driver will now search for new loop id before retrying login.
--- drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_init.c | 13 ++++++++----- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_init.c +8 -5
@@ -644,11 +644,14 @@ static void qla24xx_handle_gnl_done_evenbreak ;case DSC_LS_PORT_UNAVAIL :default : -if (fcport->loop_id !=FC_NO_LOOP_ID ) -qla2x00_clear_loop_id (fcport); - - fcport->loop_id = loop_id; - fcport->fw_login_state =DSC_LS_PORT_UNAVAIL ; +if (fcport->loop_id ==FC_NO_LOOP_ID ) { +qla2x00_find_new_loop_id (vha, fcport); + fcport->fw_login_state = +DSC_LS_PORT_UNAVAIL ; + } +ql_dbg (ql_dbg_disc, vha,0x20e5 , +"%s %d %8phC\n" , __func__, __LINE__, + fcport->port_name);qla24xx_fcport_handle_login (vha, fcport);break ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 57/238 tracing: Do not free iter->trace in fail path of tracing_open_pipe()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: zhangyi (F) <[email protected]>
commit e7f0c424d0806b05d6f47be9f202b037eb701707 upstream.
Commit d716ff71dd12 ("tracing: Remove taking of trace_types_lock in pipe files") use the current tracer instead of the copy in tracing_open_pipe(), but it forget to remove the freeing sentence in the error path.
There's an error path that can call kfree(iter->trace) after the iter->trace was assigned to tr->current_trace, which would be bad to free.
--- kernel/trace/trace.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
kernel/trace/trace.c +0 -1
@@ -5626,7 +5626,6 @@ out:return ret; fail: -kfree (iter->trace);kfree (iter);__trace_array_put (tr);mutex_unlock (&trace_types_lock);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 85/238 scsi: qla2xxx: Use complete switch scan for RSCN events
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Quinn Tran <[email protected]>
commit 1560bafdff9ed54857ac3a03c4c8d8f10d791ba6 upstream.
This patch removes unnecessary code to handle RSCN, instead performs full scan everytime driver receives RSCN
--- drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_init.c | 86 ---------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 86 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_init.c +0 -86
@@ -1474,29 +1474,6 @@ int qla24xx_fcport_handle_login(struct sreturn 0 ; } -static -void qla24xx_handle_rscn_event (fc_port_t *fcport,struct event_arg *ea) -{ - fcport->rscn_gen++; - -ql_dbg (ql_dbg_disc, fcport->vha,0x210c , -"%s %8phC DS %d LS %d\n" , - __func__, fcport->port_name, fcport->disc_state, - fcport->fw_login_state); - -if (fcport->flags &FCF_ASYNC_SENT ) -return ; - -switch (fcport->disc_state) { -case DSC_DELETED : -case DSC_LOGIN_COMPLETE : -qla24xx_post_gpnid_work (fcport->vha, &ea->id); -break ; -default : -break ; - } -} -int qla24xx_post_newsess_work (struct scsi_qla_host *vha,port_id_t *id,u8 *port_name,u8 *node_name,void *pla,u8 fc4_type) {
@@ -1563,8 +1540,6 @@ static void qla_handle_els_plogi_done(scvoid qla2x00_fcport_event_handler (scsi_qla_host_t *vha,struct event_arg *ea) { -fc_port_t *f, *tf; -uint32_t id =0 , mask, rid;fc_port_t *fcport;switch (ea->event) {
@@ -1577,10 +1552,6 @@ void qla2x00_fcport_event_handler(scsi_qcase FCME_RSCN :if (test_bit (UNLOADING , &vha->dpc_flags))return ; -switch (ea->id.b.rsvd_1) { -case RSCN_PORT_ADDR : -#define BIGSCAN 1 -#if definedBIGSCAN &BIGSCAN >0 {unsigned long flags; fcport = qla2x00_find_fcport_by_nportid
@@ -1599,59 +1570,6 @@ void qla2x00_fcport_event_handler(scsi_q }spin_unlock_irqrestore (&vha->work_lock, flags); } -#else - { -int rc; - fcport =qla2x00_find_fcport_by_nportid (vha, &ea->id,1 ); -if (!fcport) { -/* cable moved */ - rc =qla24xx_post_gpnid_work (vha, &ea->id); -if (rc) { -ql_log (ql_log_warn, vha,0xd044 , -"RSCN GPNID work failed %06x\n" , - ea->id.b24); - } - }else { - ea->fcport = fcport; - fcport->scan_needed =1 ; -qla24xx_handle_rscn_event (fcport, ea); - } - } -#endif -break ; -case RSCN_AREA_ADDR : -case RSCN_DOM_ADDR : -if (ea->id.b.rsvd_1 ==RSCN_AREA_ADDR ) { - mask =0xffff00 ; -ql_dbg (ql_dbg_async, vha,0x5044 , -"RSCN: Area 0x%06x was affected\n" , - ea->id.b24); - }else { - mask =0xff0000 ; -ql_dbg (ql_dbg_async, vha,0x507a , -"RSCN: Domain 0x%06x was affected\n" , - ea->id.b24); - } - - rid = ea->id.b24 & mask; -list_for_each_entry_safe (f, tf, &vha->vp_fcports, - list) { - id = f->d_id.b24 & mask; -if (rid == id) { - ea->fcport = f; -qla24xx_handle_rscn_event (f, ea); - } - } -break ; -case RSCN_FAB_ADDR : -default : -ql_log (ql_log_warn, vha,0xd045 , -"RSCN: Fabric was affected. Addr format %d\n" , - ea->id.b.rsvd_1); -qla2x00_mark_all_devices_lost (vha,1 ); -set_bit (LOOP_RESYNC_NEEDED , &vha->dpc_flags); -set_bit (LOCAL_LOOP_UPDATE , &vha->dpc_flags); - }break ;case FCME_GNL_DONE :qla24xx_handle_gnl_done_event (vha, ea);
@@ -1712,11 +1630,7 @@ void qla_rscn_replay(fc_port_t *fcport) ea.event =FCME_RSCN ; ea.id = fcport->d_id; ea.id.b.rsvd_1 =RSCN_PORT_ADDR ; -#if definedBIGSCAN &BIGSCAN >0 qla2x00_fcport_event_handler (fcport->vha, &ea); -#else -qla24xx_post_gpnid_work (fcport->vha, &ea.id); -#endif } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 86/238 fs/devpts: always delete dcache dentry-s in dput()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Varad Gautam <[email protected]>
commit 73052b0daee0b750b39af18460dfec683e4f5887 upstream.
d_delete only unhashes an entry if it is reached with dentry->d_lockref.count != 1. Prior to commit 8ead9dd54716 ("devpts:
more pty driver interface cleanups"), d_delete was called on a dentry from devpts_pty_kill with two references held, which would trigger the unhashing, and the subsequent dputs would release it.
Commit 8ead9dd54716 reworked devpts_pty_kill to stop acquiring the second reference from d_find_alias, and the d_delete call left the dentries still on the hashed list without actually ever being dropped from dcache before explicit cleanup. This causes the number of negative dentries for devpts to pile up, and an ls /dev/pts invocation can take seconds to return.
Provide always_delete_dentry() from simple_dentry_operations as .d_delete for devpts, to make the dentry be dropped from dcache.
Without this cleanup, the number of dentries in /dev/pts/ can be grown arbitrarily as:
python -c 'import pty; pty.spawn(["ls", "/dev/pts"])'
A systemtap probe on dcache_readdir to count d_subdirs shows this count to increase with each pty spawn invocation above:
probe kernel.function("dcache_readdir") {
subdirs = &@cast($file->f_path->dentry, "dentry")->d_subdirs;
p = subdirs;
p = @cast(p, "list_head")->next;
i = 0
while (p != subdirs) {
p = @cast(p, "list_head")->next;
i = i+1;
}
printf("number of dentries: %d\n", i);
}--- fs/devpts/inode.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/devpts/inode.c +1 -0
@@ -455,6 +455,7 @@ devpts_fill_super(struct super_block *s, s->s_blocksize_bits =10 ; s->s_magic =DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC ; s->s_op = &devpts_sops; + s->s_d_op = &simple_dentry_operations; s->s_time_gran =1 ; error = -ENOMEM ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 87/238 splice: dont merge into linked buffers
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
commit a0ce2f0aa6ad97c3d4927bf2ca54bcebdf062d55 upstream.
Before this patch, it was possible for two pipes to affect each other after data had been transferred between them with tee():
============
$ cat tee_test.c
int main(void) {
int pipe_a[2];
if (pipe(pipe_a)) err(1, "pipe");
int pipe_b[2];
if (pipe(pipe_b)) err(1, "pipe");
if (write(pipe_a[1], "abcd", 4) != 4) err(1, "write"); if (tee(pipe_a[0], pipe_b[1], 2, 0) != 2) err(1, "tee"); if (write(pipe_b[1], "xx", 2) != 2) err(1, "write");
char buf[5];
if (read(pipe_a[0], buf, 4) != 4) err(1, "read"); buf[4] = 0;
printf("got back: '%s'\n", buf);
}
$ gcc -o tee_test tee_test.c $ ./tee_test got back: 'abxx' $ ============
As suggested by Al Viro, fix it by creating a separate type for non-mergeable pipe buffers, then changing the types of buffers in splice_pipe_to_pipe() and link_pipe().
--- fs/pipe.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ fs/splice.c | 4 ++++ include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+)
fs/pipe.c +14 -0
@@ -234,6 +234,14 @@ static const struct pipe_buf_operations .get = generic_pipe_buf_get, }; +static const struct pipe_buf_operations anon_pipe_buf_nomerge_ops = { + .can_merge =0 , + .confirm = generic_pipe_buf_confirm, + .release = anon_pipe_buf_release, + .steal = anon_pipe_buf_steal, + .get = generic_pipe_buf_get, +}; +static const struct pipe_buf_operations packet_pipe_buf_ops = { .can_merge =0 , .confirm = generic_pipe_buf_confirm,
@@ -242,6 +250,12 @@ static const struct pipe_buf_operations .get = generic_pipe_buf_get, }; +void pipe_buf_mark_unmergeable (struct pipe_buffer *buf) +{ +if (buf->ops == &anon_pipe_buf_ops) + buf->ops = &anon_pipe_buf_nomerge_ops; +} +static ssize_t pipe_read (struct kiocb *iocb,struct iov_iter *to) {
fs/splice.c +4 -0
@@ -1597,6 +1597,8 @@ retry:*/ obuf->flags &= ~PIPE_BUF_FLAG_GIFT ; +pipe_buf_mark_unmergeable (obuf); + obuf->len = len; opipe->nrbufs++; ibuf->offset += obuf->len;
@@ -1671,6 +1673,8 @@ static int link_pipe(struct pipe_inode_i*/ obuf->flags &= ~PIPE_BUF_FLAG_GIFT ; +pipe_buf_mark_unmergeable (obuf); +if (obuf->len > len) obuf->len = len;
include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h +1 -0
@@ -182,6 +182,7 @@ void generic_pipe_buf_get(struct pipe_inint generic_pipe_buf_confirm (struct pipe_inode_info *,struct pipe_buffer *);int generic_pipe_buf_steal (struct pipe_inode_info *,struct pipe_buffer *);void generic_pipe_buf_release (struct pipe_inode_info *,struct pipe_buffer *); +void pipe_buf_mark_unmergeable (struct pipe_buffer *buf);extern const struct pipe_buf_operations nosteal_pipe_buf_ops;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 58/238 tracing/perf: Use strndup_user() instead of buggy open-coded version
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
commit 83540fbc8812a580b6ad8f93f4c29e62e417687e upstream.
The first version of this method was missing the check for ret == PATH_MAX; then such a check was added, but it didn't call kfree() on error, so there was still a small memory leak in the error case. Fix it by using strndup_user() instead of open-coding it.
--- kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c | 16 +++++++--------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c +7 -9
@@ -299,15 +299,13 @@ int perf_uprobe_init(struct perf_event *if (!p_event->attr.uprobe_path)return -EINVAL ; - path =kzalloc (PATH_MAX ,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!path) -return -ENOMEM ; - ret =strncpy_from_user ( - path,u64_to_user_ptr (p_event->attr.uprobe_path),PATH_MAX ); -if (ret ==PATH_MAX ) -return -E2BIG ; -if (ret <0 ) - goto out; + + path =strndup_user (u64_to_user_ptr (p_event->attr.uprobe_path), +PATH_MAX ); +if (IS_ERR (path)) { + ret =PTR_ERR (path); +return (ret == -EINVAL ) ? -E2BIG : ret; + }if (path[0 ] =='\0' ) { ret = -EINVAL ; goto out;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 59/238 vmw_balloon: release lock on error in vmballoon_reset()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
commit d04071a5d6413b65f17f7bd6e2bdb22e22e4ace7 upstream.
We added some locking to this function but forgot to drop the lock on these two error paths. This bug would lead to an immediate deadlock.
--- drivers/misc/vmw_balloon.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/misc/vmw_balloon.c +3 -2
@@ -1287,7 +1287,7 @@ static void vmballoon_reset(struct vmbalvmballoon_pop (b);if (vmballoon_send_start (b,VMW_BALLOON_CAPABILITIES )) -return ; + goto unlock;if ((b->capabilities &VMW_BALLOON_BATCHED_CMDS ) !=0 ) {if (vmballoon_init_batching (b)) {
@@ -1298,7 +1298,7 @@ static void vmballoon_reset(struct vmbal* The guest will retry in one second. */ vmballoon_send_start (b,0 ); -return ; + goto unlock; } }else if ((b->capabilities &VMW_BALLOON_BASIC_CMDS ) !=0 ) {vmballoon_deinit_batching (b);
@@ -1314,6 +1314,7 @@ static void vmballoon_reset(struct vmbalif (vmballoon_send_guest_id (b))pr_err ("failed to send guest ID to the host\n" ); +unlock:up_write (&b->conf_sem); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 60/238 xen: fix dom0 boot on huge systems
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
commit 01bd2ac2f55a1916d81dace12fa8d7ae1c79b5ea upstream.
Commit f7c90c2aa40048 ("x86/xen: don't write ptes directly in 32-bit PV guests") introduced a regression for booting dom0 on huge systems with lots of RAM (in the TB range).
Reason is that on those hosts the p2m list needs to be moved early in the boot process and this requires temporary page tables to be created. Said commit modified xen_set_pte_init() to use a hypercall for writing a PTE, but this requires the page table being in the direct mapped area, which is not the case for the temporary page tables used in xen_relocate_p2m().
As the page tables are completely written before being linked to the actual address space instead of set_pte() a plain write to memory can be used in xen_relocate_p2m().
--- arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c | 13 ++++++------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c +6 -7
@@ -2114,10 +2114,10 @@ void __init xen_relocate_p2m(void) pt =early_memremap (pt_phys,PAGE_SIZE );clear_page (pt);for (idx_pte =0 ; - idx_pte <min (n_pte,PTRS_PER_PTE ); - idx_pte++) { -set_pte (pt + idx_pte, -pfn_pte (p2m_pfn,PAGE_KERNEL )); + idx_pte <min (n_pte,PTRS_PER_PTE ); + idx_pte++) { + pt[idx_pte] =pfn_pte (p2m_pfn, +PAGE_KERNEL ); p2m_pfn++; } n_pte -=PTRS_PER_PTE ;
@@ -2125,8 +2125,7 @@ void __init xen_relocate_p2m(void)make_lowmem_page_readonly (__va (pt_phys));pin_pagetable_pfn (MMUEXT_PIN_L1_TABLE ,PFN_DOWN (pt_phys)); -set_pmd (pmd + idx_pt, -__pmd (_PAGE_TABLE | pt_phys)); + pmd[idx_pt] =__pmd (_PAGE_TABLE | pt_phys); pt_phys +=PAGE_SIZE ; } n_pt -=PTRS_PER_PMD ;
@@ -2134,7 +2133,7 @@ void __init xen_relocate_p2m(void)make_lowmem_page_readonly (__va (pmd_phys));pin_pagetable_pfn (MMUEXT_PIN_L2_TABLE ,PFN_DOWN (pmd_phys)); -set_pud (pud + idx_pmd,__pud (_PAGE_TABLE | pmd_phys)); + pud[idx_pmd] =__pud (_PAGE_TABLE | pmd_phys); pmd_phys +=PAGE_SIZE ; } n_pmd -=PTRS_PER_PUD ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 61/238 ACPI / device_sysfs: Avoid OF modalias creation for removed device
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
commit f16eb8a4b096514ac06fb25bf599dcc792899b3d upstream.
If SSDT overlay is loaded via ConfigFS and then unloaded the device, we would like to have OF modalias for, already gone. Thus, acpi_get_name() returns no allocated buffer for such case and kernel crashes afterwards:
ACPI: Host-directed Dynamic ACPI Table Unload ads7950 spi-PRP0001:00: Dropping the link to regulator.0
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000 #PF error: [normal kernel read fault] PGD 80000000070d6067 P4D 80000000070d6067 PUD 70d0067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 40 Comm: kworker/u4:2 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #96 Hardware name: Intel Corporation Merrifield/BODEGA BAY, BIOS 542 2015.01.21:18.19.48 Workqueue: kacpi_hotplug acpi_device_del_work_fn RIP: 0010:create_of_modalias.isra.1+0x4c/0x150 Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 54 24 08 48 c7 44 24 10 00 00 00 00 48 c7 44 24 08 ff ff ff ff e8 7a b0 03 00 48 8b 4c 24 10 <0f> b6 01 84 c0 74 27 48 c7 c7 00 09 f4 a5 0f b6 f0 8d 50 20 f6 04 RSP: 0000:ffffa51040297c10 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000001001 RBX: 0000000000000785 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000001001 RSI: 0000000000000286 RDI: ffffa2163dc042e0 RBP: ffffa216062b1196 R08: 0000000000001001 R09: ffffa21639873000 R10: ffffffffa606761d R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffa21639873218 R13: ffffa2163deb5060 R14: ffffa216063d1010 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa2163e000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000007114000 CR4: 00000000001006f0 Call Trace: __acpi_device_uevent_modalias+0xb0/0x100 spi_uevent+0xd/0x40
...
In order to fix above let create_of_modalias() check the status returned by acpi_get_name() and bail out in case of failure.
--- drivers/acpi/device_sysfs.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/acpi/device_sysfs.c +5 -1
@@ -202,11 +202,15 @@ static int create_of_modalias(struct acp {struct acpi_buffer buf = {ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER };const union acpi_object *of_compatible, *obj; +acpi_status status;int len, count;int i, nval;char *c; -acpi_get_name (acpi_dev->handle,ACPI_SINGLE_NAME , &buf); + status =acpi_get_name (acpi_dev->handle,ACPI_SINGLE_NAME , &buf); +if (ACPI_FAILURE (status)) +return -ENODEV ; +/* DT strings are all in lower case */ for (c = buf.pointer; *c !='\0' ; c++) *c =tolower (*c);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 62/238 mmc: sdhci-esdhc-imx: fix HS400 timing issue
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: BOUGH CHEN <[email protected]>
commit de0a0decf2edfc5b0c782915f4120cf990a9bd13 upstream.
Now tuning reset will be done when the timing is MMC_TIMING_LEGACY/ MMC_TIMING_MMC_HS/MMC_TIMING_SD_HS. But for timing MMC_TIMING_MMC_HS, we can not do tuning reset, otherwise HS400 timing is not right.
Here is the process of init HS400, first finish tuning in HS200 mode, then switch to HS mode and 8 bit DDR mode, finally switch to HS400 mode. If we do tuning reset in HS mode, this will cause HS400 mode lost the tuning setting, which will cause CRC error.
--- drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-esdhc-imx.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-esdhc-imx.c +1 -0
@@ -979,6 +979,7 @@ static void esdhc_set_uhs_signaling(strucase MMC_TIMING_UHS_SDR25 :case MMC_TIMING_UHS_SDR50 :case MMC_TIMING_UHS_SDR104 : +case MMC_TIMING_MMC_HS :case MMC_TIMING_MMC_HS200 :writel (m, host->ioaddr +ESDHC_MIX_CTRL );break ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 63/238 mmc: renesas_sdhi: Fix card initialization failure in high speed mode
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takeshi Saito <[email protected]>
commit d30ae056adb81e1d2b8b953efa74735a020b8e3b upstream.
This fixes card initialization failure in high speed mode.
If U-Boot uses SDR or HS200/400 mode before starting Linux and Linux DT does not enable SDR/HS200/HS400 mode, card initialization fails in high speed mode.
It is necessary to initialize SCC registers during card initialization phase. HW reset function is registered only for a port with either of SDR/HS200/HS400 properties in device tree. If SDR/HS200/HS400 properties are not present in device tree, SCC registers will not be reset. In SoC that support SCC registers, HW reset function should be registered regardless of the configuration of device tree.
Reproduction procedure:
- Use U-Boot that support MMC HS200/400 mode.
- Delete HS200/HS400 properties in device tree. (Delete mmc-hs200-1_8v and mmc-hs400-1_8v)
- MMC port works high speed mode and all commands fail.
--- drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c +7 -4
@@ -723,6 +723,13 @@ int renesas_sdhi_probe(struct platform_d host->ops.start_signal_voltage_switch = renesas_sdhi_start_signal_voltage_switch; host->sdcard_irq_setbit_mask =TMIO_STAT_ALWAYS_SET_27 ; + +/* SDR and HS200/400 registers requires HW reset */ +if (of_data && of_data->scc_offset) { + priv->scc_ctl = host->ctl + of_data->scc_offset; + host->mmc->caps |=MMC_CAP_HW_RESET ; + host->hw_reset = renesas_sdhi_hw_reset; + } }/* Orginally registers were 16 bit apart, could be 32 or 64 nowadays */
@@ -775,8 +782,6 @@ int renesas_sdhi_probe(struct platform_dconst struct renesas_sdhi_scc *taps = of_data->taps;bool hit = false; - host->mmc->caps |=MMC_CAP_HW_RESET ; -for (i =0 ; i < of_data->taps_num; i++) {if (taps[i].clk_rate ==0 || taps[i].clk_rate == host->mmc->f_max) {
@@ -789,12 +794,10 @@ int renesas_sdhi_probe(struct platform_dif (!hit)dev_warn (&host->pdev->dev,"Unknown clock rate for SDR104\n" ); - priv->scc_ctl = host->ctl + of_data->scc_offset; host->init_tuning = renesas_sdhi_init_tuning; host->prepare_tuning = renesas_sdhi_prepare_tuning; host->select_tuning = renesas_sdhi_select_tuning; host->check_scc_error = renesas_sdhi_check_scc_error; - host->hw_reset = renesas_sdhi_hw_reset; host->prepare_hs400_tuning = renesas_sdhi_prepare_hs400_tuning; host->hs400_downgrade = renesas_sdhi_disable_scc;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 54/238 CIFS: Fix read after write for files with read caching
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
commit 6dfbd84684700cb58b34e8602c01c12f3d2595c8 upstream.
When we have a READ lease for a file and have just issued a write operation to the server we need to purge the cache and set oplock/lease level to NONE to avoid reading stale data. Currently we do that only if a write operation succedeed thus not covering cases when a request was sent to the server but a negative error code was returned later for some other reasons (e.g. -EIOCBQUEUED or -EINTR). Fix this by turning off caching regardless of the error code being returned.
The patches fixes generic tests 075 and 112 from the xfs-tests.
--- fs/cifs/file.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/cifs/file.c +7 -5
@@ -3028,14 +3028,16 @@ cifs_strict_writev(struct kiocb *iocb, s* these pages but not on the region from pos to ppos+len-1. */ written =cifs_user_writev (iocb, from); -if (written >0 &&CIFS_CACHE_READ (cinode)) { +if (CIFS_CACHE_READ (cinode)) {/* -* Windows 7 server can delay breaking level2 oplock if a write -* request comes - break it on the client to prevent reading -* an old data. +* We have read level caching and we have just sent a write +* request to the server thus making data in the cache stale. +* Zap the cache and set oplock/lease level to NONE to avoid +* reading stale data from the cache. All subsequent read +* operations will read new data from the server. */ cifs_zap_mapping (inode); -cifs_dbg (FYI ,"Set no oplock for inode=%p after a write operation\n" , +cifs_dbg (FYI ,"Set Oplock/Lease to NONE for inode=%p after write\n" , inode); cinode->oplock =0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 89/238 ovl: Do not lose security.capability xattr over metadata file copy-up
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vivek Goyal <[email protected]>
commit 993a0b2aec52754f0897b1dab4c453be8217cae5 upstream.
If a file has been copied up metadata only, and later data is copied up, upper loses any security.capability xattr it has (underlying filesystem clears it as upon file write).
Quoted 1 line
From a user's point of view, this is just a file copy-up and that should
not result in losing security.capability xattr. Hence, before data copy up, save security.capability xattr (if any) and restore it on upper after data copy up is complete.
--- fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++- fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 2 + fs/overlayfs/util.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 3 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c +26 -2
@@ -742,6 +742,8 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_meta_inode_data(s {struct path upperpath, datapath;int err; +char *capability =NULL ; +ssize_t uninitialized_var (cap_size );ovl_path_upper (c->dentry, &upperpath);if (WARN_ON (upperpath.dentry ==NULL ))
@@ -751,15 +753,37 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_meta_inode_data(sif (WARN_ON (datapath.dentry ==NULL ))return -EIO ; +if (c->stat.size) { + err = cap_size =ovl_getxattr (upperpath.dentry,XATTR_NAME_CAPS , + &capability,0 ); +if (err <0 && err != -ENODATA ) + goto out; + } + err =ovl_copy_up_data (&datapath, &upperpath, c->stat.size);if (err) -return err; + goto out_free; + +/* +* Writing to upper file will clear security.capability xattr. We +* don't want that to happen for normal copy-up operation. +*/ +if (capability) { + err =ovl_do_setxattr (upperpath.dentry,XATTR_NAME_CAPS , + capability, cap_size,0 ); +if (err) + goto out_free; + } + err =vfs_removexattr (upperpath.dentry,OVL_XATTR_METACOPY );if (err) -return err; + goto out_free;ovl_set_upperdata (d_inode (c->dentry)); +out_free: +kfree (capability); +out:return err; }
fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h +2 -0
@@ -277,6 +277,8 @@ int ovl_lock_rename_workdir(struct dentrint ovl_check_metacopy_xattr (struct dentry *dentry);bool ovl_is_metacopy_dentry (struct dentry *dentry);char *ovl_get_redirect_xattr (struct dentry *dentry,int padding); +ssize_t ovl_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,char *name,char **value, +size_t padding);static inline bool ovl_is_impuredir (struct dentry *dentry) {
fs/overlayfs/util.c +35 -20
78 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 98/238 Btrfs: fix deadlock between clone/dedupe and rename
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
commit 4ea748e1d2c9f8a27332b949e8210dbbf392987e upstream.
Reflinking (clone/dedupe) and rename are operations that operate on two inodes and therefore need to lock them in the same order to avoid ABBA deadlocks. It happens that Btrfs' reflink implementation always locked them in a different order from VFS's lock_two_nondirectories() helper, which is used by the rename code in VFS, resulting in ABBA type deadlocks.
Btrfs' locking order:
static void btrfs_double_inode_lock(struct inode *inode1, struct inode *inode2)
{
if (inode1 < inode2)
swap(inode1, inode2); inode_lock_nested(inode1, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
inode_lock_nested(inode2, I_MUTEX_CHILD);}
VFS's locking order:
void lock_two_nondirectories(struct inode *inode1, struct inode *inode2)
{
if (inode1 > inode2)
swap(inode1, inode2); if (inode1 && !S_ISDIR(inode1->i_mode))
inode_lock(inode1);
if (inode2 && !S_ISDIR(inode2->i_mode) && inode2 != inode1)
inode_lock_nested(inode2, I_MUTEX_NONDIR2);
}Fix this by killing the btrfs helper function that does the double inode locking and replace it with VFS's helper lock_two_nondirectories().
--- fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 21 +++------------------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +3 -18
@@ -3206,21 +3206,6 @@ out:return ret; } -static void btrfs_double_inode_unlock (struct inode *inode1,struct inode *inode2) -{ -inode_unlock (inode1); -inode_unlock (inode2); -} - -static void btrfs_double_inode_lock (struct inode *inode1,struct inode *inode2) -{ -if (inode1 < inode2) -swap (inode1, inode2); - -inode_lock_nested (inode1,I_MUTEX_PARENT ); -inode_lock_nested (inode2,I_MUTEX_CHILD ); -} -static void btrfs_double_extent_unlock (struct inode *inode1,u64 loff1,struct inode *inode2,u64 loff2,u64 len) {
@@ -3989,7 +3974,7 @@ static int btrfs_remap_file_range_prep(sif (same_inode)inode_lock (inode_in);else -btrfs_double_inode_lock (inode_in, inode_out); +lock_two_nondirectories (inode_in, inode_out);/* * Now that the inodes are locked, we need to start writeback ourselves
@@ -4039,7 +4024,7 @@ static int btrfs_remap_file_range_prep(sif (same_inode)inode_unlock (inode_in);else -btrfs_double_inode_unlock (inode_in, inode_out); +unlock_two_nondirectories (inode_in, inode_out);return ret; }
@@ -4069,7 +4054,7 @@ loff_t btrfs_remap_file_range(struct filif (same_inode)inode_unlock (src_inode);else -btrfs_double_inode_unlock (src_inode, dst_inode); +unlock_two_nondirectories (src_inode, dst_inode);return ret <0 ? ret : len; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 99/238 soc: qcom: rpmh: Avoid accessing freed memory from batch API
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
commit baef1c90aac7e5bf13f0360a3b334825a23d31a1 upstream.
Using the batch API from the interconnect driver sometimes leads to a KASAN error due to an access to freed memory. This is easier to trigger with threadirqs on the kernel commandline.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rpmh_tx_done+0x114/0x12c
Read of size 1 at addr fffffff51414ad84 by task irq/110-apps_rs/57
CPU: 0 PID: 57 Comm: irq/110-apps_rs Tainted: G W 4.19.10 #72
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2f8
show_stack+0x20/0x2c
__dump_stack+0x20/0x28
dump_stack+0xcc/0x10c
print_address_description+0x74/0x240
kasan_report+0x250/0x26c
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x20/0x2c
rpmh_tx_done+0x114/0x12c
tcs_tx_done+0x450/0x768
irq_forced_thread_fn+0x58/0x9c
irq_thread+0x120/0x1dc
kthread+0x248/0x260
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
Allocated by task 385:
kasan_kmalloc+0xac/0x148
__kmalloc+0x170/0x1e4
rpmh_write_batch+0x174/0x540
qcom_icc_set+0x8dc/0x9ac
icc_set+0x288/0x2e8
a6xx_gmu_stop+0x320/0x3c0
a6xx_pm_suspend+0x108/0x124
adreno_suspend+0x50/0x60
pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x60/0x78
__rpm_callback+0x214/0x32c
rpm_callback+0x54/0x184
rpm_suspend+0x3f8/0xa90
pm_runtime_work+0xb4/0x178
process_one_work+0x544/0xbc0
worker_thread+0x514/0x7d0
kthread+0x248/0x260
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
Freed by task 385:
__kasan_slab_free+0x12c/0x1e0
kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x1c
kfree+0x134/0x588
rpmh_write_batch+0x49c/0x540
qcom_icc_set+0x8dc/0x9ac
icc_set+0x288/0x2e8
a6xx_gmu_stop+0x320/0x3c0
a6xx_pm_suspend+0x108/0x124
adreno_suspend+0x50/0x60
cr50_spi spi5.0: SPI transfer timed out
pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x60/0x78
__rpm_callback+0x214/0x32c
rpm_callback+0x54/0x184
rpm_suspend+0x3f8/0xa90
pm_runtime_work+0xb4/0x178
process_one_work+0x544/0xbc0
worker_thread+0x514/0x7d0
kthread+0x248/0x260
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
The buggy address belongs to the object at fffffff51414ac80
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
The buggy address is located 260 bytes inside of
512-byte region [fffffff51414ac80, fffffff51414ae80)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffffbfd4505200 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:fffffff51e00c680 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x4000000000008100(slab|head)
raw: 4000000000008100 ffffffbfd4529008 ffffffbfd44f9208 fffffff51e00c680
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
fffffff51414ac80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
fffffff51414ad00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>fffffff51414ad80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
fffffff51414ae00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
fffffff51414ae80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fcThe batch API sets the same completion for each rpmh message that's sent and then loops through all the messages and waits for that single completion declared on the stack to be completed before returning from the function and freeing the message structures. Unfortunately, some messages may still be in process and 'stuck' in the TCS. At some later point, the tcs_tx_done() interrupt will run and try to process messages that have already been freed at the end of rpmh_write_batch(). This will in turn access the 'needs_free' member of the rpmh_request structure and cause KASAN to complain. Furthermore, if there's a message that's completed in rpmh_tx_done() and freed immediately after the complete() call is made we'll be racing with potentially freed memory when accessing the 'needs_free' member:
CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- rpmh_tx_done() complete(&compl) wait_for_completion(&compl) kfree(rpm_msg) if (rpm_msg->needs_free) <KASAN warning splat>
Let's fix this by allocating a chunk of completions for each message and waiting for all of them to be completed before returning from the batch API. Alternatively, we could wait for the last message in the batch, but that may be a more complicated change because it looks like tcs_tx_done() just iterates through the indices of the queue and completes each message instead of tracking the last inserted message and completing that first.
--- drivers/soc/qcom/rpmh.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
drivers/soc/qcom/rpmh.c +21 -13
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ void rpmh_tx_done(const struct tcs_reque struct rpmh_request *rpm_msg = container_of(msg, struct rpmh_request, msg);struct completion *compl = rpm_msg->completion; +bool free = rpm_msg->needs_free; rpm_msg->err = r;
@@ -94,7 +95,7 @@ void rpmh_tx_done(const struct tcs_requecomplete (compl); exit: -if (rpm_msg->needs_free) +if (free)kfree (rpm_msg); }
@@ -348,11 +349,12 @@ int rpmh_write_batch(const struct device {struct batch_cache_req *req;struct rpmh_request *rpm_msgs; -DECLARE_COMPLETION_ONSTACK (compl); +struct completion *compls;struct rpmh_ctrlr *ctrlr =get_rpmh_ctrlr (dev);unsigned long time_left;int count =0 ; -int ret, i, j; +int ret, i; +void *ptr;if (!cmd || !n)return -EINVAL ;
@@ -362,10 +364,15 @@ int rpmh_write_batch(const struct deviceif (!count)return -EINVAL ; - req =kzalloc (sizeof (*req) + count *sizeof (req->rpm_msgs[0 ]), + ptr =kzalloc (sizeof (*req) + + count * (sizeof (req->rpm_msgs[0 ]) +sizeof (*compls)),GFP_ATOMIC ); -if (!req) +if (!ptr)return -ENOMEM ; + + req = ptr; + compls = ptr +sizeof (*req) + count *sizeof (*rpm_msgs); + req->count = count; rpm_msgs = req->rpm_msgs;
@@ -380,25 +387,26 @@ int rpmh_write_batch(const struct device }for (i =0 ; i < count; i++) { - rpm_msgs[i].completion = &compl; +struct completion *compl = &compls[i]; + +init_completion (compl); + rpm_msgs[i].completion = compl; ret =rpmh_rsc_send_data (ctrlr_to_drv (ctrlr), &rpm_msgs[i].msg);if (ret) {pr_err ("Error(%d) sending RPMH message addr=%#x\n" , ret, rpm_msgs[i].msg.cmds[0 ].addr); -for (j = i; j < count; j++) -rpmh_tx_done (&rpm_msgs[j].msg, ret);break ; } } time_left =RPMH_TIMEOUT_MS ; -for (i =0 ; i < count; i++) { - time_left =wait_for_completion_timeout (&compl, time_left); +while (i--) { + time_left =wait_for_completion_timeout (&compls[i], time_left);if (!time_left) {/* * Better hope they never finish because they'll signal -* the completion on our stack and that's bad once -* we've returned from the function. +* the completion that we're going to free once +* we've returned from this function. */ WARN_ON (1 ); ret = -ETIMEDOUT ;
@@ -407,7 +415,7 @@ int rpmh_write_batch(const struct device } exit: -kfree (req); +kfree (ptr);return ret; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 100/238 libertas_tf: dont set URB_ZERO_PACKET on IN USB transfer
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lubomir Rintel <[email protected]>
commit 607076a904c435f2677fadaadd4af546279db68b upstream.
It doesn't make sense and the USB core warns on each submit of such URB, easily flooding the message buffer with tracebacks.
Analogous issue was fixed in regular libertas driver in commit 6528d8804780 ("libertas: don't set URB_ZERO_PACKET on IN USB transfer").
--- drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas_tf/if_usb.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas_tf/if_usb.c +0 -2
@@ -433,8 +433,6 @@ static int __if_usb_submit_rx_urb(structskb_tail_pointer (skb), MRVDRV_ETH_RX_PACKET_BUFFER_SIZE, callbackfn, cardp); - cardp->rx_urb->transfer_flags |=URB_ZERO_PACKET ; -lbtf_deb_usb2 (&cardp->udev->dev,"Pointer for rx_urb %p\n" , cardp->rx_urb); ret =usb_submit_urb (cardp->rx_urb,GFP_ATOMIC );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 101/238 irqchip/gic-v3-its: Avoid parsing _indirect_ twice for Device table
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zenghui Yu <[email protected]>
commit 8d565748b6035eeda18895c213396a4c9fac6a4c upstream.
In current logic, its_parse_indirect_baser() will be invoked twice when allocating Device tables. Add a *break* to omit the unnecessary and annoying (might be ...) invoking.
--- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c +2 -0
@@ -1955,6 +1955,8 @@ static int its_alloc_tables(struct its_n indirect =its_parse_indirect_baser (its, baser, psz, &order, its->device_ids); +break ; +case GITS_BASER_TYPE_VCPU : indirect = its_parse_indirect_baser(its, baser, psz, &order,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 102/238 irqchip/brcmstb-l2: Use _irqsave locking variants in non-interrupt code
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Doug Berger <[email protected]>
commit 33517881ede742107f416533b8c3e4abc56763da upstream.
Using the irq_gc_lock/irq_gc_unlock functions in the suspend and resume functions creates the opportunity for a deadlock during suspend, resume, and shutdown. Using the irq_gc_lock_irqsave/ irq_gc_unlock_irqrestore variants prevents this possible deadlock.
--- drivers/irqchip/irq-brcmstb-l2.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/irqchip/irq-brcmstb-l2.c +6 -4
@@ -129,8 +129,9 @@ static void brcmstb_l2_intc_suspend(strustruct irq_chip_generic *gc =irq_data_get_irq_chip_data (d);struct irq_chip_type *ct =irq_data_get_chip_type (d);struct brcmstb_l2_intc_data *b = gc->private; +unsigned long flags; -irq_gc_lock (gc); +irq_gc_lock_irqsave (gc, flags);/* Save the current mask */ b->saved_mask =irq_reg_readl (gc, ct->regs.mask);
@@ -139,7 +140,7 @@ static void brcmstb_l2_intc_suspend(struirq_reg_writel (gc, ~gc->wake_active, ct->regs.disable);irq_reg_writel (gc, gc->wake_active, ct->regs.enable); } -irq_gc_unlock (gc); +irq_gc_unlock_irqrestore (gc, flags); }static void brcmstb_l2_intc_resume (struct irq_data *d)
@@ -147,8 +148,9 @@ static void brcmstb_l2_intc_resume(strucstruct irq_chip_generic *gc =irq_data_get_irq_chip_data (d);struct irq_chip_type *ct =irq_data_get_chip_type (d);struct brcmstb_l2_intc_data *b = gc->private; +unsigned long flags; -irq_gc_lock (gc); +irq_gc_lock_irqsave (gc, flags);if (ct->chip.irq_ack) {/* Clear unmasked non-wakeup interrupts */ irq_reg_writel(gc, ~b->saved_mask & ~gc->wake_active,
@@ -158,7 +160,7 @@ static void brcmstb_l2_intc_resume(struc/* Restore the saved mask */ irq_reg_writel (gc, b->saved_mask, ct->regs.disable);irq_reg_writel (gc, ~b->saved_mask, ct->regs.enable); -irq_gc_unlock (gc); +irq_gc_unlock_irqrestore (gc, flags); } static int __init brcmstb_l2_intc_of_init(struct device_node *np,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 103/238 x86/kprobes: Prohibit probing on optprobe template code
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
commit 0192e6535ebe9af68614198ced4fd6d37b778ebf upstream.
Prohibit probing on optprobe template code, since it is not a code but a template instruction sequence. If we modify this template, copied template must be broken.
--- arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c +5 -0
@@ -141,6 +141,11 @@ asm (void optprobe_template_func (void );STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD (optprobe_template_func); +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL (optprobe_template_func); +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL (optprobe_template_entry); +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL (optprobe_template_val); +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL (optprobe_template_call); +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL (optprobe_template_end);#define TMPL_MOVE_IDX \ ((long)optprobe_template_val - (long)optprobe_template_entry)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 104/238 cpufreq: kryo: Release OPP tables on module removal
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Viresh Kumar <[email protected]>
commit 0334906c06967142c8805fbe88acf787f65d3d26 upstream.
Commit 5ad7346b4ae2 ("cpufreq: kryo: Add module remove and exit") made it possible to build the kryo cpufreq driver as a module, but it failed to release all the resources, i.e. OPP tables, when the module is unloaded.
This patch fixes it by releasing the OPP tables, by calling dev_pm_opp_put_supported_hw() for them, from the qcom_cpufreq_kryo_remove() routine. The array of pointers to the OPP tables is also allocated dynamically now in qcom_cpufreq_kryo_probe(), as the pointers will be required while releasing the resources.
Compile tested only.
--- drivers/cpufreq/qcom-cpufreq-kryo.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/cpufreq/qcom-cpufreq-kryo.c +18 -2
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static enum _msm8996_version qcom_cpufrestatic int qcom_cpufreq_kryo_probe (struct platform_device *pdev) { -struct opp_table *opp_tables[NR_CPUS ] = {0 }; +struct opp_table **opp_tables;enum _msm8996_version msm8996_version;struct nvmem_cell *speedbin_nvmem;struct device_node *np;
@@ -133,6 +133,10 @@ static int qcom_cpufreq_kryo_probe(struc }kfree (speedbin); + opp_tables =kcalloc (num_possible_cpus (),sizeof (*opp_tables),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!opp_tables) +return -ENOMEM ; +for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) { cpu_dev =get_cpu_device (cpu);if (NULL == cpu_dev) {
@@ -151,8 +155,10 @@ static int qcom_cpufreq_kryo_probe(struc cpufreq_dt_pdev =platform_device_register_simple ("cpufreq-dt" ,-1 ,NULL ,0 ); -if (!IS_ERR (cpufreq_dt_pdev)) +if (!IS_ERR (cpufreq_dt_pdev)) { +platform_set_drvdata (pdev, opp_tables);return 0 ; + } ret =PTR_ERR (cpufreq_dt_pdev);dev_err (cpu_dev,"Failed to register platform device\n" );
@@ -163,13 +169,23 @@ free_opp:break ;dev_pm_opp_put_supported_hw (opp_tables[cpu]); } +kfree (opp_tables);return ret; }static int qcom_cpufreq_kryo_remove (struct platform_device *pdev) { +struct opp_table **opp_tables =platform_get_drvdata (pdev); +unsigned int cpu; +platform_device_unregister (cpufreq_dt_pdev); + +for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) +dev_pm_opp_put_supported_hw (opp_tables[cpu]); + +kfree (opp_tables); +return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 105/238 cpufreq: tegra124: add missing of_node_put()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yangtao Li <[email protected]>
commit 446fae2bb5395f3028d8e3aae1508737e5a72ea1 upstream.
of_cpu_device_node_get() will increase the refcount of device_node, it is necessary to call of_node_put() at the end to release the refcount.
--- drivers/cpufreq/tegra124-cpufreq.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/cpufreq/tegra124-cpufreq.c +2 -0
@@ -134,6 +134,8 @@ static int tegra124_cpufreq_probe(structplatform_set_drvdata (pdev, priv); +of_node_put (np); +return 0 ; out_switch_to_pllx:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 106/238 cpufreq: pxa2xx: remove incorrect __init annotation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
commit 9505b98ccddc454008ca7efff90044e3e857c827 upstream.
pxa_cpufreq_init_voltages() is marked __init but usually inlined into the non-__init pxa_cpufreq_init() function. When building with clang, it can stay as a standalone function in a discarded section, and produce this warning:
WARNING: vmlinux.o(.text+0x616a00): Section mismatch in reference from the function pxa_cpufreq_init() to the function .init.text:pxa_cpufreq_init_voltages() The function pxa_cpufreq_init() references
the function __init pxa_cpufreq_init_voltages().
This is often because pxa_cpufreq_init lacks a __init
annotation or the annotation of pxa_cpufreq_init_voltages is wrong.
--- drivers/cpufreq/pxa2xx-cpufreq.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/cpufreq/pxa2xx-cpufreq.c +2 -2
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ static int pxa_cpufreq_change_voltage(coreturn ret; } -static void __init pxa_cpufreq_init_voltages (void ) +static void pxa_cpufreq_init_voltages (void ) { vcc_core =regulator_get (NULL ,"vcc_core" );if (IS_ERR (vcc_core)) {
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ static int pxa_cpufreq_change_voltage(coreturn 0 ; } -static void __init pxa_cpufreq_init_voltages (void ) { } +static void pxa_cpufreq_init_voltages (void ) { }#endif static void find_freq_tables(struct cpufreq_frequency_table **freq_table,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 107/238 ext4: fix check of inode in swap_inode_boot_loader
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: yangerkun <[email protected]>
commit 67a11611e1a5211f6569044fbf8150875764d1d0 upstream.
Before really do swap between inode and boot inode, something need to check to avoid invalid or not permitted operation, like does this inode has inline data. But the condition check should be protected by inode lock to avoid change while swapping. Also some other condition will not change between swapping, but there has no problem to do this under inode lock.
--- fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 22 +++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/ioctl.c +13 -9
@@ -116,15 +116,6 @@ static long swap_inode_boot_loader(strucstruct inode *inode_bl;struct ext4_inode_info *ei_bl; -if (inode->i_nlink !=1 || !S_ISREG (inode->i_mode) || -IS_SWAPFILE (inode) ||IS_ENCRYPTED (inode) || -ext4_has_inline_data (inode)) -return -EINVAL ; - -if (IS_RDONLY (inode) ||IS_APPEND (inode) ||IS_IMMUTABLE (inode) || - !inode_owner_or_capable (inode) || !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ; - inode_bl =ext4_iget (sb,EXT4_BOOT_LOADER_INO ,EXT4_IGET_SPECIAL );if (IS_ERR (inode_bl))return PTR_ERR (inode_bl);
@@ -137,6 +128,19 @@ static long swap_inode_boot_loader(struc* that only 1 swap_inode_boot_loader is running. */ lock_two_nondirectories (inode, inode_bl); +if (inode->i_nlink !=1 || !S_ISREG (inode->i_mode) || +IS_SWAPFILE (inode) ||IS_ENCRYPTED (inode) || +ext4_has_inline_data (inode)) { + err = -EINVAL ; + goto journal_err_out; + } + +if (IS_RDONLY (inode) ||IS_APPEND (inode) ||IS_IMMUTABLE (inode) || + !inode_owner_or_capable (inode) || !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) { + err = -EPERM ; + goto journal_err_out; + } +/* Wait for all existing dio workers */ inode_dio_wait (inode);inode_dio_wait (inode_bl);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 90/238 m68k: Add -ffreestanding to CFLAGS
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Finn Thain <[email protected]>
commit 28713169d879b67be2ef2f84dcf54905de238294 upstream.
This patch fixes a build failure when using GCC 8.1:
/usr/bin/ld: block/partitions/ldm.o: in function `ldm_parse_tocblock':block/partitions/ldm.c:153: undefined reference to `strcmp'
This is caused by a new optimization which effectively replaces a strncmp() call with a strcmp() call. This affects a number of strncmp() call sites in the kernel.
The entire class of optimizations is avoided with -fno-builtin, which gets enabled by -ffreestanding. This may avoid possible future build failures in case new optimizations appear in future compilers.
I haven't done any performance measurements with this patch but I did count the function calls in a defconfig build. For example, there are now 23 more sprintf() calls and 39 fewer strcpy() calls. The effect on the other libc functions is smaller.
If this harms performance we can tackle that regression by optimizing the call sites, ideally using semantic patches. That way, clang and ICC builds might benfit too.
Cc: [email protected]
Reference: https://marc.info/?l=linux-m68k&m=154514816222244&w=2
--- arch/m68k/Makefile | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/m68k/Makefile +4 -1
@@ -58,7 +58,10 @@ cpuflags-$(CONFIG_M5206e) := $(call cc-o cpuflags-$(CONFIG_M5206) := $(call cc-option,-mcpu=5206,-m5200) KBUILD_AFLAGS += $(cpuflags-y) -KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(cpuflags-y) -pipe +KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(cpuflags-y) + +KBUILD_CFLAGS += -pipe -ffreestanding + ifdef CONFIG_MMU # without -fno-strength-reduce the 53c7xx.c driver fails ;-( KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-strength-reduce -ffixed-a2
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 108/238 ext4: cleanup pagecache before swap i_data
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: yangerkun <[email protected]>
commit a46c68a318b08f819047843abf349aeee5d10ac2 upstream.
While do swap, we should make sure there has no new dirty page since we should swap i_data between two inode:
1.We should lock i_mmap_sem with write to avoid new pagecache from mmap read/write;
2.Change filemap_flush to filemap_write_and_wait and move them to the space protected by inode lock to avoid new pagecache from buffer read/write.
--- fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/ioctl.c +12 -4
@@ -121,9 +121,6 @@ static long swap_inode_boot_loader(strucreturn PTR_ERR (inode_bl); ei_bl =EXT4_I (inode_bl); -filemap_flush (inode->i_mapping); -filemap_flush (inode_bl->i_mapping); -/* Protect orig inodes against a truncate and make sure, * that only 1 swap_inode_boot_loader is running. */ lock_two_nondirectories (inode, inode_bl);
@@ -141,6 +138,15 @@ static long swap_inode_boot_loader(struc goto journal_err_out; } +down_write (&EXT4_I (inode)->i_mmap_sem); + err =filemap_write_and_wait (inode->i_mapping); +if (err) + goto err_out; + + err =filemap_write_and_wait (inode_bl->i_mapping); +if (err) + goto err_out; +/* Wait for all existing dio workers */ inode_dio_wait (inode);inode_dio_wait (inode_bl);
@@ -151,7 +157,7 @@ static long swap_inode_boot_loader(struc handle =ext4_journal_start (inode_bl,EXT4_HT_MOVE_EXTENTS ,2 );if (IS_ERR (handle)) { err = -EINVAL ; - goto journal_err_out; + goto err_out; }/* Protect extent tree against block allocations via delalloc */
@@ -208,6 +214,8 @@ static long swap_inode_boot_loader(strucext4_journal_stop (handle);ext4_double_up_write_data_sem (inode, inode_bl); +err_out: +up_write (&EXT4_I (inode)->i_mmap_sem); journal_err_out:unlock_two_nondirectories (inode, inode_bl);iput (inode_bl);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 109/238 mm: hwpoison: fix thp split handing in soft_offline_in_use_page()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: zhongjiang <[email protected]>
commit 46612b751c4941c5c0472ddf04027e877ae5990f upstream.
When soft_offline_in_use_page() runs on a thp tail page after pmd is split, we trigger the following VM_BUG_ON_PAGE():
Memory failure: 0x3755ff: non anonymous thp
__get_any_page: 0x3755ff: unknown zero refcount page type 2fffff80000000 Soft offlining pfn 0x34d805 at process virtual address 0x20fff000 page:ffffea000d360140 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1
flags: 0x2fffff80000000()
raw: 002fffff80000000 ffffea000d360108 ffffea000d360188 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_ref_count(page) == 0) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at ./include/linux/mm.h:519!
soft_offline_in_use_page() passed refcount and page lock from tail page to head page, which is not needed because we can pass any subpage to split_huge_page().
Naoya had fixed a similar issue in c3901e722b29 ("mm: hwpoison: fix thp split handling in memory_failure()"). But he missed fixing soft offline.
--- mm/memory-failure.c | 14 ++++++-------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
mm/memory-failure.c +6 -8
@@ -1825,19 +1825,17 @@ static int soft_offline_in_use_page(strustruct page *hpage =compound_head (page);if (!PageHuge (page) &&PageTransHuge (hpage)) { -lock_page (hpage); -if (!PageAnon (hpage) ||unlikely (split_huge_page (hpage))) { -unlock_page (hpage); -if (!PageAnon (hpage)) +lock_page (page); +if (!PageAnon (page) ||unlikely (split_huge_page (page))) { +unlock_page (page); +if (!PageAnon (page))pr_info ("soft offline: %#lx: non anonymous thp\n" ,page_to_pfn (page));else pr_info ("soft offline: %#lx: thp split failed\n" ,page_to_pfn (page)); -put_hwpoison_page (hpage); +put_hwpoison_page (page);return -EBUSY ; } -unlock_page (hpage); -get_hwpoison_page (page); -put_hwpoison_page (hpage); +unlock_page (page); }/*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 110/238 mm/vmalloc: fix size check for remap_vmalloc_range_partial()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Roman Penyaev <[email protected]>
commit 401592d2e095947344e10ec0623adbcd58934dd4 upstream.
When VM_NO_GUARD is not set area->size includes adjacent guard page, thus for correct size checking get_vm_area_size() should be used, but not area->size.
This fixes possible kernel oops when userspace tries to mmap an area on 1 page bigger than was allocated by vmalloc_user() call: the size check inside remap_vmalloc_range_partial() accounts non-existing guard page also, so check successfully passes but vmalloc_to_page() returns NULL (guard page does not physically exist).
The following code pattern example should trigger an oops:
static int oops_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
void *mem; mem = vmalloc_user(4096);
BUG_ON(!mem);
/* Do not care about mem leak */
return remap_vmalloc_range(vma, mem, 0);}
And userspace simply mmaps size + PAGE_SIZE:
mmap(NULL, 8192, PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
Possible candidates for oops which do not have any explicit size checks:
*** drivers/media/usb/stkwebcam/stk-webcam.c: v4l_stk_mmap[789] ret = remap_vmalloc_range(vma, sbuf->buffer, 0);
Or the following one:
*** drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c
static int
fb_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct * vma)
...
res = fb->fb_mmap(info, vma);Where fb_mmap callback calls remap_vmalloc_range() directly without any explicit checks:
*** drivers/video/fbdev/vfb.c
static int vfb_mmap(struct fb_info *info,
struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
return remap_vmalloc_range(vma, (void *)info->fix.smem_start, vma->vm_pgoff);
}--- mm/vmalloc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/vmalloc.c +1 -1
@@ -2248,7 +2248,7 @@ int remap_vmalloc_range_partial(struct vif (!(area->flags &VM_USERMAP ))return -EINVAL ; -if (kaddr + size > area->addr + area->size) +if (kaddr + size > area->addr +get_vm_area_size (area))return -EINVAL ; do {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 112/238 kernel/sysctl.c: add missing range check in do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zev Weiss <[email protected]>
commit 8cf7630b29701d364f8df4a50e4f1f5e752b2778 upstream.
This bug has apparently existed since the introduction of this function in the pre-git era (4500e91754d3 in Thomas Gleixner's history.git, "[NET]: Add proc_dointvec_userhz_jiffies, use it for proper handling of neighbour sysctls.").
As a minimal fix we can simply duplicate the corresponding check in do_proc_dointvec_conv().
--- kernel/sysctl.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/sysctl.c +10 -1
@@ -2579,7 +2579,16 @@ static int do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv( {struct do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param *param = data;if (write) { -int val = *negp ? -*lvalp : *lvalp; +int val; +if (*negp) { +if (*lvalp > (unsigned long )INT_MAX +1 ) +return -EINVAL ; + val = -*lvalp; + }else { +if (*lvalp > (unsigned long )INT_MAX ) +return -EINVAL ; + val = *lvalp; + }if ((param->min && *param->min > val) || (param->max && *param->max < val))return -EINVAL ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 111/238 mm/memory.c: do_fault: avoid usage of stale vm_area_struct
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jan Stancek <[email protected]>
commit fc8efd2ddfed3f343c11b693e87140ff358d7ff5 upstream.
LTP testcase mtest06 [1] can trigger a crash on s390x running 5.0.0-rc8. This is a stress test, where one thread mmaps/writes/munmaps memory area and other thread is trying to read from it:
CPU: 0 PID: 2611 Comm: mmap1 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc8+ #51 Hardware name: IBM 2964 N63 400 (z/VM 6.4.0) Krnl PSW : 0404e00180000000 00000000001ac8d8 (__lock_acquire+0x7/0x7a8) Call Trace: ([<0000000000000000>] (null)) [<00000000001adae4>] lock_acquire+0xec/0x258 [<000000000080d1ac>] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x5c/0x98 [<000000000012a780>] page_table_free+0x48/0x1a8 [<00000000002f6e54>] do_fault+0xdc/0x670 [<00000000002fadae>] __handle_mm_fault+0x416/0x5f0 [<00000000002fb138>] handle_mm_fault+0x1b0/0x320 [<00000000001248cc>] do_dat_exception+0x19c/0x2c8 [<000000000080e5ee>] pgm_check_handler+0x19e/0x200
page_table_free() is called with NULL mm parameter, but because "0" is a valid address on s390 (see S390_lowcore), it keeps going until it eventually crashes in lockdep's lock_acquire. This crash is reproducible at least since 4.14.
Problem is that "vmf->vma" used in do_fault() can become stale. Because mmap_sem may be released, other threads can come in, call munmap() and cause "vma" be returned to kmem cache, and get zeroed/re-initialized and re-used:
handle_mm_fault |
__handle_mm_fault |
do_fault |
vma = vmf->vma |
do_read_fault |
__do_fault |
vma->vm_ops->fault(vmf); |
mmap_sem is released |
|
| do_munmap()
| remove_vma_list()
| remove_vma()
| vm_area_free()
| # vma is released
| ...
| # same vma is allocated
| # from kmem cache
| do_mmap()
| vm_area_alloc()
| memset(vma, 0, ...)
|
pte_free(vma->vm_mm, ...); |
page_table_free |
spin_lock_bh(&mm->context.lock);|
<crash> |Cache mm_struct to avoid using potentially stale "vma".
[1] https://github.com/linux-test-project/ltp/blob/master/testcases/kernel/mem/mtest06/mmap1.c
--- mm/memory.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/memory.c +4 -1
@@ -3517,10 +3517,13 @@ static vm_fault_t do_shared_fault(struct* but allow concurrent faults). * The mmap_sem may have been released depending on flags and our * return value. See filemap_fault() and __lock_page_or_retry(). +* If mmap_sem is released, vma may become invalid (for example +* by other thread calling munmap()). */ static vm_fault_t do_fault (struct vm_fault *vmf) {struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma; +struct mm_struct *vm_mm = vma->vm_mm;vm_fault_t ret;/*
@@ -3561,7 +3564,7 @@ static vm_fault_t do_fault(struct vm_fau/* preallocated pagetable is unused: free it */ if (vmf->prealloc_pte) { -pte_free (vma->vm_mm, vmf->prealloc_pte); +pte_free (vm_mm, vmf->prealloc_pte); vmf->prealloc_pte =NULL ; }return ret;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 114/238 device property: Fix the length used in PROPERTY_ENTRY_STRING()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Heikki Krogerus <[email protected]>
commit 2b6e492467c78183bb629bb0a100ea3509b615a5 upstream.
With string type property entries we need to use sizeof(const char *) instead of the number of characters as the length of the entry.
If the string was shorter then sizeof(const char *), attempts to read it would have failed with -EOVERFLOW. The problem has been hidden because all build-in string properties have had a string longer then 8 characters until now.
--- include/linux/property.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/property.h +1 -1
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ struct property_entry {#define PROPERTY_ENTRY_STRING (_name_, _val_) \ (struct property_entry) { \ .name = _name_, \ - .length = sizeof(_val_), \ + .length = sizeof(const char *), \ .type = DEV_PROP_STRING, \ { .value = { .str = _val_ } }, \ }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 116/238 parport_pc: fix find_superio io compare code, should use equal test.
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: QiaoChong <[email protected]>
commit 21698fd57984cd28207d841dbdaa026d6061bceb upstream.
In the original code before 181bf1e815a2 the loop was continuing until it finds the first matching superios[i].io and p->base.
But after 181bf1e815a2 the logic changed and the loop now returns the pointer to the first mismatched array element which is then used in get_superio_dma() and get_superio_irq() and thus returning the wrong value.
Fix the condition so that it now returns the correct pointer.
--- drivers/parport/parport_pc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/parport/parport_pc.c +1 -1
@@ -1377,7 +1377,7 @@ static struct superio_struct *find_super {int i;for (i =0 ; i <NR_SUPERIOS ; i++) -if (superios[i].io != p->base) +if (superios[i].io == p->base)return &superios[i];return NULL ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 117/238 i2c: tegra: fix maximum transfer size
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sowjanya Komatineni <[email protected]>
commit f4e3f4ae1d9c9330de355f432b69952e8cef650c upstream.
Tegra186 and prior supports maximum 4K bytes per packet transfer including 12 bytes of packet header.
This patch fixes max write length limit to account packet header size for transfers.
--- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-tegra.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-tegra.c +1 -1
@@ -837,7 +837,7 @@ static const struct i2c_algorithm tegra_static const struct i2c_adapter_quirks tegra_i2c_quirks = { .flags =I2C_AQ_NO_ZERO_LEN , .max_read_len =4096 , - .max_write_len =4096 , + .max_write_len =4096 -12 , };static const struct i2c_adapter_quirks tegra194_i2c_quirks = {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 91/238 Btrfs: setup a nofs context for memory allocation at btrfs_create_tree()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
commit b89f6d1fcb30a8cbdc18ce00c7d93792076af453 upstream.
We are holding a transaction handle when creating a tree, therefore we can not allocate the root using GFP_KERNEL, as we could deadlock if reclaim is triggered by the allocation, therefore setup a nofs context.
--- fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
fs/btrfs/disk-io.c +8 -0
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@#include <linux/semaphore.h> #include <linux/error-injection.h> #include <linux/crc32c.h> +#include <linux/sched/mm.h> #include <asm/unaligned.h> #include "ctree.h" #include "disk-io.h"
@@ -1258,10 +1259,17 @@ struct btrfs_root *btrfs_create_tree(strstruct btrfs_root *tree_root = fs_info->tree_root;struct btrfs_root *root;struct btrfs_key key; +unsigned int nofs_flag;int ret =0 ;uuid_le uuid =NULL_UUID_LE ; +/* +* We're holding a transaction handle, so use a NOFS memory allocation +* context to avoid deadlock if reclaim happens. +*/ + nofs_flag =memalloc_nofs_save (); root =btrfs_alloc_root (fs_info,GFP_KERNEL ); +memalloc_nofs_restore (nofs_flag);if (!root)return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 119/238 media: i2c: ov5640: Fix post-reset delay
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Loic Poulain <[email protected]>
commit 1d4c41f3d887bcd66e82cb2fda124533dad8808a upstream.
According to the ov5640 specification (2.7 power up sequence), host can access the sensor's registers 20ms after reset. Trying to access them before leads to undefined behavior and result in sporadic initialization errors.
--- drivers/media/i2c/ov5640.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/i2c/ov5640.c +1 -1
@@ -1893,7 +1893,7 @@ static void ov5640_reset(struct ov5640_dusleep_range (1000 ,2000 );gpiod_set_value_cansleep (sensor->reset_gpio,0 ); -usleep_range (5000 ,10000 ); +usleep_range (20000 ,25000 ); }static int ov5640_set_power_on (struct ov5640_dev *sensor)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 120/238 gpio: pca953x: Fix dereference of irq data in shutdown
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mark Walton <[email protected]>
commit c378b3aa015931a46c91d6ccc2fe04d97801d060 upstream.
If a PCA953x gpio was used as an interrupt and then released, the shutdown function was trying to extract the pca953x_chip pointer directly from the irq_data, but in reality was getting the gpio_chip structure.
The net effect was that the subsequent writes to the data structure corrupted data in the gpio_chip structure, which wasn't immediately obvious until attempting to use the GPIO again in the future, at which point the kernel panics.
This fix correctly extracts the pca953x_chip structure via the gpio_chip structure, as is correctly done in the other irq functions.
--- drivers/gpio/gpio-pca953x.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpio/gpio-pca953x.c +2 -1
@@ -587,7 +587,8 @@ static int pca953x_irq_set_type(struct istatic void pca953x_irq_shutdown (struct irq_data *d) { -struct pca953x_chip *chip =irq_data_get_irq_chip_data (d); +struct gpio_chip *gc =irq_data_get_irq_chip_data (d); +struct pca953x_chip *chip =gpiochip_get_data (gc);u8 mask =1 << (d->hwirq %BANK_SZ ); chip->irq_trig_raise[d->hwirq /BANK_SZ ] &= ~mask;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 92/238 Btrfs: setup a nofs context for memory allocation at __btrfs_set_acl
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
commit a0873490660246db587849a9e172f2b7b21fa88a upstream.
We are holding a transaction handle when setting an acl, therefore we can not allocate the xattr value buffer using GFP_KERNEL, as we could deadlock if reclaim is triggered by the allocation, therefore setup a nofs context.
--- fs/btrfs/acl.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
fs/btrfs/acl.c +9 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h> #include <linux/posix_acl.h> #include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/sched/mm.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include "ctree.h"
@@ -72,8 +73,16 @@ static int __btrfs_set_acl(struct btrfs_ }if (acl) { +unsigned int nofs_flag; + size =posix_acl_xattr_size (acl->a_count); +/* +* We're holding a transaction handle, so use a NOFS memory +* allocation context to avoid deadlock if reclaim happens. +*/ + nofs_flag =memalloc_nofs_save (); value =kmalloc (size,GFP_KERNEL ); +memalloc_nofs_restore (nofs_flag);if (!value) { ret = -ENOMEM ; goto out;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 93/238 btrfs: scrub: fix circular locking dependency warning
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Anand Jain <[email protected]>
commit 1cec3f27168d7835ff3d23ab371cd548440131bb upstream.
This fixes a longstanding lockdep warning triggered by fstests/btrfs/011.
Circular locking dependency check reports warning[1], that's because the btrfs_scrub_dev() calls the stack #0 below with, the fs_info::scrub_lock held. The test case leading to this warning:
$ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdb $ mount /dev/sdb /btrfs $ btrfs scrub start -B /btrfs
In fact we have fs_info::scrub_workers_refcnt to track if the init and destroy of the scrub workers are needed. So once we have incremented and decremented the fs_info::scrub_workers_refcnt value in the thread, its ok to drop the scrub_lock, and then actually do the btrfs_destroy_workqueue() part. So this patch drops the scrub_lock before calling btrfs_destroy_workqueue().
[359.258534] ======================================================
[359.260305] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[359.261938] 5.0.0-rc6-default #461 Not tainted
[359.263135] ------------------------------------------------------
[359.264672] btrfs/20975 is trying to acquire lock:
[359.265927] 00000000d4d32bea ((wq_completion)"%s-%s""btrfs", name){+.+.}, at: flush_workqueue+0x87/0x540
[359.268416]
[359.268416] but task is already holding lock:
[359.270061] 0000000053ea26a6 (&fs_info->scrub_lock){+.+.}, at: btrfs_scrub_dev+0x322/0x590 [btrfs]
[359.272418]
[359.272418] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[359.272418]
[359.274692]
[359.274692] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[359.276671]
[359.276671] -> #3 (&fs_info->scrub_lock){+.+.}:
[359.278187] __mutex_lock+0x86/0x9c0
[359.279086] btrfs_scrub_pause+0x31/0x100 [btrfs]
[359.280421] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x1e4/0x9e0 [btrfs]
[359.281931] close_ctree+0x30b/0x350 [btrfs]
[359.283208] generic_shutdown_super+0x64/0x100
[359.284516] kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30
[359.285658] btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0xa0 [btrfs]
[359.286964] deactivate_locked_super+0x29/0x60
[359.288242] cleanup_mnt+0x3b/0x70
[359.289310] task_work_run+0x98/0xc0
[359.290428] exit_to_usermode_loop+0x83/0x90
[359.291445] do_syscall_64+0x15b/0x180
[359.292598] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[359.294011]
[359.294011] -> #2 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}:
[359.295432] __sb_start_write+0x113/0x1d0
[359.296394] start_transaction+0x369/0x500 [btrfs]
[359.297471] btrfs_finish_ordered_io+0x2aa/0x7c0 [btrfs]
[359.298629] normal_work_helper+0xcd/0x530 [btrfs]
[359.299698] process_one_work+0x246/0x610
[359.300898] worker_thread+0x3c/0x390
[359.302020] kthread+0x116/0x130
[359.303053] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30
[359.304152]
[359.304152] -> #1 ((work_completion)(&work->normal_work)){+.+.}:
[359.306100] process_one_work+0x21f/0x610
[359.307302] worker_thread+0x3c/0x390
[359.308465] kthread+0x116/0x130
[359.309357] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30
[359.310229]
[359.310229] -> #0 ((wq_completion)"%s-%s""btrfs", name){+.+.}:
[359.311812] lock_acquire+0x90/0x180
[359.312929] flush_workqueue+0xaa/0x540
[359.313845] drain_workqueue+0xa1/0x180
[359.314761] destroy_workqueue+0x17/0x240
[359.315754] btrfs_destroy_workqueue+0x57/0x200 [btrfs]
[359.317245] scrub_workers_put+0x2c/0x60 [btrfs]
[359.318585] btrfs_scrub_dev+0x336/0x590 [btrfs]
[359.319944] btrfs_dev_replace_by_ioctl.cold.19+0x179/0x1bb [btrfs]
[359.321622] btrfs_ioctl+0x28a4/0x2e40 [btrfs]
[359.322908] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa2/0x6d0
[359.324021] ksys_ioctl+0x3a/0x70
[359.325066] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
[359.326236] do_syscall_64+0x54/0x180
[359.327379] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[359.328772]
[359.328772] other info that might help us debug this:
[359.328772]
[359.330990] Chain exists of:
[359.330990] (wq_completion)"%s-%s""btrfs", name --> sb_internal#2 --> &fs_info->scrub_lock
[359.330990]
[359.334376] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[359.334376]
[359.336020] CPU0 CPU1
[359.337070] ---- ----
[359.337821] lock(&fs_info->scrub_lock);
[359.338506] lock(sb_internal#2);
[359.339506] lock(&fs_info->scrub_lock);
[359.341461] lock((wq_completion)"%s-%s""btrfs", name);
[359.342437]
[359.342437] *** DEADLOCK ***
[359.342437]
[359.343745] 1 lock held by btrfs/20975:
[359.344788] #0: 0000000053ea26a6 (&fs_info->scrub_lock){+.+.}, at: btrfs_scrub_dev+0x322/0x590 [btrfs]
[359.346778]
[359.346778] stack backtrace:
[359.347897] CPU: 0 PID: 20975 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.0.0-rc6-default #461
[359.348983] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.2-0-gf9626cc-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
[359.350501] Call Trace:
[359.350931] dump_stack+0x67/0x90
[359.351676] print_circular_bug.isra.37.cold.56+0x15c/0x195
[359.353569] check_prev_add.constprop.44+0x4f9/0x750
[359.354849] ? check_prev_add.constprop.44+0x286/0x750
[359.356505] __lock_acquire+0xb84/0xf10
[359.357505] lock_acquire+0x90/0x180
[359.358271] ? flush_workqueue+0x87/0x540
[359.359098] flush_workqueue+0xaa/0x540
[359.359912] ? flush_workqueue+0x87/0x540
[359.360740] ? drain_workqueue+0x1e/0x180
[359.361565] ? drain_workqueue+0xa1/0x180
[359.362391] drain_workqueue+0xa1/0x180
[359.363193] destroy_workqueue+0x17/0x240
[359.364539] btrfs_destroy_workqueue+0x57/0x200 [btrfs]
[359.365673] scrub_workers_put+0x2c/0x60 [btrfs]
[359.366618] btrfs_scrub_dev+0x336/0x590 [btrfs]
[359.367594] ? start_transaction+0xa1/0x500 [btrfs]
[359.368679] btrfs_dev_replace_by_ioctl.cold.19+0x179/0x1bb [btrfs]
[359.369545] btrfs_ioctl+0x28a4/0x2e40 [btrfs]
[359.370186] ? __lock_acquire+0x263/0xf10
[359.370777] ? kvm_clock_read+0x14/0x30
[359.371392] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x5/0x10
[359.372248] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
[359.372786] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xc0
[359.373662] ? do_vfs_ioctl+0xa2/0x6d0
[359.374552] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa2/0x6d0
[359.375378] ? do_sigaction+0xff/0x250
[359.376233] ksys_ioctl+0x3a/0x70
[359.376954] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
[359.377772] do_syscall_64+0x54/0x180
[359.378841] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[359.380422] RIP: 0033:0x7f5429296a97Backporting to older kernels: scrub_nocow_workers must be freed the same way as the others.
--- fs/btrfs/scrub.c | 22 +++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/scrub.c +11 -11
@@ -3770,16 +3770,6 @@ fail_scrub_workers:return -ENOMEM ; } -static noinline_for_stack void scrub_workers_put(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) -{ -if (--fs_info->scrub_workers_refcnt ==0 ) { -btrfs_destroy_workqueue (fs_info->scrub_workers); -btrfs_destroy_workqueue (fs_info->scrub_wr_completion_workers); -btrfs_destroy_workqueue (fs_info->scrub_parity_workers); - } -WARN_ON (fs_info->scrub_workers_refcnt <0 ); -} -int btrfs_scrub_dev (struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,u64 devid,u64 start,u64 end,struct btrfs_scrub_progress *progress,int readonly,int is_dev_replace)
@@ -3788,6 +3778,9 @@ int btrfs_scrub_dev(struct btrfs_fs_infoint ret;struct btrfs_device *dev;unsigned int nofs_flag; +struct btrfs_workqueue *scrub_workers =NULL ; +struct btrfs_workqueue *scrub_wr_comp =NULL ; +struct btrfs_workqueue *scrub_parity =NULL ;if (btrfs_fs_closing (fs_info))return -EINVAL ;
@@ -3927,9 +3920,16 @@ int btrfs_scrub_dev(struct btrfs_fs_infomutex_lock (&fs_info->scrub_lock); dev->scrub_ctx =NULL ; -scrub_workers_put (fs_info); +if (--fs_info->scrub_workers_refcnt ==0 ) { + scrub_workers = fs_info->scrub_workers; + scrub_wr_comp = fs_info->scrub_wr_completion_workers; + scrub_parity = fs_info->scrub_parity_workers; + }mutex_unlock (&fs_info->scrub_lock); +btrfs_destroy_workqueue (scrub_workers); +btrfs_destroy_workqueue (scrub_wr_comp); +btrfs_destroy_workqueue (scrub_parity);scrub_put_ctx (sctx);return ret;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 95/238 btrfs: ensure that a DUP or RAID1 block group has exactly two stripes
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
commit 349ae63f40638a28c6fce52e8447c2d14b84cc0c upstream.
We recently had a customer issue with a corrupted filesystem. When trying to mount this image btrfs panicked with a division by zero in calc_stripe_length().
The corrupt chunk had a 'num_stripes' value of 1. calc_stripe_length() takes this value and divides it by the number of copies the RAID profile is expected to have to calculate the amount of data stripes. As a DUP profile is expected to have 2 copies this division resulted in 1/2 = 0. Later then the 'data_stripes' variable is used as a divisor in the stripe length calculation which results in a division by 0 and thus a kernel panic.
When encountering a filesystem with a DUP block group and a 'num_stripes' value unequal to 2, refuse mounting as the image is corrupted and will lead to unexpected behaviour.
Code inspection showed a RAID1 block group has the same issues.
--- fs/btrfs/volumes.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/volumes.c +2 -2
@@ -6782,10 +6782,10 @@ static int btrfs_check_chunk_valid(struc }if ((type &BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID10 && sub_stripes !=2 ) || - (type &BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID1 && num_stripes <1 ) || + (type &BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID1 && num_stripes !=2 ) || (type &BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID5 && num_stripes <2 ) || (type &BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID6 && num_stripes <3 ) || - (type &BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_DUP && num_stripes >2 ) || + (type &BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_DUP && num_stripes !=2 ) || ((type &BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_PROFILE_MASK ) ==0 && num_stripes !=1 )) { btrfs_err(fs_info,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 94/238 btrfs: drop the lock on error in btrfs_dev_replace_cancel
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
commit 669e859b5ea7c6f4fce0149d3907c64e550c294b upstream.
We should drop the lock on this error path. This has been found by a static tool.
The lock needs to be released, it's there to protect access to the dev_replace members and is not supposed to be left locked. The value of state that's being switched would need to be artifically changed to an invalid value so the default: branch is taken.
--- fs/btrfs/dev-replace.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/btrfs/dev-replace.c +1 -0
@@ -862,6 +862,7 @@ int btrfs_dev_replace_cancel(struct btrfbtrfs_destroy_dev_replace_tgtdev (tgt_device);break ;default : +up_write (&dev_replace->rwsem); result = -EINVAL ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 96/238 btrfs: init csum_list before possible free
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Robertson <[email protected]>
commit e49be14b8d80e23bb7c53d78c21717a474ade76b upstream.
The scrub_ctx csum_list member must be initialized before scrub_free_ctx is called. If the csum_list is not initialized beforehand, the list_empty call in scrub_free_csums will result in a null deref if the allocation fails in the for loop.
--- fs/btrfs/scrub.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/btrfs/scrub.c +1 -1
@@ -584,6 +584,7 @@ static noinline_for_stack struct scrub_c sctx->pages_per_rd_bio =SCRUB_PAGES_PER_RD_BIO ; sctx->curr =-1 ; sctx->fs_info = fs_info; +INIT_LIST_HEAD (&sctx->csum_list);for (i =0 ; i <SCRUB_BIOS_PER_SCTX ; ++i) {struct scrub_bio *sbio;
@@ -608,7 +609,6 @@ static noinline_for_stack struct scrub_catomic_set (&sctx->workers_pending,0 );atomic_set (&sctx->cancel_req,0 ); sctx->csum_size =btrfs_super_csum_size (fs_info->super_copy); -INIT_LIST_HEAD (&sctx->csum_list);spin_lock_init (&sctx->list_lock);spin_lock_init (&sctx->stat_lock);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 97/238 Btrfs: fix corruption reading shared and compressed extents after hole punching
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
commit 8e928218780e2f1cf2f5891c7575e8f0b284fcce upstream.
In the past we had data corruption when reading compressed extents that are shared within the same file and they are consecutive, this got fixed by commit 005efedf2c7d0 ("Btrfs: fix read corruption of compressed and shared extents") and by commit 808f80b46790f ("Btrfs: update fix for read corruption of compressed and shared extents"). However there was a case that was missing in those fixes, which is when the shared and compressed extents are referenced with a non-zero offset. The following shell script creates a reproducer for this issue:
#!/bin/bash
mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdc &> /dev/null
mount -o compress /dev/sdc /mnt/sdc
# Create a file with 3 consecutive compressed extents, each has an
# uncompressed size of 128Kb and a compressed size of 4Kb.
for ((i = 1; i <= 3; i++)); do
head -c 4096 /dev/zero
for ((j = 1; j <= 31; j++)); do
head -c 4096 /dev/zero | tr '\0' "\377"
done
done > /mnt/sdc/foobar
syncecho "Digest after file creation: $(md5sum /mnt/sdc/foobar)"
# Clone the first extent into offsets 128K and 256K. xfs_io -c "reflink /mnt/sdc/foobar 0 128K 128K" /mnt/sdc/foobar xfs_io -c "reflink /mnt/sdc/foobar 0 256K 128K" /mnt/sdc/foobar sync
echo "Digest after cloning: $(md5sum /mnt/sdc/foobar)"
# Punch holes into the regions that are already full of zeroes. xfs_io -c "fpunch 0 4K" /mnt/sdc/foobar
xfs_io -c "fpunch 128K 4K" /mnt/sdc/foobar
xfs_io -c "fpunch 256K 4K" /mnt/sdc/foobar
sync
echo "Digest after hole punching: $(md5sum /mnt/sdc/foobar)" echo "Dropping page cache..." sysctl -q vm.drop_caches=1 echo "Digest after hole punching: $(md5sum /mnt/sdc/foobar)"
umount /dev/sdc
When running the script we get the following output:
Digest after file creation: 5a0888d80d7ab1fd31c229f83a3bbcc8 /mnt/sdc/foobar
linked 131072/131072 bytes at offset 131072
128 KiB, 1 ops; 0.0033 sec (36.960 MiB/sec and 295.6830 ops/sec) linked 131072/131072 bytes at offset 262144
128 KiB, 1 ops; 0.0015 sec (78.567 MiB/sec and 628.5355 ops/sec)
Digest after cloning: 5a0888d80d7ab1fd31c229f83a3bbcc8 /mnt/sdc/foobar Digest after hole punching: 5a0888d80d7ab1fd31c229f83a3bbcc8 /mnt/sdc/foobar
Dropping page cache...
Digest after hole punching: fba694ae8664ed0c2e9ff8937e7f1484 /mnt/sdc/foobar
This happens because after reading all the pages of the extent in the range from 128K to 256K for example, we read the hole at offset 256K and then when reading the page at offset 260K we don't submit the existing bio, which is responsible for filling all the page in the range 128K to 256K only, therefore adding the pages from range 260K to 384K to the existing bio and submitting it after iterating over the entire range. Once the bio completes, the uncompressed data fills only the pages in the range 128K to 256K because there's no more data read from disk, leaving the pages in the range 260K to 384K unfilled. It is just a slightly different variant of what was solved by commit 005efedf2c7d0 ("Btrfs: fix read corruption of compressed and shared extents").
Fix this by forcing a bio submit, during readpages(), whenever we find a compressed extent map for a page that is different from the extent map for the previous page or has a different starting offset (in case it's the same compressed extent), instead of the extent map's original start offset.
A test case for fstests follows soon.
--- fs/btrfs/extent_io.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/extent_io.c +2 -2
@@ -2985,11 +2985,11 @@ static int __do_readpage(struct extent_i*/ if (test_bit (EXTENT_FLAG_COMPRESSED , &em->flags) && prev_em_start && *prev_em_start != (u64)-1 && - *prev_em_start != em->orig_start) + *prev_em_start != em->start) force_bio_submit = true;if (prev_em_start) - *prev_em_start = em->orig_start; + *prev_em_start = em->start;free_extent_map (em); em =NULL ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 123/238 ext4: fix crash during online resizing
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
commit f96c3ac8dfc24b4e38fc4c2eba5fea2107b929d1 upstream.
When computing maximum size of filesystem possible with given number of group descriptor blocks, we forget to include s_first_data_block into the number of blocks. Thus for filesystems with non-zero s_first_data_block it can happen that computed maximum filesystem size is actually lower than current filesystem size which confuses the code and eventually leads to a BUG_ON in ext4_alloc_group_tables() hitting on flex_gd->count == 0. The problem can be reproduced like:
truncate -s 100g /tmp/image
mkfs.ext4 -b 1024 -E resize=262144 /tmp/image 32768 mount -t ext4 -o loop /tmp/image /mnt resize2fs /dev/loop0 262145
resize2fs /dev/loop0 300000
Fix the problem by properly including s_first_data_block into the computed number of filesystem blocks.
--- fs/ext4/resize.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/resize.c +2 -1
@@ -1960,7 +1960,8 @@ retry:le16_to_cpu (es->s_reserved_gdt_blocks); n_group = n_desc_blocks *EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK (sb); n_blocks_count = (ext4_fsblk_t )n_group * -EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP (sb); +EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP (sb) + +le32_to_cpu (es->s_first_data_block); n_group--;/* set to last group number */ }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 132/238 PCI: pci-bridge-emul: Create per-bridge copy of register behavior
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Petazzoni <[email protected]>
commit 59f81c35e0df840f7112cb296dde48df84a67c79 upstream.
The behavior of the different registers of the PCI-to-PCI bridge is currently encoded in two global arrays, shared by all instances of PCI-to-PCI bridge emulation.
However, we will need to tweak the behavior on a per-bridge basis, to accommodate for different capabilities of the platforms where this code is used. In preparation for this, create a per-bridge copy of the register behavior arrays, so that they can later be tweaked on a per-bridge basis.
--- drivers/pci/pci-bridge-emul.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- drivers/pci/pci-bridge-emul.h | 8 +++- 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
drivers/pci/pci-bridge-emul.c +53 -27
@@ -24,29 +24,6 @@#define PCI_CAP_PCIE_START PCI_BRIDGE_CONF_END#define PCI_CAP_PCIE_END (PCI_CAP_PCIE_START + PCI_EXP_SLTSTA2 + 2) -/* -* Initialize a pci_bridge_emul structure to represent a fake PCI -* bridge configuration space. The caller needs to have initialized -* the PCI configuration space with whatever values make sense -* (typically at least vendor, device, revision), the ->ops pointer, -* and optionally ->data and ->has_pcie. -*/ -void pci_bridge_emul_init (struct pci_bridge_emul *bridge) -{ - bridge->conf.class_revision |=PCI_CLASS_BRIDGE_PCI <<16 ; - bridge->conf.header_type =PCI_HEADER_TYPE_BRIDGE ; - bridge->conf.cache_line_size =0x10 ; - bridge->conf.status =PCI_STATUS_CAP_LIST ; - -if (bridge->has_pcie) { - bridge->conf.capabilities_pointer =PCI_CAP_PCIE_START ; - bridge->pcie_conf.cap_id =PCI_CAP_ID_EXP ; -/* Set PCIe v2, root port, slot support */ - bridge->pcie_conf.cap =PCI_EXP_TYPE_ROOT_PORT <<4 |2 | -PCI_EXP_FLAGS_SLOT ; - } -} -struct pci_bridge_reg_behavior {/* Read-only bits */ u32 ro;
@@ -284,6 +261,55 @@ const static struct pci_bridge_reg_behav };/* +* Initialize a pci_bridge_emul structure to represent a fake PCI +* bridge configuration space. The caller needs to have initialized +* the PCI configuration space with whatever values make sense +* (typically at least vendor, device, revision), the ->ops pointer, +* and optionally ->data and ->has_pcie. +*/ +int pci_bridge_emul_init (struct pci_bridge_emul *bridge) +{ + bridge->conf.class_revision |=PCI_CLASS_BRIDGE_PCI <<16 ; + bridge->conf.header_type =PCI_HEADER_TYPE_BRIDGE ; + bridge->conf.cache_line_size =0x10 ; + bridge->conf.status =PCI_STATUS_CAP_LIST ; + bridge->pci_regs_behavior =kmemdup (pci_regs_behavior, +sizeof (pci_regs_behavior), +GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!bridge->pci_regs_behavior) +return -ENOMEM ; + +if (bridge->has_pcie) { + bridge->conf.capabilities_pointer =PCI_CAP_PCIE_START ; + bridge->pcie_conf.cap_id =PCI_CAP_ID_EXP ; +/* Set PCIe v2, root port, slot support */ + bridge->pcie_conf.cap =PCI_EXP_TYPE_ROOT_PORT <<4 |2 | +PCI_EXP_FLAGS_SLOT ; + bridge->pcie_cap_regs_behavior = +kmemdup (pcie_cap_regs_behavior, +sizeof (pcie_cap_regs_behavior), +GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!bridge->pcie_cap_regs_behavior) { +kfree (bridge->pci_regs_behavior); +return -ENOMEM ; + } + } + +return 0 ; +} + +/* +* Cleanup a pci_bridge_emul structure that was previously initilized +* using pci_bridge_emul_init(). +*/ +void pci_bridge_emul_cleanup (struct pci_bridge_emul *bridge) +{ +if (bridge->has_pcie) +kfree (bridge->pcie_cap_regs_behavior); +kfree (bridge->pci_regs_behavior); +} + +/* * Should be called by the PCI controller driver when reading the PCI * configuration space of the fake bridge. It will call back the * ->ops->read_base or ->ops->read_pcie operations.
@@ -312,11 +338,11 @@ int pci_bridge_emul_conf_read(struct pci reg -=PCI_CAP_PCIE_START ; read_op = bridge->ops->read_pcie; cfgspace = (u32 *) &bridge->pcie_conf; - behavior = pcie_cap_regs_behavior; + behavior = bridge->pcie_cap_regs_behavior; }else { read_op = bridge->ops->read_base; cfgspace = (u32 *) &bridge->conf; - behavior = pci_regs_behavior; + behavior = bridge->pci_regs_behavior; }if (read_op)
@@ -383,11 +409,11 @@ int pci_bridge_emul_conf_write(struct pc reg -=PCI_CAP_PCIE_START ; write_op = bridge->ops->write_pcie; cfgspace = (u32 *) &bridge->pcie_conf; - behavior = pcie_cap_regs_behavior; + behavior = bridge->pcie_cap_regs_behavior; }else { write_op = bridge->ops->write_base; cfgspace = (u32 *) &bridge->conf; - behavior = pci_regs_behavior; + behavior = bridge->pci_regs_behavior; }/* Keep all bits, except the RW bits */
drivers/pci/pci-bridge-emul.h +7 -1
@@ -107,15 +107,21 @@ struct pci_bridge_emul_ops { u32 old, u32 new, u32 mask); }; +struct pci_bridge_reg_behavior ; +struct pci_bridge_emul {struct pci_bridge_emul_conf conf;struct pci_bridge_emul_pcie_conf pcie_conf;struct pci_bridge_emul_ops *ops; +struct pci_bridge_reg_behavior *pci_regs_behavior; +struct pci_bridge_reg_behavior *pcie_cap_regs_behavior;void *data;bool has_pcie; }; -void pci_bridge_emul_init (struct pci_bridge_emul *bridge); +int pci_bridge_emul_init (struct pci_bridge_emul *bridge); +void pci_bridge_emul_cleanup (struct pci_bridge_emul *bridge); +int pci_bridge_emul_conf_read (struct pci_bridge_emul *bridge,int where,int size,u32 *value); int pci_bridge_emul_conf_write(struct pci_bridge_emul *bridge, int where,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 133/238 PCI: pci-bridge-emul: Extend pci_bridge_emul_init() with flags
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Petazzoni <[email protected]>
commit 33776d059630e5045ea9ccf756c74de8f9cc86de upstream.
Depending on the capabilities of the PCI controller/platform, the PCI-to-PCI bridge emulation behavior might need to be different. For example, on platforms that use the pci-mvebu code, we currently don't support prefetchable memory BARs, so the corresponding fields in the PCI-to-PCI bridge configuration space should be read-only.
To implement this, extend pci_bridge_emul_init() to take a "flags" argument, with currently one flag supported:
PCI_BRIDGE_EMUL_NO_PREFETCHABLE_BAR
that will make the prefetchable memory base and limit registers read-only.
The pci-mvebu and pci-aardvark drivers are updated accordingly.
--- drivers/pci/controller/pci-aardvark.c | 2 +- drivers/pci/controller/pci-mvebu.c | 2 +- drivers/pci/pci-bridge-emul.c | 8 +++++++- drivers/pci/pci-bridge-emul.h | 7 ++++++- 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/pci/controller/pci-aardvark.c +1 -1
@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ static void advk_sw_pci_bridge_init(stru bridge->data = pcie; bridge->ops = &advk_pci_bridge_emul_ops; -pci_bridge_emul_init (bridge); +pci_bridge_emul_init (bridge,0 ); }
drivers/pci/controller/pci-mvebu.c +1 -1
@@ -583,7 +583,7 @@ static void mvebu_pci_bridge_emul_init(s bridge->data = port; bridge->ops = &mvebu_pci_bridge_emul_ops; -pci_bridge_emul_init (bridge); +pci_bridge_emul_init (bridge,PCI_BRIDGE_EMUL_NO_PREFETCHABLE_BAR ); }static inline struct mvebu_pcie *sys_to_pcie (struct pci_sys_data *sys)
drivers/pci/pci-bridge-emul.c +7 -1
@@ -267,7 +267,8 @@ const static struct pci_bridge_reg_behav* (typically at least vendor, device, revision), the ->ops pointer, * and optionally ->data and ->has_pcie. */ -int pci_bridge_emul_init (struct pci_bridge_emul *bridge) +int pci_bridge_emul_init (struct pci_bridge_emul *bridge, +unsigned int flags) { bridge->conf.class_revision |=PCI_CLASS_BRIDGE_PCI <<16 ; bridge->conf.header_type =PCI_HEADER_TYPE_BRIDGE ;
@@ -295,6 +296,11 @@ int pci_bridge_emul_init(struct pci_brid } } +if (flags &PCI_BRIDGE_EMUL_NO_PREFETCHABLE_BAR ) { + bridge->pci_regs_behavior[PCI_PREF_MEMORY_BASE /4 ].ro = ~0 ; + bridge->pci_regs_behavior[PCI_PREF_MEMORY_BASE /4 ].rw =0 ; + } +return 0 ; }
drivers/pci/pci-bridge-emul.h +6 -1
@@ -119,7 +119,12 @@ struct pci_bridge_emul {bool has_pcie; }; -int pci_bridge_emul_init (struct pci_bridge_emul *bridge); +enum { +PCI_BRIDGE_EMUL_NO_PREFETCHABLE_BAR =BIT (0 ), +}; + +int pci_bridge_emul_init (struct pci_bridge_emul *bridge, +unsigned int flags);void pci_bridge_emul_cleanup (struct pci_bridge_emul *bridge); int pci_bridge_emul_conf_read(struct pci_bridge_emul *bridge, int where,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 134/238 IB/hfi1: Close race condition on user context disable and close
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael J. Ruhl <[email protected]>
commit bc5add09764c123f58942a37c8335247e683d234 upstream.
When disabling and removing a receive context, it is possible for an asynchronous event (i.e IRQ) to occur. Because of this, there is a race between cleaning up the context, and the context being used by the asynchronous event.
cpu 0 (context cleanup)
rc->ref_count-- (ref_count == 0)
hfi1_rcd_free()
cpu 1 (IRQ (with rcd index))
rcd_get_by_index()
lock
ref_count+++ <-- reference count race (WARNING)
return rcd
unlockcpu 0
hfi1_free_ctxtdata() <-- incorrect free location lock
remove rcd from array
unlock
free rcd
This race will cause the following WARNING trace:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 175027 at include/linux/kref.h:52 hfi1_rcd_get_by_index+0x84/0xa0 [hfi1] CPU: 0 PID: 175027 Comm: IMB-MPI1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE ------------ 3.10.0-957.el7.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600KP/S2600KP, BIOS SE5C610.86B.11.01.0076.C4.111920150602 11/19/2015 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x19/0x1b __warn+0xd8/0x100 warn_slowpath_null+0x1d/0x20 hfi1_rcd_get_by_index+0x84/0xa0 [hfi1] is_rcv_urgent_int+0x24/0x90 [hfi1] general_interrupt+0x1b6/0x210 [hfi1] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x44/0x1c0 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x32/0x80 handle_irq_event+0x3c/0x60 handle_edge_irq+0x7f/0x150 handle_irq+0xe4/0x1a0 do_IRQ+0x4d/0xf0 common_interrupt+0x162/0x162
The race can also lead to a use after free which could be similar to:
general protection fault: 0000 1 SMP CPU: 71 PID: 177147 Comm: IMB-MPI1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W OE ------------ 3.10.0-957.el7.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600KP/S2600KP, BIOS SE5C610.86B.11.01.0076.C4.111920150602 11/19/2015 task: ffff9962a8098000 ti: ffff99717a508000 task.ti: ffff99717a508000 __kmalloc+0x94/0x230 Call Trace: ? hfi1_user_sdma_process_request+0x9c8/0x1250 [hfi1] hfi1_user_sdma_process_request+0x9c8/0x1250 [hfi1] hfi1_aio_write+0xba/0x110 [hfi1] do_sync_readv_writev+0x7b/0xd0 do_readv_writev+0xce/0x260 ? handle_mm_fault+0x39d/0x9b0 ? pick_next_task_fair+0x5f/0x1b0 ? sched_clock_cpu+0x85/0xc0 ? __schedule+0x13a/0x890 vfs_writev+0x35/0x60 SyS_writev+0x7f/0x110 system_call_fastpath+0x22/0x27
Use the appropriate kref API to verify access.
Reorder context cleanup to ensure context removal before cleanup occurs correctly.
--- drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/hfi.h | 2 +- drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/init.c | 14 +++++++++----- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/hfi.h +1 -1
@@ -1435,7 +1435,7 @@ void hfi1_init_pportdata(struct pci_dev struct hfi1_devdata *dd, u8 hw_pidx, u8 port);void hfi1_free_ctxtdata (struct hfi1_devdata *dd,struct hfi1_ctxtdata *rcd);int hfi1_rcd_put (struct hfi1_ctxtdata *rcd); -void hfi1_rcd_get (struct hfi1_ctxtdata *rcd); +int hfi1_rcd_get (struct hfi1_ctxtdata *rcd);struct hfi1_ctxtdata *hfi1_rcd_get_by_index_safe (struct hfi1_devdata *dd,u16 ctxt);struct hfi1_ctxtdata *hfi1_rcd_get_by_index (struct hfi1_devdata *dd,u16 ctxt);
drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/init.c +9 -5
@@ -215,12 +215,12 @@ static void hfi1_rcd_free(struct kref *kstruct hfi1_ctxtdata *rcd = container_of(kref, struct hfi1_ctxtdata, kref); -hfi1_free_ctxtdata (rcd->dd, rcd); -spin_lock_irqsave (&rcd->dd->uctxt_lock, flags); rcd->dd->rcd[rcd->ctxt] =NULL ;spin_unlock_irqrestore (&rcd->dd->uctxt_lock, flags); +hfi1_free_ctxtdata (rcd->dd, rcd); +kfree (rcd); }
@@ -243,10 +243,13 @@ int hfi1_rcd_put(struct hfi1_ctxtdata *r* @rcd: pointer to an initialized rcd data structure * * Use this to get a reference after the init. +* +* Return : reflect kref_get_unless_zero(), which returns non-zero on +* increment, otherwise 0. */ -void hfi1_rcd_get (struct hfi1_ctxtdata *rcd) +int hfi1_rcd_get (struct hfi1_ctxtdata *rcd) { -kref_get (&rcd->kref); +return kref_get_unless_zero (&rcd->kref); }/**
@@ -326,7 +329,8 @@ struct hfi1_ctxtdata *hfi1_rcd_get_by_inspin_lock_irqsave (&dd->uctxt_lock, flags);if (dd->rcd[ctxt]) { rcd = dd->rcd[ctxt]; -hfi1_rcd_get (rcd); +if (!hfi1_rcd_get (rcd)) + rcd =NULL ; }spin_unlock_irqrestore (&dd->uctxt_lock, flags);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 135/238 IB/rdmavt: Fix loopback send with invalidate ordering
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mike Marciniszyn <[email protected]>
commit 38bbc9f0381550d1d227fc57afa08436e36b32fc upstream.
The IBTA spec notes:
o9-5.2.1: For any HCA which supports SEND with Invalidate, upon receiving an IETH, the Invalidate operation must not take place until after the normal transport header validation checks have been successfully completed.
The rdmavt loopback code does the validation after the invalidate.
Fix by relocating the operation specific logic for all SEND variants until after the validity checks.
--- drivers/infiniband/sw/rdmavt/qp.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/sw/rdmavt/qp.c +16 -10
@@ -2893,18 +2893,8 @@ again: goto send_comp;case IB_WR_SEND_WITH_INV : -if (!rvt_invalidate_rkey (qp, wqe->wr.ex.invalidate_rkey)) { - wc.wc_flags =IB_WC_WITH_INVALIDATE ; - wc.ex.invalidate_rkey = wqe->wr.ex.invalidate_rkey; - } - goto send; -case IB_WR_SEND_WITH_IMM : - wc.wc_flags =IB_WC_WITH_IMM ; - wc.ex.imm_data = wqe->wr.ex.imm_data; -/* FALLTHROUGH */ case IB_WR_SEND : -send: ret =rvt_get_rwqe (qp, false);if (ret <0 ) goto op_err;
@@ -2912,6 +2902,22 @@ send: goto rnr_nak;if (wqe->length > qp->r_len) goto inv_err; +switch (wqe->wr.opcode) { +case IB_WR_SEND_WITH_INV : +if (!rvt_invalidate_rkey (qp, + wqe->wr.ex.invalidate_rkey)) { + wc.wc_flags =IB_WC_WITH_INVALIDATE ; + wc.ex.invalidate_rkey = + wqe->wr.ex.invalidate_rkey; + } +break ; +case IB_WR_SEND_WITH_IMM : + wc.wc_flags =IB_WC_WITH_IMM ; + wc.ex.imm_data = wqe->wr.ex.imm_data; +break ; +default : +break ; + }break ;case IB_WR_RDMA_WRITE_WITH_IMM :
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 136/238 IB/rdmavt: Fix concurrency panics in QP post_send and modify to error
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael J. Ruhl <[email protected]>
commit d757c60eca9b22f4d108929a24401e0fdecda0b1 upstream.
The RC/UC code path can go through a software loopback. In this code path the receive side QP is manipulated.
If two threads are working on the QP receive side (i.e. post_send, and modify_qp to an error state), QP information can be corrupted.
(post_send via loopback)
set r_sge
loop
update r_sge
(modify_qp)
take r_lock
update r_sge <---- r_sge is now incorrect
(post_send)
update r_sge <---- crash, etc.
...This can lead to one of the two following crashes:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: hfi1_copy_sge+0xf1/0x2e0 [hfi1] PGD 8000001fe6a57067 PUD 1fd9e0c067 PMD 0 Call Trace: ruc_loopback+0x49b/0xbc0 [hfi1] hfi1_do_send+0x38e/0x3e0 [hfi1] _hfi1_do_send+0x1e/0x20 [hfi1] process_one_work+0x17f/0x440 worker_thread+0x126/0x3c0 kthread+0xd1/0xe0 ret_from_fork_nospec_begin+0x21/0x21
or:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000048 IP: rvt_clear_mr_refs+0x45/0x370 [rdmavt] PGD 80000006ae5eb067 PUD ef15d0067 PMD 0 Call Trace: rvt_error_qp+0xaa/0x240 [rdmavt] rvt_modify_qp+0x47f/0xaa0 [rdmavt] ib_security_modify_qp+0x8f/0x400 [ib_core] ib_modify_qp_with_udata+0x44/0x70 [ib_core] modify_qp.isra.23+0x1eb/0x2b0 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_modify_qp+0xaa/0xf0 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_write+0x272/0x430 [ib_uverbs] vfs_write+0xc0/0x1f0 SyS_write+0x7f/0xf0 system_call_fastpath+0x1c/0x21
Fix by using the appropriate locking on the receiving QP.
--- drivers/infiniband/sw/rdmavt/qp.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/sw/rdmavt/qp.c +23 -10
@@ -2785,6 +2785,18 @@ again: }EXPORT_SYMBOL (rvt_copy_sge); +static enum ib_wc_status loopback_qp_drop (struct rvt_ibport *rvp, +struct rvt_qp *sqp) +{ + rvp->n_pkt_drops++; +/* +* For RC, the requester would timeout and retry so +* shortcut the timeouts and just signal too many retries. +*/ +return sqp->ibqp.qp_type ==IB_QPT_RC ? +IB_WC_RETRY_EXC_ERR :IB_WC_SUCCESS ; +} +/** * ruc_loopback - handle UC and RC loopback requests * @sqp: the sending QP
@@ -2857,17 +2869,14 @@ again: }spin_unlock_irqrestore (&sqp->s_lock, flags); -if (!qp || !(ib_rvt_state_ops[qp->state] &RVT_PROCESS_RECV_OK ) || +if (!qp) { + send_status =loopback_qp_drop (rvp, sqp); + goto serr_no_r_lock; + } +spin_lock_irqsave (&qp->r_lock, flags); +if (!(ib_rvt_state_ops[qp->state] &RVT_PROCESS_RECV_OK ) || qp->ibqp.qp_type != sqp->ibqp.qp_type) { - rvp->n_pkt_drops++; -/* -* For RC, the requester would timeout and retry so -* shortcut the timeouts and just signal too many retries. -*/ -if (sqp->ibqp.qp_type ==IB_QPT_RC ) - send_status =IB_WC_RETRY_EXC_ERR ; -else - send_status =IB_WC_SUCCESS ; + send_status =loopback_qp_drop (rvp, sqp); goto serr; }
@@ -3047,6 +3056,7 @@ do_write: wqe->wr.send_flags & IB_SEND_SOLICITED); send_comp: +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&qp->r_lock, flags);spin_lock_irqsave (&sqp->s_lock, flags); rvp->n_loop_pkts++; flush_send:
@@ -3073,6 +3083,7 @@ rnr_nak: }if (sqp->s_rnr_retry_cnt <7 ) sqp->s_rnr_retry--; +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&qp->r_lock, flags);spin_lock_irqsave (&sqp->s_lock, flags);if (!(ib_rvt_state_ops[sqp->state] &RVT_PROCESS_RECV_OK )) goto clr_busy;
@@ -3101,6 +3112,8 @@ err:rvt_rc_error (qp, wc.status); serr: +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&qp->r_lock, flags); +serr_no_r_lock:spin_lock_irqsave (&sqp->s_lock, flags);rvt_send_complete (sqp, wqe, send_status);if (sqp->ibqp.qp_type ==IB_QPT_RC ) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 137/238 cxl: Wrap iterations over afu slices inside afu_list_lock
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vaibhav Jain <[email protected]>
commit edeb304f659792fb5bab90d7d6f3408b4c7301fb upstream.
Within cxl module, iteration over array 'adapter->afu' may be racy at few points as it might be simultaneously read during an EEH and its contents being set to NULL while driver is being unloaded or unbound from the adapter. This might result in a NULL pointer to 'struct afu' being de-referenced during an EEH thereby causing a kernel oops.
This patch fixes this by making sure that all access to the array 'adapter->afu' is wrapped within the context of spin-lock 'adapter->afu_list_lock'.
--- drivers/misc/cxl/guest.c | 2 ++ drivers/misc/cxl/pci.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/misc/cxl/guest.c +2 -0
@@ -267,6 +267,7 @@ static int guest_reset(struct cxl *adaptint i, rc;pr_devel ("Adapter reset request\n" ); +spin_lock (&adapter->afu_list_lock);for (i =0 ; i < adapter->slices; i++) {if ((afu = adapter->afu[i])) { pci_error_handlers(afu, CXL_ERROR_DETECTED_EVENT,
@@ -283,6 +284,7 @@ static int guest_reset(struct cxl *adaptpci_error_handlers (afu,CXL_RESUME_EVENT ,0 ); } } +spin_unlock (&adapter->afu_list_lock);return rc; }
drivers/misc/cxl/pci.c +30 -9
@@ -1805,7 +1805,7 @@ static pci_ers_result_t cxl_vphb_error_d/* There should only be one entry, but go through the list * anyway */ -if (afu->phb ==NULL ) +if (afu ==NULL || afu->phb ==NULL )return result;list_for_each_entry (afu_dev, &afu->phb->bus->devices, bus_list) {
@@ -1832,7 +1832,8 @@ static pci_ers_result_t cxl_pci_error_de {struct cxl *adapter =pci_get_drvdata (pdev);struct cxl_afu *afu; -pci_ers_result_t result =PCI_ERS_RESULT_NEED_RESET , afu_result; +pci_ers_result_t result =PCI_ERS_RESULT_NEED_RESET ; +pci_ers_result_t afu_result =PCI_ERS_RESULT_NEED_RESET ;int i;/* At this point, we could still have an interrupt pending.
@@ -1843,6 +1844,7 @@ static pci_ers_result_t cxl_pci_error_de/* If we're permanently dead, give up. */ if (state == pci_channel_io_perm_failure) { +spin_lock (&adapter->afu_list_lock);for (i =0 ; i < adapter->slices; i++) { afu = adapter->afu[i];/*
@@ -1851,6 +1853,7 @@ static pci_ers_result_t cxl_pci_error_de*/ cxl_vphb_error_detected (afu, state); } +spin_unlock (&adapter->afu_list_lock);return PCI_ERS_RESULT_DISCONNECT ; }
@@ -1932,11 +1935,17 @@ static pci_ers_result_t cxl_pci_error_de* * In slot_reset, free the old resources and allocate new ones. * * In resume, clear the flag to allow things to start. */ + +/* Make sure no one else changes the afu list */ +spin_lock (&adapter->afu_list_lock); +for (i =0 ; i < adapter->slices; i++) { afu = adapter->afu[i]; - afu_result =cxl_vphb_error_detected (afu, state); +if (afu ==NULL ) +continue ; + afu_result =cxl_vphb_error_detected (afu, state);cxl_context_detach_all (afu); cxl_ops->afu_deactivate_mode (afu, afu->current_mode);pci_deconfigure_afu (afu);
@@ -1948,6 +1957,7 @@ static pci_ers_result_t cxl_pci_error_de (result == PCI_ERS_RESULT_NEED_RESET)) result =PCI_ERS_RESULT_NONE ; } +spin_unlock (&adapter->afu_list_lock);/* should take the context lock here */ if (cxl_adapter_context_lock (adapter) !=0 )
@@ -1980,14 +1990,18 @@ static pci_ers_result_t cxl_pci_slot_res*/ cxl_adapter_context_unlock (adapter); +spin_lock (&adapter->afu_list_lock);for (i =0 ; i < adapter->slices; i++) { afu = adapter->afu[i]; +if (afu ==NULL ) +continue ; +if (pci_configure_afu (afu, adapter, pdev)) - goto err; + goto err_unlock;if (cxl_afu_select_best_mode (afu)) - goto err; + goto err_unlock;if (afu->phb ==NULL )continue ;
@@ -1999,16 +2013,16 @@ static pci_ers_result_t cxl_pci_slot_res ctx =cxl_get_context (afu_dev);if (ctx &&cxl_release_context (ctx)) - goto err; + goto err_unlock; ctx =cxl_dev_context_init (afu_dev);if (IS_ERR (ctx)) - goto err; + goto err_unlock; afu_dev->dev.archdata.cxl_ctx = ctx;if (cxl_ops->afu_check_and_enable (afu)) - goto err; + goto err_unlock; afu_dev->error_state = pci_channel_io_normal;
@@ -2029,8 +2043,13 @@ static pci_ers_result_t cxl_pci_slot_res result =PCI_ERS_RESULT_DISCONNECT ; } } + +spin_unlock (&adapter->afu_list_lock);return result; +err_unlock: +spin_unlock (&adapter->afu_list_lock); + err:/* All the bits that happen in both error_detected and cxl_remove * should be idempotent, so we don't need to worry about leaving a mix
@@ -2051,10 +2070,11 @@ static void cxl_pci_resume(struct pci_de* This is not the place to be checking if everything came back up * properly, because there's no return value: do that in slot_reset. */ +spin_lock (&adapter->afu_list_lock);for (i =0 ; i < adapter->slices; i++) { afu = adapter->afu[i]; -if (afu->phb ==NULL ) +if (afu ==NULL || afu->phb ==NULL )continue ;list_for_each_entry (afu_dev, &afu->phb->bus->devices, bus_list) {
@@ -2063,6 +2083,7 @@ static void cxl_pci_resume(struct pci_de afu_dev->driver->err_handler->resume (afu_dev); } } +spin_unlock (&adapter->afu_list_lock); }static const struct pci_error_handlers cxl_err_handler = {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 139/238 clk: uniphier: Fix update register for CPU-gear
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kunihiko Hayashi <[email protected]>
commit 521282237b9d78b9bff423ec818becd4c95841c2 upstream.
Need to set the update bit in UNIPHIER_CLK_CPUGEAR_UPD to update the CPU-gear value.
--- drivers/clk/uniphier/clk-uniphier-cpugear.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/clk/uniphier/clk-uniphier-cpugear.c +1 -1
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static int uniphier_clk_cpugear_set_parereturn ret; ret =regmap_write_bits (gear->regmap, - gear->regbase +UNIPHIER_CLK_CPUGEAR_SET , + gear->regbase +UNIPHIER_CLK_CPUGEAR_UPD ,UNIPHIER_CLK_CPUGEAR_UPD_BIT ,UNIPHIER_CLK_CPUGEAR_UPD_BIT );if (ret)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 140/238 clk: clk-twl6040: Fix imprecise external abort for pdmclk
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]>
commit 5ae51d67aec95f6f9386aa8dd5db424964895575 upstream.
I noticed that modprobe clk-twl6040 can fail after a cold boot with:
abe_cm:clk:0010:0: failed to enable
...
Unhandled fault: imprecise external abort (0x1406) at 0xbe896b20
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 29 at drivers/clk/clk.c:828 clk_core_disable_lock+0x18/0x24
...
(clk_core_disable_lock) from [<c0123534>] (_disable_clocks+0x18/0x90) (_disable_clocks) from [<c0124040>] (_idle+0x17c/0x244) (_idle) from [<c0125ad4>] (omap_hwmod_idle+0x24/0x44) (omap_hwmod_idle) from [<c053a038>] (sysc_runtime_suspend+0x48/0x108) (sysc_runtime_suspend) from [<c06084c4>] (__rpm_callback+0x144/0x1d8) (__rpm_callback) from [<c0608578>] (rpm_callback+0x20/0x80) (rpm_callback) from [<c0607034>] (rpm_suspend+0x120/0x694) (rpm_suspend) from [<c0607a78>] (__pm_runtime_idle+0x60/0x84) (__pm_runtime_idle) from [<c053aaf0>] (sysc_probe+0x874/0xf2c) (sysc_probe) from [<c05fecd4>] (platform_drv_probe+0x48/0x98)
After searching around for a similar issue, I came across an earlier fix that never got merged upstream in the Android tree for glass-omap-xrr02. There is patch "MFD: twl6040-codec: Implement PDMCLK cold temp errata" by Misael Lopez Cruz <[email protected]>.
Based on my observations, this fix is also needed when cold booting devices, and not just for deeper idle modes. Since we now have a clock driver for pdmclk, let's fix the issue in twl6040_pdmclk_prepare().
--- drivers/clk/clk-twl6040.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/clk/clk-twl6040.c +51 -2
@@ -41,6 +41,43 @@ static int twl6040_pdmclk_is_prepared(streturn pdmclk->enabled; } +static int twl6040_pdmclk_reset_one_clock (struct twl6040_pdmclk *pdmclk, +unsigned int reg) +{ +const u8 reset_mask =TWL6040_HPLLRST ;/* Same for HPPLL and LPPLL */ +int ret; + + ret =twl6040_set_bits (pdmclk->twl6040, reg, reset_mask); +if (ret <0 ) +return ret; + + ret =twl6040_clear_bits (pdmclk->twl6040, reg, reset_mask); +if (ret <0 ) +return ret; + +return 0 ; +} + +/* +* TWL6040A2 Phoenix Audio IC erratum #6: "PDM Clock Generation Issue At +* Cold Temperature". This affects cold boot and deeper idle states it +* seems. The workaround consists of resetting HPPLL and LPPLL. +*/ +static int twl6040_pdmclk_quirk_reset_clocks (struct twl6040_pdmclk *pdmclk) +{ +int ret; + + ret =twl6040_pdmclk_reset_one_clock (pdmclk,TWL6040_REG_HPPLLCTL ); +if (ret) +return ret; + + ret =twl6040_pdmclk_reset_one_clock (pdmclk,TWL6040_REG_LPPLLCTL ); +if (ret) +return ret; + +return 0 ; +} +static int twl6040_pdmclk_prepare (struct clk_hw *hw) { struct twl6040_pdmclk *pdmclk = container_of(hw, struct twl6040_pdmclk,
@@ -48,8 +85,20 @@ static int twl6040_pdmclk_prepare(structint ret; ret =twl6040_power (pdmclk->twl6040,1 ); -if (!ret) - pdmclk->enabled =1 ; +if (ret) +return ret; + + ret =twl6040_pdmclk_quirk_reset_clocks (pdmclk); +if (ret) + goto out_err; + + pdmclk->enabled =1 ; + +return 0 ; + +out_err: +dev_err (pdmclk->dev,"%s: error %i\n" , __func__, ret); +twl6040_power (pdmclk->twl6040,0 );return ret; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 141/238 clk: samsung: exynos5: Fix possible NULL pointer exception on platform_device_alloc() failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
commit 5f0b6216ea381b43c0dff88702d6cc5673d63922 upstream.
During initialization of subdevices if platform_device_alloc() failed, returned NULL pointer will be later dereferenced. Add proper error paths to exynos5_clk_register_subcmu(). The return value of this function is still ignored because at this stage of init there is nothing we can do.
--- drivers/clk/samsung/clk-exynos5-subcmu.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/clk/samsung/clk-exynos5-subcmu.c +8 -2
@@ -136,15 +136,21 @@ static int __init exynos5_clk_register_s {struct of_phandle_args genpdspec = { .np = pd_node };struct platform_device *pdev; +int ret; pdev =platform_device_alloc (info->pd_name,-1 ); +if (!pdev) +return -ENOMEM ; + pdev->dev.parent = parent; pdev->driver_override ="exynos5-subcmu" ;platform_set_drvdata (pdev, (void *)info);of_genpd_add_device (&genpdspec, &pdev->dev); -platform_device_add (pdev); + ret =platform_device_add (pdev); +if (ret) +platform_device_put (pdev); -return 0 ; +return ret; }static int __init exynos5_clk_probe (struct platform_device *pdev)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 142/238 clk: samsung: exynos5: Fix kfree() of const memory on setting driver_override
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
commit 785c9f411eb2d9a6076d3511c631587d5e676bf3 upstream.
Platform driver driver_override field should not be initialized from const memory because the core later kfree() it. If driver_override is manually set later through sysfs, kfree() of old value leads to:
$ echo "new_value" > /sys/bus/platform/drivers/.../driver_override
kernel BUG at ../mm/slub.c:3960!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
...
(kfree) from [<c058e8c0>] (platform_set_driver_override+0x84/0xac)
(platform_set_driver_override) from [<c058e908>] (driver_override_store+0x20/0x34)
(driver_override_store) from [<c031f778>] (kernfs_fop_write+0x100/0x1dc)
(kernfs_fop_write) from [<c0296de8>] (__vfs_write+0x2c/0x17c)
(__vfs_write) from [<c02970c4>] (vfs_write+0xa4/0x188)
(vfs_write) from [<c02972e8>] (ksys_write+0x4c/0xac)
(ksys_write) from [<c0101000>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x28)The clk-exynos5-subcmu driver uses override only for the purpose of creating meaningful names for children devices (matching names of power domains, e.g. DISP, MFC). The driver_override was not developed for this purpose so just switch to default names of devices to fix the issue.
--- drivers/clk/samsung/clk-exynos5-subcmu.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/clk/samsung/clk-exynos5-subcmu.c +1 -2
@@ -138,12 +138,11 @@ static int __init exynos5_clk_register_sstruct platform_device *pdev;int ret; - pdev =platform_device_alloc (info->pd_name,-1 ); + pdev =platform_device_alloc ("exynos5-subcmu" ,PLATFORM_DEVID_AUTO );if (!pdev)return -ENOMEM ; pdev->dev.parent = parent; - pdev->driver_override ="exynos5-subcmu" ;platform_set_drvdata (pdev, (void *)info);of_genpd_add_device (&genpdspec, &pdev->dev); ret =platform_device_add (pdev);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 143/238 clk: ingenic: Fix round_rate misbehaving with non-integer dividers
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paul Cercueil <[email protected]>
commit bc5d922c93491878c44c9216e9d227c7eeb81d7f upstream.
Take a parent rate of 180 MHz, and a requested rate of 4.285715 MHz. This results in a theorical divider of 41.999993 which is then rounded up to 42. The .round_rate function would then return (180 MHz / 42) as the clock, rounded down, so 4.285714 MHz.
Calling clk_set_rate on 4.285714 MHz would round the rate again, and give a theorical divider of 42,0000028, now rounded up to 43, and the rate returned would be (180 MHz / 43) which is 4.186046 MHz, aka. not what we requested.
Fix this by rounding up the divisions.
--- drivers/clk/ingenic/cgu.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/clk/ingenic/cgu.c +5 -5
@@ -426,16 +426,16 @@ ingenic_clk_round_rate(struct clk_hw *hwstruct ingenic_clk *ingenic_clk =to_ingenic_clk (hw);struct ingenic_cgu *cgu = ingenic_clk->cgu;const struct ingenic_cgu_clk_info *clk_info; -long rate = *parent_rate; +unsigned int div =1 ; clk_info = &cgu->clock_info[ingenic_clk->idx];if (clk_info->type &CGU_CLK_DIV ) - rate /=ingenic_clk_calc_div (clk_info, *parent_rate, req_rate); + div =ingenic_clk_calc_div (clk_info, *parent_rate, req_rate);else if (clk_info->type &CGU_CLK_FIXDIV ) - rate /= clk_info->fixdiv.div; + div = clk_info->fixdiv.div; -return rate; +return DIV_ROUND_UP (*parent_rate, div); } static int
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ ingenic_clk_set_rate(struct clk_hw *hw,if (clk_info->type &CGU_CLK_DIV ) { div =ingenic_clk_calc_div (clk_info, parent_rate, req_rate); - rate = parent_rate / div; + rate =DIV_ROUND_UP (parent_rate, div);if (rate != req_rate)return -EINVAL ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 146/238 usb: typec: tps6598x: handle block writes separately with plain-I2C adapters
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nikolaus Voss <[email protected]>
commit 8a863a608d47fa5d9dd15cf841817f73f804cf91 upstream.
Commit 1a2f474d328f handles block _reads_ separately with plain-I2C adapters, but the problem described with regmap-i2c not handling SMBus block transfers (i.e. read and writes) correctly also exists with writes.
As workaround, this patch adds a block write function the same way 1a2f474d328f adds a block read function.
--- drivers/usb/typec/tps6598x.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/typec/tps6598x.c +20 -6
@@ -110,6 +110,20 @@ tps6598x_block_read(struct tps6598x *tpsreturn 0 ; } +static int tps6598x_block_write (struct tps6598x *tps,u8 reg, +void *val,size_t len) +{ +u8 data[TPS_MAX_LEN +1 ]; + +if (!tps->i2c_protocol) +return regmap_raw_write (tps->regmap, reg, val, len); + + data[0 ] = len; +memcpy (&data[1 ], val, len); + +return regmap_raw_write (tps->regmap, reg, data,sizeof (data)); +} +static inline int tps6598x_read16 (struct tps6598x *tps,u8 reg,u16 *val) {return tps6598x_block_read (tps, reg, val,sizeof (u16));
@@ -127,23 +141,23 @@ static inline int tps6598x_read64(structstatic inline int tps6598x_write16 (struct tps6598x *tps,u8 reg,u16 val) { -return regmap_raw_write (tps->regmap, reg, &val,sizeof (u16)); +return tps6598x_block_write (tps, reg, &val,sizeof (u16)); }static inline int tps6598x_write32 (struct tps6598x *tps,u8 reg,u32 val) { -return regmap_raw_write (tps->regmap, reg, &val,sizeof (u32)); +return tps6598x_block_write (tps, reg, &val,sizeof (u32)); }static inline int tps6598x_write64 (struct tps6598x *tps,u8 reg,u64 val) { -return regmap_raw_write (tps->regmap, reg, &val,sizeof (u64)); +return tps6598x_block_write (tps, reg, &val,sizeof (u64)); }static inline int tps6598x_write_4cc (struct tps6598x *tps,u8 reg,const char *val) { -return regmap_raw_write (tps->regmap, reg, &val,sizeof (u32)); +return tps6598x_block_write (tps, reg, &val,sizeof (u32)); }static int tps6598x_read_partner_identity (struct tps6598x *tps)
@@ -229,8 +243,8 @@ static int tps6598x_exec_cmd(struct tps6return -EBUSY ;if (in_len) { - ret =regmap_raw_write (tps->regmap,TPS_REG_DATA1 , - in_data, in_len); + ret =tps6598x_block_write (tps,TPS_REG_DATA1 , + in_data, in_len);if (ret)return ret; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 148/238 serial: uartps: Fix stuck ISR if RX disabled with non-empty FIFO
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Anssi Hannula <[email protected]>
commit 7abab1605139bc41442864c18f9573440f7ca105 upstream.
If RX is disabled while there are still unprocessed bytes in RX FIFO, cdns_uart_handle_rx() called from interrupt handler will get stuck in the receive loop as read bytes will not get removed from the RX FIFO and CDNS_UART_SR_RXEMPTY bit will never get set.
Avoid the stuck handler by checking first if RX is disabled. port->lock protects against race with RX-disabling functions.
This HW behavior was mentioned by Nathan Rossi in 43e98facc4a3 ("tty:
xuartps: Fix RX hang, and TX corruption in termios call") which fixed a similar issue in cdns_uart_set_termios().
The behavior can also be easily verified by e.g. setting CDNS_UART_CR_RX_DIS at the beginning of cdns_uart_handle_rx() - the following loop will then get stuck.
Resetting the FIFO using RXRST would not set RXEMPTY either so simply issuing a reset after RX-disable would not work.
I observe this frequently on a ZynqMP board during heavy RX load at 1M baudrate when the reader process exits and thus RX gets disabled.
--- drivers/tty/serial/xilinx_uartps.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/tty/serial/xilinx_uartps.c +7 -1
@@ -364,7 +364,13 @@ static irqreturn_t cdns_uart_isr(int irqcdns_uart_handle_tx (dev_id); isrstatus &= ~CDNS_UART_IXR_TXEMPTY ; } -if (isrstatus &CDNS_UART_IXR_RXMASK ) + +/* +* Skip RX processing if RX is disabled as RXEMPTY will never be set +* as read bytes will not be removed from the FIFO. +*/ +if (isrstatus &CDNS_UART_IXR_RXMASK && + !(readl (port->membase +CDNS_UART_CR ) &CDNS_UART_CR_RX_DIS ))cdns_uart_handle_rx (dev_id, isrstatus);spin_unlock (&port->lock);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 149/238 serial: 8250_of: assume reg-shift of 2 for mrvl,mmp-uart
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lubomir Rintel <[email protected]>
commit f4817843e39ce78aace0195a57d4e8500a65a898 upstream.
There are two other drivers that bind to mrvl,mmp-uart and both of them assume register shift of 2 bits. There are device trees that lack the property and rely on that assumption.
If this driver wins the race to bind to those devices, it should behave the same as the older deprecated driver.
--- drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_of.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_of.c +4 -0
@@ -130,6 +130,10 @@ static int of_platform_serial_setup(stru port->flags |=UPF_IOREMAP ; } +/* Compatibility with the deprecated pxa driver and 8250_pxa drivers. */ +if (of_device_is_compatible (np,"mrvl,mmp-uart" )) + port->regshift =2 ; +/* Check for registers offset within the devices address range */ if (of_property_read_u32 (np,"reg-shift" , &prop) ==0 ) port->regshift = prop;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 151/238 serial: 8250_pci: Have ACCES cards that use the four port Pericom PI7C9X7954 chip use the pci_pericom_setup()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jay Dolan <[email protected]>
commit 78d3820b9bd39028727c6aab7297b63c093db343 upstream.
The four port Pericom chips have the fourth port at the wrong address. Make use of quirk to fix it.
--- drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_pci.c | 105 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 105 insertions(+)
drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_pci.c +105 -0
@@ -2027,6 +2027,111 @@ static struct pci_serial_quirk pci_seria .setup = pci_default_setup, .exit = pci_plx9050_exit, }, + { + .vendor = PCI_VENDOR_ID_ACCESIO, + .device = PCI_DEVICE_ID_ACCESIO_PCIE_COM_4SDB, + .subvendor = PCI_ANY_ID, + .subdevice = PCI_ANY_ID, + .setup = pci_pericom_setup, + }, + { + .vendor = PCI_VENDOR_ID_ACCESIO, + .device = PCI_DEVICE_ID_ACCESIO_MPCIE_COM_4S, + .subvendor = PCI_ANY_ID, + .subdevice = PCI_ANY_ID, + .setup = pci_pericom_setup, + }, + { + .vendor = PCI_VENDOR_ID_ACCESIO, + .device = PCI_DEVICE_ID_ACCESIO_PCIE_COM232_4DB, + .subvendor = PCI_ANY_ID, + .subdevice = PCI_ANY_ID, + .setup = pci_pericom_setup, + }, + { + .vendor = PCI_VENDOR_ID_ACCESIO, + .device = PCI_DEVICE_ID_ACCESIO_MPCIE_COM232_4, + .subvendor = PCI_ANY_ID, + .subdevice = PCI_ANY_ID, + .setup = pci_pericom_setup, + }, + { + .vendor = PCI_VENDOR_ID_ACCESIO, + .device = PCI_DEVICE_ID_ACCESIO_PCIE_COM_4SMDB, + .subvendor = PCI_ANY_ID, + .subdevice = PCI_ANY_ID, + .setup = pci_pericom_setup, + }, + { + .vendor = PCI_VENDOR_ID_ACCESIO, + .device = PCI_DEVICE_ID_ACCESIO_MPCIE_COM_4SM, + .subvendor = PCI_ANY_ID, + .subdevice = PCI_ANY_ID, + .setup = pci_pericom_setup, + }, + { + .vendor = PCI_VENDOR_ID_ACCESIO, + .device = PCI_DEVICE_ID_ACCESIO_MPCIE_ICM422_4, + .subvendor = PCI_ANY_ID, + .subdevice = PCI_ANY_ID, + .setup = pci_pericom_setup, + }, + { + .vendor = PCI_VENDOR_ID_ACCESIO, + .device = PCI_DEVICE_ID_ACCESIO_MPCIE_ICM485_4, + .subvendor = PCI_ANY_ID, + .subdevice = PCI_ANY_ID, + .setup = pci_pericom_setup, + }, + { + .vendor = PCI_DEVICE_ID_ACCESIO_PCIE_ICM_4S, + .device = PCI_DEVICE_ID_ACCESIO_PCIE_ICM232_4, + .subvendor = PCI_ANY_ID, + .subdevice = PCI_ANY_ID, + .setup = pci_pericom_setup, + }, + { + .vendor = PCI_VENDOR_ID_ACCESIO, + .device = PCI_DEVICE_ID_ACCESIO_MPCIE_ICM232_4, + .subvendor = PCI_ANY_ID, + .subdevice = PCI_ANY_ID, + .setup = pci_pericom_setup, + }, + { + .vendor = PCI_VENDOR_ID_ACCESIO, + .device = PCI_DEVICE_ID_ACCESIO_PCIE_COM422_4, + .subvendor = PCI_ANY_ID, + .subdevice = PCI_ANY_ID, + .setup = pci_pericom_setup, + }, + { + .vendor = PCI_VENDOR_ID_ACCESIO, + .device = PCI_DEVICE_ID_ACCESIO_PCIE_COM485_4, + .subvendor = PCI_ANY_ID, + .subdevice = PCI_ANY_ID, + .setup = pci_pericom_setup, + }, + { + .vendor = PCI_VENDOR_ID_ACCESIO, + .device = PCI_DEVICE_ID_ACCESIO_PCIE_COM232_4, + .subvendor = PCI_ANY_ID, + .subdevice = PCI_ANY_ID, + .setup = pci_pericom_setup, + }, + { + .vendor = PCI_VENDOR_ID_ACCESIO, + .device = PCI_DEVICE_ID_ACCESIO_PCIE_COM_4SM, + .subvendor = PCI_ANY_ID, + .subdevice = PCI_ANY_ID, + .setup = pci_pericom_setup, + }, + { + .vendor = PCI_VENDOR_ID_ACCESIO, + .device = PCI_DEVICE_ID_ACCESIO_PCIE_ICM_4SM, + .subvendor = PCI_ANY_ID, + .subdevice = PCI_ANY_ID, + .setup = pci_pericom_setup, + }, /* * SBS Technologies, Inc., PMC-OCTALPRO 232 */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 125/238 swiotlb: Introduce swiotlb_max_mapping_size()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
commit abe420bfae528c92bd8cc5ecb62dc95672b1fd6f upstream.
The function returns the maximum size that can be remapped by the SWIOTLB implementation. This function will be later exposed to users through the DMA-API.
--- include/linux/swiotlb.h | 5 +++++ kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
include/linux/swiotlb.h +5 -0
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ bool swiotlb_map(struct device *dev, phy size_t size, enum dma_data_direction dir, unsigned long attrs);void __init swiotlb_exit (void );unsigned int swiotlb_max_segment (void ); +size_t swiotlb_max_mapping_size (struct device *dev);#else #define swiotlb_force SWIOTLB_NO_FORCEstatic inline bool is_swiotlb_buffer (phys_addr_t paddr)
@@ -95,6 +96,10 @@ static inline unsigned int swiotlb_max_s {return 0 ; } +static inline size_t swiotlb_max_mapping_size (struct device *dev) +{ +return SIZE_MAX ; +}#endif /* CONFIG_SWIOTLB */ extern void swiotlb_print_info (void );
kernel/dma/swiotlb.c +5 -0
@@ -662,3 +662,8 @@ swiotlb_dma_supported(struct device *hwd {return __phys_to_dma (hwdev, io_tlb_end -1 ) <= mask; } + +size_t swiotlb_max_mapping_size (struct device *dev) +{ +return ((size_t )1 <<IO_TLB_SHIFT ) *IO_TLB_SEGSIZE ; +}
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 152/238 jbd2: clear dirty flag when revoking a buffer from an older transaction
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: zhangyi (F) <[email protected]>
commit 904cdbd41d749a476863a0ca41f6f396774f26e4 upstream.
Now, we capture a data corruption problem on ext4 while we're truncating an extent index block. Imaging that if we are revoking a buffer which has been journaled by the committing transaction, the buffer's jbddirty flag will not be cleared in jbd2_journal_forget(), so the commit code will set the buffer dirty flag again after refile the buffer.
fsx kjournald2
jbd2_journal_commit_transactionjbd2_journal_revoke commit phase 1~5...
jbd2_journal_forget
belongs to older transaction commit phase 6
jbddirty not clear __jbd2_journal_refile_buffer
__jbd2_journal_unfile_buffer
test_clear_buffer_jbddirty
mark_buffer_dirty
Finally, if the freed extent index block was allocated again as data block by some other files, it may corrupt the file data after writing cached pages later, such as during unmount time. (In general, clean_bdev_aliases() related helpers should be invoked after re-allocation to prevent the above corruption, but unfortunately we missed it when zeroout the head of extra extent blocks in ext4_ext_handle_unwritten_extents()).
This patch mark buffer as freed and set j_next_transaction to the new transaction when it already belongs to the committing transaction in jbd2_journal_forget(), so that commit code knows it should clear dirty bits when it is done with the buffer.
This problem can be reproduced by xfstests generic/455 easily with seeds (3246 3247 3248 3249).
--- fs/jbd2/transaction.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/jbd2/transaction.c +12 -5
@@ -1609,14 +1609,21 @@ int jbd2_journal_forget (handle_t *handl/* However, if the buffer is still owned by a prior * (committing) transaction, we can't drop it yet... */ JBUFFER_TRACE (jh,"belongs to older transaction" ); -/* ... but we CAN drop it from the new transaction if we -* have also modified it since the original commit. */ +/* ... but we CAN drop it from the new transaction through +* marking the buffer as freed and set j_next_transaction to +* the new transaction, so that not only the commit code +* knows it should clear dirty bits when it is done with the +* buffer, but also the buffer can be checkpointed only +* after the new transaction commits. */ -if (jh->b_next_transaction) { -J_ASSERT (jh->b_next_transaction == transaction); +set_buffer_freed (bh); + +if (!jh->b_next_transaction) {spin_lock (&journal->j_list_lock); - jh->b_next_transaction =NULL ; + jh->b_next_transaction = transaction;spin_unlock (&journal->j_list_lock); + }else { +J_ASSERT (jh->b_next_transaction == transaction);/* * only drop a reference if this transaction modified
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 154/238 selinux: add the missing walk_size + len check in selinux_sctp_bind_connect
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Xin Long <[email protected]>
commit 292c997a1970f8d1e1dfa354ed770a22f7b5a434 upstream.
As does in __sctp_connect(), when checking addrs in a while loop, after get the addr len according to sa_family, it's necessary to do the check walk_size + af->sockaddr_len > addrs_size to make sure it won't access an out-of-bounds addr.
The same thing is needed in selinux_sctp_bind_connect(), otherwise an out-of-bounds issue can be triggered:
[14548.772313] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in selinux_sctp_bind_connect+0x1aa/0x1f0 [14548.927083] Call Trace: [14548.938072] dump_stack+0x9a/0xe9 [14548.953015] print_address_description+0x65/0x22e [14548.996524] kasan_report.cold.6+0x92/0x1a6 [14549.015335] selinux_sctp_bind_connect+0x1aa/0x1f0 [14549.036947] security_sctp_bind_connect+0x58/0x90 [14549.058142] __sctp_setsockopt_connectx+0x5a/0x150 [sctp] [14549.081650] sctp_setsockopt.part.24+0x1322/0x3ce0 [sctp]
--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
security/selinux/hooks.c +3 -0
@@ -5120,6 +5120,9 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(strreturn -EINVAL ; } +if (walk_size + len > addrlen) +return -EINVAL ; + err = -EINVAL ;switch (optname) {/* Bind checks */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 126/238 swiotlb: Add is_swiotlb_active() function
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
commit 492366f7b4237257ef50ca9c431a6a0d50225aca upstream.
This function will be used from dma_direct code to determine the maximum segment size of a dma mapping.
--- include/linux/swiotlb.h | 6 ++++++ kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
include/linux/swiotlb.h +6 -0
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ bool swiotlb_map(struct device *dev, phyvoid __init swiotlb_exit (void );unsigned int swiotlb_max_segment (void );size_t swiotlb_max_mapping_size (struct device *dev); +bool is_swiotlb_active (void );#else #define swiotlb_force SWIOTLB_NO_FORCEstatic inline bool is_swiotlb_buffer (phys_addr_t paddr)
@@ -100,6 +101,11 @@ static inline size_t swiotlb_max_mapping {return SIZE_MAX ; } + +static inline bool is_swiotlb_active (void ) +{ +return false; +}#endif /* CONFIG_SWIOTLB */ extern void swiotlb_print_info (void );
kernel/dma/swiotlb.c +9 -0
@@ -667,3 +667,12 @@ size_t swiotlb_max_mapping_size(struct d {return ((size_t )1 <<IO_TLB_SHIFT ) *IO_TLB_SEGSIZE ; } + +bool is_swiotlb_active (void ) +{ +/* +* When SWIOTLB is initialized, even if io_tlb_start points to physical +* address zero, io_tlb_end surely doesn't. +*/ +return io_tlb_end !=0 ; +}
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 128/238 PCI/DPC: Fix print AER status in DPC event handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dongdong Liu <[email protected]>
commit 9f08a5d896ce43380314c34ed3f264c8e6075b80 upstream.
Previously dpc_handler() called aer_get_device_error_info() without initializing info->severity, so aer_get_device_error_info() relied on uninitialized data.
Add dpc_get_aer_uncorrect_severity() to read the port's AER status, mask, and severity registers and set info->severity.
Also, clear the port's AER fatal error status bits.
--- drivers/pci/pcie/dpc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/pci/pcie/dpc.c +26 -1
@@ -202,6 +202,28 @@ static void dpc_process_rp_pio_error(strpci_write_config_dword (pdev, cap +PCI_EXP_DPC_RP_PIO_STATUS , status); } +static int dpc_get_aer_uncorrect_severity (struct pci_dev *dev, +struct aer_err_info *info) +{ +int pos = dev->aer_cap; +u32 status, mask, sev; + +pci_read_config_dword (dev, pos +PCI_ERR_UNCOR_STATUS , &status); +pci_read_config_dword (dev, pos +PCI_ERR_UNCOR_MASK , &mask); + status &= ~mask; +if (!status) +return 0 ; + +pci_read_config_dword (dev, pos +PCI_ERR_UNCOR_SEVER , &sev); + status &= sev; +if (status) + info->severity =AER_FATAL ; +else + info->severity =AER_NONFATAL ; + +return 1 ; +} +static irqreturn_t dpc_handler (int irq,void *context) {struct aer_err_info info;
@@ -229,9 +251,12 @@ static irqreturn_t dpc_handler(int irq,/* show RP PIO error detail information */ if (dpc->rp_extensions && reason ==3 && ext_reason ==0 )dpc_process_rp_pio_error (dpc); -else if (reason ==0 &&aer_get_device_error_info (pdev, &info)) { +else if (reason ==0 && +dpc_get_aer_uncorrect_severity (pdev, &info) && +aer_get_device_error_info (pdev, &info)) {aer_print_error (pdev, &info);pci_cleanup_aer_uncorrect_error_status (pdev); +pci_aer_clear_fatal_status (pdev); }/* We configure DPC so it only triggers on ERR_FATAL */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 127/238 PCI/ASPM: Use LTR if already enabled by platform
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]>
commit 10ecc818ea7319b5d0d2b4e1aa6a77323e776f76 upstream.
RussianNeuroMancer reported that the Intel 7265 wifi on a Dell Venue 11 Pro 7140 table stopped working after wakeup from suspend and bisected the problem to 9ab105deb60f ("PCI/ASPM: Disable ASPM L1.2 Substate if we don't have LTR"). David Ward reported the same problem on a Dell Latitude 7350.
After af8bb9f89838 ("PCI/ACPI: Request LTR control from platform before using it"), we don't enable LTR unless the platform has granted LTR control to us. In addition, we don't notice if the platform had already enabled LTR itself.
After 9ab105deb60f ("PCI/ASPM: Disable ASPM L1.2 Substate if we don't have LTR"), we avoid using LTR if we don't think the path to the device has LTR enabled.
The combination means that if the platform itself enables LTR but declines to give the OS control over LTR, we unnecessarily avoided using ASPM L1.2.
--- drivers/pci/probe.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
drivers/pci/probe.c +23 -13
@@ -2071,11 +2071,8 @@ static void pci_configure_ltr(struct pci {#ifdef CONFIG_PCIEASPM struct pci_host_bridge *host =pci_find_host_bridge (dev->bus); -u32 cap;struct pci_dev *bridge; - -if (!host->native_ltr) -return ; +u32 cap, ctl;if (!pci_is_pcie (dev))return ;
@@ -2084,22 +2081,35 @@ static void pci_configure_ltr(struct pciif (!(cap &PCI_EXP_DEVCAP2_LTR ))return ; -/* -* Software must not enable LTR in an Endpoint unless the Root -* Complex and all intermediate Switches indicate support for LTR. -* PCIe r3.1, sec 6.18. -*/ -if (pci_pcie_type (dev) ==PCI_EXP_TYPE_ROOT_PORT ) - dev->ltr_path =1 ; -else { +pcie_capability_read_dword (dev,PCI_EXP_DEVCTL2 , &ctl); +if (ctl &PCI_EXP_DEVCTL2_LTR_EN ) { +if (pci_pcie_type (dev) ==PCI_EXP_TYPE_ROOT_PORT ) { + dev->ltr_path =1 ; +return ; + } + bridge =pci_upstream_bridge (dev);if (bridge && bridge->ltr_path) dev->ltr_path =1 ; + +return ; } -if (dev->ltr_path) +if (!host->native_ltr) +return ; + +/* +* Software must not enable LTR in an Endpoint unless the Root +* Complex and all intermediate Switches indicate support for LTR. +* PCIe r4.0, sec 6.18. +*/ +if (pci_pcie_type (dev) ==PCI_EXP_TYPE_ROOT_PORT || + ((bridge =pci_upstream_bridge (dev)) && + bridge->ltr_path)) {pcie_capability_set_word (dev,PCI_EXP_DEVCTL2 ,PCI_EXP_DEVCTL2_LTR_EN ); + dev->ltr_path =1 ; + }#endif }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 129/238 PCI: qcom: Dont deassert reset GPIO during probe
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bjorn Andersson <[email protected]>
commit 02b485e31d98265189b91f3e69c43df2ed50610c upstream.
Acquiring the reset GPIO low means that reset is being deasserted, this is followed almost immediately with qcom_pcie_host_init() asserting it, initializing it and then finally deasserting it again, for the link to come up.
Some PCIe devices requires a minimum time between the initial deassert and subsequent reset cycles. In a platform that boots with the reset GPIO asserted this requirement is being violated by this deassert/assert pulse.
Acquire the reset GPIO high to prevent this situation by matching the state to the subsequent asserted state.
--- drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-qcom.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-qcom.c +1 -1
@@ -1228,7 +1228,7 @@ static int qcom_pcie_probe(struct platfo pcie->ops =of_device_get_match_data (dev); - pcie->reset =devm_gpiod_get_optional (dev,"perst" ,GPIOD_OUT_LOW ); + pcie->reset =devm_gpiod_get_optional (dev,"perst" ,GPIOD_OUT_HIGH );if (IS_ERR (pcie->reset)) { ret =PTR_ERR (pcie->reset); goto err_pm_runtime_put;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 122/238 ext4: add mask of ext4 flags to swap
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: yangerkun <[email protected]>
commit abdc644e8cbac2e9b19763680e5a7cf9bab2bee7 upstream.
The reason is that while swapping two inode, we swap the flags too. Some flags such as EXT4_JOURNAL_DATA_FL can really confuse the things since we're not resetting the address operations structure. The simplest way to keep things sane is to restrict the flags that can be swapped.
--- fs/ext4/ext4.h | 3 +++ fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 6 +++++- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/ext4.h +3 -0
@@ -426,6 +426,9 @@ struct flex_groups {/* Flags that are appropriate for non-directories/regular files. */ #define EXT4_OTHER_FLMASK (EXT4_NODUMP_FL | EXT4_NOATIME_FL) +/* The only flags that should be swapped */ +#define EXT4_FL_SHOULD_SWAP (EXT4_HUGE_FILE_FL | EXT4_EXTENTS_FL) +/* Mask out flags that are inappropriate for the given type of inode. */ static inline __u32 ext4_mask_flags (umode_t mode,__u32 flags) {
fs/ext4/ioctl.c +5 -1
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static void swap_inode_data(struct inodeloff_t isize;struct ext4_inode_info *ei1;struct ext4_inode_info *ei2; +unsigned long tmp; ei1 =EXT4_I (inode1); ei2 =EXT4_I (inode2);
@@ -72,7 +73,10 @@ static void swap_inode_data(struct inodeswap (inode1->i_mtime, inode2->i_mtime);memswap (ei1->i_data, ei2->i_data,sizeof (ei1->i_data)); -swap (ei1->i_flags, ei2->i_flags); + tmp = ei1->i_flags &EXT4_FL_SHOULD_SWAP ; + ei1->i_flags = (ei2->i_flags &EXT4_FL_SHOULD_SWAP ) | + (ei1->i_flags & ~EXT4_FL_SHOULD_SWAP ); + ei2->i_flags = tmp | (ei2->i_flags & ~EXT4_FL_SHOULD_SWAP );swap (ei1->i_disksize, ei2->i_disksize);ext4_es_remove_extent (inode1,0 ,EXT_MAX_BLOCKS );ext4_es_remove_extent (inode2,0 ,EXT_MAX_BLOCKS );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 131/238 PCI: pciehp: Disable Data Link Layer State Changed event on suspend
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mika Westerberg <[email protected]>
commit bbe54ea5330d828cc396d451c0e1e5c3f9764c1e upstream.
Commit 0e157e528604 ("PCI/PME: Implement runtime PM callbacks") tried to solve an issue where the hierarchy immediately wakes up when it is transitioned into D3cold. However, it turns out to prevent PME propagation on some systems that do not support D3cold.
I looked more closely at what might cause the immediate wakeup. It happens when the ACPI power resource of the root port is turned off. The AML code associated with the _OFF() method of the ACPI power resource starts a PCIe L2/L3 Ready transition and waits for it to complete. Right after the L2/L3 Ready transition is started the root port receives a PME from the downstream port.
The simplest hierarchy where this happens looks like this:
00:1d.0 PCIe Root Port
^
|
v
05:00.0 PCIe switch #1 upstream port
06:01.0 PCIe switch #1 downstream hotplug port
^
|
v
08:00.0 PCIe switch #2 upstream portIt seems that the PCIe link between the two switches, before PME_Turn_Off/PME_TO_Ack is complete for the whole hierarchy, goes inactive and triggers PME towards the root port bringing it back to D0. The L2/L3 Ready sequence is described in PCIe r4.0 spec sections 5.2 and 5.3.3 but unfortunately they do not state what happens if DLLSCE is enabled during the sequence.
Disabling Data Link Layer State Changed event (DLLSCE) seems to prevent the issue and still allows the downstream hotplug port to notice when a device is plugged/unplugged.
--- drivers/pci/hotplug/pciehp_hpc.c | 17 +++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/pci/hotplug/pciehp_hpc.c +15 -2
@@ -736,12 +736,25 @@ void pcie_clear_hotplug_events(struct covoid pcie_enable_interrupt (struct controller *ctrl) { -pcie_write_cmd (ctrl,PCI_EXP_SLTCTL_HPIE ,PCI_EXP_SLTCTL_HPIE ); +u16 mask; + + mask =PCI_EXP_SLTCTL_HPIE |PCI_EXP_SLTCTL_DLLSCE ; +pcie_write_cmd (ctrl, mask, mask); }void pcie_disable_interrupt (struct controller *ctrl) { -pcie_write_cmd (ctrl,0 ,PCI_EXP_SLTCTL_HPIE ); +u16 mask; + +/* +* Mask hot-plug interrupt to prevent it triggering immediately +* when the link goes inactive (we still get PME when any of the +* enabled events is detected). Same goes with Link Layer State +* changed event which generates PME immediately when the link goes +* inactive so mask it as well. +*/ + mask =PCI_EXP_SLTCTL_HPIE |PCI_EXP_SLTCTL_DLLSCE ; +pcie_write_cmd (ctrl,0 , mask); }/*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 157/238 powerpc/wii: properly disable use of BATs when requested.
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
commit 6d183ca8baec983dc4208ca45ece3c36763df912 upstream.
'nobats' kernel parameter or some options like CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC deny the use of BATS for mapping memory.
This patch makes sure that the specific wii RAM mapping function takes it into account as well.
--- arch/powerpc/platforms/embedded6xx/wii.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/powerpc/platforms/embedded6xx/wii.c +4 -0
@@ -83,6 +83,10 @@ unsigned long __init wii_mmu_mapin_mem2(/* MEM2 64MB@0x10000000 */ delta = wii_hole_start + wii_hole_size; size = top - delta; + +if (__map_without_bats) +return delta; +for (bl =128 <<10 ; bl < max_size; bl <<=1 ) {if (bl *2 > size)break ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 166/238 powerpc/smp: Fix NMI IPI timeout
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
commit 1b5fc84aba170bdfe3533396ca9662ceea1609b7 upstream.
The NMI IPI timeout logic is broken, if __smp_send_nmi_ipi() times out on the first condition, delay_us will be zero which will send it into the second spin loop with no timeout so it will spin forever.
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/smp.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/smp.c +3 -2
@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ int __smp_send_nmi_ipi(int cpu, void (*fif (delay_us) { delay_us--;if (!delay_us) -break ; + goto timeout; } }
@@ -530,10 +530,11 @@ int __smp_send_nmi_ipi(int cpu, void (*fif (delay_us) { delay_us--;if (!delay_us) -break ; + goto timeout; } } +timeout:if (!cpumask_empty (&nmi_ipi_pending_mask)) {/* Timeout waiting for CPUs to call smp_handle_nmi_ipi */ ret =0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 168/238 powerpc/traps: fix recoverability of machine check handling on book3s/32
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
commit 0bbea75c476b77fa7d7811d6be911cc7583e640f upstream.
Looks like book3s/32 doesn't set RI on machine check, so checking RI before calling die() will always be fatal allthought this is not an issue in most cases.
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c +4 -4
@@ -763,15 +763,15 @@ void machine_check_exception(struct pt_rif (check_io_access (regs)) goto bail; -/* Must die if the interrupt is not recoverable */ -if (!(regs->msr &MSR_RI )) -nmi_panic (regs,"Unrecoverable Machine check" ); -if (!nested)nmi_exit ();die ("Machine check" , regs,SIGBUS ); +/* Must die if the interrupt is not recoverable */ +if (!(regs->msr &MSR_RI )) +nmi_panic (regs,"Unrecoverable Machine check" ); +return ; bail:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 167/238 powerpc/smp: Fix NMI IPI xmon timeout
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
commit 88b9a3d1425a436e95c41f09986fdae2daee437a upstream.
The xmon debugger IPI handler waits in the callback function while xmon is still active. This means they don't complete the IPI, and the initiator always times out waiting for them.
Things manage to work after the timeout because there is some fallback logic to keep NMI IPI state sane in case of the timeout, but this is a bit ugly.
This patch changes NMI IPI back to half-asynchronous (i.e., wait for everyone to call in, do not wait for IPI function to complete), but the complexity is avoided by going one step further and allowing new IPIs to be issued before the IPI functions to all complete.
If synchronization against that is required, it is left up to the caller, but current callers don't require that. In fact with the timeout handling, callers must be able to cope with this already.
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/smp.c | 93 ++++++++++++++-------------------------------- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/smp.c +29 -64
@@ -358,13 +358,12 @@ void arch_send_call_function_ipi_mask(co* NMI IPIs may not be recoverable, so should not be used as ongoing part of * a running system. They can be used for crash, debug, halt/reboot, etc. * -* NMI IPIs are globally single threaded. No more than one in progress at -* any time. -* * The IPI call waits with interrupts disabled until all targets enter the -* NMI handler, then the call returns. +* NMI handler, then returns. Subsequent IPIs can be issued before targets +* have returned from their handlers, so there is no guarantee about +* concurrency or re-entrancy. * -* No new NMI can be initiated until targets exit the handler. +* A new NMI can be issued before all targets exit the handler. * * The IPI call may time out without all targets entering the NMI handler. * In that case, there is some logic to recover (and ignore subsequent
@@ -375,7 +374,7 @@ void arch_send_call_function_ipi_mask(costatic atomic_t __nmi_ipi_lock =ATOMIC_INIT (0 );static struct cpumask nmi_ipi_pending_mask; -static int nmi_ipi_busy_count =0 ; +static bool nmi_ipi_busy = false;static void (*nmi_ipi_function)(struct pt_regs *) =NULL ;static void nmi_ipi_lock_start (unsigned long *flags)
@@ -414,7 +413,7 @@ static void nmi_ipi_unlock_end(unsigned*/ int smp_handle_nmi_ipi (struct pt_regs *regs) { -void (*fn)(struct pt_regs *); +void (*fn)(struct pt_regs *) =NULL ;unsigned long flags;int me =raw_smp_processor_id ();int ret =0 ;
@@ -425,29 +424,17 @@ int smp_handle_nmi_ipi(struct pt_regs *r* because the caller may have timed out. */ nmi_ipi_lock_start (&flags); -if (!nmi_ipi_busy_count) - goto out; -if (!cpumask_test_cpu (me, &nmi_ipi_pending_mask)) - goto out; - - fn = nmi_ipi_function; -if (!fn) - goto out; - -cpumask_clear_cpu (me, &nmi_ipi_pending_mask); - nmi_ipi_busy_count++; -nmi_ipi_unlock (); - - ret =1 ; - -fn (regs); - -nmi_ipi_lock (); -if (nmi_ipi_busy_count >1 )/* Can race with caller time-out */ - nmi_ipi_busy_count--; -out: +if (cpumask_test_cpu (me, &nmi_ipi_pending_mask)) { +cpumask_clear_cpu (me, &nmi_ipi_pending_mask); + fn =READ_ONCE (nmi_ipi_function); +WARN_ON_ONCE (!fn); + ret =1 ; + }nmi_ipi_unlock_end (&flags); +if (fn) +fn (regs); +return ret; }
@@ -473,7 +460,7 @@ static void do_smp_send_nmi_ipi(int cpu,* - cpu is the target CPU (must not be this CPU), or NMI_IPI_ALL_OTHERS. * - fn is the target callback function. * - delay_us > 0 is the delay before giving up waiting for targets to -* complete executing the handler, == 0 specifies indefinite delay. +* begin executing the handler, == 0 specifies indefinite delay. */ int __smp_send_nmi_ipi (int cpu,void (*fn)(struct pt_regs *),u64 delay_us,bool safe) {
@@ -487,31 +474,33 @@ int __smp_send_nmi_ipi(int cpu, void (*fif (unlikely (!smp_ops))return 0 ; -/* Take the nmi_ipi_busy count/lock with interrupts hard disabled */ nmi_ipi_lock_start (&flags); -while (nmi_ipi_busy_count) { +while (nmi_ipi_busy) {nmi_ipi_unlock_end (&flags); -spin_until_cond (nmi_ipi_busy_count ==0 ); +spin_until_cond (!nmi_ipi_busy);nmi_ipi_lock_start (&flags); } - + nmi_ipi_busy = true; nmi_ipi_function = fn; +WARN_ON_ONCE (!cpumask_empty (&nmi_ipi_pending_mask)); +if (cpu <0 ) {/* ALL_OTHERS */ cpumask_copy (&nmi_ipi_pending_mask, cpu_online_mask);cpumask_clear_cpu (me, &nmi_ipi_pending_mask); }else { -/* cpumask starts clear */ cpumask_set_cpu (cpu, &nmi_ipi_pending_mask); } - nmi_ipi_busy_count++; +nmi_ipi_unlock (); +/* Interrupts remain hard disabled */ +do_smp_send_nmi_ipi (cpu, safe);nmi_ipi_lock (); -/* nmi_ipi_busy_count is held here, so unlock/lock is okay */ +/* nmi_ipi_busy is set here, so unlock/lock is okay */ while (!cpumask_empty (&nmi_ipi_pending_mask)) {nmi_ipi_unlock ();udelay (1 );
@@ -519,34 +508,19 @@ int __smp_send_nmi_ipi(int cpu, void (*fif (delay_us) { delay_us--;if (!delay_us) - goto timeout; +break ; } } -while (nmi_ipi_busy_count >1 ) { -nmi_ipi_unlock (); -udelay (1 ); -nmi_ipi_lock (); -if (delay_us) { - delay_us--; -if (!delay_us) - goto timeout; - } - } - -timeout:if (!cpumask_empty (&nmi_ipi_pending_mask)) {/* Timeout waiting for CPUs to call smp_handle_nmi_ipi */ ret =0 ;cpumask_clear (&nmi_ipi_pending_mask); } -if (nmi_ipi_busy_count >1 ) { -/* Timeout waiting for CPUs to execute fn */ - ret =0 ; - nmi_ipi_busy_count =1 ; - } - nmi_ipi_busy_count--; + nmi_ipi_function =NULL ; + nmi_ipi_busy = false; +nmi_ipi_unlock_end (&flags);return ret;
@@ -614,17 +588,8 @@ void crash_send_ipi(void (*crash_ipi_calstatic void nmi_stop_this_cpu (struct pt_regs *regs) {/* -* This is a special case because it never returns, so the NMI IPI -* handling would never mark it as done, which makes any later -* smp_send_nmi_ipi() call spin forever. Mark it done now. -* * IRQs are already hard disabled by the smp_handle_nmi_ipi. */ -nmi_ipi_lock (); -if (nmi_ipi_busy_count >1 ) - nmi_ipi_busy_count--; -nmi_ipi_unlock (); -spin_begin ();while (1 )spin_cpu_relax ();
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 170/238 ARM: s3c24xx: Fix boolean expressions in osiris_dvs_notify
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
commit e2477233145f2156434afb799583bccd878f3e9f upstream.
Fix boolean expressions by using logical AND operator '&&' instead of bitwise operator '&'.
This issue was detected with the help of Coccinelle.
--- arch/arm/mach-s3c24xx/mach-osiris-dvs.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/arm/mach-s3c24xx/mach-osiris-dvs.c +4 -4
@@ -65,16 +65,16 @@ static int osiris_dvs_notify(struct notiswitch (val) {case CPUFREQ_PRECHANGE : -if (old_dvs & !new_dvs || - cur_dvs & !new_dvs) { +if ((old_dvs && !new_dvs) || + (cur_dvs && !new_dvs)) {pr_debug ("%s: exiting dvs\n" , __func__); cur_dvs = false;gpio_set_value (OSIRIS_GPIO_DVS ,1 ); }break ;case CPUFREQ_POSTCHANGE : -if (!old_dvs & new_dvs || - !cur_dvs & new_dvs) { +if ((!old_dvs && new_dvs) || + (!cur_dvs && new_dvs)) {pr_debug ("entering dvs\n" ); cur_dvs = true;gpio_set_value (OSIRIS_GPIO_DVS ,0 );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 173/238 arm64: debug: Ensure debug handlers check triggering exception level
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
commit 6bd288569b50bc89fa5513031086746968f585cb upstream.
Debug exception handlers may be called for exceptions generated both by user and kernel code. In many cases, this is checked explicitly, but in other cases things either happen to work by happy accident or they go slightly wrong. For example, executing 'brk #4' from userspace will enter the kprobes code and be ignored, but the instruction will be retried forever in userspace instead of delivering a SIGTRAP.
Fix this issue in the most stable-friendly fashion by simply adding explicit checks of the triggering exception level to all of our debug exception handlers.
--- arch/arm64/kernel/kgdb.c | 14 ++++++++++---- arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/kgdb.c +10 -4
@@ -244,27 +244,33 @@ int kgdb_arch_handle_exception(int excepstatic int kgdb_brk_fn (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned int esr) { +if (user_mode (regs)) +return DBG_HOOK_ERROR ; +kgdb_handle_exception (1 ,SIGTRAP ,0 , regs); -return 0 ; +return DBG_HOOK_HANDLED ; }NOKPROBE_SYMBOL (kgdb_brk_fn) static int kgdb_compiled_brk_fn(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int esr) { +if (user_mode (regs)) +return DBG_HOOK_ERROR ; + compiled_break =1 ;kgdb_handle_exception (1 ,SIGTRAP ,0 , regs); -return 0 ; +return DBG_HOOK_HANDLED ; }NOKPROBE_SYMBOL (kgdb_compiled_brk_fn);static int kgdb_step_brk_fn (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned int esr) { -if (!kgdb_single_step) +if (user_mode (regs) || !kgdb_single_step)return DBG_HOOK_ERROR ;kgdb_handle_exception (1 ,SIGTRAP ,0 , regs); -return 0 ; +return DBG_HOOK_HANDLED ; }NOKPROBE_SYMBOL (kgdb_step_brk_fn);
arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c +6 -0
@@ -450,6 +450,9 @@ kprobe_single_step_handler(struct pt_regstruct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb =get_kprobe_ctlblk ();int retval; +if (user_mode (regs)) +return DBG_HOOK_ERROR ; +/* return error if this is not our step */ retval =kprobe_ss_hit (kcb,instruction_pointer (regs));
@@ -466,6 +469,9 @@ kprobe_single_step_handler(struct pt_regint __kprobes kprobe_breakpoint_handler (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned int esr) { +if (user_mode (regs)) +return DBG_HOOK_ERROR ; +kprobe_handler (regs);return DBG_HOOK_HANDLED ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 172/238 arm64: debug: Dont propagate UNKNOWN FAR into si_code for debug signals
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
commit b9a4b9d084d978f80eb9210727c81804588b42ff upstream.
FAR_EL1 is UNKNOWN for all debug exceptions other than those caused by taking a hardware watchpoint. Unfortunately, if a debug handler returns a non-zero value, then we will propagate the UNKNOWN FAR value to userspace via the si_addr field of the SIGTRAP siginfo_t.
Instead, let's set si_addr to take on the PC of the faulting instruction, which we have available in the current pt_regs.
--- arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +5 -4
@@ -824,11 +824,12 @@ void __init hook_debug_fault_code(int nr debug_fault_info[nr].name = name; } -asmlinkage int __exception do_debug_exception(unsigned long addr, +asmlinkage int __exception do_debug_exception(unsigned long addr_if_watchpoint,unsigned int esr,struct pt_regs *regs) {const struct fault_info *inf =esr_to_debug_fault_info (esr); +unsigned long pc =instruction_pointer (regs);int rv;/*
@@ -838,14 +839,14 @@ asmlinkage int __exception do_debug_exceif (interrupts_enabled (regs))trace_hardirqs_off (); -if (user_mode (regs) && !is_ttbr0_addr (instruction_pointer (regs))) +if (user_mode (regs) && !is_ttbr0_addr (pc))arm64_apply_bp_hardening (); -if (!inf->fn (addr, esr, regs)) { +if (!inf->fn (addr_if_watchpoint, esr, regs)) { rv =1 ; }else {arm64_notify_die (inf->name, regs, - inf->sig, inf->code, (void __user *)addr, esr); + inf->sig, inf->code, (void __user *)pc, esr); rv =0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 158/238 powerpc/powernv: Make opal log only readable by root
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jordan Niethe <[email protected]>
commit 7b62f9bd2246b7d3d086e571397c14ba52645ef1 upstream.
Currently the opal log is globally readable. It is kernel policy to limit the visibility of physical addresses / kernel pointers to root. Given this and the fact the opal log may contain this information it would be better to limit the readability to root.
--- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-msglog.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-msglog.c +1 -1
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static ssize_t opal_msglog_read(struct f }static struct bin_attribute opal_msglog_attr = { - .attr = {.name ="msglog" , .mode =0444 }, + .attr = {.name ="msglog" , .mode =0400 }, .read = opal_msglog_read };