Skip to contentSkip to conversation

CIFS: fix POSIX lock leak and invalid ptr deref

PATCH New Sasha Levin 1 participant 63 messages Mar 27, 2019

Subsystems (22)
lore
Share & tools
lore
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 3/63 i2c: sis630: correct format strings

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Louis Taylor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 60f7691c624b41a05bfc3493d9b0519e7951b7ef ]

When compiling with -Wformat, clang warns:

drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-sis630.c:482:4: warning: format specifies type
'unsigned short' but the argument has type 'int' [-Wformat]
smbus_base + SMB_STS, ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-sis630.c:483:4: warning: format specifies type

      'unsigned short' but the argument has type 'int' [-Wformat]
                        smbus_base + SMB_STS + SIS630_SMB_IOREGION - 1);
                        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-sis630.c:531:37: warning: format specifies type

      'unsigned short' but the argument has type 'int' [-Wformat]
                 "SMBus SIS630 adapter at %04hx", smbus_base + SMB_STS);
                                          ~~~~~   ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

This patch fixes the format strings to use the format type for int.

---
 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-sis630.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-sis630.c +2 -2
index 1e6805b5cef2..a57aa4fe51a4 100644
@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ static int sis630_setup(struct pci_dev *sis630_dev)
 	if (!request_region(smbus_base + SMB_STS, SIS630_SMB_IOREGION,
 			    sis630_driver.name)) {
 		dev_err(&sis630_dev->dev,
-			"I/O Region 0x%04hx-0x%04hx for SMBus already in use.\n",
+			"I/O Region 0x%04x-0x%04x for SMBus already in use.\n",
 			smbus_base + SMB_STS,
 			smbus_base + SMB_STS + SIS630_SMB_IOREGION - 1);
 		retval = -EBUSY;
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ static int sis630_probe(struct pci_dev *dev, const struct pci_device_id *id)
 	sis630_adapter.dev.parent = &dev->dev;
 
 	snprintf(sis630_adapter.name, sizeof(sis630_adapter.name),
-		 "SMBus SIS630 adapter at %04hx", smbus_base + SMB_STS);
+		 "SMBus SIS630 adapter at %04x", smbus_base + SMB_STS);
 
 	return i2c_add_adapter(&sis630_adapter);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 5/63 gpio: gpio-omap: fix level interrupt idling

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d01849f7deba81f4959fd9e51bf20dbf46987d1c ]

Tony notes that the GPIO module does not idle when level interrupts are in use, as the wakeup appears to get stuck.

After extensive investigation, it appears that the wakeup will only be cleared if the interrupt status register is cleared while the interrupt is enabled. However, we are currently clearing it with the interrupt disabled for level-based interrupts.

It is acknowledged that this observed behaviour conflicts with a statement in the TRM:

CAUTION
After servicing the interrupt, the status bit in the interrupt status register (GPIOi.GPIO_IRQSTATUS_0 or GPIOi.GPIO_IRQSTATUS_1) must be reset and the interrupt line released (by setting the corresponding bit of the interrupt status register to 1) before enabling an interrupt for the GPIO channel in the interrupt-enable register (GPIOi.GPIO_IRQSTATUS_SET_0 or GPIOi.GPIO_IRQSTATUS_SET_1) to prevent the occurrence of unexpected interrupts when enabling an interrupt for the GPIO channel.

However, this does not appear to be a practical problem.

Further, as reported by Grygorii Strashko <[email protected]>, the TI Android kernel tree has an earlier similar patch as "GPIO: OMAP:
Fix the sequence to clear the IRQ status" saying:

if the status is cleared after disabling the IRQ then sWAKEUP will not be cleared and gates the module transition

When we unmask the level interrupt after the interrupt has been handled, enable the interrupt and only then clear the interrupt. If the interrupt is still pending, the hardware will re-assert the interrupt status.

Should the caution note in the TRM prove to be a problem, we could use a clear-enable-clear sequence instead.

Cc Aaro Koskinen <[email protected]>
Cc Keerthy <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Ujfalusi <[email protected]>
[[email protected]: updated comments based on an earlier TI patch]
---
 drivers/gpio/gpio-omap.c | 14 ++++++++------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/gpio/gpio-omap.c +8 -6
index f7fbb46d5d79..9943273ec981 100644
@@ -872,14 +872,16 @@ static void omap_gpio_unmask_irq(struct irq_data *d)
 	if (trigger)
 		omap_set_gpio_triggering(bank, offset, trigger);
 
-	/* For level-triggered GPIOs, the clearing must be done after
-	 * the HW source is cleared, thus after the handler has run */
-	if (bank->level_mask & BIT(offset)) {
-		omap_set_gpio_irqenable(bank, offset, 0);
+	omap_set_gpio_irqenable(bank, offset, 1);
+
+	/*
+	 * For level-triggered GPIOs, clearing must be done after the source
+	 * is cleared, thus after the handler has run. OMAP4 needs this done
+	 * after enabing the interrupt to clear the wakeup status.
+	 */
+	if (bank->level_mask & BIT(offset))
 		omap_clear_gpio_irqstatus(bank, offset);
-	}
 
-	omap_set_gpio_irqenable(bank, offset, 1);
 	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&bank->lock, flags);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#12 lore raw

PATCH 13/63 f2fs: do not use mutex lock in atomic context

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Sahitya Tummala <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9083977dabf3833298ddcd40dee28687f1e6b483 ]

Fix below warning coming because of using mutex lock in atomic context.

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:98
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 585, name: sh
Preemption disabled at: __radix_tree_preload+0x28/0x130
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2b4
 show_stack+0x20/0x28
 dump_stack+0xa8/0xe0
 ___might_sleep+0x144/0x194
 __might_sleep+0x58/0x8c
 mutex_lock+0x2c/0x48
 f2fs_trace_pid+0x88/0x14c
 f2fs_set_node_page_dirty+0xd0/0x184

Do not use f2fs_radix_tree_insert() to avoid doing cond_resched() with spin_lock() acquired.

---
 fs/f2fs/trace.c | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/f2fs/trace.c +7 -1
index 145fb659ad44..8f327fa7ae47 100644
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ void f2fs_trace_pid(struct page *page)
 
 	page->private = pid;
 
+retry:
 	if (radix_tree_preload(GFP_NOFS))
 		return;
 
@@ -70,7 +71,12 @@ void f2fs_trace_pid(struct page *page)
 	if (p)
 		radix_tree_delete(&pids, pid);
 
-	f2fs_radix_tree_insert(&pids, pid, current);
+	if (radix_tree_insert(&pids, pid, current)) {
+		spin_unlock(&pids_lock);
+		radix_tree_preload_end();
+		cond_resched();
+		goto retry;
+	}
 
 	trace_printk("%3x:%3x %4x %-16s\n",
 			MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev), MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#20 lore raw

PATCH 21/63 scsi: core: replace GFP_ATOMIC with GFP_KERNEL in scsi_scan.c

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Benjamin Block <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1749ef00f7312679f76d5e9104c5d1e22a829038 ]

We had a test-report where, under memory pressure, adding LUNs to the systems would fail (the tests add LUNs strictly in sequence):

[ 5525.853432] scsi 0:0:1:1088045124: Direct-Access     IBM      2107900          .148 PQ: 0 ANSI: 5
[ 5525.853826] scsi 0:0:1:1088045124: alua: supports implicit TPGS
[ 5525.853830] scsi 0:0:1:1088045124: alua: device naa.6005076303ffd32700000000000044da port group 0 rel port 43
[ 5525.853931] sd 0:0:1:1088045124: Attached scsi generic sg10 type 0
[ 5525.854075] sd 0:0:1:1088045124: [sdk] Disabling DIF Type 1 protection
[ 5525.855495] sd 0:0:1:1088045124: [sdk] 2097152 512-byte logical blocks: (1.07 GB/1.00 GiB)
[ 5525.855606] sd 0:0:1:1088045124: [sdk] Write Protect is off
[ 5525.855609] sd 0:0:1:1088045124: [sdk] Mode Sense: ed 00 00 08
[ 5525.855795] sd 0:0:1:1088045124: [sdk] Write cache: enabled, read cache: enabled, doesn't support DPO or FUA
[ 5525.857838]  sdk: sdk1
[ 5525.859468] sd 0:0:1:1088045124: [sdk] Attached SCSI disk
[ 5525.865073] sd 0:0:1:1088045124: alua: transition timeout set to 60 seconds
[ 5525.865078] sd 0:0:1:1088045124: alua: port group 00 state A preferred supports tolusnA
[ 5526.015070] sd 0:0:1:1088045124: alua: port group 00 state A preferred supports tolusnA
[ 5526.015213] sd 0:0:1:1088045124: alua: port group 00 state A preferred supports tolusnA
[ 5526.587439] scsi_alloc_sdev: Allocation failure during SCSI scanning, some SCSI devices might not be configured
[ 5526.588562] scsi_alloc_sdev: Allocation failure during SCSI scanning, some SCSI devices might not be configured

Looking at the code of scsi_alloc_sdev(), and all the calling contexts, there seems to be no reason to use GFP_ATMOIC here. All the different call-contexts use a mutex at some point, and nothing in between that requires no sleeping, as far as I could see. Additionally, the code that later allocates the block queue for the device (scsi_mq_alloc_queue()) already uses GFP_KERNEL.

There are similar allocations in two other functions:
scsi_probe_and_add_lun(), and scsi_add_lun(),; that can also be done with GFP_KERNEL.

Here is the contexts for the three functions so far:

    scsi_alloc_sdev()
        scsi_probe_and_add_lun()
            scsi_sequential_lun_scan()
                __scsi_scan_target()
                    scsi_scan_target()
                        mutex_lock()
                    scsi_scan_channel()
                        scsi_scan_host_selected()
                            mutex_lock()
            scsi_report_lun_scan()
                __scsi_scan_target()
    	            ...
            __scsi_add_device()
                mutex_lock()
            __scsi_scan_target()
                ...
        scsi_report_lun_scan()
            ...
        scsi_get_host_dev()
            mutex_lock()

    scsi_probe_and_add_lun()
        ...

    scsi_add_lun()
        scsi_probe_and_add_lun()
            ...

So replace all these, and give them a bit of a better chance to succeed, with more chances of reclaim.

---
 drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c +3 -3
index 850ddc5fac04..3e2288af56bc 100644
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ static struct scsi_device *scsi_alloc_sdev(struct scsi_target *starget,
 	extern void scsi_requeue_run_queue(struct work_struct *work);
 
 	sdev = kzalloc(sizeof(*sdev) + shost->transportt->device_size,
-		       GFP_ATOMIC);
+		       GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!sdev)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -791,7 +791,7 @@ static int scsi_add_lun(struct scsi_device *sdev, unsigned char *inq_result,
 	 */
 	sdev->inquiry = kmemdup(inq_result,
 				max_t(size_t, sdev->inquiry_len, 36),
-				GFP_ATOMIC);
+				GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (sdev->inquiry == NULL)
 		return SCSI_SCAN_NO_RESPONSE;
 
@@ -1085,7 +1085,7 @@ static int scsi_probe_and_add_lun(struct scsi_target *starget,
 	if (!sdev)
 		goto out;
 
-	result = kmalloc(result_len, GFP_ATOMIC |
+	result = kmalloc(result_len, GFP_KERNEL |
 			((shost->unchecked_isa_dma) ? __GFP_DMA : 0));
 	if (!result)
 		goto out_free_sdev;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#23 lore raw

PATCH 24/63 mmc: omap: fix the maximum timeout setting

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Aaro Koskinen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a6327b5e57fdc679c842588c3be046c0b39cc127 ]

When running OMAP1 kernel on QEMU, MMC access is annoyingly noisy:

	MMC: CTO of 0xff and 0xfe cannot be used!
	MMC: CTO of 0xff and 0xfe cannot be used!
	MMC: CTO of 0xff and 0xfe cannot be used!
	[ad inf.]

Emulator warnings appear to be valid. The TI document SPRU680 [1] ("OMAP5910 Dual-Core Processor MultiMedia Card/Secure Data Memory Card (MMC/SD) Reference Guide") page 36 states that the maximum timeout is 253 cycles and "0xff and 0xfe cannot be used".

Fix by using 0xfd as the maximum timeout.

Tested using QEMU 2.5 (Siemens SX1 machine, OMAP310), and also checked on real hardware using Palm TE (OMAP310), Nokia 770 (OMAP1710) and Nokia N810 (OMAP2420) that MMC works as before.

[1] http://www.ti.com/lit/ug/spru680/spru680.pdf

Fixes 730c9b7e6630f ("[MMC] Add OMAP MMC host driver")
---
 drivers/mmc/host/omap.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mmc/host/omap.c +1 -1
index 5bcf4f45f8b4..20d422558fa3 100644
@@ -921,7 +921,7 @@ static inline void set_cmd_timeout(struct mmc_omap_host *host, struct mmc_reques
 	reg &= ~(1 << 5);
 	OMAP_MMC_WRITE(host, SDIO, reg);
 	/* Set maximum timeout */
-	OMAP_MMC_WRITE(host, CTO, 0xff);
+	OMAP_MMC_WRITE(host, CTO, 0xfd);
 }
 
 static inline void set_data_timeout(struct mmc_omap_host *host, struct mmc_request *req)
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#25 lore raw

PATCH 26/63 IB/mlx4: Increase the timeout for CM cache

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Håkon Bugge <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2612d723aadcf8281f9bf8305657129bd9f3cd57 ]

Using CX-3 virtual functions, either from a bare-metal machine or pass-through from a VM, MAD packets are proxied through the PF driver.

Since the VF drivers have separate name spaces for MAD Transaction Ids (TIDs), the PF driver has to re-map the TIDs and keep the book keeping in a cache.

Following the RDMA Connection Manager (CM) protocol, it is clear when an entry has to evicted form the cache. But life is not perfect, remote peers may die or be rebooted. Hence, it's a timeout to wipe out a cache entry, when the PF driver assumes the remote peer has gone.

During workloads where a high number of QPs are destroyed concurrently, excessive amount of CM DREQ retries has been observed

The problem can be demonstrated in a bare-metal environment, where two nodes have instantiated 8 VFs each. This using dual ported HCAs, so we have 16 vPorts per physical server.

64 processes are associated with each vPort and creates and destroys one QP for each of the remote 64 processes. That is, 1024 QPs per vPort, all in all 16K QPs. The QPs are created/destroyed using the CM.

When tearing down these 16K QPs, excessive CM DREQ retries (and duplicates) are observed. With some cat/paste/awk wizardry on the infiniband_cm sysfs, we observe as sum of the 16 vPorts on one of the nodes:

cm_rx_duplicates:

      dreq  2102
cm_rx_msgs:
      drep  1989
      dreq  6195
       rep  3968
       req  4224
       rtu  4224
cm_tx_msgs:
      drep  4093
      dreq 27568
       rep  4224
       req  3968
       rtu  3968
cm_tx_retries:
      dreq 23469

Note that the active/passive side is equally distributed between the two nodes.

Enabling pr_debug in cm.c gives tons of:

[171778.814239] <mlx4_ib> mlx4_ib_multiplex_cm_handler: id{slave:

1,sl_cm_id: 0xd393089f} is NULL!

By increasing the CM_CLEANUP_CACHE_TIMEOUT from 5 to 30 seconds, the tear-down phase of the application is reduced from approximately 90 to 50 seconds. Retries/duplicates are also significantly reduced:

cm_rx_duplicates:

      dreq  2460
[]
cm_tx_retries:
      dreq  3010
       req    47

Increasing the timeout further didn't help, as these duplicates and retries stems from a too short CMA timeout, which was 20 (~4 seconds) on the systems. By increasing the CMA timeout to 22 (~17 seconds), the numbers fell down to about 10 for both of them.

Adjustment of the CMA timeout is not part of this commit.

---
 drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/cm.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/cm.c +1 -1
index 39a488889fc7..5dc920fe1326 100644
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
 
 #include "mlx4_ib.h"
 
-#define CM_CLEANUP_CACHE_TIMEOUT  (5 * HZ)
+#define CM_CLEANUP_CACHE_TIMEOUT  (30 * HZ)
 
 struct id_map_entry {
 	struct rb_node node;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#27 lore raw

PATCH 28/63 scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jason Yan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bcf3b67d16a4c8ffae0aa79de5853435e683945c ]

when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM, instead of 0.
In some case in:

    megasas_init_adapter_fusion()

    -->megasas_alloc_cmds()
       -->megasas_create_frame_pool
          create DMA pool failed,
        --> megasas_free_cmds() [1]

    -->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
       failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
    -->megasas_free_cmds() [2]

we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:

Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address

00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003, *pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707

Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
 task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
 PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
 LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
 ...
 Call trace:
 [<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
 [<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
 [<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
 [<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
 [<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
 [<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
 [<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
 [<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
 [<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
  [<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
 [<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
 [<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
 [<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
 [<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
 [<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
 [<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
 [<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
---
 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c +1 -0
index ac7acd257c99..2422094f1f15 100644
@@ -3847,6 +3847,7 @@ int megasas_alloc_cmds(struct megasas_instance *instance)
 	if (megasas_create_frame_pool(instance)) {
 		dev_printk(KERN_DEBUG, &instance->pdev->dev, "Error creating frame DMA pool\n");
 		megasas_free_cmds(instance);
+		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
 	return 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#29 lore raw

PATCH 30/63 SoC: imx-sgtl5000: add missing put_device()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Wen Yang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8fa857da9744f513036df1c43ab57f338941ae7d ]

The of_find_device_by_node() takes a reference to the underlying device structure, we should release that reference.

Detected by coccinelle with the following warnings:
./sound/soc/fsl/imx-sgtl5000.c:169:1-7: ERROR: missing put_device; call of_find_device_by_node on line 105, but without a corresponding object release within this function. ./sound/soc/fsl/imx-sgtl5000.c:177:1-7: ERROR: missing put_device; call of_find_device_by_node on line 105, but without a corresponding object release within this function.

Cc Timur Tabi <[email protected]>
Cc Nicolin Chen <[email protected]>
Cc Xiubo Li <[email protected]>
Cc Fabio Estevam <[email protected]>
Cc Liam Girdwood <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Cc Jaroslav Kysela <[email protected]>
Cc Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Cc Shawn Guo <[email protected]>
Cc Sascha Hauer <[email protected]>
Cc Pengutronix Kernel Team <[email protected]>
Cc NXP Linux Team <[email protected]>
---
 sound/soc/fsl/imx-sgtl5000.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/soc/fsl/imx-sgtl5000.c +1 -0
index b99e0b5e00e9..8e525f7ac08d 100644
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ static int imx_sgtl5000_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 		ret = -EPROBE_DEFER;
 		goto fail;
 	}
+	put_device(&ssi_pdev->dev);
 	codec_dev = of_find_i2c_device_by_node(codec_np);
 	if (!codec_dev) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to find codec platform device\n");
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#34 lore raw

PATCH 35/63 leds: lp55xx: fix null deref on firmware load failure

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Michal Kazior <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5ddb0869bfc1bca6cfc592c74c64a026f936638c ]

I've stumbled upon a kernel crash and the logs
pointed me towards the lp5562 driver:

Quoted 8 lines
<4>[306013.841294] lp5562 0-0030: Direct firmware load for lp5562 failed with error -2
<4>[306013.894990] lp5562 0-0030: Falling back to user helper
...
<3>[306073.924886] lp5562 0-0030: firmware request failed
<1>[306073.939456] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000
<4>[306074.251011] PC is at _raw_spin_lock+0x1c/0x58
<4>[306074.255539] LR is at release_firmware+0x6c/0x138

...

After taking a look I noticed firmware_release()
could be called with either NULL or a dangling
pointer.

Fixes 10c06d178df11 ("leds-lp55xx: support firmware interface")
---
 drivers/leds/leds-lp55xx-common.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/leds/leds-lp55xx-common.c +2 -2
index 59b76833f0d3..fd077c176a62 100644
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ static void lp55xx_firmware_loaded(const struct firmware *fw, void *context)
 
 	if (!fw) {
 		dev_err(dev, "firmware request failed\n");
-		goto out;
+		return;
 	}
 
 	/* handling firmware data is chip dependent */
@@ -213,9 +213,9 @@ static void lp55xx_firmware_loaded(const struct firmware *fw, void *context)
 
 	mutex_unlock(&chip->lock);
 
-out:
 	/* firmware should be released for other channel use */
 	release_firmware(chip->fw);
+	chip->fw = NULL;
 }
 
 static int lp55xx_request_firmware(struct lp55xx_chip *chip)
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#38 lore raw

PATCH 39/63 bcache: fix input overflow to cache set sysfs file io_error_halflife

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Coly Li <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a91fbda49f746119828f7e8ad0f0aa2ab0578f65 ]

Cache set sysfs entry io_error_halflife is used to set c->error_decay. c->error_decay is in type unsigned int, and it is converted by strtoul_or_return(), therefore overflow to c->error_decay is possible for a large input value.

This patch fixes the overflow by using strtoul_safe_clamp() to convert input string to an unsigned long value in range [0, UINT_MAX], then divides by 88 and set it to c->error_decay.

---
 drivers/md/bcache/sysfs.c | 13 +++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/md/bcache/sysfs.c +11 -2
index 5a5c1f1bd8a5..87daccbbc61b 100644
@@ -645,8 +645,17 @@ STORE(__bch_cache_set)
 		c->error_limit = strtoul_or_return(buf) << IO_ERROR_SHIFT;
 
 	/* See count_io_errors() for why 88 */
-	if (attr == &sysfs_io_error_halflife)
-		c->error_decay = strtoul_or_return(buf) / 88;
+	if (attr == &sysfs_io_error_halflife) {
+		unsigned long v = 0;
+		ssize_t ret;
+
+		ret = strtoul_safe_clamp(buf, v, 0, UINT_MAX);
+		if (!ret) {
+			c->error_decay = v / 88;
+			return size;
+		}
+		return ret;
+	}
 
 	sysfs_strtoul(journal_delay_ms,		c->journal_delay_ms);
 	sysfs_strtoul(verify,			c->verify);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#39 lore raw

PATCH 40/63 bcache: fix input overflow to sequential_cutoff

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Coly Li <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8c27a3953e92eb0b22dbb03d599f543a05f9574e ]

People may set sequential_cutoff of a cached device via sysfs file, but current code does not check input value overflow. E.g. if value 4294967295 (UINT_MAX) is written to file sequential_cutoff, its value is 4GB, but if 4294967296 (UINT_MAX + 1) is written into, its value will be 0. This is an unexpected behavior.

This patch replaces d_strtoi_h() by sysfs_strtoul_clamp() to convert input string to unsigned integer value, and limit its range in [0, UINT_MAX]. Then the input overflow can be fixed.

---
 drivers/md/bcache/sysfs.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/md/bcache/sysfs.c +3 -1
index 87daccbbc61b..463ce6757338 100644
@@ -215,7 +215,9 @@ STORE(__cached_dev)
 	d_strtoul(writeback_rate_d_term);
 	d_strtoul_nonzero(writeback_rate_p_term_inverse);
 
-	d_strtoi_h(sequential_cutoff);
+	sysfs_strtoul_clamp(sequential_cutoff,
+			    dc->sequential_cutoff,
+			    0, UINT_MAX);
 	d_strtoi_h(readahead);
 
 	if (attr == &sysfs_clear_stats)
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#40 lore raw

PATCH 41/63 bcache: improve sysfs_strtoul_clamp()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Coly Li <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 596b5a5dd1bc2fa019fdaaae522ef331deef927f ]

Currently sysfs_strtoul_clamp() is defined as,

 82 #define sysfs_strtoul_clamp(file, var, min, max)                   \
 83 do {                                                               \
 84         if (attr == &sysfs_ ## file)                               \
 85                 return strtoul_safe_clamp(buf, var, min, max)      \
 86                         ?: (ssize_t) size;                         \

87 } while (0)

The problem is, if bit width of var is less then unsigned long, min and max may not protect var from integer overflow, because overflow happens in strtoul_safe_clamp() before checking min and max.

To fix such overflow in sysfs_strtoul_clamp(), to make min and max take effect, this patch adds an unsigned long variable, and uses it to macro strtoul_safe_clamp() to convert an unsigned long value in range defined by [min, max]. Then assign this value to var. By this method, if bit width of var is less than unsigned long, integer overflow won't happen before min and max are checking.

Now sysfs_strtoul_clamp() can properly handle smaller data type like unsigned int, of cause min and max should be defined in range of unsigned int too.

---
 drivers/md/bcache/sysfs.h | 13 ++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/md/bcache/sysfs.h +10 -3
index 0526fe92a683..e7a3c12aa66f 100644
@@ -80,9 +80,16 @@ do {									\
 
 #define sysfs_strtoul_clamp(file, var, min, max)			\
 do {									\
-	if (attr == &sysfs_ ## file)					\
-		return strtoul_safe_clamp(buf, var, min, max)		\
-			?: (ssize_t) size;				\
+	if (attr == &sysfs_ ## file) {					\
+		unsigned long v = 0;					\
+		ssize_t ret;						\
+		ret = strtoul_safe_clamp(buf, v, min, max);		\
+		if (!ret) {						\
+			var = v;					\
+			return size;					\
+		}							\
+		return ret;						\
+	}								\
 } while (0)
 
 #define strtoul_or_return(cp)						\
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#41 lore raw

PATCH 42/63 fbdev: fbmem: fix memory access if logo is bigger than the screen

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Manfred Schlaegl <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a5399db139cb3ad9b8502d8b1bd02da9ce0b9df0 ]

There is no clipping on the x or y axis for logos larger that the framebuffer size. Therefore: a logo bigger than screen size leads to invalid memory access:

[    1.254664] Backtrace:
[    1.254728] [<c02714e0>] (cfb_imageblit) from [<c026184c>] (fb_show_logo+0x620/0x684)
[    1.254763]  r10:00000003 r9:00027fd8 r8:c6a40000 r7:c6a36e50 r6:00000000 r5:c06b81e4
[    1.254774]  r4:c6a3e800
[    1.254810] [<c026122c>] (fb_show_logo) from [<c026c1e4>] (fbcon_switch+0x3fc/0x46c)
[    1.254842]  r10:c6a3e824 r9:c6a3e800 r8:00000000 r7:c6a0c000 r6:c070b014 r5:c6a3e800
[    1.254852]  r4:c6808c00
[    1.254889] [<c026bde8>] (fbcon_switch) from [<c029c8f8>] (redraw_screen+0xf0/0x1e8)
[    1.254918]  r10:00000000 r9:00000000 r8:00000000 r7:00000000 r6:c070d5a0 r5:00000080
[    1.254928]  r4:c6808c00
[    1.254961] [<c029c808>] (redraw_screen) from [<c029d264>] (do_bind_con_driver+0x194/0x2e4)
[    1.254991]  r9:00000000 r8:00000000 r7:00000014 r6:c070d5a0 r5:c070d5a0 r4:c070d5a0

So prevent displaying a logo bigger than screen size and avoid invalid memory access.

---
 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c +3 -0
index ea2bd6208a2f..9eae191728d2 100644
@@ -425,6 +425,9 @@ static void fb_do_show_logo(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_image *image,
 {
 	unsigned int x;
 
+	if (image->width > info->var.xres || image->height > info->var.yres)
+		return;
+
 	if (rotate = FB_ROTATE_UR) {
 		for (x = 0;
 		     x < num && image->dx + image->width <= info->var.xres;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#46 lore raw

PATCH 47/63 soc: qcom: gsbi: Fix error handling in gsbi_probe()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Alexey Khoroshilov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8cd09a3dd3e176c62da67efcd477a44a8d87185e ]

If of_platform_populate() fails in gsbi_probe(), gsbi->hclk is left undisabled.

Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).

---
 drivers/soc/qcom/qcom_gsbi.c | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/soc/qcom/qcom_gsbi.c +5 -2
index 09c669e70d63..038abc377fdb 100644
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static int gsbi_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	struct resource *res;
 	void __iomem *base;
 	struct gsbi_info *gsbi;
-	int i;
+	int i, ret;
 	u32 mask, gsbi_num;
 	const struct crci_config *config = NULL;
 
@@ -221,7 +221,10 @@ static int gsbi_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	platform_set_drvdata(pdev, gsbi);
 
-	return of_platform_populate(node, NULL, NULL, &pdev->dev);
+	ret = of_platform_populate(node, NULL, NULL, &pdev->dev);
+	if (ret)
+		clk_disable_unprepare(gsbi->hclk);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static int gsbi_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#48 lore raw

PATCH 49/63 ARM: avoid Cortex-A9 livelock on tight dmb loops

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5388a5b82199facacd3d7ac0d05aca6e8f902fed ]

machine_crash_nonpanic_core() does this:

	while (1)
		cpu_relax();

because the kernel has crashed, and we have no known safe way to deal with the CPU. So, we place the CPU into an infinite loop which we expect it to never exit - at least not until the system as a whole is reset by some method.

In the absence of erratum 754327, this code assembles to:

	b	.

In other words, an infinite loop. When erratum 754327 is enabled, this becomes:

1: dmb

	b	1b

It has been observed that on some systems (eg, OMAP4) where, if a crash is triggered, the system tries to kexec into the panic kernel, but fails after taking the secondary CPU down - placing it into one of these loops. This causes the system to livelock, and the most noticable effect is the system stops after issuing:

Loading crashdump kernel...

to the system console.

The tested as working solution I came up with was to add wfe() to these infinite loops thusly:

	while (1) {
		cpu_relax();
		wfe();
	}

which, without 754327 builds to:

1: wfe

	b	1b

or with 754327 is enabled:

1: dmb

	wfe
	b	1b

Adding "wfe" does two things depending on the environment we're running under:
- where we're running on bare metal, and the processor implements "wfe", it stops us spinning endlessly in a loop where we're never going to do any useful work.
- if we're running in a VM, it allows the CPU to be given back to the hypervisor and rescheduled for other purposes (maybe a different VM) rather than wasting CPU cycles inside a crashed VM.

However, in light of erratum 794072, Will Deacon wanted to see 10 nops as well - which is reasonable to cover the case where we have erratum 754327 enabled _and_ we have a processor that doesn't implement the wfe hint.

So, we now end up with:

1: wfe
b 1b

when erratum 754327 is disabled, or:

1: dmb
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
wfe
b 1b

when erratum 754327 is enabled. We also get the dmb + 10 nop sequence elsewhere in the kernel, in terminating loops.

This is reasonable - it means we get the workaround for erratum 794072 when erratum 754327 is enabled, but still relinquish the dead processor - either by placing it in a lower power mode when wfe is implemented as such or by returning it to the hypervisior, or in the case where wfe is a no-op, we use the workaround specified in erratum 794072 to avoid the problem.

These as two entirely orthogonal problems - the 10 nops addresses erratum 794072, and the wfe is an optimisation that makes the system more efficient when crashed either in terms of power consumption or by allowing the host/other VMs to make use of the CPU.

I don't see any reason not to use kexec() inside a VM - it has the potential to provide automated recovery from a failure of the VMs kernel with the opportunity for saving a crashdump of the failure. A panic() with a reboot timeout won't do that, and reading the libvirt documentation, setting on_reboot to "preserve" won't either (the documentation states "The preserve action for an on_reboot event is treated as a destroy".) Surely it has to be a good thing to avoiding having CPUs spinning inside a VM that is doing no useful work.

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h   | 2 ++
 arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h | 6 +++++-
 arch/arm/kernel/machine_kexec.c  | 5 ++++-
 arch/arm/kernel/smp.c            | 4 +++-
 arch/arm/mach-omap2/prm_common.c | 4 +++-
 5 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h +2 -0
index 3ff5642d9788..27c1d26b05b5 100644
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
 #define sev()	__asm__ __volatile__ ("sev" : : : "memory")
 #define wfe()	__asm__ __volatile__ ("wfe" : : : "memory")
 #define wfi()	__asm__ __volatile__ ("wfi" : : : "memory")
+#else
+#define wfe()	do { } while (0)
 #endif
 
 #if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ >= 7
arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h +5 -1
index 8a1e8e995dae..08509183c7df 100644
@@ -77,7 +77,11 @@ extern void release_thread(struct task_struct *);
 unsigned long get_wchan(struct task_struct *p);
 
 #if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ == 6 || defined(CONFIG_ARM_ERRATA_754327)
-#define cpu_relax()			smp_mb()
+#define cpu_relax()						\
+	do {							\
+		smp_mb();					\
+		__asm__ __volatile__("nop; nop; nop; nop; nop; nop; nop; nop; nop; nop;");	\
+	} while (0)
 #else
 #define cpu_relax()			barrier()
 #endif
arch/arm/kernel/machine_kexec.c +4 -1
index 8bf3b7c09888..46519916a465 100644
@@ -87,8 +87,11 @@ void machine_crash_nonpanic_core(void *unused)
 
 	set_cpu_online(smp_processor_id(), false);
 	atomic_dec(&waiting_for_crash_ipi);
-	while (1)
+
+	while (1) {
 		cpu_relax();
+		wfe();
+	}
 }
 
 static void machine_kexec_mask_interrupts(void)
arch/arm/kernel/smp.c +3 -1
index 08ce9e36dc5a..0f1c11861147 100644
@@ -563,8 +563,10 @@ static void ipi_cpu_stop(unsigned int cpu)
 	local_fiq_disable();
 	local_irq_disable();
 
-	while (1)
+	while (1) {
 		cpu_relax();
+		wfe();
+	}
 }
 
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct completion *, cpu_completion);
arch/arm/mach-omap2/prm_common.c +3 -1
index 0ce4548ef7f0..4b9e9d1d8229 100644
@@ -533,8 +533,10 @@ void omap_prm_reset_system(void)
 
 	prm_ll_data->reset_system();
 
-	while (1)
+	while (1) {
 		cpu_relax();
+		wfe();
+	}
 }
 
 /**
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#52 lore raw

PATCH 53/63 soc/tegra: fuse: Fix illegal free of IO base address

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Timo Alho <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 51294bf6b9e897d595466dcda5a3f2751906a200 ]

On cases where device tree entries for fuse and clock provider are in different order, fuse driver needs to defer probing. This leads to freeing incorrect IO base address as the fuse->base variable gets overwritten once during first probe invocation. This leads to the following spew during boot:

[    3.082285] Trying to vfree() nonexistent vm area (00000000cfe8fd94)
[    3.082308] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 126 at /hdd/l4t/kernel/stable/mm/vmalloc.c:1511 __vunmap+0xcc/0xd8
[    3.082318] Modules linked in:
[    3.082330] CPU: 5 PID: 126 Comm: kworker/5:1 Tainted: G S                4.19.7-tegra-gce119d3 #1
[    3.082340] Hardware name: quill (DT)
[    3.082353] Workqueue: events deferred_probe_work_func
[    3.082364] pstate: 40000005 (nZcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[    3.082372] pc : __vunmap+0xcc/0xd8
[    3.082379] lr : __vunmap+0xcc/0xd8
[    3.082385] sp : ffff00000a1d3b60
[    3.082391] x29: ffff00000a1d3b60 x28: 0000000000000000
[    3.082402] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffff000008e8b610
[    3.082413] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000009
[    3.082423] x23: ffff000009221a90 x22: ffff000009f6d000
[    3.082432] x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 0000000000000000
[    3.082442] x19: ffff000009f6d000 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[    3.082452] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[    3.082462] x15: ffff0000091396c8 x14: 0720072007200720
[    3.082471] x13: 0720072007200720 x12: 0720072907340739
[    3.082481] x11: 0764076607380765 x10: 0766076307300730
[    3.082491] x9 : 0730073007300730 x8 : 0730073007280720
[    3.082501] x7 : 0761076507720761 x6 : 0000000000000102
[    3.082510] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000
[    3.082519] x3 : ffffffffffffffff x2 : ffff000009150ff8
[    3.082528] x1 : 3d95b1429fff5200 x0 : 0000000000000000
[    3.082538] Call trace:
[    3.082545]  __vunmap+0xcc/0xd8
[    3.082552]  vunmap+0x24/0x30
[    3.082561]  __iounmap+0x2c/0x38
[    3.082569]  tegra_fuse_probe+0xc8/0x118
[    3.082577]  platform_drv_probe+0x50/0xa0
[    3.082585]  really_probe+0x1b0/0x288
[    3.082593]  driver_probe_device+0x58/0x100
[    3.082601]  __device_attach_driver+0x98/0xf0
[    3.082609]  bus_for_each_drv+0x64/0xc8
[    3.082616]  __device_attach+0xd8/0x130
[    3.082624]  device_initial_probe+0x10/0x18
[    3.082631]  bus_probe_device+0x90/0x98
[    3.082638]  deferred_probe_work_func+0x74/0xb0
[    3.082649]  process_one_work+0x1e0/0x318
[    3.082656]  worker_thread+0x228/0x450
[    3.082664]  kthread+0x128/0x130
[    3.082672]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
[    3.082678] ---[ end trace 0810fe6ba772c1c7 ]---

Fix this by retaining the value of fuse->base until driver has successfully probed.

---
 drivers/soc/tegra/fuse/fuse-tegra.c | 12 +++++++++---
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/soc/tegra/fuse/fuse-tegra.c +9 -3
index de2c1bfe28b5..c4f5e5bbb8dc 100644
@@ -131,13 +131,17 @@ static int tegra_fuse_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	/* take over the memory region from the early initialization */
 	res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
 	fuse->base = devm_ioremap_resource(&pdev->dev, res);
-	if (IS_ERR(fuse->base))
-		return PTR_ERR(fuse->base);
+	if (IS_ERR(fuse->base)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(fuse->base);
+		fuse->base = base;
+		return err;
+	}
 
 	fuse->clk = devm_clk_get(&pdev->dev, "fuse");
 	if (IS_ERR(fuse->clk)) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to get FUSE clock: %ld",
 			PTR_ERR(fuse->clk));
+		fuse->base = base;
 		return PTR_ERR(fuse->clk);
 	}
 
@@ -146,8 +150,10 @@ static int tegra_fuse_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	if (fuse->soc->probe) {
 		err = fuse->soc->probe(fuse);
-		if (err < 0)
+		if (err < 0) {
+			fuse->base = base;
 			return err;
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (tegra_fuse_create_sysfs(&pdev->dev, fuse->soc->info->size,
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#61 lore raw

PATCH 62/63 dmaengine: tegra: avoid overflow of byte tracking

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ben Dooks <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e486df39305864604b7e25f2a95d51039517ac57 ]

The dma_desc->bytes_transferred counter tracks the number of bytes moved by the DMA channel. This is then used to calculate the information passed back in the in the tegra_dma_tx_status callback, which is usually fine.

When the DMA channel is configured as continous, then the bytes_transferred counter will increase over time and eventually overflow to become negative so the residue count will become invalid and the ALSA sound-dma code will report invalid hardware pointer values to the application. This results in some users becoming confused about the playout position and putting audio data in the wrong place.

To fix this issue, always ensure the bytes_transferred field is modulo the size of the request. We only do this for the case of the cyclic transfer done ISR as anyone attempting to move 2GiB of DMA data in one transfer is unlikely.

Note, we don't fix the issue that we should /never/ transfer a negative number of bytes so we could make those fields unsigned.

---
 drivers/dma/tegra20-apb-dma.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/dma/tegra20-apb-dma.c +4 -1
index c8f79dcaaee8..67f201b8dcda 100644
@@ -632,7 +632,10 @@ static void handle_cont_sngl_cycle_dma_done(struct tegra_dma_channel *tdc,
 
 	sgreq = list_first_entry(&tdc->pending_sg_req, typeof(*sgreq), node);
 	dma_desc = sgreq->dma_desc;
-	dma_desc->bytes_transferred += sgreq->req_len;
+	/* if we dma for long enough the transfer count will wrap */
+	dma_desc->bytes_transferred =
+		(dma_desc->bytes_transferred + sgreq->req_len) %
+		dma_desc->bytes_requested;
 
 	/* Callback need to be call */
 	if (!dma_desc->cb_count)
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH 8/63 mm/cma.c: cma_declare_contiguous: correct err handling

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Peng Fan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0d3bd18a5efd66097ef58622b898d3139790aa9d ]

In case cma_init_reserved_mem failed, need to free the memblock allocated by memblock_reserve or memblock_alloc_range.

Quote Catalin's comments:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/2/26/482

Kmemleak is supposed to work with the memblock_{alloc,free} pair and it ignores the memblock_reserve() as a memblock_alloc() implementation detail. It is, however, tolerant to memblock_free() being called on a sub-range or just a different range from a previous memblock_alloc(). So the original patch looks fine to me. FWIW:

---
 mm/cma.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/cma.c +3 -1
index 43f4a122e969..f0d91aca5a4c 100644
@@ -339,12 +339,14 @@ int __init cma_declare_contiguous(phys_addr_t base,
 
 	ret = cma_init_reserved_mem(base, size, order_per_bit, res_cma);
 	if (ret)
-		goto err;
+		goto free_mem;
 
 	pr_info("Reserved %ld MiB at %pa\n", (unsigned long)size / SZ_1M,
 		&base);
 	return 0;
 
+free_mem:
+	memblock_free(base, size);
 err:
 	pr_err("Failed to reserve %ld MiB\n", (unsigned long)size / SZ_1M);
 	return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH 7/63 enic: fix build warning without CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 43d281662fdb46750d49417559b71069f435298d ]

The enic driver relies on the CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK feature to dynamically allocate a struct member, but this is normally intended for local variables.

Building with clang, I get a warning for a few locations that check the address of the cpumask_var_t:

drivers/net/ethernet/cisco/enic/enic_main.c:122:22: error: address of array 'enic->msix[i].affinity_mask' will always evaluate to 'true' [-Werror,-Wpointer-bool-conversion]

As far as I can tell, the code is still correct, as the truth value of the pointer is what we need in this configuration. To get rid of the warning, use cpumask_available() instead of checking the pointer directly.

Fixes 322cf7e3a4e8 ("enic: assign affinity hint to interrupts")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/cisco/enic/enic_main.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/cisco/enic/enic_main.c +3 -3
index 9ef4caa4b84d..3c20d0dc9256 100644
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ static void enic_init_affinity_hint(struct enic *enic)
 
 	for (i = 0; i < enic->intr_count; i++) {
 		if (enic_is_err_intr(enic, i) || enic_is_notify_intr(enic, i) ||
-		    (enic->msix[i].affinity_mask &&
+		    (cpumask_available(enic->msix[i].affinity_mask) &&
 		     !cpumask_empty(enic->msix[i].affinity_mask)))
 			continue;
 		if (zalloc_cpumask_var(&enic->msix[i].affinity_mask,
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static void enic_set_affinity_hint(struct enic *enic)
 	for (i = 0; i < enic->intr_count; i++) {
 		if (enic_is_err_intr(enic, i)		||
 		    enic_is_notify_intr(enic, i)	||
-		    !enic->msix[i].affinity_mask	||
+		    !cpumask_available(enic->msix[i].affinity_mask) ||
 		    cpumask_empty(enic->msix[i].affinity_mask))
 			continue;
 		err = irq_set_affinity_hint(enic->msix_entry[i].vector,
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ static void enic_set_affinity_hint(struct enic *enic)
 	for (i = 0; i < enic->wq_count; i++) {
 		int wq_intr = enic_msix_wq_intr(enic, i);
 
-		if (enic->msix[wq_intr].affinity_mask &&
+		if (cpumask_available(enic->msix[wq_intr].affinity_mask) &&
 		    !cpumask_empty(enic->msix[wq_intr].affinity_mask))
 			netif_set_xps_queue(enic->netdev,
 					    enic->msix[wq_intr].affinity_mask,
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH 9/63 mm/page_ext.c: fix an imbalance with kmemleak

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Qian Cai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0c81585499601acd1d0e1cbf424cabfaee60628c ]

After offlining a memory block, kmemleak scan will trigger a crash, as it encounters a page ext address that has already been freed during memory offlining. At the beginning in alloc_page_ext(), it calls kmemleak_alloc(), but it does not call kmemleak_free() in free_page_ext().

    BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff888453d00000
    PGD 128a01067 P4D 128a01067 PUD 128a04067 PMD 47e09e067 PTE 800ffffbac2ff060
    Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI
    CPU: 1 PID: 1594 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.0.0-rc8+ #15
    Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL180 Gen9/ProLiant DL180 Gen9, BIOS U20 10/25/2017
    RIP: 0010:scan_block+0xb5/0x290
    Code: 85 6e 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 30 f5 81 88 ff ff 48 39 c3 0f 84 5b 01 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 20 00 0f 85 87 01 00 00 <4c> 8b 3b e8 f3 0c fa ff 4c 39 3d 0c 6b 4c 01 0f 87 08 01 00 00 4c
    RSP: 0018:ffff8881ec57f8e0 EFLAGS: 00010082
    RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888453d00000 RCX: ffffffffa61e5a54
    RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff888453d00000
    RBP: ffff8881ec57f920 R08: fffffbfff4ed588d R09: fffffbfff4ed588c
    R10: fffffbfff4ed588c R11: ffffffffa76ac463 R12: dffffc0000000000
    R13: ffff888453d00ff9 R14: ffff8881f80cef48 R15: ffff8881f80cef48
    FS:  00007f6c0e3f8740(0000) GS:ffff8881f7680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: ffff888453d00000 CR3: 00000001c4244003 CR4: 00000000001606a0
    Call Trace:
     scan_gray_list+0x269/0x430
     kmemleak_scan+0x5a8/0x10f0
     kmemleak_write+0x541/0x6ca
     full_proxy_write+0xf8/0x190
     __vfs_write+0xeb/0x980
     vfs_write+0x15a/0x4f0
     ksys_write+0xd2/0x1b0
     __x64_sys_write+0x73/0xb0
     do_syscall_64+0xeb/0xaaa
     entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
    RIP: 0033:0x7f6c0dad73b8
    Code: 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8d 05 65 63 2d 00 8b 00 85 c0 75 17 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 58 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 41 54 49 89 d4 55
    RSP: 002b:00007ffd5b863cb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
    RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00007f6c0dad73b8
    RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 000055a9216e1710 RDI: 0000000000000001
    RBP: 000055a9216e1710 R08: 000000000000000a R09: 00007ffd5b863840
    R10: 000000000000000a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f6c0dda9780
    R13: 0000000000000005 R14: 00007f6c0dda4740 R15: 0000000000000005
    Modules linked in: nls_iso8859_1 nls_cp437 vfat fat kvm_intel kvm irqbypass efivars ip_tables x_tables xfs sd_mod ahci libahci igb i2c_algo_bit libata i2c_core dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod efivarfs
    CR2: ffff888453d00000
    ---[ end trace ccf646c7456717c5 ]---
    Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
    Shutting down cpus with NMI
    Kernel Offset: 0x24c00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range:
    0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)
    ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]---
---
 mm/page_ext.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
mm/page_ext.c +1 -0
index 4d1eac0d4fc5..de1f34c5a2f1 100644
@@ -255,6 +255,7 @@ static void free_page_ext(void *addr)
 		table_size = sizeof(struct page_ext) * PAGES_PER_SECTION;
 
 		BUG_ON(PageReserved(page));
+		kmemleak_free(addr);
 		free_pages_exact(addr, table_size);
 	}
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH 10/63 mm/vmalloc.c: fix kernel BUG at mm/vmalloc.c:512!

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit afd07389d3f4933c7f7817a92fb5e053d59a3182 ]

One of the vmalloc stress test case triggers the kernel BUG():

<snip>

  [60.562151] ------------[ cut here ]------------
  [60.562154] kernel BUG at mm/vmalloc.c:512!
  [60.562206] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
  [60.562247] CPU: 0 PID: 430 Comm: vmalloc_test/0 Not tainted 4.20.0+ #161
  [60.562293] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014
  [60.562351] RIP: 0010:alloc_vmap_area+0x36f/0x390
  <snip>

it can happen due to big align request resulting in overflowing of calculated address, i.e. it becomes 0 after ALIGN()'s fixup.

Fix it by checking if calculated address is within vstart/vend range.

---
 mm/vmalloc.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/vmalloc.c +5 -1
index 400e580725da..7c556b59f0ec 100644
@@ -446,7 +446,11 @@ static struct vmap_area *alloc_vmap_area(unsigned long size,
 	}
 
 found:
-	if (addr + size > vend)
+	/*
+	 * Check also calculated address against the vstart,
+	 * because it can be 0 because of big align request.
+	 */
+	if (addr + size > vend || addr < vstart)
 		goto overflow;
 
 	va->va_start = addr;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH 11/63 mm/slab.c: kmemleak no scan alien caches

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Qian Cai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 92d1d07daad65c300c7d0b68bbef8867e9895d54 ]

Kmemleak throws endless warnings during boot due to in __alloc_alien_cache(),

    alc = kmalloc_node(memsize, gfp, node);
    init_arraycache(&alc->ac, entries, batch);
    kmemleak_no_scan(ac);

Kmemleak does not track the array cache (alc->ac) but the alien cache (alc) instead, so let it track the latter by lifting kmemleak_no_scan() out of init_arraycache().

There is another place that calls init_arraycache(), but alloc_kmem_cache_cpus() uses the percpu allocation where will never be considered as a leak.

kmemleak: Found object by alias at 0xffff8007b9aa7e38

  CPU: 190 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #2
  Call trace:
   dump_backtrace+0x0/0x168
   show_stack+0x24/0x30
   dump_stack+0x88/0xb0
   lookup_object+0x84/0xac
   find_and_get_object+0x84/0xe4
   kmemleak_no_scan+0x74/0xf4
   setup_kmem_cache_node+0x2b4/0x35c
   __do_tune_cpucache+0x250/0x2d4
   do_tune_cpucache+0x4c/0xe4
   enable_cpucache+0xc8/0x110
   setup_cpu_cache+0x40/0x1b8
   __kmem_cache_create+0x240/0x358
   create_cache+0xc0/0x198
   kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x158/0x20c
   kmem_cache_create+0x50/0x64
   fsnotify_init+0x58/0x6c
   do_one_initcall+0x194/0x388
   kernel_init_freeable+0x668/0x688
   kernel_init+0x18/0x124
   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
  kmemleak: Object 0xffff8007b9aa7e00 (size 256):
  kmemleak:   comm "swapper/0", pid 1, jiffies 4294697137
  kmemleak:   min_count = 1
  kmemleak:   count = 0
  kmemleak:   flags = 0x1
  kmemleak:   checksum = 0
  kmemleak:   backtrace:
       kmemleak_alloc+0x84/0xb8
       kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace+0x31c/0x3a0
       __kmalloc_node+0x58/0x78
       setup_kmem_cache_node+0x26c/0x35c
       __do_tune_cpucache+0x250/0x2d4
       do_tune_cpucache+0x4c/0xe4
       enable_cpucache+0xc8/0x110
       setup_cpu_cache+0x40/0x1b8
       __kmem_cache_create+0x240/0x358
       create_cache+0xc0/0x198
       kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x158/0x20c
       kmem_cache_create+0x50/0x64
       fsnotify_init+0x58/0x6c
       do_one_initcall+0x194/0x388
       kernel_init_freeable+0x668/0x688
       kernel_init+0x18/0x124
  kmemleak: Not scanning unknown object at 0xffff8007b9aa7e38
  CPU: 190 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #2
  Call trace:
   dump_backtrace+0x0/0x168
   show_stack+0x24/0x30
   dump_stack+0x88/0xb0
   kmemleak_no_scan+0x90/0xf4
   setup_kmem_cache_node+0x2b4/0x35c
   __do_tune_cpucache+0x250/0x2d4
   do_tune_cpucache+0x4c/0xe4
   enable_cpucache+0xc8/0x110
   setup_cpu_cache+0x40/0x1b8
   __kmem_cache_create+0x240/0x358
   create_cache+0xc0/0x198
   kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x158/0x20c
   kmem_cache_create+0x50/0x64
   fsnotify_init+0x58/0x6c
   do_one_initcall+0x194/0x388
   kernel_init_freeable+0x668/0x688
   kernel_init+0x18/0x124
   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
Fixes 1fe00d50a9e8 ("slab: factor out initialization of array cache")
Cc Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc Pekka Enberg <[email protected]>
Cc David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
---
 mm/slab.c | 17 +++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
mm/slab.c +9 -8
index 92df044f5e00..d043b8007f23 100644
@@ -660,14 +660,6 @@ static void start_cpu_timer(int cpu)
 
 static void init_arraycache(struct array_cache *ac, int limit, int batch)
 {
-	/*
-	 * The array_cache structures contain pointers to free object.
-	 * However, when such objects are allocated or transferred to another
-	 * cache the pointers are not cleared and they could be counted as
-	 * valid references during a kmemleak scan. Therefore, kmemleak must
-	 * not scan such objects.
-	 */
-	kmemleak_no_scan(ac);
 	if (ac) {
 		ac->avail = 0;
 		ac->limit = limit;
@@ -683,6 +675,14 @@ static struct array_cache *alloc_arraycache(int node, int entries,
 	struct array_cache *ac = NULL;
 
 	ac = kmalloc_node(memsize, gfp, node);
+	/*
+	 * The array_cache structures contain pointers to free object.
+	 * However, when such objects are allocated or transferred to another
+	 * cache the pointers are not cleared and they could be counted as
+	 * valid references during a kmemleak scan. Therefore, kmemleak must
+	 * not scan such objects.
+	 */
+	kmemleak_no_scan(ac);
 	init_arraycache(ac, entries, batchcount);
 	return ac;
 }
@@ -876,6 +876,7 @@ static struct alien_cache *__alloc_alien_cache(int node, int entries,
 
 	alc = kmalloc_node(memsize, gfp, node);
 	if (alc) {
+		kmemleak_no_scan(alc);
 		init_arraycache(&alc->ac, entries, batch);
 		spin_lock_init(&alc->lock);
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#11 lore raw

PATCH 12/63 ocfs2: fix a panic problem caused by o2cb_ctl

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jia Guo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cc725ef3cb202ef2019a3c67c8913efa05c3cce6 ]

In the process of creating a node, it will cause NULL pointer dereference in kernel if o2cb_ctl failed in the interval (mkdir, o2cb_set_node_attribute(node_num)] in function o2cb_add_node.

The node num is initialized to 0 in function o2nm_node_group_make_item, o2nm_node_group_drop_item will mistake the node number 0 for a valid node number when we delete the node before the node number is set correctly. If the local node number of the current host happens to be 0, cluster->cl_local_node will be set to O2NM_INVALID_NODE_NUM while o2hb_thread still running. The panic stack is generated as follows:

  o2hb_thread
      \-o2hb_do_disk_heartbeat
          \-o2hb_check_own_slot
              |-slot = &reg->hr_slots[o2nm_this_node()];
              //o2nm_this_node() return O2NM_INVALID_NODE_NUM

We need to check whether the node number is set when we delete the node.

---
 fs/ocfs2/cluster/nodemanager.c | 14 ++++++++------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/ocfs2/cluster/nodemanager.c +8 -6
index 3c45a9301a09..a87a08e1bfab 100644
@@ -621,13 +621,15 @@ static void o2nm_node_group_drop_item(struct config_group *group,
 	struct o2nm_node *node = to_o2nm_node(item);
 	struct o2nm_cluster *cluster = to_o2nm_cluster(group->cg_item.ci_parent);
 
-	o2net_disconnect_node(node);
+	if (cluster->cl_nodes[node->nd_num] == node) {
+		o2net_disconnect_node(node);
 
-	if (cluster->cl_has_local &&
-	    (cluster->cl_local_node == node->nd_num)) {
-		cluster->cl_has_local = 0;
-		cluster->cl_local_node = O2NM_INVALID_NODE_NUM;
-		o2net_stop_listening(node);
+		if (cluster->cl_has_local &&
+		    (cluster->cl_local_node == node->nd_num)) {
+			cluster->cl_has_local = 0;
+			cluster->cl_local_node = O2NM_INVALID_NODE_NUM;
+			o2net_stop_listening(node);
+		}
 	}
 
 	/* XXX call into net to stop this node from trading messages */
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#15 lore raw

PATCH 16/63 dm thin: add sanity checks to thin-pool and external snapshot creation

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: "Jason Cai (Xiang Feng)" <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 70de2cbda8a5d788284469e755f8b097d339c240 ]

Invoking dm_get_device() twice on the same device path with different modes is dangerous. Because in that case, upgrade_mode() will alloc a new 'dm_dev' and free the old one, which may be referenced by a previous caller. Dereferencing the dangling pointer will trigger kernel NULL pointer dereference.

The following two cases can reproduce this issue. Actually, they are invalid setups that must be disallowed, e.g.:

1. Creating a thin-pool with read_only mode, and the same device as both metadata and data.

dmsetup create thinp --table \
    "0 41943040 thin-pool /dev/vdb /dev/vdb 128 0 1 read_only"
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000080
...
Call Trace:
 new_read+0xfb/0x110 [dm_bufio]
 dm_bm_read_lock+0x43/0x190 [dm_persistent_data]
 ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x15c/0x1e0
 __create_persistent_data_objects+0x65/0x3e0 [dm_thin_pool]
 dm_pool_metadata_open+0x8c/0xf0 [dm_thin_pool]
 pool_ctr.cold.79+0x213/0x913 [dm_thin_pool]
 ? realloc_argv+0x50/0x70 [dm_mod]
 dm_table_add_target+0x14e/0x330 [dm_mod]
 table_load+0x122/0x2e0 [dm_mod]
 ? dev_status+0x40/0x40 [dm_mod]
 ctl_ioctl+0x1aa/0x3e0 [dm_mod]
 dm_ctl_ioctl+0xa/0x10 [dm_mod]
 do_vfs_ioctl+0xa2/0x600
 ? handle_mm_fault+0xda/0x200
 ? __do_page_fault+0x26c/0x4f0
 ksys_ioctl+0x60/0x90
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
 do_syscall_64+0x55/0x150
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

2. Creating a external snapshot using the same thin-pool device.

dmsetup create thinp --table \
    "0 41943040 thin-pool /dev/vdc /dev/vdb 128 0 2 ignore_discard"
dmsetup message /dev/mapper/thinp 0 "create_thin 0"
dmsetup create snap --table \
            "0 204800 thin /dev/mapper/thinp 0 /dev/mapper/thinp"
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
...
Call Trace:
? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x13c/0x2e0
retrieve_status+0xa5/0x1f0 [dm_mod]
? dm_get_live_or_inactive_table.isra.7+0x20/0x20 [dm_mod]
 table_status+0x61/0xa0 [dm_mod]
 ctl_ioctl+0x1aa/0x3e0 [dm_mod]
 dm_ctl_ioctl+0xa/0x10 [dm_mod]
 do_vfs_ioctl+0xa2/0x600
 ksys_ioctl+0x60/0x90
 ? ksys_write+0x4f/0xb0
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
 do_syscall_64+0x55/0x150
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
---
 drivers/md/dm-thin.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
drivers/md/dm-thin.c +13 -0
index 07eaa9f90712..d52ea584e0bc 100644
@@ -3210,6 +3210,13 @@ static int pool_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv)
 	as.argc = argc;
 	as.argv = argv;
 
+	/* make sure metadata and data are different devices */
+	if (!strcmp(argv[0], argv[1])) {
+		ti->error = "Error setting metadata or data device";
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * Set default pool features.
 	 */
@@ -4092,6 +4099,12 @@ static int thin_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv)
 	tc->sort_bio_list = RB_ROOT;
 
 	if (argc == 3) {
+		if (!strcmp(argv[0], argv[2])) {
+			ti->error = "Error setting origin device";
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto bad_origin_dev;
+		}
+
 		r = dm_get_device(ti, argv[2], FMODE_READ, &origin_dev);
 		if (r) {
 			ti->error = "Error opening origin device";
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#19 lore raw

PATCH 20/63 usb: chipidea: Grab the (legacy) USB PHY by phandle first

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Paul Kocialkowski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 68ef236274793066b9ba3154b16c0acc1c891e5c ]

According to the chipidea driver bindings, the USB PHY is specified via the "phys" phandle node. However, this only takes effect for USB PHYs that use the common PHY framework. For legacy USB PHYs, a simple lookup based on the USB PHY type is done instead.

This does not play out well when more than one USB PHY is registered, since the first registered PHY matching the type will always be returned regardless of what the driver was bound to.

Fix this by looking up the PHY based on the "phys" phandle node. Although generic PHYs are rather matched by their "phys-name" and not the "phys" phandle directly, there is no helper for similar lookup on legacy PHYs and it's probably not worth the effort to add it.

When no legacy USB PHY is found by phandle, fallback to grabbing any registered USB2 PHY. This ensures backward compatibility if some users were actually relying on this mechanism.

---
 drivers/usb/chipidea/core.c | 9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/chipidea/core.c +8 -1
index 57ee43512992..dee22d8effda 100644
@@ -913,8 +913,15 @@ static int ci_hdrc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	} else if (ci->platdata->usb_phy) {
 		ci->usb_phy = ci->platdata->usb_phy;
 	} else {
+		ci->usb_phy = devm_usb_get_phy_by_phandle(dev->parent, "phys",
+							  0);
 		ci->phy = devm_phy_get(dev->parent, "usb-phy");
-		ci->usb_phy = devm_usb_get_phy(dev->parent, USB_PHY_TYPE_USB2);
+
+		/* Fallback to grabbing any registered USB2 PHY */
+		if (IS_ERR(ci->usb_phy) &&
+		    PTR_ERR(ci->usb_phy) != -EPROBE_DEFER)
+			ci->usb_phy = devm_usb_get_phy(dev->parent,
+						       USB_PHY_TYPE_USB2);
 
 		/* if both generic PHY and USB PHY layers aren't enabled */
 		if (PTR_ERR(ci->phy) == -ENOSYS &&
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#18 lore raw

PATCH 19/63 tools lib traceevent: Fix buffer overflow in arg_eval

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Tony Jones <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7c5b019e3a638a5a290b0ec020f6ca83d2ec2aaa ]

Fix buffer overflow observed when running perf test.

The overflow is when trying to evaluate "1ULL << (64 - 1)" which is resulting in -9223372036854775808 which overflows the 20 character buffer.

If is possible this bug has been reported before but I still don't see any fix checked in:

See: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-perf-users/msg07714.html

---
 tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c +1 -1
index 6e4a10fe9dd0..743746a3c50d 100644
@@ -2419,7 +2419,7 @@ static int arg_num_eval(struct print_arg *arg, long long *val)
 static char *arg_eval (struct print_arg *arg)
 {
 	long long val;
-	static char buf[20];
+	static char buf[24];
 
 	switch (arg->type) {
 	case PRINT_ATOM:
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#21 lore raw

PATCH 22/63 coresight: etm4x: Add support to enable ETMv4.2

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Sai Prakash Ranjan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5666dfd1d8a45a167f0d8b4ef47ea7f780b1f24a ]

SDM845 has ETMv4.2 and can use the existing etm4x driver. But the current etm driver checks only for ETMv4.0 and errors out for other etm4x versions. This patch adds this missing support to enable SoC's with ETMv4x to use same driver by checking only the ETM architecture major version number.

Without this change, we get below error during etm probe:

/ # dmesg | grep etm

[    6.660093] coresight-etm4x: probe of 7040000.etm failed with error -22
[    6.666902] coresight-etm4x: probe of 7140000.etm failed with error -22
[    6.673708] coresight-etm4x: probe of 7240000.etm failed with error -22
[    6.680511] coresight-etm4x: probe of 7340000.etm failed with error -22
[    6.687313] coresight-etm4x: probe of 7440000.etm failed with error -22
[    6.694113] coresight-etm4x: probe of 7540000.etm failed with error -22
[    6.700914] coresight-etm4x: probe of 7640000.etm failed with error -22
[    6.707717] coresight-etm4x: probe of 7740000.etm failed with error -22

With this change, etm probe is successful:

/ # dmesg | grep etm

[    6.659198] coresight-etm4x 7040000.etm: CPU0: ETM v4.2 initialized
[    6.665848] coresight-etm4x 7140000.etm: CPU1: ETM v4.2 initialized
[    6.672493] coresight-etm4x 7240000.etm: CPU2: ETM v4.2 initialized
[    6.679129] coresight-etm4x 7340000.etm: CPU3: ETM v4.2 initialized
[    6.685770] coresight-etm4x 7440000.etm: CPU4: ETM v4.2 initialized
[    6.692403] coresight-etm4x 7540000.etm: CPU5: ETM v4.2 initialized
[    6.699024] coresight-etm4x 7640000.etm: CPU6: ETM v4.2 initialized
[    6.705646] coresight-etm4x 7740000.etm: CPU7: ETM v4.2 initialized
---
 drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x.c +2 -1
index a6707642bb23..89569866ea7c 100644
@@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ static void etm4_os_unlock(void *info)
 
 static bool etm4_arch_supported(u8 arch)
 {
-	switch (arch) {
+	/* Mask out the minor version number */
+	switch (arch & 0xf0) {
 	case ETM_ARCH_V4:
 		break;
 	default:
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#24 lore raw

PATCH 25/63 e1000e: Fix -Wformat-truncation warnings

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 135e7245479addc6b1f5d031e3d7e2ddb3d2b109 ]

Provide precision hints to snprintf() since we know the destination buffer size of the RX/TX ring names are IFNAMSIZ + 5 - 1. This fixes the following warnings:

drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c: In function 'e1000_request_msix':
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c:2109:13: warning: 'snprintf' output may be truncated before the last format character [-Wformat-truncation=]

     "%s-rx-0", netdev->name);
             ^

drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c:2107:3: note: 'snprintf' output between 6 and 21 bytes into a destination of size 20
snprintf(adapter->rx_ring->name, ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

     sizeof(adapter->rx_ring->name) - 1,
     ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
     "%s-rx-0", netdev->name);
     ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c:2125:13: warning: 'snprintf'
output may be truncated before the last format character
[-Wformat-truncation=]
     "%s-tx-0", netdev->name);
             ^

drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c:2123:3: note: 'snprintf' output between 6 and 21 bytes into a destination of size 20
snprintf(adapter->tx_ring->name, ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

     sizeof(adapter->tx_ring->name) - 1,
     ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
     "%s-tx-0", netdev->name);
     ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c +2 -2
index 6369d88b81c1..6b1cacd86c6e 100644
@@ -2131,7 +2131,7 @@ static int e1000_request_msix(struct e1000_adapter *adapter)
 	if (strlen(netdev->name) < (IFNAMSIZ - 5))
 		snprintf(adapter->rx_ring->name,
 			 sizeof(adapter->rx_ring->name) - 1,
-			 "%s-rx-0", netdev->name);
+			 "%.14s-rx-0", netdev->name);
 	else
 		memcpy(adapter->rx_ring->name, netdev->name, IFNAMSIZ);
 	err = request_irq(adapter->msix_entries[vector].vector,
@@ -2147,7 +2147,7 @@ static int e1000_request_msix(struct e1000_adapter *adapter)
 	if (strlen(netdev->name) < (IFNAMSIZ - 5))
 		snprintf(adapter->tx_ring->name,
 			 sizeof(adapter->tx_ring->name) - 1,
-			 "%s-tx-0", netdev->name);
+			 "%.14s-tx-0", netdev->name);
 	else
 		memcpy(adapter->tx_ring->name, netdev->name, IFNAMSIZ);
 	err = request_irq(adapter->msix_entries[vector].vector,
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#31 lore raw

PATCH 32/63 media: s5p-jpeg: Correct return type for mem2mem buffer helpers

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ezequiel Garcia <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4a88f89885c7cf65c62793f385261a6e3315178a ]

Fix the assigned type of mem2mem buffer handling API. Namely, these functions:

v4l2_m2m_next_buf
v4l2_m2m_last_buf
v4l2_m2m_buf_remove
v4l2_m2m_next_src_buf
v4l2_m2m_next_dst_buf
v4l2_m2m_last_src_buf
v4l2_m2m_last_dst_buf
v4l2_m2m_src_buf_remove
v4l2_m2m_dst_buf_remove

return a struct vb2_v4l2_buffer, and not a struct vb2_buffer.

Fixing this is necessary to fix the mem2mem buffer handling API, changing the return to the correct struct vb2_v4l2_buffer instead of a void pointer.

---
 drivers/media/platform/s5p-jpeg/jpeg-core.c | 38 ++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/s5p-jpeg/jpeg-core.c +19 -19
index 9c6fc09b88e0..80c83bba7af3 100644
@@ -788,14 +788,14 @@ static void skip(struct s5p_jpeg_buffer *buf, long len);
 static void exynos4_jpeg_parse_decode_h_tbl(struct s5p_jpeg_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	struct s5p_jpeg *jpeg = ctx->jpeg;
-	struct vb2_buffer *vb = v4l2_m2m_next_src_buf(ctx->fh.m2m_ctx);
+	struct vb2_v4l2_buffer *vb = v4l2_m2m_next_src_buf(ctx->fh.m2m_ctx);
 	struct s5p_jpeg_buffer jpeg_buffer;
 	unsigned int word;
 	int c, x, components;
 
 	jpeg_buffer.size = 2; /* Ls */
 	jpeg_buffer.data =
-		(unsigned long)vb2_plane_vaddr(vb, 0) + ctx->out_q.sos + 2;
+		(unsigned long)vb2_plane_vaddr(&vb->vb2_buf, 0) + ctx->out_q.sos + 2;
 	jpeg_buffer.curr = 0;
 
 	word = 0;
@@ -825,14 +825,14 @@ static void exynos4_jpeg_parse_decode_h_tbl(struct s5p_jpeg_ctx *ctx)
 static void exynos4_jpeg_parse_huff_tbl(struct s5p_jpeg_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	struct s5p_jpeg *jpeg = ctx->jpeg;
-	struct vb2_buffer *vb = v4l2_m2m_next_src_buf(ctx->fh.m2m_ctx);
+	struct vb2_v4l2_buffer *vb = v4l2_m2m_next_src_buf(ctx->fh.m2m_ctx);
 	struct s5p_jpeg_buffer jpeg_buffer;
 	unsigned int word;
 	int c, i, n, j;
 
 	for (j = 0; j < ctx->out_q.dht.n; ++j) {
 		jpeg_buffer.size = ctx->out_q.dht.len[j];
-		jpeg_buffer.data = (unsigned long)vb2_plane_vaddr(vb, 0) +
+		jpeg_buffer.data = (unsigned long)vb2_plane_vaddr(&vb->vb2_buf, 0) +
 				   ctx->out_q.dht.marker[j];
 		jpeg_buffer.curr = 0;
 
@@ -884,13 +884,13 @@ static void exynos4_jpeg_parse_huff_tbl(struct s5p_jpeg_ctx *ctx)
 static void exynos4_jpeg_parse_decode_q_tbl(struct s5p_jpeg_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	struct s5p_jpeg *jpeg = ctx->jpeg;
-	struct vb2_buffer *vb = v4l2_m2m_next_src_buf(ctx->fh.m2m_ctx);
+	struct vb2_v4l2_buffer *vb = v4l2_m2m_next_src_buf(ctx->fh.m2m_ctx);
 	struct s5p_jpeg_buffer jpeg_buffer;
 	int c, x, components;
 
 	jpeg_buffer.size = ctx->out_q.sof_len;
 	jpeg_buffer.data =
-		(unsigned long)vb2_plane_vaddr(vb, 0) + ctx->out_q.sof;
+		(unsigned long)vb2_plane_vaddr(&vb->vb2_buf, 0) + ctx->out_q.sof;
 	jpeg_buffer.curr = 0;
 
 	skip(&jpeg_buffer, 5); /* P, Y, X */
@@ -915,14 +915,14 @@ static void exynos4_jpeg_parse_decode_q_tbl(struct s5p_jpeg_ctx *ctx)
 static void exynos4_jpeg_parse_q_tbl(struct s5p_jpeg_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	struct s5p_jpeg *jpeg = ctx->jpeg;
-	struct vb2_buffer *vb = v4l2_m2m_next_src_buf(ctx->fh.m2m_ctx);
+	struct vb2_v4l2_buffer *vb = v4l2_m2m_next_src_buf(ctx->fh.m2m_ctx);
 	struct s5p_jpeg_buffer jpeg_buffer;
 	unsigned int word;
 	int c, i, j;
 
 	for (j = 0; j < ctx->out_q.dqt.n; ++j) {
 		jpeg_buffer.size = ctx->out_q.dqt.len[j];
-		jpeg_buffer.data = (unsigned long)vb2_plane_vaddr(vb, 0) +
+		jpeg_buffer.data = (unsigned long)vb2_plane_vaddr(&vb->vb2_buf, 0) +
 				   ctx->out_q.dqt.marker[j];
 		jpeg_buffer.curr = 0;
 
@@ -2016,15 +2016,15 @@ static void s5p_jpeg_device_run(void *priv)
 {
 	struct s5p_jpeg_ctx *ctx = priv;
 	struct s5p_jpeg *jpeg = ctx->jpeg;
-	struct vb2_buffer *src_buf, *dst_buf;
+	struct vb2_v4l2_buffer *src_buf, *dst_buf;
 	unsigned long src_addr, dst_addr, flags;
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&ctx->jpeg->slock, flags);
 
 	src_buf = v4l2_m2m_next_src_buf(ctx->fh.m2m_ctx);
 	dst_buf = v4l2_m2m_next_dst_buf(ctx->fh.m2m_ctx);
-	src_addr = vb2_dma_contig_plane_dma_addr(src_buf, 0);
-	dst_addr = vb2_dma_contig_plane_dma_addr(dst_buf, 0);
+	src_addr = vb2_dma_contig_plane_dma_addr(&src_buf->vb2_buf, 0);
+	dst_addr = vb2_dma_contig_plane_dma_addr(&dst_buf->vb2_buf, 0);
 
 	s5p_jpeg_reset(jpeg->regs);
 	s5p_jpeg_poweron(jpeg->regs);
@@ -2097,7 +2097,7 @@ static void exynos4_jpeg_set_img_addr(struct s5p_jpeg_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	struct s5p_jpeg *jpeg = ctx->jpeg;
 	struct s5p_jpeg_fmt *fmt;
-	struct vb2_buffer *vb;
+	struct vb2_v4l2_buffer *vb;
 	struct s5p_jpeg_addr jpeg_addr = {};
 	u32 pix_size, padding_bytes = 0;
 
@@ -2116,7 +2116,7 @@ static void exynos4_jpeg_set_img_addr(struct s5p_jpeg_ctx *ctx)
 		vb = v4l2_m2m_next_dst_buf(ctx->fh.m2m_ctx);
 	}
 
-	jpeg_addr.y = vb2_dma_contig_plane_dma_addr(vb, 0);
+	jpeg_addr.y = vb2_dma_contig_plane_dma_addr(&vb->vb2_buf, 0);
 
 	if (fmt->colplanes == 2) {
 		jpeg_addr.cb = jpeg_addr.y + pix_size - padding_bytes;
@@ -2134,7 +2134,7 @@ static void exynos4_jpeg_set_img_addr(struct s5p_jpeg_ctx *ctx)
 static void exynos4_jpeg_set_jpeg_addr(struct s5p_jpeg_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	struct s5p_jpeg *jpeg = ctx->jpeg;
-	struct vb2_buffer *vb;
+	struct vb2_v4l2_buffer *vb;
 	unsigned int jpeg_addr = 0;
 
 	if (ctx->mode == S5P_JPEG_ENCODE)
@@ -2142,7 +2142,7 @@ static void exynos4_jpeg_set_jpeg_addr(struct s5p_jpeg_ctx *ctx)
 	else
 		vb = v4l2_m2m_next_src_buf(ctx->fh.m2m_ctx);
 
-	jpeg_addr = vb2_dma_contig_plane_dma_addr(vb, 0);
+	jpeg_addr = vb2_dma_contig_plane_dma_addr(&vb->vb2_buf, 0);
 	if (jpeg->variant->version == SJPEG_EXYNOS5433 &&
 	    ctx->mode == S5P_JPEG_DECODE)
 		jpeg_addr += ctx->out_q.sos;
@@ -2257,7 +2257,7 @@ static void exynos3250_jpeg_set_img_addr(struct s5p_jpeg_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	struct s5p_jpeg *jpeg = ctx->jpeg;
 	struct s5p_jpeg_fmt *fmt;
-	struct vb2_buffer *vb;
+	struct vb2_v4l2_buffer *vb;
 	struct s5p_jpeg_addr jpeg_addr = {};
 	u32 pix_size;
 
@@ -2271,7 +2271,7 @@ static void exynos3250_jpeg_set_img_addr(struct s5p_jpeg_ctx *ctx)
 		fmt = ctx->cap_q.fmt;
 	}
 
-	jpeg_addr.y = vb2_dma_contig_plane_dma_addr(vb, 0);
+	jpeg_addr.y = vb2_dma_contig_plane_dma_addr(&vb->vb2_buf, 0);
 
 	if (fmt->colplanes == 2) {
 		jpeg_addr.cb = jpeg_addr.y + pix_size;
@@ -2289,7 +2289,7 @@ static void exynos3250_jpeg_set_img_addr(struct s5p_jpeg_ctx *ctx)
 static void exynos3250_jpeg_set_jpeg_addr(struct s5p_jpeg_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	struct s5p_jpeg *jpeg = ctx->jpeg;
-	struct vb2_buffer *vb;
+	struct vb2_v4l2_buffer *vb;
 	unsigned int jpeg_addr = 0;
 
 	if (ctx->mode == S5P_JPEG_ENCODE)
@@ -2297,7 +2297,7 @@ static void exynos3250_jpeg_set_jpeg_addr(struct s5p_jpeg_ctx *ctx)
 	else
 		vb = v4l2_m2m_next_src_buf(ctx->fh.m2m_ctx);
 
-	jpeg_addr = vb2_dma_contig_plane_dma_addr(vb, 0);
+	jpeg_addr = vb2_dma_contig_plane_dma_addr(&vb->vb2_buf, 0);
 	exynos3250_jpeg_jpgadr(jpeg->regs, jpeg_addr);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#33 lore raw

PATCH 34/63 media: mx2_emmaprp: Correct return type for mem2mem buffer helpers

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ezequiel Garcia <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8d20dcefe471763f23ad538369ec65b51993ffff ]

Fix the assigned type of mem2mem buffer handling API. Namely, these functions:

v4l2_m2m_next_buf
v4l2_m2m_last_buf
v4l2_m2m_buf_remove
v4l2_m2m_next_src_buf
v4l2_m2m_next_dst_buf
v4l2_m2m_last_src_buf
v4l2_m2m_last_dst_buf
v4l2_m2m_src_buf_remove
v4l2_m2m_dst_buf_remove

return a struct vb2_v4l2_buffer, and not a struct vb2_buffer.

Fixing this is necessary to fix the mem2mem buffer handling API, changing the return to the correct struct vb2_v4l2_buffer instead of a void pointer.

---
 drivers/media/platform/mx2_emmaprp.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/mx2_emmaprp.c +3 -3
index 03a1b606655d..009a4bb77d05 100644
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ static void emmaprp_device_run(void *priv)
 {
 	struct emmaprp_ctx *ctx = priv;
 	struct emmaprp_q_data *s_q_data, *d_q_data;
-	struct vb2_buffer *src_buf, *dst_buf;
+	struct vb2_v4l2_buffer *src_buf, *dst_buf;
 	struct emmaprp_dev *pcdev = ctx->dev;
 	unsigned int s_width, s_height;
 	unsigned int d_width, d_height;
@@ -309,8 +309,8 @@ static void emmaprp_device_run(void *priv)
 	d_height = d_q_data->height;
 	d_size = d_width * d_height;
 
-	p_in = vb2_dma_contig_plane_dma_addr(src_buf, 0);
-	p_out = vb2_dma_contig_plane_dma_addr(dst_buf, 0);
+	p_in = vb2_dma_contig_plane_dma_addr(&src_buf->vb2_buf, 0);
+	p_out = vb2_dma_contig_plane_dma_addr(&dst_buf->vb2_buf, 0);
 	if (!p_in || !p_out) {
 		v4l2_err(&pcdev->v4l2_dev,
 			 "Acquiring kernel pointers to buffers failed\n");
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#35 lore raw

PATCH 36/63 kprobes: Prohibit probing on bsearch()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Andrea Righi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 02106f883cd745523f7766d90a739f983f19e650 ]

Since kprobe breakpoing handler is using bsearch(), probing on this routine can cause recursive breakpoint problem.

int3
->do_int3()
->ftrace_int3_handler()

     ->ftrace_location()
       ->ftrace_location_range()
         ->bsearch() -> int3

Prohibit probing on bsearch().

---
 lib/bsearch.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
lib/bsearch.c +2 -0
index e33c179089db..d50048446b77 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/bsearch.h>
+#include <linux/kprobes.h>
 
 /*
  * bsearch - binary search an array of elements
@@ -51,3 +52,4 @@ void *bsearch(const void *key, const void *base, size_t num, size_t size,
 	return NULL;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(bsearch);
+NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(bsearch);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#37 lore raw

PATCH 38/63 ALSA: PCM: check if ops are defined before suspending PCM

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ranjani Sridharan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d9c0b2afe820fa3b3f8258a659daee2cc71ca3ef ]

BE dai links only have internal PCM's and their substream ops may not be set. Suspending these PCM's will result in their
ops->trigger() being invoked and cause a kernel oops.
So skip suspending PCM's if their ops are NULL.

[ NOTE: this change is required now for following the recent PCM core
change to get rid of snd_pcm_suspend() call. Since DPCM BE takes the runtime carried from FE while keeping NULL ops, it can hit this bug. See details at:
https://github.com/thesofproject/linux/pull/582
-- tiwai ]

---
 sound/core/pcm_native.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
sound/core/pcm_native.c +8 -0
index 9b6dcdea4431..4eb0c2f48638 100644
@@ -1335,6 +1335,14 @@ int snd_pcm_suspend_all(struct snd_pcm *pcm)
 			/* FIXME: the open/close code should lock this as well */
 			if (substream->runtime == NULL)
 				continue;
+
+			/*
+			 * Skip BE dai link PCM's that are internal and may
+			 * not have their substream ops set.
+			 */
+			if (!substream->ops)
+				continue;
+
 			err = snd_pcm_suspend(substream);
 			if (err < 0 && err != -EBUSY)
 				return err;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#36 lore raw

PATCH 37/63 ARM: 8833/1: Ensure that NEON code always compiles with Clang

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit de9c0d49d85dc563549972edc5589d195cd5e859 ]

While building arm32 allyesconfig, I ran into the following errors:

arch/arm/lib/xor-neon.c:17:2: error: You should compile this file with '-mfloat-abi=softfp -mfpu=neon'

In file included from lib/raid6/neon1.c:27:
/home/nathan/cbl/prebuilt/lib/clang/8.0.0/include/arm_neon.h:28:2:
error: "NEON support not enabled"

Building V=1 showed NEON_FLAGS getting passed along to Clang but __ARM_NEON__ was not getting defined. Ultimately, it boils down to Clang only defining __ARM_NEON__ when targeting armv7, rather than armv6k, which is the '-march' value for allyesconfig.

Quoted 1 line

From lib/Basic/Targets/ARM.cpp in the Clang source:

// This only gets set when Neon instructions are actually available, unlike // the VFP define, hence the soft float and arch check. This is subtly // different from gcc, we follow the intent which was that it should be set // when Neon instructions are actually available.

  if ((FPU & NeonFPU) && !SoftFloat && ArchVersion >= 7) {
    Builder.defineMacro("__ARM_NEON", "1");
    Builder.defineMacro("__ARM_NEON__");
    // current AArch32 NEON implementations do not support double-precision
    // floating-point even when it is present in VFP.
    Builder.defineMacro("__ARM_NEON_FP",
                        "0x" + Twine::utohexstr(HW_FP & ~HW_FP_DP));

}

Ard Biesheuvel recommended explicitly adding '-march=armv7-a' at the beginning of the NEON_FLAGS definitions so that __ARM_NEON__ always gets definined by Clang. This doesn't functionally change anything because that code will only run where NEON is supported, which is implicitly armv7.

---
 Documentation/arm/kernel_mode_neon.txt | 4 ++--
 arch/arm/lib/Makefile                  | 2 +-
 arch/arm/lib/xor-neon.c                | 2 +-
 lib/raid6/Makefile                     | 2 +-
 4 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Documentation/arm/kernel_mode_neon.txt +2 -2
index 525452726d31..b9e060c5b61e 100644
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ TL;DR summary
 * Use only NEON instructions, or VFP instructions that don't rely on support
   code
 * Isolate your NEON code in a separate compilation unit, and compile it with
-  '-mfpu=neon -mfloat-abi=softfp'
+  '-march=armv7-a -mfpu=neon -mfloat-abi=softfp'
 * Put kernel_neon_begin() and kernel_neon_end() calls around the calls into your
   NEON code
 * Don't sleep in your NEON code, and be aware that it will be executed with
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ instructions appearing in unexpected places if no special care is taken.
 Therefore, the recommended and only supported way of using NEON/VFP in the
 kernel is by adhering to the following rules:
 * isolate the NEON code in a separate compilation unit and compile it with
-  '-mfpu=neon -mfloat-abi=softfp';
+  '-march=armv7-a -mfpu=neon -mfloat-abi=softfp';
 * issue the calls to kernel_neon_begin(), kernel_neon_end() as well as the calls
   into the unit containing the NEON code from a compilation unit which is *not*
   built with the GCC flag '-mfpu=neon' set.
arch/arm/lib/Makefile +1 -1
index d8a780799506..06348a3d50c2 100644
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ $(obj)/csumpartialcopy.o:	$(obj)/csumpartialcopygeneric.S
 $(obj)/csumpartialcopyuser.o:	$(obj)/csumpartialcopygeneric.S
 
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_KERNEL_MODE_NEON),y)
-  NEON_FLAGS			:= -mfloat-abi=softfp -mfpu=neon
+  NEON_FLAGS			:= -march=armv7-a -mfloat-abi=softfp -mfpu=neon
   CFLAGS_xor-neon.o		+= $(NEON_FLAGS)
   obj-$(CONFIG_XOR_BLOCKS)	+= xor-neon.o
 endif
arch/arm/lib/xor-neon.c +1 -1
index 2c40aeab3eaa..c691b901092f 100644
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
 
 #ifndef __ARM_NEON__
-#error You should compile this file with '-mfloat-abi=softfp -mfpu=neon'
+#error You should compile this file with '-march=armv7-a -mfloat-abi=softfp -mfpu=neon'
 #endif
 
 /*
lib/raid6/Makefile +1 -1
index 3b10a48fa040..a84efd4aad37 100644
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ endif
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_KERNEL_MODE_NEON),y)
 NEON_FLAGS := -ffreestanding
 ifeq ($(ARCH),arm)
-NEON_FLAGS += -mfloat-abi=softfp -mfpu=neon
+NEON_FLAGS += -march=armv7-a -mfloat-abi=softfp -mfpu=neon
 endif
 ifeq ($(ARCH),arm64)
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_neon1.o += -mgeneral-regs-only
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#44 lore raw

PATCH 45/63 ASoC: fsl-asoc-card: fix object reference leaks in fsl_asoc_card_probe

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: wen yang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 11907e9d3533648615db08140e3045b829d2c141 ]

The of_find_device_by_node() takes a reference to the underlying device structure, we should release that reference.

---
 sound/soc/fsl/fsl-asoc-card.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/soc/fsl/fsl-asoc-card.c +1 -0
index 1b05d1c5d9fd..a32fe14b4687 100644
@@ -659,6 +659,7 @@ static int fsl_asoc_card_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 asrc_fail:
 	of_node_put(asrc_np);
 	of_node_put(codec_np);
+	put_device(&cpu_pdev->dev);
 fail:
 	of_node_put(cpu_np);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#42 lore raw

PATCH 43/63 cdrom: Fix race condition in cdrom_sysctl_register

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f25191bb322dec8fa2979ecb8235643aa42470e1 ]

The following traceback is sometimes seen when booting an image in qemu:

[   54.608293] cdrom: Uniform CD-ROM driver Revision: 3.20
[   54.611085] Fusion MPT base driver 3.04.20
[   54.611877] Copyright (c) 1999-2008 LSI Corporation
[   54.616234] Fusion MPT SAS Host driver 3.04.20
[   54.635139] sysctl duplicate entry: /dev/cdrom//info
[   54.639578] CPU: 0 PID: 266 Comm: kworker/u4:5 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc5 #1
[   54.639578] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
[   54.641273] Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn
[   54.641273] Call Trace:
[   54.641273]  dump_stack+0x67/0x90
[   54.641273]  __register_sysctl_table+0x50b/0x570
[   54.641273]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x6f/0x80
[   54.641273]  ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x1c7/0x1f0
[   54.646814]  __register_sysctl_paths+0x1c8/0x1f0
[   54.646814]  cdrom_sysctl_register.part.7+0xc/0x5f
[   54.646814]  register_cdrom.cold.24+0x2a/0x33
[   54.646814]  sr_probe+0x4bd/0x580
[   54.646814]  ? __driver_attach+0xd0/0xd0
[   54.646814]  really_probe+0xd6/0x260
[   54.646814]  ? __driver_attach+0xd0/0xd0
[   54.646814]  driver_probe_device+0x4a/0xb0
[   54.646814]  ? __driver_attach+0xd0/0xd0
[   54.646814]  bus_for_each_drv+0x73/0xc0
[   54.646814]  __device_attach+0xd6/0x130
[   54.646814]  bus_probe_device+0x9a/0xb0
[   54.646814]  device_add+0x40c/0x670
[   54.646814]  ? __pm_runtime_resume+0x4f/0x80
[   54.646814]  scsi_sysfs_add_sdev+0x81/0x290
[   54.646814]  scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x888/0xc00
[   54.646814]  ? scsi_autopm_get_host+0x21/0x40
[   54.646814]  __scsi_add_device+0x116/0x130
[   54.646814]  ata_scsi_scan_host+0x93/0x1c0
[   54.646814]  async_run_entry_fn+0x34/0x100
[   54.646814]  process_one_work+0x237/0x5e0
[   54.646814]  worker_thread+0x37/0x380
[   54.646814]  ? rescuer_thread+0x360/0x360
[   54.646814]  kthread+0x118/0x130
[   54.646814]  ? kthread_create_on_node+0x60/0x60
[   54.646814]  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

The only sensible explanation is that cdrom_sysctl_register() is called twice, once from the module init function and once from register_cdrom(). cdrom_sysctl_register() is not mutex protected and may happily execute twice if the second call is made before the first call is complete.

Use a static atomic to ensure that the function is executed exactly once.

---
 drivers/cdrom/cdrom.c | 7 +++----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/cdrom/cdrom.c +3 -4
index d203940203b6..aee23092f50e 100644
@@ -265,6 +265,7 @@
 /* #define ERRLOGMASK (CD_WARNING|CD_OPEN|CD_COUNT_TRACKS|CD_CLOSE) */
 /* #define ERRLOGMASK (CD_WARNING|CD_REG_UNREG|CD_DO_IOCTL|CD_OPEN|CD_CLOSE|CD_COUNT_TRACKS) */
 
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/major.h>
@@ -3677,9 +3678,9 @@ static struct ctl_table_header *cdrom_sysctl_header;
 
 static void cdrom_sysctl_register(void)
 {
-	static int initialized;
+	static atomic_t initialized = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 
-	if (initialized == 1)
+	if (!atomic_add_unless(&initialized, 1, 1))
 		return;
 
 	cdrom_sysctl_header = register_sysctl_table(cdrom_root_table);
@@ -3690,8 +3691,6 @@ static void cdrom_sysctl_register(void)
 	cdrom_sysctl_settings.debug = debug;
 	cdrom_sysctl_settings.lock = lockdoor;
 	cdrom_sysctl_settings.check = check_media_type;
-
-	initialized = 1;
 }
 
 static void cdrom_sysctl_unregister(void)
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#45 lore raw

PATCH 46/63 locking/lockdep: Add debug_locks check in __lock_downgrade()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Waiman Long <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 71492580571467fb7177aade19c18ce7486267f5 ]

Tetsuo Handa had reported he saw an incorrect "downgrading a read lock" warning right after a previous lockdep warning. It is likely that the previous warning turned off lock debugging causing the lockdep to have inconsistency states leading to the lock downgrade warning.

Fix that by add a check for debug_locks at the beginning of __lock_downgrade().

---
 kernel/locking/lockdep.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
kernel/locking/lockdep.c +3 -0
index 774ab79d3ec7..a49c565529a0 100644
@@ -3314,6 +3314,9 @@ __lock_set_class(struct lockdep_map *lock, const char *name,
 	unsigned int depth;
 	int i;
 
+	if (unlikely(!debug_locks))
+		return 0;
+
 	depth = curr->lockdep_depth;
 	/*
 	 * This function is about (re)setting the class of a held lock,
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#32 lore raw

PATCH 33/63 media: s5p-g2d: Correct return type for mem2mem buffer helpers

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ezequiel Garcia <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 30fa627b32230737bc3f678067e2adfecf956987 ]

Fix the assigned type of mem2mem buffer handling API. Namely, these functions:

v4l2_m2m_next_buf
v4l2_m2m_last_buf
v4l2_m2m_buf_remove
v4l2_m2m_next_src_buf
v4l2_m2m_next_dst_buf
v4l2_m2m_last_src_buf
v4l2_m2m_last_dst_buf
v4l2_m2m_src_buf_remove
v4l2_m2m_dst_buf_remove

return a struct vb2_v4l2_buffer, and not a struct vb2_buffer.

Fixing this is necessary to fix the mem2mem buffer handling API, changing the return to the correct struct vb2_v4l2_buffer instead of a void pointer.

---
 drivers/media/platform/s5p-g2d/g2d.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/s5p-g2d/g2d.c +3 -3
index e1936d9d27da..2b939555cccb 100644
@@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ static void device_run(void *prv)
 {
 	struct g2d_ctx *ctx = prv;
 	struct g2d_dev *dev = ctx->dev;
-	struct vb2_buffer *src, *dst;
+	struct vb2_v4l2_buffer *src, *dst;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	u32 cmd = 0;
 
@@ -512,10 +512,10 @@ static void device_run(void *prv)
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->ctrl_lock, flags);
 
 	g2d_set_src_size(dev, &ctx->in);
-	g2d_set_src_addr(dev, vb2_dma_contig_plane_dma_addr(src, 0));
+	g2d_set_src_addr(dev, vb2_dma_contig_plane_dma_addr(&src->vb2_buf, 0));
 
 	g2d_set_dst_size(dev, &ctx->out);
-	g2d_set_dst_addr(dev, vb2_dma_contig_plane_dma_addr(dst, 0));
+	g2d_set_dst_addr(dev, vb2_dma_contig_plane_dma_addr(&dst->vb2_buf, 0));
 
 	g2d_set_rop4(dev, ctx->rop);
 	g2d_set_flip(dev, ctx->flip);
Signature · 7 lines
2.19.1


_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
author maintainer
#47 lore raw

PATCH 48/63 mt7601u: bump supported EEPROM version

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Stanislaw Gruszka <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3bd1505fed71d834f45e87b32ff07157fdda47e0 ]

As reported by Michael eeprom 0d is supported and work with the driver.

Dump of /sys/kernel/debug/ieee80211/phy1/mt7601u/eeprom_param with 0d EEPORM looks like this:

RSSI offset: 0 0
Reference temp: f9
LNA gain: 8
Reg channels: 1-14
Per rate power:

	 raw:05 bw20:05 bw40:05
	 raw:05 bw20:05 bw40:05
	 raw:03 bw20:03 bw40:03
	 raw:03 bw20:03 bw40:03
	 raw:04 bw20:04 bw40:04
	 raw:00 bw20:00 bw40:00
	 raw:00 bw20:00 bw40:00
	 raw:00 bw20:00 bw40:00
	 raw:02 bw20:02 bw40:02
	 raw:00 bw20:00 bw40:00
Per channel power:
	 tx_power  ch1:09 ch2:09
	 tx_power  ch3:0a ch4:0a
	 tx_power  ch5:0a ch6:0a
	 tx_power  ch7:0b ch8:0b
	 tx_power  ch9:0b ch10:0b
	 tx_power  ch11:0b ch12:0b
	 tx_power  ch13:0b ch14:0b
---
 drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt7601u/eeprom.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt7601u/eeprom.h +1 -1
index 662d12703b69..57b503ae63f1 100644
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 
 struct mt7601u_dev;
 
-#define MT7601U_EE_MAX_VER			0x0c
+#define MT7601U_EE_MAX_VER			0x0d
 #define MT7601U_EEPROM_SIZE			256
 
 #define MT7601U_DEFAULT_TX_POWER		6
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#49 lore raw

PATCH 50/63 tty: increase the default flip buffer limit to 2*640K

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Manfred Schlaegl <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7ab57b76ebf632bf2231ccabe26bea33868118c6 ]

We increase the default limit for buffer memory allocation by a factor of 10 to 640K to prevent data loss when using fast serial interfaces.

For example when using RS485 without flow-control at speeds of 1Mbit/s an upwards we've run into problems such as applications being too slow to read out this buffer (on embedded devices based on imx53 or imx6).

If you want to write transmitted data to a slow SD card and thus have realtime requirements, this limit can become a problem.

That shouldn't be the case and 640K buffers fix such problems for us.

This value is a maximum limit for allocation only. It has no effect on systems that currently run fine. When transmission is slow enough applications and hardware can keep up and increasing this limit doesn't change anything.

It only _allows_ to allocate more than 2*64K in cases we currently fail to allocate memory despite having some.

---
 drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c +1 -1
index 355e9cad680d..4706df20191b 100644
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
  * Byte threshold to limit memory consumption for flip buffers.
  * The actual memory limit is > 2x this amount.
  */
-#define TTYB_DEFAULT_MEM_LIMIT	65536
+#define TTYB_DEFAULT_MEM_LIMIT	(640 * 1024UL)
 
 /*
  * We default to dicing tty buffer allocations to this many characters
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#50 lore raw

PATCH 51/63 media: mt9m111: set initial frame size other than 0x0

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Akinobu Mita <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 29856308137de1c21eda89411695f4fc6e9780ff ]

This driver sets initial frame width and height to 0x0, which is invalid. So set it to selection rectangle bounds instead.

This is detected by v4l2-compliance detected.

---
 drivers/media/i2c/soc_camera/mt9m111.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/media/i2c/soc_camera/mt9m111.c +2 -0
index 6dfaead6aaa8..1d1ca03c797f 100644
@@ -988,6 +988,8 @@ static int mt9m111_probe(struct i2c_client *client,
 	mt9m111->rect.top	= MT9M111_MIN_DARK_ROWS;
 	mt9m111->rect.width	= MT9M111_MAX_WIDTH;
 	mt9m111->rect.height	= MT9M111_MAX_HEIGHT;
+	mt9m111->width		= mt9m111->rect.width;
+	mt9m111->height		= mt9m111->rect.height;
 	mt9m111->fmt		= &mt9m111_colour_fmts[0];
 	mt9m111->lastpage	= -1;
 	mutex_init(&mt9m111->power_lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#51 lore raw

PATCH 52/63 hwrng: virtio - Avoid repeated init of completion

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: David Tolnay <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit aef027db48da56b6f25d0e54c07c8401ada6ce21 ]

The virtio-rng driver uses a completion called have_data to wait for a virtio read to be fulfilled by the hypervisor. The completion is reset before placing a buffer on the virtio queue and completed by the virtio callback once data has been written into the buffer.

Prior to this commit, the driver called init_completion on this completion both during probe as well as when registering virtio buffers as part of a hwrng read operation. The second of these init_completion calls should instead be reinit_completion because the have_data completion has already been inited by probe. As described in Documentation/scheduler/completion.txt, "Calling init_completion() twice on the same completion object is most likely a bug".

This bug was present in the initial implementation of virtio-rng in f7f510ec1957 ("virtio: An entropy device, as suggested by hpa"). Back then the have_data completion was a single static completion rather than a member of one of potentially multiple virtrng_info structs as implemented later by 08e53fbdb85c ("virtio-rng: support multiple virtio-rng devices"). The original driver incorrectly used init_completion rather than INIT_COMPLETION to reset have_data during read.

Tested by running head -c48 /dev/random | hexdump within crosvm, the Chrome OS virtual machine monitor, and confirming that the virtio-rng driver successfully produces random bytes from the host.

---
 drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c +1 -1
index 3fa2f8a009b3..1c5c4314c6b5 100644
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static int virtio_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *buf, size_t size, bool wait)
 
 	if (!vi->busy) {
 		vi->busy = true;
-		init_completion(&vi->have_data);
+		reinit_completion(&vi->have_data);
 		register_buffer(vi, buf, size);
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#54 lore raw

PATCH 55/63 hpet: Fix missing '=' character in the __setup() code of hpet_mmap_enable

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Buland Singh <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 24d48a61f2666630da130cc2ec2e526eacf229e3 ]

Commit '3d035f580699 ("drivers/char/hpet.c: allow user controlled mmap for user processes")' introduced a new kernel command line parameter hpet_mmap, that is required to expose the memory map of the HPET registers to user-space. Unfortunately the kernel command line parameter 'hpet_mmap' is broken and never takes effect due to missing '=' character in the __setup() code of hpet_mmap_enable.

Before this patch:

dmesg output with the kernel command line parameter hpet_mmap=1

[    0.204152] HPET mmap disabled

dmesg output with the kernel command line parameter hpet_mmap=0

[    0.204192] HPET mmap disabled

After this patch:

dmesg output with the kernel command line parameter hpet_mmap=1

[    0.203945] HPET mmap enabled

dmesg output with the kernel command line parameter hpet_mmap=0

[    0.204652] HPET mmap disabled
Fixes 3d035f580699 ("drivers/char/hpet.c: allow user controlled mmap for user processes")
---
 drivers/char/hpet.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/hpet.c +1 -1
index 240b6cf1d97c..72e073895ed9 100644
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ static __init int hpet_mmap_enable(char *str)
 	pr_info("HPET mmap %s\n", hpet_mmap_enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
 	return 1;
 }
-__setup("hpet_mmap", hpet_mmap_enable);
+__setup("hpet_mmap=", hpet_mmap_enable);
 
 static int hpet_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#56 lore raw

PATCH 57/63 netfilter: physdev: relax br_netfilter dependency

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8e2f311a68494a6677c1724bdcb10bada21af37c ]

Following command:
iptables -D FORWARD -m physdev ...
causes connectivity loss in some setups.

Reason is that iptables userspace will probe kernel for the module revision of the physdev patch, and physdev has an artificial dependency on br_netfilter (xt_physdev use makes no sense unless a br_netfilter module is loaded).

This causes the "phydev" module to be loaded, which in turn enables the "call-iptables" infrastructure.

bridged packets might then get dropped by the iptables ruleset.

The better fix would be to change the "call-iptables" defaults to 0 and enforce explicit setting to 1, but that breaks backwards compatibility.

This does the next best thing: add a request_module call to checkentry. This was a stray '-D ... -m physdev' won't activate br_netfilter anymore.

---
 include/net/netfilter/br_netfilter.h | 1 -
 net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c      | 5 -----
 net/netfilter/xt_physdev.c           | 9 +++++++--
 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
include/net/netfilter/br_netfilter.h +0 -1
index e8d1448425a7..b1d0d46344e2 100644
@@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ static inline struct rtable *bridge_parent_rtable(const struct net_device *dev)
 }
 
 struct net_device *setup_pre_routing(struct sk_buff *skb);
-void br_netfilter_enable(void);
 
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
 int br_validate_ipv6(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb);
net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c +0 -5
index 6def85d75b1d..93b5525bcccf 100644
@@ -873,11 +873,6 @@ static const struct nf_br_ops br_ops = {
 	.br_dev_xmit_hook =	br_nf_dev_xmit,
 };
 
-void br_netfilter_enable(void)
-{
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(br_netfilter_enable);
-
 /* For br_nf_post_routing, we need (prio = NF_BR_PRI_LAST), because
  * br_dev_queue_push_xmit is called afterwards */
 static struct nf_hook_ops br_nf_ops[] __read_mostly = {
net/netfilter/xt_physdev.c +7 -2
index 1caaccbc306c..7e4063621960 100644
@@ -96,8 +96,7 @@ physdev_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)
 static int physdev_mt_check(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par)
 {
 	const struct xt_physdev_info *info = par->matchinfo;
-
-	br_netfilter_enable();
+	static bool brnf_probed __read_mostly;
 
 	if (!(info->bitmask & XT_PHYSDEV_OP_MASK) ||
 	    info->bitmask & ~XT_PHYSDEV_OP_MASK)
@@ -113,6 +112,12 @@ static int physdev_mt_check(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par)
 		if (par->hook_mask & (1 << NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT))
 			return -EINVAL;
 	}
+
+	if (!brnf_probed) {
+		brnf_probed = true;
+		request_module("br_netfilter");
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#59 lore raw

PATCH 60/63 wlcore: Fix memory leak in case wl12xx_fetch_firmware failure

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Zumeng Chen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ba2ffc96321c8433606ceeb85c9e722b8113e5a7 ]

Release fw_status, raw_fw_status, and tx_res_if when wl12xx_fetch_firmware failed instead of meaningless goto out to avoid the following memory leak reports(Only the last one listed):

unreferenced object 0xc28a9a00 (size 512):
comm "kworker/0:4", pid 31298, jiffies 2783204 (age 203.290s) hex dump (first 32 bytes):

    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
  backtrace:
    [<6624adab>] kmemleak_alloc+0x40/0x74
    [<500ddb31>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x1ac/0x270
    [<db4d731d>] wl12xx_chip_wakeup+0xc4/0x1fc [wlcore]
    [<76c5db53>] wl1271_op_add_interface+0x4a4/0x8f4 [wlcore]
    [<cbf30777>] drv_add_interface+0xa4/0x1a0 [mac80211]
    [<65bac325>] ieee80211_reconfig+0x9c0/0x1644 [mac80211]
    [<2817c80e>] ieee80211_restart_work+0x90/0xc8 [mac80211]
    [<7e1d425a>] process_one_work+0x284/0x42c
    [<55f9432e>] worker_thread+0x2fc/0x48c
    [<abb582c6>] kthread+0x148/0x160
    [<63144b13>] ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c
    [< (null)>] (null)
    [<1f6e7715>] 0xffffffff
---
 drivers/net/wireless/ti/wlcore/main.c | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/ti/wlcore/main.c +5 -2
index 7b27c7e23af2..cc10b72607c6 100644
@@ -1123,8 +1123,11 @@ static int wl12xx_chip_wakeup(struct wl1271 *wl, bool plt)
 		goto out;
 
 	ret = wl12xx_fetch_firmware(wl, plt);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		kfree(wl->fw_status);
+		kfree(wl->raw_fw_status);
+		kfree(wl->tx_res_if);
+	}
 
 out:
 	return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#62 lore raw

PATCH 63/63 drm/dp/mst: Configure no_stop_bit correctly for remote i2c xfers

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c978ae9bde582e82a04c63a4071701691dd8b35c ]

We aren't supposed to force a stop+start between every i2c msg when performing multi message transfers. This should eg. cause the DDC segment address to be reset back to 0 between writing the segment address and reading the actual EDID extension block.

To quote the E-DDC spec:
"... this standard requires that the segment pointer be
reset to 00h when a NO ACK or a STOP condition is received."

Since we're going to touch this might as well consult the I2C_M_STOP flag to determine whether we want to force the stop or not.

Cc: Brian Vincent <[email protected]>
References: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=108081

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_mst_topology.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_mst_topology.c +1 -0
index 5a1bafb5ecbb..ff12d926eb65 100644
@@ -3019,6 +3019,7 @@ static int drm_dp_mst_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adapter, struct i2c_msg *msgs
 		msg.u.i2c_read.transactions[i].i2c_dev_id = msgs[i].addr;
 		msg.u.i2c_read.transactions[i].num_bytes = msgs[i].len;
 		msg.u.i2c_read.transactions[i].bytes = msgs[i].buf;
+		msg.u.i2c_read.transactions[i].no_stop_bit = !(msgs[i].flags & I2C_M_STOP);
 	}
 	msg.u.i2c_read.read_i2c_device_id = msgs[num - 1].addr;
 	msg.u.i2c_read.num_bytes_read = msgs[num - 1].len;
Signature · 6 lines
2.19.1

_______________________________________________
dri-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel
author maintainer
#58 lore raw

PATCH 59/63 regulator: act8865: Fix act8600_sudcdc_voltage_ranges setting

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Axel Lin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f01a7beb6791f1c419424c1a6958b7d0a289c974 ]

The act8600_sudcdc_voltage_ranges setting does not match the datasheet.

The problems in below entry:
REGULATOR_LINEAR_RANGE(19000000, 191, 255, 400000),

1. The off-by-one min_sel causes wrong volatage calculation. The min_sel should be 192.
2. According to the datasheet[1] Table 7. (on page 43):
The selector 248 (0b11111000) ~ 255 (0b11111111) are 41.400V.

Also fix off-by-one for ACT8600_SUDCDC_VOLTAGE_NUM.

[1] https://active-semi.com/wp-content/uploads/ACT8600_Datasheet.pdf

Fixes df3a950e4e73 ("regulator: act8865: Add act8600 support")
---
 drivers/regulator/act8865-regulator.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/regulator/act8865-regulator.c +3 -2
index f8d4cd3d1397..63a00d1d9360 100644
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@
  * ACT8865 voltage number
  */
 #define	ACT8865_VOLTAGE_NUM	64
-#define ACT8600_SUDCDC_VOLTAGE_NUM	255
+#define ACT8600_SUDCDC_VOLTAGE_NUM	256
 
 struct act8865 {
 	struct regmap *regmap;
@@ -154,7 +154,8 @@ static const struct regulator_linear_range act8600_sudcdc_voltage_ranges[] = {
 	REGULATOR_LINEAR_RANGE(3000000, 0, 63, 0),
 	REGULATOR_LINEAR_RANGE(3000000, 64, 159, 100000),
 	REGULATOR_LINEAR_RANGE(12600000, 160, 191, 200000),
-	REGULATOR_LINEAR_RANGE(19000000, 191, 255, 400000),
+	REGULATOR_LINEAR_RANGE(19000000, 192, 247, 400000),
+	REGULATOR_LINEAR_RANGE(41400000, 248, 255, 0),
 };
 
 static struct regulator_ops act8865_ops = {
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#57 lore raw

PATCH 58/63 media: s5p-jpeg: Check for fmt_ver_flag when doing fmt enumeration

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Pawe? Chmiel <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 49710c32cd9d6626a77c9f5f978a5f58cb536b35 ]

Previously when doing format enumeration, it was returning all
formats supported by driver, even if they're not supported by hw.
Add missing check for fmt_ver_flag, so it'll be fixed and only those
supported by hw will be returned. Similar thing is already done in s5p_jpeg_find_format.

It was found by using v4l2-compliance tool and checking result
of VIDIOC_ENUM_FMT/FRAMESIZES/FRAMEINTERVALS test
and using v4l2-ctl to get list of all supported formats.

Tested on s5pv210-galaxys (Samsung i9000 phone).

Fixes bb677f3ac434 ("[media] Exynos4 JPEG codec v4l2 driver")
---
 drivers/media/platform/s5p-jpeg/jpeg-core.c | 19 +++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/s5p-jpeg/jpeg-core.c +11 -8
index 80c83bba7af3..0d981bbf38bc 100644
@@ -1262,13 +1262,16 @@ static int s5p_jpeg_querycap(struct file *file, void *priv,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int enum_fmt(struct s5p_jpeg_fmt *sjpeg_formats, int n,
+static int enum_fmt(struct s5p_jpeg_ctx *ctx,
+		    struct s5p_jpeg_fmt *sjpeg_formats, int n,
 		    struct v4l2_fmtdesc *f, u32 type)
 {
 	int i, num = 0;
+	unsigned int fmt_ver_flag = ctx->jpeg->variant->fmt_ver_flag;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
-		if (sjpeg_formats[i].flags & type) {
+		if (sjpeg_formats[i].flags & type &&
+		    sjpeg_formats[i].flags & fmt_ver_flag) {
 			/* index-th format of type type found ? */
 			if (num == f->index)
 				break;
@@ -1294,11 +1297,11 @@ static int s5p_jpeg_enum_fmt_vid_cap(struct file *file, void *priv,
 	struct s5p_jpeg_ctx *ctx = fh_to_ctx(priv);
 
 	if (ctx->mode == S5P_JPEG_ENCODE)
-		return enum_fmt(sjpeg_formats, SJPEG_NUM_FORMATS, f,
+		return enum_fmt(ctx, sjpeg_formats, SJPEG_NUM_FORMATS, f,
 				SJPEG_FMT_FLAG_ENC_CAPTURE);
 
-	return enum_fmt(sjpeg_formats, SJPEG_NUM_FORMATS, f,
-					SJPEG_FMT_FLAG_DEC_CAPTURE);
+	return enum_fmt(ctx, sjpeg_formats, SJPEG_NUM_FORMATS, f,
+			SJPEG_FMT_FLAG_DEC_CAPTURE);
 }
 
 static int s5p_jpeg_enum_fmt_vid_out(struct file *file, void *priv,
@@ -1307,11 +1310,11 @@ static int s5p_jpeg_enum_fmt_vid_out(struct file *file, void *priv,
 	struct s5p_jpeg_ctx *ctx = fh_to_ctx(priv);
 
 	if (ctx->mode == S5P_JPEG_ENCODE)
-		return enum_fmt(sjpeg_formats, SJPEG_NUM_FORMATS, f,
+		return enum_fmt(ctx, sjpeg_formats, SJPEG_NUM_FORMATS, f,
 				SJPEG_FMT_FLAG_ENC_OUTPUT);
 
-	return enum_fmt(sjpeg_formats, SJPEG_NUM_FORMATS, f,
-					SJPEG_FMT_FLAG_DEC_OUTPUT);
+	return enum_fmt(ctx, sjpeg_formats, SJPEG_NUM_FORMATS, f,
+			SJPEG_FMT_FLAG_DEC_OUTPUT);
 }
 
 static struct s5p_jpeg_q_data *get_q_data(struct s5p_jpeg_ctx *ctx,
Signature · 7 lines
2.19.1


_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
author maintainer
#60 lore raw

PATCH 61/63 x86/build: Mark per-CPU symbols as absolute explicitly for LLD

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Rafael Ávila de Espíndola <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d071ae09a4a1414c1433d5ae9908959a7325b0ad ]

Accessing per-CPU variables is done by finding the offset of the variable in the per-CPU block and adding it to the address of the respective CPU's block.

Section 3.10.8 of ld.bfd's documentation states:

For expressions involving numbers, relative addresses and absolute addresses, ld follows these rules to evaluate terms:

Other binary operations, that is, between two relative addresses not in the same section, or between a relative address and an absolute address, first convert any non-absolute term to an absolute address before applying the operator."

Note that LLVM's linker does not adhere to the GNU ld's implementation and as such requires implicitly-absolute terms to be explicitly marked as absolute in the linker script. If not, it fails currently with:

ld.lld: error: ./arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds:153: at least one side of the expression must be absolute ld.lld: error: ./arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds:154: at least one side of the expression must be absolute Makefile:1040: recipe for target 'vmlinux' failed

This is not a functional change for ld.bfd which converts the term to an absolute symbol anyways as specified above.

Based on a previous submission by Tri Vo <[email protected]>.

[ Update commit message per Boris' and Michael's suggestions. ]
[ Massage commit message more, fix typos. ]
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
Cc Cao Jin <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Cc Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>
Cc Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Tri Vo <[email protected]>
Cc x86-ml <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +1 -1
index a703842b54de..17e1e60b6b40 100644
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ SECTIONS
  * Per-cpu symbols which need to be offset from __per_cpu_load
  * for the boot processor.
  */
-#define INIT_PER_CPU(x) init_per_cpu__##x = x + __per_cpu_load
+#define INIT_PER_CPU(x) init_per_cpu__##x = ABSOLUTE(x) + __per_cpu_load
 INIT_PER_CPU(gdt_page);
 INIT_PER_CPU(irq_stack_union);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#55 lore raw

PATCH 56/63 dmaengine: imx-dma: fix warning comparison of distinct pointer types

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Anders Roxell <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9227ab5643cb8350449502dd9e3168a873ab0e3b ]

The warning got introduced by commit 930507c18304 ("arm64: add basic Kconfig symbols for i.MX8"). Since it got enabled for arm64. The warning haven't been seen before since size_t was 'unsigned int' when built on arm32.

../drivers/dma/imx-dma.c: In function ‘imxdma_sg_next’:
../include/linux/kernel.h:846:29: warning: comparison of distinct pointer types lacks a cast
(!!(sizeof((typeof(x) *)1 == (typeof(y) *)1)))

                             ^~
../include/linux/kernel.h:860:4: note: in expansion of macro ‘__typecheck’
   (__typecheck(x, y) && __no_side_effects(x, y))
    ^~~~~~~~~~~
../include/linux/kernel.h:870:24: note: in expansion of macro ‘__safe_cmp’
  __builtin_choose_expr(__safe_cmp(x, y), \
                        ^~~~~~~~~~
../include/linux/kernel.h:879:19: note: in expansion of macro ‘__careful_cmp’
 #define min(x, y) __careful_cmp(x, y, <)
                   ^~~~~~~~~~~~~
../drivers/dma/imx-dma.c:288:8: note: in expansion of macro ‘min’
  now = min(d->len, sg_dma_len(sg));
        ^~~

Rework so that we use min_t and pass in the size_t that returns the minimum of two values, using the specified type.

---
 drivers/dma/imx-dma.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/dma/imx-dma.c +1 -1
index dfa337ae06fc..529b315a6683 100644
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static inline int imxdma_sg_next(struct imxdma_desc *d)
 	struct scatterlist *sg = d->sg;
 	unsigned long now;
 
-	now = min(d->len, sg_dma_len(sg));
+	now = min_t(size_t, d->len, sg_dma_len(sg));
 	if (d->len != IMX_DMA_LENGTH_LOOP)
 		d->len -= now;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#53 lore raw

PATCH 54/63 Bluetooth: Verify that l2cap_get_conf_opt provides large enough buffer

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7c9cbd0b5e38a1672fcd137894ace3b042dfbf69 ]

The function l2cap_get_conf_opt will return L2CAP_CONF_OPT_SIZE + opt->len as length value. The opt->len however is in control over the remote user and can be used by an attacker to gain access beyond the bounds of the actual packet.

To prevent any potential leak of heap memory, it is enough to check that the resulting len calculation after calling l2cap_get_conf_opt is not below zero. A well formed packet will always return >= 0 here and will end with the length value being zero after the last option has been parsed. In case of malformed packets messing with the opt->len field the length value will become negative. If that is the case, then just abort and ignore the option.

In case an attacker uses a too short opt->len value, then garbage will be parsed, but that is protected by the unknown option handling and also the option parameter size checks.

---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +6 -0
index af68674690af..06e0ee24d12d 100644
@@ -3315,6 +3315,8 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_req(struct l2cap_chan *chan, void *data, size_t data
 
 	while (len >= L2CAP_CONF_OPT_SIZE) {
 		len -= l2cap_get_conf_opt(&req, &type, &olen, &val);
+		if (len < 0)
+			break;
 
 		hint  = type & L2CAP_CONF_HINT;
 		type &= L2CAP_CONF_MASK;
@@ -3526,6 +3528,8 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_rsp(struct l2cap_chan *chan, void *rsp, int len,
 
 	while (len >= L2CAP_CONF_OPT_SIZE) {
 		len -= l2cap_get_conf_opt(&rsp, &type, &olen, &val);
+		if (len < 0)
+			break;
 
 		switch (type) {
 		case L2CAP_CONF_MTU:
@@ -3706,6 +3710,8 @@ static void l2cap_conf_rfc_get(struct l2cap_chan *chan, void *rsp, int len)
 
 	while (len >= L2CAP_CONF_OPT_SIZE) {
 		len -= l2cap_get_conf_opt(&rsp, &type, &olen, &val);
+		if (len < 0)
+			break;
 
 		switch (type) {
 		case L2CAP_CONF_RFC:
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#43 lore raw

PATCH 44/63 e1000e: fix cyclic resets at link up with active tx

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Konstantin Khlebnikov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0f9e980bf5ee1a97e2e401c846b2af989eb21c61 ]

I'm seeing series of e1000e resets (sometimes endless) at system boot if something generates tx traffic at this time. In my case this is netconsole who sends message "e1000e 0000:02:00.0: Some CPU C-states have been disabled in order to enable jumbo frames" from e1000e itself. As result e1000_watchdog_task sees used tx buffer while carrier is off and start this reset cycle again.

[   17.794359] e1000e: eth1 NIC Link is Up 1000 Mbps Full Duplex, Flow Control: None
[   17.794714] IPv6: ADDRCONF(NETDEV_CHANGE): eth1: link becomes ready
[   22.936455] e1000e 0000:02:00.0 eth1: changing MTU from 1500 to 9000
[   23.033336] e1000e 0000:02:00.0: Some CPU C-states have been disabled in order to enable jumbo frames
[   26.102364] e1000e: eth1 NIC Link is Up 1000 Mbps Full Duplex, Flow Control: None
[   27.174495] 8021q: 802.1Q VLAN Support v1.8
[   27.174513] 8021q: adding VLAN 0 to HW filter on device eth1
[   30.671724] cgroup: cgroup: disabling cgroup2 socket matching due to net_prio or net_cls activation
[   30.898564] netpoll: netconsole: local port 6666
[   30.898566] netpoll: netconsole: local IPv6 address 2a02:6b8:0:80b:beae:c5ff:fe28:23f8
[   30.898567] netpoll: netconsole: interface 'eth1'
[   30.898568] netpoll: netconsole: remote port 6666
[   30.898568] netpoll: netconsole: remote IPv6 address 2a02:6b8:b000:605c:e61d:2dff:fe03:3790
[   30.898569] netpoll: netconsole: remote ethernet address b0:a8:6e:f4:ff:c0
[   30.917747] console [netcon0] enabled
[   30.917749] netconsole: network logging started
[   31.453353] e1000e 0000:02:00.0: Some CPU C-states have been disabled in order to enable jumbo frames
[   34.185730] e1000e 0000:02:00.0: Some CPU C-states have been disabled in order to enable jumbo frames
[   34.321840] e1000e 0000:02:00.0: Some CPU C-states have been disabled in order to enable jumbo frames
[   34.465822] e1000e 0000:02:00.0: Some CPU C-states have been disabled in order to enable jumbo frames
[   34.597423] e1000e 0000:02:00.0: Some CPU C-states have been disabled in order to enable jumbo frames
[   34.745417] e1000e 0000:02:00.0: Some CPU C-states have been disabled in order to enable jumbo frames
[   34.877356] e1000e 0000:02:00.0: Some CPU C-states have been disabled in order to enable jumbo frames
[   35.005441] e1000e 0000:02:00.0: Some CPU C-states have been disabled in order to enable jumbo frames
[   35.157376] e1000e 0000:02:00.0: Some CPU C-states have been disabled in order to enable jumbo frames
[   35.289362] e1000e 0000:02:00.0: Some CPU C-states have been disabled in order to enable jumbo frames
[   35.417441] e1000e 0000:02:00.0: Some CPU C-states have been disabled in order to enable jumbo frames
[   37.790342] e1000e: eth1 NIC Link is Up 1000 Mbps Full Duplex, Flow Control: None

This patch flushes tx buffers only once when carrier is off rather than at each watchdog iteration.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c | 15 ++++++---------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c +6 -9
index 6b1cacd86c6e..44312962b64e 100644
@@ -5246,8 +5246,13 @@ static void e1000_watchdog_task(struct work_struct *work)
 			/* 8000ES2LAN requires a Rx packet buffer work-around
 			 * on link down event; reset the controller to flush
 			 * the Rx packet buffer.
+			 *
+			 * If the link is lost the controller stops DMA, but
+			 * if there is queued Tx work it cannot be done.  So
+			 * reset the controller to flush the Tx packet buffers.
 			 */
-			if (adapter->flags & FLAG_RX_NEEDS_RESTART)
+			if ((adapter->flags & FLAG_RX_NEEDS_RESTART) ||
+			    e1000_desc_unused(tx_ring) + 1 < tx_ring->count)
 				adapter->flags |= FLAG_RESTART_NOW;
 			else
 				pm_schedule_suspend(netdev->dev.parent,
@@ -5270,14 +5275,6 @@ static void e1000_watchdog_task(struct work_struct *work)
 	adapter->gotc_old = adapter->stats.gotc;
 	spin_unlock(&adapter->stats64_lock);
 
-	/* If the link is lost the controller stops DMA, but
-	 * if there is queued Tx work it cannot be done.  So
-	 * reset the controller to flush the Tx packet buffers.
-	 */
-	if (!netif_carrier_ok(netdev) &&
-	    (e1000_desc_unused(tx_ring) + 1 < tx_ring->count))
-		adapter->flags |= FLAG_RESTART_NOW;
-
 	/* If reset is necessary, do it outside of interrupt context. */
 	if (adapter->flags & FLAG_RESTART_NOW) {
 		schedule_work(&adapter->reset_task);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#30 lore raw

PATCH 31/63 media: sh_veu: Correct return type for mem2mem buffer helpers

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ezequiel Garcia <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 43c145195c7fc3025ee7ecfc67112ac1c82af7c2 ]

Fix the assigned type of mem2mem buffer handling API. Namely, these functions:

v4l2_m2m_next_buf
v4l2_m2m_last_buf
v4l2_m2m_buf_remove
v4l2_m2m_next_src_buf
v4l2_m2m_next_dst_buf
v4l2_m2m_last_src_buf
v4l2_m2m_last_dst_buf
v4l2_m2m_src_buf_remove
v4l2_m2m_dst_buf_remove

return a struct vb2_v4l2_buffer, and not a struct vb2_buffer.

Fixing this is necessary to fix the mem2mem buffer handling API, changing the return to the correct struct vb2_v4l2_buffer instead of a void pointer.

---
 drivers/media/platform/sh_veu.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/sh_veu.c +2 -2
index d6ab33e7060a..b9f4cdee555e 100644
@@ -277,13 +277,13 @@ static void sh_veu_process(struct sh_veu_dev *veu,
 static void sh_veu_device_run(void *priv)
 {
 	struct sh_veu_dev *veu = priv;
-	struct vb2_buffer *src_buf, *dst_buf;
+	struct vb2_v4l2_buffer *src_buf, *dst_buf;
 
 	src_buf = v4l2_m2m_next_src_buf(veu->m2m_ctx);
 	dst_buf = v4l2_m2m_next_dst_buf(veu->m2m_ctx);
 
 	if (src_buf && dst_buf)
-		sh_veu_process(veu, src_buf, dst_buf);
+		sh_veu_process(veu, &src_buf->vb2_buf, &dst_buf->vb2_buf);
 }
 
 		/* ========== video ioctls ========== */
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#26 lore raw

PATCH 27/63 ASoC: qcom: Fix of-node refcount unbalance in apq8016_sbc_parse_of()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8d1667200850f8753c0265fa4bd25c9a6e5f94ce ]

The apq8016 driver leaves the of-node refcount at aborting from the loop of for_each_child_of_node() in the error path. Not only the iterator node of for_each_child_of_node(), the children nodes referred from it for codec and cpu have to be properly unreferenced.

Fixes bdb052e81f62 ("ASoC: qcom: add apq8016 sound card support")
Cc Patrick Lai <[email protected]>
Cc Banajit Goswami <[email protected]>
---
 sound/soc/qcom/apq8016_sbc.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
sound/soc/qcom/apq8016_sbc.c +16 -5
index 1efdf0088ecd..886f2027e671 100644
@@ -98,13 +98,15 @@ static struct apq8016_sbc_data *apq8016_sbc_parse_of(struct snd_soc_card *card)
 
 		if (!cpu || !codec) {
 			dev_err(dev, "Can't find cpu/codec DT node\n");
-			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto error;
 		}
 
 		link->cpu_of_node = of_parse_phandle(cpu, "sound-dai", 0);
 		if (!link->cpu_of_node) {
 			dev_err(card->dev, "error getting cpu phandle\n");
-			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto error;
 		}
 
 		link->codec_of_node = of_parse_phandle(codec, "sound-dai", 0);
@@ -116,13 +118,13 @@ static struct apq8016_sbc_data *apq8016_sbc_parse_of(struct snd_soc_card *card)
 		ret = snd_soc_of_get_dai_name(cpu, &link->cpu_dai_name);
 		if (ret) {
 			dev_err(card->dev, "error getting cpu dai name\n");
-			return ERR_PTR(ret);
+			goto error;
 		}
 
 		ret = snd_soc_of_get_dai_name(codec, &link->codec_dai_name);
 		if (ret) {
 			dev_err(card->dev, "error getting codec dai name\n");
-			return ERR_PTR(ret);
+			goto error;
 		}
 
 		link->platform_of_node = link->cpu_of_node;
@@ -132,15 +134,24 @@ static struct apq8016_sbc_data *apq8016_sbc_parse_of(struct snd_soc_card *card)
 		ret = of_property_read_string(np, "link-name", &link->name);
 		if (ret) {
 			dev_err(card->dev, "error getting codec dai_link name\n");
-			return ERR_PTR(ret);
+			goto error;
 		}
 
 		link->stream_name = link->name;
 		link->init = apq8016_sbc_dai_init;
 		link++;
+
+		of_node_put(cpu);
+		of_node_put(codec);
 	}
 
 	return data;
+
+ error:
+	of_node_put(np);
+	of_node_put(cpu);
+	of_node_put(codec);
+	return ERR_PTR(ret);
 }
 
 static int apq8016_sbc_platform_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#28 lore raw

PATCH 29/63 perf test: Fix failure of 'evsel-tp-sched' test on s390

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Thomas Richter <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 03d309711d687460d1345de8a0363f45b1c8cd11 ]

Commit 489338a717a0 ("perf tests evsel-tp-sched: Fix bitwise operator") causes test case 14 "Parse sched tracepoints fields" to fail on s390.

This test succeeds on x86.

In fact this test now fails on all architectures with type char treated as type unsigned char.

The root cause is the signed-ness of character arrays in the tracepoints sched_switch for structure members prev_comm and next_comm.

On s390 the output of:

[root@m35lp76 perf]# cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/sched/sched_switch/format
name: sched_switch
ID: 287
format:
field:unsigned short common_type; offset:0; size:2; signed:0;
...
field:char prev_comm[16]; offset:8; size:16; signed:0;
...
field:char next_comm[16]; offset:40; size:16; signed:0;

reveals the character arrays prev_comm and next_comm are per default unsigned char and have values in the range of 0..255.

On x86 both fields are signed as this output shows:

 [root@f29]# cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/sched/sched_switch/format
 name: sched_switch
 ID: 287
 format:
   field:unsigned short common_type; offset:0; size:2;	signed:0;
   ...
   field:char prev_comm[16]; offset:8; size:16;	signed:1;
   ...
   field:char next_comm[16]; offset:40; size:16; signed:1;

and the character arrays prev_comm and next_comm are per default signed char and have values in the range of -1..127. The implementation of type char is architecture specific.

Since the character arrays in both tracepoints sched_switch and sched_wakeup should contain ascii characters, simply omit the check for signedness in the test case.

Output before:

[root@m35lp76 perf]# ./perf test -F 14
14: Parse sched tracepoints fields :
--- start ---
sched:sched_switch: "prev_comm" signedness(0) is wrong, should be 1 sched:sched_switch: "next_comm" signedness(0) is wrong, should be 1 sched:sched_wakeup: "comm" signedness(0) is wrong, should be 1 ---- end ----
14: Parse sched tracepoints fields : FAILED!
[root@m35lp76 perf]#

Output after:

[root@m35lp76 perf]# ./perf test -Fv 14
14: Parse sched tracepoints fields :
--- start ---
---- end ----
Parse sched tracepoints fields: Ok
[root@m35lp76 perf]#

Fixes 489338a717a0 ("perf tests evsel-tp-sched: Fix bitwise operator")
---
 tools/perf/tests/evsel-tp-sched.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
tools/perf/tests/evsel-tp-sched.c +3 -3
index da474d743b6a..1b832e54c04b 100644
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ int test__perf_evsel__tp_sched_test(void)
 		return -1;
 	}
 
-	if (perf_evsel__test_field(evsel, "prev_comm", 16, true))
+	if (perf_evsel__test_field(evsel, "prev_comm", 16, false))
 		ret = -1;
 
 	if (perf_evsel__test_field(evsel, "prev_pid", 4, true))
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ int test__perf_evsel__tp_sched_test(void)
 	if (perf_evsel__test_field(evsel, "prev_state", sizeof(long), true))
 		ret = -1;
 
-	if (perf_evsel__test_field(evsel, "next_comm", 16, true))
+	if (perf_evsel__test_field(evsel, "next_comm", 16, false))
 		ret = -1;
 
 	if (perf_evsel__test_field(evsel, "next_pid", 4, true))
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ int test__perf_evsel__tp_sched_test(void)
 		return -1;
 	}
 
-	if (perf_evsel__test_field(evsel, "comm", 16, true))
+	if (perf_evsel__test_field(evsel, "comm", 16, false))
 		ret = -1;
 
 	if (perf_evsel__test_field(evsel, "pid", 4, true))
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#22 lore raw

PATCH 23/63 ARM: 8840/1: use a raw_spinlock_t in unwind

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 74ffe79ae538283bbf7c155e62339f1e5c87b55a ]

Mostly unwind is done with irqs enabled however SLUB may call it with irqs disabled while creating a new SLUB cache.

I had system freeze while loading a module which called kmem_cache_create() on init. That means SLUB's __slab_alloc() disabled interrupts and then

->new_slab_objects()
->new_slab()
->setup_object()
->setup_object_debug()

    ->init_tracking()
     ->set_track()
      ->save_stack_trace()
       ->save_stack_trace_tsk()
        ->walk_stackframe()
         ->unwind_frame()
          ->unwind_find_idx()
           =>spin_lock_irqsave(&unwind_lock);
---
 arch/arm/kernel/unwind.c | 14 +++++++-------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/arm/kernel/unwind.c +7 -7
index 0bee233fef9a..314cfb232a63 100644
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ extern const struct unwind_idx __start_unwind_idx[];
 static const struct unwind_idx *__origin_unwind_idx;
 extern const struct unwind_idx __stop_unwind_idx[];
 
-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(unwind_lock);
+static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(unwind_lock);
 static LIST_HEAD(unwind_tables);
 
 /* Convert a prel31 symbol to an absolute address */
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ static const struct unwind_idx *unwind_find_idx(unsigned long addr)
 		/* module unwind tables */
 		struct unwind_table *table;
 
-		spin_lock_irqsave(&unwind_lock, flags);
+		raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&unwind_lock, flags);
 		list_for_each_entry(table, &unwind_tables, list) {
 			if (addr >= table->begin_addr &&
 			    addr < table->end_addr) {
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ static const struct unwind_idx *unwind_find_idx(unsigned long addr)
 				break;
 			}
 		}
-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&unwind_lock, flags);
+		raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&unwind_lock, flags);
 	}
 
 	pr_debug("%s: idx = %p\n", __func__, idx);
@@ -529,9 +529,9 @@ struct unwind_table *unwind_table_add(unsigned long start, unsigned long size,
 	tab->begin_addr = text_addr;
 	tab->end_addr = text_addr + text_size;
 
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&unwind_lock, flags);
+	raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&unwind_lock, flags);
 	list_add_tail(&tab->list, &unwind_tables);
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&unwind_lock, flags);
+	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&unwind_lock, flags);
 
 	return tab;
 }
@@ -543,9 +543,9 @@ void unwind_table_del(struct unwind_table *tab)
 	if (!tab)
 		return;
 
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&unwind_lock, flags);
+	raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&unwind_lock, flags);
 	list_del(&tab->list);
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&unwind_lock, flags);
+	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&unwind_lock, flags);
 
 	kfree(tab);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#13 lore raw

PATCH 14/63 fs/file.c: initialize init_files.resize_wait

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Shuriyc Chu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5704a06810682683355624923547b41540e2801a ]

(Taken from https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200647)

'get_unused_fd_flags' in kthread cause kernel crash. It works fine on 4.1, but causes crash after get 64 fds. It also cause crash on ubuntu1404/1604/1804, centos7.5, and the crash messages are almost the same.

The crash message on centos7.5 shows below:

start fd 61
start fd 62
start fd 63

  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
  IP: __wake_up_common+0x2e/0x90
  PGD 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
  Modules linked in: test(OE) xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle ipt_MASQUERADE nf_nat_masquerade_ipv4 iptable_nat nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 tun bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter devlink sunrpc kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel lrw gf128mul glue_helper ablk_helper cryptd sg ppdev pcspkr virtio_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 joydev ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sr_mod cdrom sd_mod crc_t10dif crct10dif_generic ata_generic pata_acpi virtio_scsi virtio_console virtio_net cirrus drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm crct10dif_pclmul crct10dif_common crc32c_intel drm ata_piix serio_raw libata virtio_pci virtio_ring i2c_core
   virtio floppy dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
  CPU: 2 PID: 1820 Comm: test_fd Kdump: loaded Tainted: G           OE  ------------   3.10.0-862.3.3.el7.x86_64 #1
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.10.2-0-g5f4c7b1-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
  task: ffff8e92b9431fa0 ti: ffff8e94247a0000 task.ti: ffff8e94247a0000
  RIP: 0010:__wake_up_common+0x2e/0x90
  RSP: 0018:ffff8e94247a2d18  EFLAGS: 00010086
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff9d09daa0 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: ffffffff9d09daa0
  RBP: ffff8e94247a2d50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8e92b95dfda8
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff9d09daa8
  R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8e9434e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000017c686000 CR4: 00000000000207e0
  Call Trace:
    __wake_up+0x39/0x50
    expand_files+0x131/0x250
    __alloc_fd+0x47/0x170
    get_unused_fd_flags+0x30/0x40
    test_fd+0x12a/0x1c0 [test]
    kthread+0xd1/0xe0
    ret_from_fork_nospec_begin+0x21/0x21
  Code: 66 90 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 89 f7 41 56 41 89 ce 41 55 41 54 49 89 fc 49 83 c4 08 53 48 83 ec 10 48 8b 47 08 89 55 cc 4c 89 45 d0 <48> 8b 08 49 39 c4 48 8d 78 e8 4c 8d 69 e8 75 08 eb 3b 4c 89 ef
  RIP   __wake_up_common+0x2e/0x90
   RSP <ffff8e94247a2d18>
  CR2: 0000000000000000

This issue exists since CentOS 7.5 3.10.0-862 and CentOS 7.4 (3.10.0-693.21.1 ) is ok. Root cause: the item 'resize_wait' is not initialized before being used.

---
 fs/file.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/file.c +1 -0
index 39f8f15921da..7e9eb65a2912 100644
@@ -474,6 +474,7 @@ struct files_struct init_files = {
 		.full_fds_bits	= init_files.full_fds_bits_init,
 	},
 	.file_lock	= __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(init_files.file_lock),
+	.resize_wait	= __WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD_INITIALIZER(init_files.resize_wait),
 };
 
 static unsigned long find_next_fd(struct fdtable *fdt, unsigned long start)
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#17 lore raw

PATCH 18/63 fs: fix guard_bio_eod to check for real EOD errors

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dce30ca9e3b676fb288c33c1f4725a0621361185 ]

guard_bio_eod() can truncate a segment in bio to allow it to do IO on odd last sectors of a device.

It already checks if the IO starts past EOD, but it does not consider the possibility of an IO request starting within device boundaries can contain more than one segment past EOD.

In such cases, truncated_bytes can be bigger than PAGE_SIZE, and will underflow bvec->bv_len.

Fix this by checking if truncated_bytes is lower than PAGE_SIZE.

This situation has been found on filesystems such as isofs and vfat, which doesn't check the device size before mount, if the device is smaller than the filesystem itself, a readahead on such filesystem, which spans EOD, can trigger this situation, leading a call to zero_user() with a wrong size possibly corrupting memory.

I didn't see any crash, or didn't let the system run long enough to check if memory corruption will be hit somewhere, but adding instrumentation to guard_bio_end() to check truncated_bytes size, was enough to see the error.

The following script can trigger the error.

MNT=/mnt
IMG=./DISK.img
DEV=/dev/loop0

mkfs.vfat $IMG
mount $IMG $MNT
cp -R /etc $MNT &> /dev/null
umount $MNT

losetup -D

losetup --find --show --sizelimit 16247280 $IMG
mount $DEV $MNT

find $MNT -type f -exec cat {} + >/dev/null

Kudos to Eric Sandeen for coming up with the reproducer above

---
 fs/buffer.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
fs/buffer.c +7 -0
index 6f7d519a093b..f278e27bd8c0 100644
@@ -2985,6 +2985,13 @@ void guard_bio_eod(int rw, struct bio *bio)
 	/* Uhhuh. We've got a bio that straddles the device size! */
 	truncated_bytes = bio->bi_iter.bi_size - (maxsector << 9);
 
+	/*
+	 * The bio contains more than one segment which spans EOD, just return
+	 * and let IO layer turn it into an EIO
+	 */
+	if (truncated_bytes > bvec->bv_len)
+		return;
+
 	/* Truncate the bio.. */
 	bio->bi_iter.bi_size -= truncated_bytes;
 	bvec->bv_len -= truncated_bytes;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#16 lore raw

PATCH 17/63 cifs: Fix NULL pointer dereference of devname

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Yao Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 68e2672f8fbd1e04982b8d2798dd318bf2515dd2 ]

There is a NULL pointer dereference of devname in strspn()

The oops looks something like:

CIFS: Attempting to mount (null)

  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
  ...
  RIP: 0010:strspn+0x0/0x50
  ...
  Call Trace:
   ? cifs_parse_mount_options+0x222/0x1710 [cifs]
   ? cifs_get_volume_info+0x2f/0x80 [cifs]
   cifs_setup_volume_info+0x20/0x190 [cifs]
   cifs_get_volume_info+0x50/0x80 [cifs]
   cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x59/0x630 [cifs]
   ? ida_alloc_range+0x34b/0x3d0
   cifs_do_mount+0x11/0x20 [cifs]
   mount_fs+0x52/0x170
   vfs_kern_mount+0x6b/0x170
   do_mount+0x216/0xdc0
   ksys_mount+0x83/0xd0
   __x64_sys_mount+0x25/0x30
   do_syscall_64+0x65/0x220
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Fix this by adding a NULL check on devname in cifs_parse_devname()

---
 fs/cifs/connect.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
fs/cifs/connect.c +5 -0
index eacf57c24ca9..9cb72fd40eff 100644
@@ -1255,6 +1255,11 @@ cifs_parse_devname(const char *devname, struct smb_vol *vol)
 	const char *delims = "/\\";
 	size_t len;
 
+	if (unlikely(!devname || !*devname)) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "Device name not specified.\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	/* make sure we have a valid UNC double delimiter prefix */
 	len = strspn(devname, delims);
 	if (len != 2)
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#14 lore raw

PATCH 15/63 cifs: use correct format characters

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Louis Taylor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 259594bea574e515a148171b5cd84ce5cbdc028a ]

When compiling with -Wformat, clang emits the following warnings:

fs/cifs/smb1ops.c:312:20: warning: format specifies type 'unsigned short' but the argument has type 'unsigned int' [-Wformat]

                         tgt_total_cnt, total_in_tgt);
                                        ^~~~~~~~~~~~

fs/cifs/cifs_dfs_ref.c:289:4: warning: format specifies type 'short' but the argument has type 'int' [-Wformat]

                 ref->flags, ref->server_type);
                 ^~~~~~~~~~

fs/cifs/cifs_dfs_ref.c:289:16: warning: format specifies type 'short' but the argument has type 'int' [-Wformat]

                 ref->flags, ref->server_type);
                             ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

fs/cifs/cifs_dfs_ref.c:291:4: warning: format specifies type 'short' but the argument has type 'int' [-Wformat]

                 ref->ref_flag, ref->path_consumed);
                 ^~~~~~~~~~~~~

fs/cifs/cifs_dfs_ref.c:291:19: warning: format specifies type 'short' but the argument has type 'int' [-Wformat]

                 ref->ref_flag, ref->path_consumed);
                                ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The types of these arguments are unconditionally defined, so this patch updates the format character to the correct ones for ints and unsigned ints.

---
 fs/cifs/cifs_dfs_ref.c | 4 ++--
 fs/cifs/smb1ops.c      | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/cifs/cifs_dfs_ref.c +2 -2
index 7dc886c9a78f..1ea643faf04b 100644
@@ -266,9 +266,9 @@ static void dump_referral(const struct dfs_info3_param *ref)
 {
 	cifs_dbg(FYI, "DFS: ref path: %s\n", ref->path_name);
 	cifs_dbg(FYI, "DFS: node path: %s\n", ref->node_name);
-	cifs_dbg(FYI, "DFS: fl: %hd, srv_type: %hd\n",
+	cifs_dbg(FYI, "DFS: fl: %d, srv_type: %d\n",
 		 ref->flags, ref->server_type);
-	cifs_dbg(FYI, "DFS: ref_flags: %hd, path_consumed: %hd\n",
+	cifs_dbg(FYI, "DFS: ref_flags: %d, path_consumed: %d\n",
 		 ref->ref_flag, ref->path_consumed);
 }
 
fs/cifs/smb1ops.c +1 -1
index efd72e1fae74..f7a9adab0b84 100644
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ coalesce_t2(char *second_buf, struct smb_hdr *target_hdr)
 	remaining = tgt_total_cnt - total_in_tgt;
 
 	if (remaining < 0) {
-		cifs_dbg(FYI, "Server sent too much data. tgt_total_cnt=%hu total_in_tgt=%hu\n",
+		cifs_dbg(FYI, "Server sent too much data. tgt_total_cnt=%hu total_in_tgt=%u\n",
 			 tgt_total_cnt, total_in_tgt);
 		return -EPROTO;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/63 h8300: use cc-cross-prefix instead of hardcoding h8300-unknown-linux-

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fc2b47b55f17fd996f7a01975ce1c33c2f2513f6 ]

It believe it is a bad idea to hardcode a specific compiler prefix that may or may not be installed on a user's system. It is annoying when testing features that should not require compilers at all.

For example, mrproper, headers_install, etc. should work without any compiler.

They look like follows on my machine.

$ make ARCH=h8300 mrproper
./scripts/gcc-version.sh: line 26: h8300-unknown-linux-gcc: command not found
./scripts/gcc-version.sh: line 27: h8300-unknown-linux-gcc: command not found
make: h8300-unknown-linux-gcc: Command not found
make: h8300-unknown-linux-gcc: Command not found
  [ a bunch of the same error messages continue ]
$ make ARCH=h8300 headers_install
./scripts/gcc-version.sh: line 26: h8300-unknown-linux-gcc: command not found
./scripts/gcc-version.sh: line 27: h8300-unknown-linux-gcc: command not found
make: h8300-unknown-linux-gcc: Command not found
  HOSTCC  scripts/basic/fixdep
make: h8300-unknown-linux-gcc: Command not found
  WRAP    arch/h8300/include/generated/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h
  [ snip ]

The solution is to delete this line, or to use cc-cross-prefix like some architectures do. I chose the latter as a moderate fixup.

I added an alternative 'h8300-linux-' because it is available at:

https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/pub/tools/crosstool/files/bin/x86_64/8.1.0/

---
 arch/h8300/Makefile | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/h8300/Makefile +1 -1
index e1c02ca230cb..073bba6f9f60 100644
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ KBUILD_AFLAGS += $(aflags-y)
 LDFLAGS += $(ldflags-y)
 
 ifeq ($(CROSS_COMPILE),)
-CROSS_COMPILE := h8300-unknown-linux-
+CROSS_COMPILE := $(call cc-cross-prefix, h8300-unknown-linux- h8300-linux-)
 endif
 
 core-y	+= arch/$(ARCH)/kernel/ arch/$(ARCH)/mm/
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 6/63 sysctl: handle overflow for file-max

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 32a5ad9c22852e6bd9e74bdec5934ef9d1480bc5 ]

Currently, when writing

echo 18446744073709551616 > /proc/sys/fs/file-max

/proc/sys/fs/file-max will overflow and be set to 0. That quickly crashes the system.

This commit sets the max and min value for file-max. The max value is set to long int. Any higher value cannot currently be used as the percpu counters are long ints and not unsigned integers.

Note that the file-max value is ultimately parsed via __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax(). This function does not report error when min or max are exceeded. Which means if a value largen that long int is written userspace will not receive an error instead the old value will be kept. There is an argument to be made that this should be changed and __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax() should return an error when a dedicated min or max value are exceeded. However this has the potential to break userspace so let's defer this to an RFC patch.

---
 kernel/sysctl.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
kernel/sysctl.c +3 -0
index beadcf83ceba..2f98b11477b8 100644
@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ static int __maybe_unused one = 1;
 static int __maybe_unused two = 2;
 static int __maybe_unused four = 4;
 static unsigned long one_ul = 1;
+static unsigned long long_max = LONG_MAX;
 static int one_hundred = 100;
 #ifdef CONFIG_PRINTK
 static int ten_thousand = 10000;
@@ -1603,6 +1604,8 @@ static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = {
 		.maxlen		= sizeof(files_stat.max_files),
 		.mode		= 0644,
 		.proc_handler	= proc_doulongvec_minmax,
+		.extra1		= &zero,
+		.extra2		= &long_max,
 	},
 	{
 		.procname	= "nr_open",
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 4/63 tracing: kdb: Fix ftdump to not sleep

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 31b265b3baaf55f209229888b7ffea523ddab366 ]

As reported back in 2016-11 [1], the "ftdump" kdb command triggers a BUG for "sleeping function called from invalid context".

kdb's "ftdump" command wants to call ring_buffer_read_prepare() in atomic context. A very simple solution for this is to add allocation flags to ring_buffer_read_prepare() so kdb can call it without triggering the allocation error. This patch does that.

Note that in the original email thread about this, it was suggested that perhaps the solution for kdb was to either preallocate the buffer ahead of time or create our own iterator. I'm hoping that this alternative of adding allocation flags to ring_buffer_read_prepare() can be considered since it means I don't need to duplicate more of the core trace code into "trace_kdb.c" (for either creating my own iterator or re-preparing a ring allocator whose memory was already allocated).

NOTE: another option for kdb is to actually figure out how to make it reuse the existing ftrace_dump() function and totally eliminate the duplication. This sounds very appealing and actually works (the "sr z" command can be seen to properly dump the ftrace buffer). The downside here is that ftrace_dump() fully consumes the trace buffer. Unless that is changed I'd rather not use it because it means "ftdump | grep xyz" won't be very useful to search the ftrace buffer since it will throw away the whole trace on the first grep. A future patch to dump only the last few lines of the buffer will also be hard to implement.

[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

---
 include/linux/ring_buffer.h | 2 +-
 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c  | 5 +++--
 kernel/trace/trace.c        | 6 ++++--
 kernel/trace/trace_kdb.c    | 6 ++++--
 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
include/linux/ring_buffer.h +1 -1
index 19d0778ec382..121c8f99ecdd 100644
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ ring_buffer_consume(struct ring_buffer *buffer, int cpu, u64 *ts,
 		    unsigned long *lost_events);
 
 struct ring_buffer_iter *
-ring_buffer_read_prepare(struct ring_buffer *buffer, int cpu);
+ring_buffer_read_prepare(struct ring_buffer *buffer, int cpu, gfp_t flags);
 void ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync(void);
 void ring_buffer_read_start(struct ring_buffer_iter *iter);
 void ring_buffer_read_finish(struct ring_buffer_iter *iter);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c +3 -2
index 74b20e3ab8c6..5e091614fe39 100644
@@ -4042,6 +4042,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ring_buffer_consume);
  * ring_buffer_read_prepare - Prepare for a non consuming read of the buffer
  * @buffer: The ring buffer to read from
  * @cpu: The cpu buffer to iterate over
+ * @flags: gfp flags to use for memory allocation
  *
  * This performs the initial preparations necessary to iterate
  * through the buffer.  Memory is allocated, buffer recording
@@ -4059,7 +4060,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ring_buffer_consume);
  * This overall must be paired with ring_buffer_read_finish.
  */
 struct ring_buffer_iter *
-ring_buffer_read_prepare(struct ring_buffer *buffer, int cpu)
+ring_buffer_read_prepare(struct ring_buffer *buffer, int cpu, gfp_t flags)
 {
 	struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer;
 	struct ring_buffer_iter *iter;
@@ -4067,7 +4068,7 @@ ring_buffer_read_prepare(struct ring_buffer *buffer, int cpu)
 	if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, buffer->cpumask))
 		return NULL;
 
-	iter = kmalloc(sizeof(*iter), GFP_KERNEL);
+	iter = kmalloc(sizeof(*iter), flags);
 	if (!iter)
 		return NULL;
 
kernel/trace/trace.c +4 -2
index 8c097de8a596..ae00e68ceae3 100644
@@ -3122,7 +3122,8 @@ __tracing_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, bool snapshot)
 	if (iter->cpu_file == RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS) {
 		for_each_tracing_cpu(cpu) {
 			iter->buffer_iter[cpu] =
-				ring_buffer_read_prepare(iter->trace_buffer->buffer, cpu);
+				ring_buffer_read_prepare(iter->trace_buffer->buffer,
+							 cpu, GFP_KERNEL);
 		}
 		ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync();
 		for_each_tracing_cpu(cpu) {
@@ -3132,7 +3133,8 @@ __tracing_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, bool snapshot)
 	} else {
 		cpu = iter->cpu_file;
 		iter->buffer_iter[cpu] =
-			ring_buffer_read_prepare(iter->trace_buffer->buffer, cpu);
+			ring_buffer_read_prepare(iter->trace_buffer->buffer,
+						 cpu, GFP_KERNEL);
 		ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync();
 		ring_buffer_read_start(iter->buffer_iter[cpu]);
 		tracing_iter_reset(iter, cpu);
kernel/trace/trace_kdb.c +4 -2
index 57149bce6aad..896458285fdd 100644
@@ -50,14 +50,16 @@ static void ftrace_dump_buf(int skip_lines, long cpu_file)
 	if (cpu_file == RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS) {
 		for_each_tracing_cpu(cpu) {
 			iter.buffer_iter[cpu] =
-			ring_buffer_read_prepare(iter.trace_buffer->buffer, cpu);
+			ring_buffer_read_prepare(iter.trace_buffer->buffer,
+						 cpu, GFP_ATOMIC);
 			ring_buffer_read_start(iter.buffer_iter[cpu]);
 			tracing_iter_reset(&iter, cpu);
 		}
 	} else {
 		iter.cpu_file = cpu_file;
 		iter.buffer_iter[cpu_file] =
-			ring_buffer_read_prepare(iter.trace_buffer->buffer, cpu_file);
+			ring_buffer_read_prepare(iter.trace_buffer->buffer,
+						 cpu_file, GFP_ATOMIC);
 		ring_buffer_read_start(iter.buffer_iter[cpu_file]);
 		tracing_iter_reset(&iter, cpu_file);
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1

Sasha Levin

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/63 CIFS: fix POSIX lock leak and invalid ptr deref

From: Aurelien Aptel <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bc31d0cdcfbadb6258b45db97e93b1c83822ba33 ]

We have a customer reporting crashes in lock_get_status() with many "Leaked POSIX lock" messages preceeding the crash.

Leaked POSIX lock on dev=0x0:0x56 ...
Leaked POSIX lock on dev=0x0:0x56 ...
Leaked POSIX lock on dev=0x0:0x56 ...
Leaked POSIX lock on dev=0x0:0x53 ...
Leaked POSIX lock on dev=0x0:0x53 ...
Leaked POSIX lock on dev=0x0:0x53 ...
Leaked POSIX lock on dev=0x0:0x53 ...
POSIX: fl_owner=ffff8900e7b79380 fl_flags=0x1 fl_type=0x1 fl_pid=20709 Leaked POSIX lock on dev=0x0:0x4b ino...
Leaked locks on dev=0x0:0x4b ino=0xf911400000029:
POSIX: fl_owner=ffff89f41c870e00 fl_flags=0x1 fl_type=0x1 fl_pid=19592

 stack segment: 0000 [#1] SMP
 Modules linked in: binfmt_misc msr tcp_diag udp_diag inet_diag unix_diag af_packet_diag netlink_diag rpcsec_gss_krb5 arc4 ecb auth_rpcgss nfsv4 md4 nfs nls_utf8 lockd grace cifs sunrpc ccm dns_resolver fscache af_packet iscsi_ibft iscsi_boot_sysfs vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock xfs libcrc32c sb_edac edac_core crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel drbg ansi_cprng vmw_balloon aesni_intel aes_x86_64 lrw gf128mul glue_helper ablk_helper cryptd joydev pcspkr vmxnet3 i2c_piix4 vmw_vmci shpchp fjes processor button ac btrfs xor raid6_pq sr_mod cdrom ata_generic sd_mod ata_piix vmwgfx crc32c_intel drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm serio_raw ahci libahci drm libata vmw_pvscsi sg dm_multipath dm_mod scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua scsi_mod autofs4

Supported: Yes

 CPU: 6 PID: 28250 Comm: lsof Not tainted 4.4.156-94.64-default #1
 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 04/05/2016
 task: ffff88a345f28740 ti: ffff88c74005c000 task.ti: ffff88c74005c000
 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8125dcab>]  [<ffffffff8125dcab>] lock_get_status+0x9b/0x3b0
 RSP: 0018:ffff88c74005fd90  EFLAGS: 00010202
 RAX: ffff89bde83e20ae RBX: ffff89e870003d18 RCX: 0000000049534f50
 RDX: ffffffff81a3541f RSI: ffffffff81a3544e RDI: ffff89bde83e20ae
 RBP: 0026252423222120 R08: 0000000020584953 R09: 000000000000ffff
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88c74005fc70 R12: ffff89e5ca7b1340
 R13: 00000000000050e5 R14: ffff89e870003d30 R15: ffff89e5ca7b1340
 FS:  00007fafd64be800(0000) GS:ffff89f41fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000001c80018 CR3: 000000a522048000 CR4: 0000000000360670
 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
 Stack:
  0000000000000208 ffffffff81a3d6b6 ffff89e870003d30 ffff89e870003d18
  ffff89e5ca7b1340 ffff89f41738d7c0 ffff89e870003d30 ffff89e5ca7b1340
  ffffffff8125e08f 0000000000000000 ffff89bc22b67d00 ffff88c74005ff28
 Call Trace:
  [<ffffffff8125e08f>] locks_show+0x2f/0x70
  [<ffffffff81230ad1>] seq_read+0x251/0x3a0
  [<ffffffff81275bbc>] proc_reg_read+0x3c/0x70
  [<ffffffff8120e456>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x140
  [<ffffffff8120e9da>] vfs_read+0x7a/0x120
  [<ffffffff8120faf2>] SyS_read+0x42/0xa0
  [<ffffffff8161cbc3>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xb7

When Linux closes a FD (close(), close-on-exec, dup2(), ...) it calls filp_close() which also removes all posix locks.

The lock struct is initialized like so in filp_close() and passed down to cifs

	...
        lock.fl_type = F_UNLCK;
        lock.fl_flags = FL_POSIX | FL_CLOSE;
        lock.fl_start = 0;
        lock.fl_end = OFFSET_MAX;
	...

Note the FL_CLOSE flag, which hints the VFS code that this unlocking is done for closing the fd.

filp_close()

  locks_remove_posix(filp, id);
    vfs_lock_file(filp, F_SETLK, &lock, NULL);
      return filp->f_op->lock(filp, cmd, fl) => cifs_lock()
        rc = cifs_setlk(file, flock, type, wait_flag, posix_lck, lock, unlock, xid);
          rc = server->ops->mand_unlock_range(cfile, flock, xid);
          if (flock->fl_flags & FL_POSIX && !rc)
                  rc = locks_lock_file_wait(file, flock)

Notice how we don't call locks_lock_file_wait() which does the generic VFS lock/unlock/wait work on the inode if rc != 0.

If we are closing the handle, the SMB server is supposed to remove any locks associated with it. Similarly, cifs.ko frees and wakes up any lock and lock waiter when closing the file:

cifs_close()
cifsFileInfo_put(file->private_data)

	/*
	 * Delete any outstanding lock records. We'll lose them when the file
	 * is closed anyway.
	 */
	down_write(&cifsi->lock_sem);
	list_for_each_entry_safe(li, tmp, &cifs_file->llist->locks, llist) {
		list_del(&li->llist);
		cifs_del_lock_waiters(li);
		kfree(li);
	}
	list_del(&cifs_file->llist->llist);
	kfree(cifs_file->llist);
	up_write(&cifsi->lock_sem);

So we can safely ignore unlocking failures in cifs_lock() if they happen with the FL_CLOSE flag hint set as both the server and the client take care of it during the actual closing.

This is not a proper fix for the unlocking failure but it's safe and it seems to prevent the lock leakages and crashes the customer experiences.

---
 fs/cifs/file.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/cifs/file.c +13 -1
index 0305e3866216..23a8374fa97f 100644
@@ -1574,8 +1574,20 @@ cifs_setlk(struct file *file, struct file_lock *flock, __u32 type,
 		rc = server->ops->mand_unlock_range(cfile, flock, xid);
 
 out:
-	if (flock->fl_flags & FL_POSIX && !rc)
+	if (flock->fl_flags & FL_POSIX) {
+		/*
+		 * If this is a request to remove all locks because we
+		 * are closing the file, it doesn't matter if the
+		 * unlocking failed as both cifs.ko and the SMB server
+		 * remove the lock on file close
+		 */
+		if (rc) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s failed rc=%d\n", __func__, rc);
+			if (!(flock->fl_flags & FL_CLOSE))
+				return rc;
+		}
 		rc = locks_lock_file_wait(file, flock);
+	}
 	return rc;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1