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drm/cirrus: Use drm_framebuffer_put to avoid kernel oops in clean-up

PATCH In review Sasha Levin 3 participants 49 messages Mar 30, 2019 – Apr 3, 2019

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Sasha Levin

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/57 drm/cirrus: Use drm_framebuffer_put to avoid kernel oops in clean-up

From: Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit abf7b30d7f61d981bfcca65d1e8331b27021b475 ]

In the Cirrus driver, the regular clean-up code also performs the clean-up of a failed initialization. If the fbdev's framebuffer was not initialized, the clean-up will fail within drm_framebuffer_unregister_private. Booting with cirrus.bpp=16 triggers this bug.

The framebuffer is currently stored directly within struct cirrus_fbdev. To fix the bug, we turn it into a pointer that is only set for initialized framebuffers. The fbdev's clean-up code skips uninitialized framebuffers.

The memory for struct drm_framebuffer is allocated dynamically. This requires additional error handling within cirrusfb_create. The framebuffer clean-up is now performed by drm_framebuffer_put, which also frees the data strcuture's memory.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/cirrus/cirrus_drv.h   |  2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/cirrus/cirrus_fbdev.c | 48 +++++++++++++++------------
 drivers/gpu/drm/cirrus/cirrus_mode.c  |  2 +-
 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/cirrus/cirrus_drv.h +1 -1
index ce9db7aab225..a29f87e98d9d 100644
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ struct cirrus_device {
 
 struct cirrus_fbdev {
 	struct drm_fb_helper helper;
-	struct drm_framebuffer gfb;
+	struct drm_framebuffer *gfb;
 	void *sysram;
 	int size;
 	int x1, y1, x2, y2; /* dirty rect */
drivers/gpu/drm/cirrus/cirrus_fbdev.c +27 -21

95 lines not on this page · raw message

drivers/gpu/drm/cirrus/cirrus_mode.c +1 -1
index 336bfda40125..90a4e641d3fb 100644
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static int cirrus_crtc_do_set_base(struct drm_crtc *crtc,
 		return ret;
 	}
 
-	if (&cdev->mode_info.gfbdev->gfb == crtc->primary->fb) {
+	if (cdev->mode_info.gfbdev->gfb == crtc->primary->fb) {
 		/* if pushing console in kmap it */
 		ret = ttm_bo_kmap(&bo->bo, 0, bo->bo.num_pages, &bo->kmap);
 		if (ret)
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/57 gpio: pxa: handle corner case of unprobed device

From: Robert Jarzmik <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9ce3ebe973bf4073426f35f282c6b955ed802765 ]

In the corner case where the gpio driver probe fails, for whatever reason, the suspend and resume handlers will still be called as they have to be registered as syscore operations. This applies as well when no probe was called while the driver has been built in the kernel.

Nicolas tracked this in :
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200905

Therefore, add a failsafe in these function, and test if a proper probe succeeded and the driver is functional.

---
 drivers/gpio/gpio-pxa.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/gpio/gpio-pxa.c +6 -0
index eb27fa76e8fc..bcc6be4a5cb2 100644
@@ -777,6 +777,9 @@ static int pxa_gpio_suspend(void)
 	struct pxa_gpio_bank *c;
 	int gpio;
 
+	if (!pchip)
+		return 0;
+
 	for_each_gpio_bank(gpio, c, pchip) {
 		c->saved_gplr = readl_relaxed(c->regbase + GPLR_OFFSET);
 		c->saved_gpdr = readl_relaxed(c->regbase + GPDR_OFFSET);
@@ -795,6 +798,9 @@ static void pxa_gpio_resume(void)
 	struct pxa_gpio_bank *c;
 	int gpio;
 
+	if (!pchip)
+		return;
+
 	for_each_gpio_bank(gpio, c, pchip) {
 		/* restore level with set/clear */
 		writel_relaxed(c->saved_gplr, c->regbase + GPSR_OFFSET);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 4/57 f2fs: fix to avoid NULL pointer dereference on se->discard_map

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7d20c8abb2edcf962ca857d51f4d0f9cd4b19053 ]

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200951

These is a NULL pointer dereference issue reported in bugzilla:

Hi,
in the setup there is a SATA SSD connected to a SATA-to-USB bridge.

The disc is "Samsung SSD 850 PRO 256G" which supports TRIM. There are four partitions:
sda1: FAT /boot
sda2: F2FS /
sda3: F2FS /home
sda4: F2FS

The bridge is ASMT1153e which uses the "uas" driver.
There is no TRIM pass-through, so, when mounting it reports:
mounting with "discard" option, but the device does not support discard

The USB host is USB3.0 and UASP capable. It is the one on RK3399.

Given this everything works fine, except there is no TRIM support.

In order to enable TRIM a new UDEV rule is added [1]:
/etc/udev/rules.d/10-sata-bridge-trim.rules:
ACTION=="add|change", ATTRS{idVendor}=="174c", ATTRS{idProduct}=="55aa", SUBSYSTEM=="scsi_disk", ATTR{provisioning_mode}="unmap"
After reboot any F2FS write hangs forever and dmesg reports:

 Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference

Also tested on a x86_64 system: works fine even with TRIM enabled.
same disc
same bridge
different usb host controller
different cpu architecture
not root filesystem

Regards,
Vicenç.

[1] Post #5 in https://bbs.archlinux.org/viewtopic.php?id=236280

 Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000000000000003e
 Mem abort info:
   ESR = 0x96000004
   Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
   SET = 0, FnV = 0
   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
 Data abort info:
   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
   CM = 0, WnR = 0
 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000626e3122
 [000000000000003e] pgd=0000000000000000
 Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
 Modules linked in: overlay snd_soc_hdmi_codec rc_cec dw_hdmi_i2s_audio dw_hdmi_cec snd_soc_simple_card snd_soc_simple_card_utils snd_soc_rockchip_i2s rockchip_rga snd_soc_rockchip_pcm rockchipdrm videobuf2_dma_sg v4l2_mem2mem rtc_rk808 videobuf2_memops analogix_dp videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_common dw_hdmi dw_wdt cec rc_core videodev drm_kms_helper media drm rockchip_thermal rockchip_saradc realtek drm_panel_orientation_quirks syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops dwmac_rk stmmac_platform stmmac pwm_bl squashfs loop crypto_user gpio_keys hid_kensington
 CPU: 5 PID: 957 Comm: nvim Not tainted 4.19.0-rc1-1-ARCH #1
 Hardware name: Sapphire-RK3399 Board (DT)
 pstate: 00000005 (nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
 pc : update_sit_entry+0x304/0x4b0
 lr : update_sit_entry+0x108/0x4b0
 sp : ffff00000ca13bd0
 x29: ffff00000ca13bd0 x28: 000000000000003e
 x27: 0000000000000020 x26: 0000000000080000
 x25: 0000000000000048 x24: ffff8000ebb85cf8
 x23: 0000000000000253 x22: 00000000ffffffff
 x21: 00000000000535f2 x20: 00000000ffffffdf
 x19: ffff8000eb9e6800 x18: ffff8000eb9e6be8
 x17: 0000000007ce6926 x16: 000000001c83ffa8
 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: ffff8000f602df90
 x13: 0000000000000006 x12: 0000000000000040
 x11: 0000000000000228 x10: 0000000000000000
 x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000
 x7 : 00000000000535f2 x6 : ffff8000ebff3440
 x5 : ffff8000ebff3440 x4 : ffff8000ebe3a6c8
 x3 : 00000000ffffffff x2 : 0000000000000020
 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff8000eb9e5800
 Process nvim (pid: 957, stack limit = 0x0000000063a78320)
 Call trace:
  update_sit_entry+0x304/0x4b0
  f2fs_invalidate_blocks+0x98/0x140
  truncate_node+0x90/0x400
  f2fs_remove_inode_page+0xe8/0x340
  f2fs_evict_inode+0x2b0/0x408
  evict+0xe0/0x1e0
  iput+0x160/0x260
  do_unlinkat+0x214/0x298
  __arm64_sys_unlinkat+0x3c/0x68
  el0_svc_handler+0x94/0x118
  el0_svc+0x8/0xc
 Code: f9400800 b9488400 36080140 f9400f01 (387c4820)
 ---[ end trace a0f21a307118c477 ]---

The reason is it is possible to enable discard flag on block queue via UDEV, but during mount, f2fs will initialize se->discard_map only if this flag is set, once the flag is set after mount, f2fs may dereference NULL pointer on se->discard_map.

So this patch does below changes to fix this issue:
- initialize and update se->discard_map all the time.
- don't clear DISCARD option if device has no QUEUE_FLAG_DISCARD flag during mount.
- don't issue small discard on zoned block device.
- introduce some functions to enhance the readability.

---
 fs/f2fs/debug.c   |  3 +--
 fs/f2fs/f2fs.h    | 15 ++++++++---
 fs/f2fs/file.c    |  2 +-
 fs/f2fs/segment.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
 fs/f2fs/super.c   | 16 +++---------
 5 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/debug.c +1 -2
index 214a968962a1..ebe649d9793c 100644
@@ -190,8 +190,7 @@ static void update_mem_info(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
 	si->base_mem += MAIN_SEGS(sbi) * sizeof(struct seg_entry);
 	si->base_mem += f2fs_bitmap_size(MAIN_SEGS(sbi));
 	si->base_mem += 2 * SIT_VBLOCK_MAP_SIZE * MAIN_SEGS(sbi);
-	if (f2fs_discard_en(sbi))
-		si->base_mem += SIT_VBLOCK_MAP_SIZE * MAIN_SEGS(sbi);
+	si->base_mem += SIT_VBLOCK_MAP_SIZE * MAIN_SEGS(sbi);
 	si->base_mem += SIT_VBLOCK_MAP_SIZE;
 	if (sbi->segs_per_sec > 1)
 		si->base_mem += MAIN_SECS(sbi) * sizeof(struct sec_entry);
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +12 -3
index 42aef5c94927..19d2bbaf4c25 100644
@@ -3410,11 +3410,20 @@ static inline int get_blkz_type(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
 }
 #endif
 
-static inline bool f2fs_discard_en(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
+static inline bool f2fs_hw_should_discard(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
 {
-	struct request_queue *q = bdev_get_queue(sbi->sb->s_bdev);
+	return f2fs_sb_has_blkzoned(sbi->sb);
+}
 
-	return blk_queue_discard(q) || f2fs_sb_has_blkzoned(sbi->sb);
+static inline bool f2fs_hw_support_discard(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
+{
+	return blk_queue_discard(bdev_get_queue(sbi->sb->s_bdev));
+}
+
+static inline bool f2fs_realtime_discard_enable(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
+{
+	return (test_opt(sbi, DISCARD) && f2fs_hw_support_discard(sbi)) ||
+					f2fs_hw_should_discard(sbi);
 }
 
 static inline void set_opt_mode(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, unsigned int mt)
fs/f2fs/file.c +1 -1
index 81c1dd635a8d..9fc076ca002d 100644
@@ -1983,7 +1983,7 @@ static int f2fs_ioc_fitrim(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg)
 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	if (!blk_queue_discard(q))
+	if (!f2fs_hw_support_discard(F2FS_SB(sb)))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 	if (copy_from_user(&range, (struct fstrim_range __user *)arg,
fs/f2fs/segment.c +28 -37

116 lines not on this page · raw message

fs/f2fs/super.c +4 -12
index c9639ef0e8d5..ec50b95c7ea5 100644
@@ -360,7 +360,6 @@ static int f2fs_check_quota_options(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
 static int parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options)
 {
 	struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_SB(sb);
-	struct request_queue *q;
 	substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
 	char *p, *name;
 	int arg = 0;
@@ -415,14 +414,7 @@ static int parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options)
 				return -EINVAL;
 			break;
 		case Opt_discard:
-			q = bdev_get_queue(sb->s_bdev);
-			if (blk_queue_discard(q)) {
-				set_opt(sbi, DISCARD);
-			} else if (!f2fs_sb_has_blkzoned(sb)) {
-				f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
-					"mounting with \"discard\" option, but "
-					"the device does not support discard");
-			}
+			set_opt(sbi, DISCARD);
 			break;
 		case Opt_nodiscard:
 			if (f2fs_sb_has_blkzoned(sb)) {
@@ -1032,7 +1024,8 @@ static void f2fs_put_super(struct super_block *sb)
 	/* be sure to wait for any on-going discard commands */
 	dropped = f2fs_wait_discard_bios(sbi);
 
-	if (f2fs_discard_en(sbi) && !sbi->discard_blks && !dropped) {
+	if ((f2fs_hw_support_discard(sbi) || f2fs_hw_should_discard(sbi)) &&
+					!sbi->discard_blks && !dropped) {
 		struct cp_control cpc = {
 			.reason = CP_UMOUNT | CP_TRIMMED,
 		};
@@ -1402,8 +1395,7 @@ static void default_options(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
 	set_opt(sbi, NOHEAP);
 	sbi->sb->s_flags |= SB_LAZYTIME;
 	set_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE);
-	if (blk_queue_discard(bdev_get_queue(sbi->sb->s_bdev)))
-		set_opt(sbi, DISCARD);
+	set_opt(sbi, DISCARD);
 	if (f2fs_sb_has_blkzoned(sbi->sb))
 		set_opt_mode(sbi, F2FS_MOUNT_LFS);
 	else
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH 8/57 f2fs: fix to do sanity check with current segment number

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 042be0f849e5fc24116d0afecfaf926eed5cac63 ]

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200219

Reproduction way:
- mount image
- run poc code
- umount image

F2FS-fs (loop1): Bitmap was wrongly set, blk:15364

------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at /home/yuchao/git/devf2fs/segment.c:2061!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 2 PID: 17686 Comm: umount Tainted: G        W  O      4.18.0-rc2+ #39
Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
EIP: update_sit_entry+0x459/0x4e0 [f2fs]
Code: e8 1c b5 fd ff 0f 0b 0f 0b 8b 45 e4 c7 44 24 08 9c 7a 6c f8 c7 44 24 04 bc 4a 6c f8 89 44 24 0c 8b 06 89 04 24 e8 f7 b4 fd ff <0f> 0b 8b 45 e4 0f b6 d2 89 54 24 10 c7 44 24 08 60 7a 6c f8 c7 44
EAX: 00000032 EBX: 000000f8 ECX: 00000002 EDX: 00000001
ESI: d7177000 EDI: f520fe68 EBP: d6477c6c ESP: d6477c34
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010282
CR0: 80050033 CR2: b7fbe000 CR3: 2a99b3c0 CR4: 000406f0
Call Trace:
 f2fs_allocate_data_block+0x124/0x580 [f2fs]
 do_write_page+0x78/0x150 [f2fs]
 f2fs_do_write_node_page+0x25/0xa0 [f2fs]
 __write_node_page+0x2bf/0x550 [f2fs]
 f2fs_sync_node_pages+0x60e/0x6d0 [f2fs]
 ? sync_inode_metadata+0x2f/0x40
 ? f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x28f/0x7d0 [f2fs]
 ? up_write+0x1e/0x80
 f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x2a9/0x7d0 [f2fs]
 ? mark_held_locks+0x5d/0x80
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x27/0x50
 kill_f2fs_super+0x68/0x90 [f2fs]
 deactivate_locked_super+0x3d/0x70
 deactivate_super+0x40/0x60
 cleanup_mnt+0x39/0x70
 __cleanup_mnt+0x10/0x20
 task_work_run+0x81/0xa0
 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x59/0xa7
 do_fast_syscall_32+0x1f5/0x22c
 entry_SYSENTER_32+0x53/0x86
EIP: 0xb7f95c51
Code: c1 1e f7 ff ff 89 e5 8b 55 08 85 d2 8b 81 64 cd ff ff 74 02 89 02 5d c3 8b 0c 24 c3 8b 1c 24 c3 90 51 52 55 89 e5 0f 34 cd 80 <5d> 5a 59 c3 90 90 90 90 8d 76 00 58 b8 77 00 00 00 cd 80 90 8d 76
EAX: 00000000 EBX: 0871ab90 ECX: bfb2cd00 EDX: 00000000
ESI: 00000000 EDI: 0871ab90 EBP: 0871ab90 ESP: bfb2cd7c
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 007b EFLAGS: 00000246
Modules linked in: f2fs(O) crc32_generic bnep rfcomm bluetooth ecdh_generic snd_intel8x0 snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_pcm snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi snd_seq pcbc joydev aesni_intel snd_seq_device aes_i586 snd_timer crypto_simd snd cryptd soundcore mac_hid serio_raw video i2c_piix4 parport_pc ppdev lp parport hid_generic psmouse usbhid hid e1000 [last unloaded: f2fs]
---[ end trace d423f83982cfcdc5 ]---

The reason is, different log headers using the same segment, once one log's next block address is used by another log, it will cause panic as above.

Main area: 24 segs, 24 secs 24 zones

  - COLD  data: 0, 0, 0
  - WARM  data: 1, 1, 1
  - HOT   data: 20, 20, 20
  - Dir   dnode: 22, 22, 22

- File dnode: 22, 22, 22
- Indir nodes: 21, 21, 21

So this patch adds sanity check to detect such condition to avoid this issue.

---
 fs/f2fs/super.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/f2fs/super.c +33 -1
index ec50b95c7ea5..442cc9023dfc 100644
@@ -2328,7 +2328,7 @@ int f2fs_sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
 	unsigned int segment_count_main;
 	unsigned int cp_pack_start_sum, cp_payload;
 	block_t user_block_count;
-	int i;
+	int i, j;
 
 	total = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count);
 	fsmeta = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_ckpt);
@@ -2369,11 +2369,43 @@ int f2fs_sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
 		if (le32_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_node_segno[i]) >= main_segs ||
 			le16_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_node_blkoff[i]) >= blocks_per_seg)
 			return 1;
+		for (j = i + 1; j < NR_CURSEG_NODE_TYPE; j++) {
+			if (le32_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_node_segno[i]) ==
+				le32_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_node_segno[j])) {
+				f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR,
+					"Node segment (%u, %u) has the same "
+					"segno: %u", i, j,
+					le32_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_node_segno[i]));
+				return 1;
+			}
+		}
 	}
 	for (i = 0; i < NR_CURSEG_DATA_TYPE; i++) {
 		if (le32_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_data_segno[i]) >= main_segs ||
 			le16_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_data_blkoff[i]) >= blocks_per_seg)
 			return 1;
+		for (j = i + 1; j < NR_CURSEG_DATA_TYPE; j++) {
+			if (le32_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_data_segno[i]) ==
+				le32_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_data_segno[j])) {
+				f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR,
+					"Data segment (%u, %u) has the same "
+					"segno: %u", i, j,
+					le32_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_data_segno[i]));
+				return 1;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < NR_CURSEG_NODE_TYPE; i++) {
+		for (j = i; j < NR_CURSEG_DATA_TYPE; j++) {
+			if (le32_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_node_segno[i]) ==
+				le32_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_data_segno[j])) {
+				f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR,
+					"Data segment (%u) and Data segment (%u)"
+					" has the same segno: %u", i, j,
+					le32_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_node_segno[i]));
+				return 1;
+			}
+		}
 	}
 
 	sit_bitmap_size = le32_to_cpu(ckpt->sit_ver_bitmap_bytesize);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH 10/57 serial: uartps: console_setup() can't be placed to init section

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Michal Simek <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4bb1ce2350a598502b23088b169e16b43d4bc639 ]

When console device is rebinded, console_setup() is called again. But marking it as __init means that function will be clear after boot is complete. If console device is binded again console_setup() is not found and error "Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address" is reported.

---
 drivers/tty/serial/xilinx_uartps.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/tty/serial/xilinx_uartps.c +1 -1
index 0e3627289047..77efa0a43fe7 100644
@@ -1223,7 +1223,7 @@ static void cdns_uart_console_write(struct console *co, const char *s,
  *
  * Return: 0 on success, negative errno otherwise.
  */
-static int __init cdns_uart_console_setup(struct console *co, char *options)
+static int cdns_uart_console_setup(struct console *co, char *options)
 {
 	struct uart_port *port = console_port;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#13 lore raw

PATCH 14/57 HID: i2c-hid: override HID descriptors for certain devices

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Julian Sax <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9ee3e06610fdb8a601cde59c92089fb6c1deb4aa ]

A particular touchpad (SIPODEV SP1064) refuses to supply the HID descriptors. This patch provides the framework for overriding these descriptors based on DMI data. It also includes the descriptors for said touchpad, which were extracted by listening to the traffic of the windows filter driver, as well as the DMI data for the laptops known to use this device.

Relevant Bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1526312

---
 drivers/hid/i2c-hid/Makefile                  |   3 +
 .../hid/i2c-hid/{i2c-hid.c => i2c-hid-core.c} |  56 ++-
 drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid-dmi-quirks.c      | 376 ++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid.h                 |  20 +
 4 files changed, 437 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
 rename drivers/hid/i2c-hid/{i2c-hid.c => i2c-hid-core.c} (96%)
 create mode 100644 drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid-dmi-quirks.c
 create mode 100644 drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid.h
drivers/hid/i2c-hid/Makefile +3 -0
index 832d8f9aaba2..099e1ce2f234 100644
@@ -3,3 +3,6 @@
 #
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_I2C_HID)				+= i2c-hid.o
+
+i2c-hid-objs					=  i2c-hid-core.o
+i2c-hid-$(CONFIG_DMI)				+= i2c-hid-dmi-quirks.o
drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid-core.c renamed from drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid.c +38 -18

88 lines not on this page · raw message

drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid-dmi-quirks.c new file +376 -0

376 lines not on this page · raw message

drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid.h new file +20 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a8c19aef5824
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+
+#ifndef I2C_HID_H
+#define I2C_HID_H
+
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DMI
+struct i2c_hid_desc *i2c_hid_get_dmi_i2c_hid_desc_override(uint8_t *i2c_name);
+char *i2c_hid_get_dmi_hid_report_desc_override(uint8_t *i2c_name,
+					       unsigned int *size);
+#else
+static inline struct i2c_hid_desc
+		   *i2c_hid_get_dmi_i2c_hid_desc_override(uint8_t *i2c_name)
+{ return NULL; }
+static inline char *i2c_hid_get_dmi_hid_report_desc_override(uint8_t *i2c_name,
+							     unsigned int *size)
+{ return NULL; }
+#endif
+
+#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#14 lore raw

PATCH 15/57 pinctrl: core: make sure strcmp() doesn't get a null parameter

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Yanjiang Jin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 54a58185bfafb5af5045fb8388c45daa373f90f3 ]

Some drivers, for example, QCOM's qdf2xxx, set groups[gpio].name only when gpio is valid, and leave invalid gpio names as null. If we want to access the sys node "pinconf-groups", pinctrl_get_group_selector() -> get_group_name() may return a null pointer if group_selector is invalid, then the below Kernel panic would happen since strcmp() uses this null pointer to do comparison.

 Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at ss 00000000
el:Internal error: Oops: 9600000[ 143.080279]
SMP
 CPU: 19 PID: 2493 Comm: read_all Tainted: G O
.aarch64 #1
 Hardware name: HXT Semiconductor HXT REP-2 System
 PC is at strcmp+0x18/0x154
 LR is at pinctrl_get_group_selector+0x6c/0xe8
 Process read_all (pid: 2493, stack limit =
 Call trace:
 Exception stack
  strcmp+0x18/0x154
  pin_config_group_get+0x64/0xd8
  pinconf_generic_dump_one+0xd8/0x1c0
  pinconf_generic_dump_pins+0x94/0xc8
  pinconf_groups_show+0xb4/0x104
  seq_read+0x178/0x464
  full_proxy_read+0x6c/0xac
  __vfs_read+0x58/0x178
  vfs_read+0x94/0x164
  SyS_read+0x60/0xc0
  __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
 --[ end trace]--
 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
---
 drivers/pinctrl/core.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/pinctrl/core.c +2 -2
index a3dd777e3ce8..c6ff4d5fa482 100644
@@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ static int pinctrl_generic_group_name_to_selector(struct pinctrl_dev *pctldev,
 	while (selector < ngroups) {
 		const char *gname = ops->get_group_name(pctldev, selector);
 
-		if (!strcmp(function, gname))
+		if (gname && !strcmp(function, gname))
 			return selector;
 
 		selector++;
@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ int pinctrl_get_group_selector(struct pinctrl_dev *pctldev,
 	while (group_selector < ngroups) {
 		const char *gname = pctlops->get_group_name(pctldev,
 							    group_selector);
-		if (!strcmp(gname, pin_group)) {
+		if (gname && !strcmp(gname, pin_group)) {
 			dev_dbg(pctldev->dev,
 				"found group selector %u for %s\n",
 				group_selector,
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#17 lore raw

PATCH 18/57 ACPI / SBS: Fix GPE storm on recent MacBookPro's

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ronald Tschalär <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ca1721c5bee77105829cbd7baab8ee0eab85b06d ]

On Apple machines, plugging-in or unplugging the power triggers a GPE for the EC. Since these machines expose an SBS device, this GPE ends up triggering the acpi_sbs_callback(). This in turn tries to get the status of the SBS charger. However, on MBP13,* and MBP14,* machines, performing the smbus-read operation to get the charger's status triggers the EC's GPE again. The result is an endless re-triggering and handling of that GPE, consuming significant CPU resources (> 50% in irq).

In the end this is quite similar to commit 3031cddea633 (ACPI / SBS:
Don't assume the existence of an SBS charger), except that on the above machines a status of all 1's is returned. And like there, we just want ignore the charger here.

---
 drivers/acpi/sbs.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/acpi/sbs.c +6 -2
index 295b59271189..96c5e27967f4 100644
@@ -441,9 +441,13 @@ static int acpi_ac_get_present(struct acpi_sbs *sbs)
 
 	/*
 	 * The spec requires that bit 4 always be 1. If it's not set, assume
-	 * that the implementation doesn't support an SBS charger
+	 * that the implementation doesn't support an SBS charger.
+	 *
+	 * And on some MacBooks a status of 0xffff is always returned, no
+	 * matter whether the charger is plugged in or not, which is also
+	 * wrong, so ignore the SBS charger for those too.
 	 */
-	if (!((status >> 4) & 0x1))
+	if (!((status >> 4) & 0x1) || status == 0xffff)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
 	sbs->charger_present = (status >> 15) & 0x1;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#18 lore raw

PATCH 19/57 HID: usbhid: Add quirk for Redragon/Dragonrise Seymur 2

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Kai-Heng Feng <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ce9d58d3eafcb2d452a69bdcc1c5f8b8ff640de5 ]

Redragon Seymur 2 stops working since commit 190d7f02ce8e ("HID: input:
do not increment usages when a duplicate is found").

Use quirk HID_QUIRK_INCREMENT_USAGE_ON_DUPLICATE suggested by the commit can solve the issue.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200995

---
 drivers/hid/hid-ids.h    | 1 +
 drivers/hid/hid-quirks.c | 1 +
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/hid/hid-ids.h +1 -0
index b7870e7e41d4..97d33b8ed36c 100644
@@ -348,6 +348,7 @@
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_DMI_ENC		0x5fab
 
 #define USB_VENDOR_ID_DRAGONRISE		0x0079
+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_REDRAGON_SEYMUR2		0x0006
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_DRAGONRISE_WIIU		0x1800
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_DRAGONRISE_PS3		0x1801
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_DRAGONRISE_DOLPHINBAR	0x1803
drivers/hid/hid-quirks.c +1 -0
index 77316f022c5a..94088c0ed68a 100644
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ static const struct hid_device_id hid_quirks[] = {
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_DMI, USB_DEVICE_ID_DMI_ENC), HID_QUIRK_NOGET },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_DRACAL_RAPHNET, USB_DEVICE_ID_RAPHNET_2NES2SNES), HID_QUIRK_MULTI_INPUT },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_DRACAL_RAPHNET, USB_DEVICE_ID_RAPHNET_4NES4SNES), HID_QUIRK_MULTI_INPUT },
+	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_DRAGONRISE, USB_DEVICE_ID_REDRAGON_SEYMUR2), HID_QUIRK_INCREMENT_USAGE_ON_DUPLICATE },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_DRAGONRISE, USB_DEVICE_ID_DRAGONRISE_DOLPHINBAR), HID_QUIRK_MULTI_INPUT },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_DRAGONRISE, USB_DEVICE_ID_DRAGONRISE_GAMECUBE1), HID_QUIRK_MULTI_INPUT },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_DRAGONRISE, USB_DEVICE_ID_DRAGONRISE_PS3), HID_QUIRK_MULTI_INPUT },
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#19 lore raw

PATCH 20/57 KVM: nVMX: restore host state in nested_vmx_vmexit for VMFail

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bd18bffca35397214ae68d85cf7203aca25c3c1d ]

A VMEnter that VMFails (as opposed to VMExits) does not touch host state beyond registers that are explicitly noted in the VMFail path, e.g. EFLAGS. Host state does not need to be loaded because VMFail is only signaled for consistency checks that occur before the CPU starts to load guest state, i.e. there is no need to restore any state as nothing has been modified. But in the case where a VMFail is detected by hardware and not by KVM (due to deferring consistency checks to hardware), KVM has already loaded some amount of guest state. Luckily, "loaded" only means loaded to KVM's software model, i.e. vmcs01 has not been modified. So, unwind our software model to the pre-VMEntry host state.

Not restoring host state in this VMFail path leads to a variety of failures because we end up with stale data in vcpu->arch, e.g. CR0, CR4, EFER, etc... will all be out of sync relative to vmcs01. Any significant delta in the stale data is all but guaranteed to crash L1, e.g. emulation of SMEP, SMAP, UMIP, WP, etc... will be wrong.

An alternative to this "soft" reload would be to load host state from vmcs12 as if we triggered a VMExit (as opposed to VMFail), but that is wildly inconsistent with respect to the VMX architecture, e.g. an L1 VMM with separate VMExit and VMFail paths would explode.

Note that this approach does not mean KVM is 100% accurate with respect to VMX hardware behavior, even at an architectural level (the exact order of consistency checks is microarchitecture specific). But 100% emulation accuracy isn't the goal (with this patch), rather the goal is to be consistent in the information delivered to L1, e.g. a VMExit should not fall-through VMENTER, and a VMFail should not jump to HOST_RIP.

This technically reverts commit "5af4157388ad (KVM: nVMX: Fix mmu context after VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME failure)", but retains the core aspects of that patch, just in an open coded form due to the need to pull state from vmcs01 instead of vmcs12. Restoring host state resolves a variety of issues introduced by commit "4f350c6dbcb9 (kvm: nVMX: Handle deferred early VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME failure properly)", which remedied the incorrect behavior of treating VMFail like VMExit but in doing so neglected to restore arch state that had been modified prior to attempting nested VMEnter.

A sample failure that occurs due to stale vcpu.arch state is a fault of some form while emulating an LGDT (due to emulated UMIP) from L1 after a failed VMEntry to L3, in this case when running the KVM unit test test_tpr_threshold_values in L1. L0 also hits a WARN in this case due to a stale arch.cr4.UMIP.

L1:

  BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffc90000663b9e
  PGD 276512067 P4D 276512067 PUD 276513067 PMD 274efa067 PTE 8000000271de2163
  Oops: 0009 [#1] SMP
  CPU: 5 PID: 12495 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Tainted: G        W         4.18.0-rc2+ #2
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  RIP: 0010:native_load_gdt+0x0/0x10

...

  Call Trace:
   load_fixmap_gdt+0x22/0x30
   __vmx_load_host_state+0x10e/0x1c0 [kvm_intel]
   vmx_switch_vmcs+0x2d/0x50 [kvm_intel]
   nested_vmx_vmexit+0x222/0x9c0 [kvm_intel]
   vmx_handle_exit+0x246/0x15a0 [kvm_intel]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x850/0x1830 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x3a1/0x5c0 [kvm]
   do_vfs_ioctl+0x9f/0x600
   ksys_ioctl+0x66/0x70
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
   do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x100
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

L0:

  WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3529 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:6618 handle_desc+0x28/0x30 [kvm_intel]
  ...
  CPU: 2 PID: 3529 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 4.17.2-coffee+ #76
  Hardware name: Intel Corporation Kabylake Client platform/KBL S
  RIP: 0010:handle_desc+0x28/0x30 [kvm_intel]

...

  Call Trace:
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x863/0x1840 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x3a1/0x5c0 [kvm]
   do_vfs_ioctl+0x9f/0x5e0
   ksys_ioctl+0x66/0x70
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
   do_syscall_64+0x49/0xf0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fixes 5af4157388ad (KVM: nVMX: Fix mmu context after VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME failure)
Fixes 4f350c6dbcb9 (kvm: nVMX: Handle deferred early VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME failure properly)
Cc Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Cc Krish Sadhukhan <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Radim KrÄmář <[email protected]>
Cc Wanpeng Li <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 173 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 153 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +153 -20
index 4029d3783e18..d4d6b08c88b9 100644
@@ -13175,24 +13175,6 @@ static void prepare_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
 	kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
 }
 
-static void load_vmcs12_mmu_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
-			struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
-{
-	u32 entry_failure_code;
-
-	nested_ept_uninit_mmu_context(vcpu);
-
-	/*
-	 * Only PDPTE load can fail as the value of cr3 was checked on entry and
-	 * couldn't have changed.
-	 */
-	if (nested_vmx_load_cr3(vcpu, vmcs12->host_cr3, false, &entry_failure_code))
-		nested_vmx_abort(vcpu, VMX_ABORT_LOAD_HOST_PDPTE_FAIL);
-
-	if (!enable_ept)
-		vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->inject_page_fault = kvm_inject_page_fault;
-}
-
 /*
  * A part of what we need to when the nested L2 guest exits and we want to
  * run its L1 parent, is to reset L1's guest state to the host state specified
@@ -13206,6 +13188,7 @@ static void load_vmcs12_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				   struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
 {
 	struct kvm_segment seg;
+	u32 entry_failure_code;
 
 	if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER)
 		vcpu->arch.efer = vmcs12->host_ia32_efer;
@@ -13232,7 +13215,17 @@ static void load_vmcs12_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits = ~vmcs_readl(CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK);
 	vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, vmcs12->host_cr4);
 
-	load_vmcs12_mmu_host_state(vcpu, vmcs12);
+	nested_ept_uninit_mmu_context(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Only PDPTE load can fail as the value of cr3 was checked on entry and
+	 * couldn't have changed.
+	 */
+	if (nested_vmx_load_cr3(vcpu, vmcs12->host_cr3, false, &entry_failure_code))
+		nested_vmx_abort(vcpu, VMX_ABORT_LOAD_HOST_PDPTE_FAIL);
+
+	if (!enable_ept)
+		vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->inject_page_fault = kvm_inject_page_fault;
 
 	/*
 	 * If vmcs01 don't use VPID, CPU flushes TLB on every
@@ -13328,6 +13321,140 @@ static void load_vmcs12_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		nested_vmx_abort(vcpu, VMX_ABORT_LOAD_HOST_MSR_FAIL);
 }
 
+static inline u64 nested_vmx_get_vmcs01_guest_efer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	struct shared_msr_entry *efer_msr;
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	if (vm_entry_controls_get(vmx) & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER)
+		return vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_EFER);
+
+	if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer)
+		return host_efer;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < vmx->msr_autoload.guest.nr; ++i) {
+		if (vmx->msr_autoload.guest.val[i].index == MSR_EFER)
+			return vmx->msr_autoload.guest.val[i].value;
+	}
+
+	efer_msr = find_msr_entry(vmx, MSR_EFER);
+	if (efer_msr)
+		return efer_msr->data;
+
+	return host_efer;
+}
+
+static void nested_vmx_restore_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct vmx_msr_entry g, h;
+	struct msr_data msr;
+	gpa_t gpa;
+	u32 i, j;
+
+	vcpu->arch.pat = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_PAT);
+
+	if (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS) {
+		/*
+		 * L1's host DR7 is lost if KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP is set
+		 * as vmcs01.GUEST_DR7 contains a userspace defined value
+		 * and vcpu->arch.dr7 is not squirreled away before the
+		 * nested VMENTER (not worth adding a variable in nested_vmx).
+		 */
+		if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP)
+			kvm_set_dr(vcpu, 7, DR7_FIXED_1);
+		else
+			WARN_ON(kvm_set_dr(vcpu, 7, vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7)));
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Note that calling vmx_set_{efer,cr0,cr4} is important as they
+	 * handle a variety of side effects to KVM's software model.
+	 */
+	vmx_set_efer(vcpu, nested_vmx_get_vmcs01_guest_efer(vmx));
+
+	vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits = X86_CR0_TS;
+	vmx_set_cr0(vcpu, vmcs_readl(CR0_READ_SHADOW));
+
+	vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits = ~vmcs_readl(CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK);
+	vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, vmcs_readl(CR4_READ_SHADOW));
+
+	nested_ept_uninit_mmu_context(vcpu);
+	vcpu->arch.cr3 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR3);
+	__set_bit(VCPU_EXREG_CR3, (ulong *)&vcpu->arch.regs_avail);
+
+	/*
+	 * Use ept_save_pdptrs(vcpu) to load the MMU's cached PDPTRs
+	 * from vmcs01 (if necessary).  The PDPTRs are not loaded on
+	 * VMFail, like everything else we just need to ensure our
+	 * software model is up-to-date.
+	 */
+	ept_save_pdptrs(vcpu);
+
+	kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
+		vmx_update_msr_bitmap(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * This nasty bit of open coding is a compromise between blindly
+	 * loading L1's MSRs using the exit load lists (incorrect emulation
+	 * of VMFail), leaving the nested VM's MSRs in the software model
+	 * (incorrect behavior) and snapshotting the modified MSRs (too
+	 * expensive since the lists are unbound by hardware).  For each
+	 * MSR that was (prematurely) loaded from the nested VMEntry load
+	 * list, reload it from the exit load list if it exists and differs
+	 * from the guest value.  The intent is to stuff host state as
+	 * silently as possible, not to fully process the exit load list.
+	 */
+	msr.host_initiated = false;
+	for (i = 0; i < vmcs12->vm_entry_msr_load_count; i++) {
+		gpa = vmcs12->vm_entry_msr_load_addr + (i * sizeof(g));
+		if (kvm_vcpu_read_guest(vcpu, gpa, &g, sizeof(g))) {
+			pr_debug_ratelimited(
+				"%s read MSR index failed (%u, 0x%08llx)\n",
+				__func__, i, gpa);
+			goto vmabort;
+		}
+
+		for (j = 0; j < vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_count; j++) {
+			gpa = vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_addr + (j * sizeof(h));
+			if (kvm_vcpu_read_guest(vcpu, gpa, &h, sizeof(h))) {
+				pr_debug_ratelimited(
+					"%s read MSR failed (%u, 0x%08llx)\n",
+					__func__, j, gpa);
+				goto vmabort;
+			}
+			if (h.index != g.index)
+				continue;
+			if (h.value == g.value)
+				break;
+
+			if (nested_vmx_load_msr_check(vcpu, &h)) {
+				pr_debug_ratelimited(
+					"%s check failed (%u, 0x%x, 0x%x)\n",
+					__func__, j, h.index, h.reserved);
+				goto vmabort;
+			}
+
+			msr.index = h.index;
+			msr.data = h.value;
+			if (kvm_set_msr(vcpu, &msr)) {
+				pr_debug_ratelimited(
+					"%s WRMSR failed (%u, 0x%x, 0x%llx)\n",
+					__func__, j, h.index, h.value);
+				goto vmabort;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return;
+
+vmabort:
+	nested_vmx_abort(vcpu, VMX_ABORT_LOAD_HOST_MSR_FAIL);
+}
+
 /*
  * Emulate an exit from nested guest (L2) to L1, i.e., prepare to run L1
  * and modify vmcs12 to make it see what it would expect to see there if
@@ -13472,7 +13599,13 @@ static void nested_vmx_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason,
 	 */
 	nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu, VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD);
 
-	load_vmcs12_mmu_host_state(vcpu, vmcs12);
+	/*
+	 * Restore L1's host state to KVM's software model.  We're here
+	 * because a consistency check was caught by hardware, which
+	 * means some amount of guest state has been propagated to KVM's
+	 * model and needs to be unwound to the host's state.
+	 */
+	nested_vmx_restore_host_state(vcpu);
 
 	/*
 	 * The emulated instruction was already skipped in
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#20 lore raw

PATCH 21/57 compiler.h: update definition of unreachable()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fe0640eb30b7da261ae84d252ed9ed3c7e68dfd8 ]

Fixes the objtool warning seen with Clang:
arch/x86/mm/fault.o: warning: objtool: no_context()+0x220: unreachable instruction

Fixes commit 815f0ddb346c ("include/linux/compiler*.h: make compiler-*.h mutually exclusive")

Josh noted that the fallback definition was meant to work around a pre-gcc-4.6 bug. GCC still needs to work around
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=82365, so compiler-gcc.h defines its own version of unreachable(). Clang and ICC can use this shared definition.

---
 include/linux/compiler.h | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/compiler.h +4 -1
index 269d376f5a11..81c2238b884c 100644
@@ -124,7 +124,10 @@ void ftrace_likely_update(struct ftrace_likely_data *f, int val,
 # define ASM_UNREACHABLE
 #endif
 #ifndef unreachable
-# define unreachable() do { annotate_reachable(); do { } while (1); } while (0)
+# define unreachable() do {		\
+	annotate_unreachable();		\
+	__builtin_unreachable();	\
+} while (0)
 #endif
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#22 lore raw

PATCH 23/57 f2fs: cleanup dirty pages if recover failed

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Sheng Yong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 26b5a079197c8cb6725565968b7fd3299bd1877b ]

During recover, we will try to create new dentries for inodes with dentry_mark. But if the parent is missing (e.g. killed by fsck), recover will break. But those recovered dirty pages are not cleanup. This will hit f2fs_bug_on:

[   53.519566] F2FS-fs (loop0): Found nat_bits in checkpoint
[   53.539354] F2FS-fs (loop0): recover_inode: ino = 5, name = file, inline = 3
[   53.539402] F2FS-fs (loop0): recover_dentry: ino = 5, name = file, dir = 0, err = -2
[   53.545760] F2FS-fs (loop0): Cannot recover all fsync data errno=-2
[   53.546105] F2FS-fs (loop0): access invalid blkaddr:4294967295
[   53.546171] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1798 at fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:163 f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x26c/0x320
[   53.546174] Modules linked in:
[   53.546183] CPU: 1 PID: 1798 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.19.0-rc2+ #1
[   53.546186] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[   53.546191] RIP: 0010:f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x26c/0x320
[   53.546195] Code: 85 bb 00 00 00 48 89 df 88 44 24 07 e8 ad a8 db ff 48 8b 3b 44 89 e1 48 c7 c2 40 03 72 a9 48 c7 c6 e0 01 72 a9 e8 84 3c ff ff <0f> 0b 0f b6 44 24 07 e9 8a 00 00 00 48 8d bf 38 01 00 00 e8 7c a8
[   53.546201] RSP: 0018:ffff88006c067768 EFLAGS: 00010282
[   53.546208] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880068844200 RCX: ffffffffa83e1a33
[   53.546211] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88006d51e590
[   53.546215] RBP: 0000000000000005 R08: ffffed000daa3cb3 R09: ffffed000daa3cb3
[   53.546218] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed000daa3cb2 R12: 00000000ffffffff
[   53.546221] R13: ffff88006a1f8000 R14: 0000000000000200 R15: 0000000000000009
[   53.546226] FS:  00007fb2f3646840(0000) GS:ffff88006d500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   53.546229] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   53.546234] CR2: 00007f0fd77f0008 CR3: 00000000687e6002 CR4: 00000000000206e0
[   53.546237] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   53.546240] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   53.546242] Call Trace:
[   53.546248]  f2fs_submit_page_bio+0x95/0x740
[   53.546253]  read_node_page+0x161/0x1e0
[   53.546271]  ? truncate_node+0x650/0x650
[   53.546283]  ? add_to_page_cache_lru+0x12c/0x170
[   53.546288]  ? pagecache_get_page+0x262/0x2d0
[   53.546292]  __get_node_page+0x200/0x660
[   53.546302]  f2fs_update_inode_page+0x4a/0x160
[   53.546306]  f2fs_write_inode+0x86/0xb0
[   53.546317]  __writeback_single_inode+0x49c/0x620
[   53.546322]  writeback_single_inode+0xe4/0x1e0
[   53.546326]  sync_inode_metadata+0x93/0xd0
[   53.546330]  ? sync_inode+0x10/0x10
[   53.546342]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xed/0x100
[   53.546347]  f2fs_sync_inode_meta+0xe0/0x130
[   53.546351]  f2fs_fill_super+0x287d/0x2d10
[   53.546367]  ? vsnprintf+0x742/0x7a0
[   53.546372]  ? f2fs_commit_super+0x180/0x180
[   53.546379]  ? up_write+0x20/0x40
[   53.546385]  ? set_blocksize+0x5f/0x140
[   53.546391]  ? f2fs_commit_super+0x180/0x180
[   53.546402]  mount_bdev+0x181/0x200
[   53.546406]  mount_fs+0x94/0x180
[   53.546411]  vfs_kern_mount+0x6c/0x1e0
[   53.546415]  do_mount+0xe5e/0x1510
[   53.546420]  ? fs_reclaim_release+0x9/0x30
[   53.546424]  ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20
[   53.546428]  ? fs_reclaim_acquire+0xd/0x30
[   53.546435]  ? __might_sleep+0x2c/0xc0
[   53.546440]  ? ___might_sleep+0x53/0x170
[   53.546453]  ? __might_fault+0x4c/0x60
[   53.546468]  ? _copy_from_user+0x95/0xa0
[   53.546474]  ? memdup_user+0x39/0x60
[   53.546478]  ksys_mount+0x88/0xb0
[   53.546482]  __x64_sys_mount+0x5d/0x70
[   53.546495]  do_syscall_64+0x65/0x130
[   53.546503]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[   53.547639] ---[ end trace b804d1ea2fec893e ]---

So if recover fails, we need to drop all recovered data.

---
 fs/f2fs/recovery.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 fs/f2fs/super.c    | 15 ++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/recovery.c +21 -11
index 9a8579fb3a30..ae0e5f2e67b4 100644
@@ -99,8 +99,12 @@ static struct fsync_inode_entry *add_fsync_inode(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
 	return ERR_PTR(err);
 }
 
-static void del_fsync_inode(struct fsync_inode_entry *entry)
+static void del_fsync_inode(struct fsync_inode_entry *entry, int drop)
 {
+	if (drop) {
+		/* inode should not be recovered, drop it */
+		f2fs_inode_synced(entry->inode);
+	}
 	iput(entry->inode);
 	list_del(&entry->list);
 	kmem_cache_free(fsync_entry_slab, entry);
@@ -321,12 +325,12 @@ static int find_fsync_dnodes(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct list_head *head,
 	return err;
 }
 
-static void destroy_fsync_dnodes(struct list_head *head)
+static void destroy_fsync_dnodes(struct list_head *head, int drop)
 {
 	struct fsync_inode_entry *entry, *tmp;
 
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, head, list)
-		del_fsync_inode(entry);
+		del_fsync_inode(entry, drop);
 }
 
 static int check_index_in_prev_nodes(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
@@ -561,7 +565,7 @@ static int do_recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct inode *inode,
 }
 
 static int recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct list_head *inode_list,
-						struct list_head *dir_list)
+		struct list_head *tmp_inode_list, struct list_head *dir_list)
 {
 	struct curseg_info *curseg;
 	struct page *page = NULL;
@@ -615,7 +619,7 @@ static int recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct list_head *inode_list,
 		}
 
 		if (entry->blkaddr == blkaddr)
-			del_fsync_inode(entry);
+			list_move_tail(&entry->list, tmp_inode_list);
 next:
 		/* check next segment */
 		blkaddr = next_blkaddr_of_node(page);
@@ -628,7 +632,7 @@ static int recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct list_head *inode_list,
 
 int f2fs_recover_fsync_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, bool check_only)
 {
-	struct list_head inode_list;
+	struct list_head inode_list, tmp_inode_list;
 	struct list_head dir_list;
 	int err;
 	int ret = 0;
@@ -659,6 +663,7 @@ int f2fs_recover_fsync_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, bool check_only)
 	}
 
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&inode_list);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tmp_inode_list);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dir_list);
 
 	/* prevent checkpoint */
@@ -677,11 +682,16 @@ int f2fs_recover_fsync_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, bool check_only)
 	need_writecp = true;
 
 	/* step #2: recover data */
-	err = recover_data(sbi, &inode_list, &dir_list);
+	err = recover_data(sbi, &inode_list, &tmp_inode_list, &dir_list);
 	if (!err)
 		f2fs_bug_on(sbi, !list_empty(&inode_list));
+	else {
+		/* restore s_flags to let iput() trash data */
+		sbi->sb->s_flags = s_flags;
+	}
 skip:
-	destroy_fsync_dnodes(&inode_list);
+	destroy_fsync_dnodes(&inode_list, err);
+	destroy_fsync_dnodes(&tmp_inode_list, err);
 
 	/* truncate meta pages to be used by the recovery */
 	truncate_inode_pages_range(META_MAPPING(sbi),
@@ -690,13 +700,13 @@ int f2fs_recover_fsync_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, bool check_only)
 	if (err) {
 		truncate_inode_pages_final(NODE_MAPPING(sbi));
 		truncate_inode_pages_final(META_MAPPING(sbi));
+	} else {
+		clear_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_POR_DOING);
 	}
-
-	clear_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_POR_DOING);
 	mutex_unlock(&sbi->cp_mutex);
 
 	/* let's drop all the directory inodes for clean checkpoint */
-	destroy_fsync_dnodes(&dir_list);
+	destroy_fsync_dnodes(&dir_list, err);
 
 	if (need_writecp) {
 		set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_IS_RECOVERED);
fs/f2fs/super.c +14 -1
index 442cc9023dfc..08162f39d3f7 100644
@@ -1884,6 +1884,19 @@ void f2fs_quota_off_umount(struct super_block *sb)
 	}
 }
 
+static void f2fs_truncate_quota_inode_pages(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct quota_info *dqopt = sb_dqopt(sb);
+	int type;
+
+	for (type = 0; type < MAXQUOTAS; type++) {
+		if (!dqopt->files[type])
+			continue;
+		f2fs_inode_synced(dqopt->files[type]);
+	}
+}
+
+
 static int f2fs_get_projid(struct inode *inode, kprojid_t *projid)
 {
 	*projid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_projid;
@@ -3130,10 +3143,10 @@ static int f2fs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 
 free_meta:
 #ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
+	f2fs_truncate_quota_inode_pages(sb);
 	if (f2fs_sb_has_quota_ino(sb) && !f2fs_readonly(sb))
 		f2fs_quota_off_umount(sbi->sb);
 #endif
-	f2fs_sync_inode_meta(sbi);
 	/*
 	 * Some dirty meta pages can be produced by f2fs_recover_orphan_inodes()
 	 * failed by EIO. Then, iput(node_inode) can trigger balance_fs_bg()
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#26 lore raw

PATCH 27/57 platform/x86: Add Intel AtomISP2 dummy / power-management driver

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 49ad712afa88c502831d37f7089d98eac441fb80 ]

The Image Signal Processor found on Cherry Trail devices is brought up in D0 state on devices which have camera sensors attached to it. The ISP will not enter D3 state again without some massaging of its registers beforehand and the ISP not being in D3 state blocks the SoC from entering S0ix modes.

There was a driver for the ISP in drivers/staging but that got removed again because it never worked. It does not seem likely that a real driver for the ISP will be added to the mainline kernel anytime soon.

This commit adds a dummy driver which contains the necessary magic from the staging driver to powerdown the ISP, so that Cherry Trail devices where the ISP is used will properly use S0ix modes when suspended.

Together with other recent S0ix related fixes this allows S0ix modes to be entered on e.g. a Chuwi Hi8 Pro and a HP x2 210.

---
 MAINTAINERS                              |   6 ++
 drivers/platform/x86/Kconfig             |  12 +++
 drivers/platform/x86/Makefile            |   1 +
 drivers/platform/x86/intel_atomisp2_pm.c | 119 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 138 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/intel_atomisp2_pm.c
MAINTAINERS +6 -0
index 9e9b19ecf6f7..11a59e82d92e 100644
@@ -7320,6 +7320,12 @@ L:	[email protected] (moderated for non-subscribers)
 S:	Supported
 F:	sound/soc/intel/
 
+INTEL ATOMISP2 DUMMY / POWER-MANAGEMENT DRIVER
+M:	Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
+L:	[email protected]
+S:	Maintained
+F:	drivers/platform/x86/intel_atomisp2_pm.c
+
 INTEL C600 SERIES SAS CONTROLLER DRIVER
 M:	Intel SCU Linux support <[email protected]>
 M:	Artur Paszkiewicz <[email protected]>
drivers/platform/x86/Kconfig +12 -0
index 7563c07e14e4..1e2524de6a63 100644
@@ -1231,6 +1231,18 @@ config I2C_MULTI_INSTANTIATE
 	  To compile this driver as a module, choose M here: the module
 	  will be called i2c-multi-instantiate.
 
+config INTEL_ATOMISP2_PM
+	tristate "Intel AtomISP2 dummy / power-management driver"
+	depends on PCI && IOSF_MBI && PM
+	help
+	  Power-management driver for Intel's Image Signal Processor found on
+	  Bay and Cherry Trail devices. This dummy driver's sole purpose is to
+	  turn the ISP off (put it in D3) to save power and to allow entering
+	  of S0ix modes.
+
+	  To compile this driver as a module, choose M here: the module
+	  will be called intel_atomisp2_pm.
+
 endif # X86_PLATFORM_DEVICES
 
 config PMC_ATOM
drivers/platform/x86/Makefile +1 -0
index e6d1becf81ce..dc29af4d8e2f 100644
@@ -92,3 +92,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_MLX_PLATFORM)	+= mlx-platform.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TURBO_MAX_3) += intel_turbo_max_3.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_CHTDC_TI_PWRBTN)	+= intel_chtdc_ti_pwrbtn.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_I2C_MULTI_INSTANTIATE)	+= i2c-multi-instantiate.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_ATOMISP2_PM)	+= intel_atomisp2_pm.o
drivers/platform/x86/intel_atomisp2_pm.c new file +119 -0

119 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#27 lore raw

PATCH 28/57 nvme-pci: fix conflicting p2p resource adds

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Keith Busch <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9fe5c59ff6a1e5e26a39b75489a1420e7eaaf0b1 ]

The nvme pci driver had been adding its CMB resource to the P2P DMA subsystem everytime on on a controller reset. This results in the following warning:

    ------------[ cut here ]------------
    nvme 0000:00:03.0: Conflicting mapping in same section
    WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 81 at kernel/memremap.c:155 devm_memremap_pages+0xa6/0x380
    ...
    Call Trace:
     pci_p2pdma_add_resource+0x153/0x370
     nvme_reset_work+0x28c/0x17b1 [nvme]
     ? add_timer+0x107/0x1e0
     ? dequeue_entity+0x81/0x660
     ? dequeue_entity+0x3b0/0x660
     ? pick_next_task_fair+0xaf/0x610
     ? __switch_to+0xbc/0x410
     process_one_work+0x1cf/0x350
     worker_thread+0x215/0x3d0
     ? process_one_work+0x350/0x350
     kthread+0x107/0x120
     ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80
     ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
    ---[ end trace f7ea76ac6ee72727 ]---
    nvme nvme0: failed to register the CMB

This patch fixes this by registering the CMB with P2P only once.

Signed-off-by Keith Busch <keith.busch at intel.com>
Reviewed-by Logan Gunthorpe <logang at deltatee.com>
Signed-off-by Christoph Hellwig <hch at lst.de>
Signed-off-by Jens Axboe <axboe at kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by Sasha Levin <sashal at kernel.org>
---
 drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/nvme/host/pci.c +4 -1
index 7b9ef8e734e7..dca87cb485e9 100644
@@ -1649,6 +1649,9 @@ static void nvme_map_cmb(struct nvme_dev *dev)
 	struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(dev->dev);
 	int bar;
 
+	if (dev->cmb_size)
+		return;
+
 	dev->cmbsz = readl(dev->bar + NVME_REG_CMBSZ);
 	if (!dev->cmbsz)
 		return;
@@ -2133,7 +2136,6 @@ static void nvme_pci_disable(struct nvme_dev *dev)
 {
 	struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(dev->dev);
 
-	nvme_release_cmb(dev);
 	pci_free_irq_vectors(pdev);
 
 	if (pci_is_enabled(pdev)) {
@@ -2585,6 +2587,7 @@ static void nvme_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev)
 	nvme_stop_ctrl(&dev->ctrl);
 	nvme_remove_namespaces(&dev->ctrl);
 	nvme_dev_disable(dev, true);
+	nvme_release_cmb(dev);
 	nvme_free_host_mem(dev);
 	nvme_dev_remove_admin(dev);
 	nvme_free_queues(dev, 0);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#31 lore raw

PATCH 31/57 ACPI: EC / PM: Disable non-wakeup GPEs for suspend-to-idle

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f941d3e41da7f86bdb9dcc1977c2bcc6b89bfe47 ]

There are systems in which non-wakeup GPEs fire during the "noirq" suspend stage of suspending devices and that effectively prevents the system that tries to suspend to idle from entering any low-power state at all. If the offending GPE fires regularly and often enough, the system appears to be suspended, but in fact it is in a tight loop over "noirq" suspend and "noirq" resume of devices all the time.

To prevent that from happening, disable all non-wakeup GPEs except for the EC GPE for suspend-to-idle (the EC GPE is special, because on some systems it has to be enabled for power button wakeup events to be generated as expected).

---
 drivers/acpi/ec.c       | 12 ++++++++++++
 drivers/acpi/internal.h |  2 ++
 drivers/acpi/sleep.c    | 11 +++++++++++
 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
drivers/acpi/ec.c +12 -0
index d4e5610e09c5..9d66a47d32fb 100644
@@ -1034,6 +1034,18 @@ void acpi_ec_unblock_transactions(void)
 		acpi_ec_start(first_ec, true);
 }
 
+void acpi_ec_mark_gpe_for_wake(void)
+{
+	if (first_ec && !ec_no_wakeup)
+		acpi_mark_gpe_for_wake(NULL, first_ec->gpe);
+}
+
+void acpi_ec_set_gpe_wake_mask(u8 action)
+{
+	if (first_ec && !ec_no_wakeup)
+		acpi_set_gpe_wake_mask(NULL, first_ec->gpe, action);
+}
+
 void acpi_ec_dispatch_gpe(void)
 {
 	if (first_ec)
drivers/acpi/internal.h +2 -0
index 530a3f675490..f59d0b9e2683 100644
@@ -188,6 +188,8 @@ int acpi_ec_ecdt_probe(void);
 int acpi_ec_dsdt_probe(void);
 void acpi_ec_block_transactions(void);
 void acpi_ec_unblock_transactions(void);
+void acpi_ec_mark_gpe_for_wake(void);
+void acpi_ec_set_gpe_wake_mask(u8 action);
 void acpi_ec_dispatch_gpe(void);
 int acpi_ec_add_query_handler(struct acpi_ec *ec, u8 query_bit,
 			      acpi_handle handle, acpi_ec_query_func func,
drivers/acpi/sleep.c +11 -0
index 754d59f95500..74c489047f57 100644
@@ -940,6 +940,8 @@ static int lps0_device_attach(struct acpi_device *adev,
 
 		acpi_handle_debug(adev->handle, "_DSM function mask: 0x%x\n",
 				  bitmask);
+
+		acpi_ec_mark_gpe_for_wake();
 	} else {
 		acpi_handle_debug(adev->handle,
 				  "_DSM function 0 evaluation failed\n");
@@ -968,11 +970,16 @@ static int acpi_s2idle_prepare(void)
 	if (lps0_device_handle) {
 		acpi_sleep_run_lps0_dsm(ACPI_LPS0_SCREEN_OFF);
 		acpi_sleep_run_lps0_dsm(ACPI_LPS0_ENTRY);
+
+		acpi_ec_set_gpe_wake_mask(ACPI_GPE_ENABLE);
 	}
 
 	if (acpi_sci_irq_valid())
 		enable_irq_wake(acpi_sci_irq);
 
+	/* Change the configuration of GPEs to avoid spurious wakeup. */
+	acpi_enable_all_wakeup_gpes();
+	acpi_os_wait_events_complete();
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1017,10 +1024,14 @@ static void acpi_s2idle_sync(void)
 
 static void acpi_s2idle_restore(void)
 {
+	acpi_enable_all_runtime_gpes();
+
 	if (acpi_sci_irq_valid())
 		disable_irq_wake(acpi_sci_irq);
 
 	if (lps0_device_handle) {
+		acpi_ec_set_gpe_wake_mask(ACPI_GPE_DISABLE);
+
 		acpi_sleep_run_lps0_dsm(ACPI_LPS0_EXIT);
 		acpi_sleep_run_lps0_dsm(ACPI_LPS0_SCREEN_ON);
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#32 lore raw

PATCH 32/57 net/rds: fix warn in rds_message_alloc_sgs

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: shamir rabinovitch <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ea010070d0a7497253d5a6f919f6dd107450b31a ]

redundant copy_from_user in rds_sendmsg system call expose rds to issue where rds_rdma_extra_size walk the rds iovec and and calculate the number pf pages (sgs) it need to add to the tail of rds message and later rds_cmsg_rdma_args copy the rds iovec again and re calculate the same number and get different result causing WARN_ON in rds_message_alloc_sgs.

fix this by doing the copy_from_user only once per rds_sendmsg system call.

When issue occur the below dump is seen:

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 19789 at net/rds/message.c:316 rds_message_alloc_sgs+0x10c/0x160 net/rds/message.c:316
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 0 PID: 19789 Comm: syz-executor827 Not tainted 4.19.0-next-20181030+ #101
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x244/0x39d lib/dump_stack.c:113
 panic+0x2ad/0x55c kernel/panic.c:188
 __warn.cold.8+0x20/0x45 kernel/panic.c:540
 report_bug+0x254/0x2d0 lib/bug.c:186
 fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:178 [inline]
 do_error_trap+0x11b/0x200 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:271
 do_invalid_op+0x36/0x40 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:290
 invalid_op+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:969
RIP: 0010:rds_message_alloc_sgs+0x10c/0x160 net/rds/message.c:316
Code: c0 74 04 3c 03 7e 6c 44 01 ab 78 01 00 00 e8 2b 9e 35 fa 4c 89 e0 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 e8 14 9e 35 fa <0f> 0b 31 ff 44 89 ee e8 18 9f 35 fa 45 85 ed 75 1b e8 fe 9d 35 fa
RSP: 0018:ffff8801c51b7460 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffff8801bc412080 RBX: ffff8801d7bf4040 RCX: ffffffff8749c9e6
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8749ca5c RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: ffff8801c51b7490 R08: ffff8801bc412080 R09: ffffed003b5c5b67
R10: ffffed003b5c5b67 R11: ffff8801dae2db3b R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000007165c R14: 000000000007165c R15: 0000000000000005
 rds_cmsg_rdma_args+0x82d/0x1510 net/rds/rdma.c:623
 rds_cmsg_send net/rds/send.c:971 [inline]
 rds_sendmsg+0x19a2/0x3180 net/rds/send.c:1273
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:622 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:632
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x7fd/0x930 net/socket.c:2117
 __sys_sendmsg+0x11d/0x280 net/socket.c:2155
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2162
 do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x44a859
Code: e8 dc e6 ff ff 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 6b cb fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f1d4710ada8 EFLAGS: 00000297 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006dcc28 RCX: 000000000044a859
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020001600 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006dcc20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000297 R12: 00000000006dcc2c
R13: 646e732f7665642f R14: 00007f1d4710b9c0 R15: 00000000006dcd2c

Kernel Offset: disabled
Rebooting in 86400 seconds..

---
 net/rds/rdma.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
 net/rds/rds.h  | 20 ++++++++++++----
 net/rds/send.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 3 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
net/rds/rdma.c +32 -31
index 98237feb607a..e1965d9cbcf8 100644
@@ -517,9 +517,10 @@ static int rds_rdma_pages(struct rds_iovec iov[], int nr_iovecs)
 	return tot_pages;
 }
 
-int rds_rdma_extra_size(struct rds_rdma_args *args)
+int rds_rdma_extra_size(struct rds_rdma_args *args,
+			struct rds_iov_vector *iov)
 {
-	struct rds_iovec vec;
+	struct rds_iovec *vec;
 	struct rds_iovec __user *local_vec;
 	int tot_pages = 0;
 	unsigned int nr_pages;
@@ -530,13 +531,23 @@ int rds_rdma_extra_size(struct rds_rdma_args *args)
 	if (args->nr_local == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	iov->iov = kcalloc(args->nr_local,
+			   sizeof(struct rds_iovec),
+			   GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!iov->iov)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	vec = &iov->iov[0];
+
+	if (copy_from_user(vec, local_vec, args->nr_local *
+			   sizeof(struct rds_iovec)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+	iov->len = args->nr_local;
+
 	/* figure out the number of pages in the vector */
-	for (i = 0; i < args->nr_local; i++) {
-		if (copy_from_user(&vec, &local_vec[i],
-				   sizeof(struct rds_iovec)))
-			return -EFAULT;
+	for (i = 0; i < args->nr_local; i++, vec++) {
 
-		nr_pages = rds_pages_in_vec(&vec);
+		nr_pages = rds_pages_in_vec(vec);
 		if (nr_pages == 0)
 			return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -558,15 +569,15 @@ int rds_rdma_extra_size(struct rds_rdma_args *args)
  * Extract all arguments and set up the rdma_op
  */
 int rds_cmsg_rdma_args(struct rds_sock *rs, struct rds_message *rm,
-			  struct cmsghdr *cmsg)
+		       struct cmsghdr *cmsg,
+		       struct rds_iov_vector *vec)
 {
 	struct rds_rdma_args *args;
 	struct rm_rdma_op *op = &rm->rdma;
 	int nr_pages;
 	unsigned int nr_bytes;
 	struct page **pages = NULL;
-	struct rds_iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iovs = iovstack;
-	int iov_size;
+	struct rds_iovec *iovs;
 	unsigned int i, j;
 	int ret = 0;
 
@@ -586,31 +597,23 @@ int rds_cmsg_rdma_args(struct rds_sock *rs, struct rds_message *rm,
 		goto out_ret;
 	}
 
-	/* Check whether to allocate the iovec area */
-	iov_size = args->nr_local * sizeof(struct rds_iovec);
-	if (args->nr_local > UIO_FASTIOV) {
-		iovs = sock_kmalloc(rds_rs_to_sk(rs), iov_size, GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!iovs) {
-			ret = -ENOMEM;
-			goto out_ret;
-		}
+	if (vec->len != args->nr_local) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_ret;
 	}
 
-	if (copy_from_user(iovs, (struct rds_iovec __user *)(unsigned long) args->local_vec_addr, iov_size)) {
-		ret = -EFAULT;
-		goto out;
-	}
+	iovs = vec->iov;
 
 	nr_pages = rds_rdma_pages(iovs, args->nr_local);
 	if (nr_pages < 0) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
+		goto out_ret;
 	}
 
 	pages = kcalloc(nr_pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!pages) {
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
-		goto out;
+		goto out_ret;
 	}
 
 	op->op_write = !!(args->flags & RDS_RDMA_READWRITE);
@@ -623,7 +626,7 @@ int rds_cmsg_rdma_args(struct rds_sock *rs, struct rds_message *rm,
 	op->op_sg = rds_message_alloc_sgs(rm, nr_pages);
 	if (!op->op_sg) {
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
-		goto out;
+		goto out_pages;
 	}
 
 	if (op->op_notify || op->op_recverr) {
@@ -635,7 +638,7 @@ int rds_cmsg_rdma_args(struct rds_sock *rs, struct rds_message *rm,
 		op->op_notifier = kmalloc(sizeof(struct rds_notifier), GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!op->op_notifier) {
 			ret = -ENOMEM;
-			goto out;
+			goto out_pages;
 		}
 		op->op_notifier->n_user_token = args->user_token;
 		op->op_notifier->n_status = RDS_RDMA_SUCCESS;
@@ -681,7 +684,7 @@ int rds_cmsg_rdma_args(struct rds_sock *rs, struct rds_message *rm,
 		 */
 		ret = rds_pin_pages(iov->addr, nr, pages, !op->op_write);
 		if (ret < 0)
-			goto out;
+			goto out_pages;
 		else
 			ret = 0;
 
@@ -714,13 +717,11 @@ int rds_cmsg_rdma_args(struct rds_sock *rs, struct rds_message *rm,
 				nr_bytes,
 				(unsigned int) args->remote_vec.bytes);
 		ret = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
+		goto out_pages;
 	}
 	op->op_bytes = nr_bytes;
 
-out:
-	if (iovs != iovstack)
-		sock_kfree_s(rds_rs_to_sk(rs), iovs, iov_size);
+out_pages:
 	kfree(pages);
 out_ret:
 	if (ret)
net/rds/rds.h +16 -4
index c4dcf654d8fe..4234ab81b5af 100644
@@ -386,6 +386,18 @@ static inline void rds_message_zcopy_queue_init(struct rds_msg_zcopy_queue *q)
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&q->zcookie_head);
 }
 
+struct rds_iov_vector {
+	struct rds_iovec *iov;
+	int               len;
+};
+
+struct rds_iov_vector_arr {
+	struct rds_iov_vector *vec;
+	int                    len;
+	int                    indx;
+	int                    incr;
+};
+
 struct rds_message {
 	refcount_t		m_refcount;
 	struct list_head	m_sock_item;
@@ -904,13 +916,13 @@ int rds_get_mr(struct rds_sock *rs, char __user *optval, int optlen);
 int rds_get_mr_for_dest(struct rds_sock *rs, char __user *optval, int optlen);
 int rds_free_mr(struct rds_sock *rs, char __user *optval, int optlen);
 void rds_rdma_drop_keys(struct rds_sock *rs);
-int rds_rdma_extra_size(struct rds_rdma_args *args);
-int rds_cmsg_rdma_args(struct rds_sock *rs, struct rds_message *rm,
-			  struct cmsghdr *cmsg);
+int rds_rdma_extra_size(struct rds_rdma_args *args,
+			struct rds_iov_vector *iov);
 int rds_cmsg_rdma_dest(struct rds_sock *rs, struct rds_message *rm,
 			  struct cmsghdr *cmsg);
 int rds_cmsg_rdma_args(struct rds_sock *rs, struct rds_message *rm,
-			  struct cmsghdr *cmsg);
+			  struct cmsghdr *cmsg,
+			  struct rds_iov_vector *vec);
 int rds_cmsg_rdma_map(struct rds_sock *rs, struct rds_message *rm,
 			  struct cmsghdr *cmsg);
 void rds_rdma_free_op(struct rm_rdma_op *ro);
net/rds/send.c +43 -7

110 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#40 lore raw

PATCH 38/57 iommu/dmar: Fix buffer overflow during PCI bus notification

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Julia Cartwright <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cffaaf0c816238c45cd2d06913476c83eb50f682 ]

Commit 57384592c433 ("iommu/vt-d: Store bus information in RMRR PCI device path") changed the type of the path data, however, the change in path type was not reflected in size calculations. Update to use the correct type and prevent a buffer overflow.

This bug manifests in systems with deep PCI hierarchies, and can lead to an overflow of the static allocated buffer (dmar_pci_notify_info_buf), or can lead to overflow of slab-allocated data.

   BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in dmar_alloc_pci_notify_info+0x1d5/0x2e0
   Write of size 1 at addr ffffffff90445d80 by task swapper/0/1
   CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G        W       4.14.87-rt49-02406-gd0a0e96 #1
   Call Trace:
    ? dump_stack+0x46/0x59
    ? print_address_description+0x1df/0x290
    ? dmar_alloc_pci_notify_info+0x1d5/0x2e0
    ? kasan_report+0x256/0x340
    ? dmar_alloc_pci_notify_info+0x1d5/0x2e0
    ? e820__memblock_setup+0xb0/0xb0
    ? dmar_dev_scope_init+0x424/0x48f
    ? __down_write_common+0x1ec/0x230
    ? dmar_dev_scope_init+0x48f/0x48f
    ? dmar_free_unused_resources+0x109/0x109
    ? cpumask_next+0x16/0x20
    ? __kmem_cache_create+0x392/0x430
    ? kmem_cache_create+0x135/0x2f0
    ? e820__memblock_setup+0xb0/0xb0
    ? intel_iommu_init+0x170/0x1848
    ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x32/0x60
    ? migrate_enable+0x27a/0x5b0
    ? sched_setattr+0x20/0x20
    ? migrate_disable+0x1fc/0x380
    ? task_rq_lock+0x170/0x170
    ? try_to_run_init_process+0x40/0x40
    ? locks_remove_file+0x85/0x2f0
    ? dev_prepare_static_identity_mapping+0x78/0x78
    ? rt_spin_unlock+0x39/0x50
    ? lockref_put_or_lock+0x2a/0x40
    ? dput+0x128/0x2f0
    ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x66/0x80
    ? __fput+0x250/0x300
    ? __rcu_read_lock+0x1b/0x30
    ? mntput_no_expire+0x38/0x290
    ? e820__memblock_setup+0xb0/0xb0
    ? pci_iommu_init+0x25/0x63
    ? pci_iommu_init+0x25/0x63
    ? do_one_initcall+0x7e/0x1c0
    ? initcall_blacklisted+0x120/0x120
    ? kernel_init_freeable+0x27b/0x307
    ? rest_init+0xd0/0xd0
    ? kernel_init+0xf/0x120
    ? rest_init+0xd0/0xd0
    ? ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
   The buggy address belongs to the variable:
    dmar_pci_notify_info_buf+0x40/0x60
Fixes 57384592c433 ("iommu/vt-d: Store bus information in RMRR PCI device path")
---
 drivers/iommu/dmar.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iommu/dmar.c +1 -1
index d9c748b6f9e4..7f9824b0609e 100644
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ dmar_alloc_pci_notify_info(struct pci_dev *dev, unsigned long event)
 		for (tmp = dev; tmp; tmp = tmp->bus->self)
 			level++;
 
-	size = sizeof(*info) + level * sizeof(struct acpi_dmar_pci_path);
+	size = sizeof(*info) + level * sizeof(info->path[0]);
 	if (size <= sizeof(dmar_pci_notify_info_buf)) {
 		info = (struct dmar_pci_notify_info *)dmar_pci_notify_info_buf;
 	} else {
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#41 lore raw

PATCH 39/57 scsi: core: Avoid that system resume triggers a kernel warning

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 388b4e6a00bb3097278ed1648ac5a1cb48c894e6 ]

scsi_device_quiesce() and scsi_device_resume() are called during system-wide suspend and resume. scsi_device_quiesce() only succeeds for SCSI devices that are in one of the RUNNING, OFFLINE or TRANSPORT_OFFLINE states (see also scsi_set_device_state()). This patch avoids that the following warning is triggered when resuming a system for which quiescing a SCSI device failed:

WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 11303 at drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:2600 scsi_device_resume+0x4f/0x58
CPU: 2 PID: 11303 Comm: kworker/u8:70 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc1+ #50
Hardware name: LENOVO 80E3/Lancer 5B2, BIOS A2CN45WW(V2.13) 08/04/2016
Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn
Call Trace:
 scsi_dev_type_resume+0x2e/0x60
 async_run_entry_fn+0x32/0xd8
 process_one_work+0x1f4/0x420
 worker_thread+0x28/0x3c0
 kthread+0x118/0x130
 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x40
Cc Przemek Socha <[email protected]>
Fixes 3a0a529971ec ("block, scsi: Make SCSI quiesce and resume work reliably") # v4.15
---
 drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c +0 -1
index 18e4289baf99..655790f30434 100644
@@ -3095,7 +3095,6 @@ void scsi_device_resume(struct scsi_device *sdev)
 	 * device deleted during suspend)
 	 */
 	mutex_lock(&sdev->state_mutex);
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(!sdev->quiesced_by);
 	sdev->quiesced_by = NULL;
 	blk_clear_preempt_only(sdev->request_queue);
 	if (sdev->sdev_state == SDEV_QUIESCE)
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#42 lore raw

PATCH 40/57 kvm: properly check debugfs dentry before using it

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8ed0579c12b2fe56a1fac2f712f58fc26c1dc49b ]

debugfs can now report an error code if something went wrong instead of just NULL. So if the return value is to be used as a "real" dentry, it needs to be checked if it is an error before dereferencing it.

This is now happening because of ff9fb72bc077 ("debugfs: return error values, not NULL"). syzbot has found a way to trigger multiple debugfs files attempting to be created, which fails, and then the error code gets passed to dentry_path_raw() which obviously does not like it.

---
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +1 -1
index c436d95fd7aa..fb74f994cb63 100644
@@ -3912,7 +3912,7 @@ static void kvm_uevent_notify_change(unsigned int type, struct kvm *kvm)
 	}
 	add_uevent_var(env, "PID=%d", kvm->userspace_pid);
 
-	if (kvm->debugfs_dentry) {
+	if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(kvm->debugfs_dentry)) {
 		char *tmp, *p = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
 
 		if (p) {
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#45 lore raw

PATCH 41/57 soc/tegra: pmc: Drop locking from tegra_powergate_is_powered()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Dmitry Osipenko <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b6e1fd17a38bd1d97c11d69fd3207b3ef9bfa4b3 ]

This fixes splats like the one below if CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP=y and machine (Tegra30) booted with SMP=n or all secondary CPU's are put offline. Locking isn't needed because it protects atomic operation.

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:254
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 128, pid: 0, name: swapper/0
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G         C        4.18.0-next-20180821-00180-gc3ebb6544e44-dirty #823
Hardware name: NVIDIA Tegra SoC (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c01134f4>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010db2c>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[<c010db2c>] (show_stack) from [<c0bd0f3c>] (dump_stack+0x94/0xa8)
[<c0bd0f3c>] (dump_stack) from [<c0151df8>] (___might_sleep+0x13c/0x174)
[<c0151df8>] (___might_sleep) from [<c0151ea0>] (__might_sleep+0x70/0xa8)
[<c0151ea0>] (__might_sleep) from [<c0bec2b8>] (mutex_lock+0x2c/0x70)
[<c0bec2b8>] (mutex_lock) from [<c0589844>] (tegra_powergate_is_powered+0x44/0xa8)
[<c0589844>] (tegra_powergate_is_powered) from [<c0581a60>] (tegra30_cpu_rail_off_ready+0x30/0x74)
[<c0581a60>] (tegra30_cpu_rail_off_ready) from [<c0122244>] (tegra30_idle_lp2+0xa0/0x108)
[<c0122244>] (tegra30_idle_lp2) from [<c0853438>] (cpuidle_enter_state+0x140/0x540)
[<c0853438>] (cpuidle_enter_state) from [<c08538a4>] (cpuidle_enter+0x40/0x4c)
[<c08538a4>] (cpuidle_enter) from [<c01595e0>] (call_cpuidle+0x30/0x48)
[<c01595e0>] (call_cpuidle) from [<c01599f8>] (do_idle+0x238/0x28c)
[<c01599f8>] (do_idle) from [<c0159d28>] (cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x2c)
[<c0159d28>] (cpu_startup_entry) from [<c0be76c8>] (rest_init+0xd8/0xdc)
[<c0be76c8>] (rest_init) from [<c1200f50>] (start_kernel+0x41c/0x430)
---
 drivers/soc/tegra/pmc.c | 8 +-------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/soc/tegra/pmc.c +1 -7
index ed71a4c9c8b2..4b452f36f054 100644
@@ -524,16 +524,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tegra_powergate_power_off);
  */
 int tegra_powergate_is_powered(unsigned int id)
 {
-	int status;
-
 	if (!tegra_powergate_is_valid(id))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	mutex_lock(&pmc->powergates_lock);
-	status = tegra_powergate_state(id);
-	mutex_unlock(&pmc->powergates_lock);
-
-	return status;
+	return tegra_powergate_state(id);
 }
 
 /**
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 5/57 9p: do not trust pdu content for stat item size

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Gertjan Halkes <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2803cf4379ed252894f046cb8812a48db35294e3 ]

v9fs_dir_readdir() could deadloop if a struct was sent with a size set to -2

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=88021

---
 fs/9p/vfs_dir.c   | 8 +++-----
 net/9p/protocol.c | 3 ++-
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/9p/vfs_dir.c +3 -5
index 48db9a9f13f9..cb6c4031af55 100644
@@ -105,7 +105,6 @@ static int v9fs_dir_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
 	int err = 0;
 	struct p9_fid *fid;
 	int buflen;
-	int reclen = 0;
 	struct p9_rdir *rdir;
 	struct kvec kvec;
 
@@ -138,11 +137,10 @@ static int v9fs_dir_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
 		while (rdir->head < rdir->tail) {
 			err = p9stat_read(fid->clnt, rdir->buf + rdir->head,
 					  rdir->tail - rdir->head, &st);
-			if (err) {
+			if (err <= 0) {
 				p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_VFS, "returned %d\n", err);
 				return -EIO;
 			}
-			reclen = st.size+2;
 
 			over = !dir_emit(ctx, st.name, strlen(st.name),
 					 v9fs_qid2ino(&st.qid), dt_type(&st));
@@ -150,8 +148,8 @@ static int v9fs_dir_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
 			if (over)
 				return 0;
 
-			rdir->head += reclen;
-			ctx->pos += reclen;
+			rdir->head += err;
+			ctx->pos += err;
 		}
 	}
 }
net/9p/protocol.c +2 -1
index ee32bbf12675..b4d80c533f89 100644
@@ -571,9 +571,10 @@ int p9stat_read(struct p9_client *clnt, char *buf, int len, struct p9_wstat *st)
 	if (ret) {
 		p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_9P, "<<< p9stat_read failed: %d\n", ret);
 		trace_9p_protocol_dump(clnt, &fake_pdu);
+		return ret;
 	}
 
-	return ret;
+	return fake_pdu.offset;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(p9stat_read);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH 11/57 powerpc/pseries: Remove prrn_work workqueue

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Nathan Fontenot <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cd24e457fd8b2d087d9236700c8d2957054598bf ]

When a PRRN event is received we are already running in a worker thread. Instead of spawning off another worker thread on the prrn_work workqueue to handle the PRRN event we can just call the PRRN handler routine directly.

With this update we can also pass the scope variable for the PRRN event directly to the handler instead of it being a global variable.

This patch fixes the following oops mnessage we are seeing in PRRN testing:

  Oops: Bad kernel stack pointer, sig: 6 [#1]
  SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
  Modules linked in: nfsv3 nfs_acl rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace sunrpc fscache binfmt_misc reiserfs vfat fat rpadlpar_io(X) rpaphp(X) tcp_diag udp_diag inet_diag unix_diag af_packet_diag netlink_diag af_packet xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time ibmveth(X) ses enclosure scsi_transport_sas rtc_generic btrfs xor raid6_pq sd_mod ibmvscsi(X) scsi_transport_srp ipr(X) libata sg dm_multipath dm_mod scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua scsi_mod autofs4
  Supported: Yes, External                                                     54
  CPU: 7 PID: 18967 Comm: kworker/u96:0 Tainted: G                 X 4.4.126-94.22-default #1
  Workqueue: pseries hotplug workque pseries_hp_work_fn
  task: c000000775367790 ti: c00000001ebd4000 task.ti: c00000070d140000
  NIP: 0000000000000000 LR: 000000001fb3d050 CTR: 0000000000000000
  REGS: c00000001ebd7d40 TRAP: 0700   Tainted: G                 X  (4.4.126-94.22-default)
  MSR: 8000000102081000 <41,VEC,ME5  CR: 28000002  XER: 20040018   4
  CFAR: 000000001fb3d084 40 419   1                                3
  GPR00: 000000000000000040000000000010007 000000001ffff400 000000041fffe200
  GPR04: 000000000000008050000000000000000 000000001fb15fa8 0000000500000500
  GPR08: 000000000001f40040000000000000001 0000000000000000 000005:5200040002
  GPR12: 00000000000000005c000000007a05400 c0000000000e89f8 000000001ed9f668
  GPR16: 000000001fbeff944000000001fbeff94 000000001fb545e4 0000006000000060
  GPR20: ffffffffffffffff4ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR24: 00000000000000005400000001fb3c000 0000000000000000 000000001fb1b040
  GPR28: 000000001fb240004000000001fb440d8 0000000000000008 0000000000000000
  NIP [0000000000000000] 5         (null)
  LR [000000001fb3d050] 031fb3d050
  Call Trace:            4
  Instruction dump:      4                                       5:47 12    2
  XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXX4XX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
  XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXX5XX XXXXXXXX 60000000 60000000 60000000 60000000
  ---[ end trace aa5627b04a7d9d6b ]---                                       3NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#27 stuck for 23s! [kworker/27:0:13903]
  Modules linked in: nfsv3 nfs_acl rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace sunrpc fscache binfmt_misc reiserfs vfat fat rpadlpar_io(X) rpaphp(X) tcp_diag udp_diag inet_diag unix_diag af_packet_diag netlink_diag af_packet xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time ibmveth(X) ses enclosure scsi_transport_sas rtc_generic btrfs xor raid6_pq sd_mod ibmvscsi(X) scsi_transport_srp ipr(X) libata sg dm_multipath dm_mod scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua scsi_mod autofs4
  Supported: Yes, External
  CPU: 27 PID: 13903 Comm: kworker/27:0 Tainted: G      D          X 4.4.126-94.22-default #1
  Workqueue: events prrn_work_fn
  task: c000000747cfa390 ti: c00000074712c000 task.ti: c00000074712c000
  NIP: c0000000008002a8 LR: c000000000090770 CTR: 000000000032e088
  REGS: c00000074712f7b0 TRAP: 0901   Tainted: G      D          X  (4.4.126-94.22-default)
  MSR: 8000000100009033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 22482044  XER: 20040000
  CFAR: c0000000008002c4 SOFTE: 1
  GPR00: c000000000090770 c00000074712fa30 c000000000f09800 c000000000fa1928 6:02
  GPR04: c000000775f5e000 fffffffffffffffe 0000000000000001 c000000000f42db8
  GPR08: 0000000000000001 0000000080000007 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR12: 8006210083180000 c000000007a14400
  NIP [c0000000008002a8] _raw_spin_lock+0x68/0xd0
  LR [c000000000090770] mobility_rtas_call+0x50/0x100
  Call Trace:            59                                        5
  [c00000074712fa60] [c000000000090770] mobility_rtas_call+0x50/0x100
  [c00000074712faf0] [c000000000090b08] pseries_devicetree_update+0xf8/0x530
  [c00000074712fc20] [c000000000031ba4] prrn_work_fn+0x34/0x50
  [c00000074712fc40] [c0000000000e0390] process_one_work+0x1a0/0x4e0
  [c00000074712fcd0] [c0000000000e0870] worker_thread+0x1a0/0x6105:57       2
  [c00000074712fd80] [c0000000000e8b18] kthread+0x128/0x150
  [c00000074712fe30] [c0000000000096f8] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64
  Instruction dump:
  2c090000 40c20010 7d40192d 40c2fff0 7c2004ac 2fa90000 40de0018 5:540030   3
  e8010010 ebe1fff8 7c0803a6 4e800020 <7c210b78> e92d0000 89290009 792affe3
---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/rtasd.c | 17 +++--------------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/rtasd.c +3 -14
index 44d66c33d59d..23b88b923f06 100644
@@ -274,27 +274,16 @@ void pSeries_log_error(char *buf, unsigned int err_type, int fatal)
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES
-static s32 prrn_update_scope;
-
-static void prrn_work_fn(struct work_struct *work)
+static void handle_prrn_event(s32 scope)
 {
 	/*
 	 * For PRRN, we must pass the negative of the scope value in
 	 * the RTAS event.
 	 */
-	pseries_devicetree_update(-prrn_update_scope);
+	pseries_devicetree_update(-scope);
 	numa_update_cpu_topology(false);
 }
 
-static DECLARE_WORK(prrn_work, prrn_work_fn);
-
-static void prrn_schedule_update(u32 scope)
-{
-	flush_work(&prrn_work);
-	prrn_update_scope = scope;
-	schedule_work(&prrn_work);
-}
-
 static void handle_rtas_event(const struct rtas_error_log *log)
 {
 	if (rtas_error_type(log) != RTAS_TYPE_PRRN || !prrn_is_enabled())
@@ -303,7 +292,7 @@ static void handle_rtas_event(const struct rtas_error_log *log)
 	/* For PRRN Events the extended log length is used to denote
 	 * the scope for calling rtas update-nodes.
 	 */
-	prrn_schedule_update(rtas_error_extended_log_length(log));
+	handle_prrn_event(rtas_error_extended_log_length(log));
 }
 
 #else
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#11 lore raw

PATCH 12/57 media: au0828: cannot kfree dev before usb disconnect

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Brad Love <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4add7104919f9e94e0db03e234caeadbfcc02ea9 ]

If au0828_analog_register fails, the dev is kfree'd and then flow jumps to done, which can call au0828_usb_disconnect. Since all USB error codes are negative, au0828_usb_disconnect will be called. The problem is au0828_usb_disconnect uses dev, if dev is NULL then there is immediate oops encountered.

[    7.454307] au0828: au0828_usb_probe() au0282_dev_register failed to register on V4L2
[    7.454323] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000050
[    7.454421] PGD 0 P4D 0
[    7.454457] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI
[    7.454500] CPU: 1 PID: 262 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: P           O      4.18.3 #1
[    7.454584] Hardware name: Google Panther/Panther, BIOS MattDevo 04/27/2015
[    7.454670] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2c/0x50
[    7.454725] Code: 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 54 53 48 89 fb 9c 58 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 c4 fa 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 e8 db 23 1b ff 31 c0 ba 01 00 00 00 <f0> 0f b1 13 85 c0 75 08 4c 89 e0 5b 41 5c 5d c3 89 c6 48 89 df e8
[    7.455004] RSP: 0018:ffff9130f53ef988 EFLAGS: 00010046
[    7.455063] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000050 RCX: 0000000000000000
[    7.455139] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: 0000000000000050
[    7.455216] RBP: ffff9130f53ef998 R08: 0000000000000018 R09: 0000000000000090
[    7.455292] R10: ffffed4cc53cb000 R11: ffffed4cc53cb108 R12: 0000000000000082
[    7.455369] R13: ffff9130cf2c6188 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000018
[    7.455447] FS:  00007f2ff8514cc0(0000) GS:ffff9130fcb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    7.455535] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    7.455597] CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 00000001753f0002 CR4: 00000000000606a0
[    7.455675] Call Trace:
[    7.455713]  __wake_up_common_lock+0x65/0xc0
[    7.455764]  __wake_up+0x13/0x20
[    7.455808]  ir_lirc_unregister+0x57/0xe0 [rc_core]
[    7.455865]  rc_unregister_device+0xa0/0xc0 [rc_core]
[    7.455935]  au0828_rc_unregister+0x25/0x40 [au0828]
[    7.455999]  au0828_usb_disconnect+0x33/0x80 [au0828]
[    7.456064]  au0828_usb_probe.cold.16+0x8d/0x2aa [au0828]
[    7.456130]  usb_probe_interface+0xf1/0x300
[    7.456184]  driver_probe_device+0x2e3/0x460
[    7.456235]  __driver_attach+0xe4/0x110
[    7.456282]  ? driver_probe_device+0x460/0x460
[    7.456335]  bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xb0
[    7.456385]  ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x15d/0x1d0
[    7.456441]  driver_attach+0x1e/0x20
[    7.456485]  bus_add_driver+0x159/0x230
[    7.456532]  driver_register+0x70/0xc0
[    7.456578]  usb_register_driver+0x7f/0x140
[    7.456626]  ? 0xffffffffc0474000
[    7.456674]  au0828_init+0xbc/0x1000 [au0828]
[    7.456725]  do_one_initcall+0x4a/0x1c9
[    7.456771]  ? _cond_resched+0x19/0x30
[    7.456817]  ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x15d/0x1d0
[    7.456873]  do_init_module+0x60/0x210
[    7.456918]  load_module+0x221b/0x2710
[    7.456966]  ? vfs_read+0xf5/0x120
[    7.457010]  __do_sys_finit_module+0xbd/0x120
[    7.457061]  ? __do_sys_finit_module+0xbd/0x120
[    7.457115]  __x64_sys_finit_module+0x1a/0x20
[    7.457166]  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x110
[    7.457210]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
---
 drivers/media/usb/au0828/au0828-core.c | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/usb/au0828/au0828-core.c +0 -1
index cd363a2100d4..257ae0d8cfe2 100644
@@ -629,7 +629,6 @@ static int au0828_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *interface,
 		pr_err("%s() au0282_dev_register failed to register on V4L2\n",
 			__func__);
 		mutex_unlock(&dev->lock);
-		kfree(dev);
 		goto done;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#12 lore raw

PATCH 13/57 Bluetooth: Fix debugfs NULL pointer dereference

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Matias Karhumaa <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 30d65e0804d58a03d1a8ea4e12c6fc07ed08218b ]

Fix crash caused by NULL pointer dereference when debugfs functions le_max_key_read, le_max_key_size_write, le_min_key_size_read or le_min_key_size_write and Bluetooth adapter was powered off.

Fix is to move max_key_size and min_key_size from smp_dev to hci_dev. At the same time they were renamed to le_max_key_size and le_min_key_size.

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000002e8
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#24] SMP PTI
CPU: 2 PID: 6255 Comm: cat Tainted: G      D    OE     4.18.9-200.fc28.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: LENOVO 4286CTO/4286CTO, BIOS 8DET76WW (1.46 ) 06/21/2018
RIP: 0010:le_max_key_size_read+0x45/0xb0 [bluetooth]
Code: 00 00 00 48 83 ec 10 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 31 c0 48 8b 87 c8 00 00 00 48 8d 7c 24 04 48 8b 80 48 0a 00 00 <48> 8b 80 e8 02 00 00 0f b6 48 52 e8 fb b6 b3 ed be 04 00 00 00 48
RSP: 0018:ffffab23c3ff3df0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f0b4ca2e000 RCX: ffffab23c3ff3f08
RDX: ffffffffc0ddb033 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffab23c3ff3df4
RBP: 0000000000020000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffab23c3ff3ed8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffab23c3ff3f08
R13: 00007f0b4ca2e000 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: ffffab23c3ff3f08
FS:  00007f0b4ca0f540(0000) GS:ffff91bd5e280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000002e8 CR3: 00000000629fa006 CR4: 00000000000606e0
Call Trace:
 full_proxy_read+0x53/0x80
 __vfs_read+0x36/0x180
 vfs_read+0x8a/0x140
 ksys_read+0x4f/0xb0
 do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x160
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
---
 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h |  2 ++
 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c         |  2 ++
 net/bluetooth/smp.c              | 23 +++++++++--------------
 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h +2 -0
index 0db1b9b428b7..1dfb75057580 100644
@@ -259,6 +259,8 @@ struct hci_dev {
 	__u16		le_max_tx_time;
 	__u16		le_max_rx_len;
 	__u16		le_max_rx_time;
+	__u8		le_max_key_size;
+	__u8		le_min_key_size;
 	__u16		discov_interleaved_timeout;
 	__u16		conn_info_min_age;
 	__u16		conn_info_max_age;
net/bluetooth/hci_core.c +2 -0
index 74b29c7d841c..a06f03047717 100644
@@ -3084,6 +3084,8 @@ struct hci_dev *hci_alloc_dev(void)
 	hdev->le_max_tx_time = 0x0148;
 	hdev->le_max_rx_len = 0x001b;
 	hdev->le_max_rx_time = 0x0148;
+	hdev->le_max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+	hdev->le_min_key_size = SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
 	hdev->le_tx_def_phys = HCI_LE_SET_PHY_1M;
 	hdev->le_rx_def_phys = HCI_LE_SET_PHY_1M;
 
net/bluetooth/smp.c +9 -14
index 73f7211d0431..a1c1b7e8a45c 100644
@@ -88,9 +88,6 @@ struct smp_dev {
 	u8			local_rand[16];
 	bool			debug_key;
 
-	u8			min_key_size;
-	u8			max_key_size;
-
 	struct crypto_cipher	*tfm_aes;
 	struct crypto_shash	*tfm_cmac;
 	struct crypto_kpp	*tfm_ecdh;
@@ -720,7 +717,7 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 	if (rsp == NULL) {
 		req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
 		req->oob_flag = oob_flag;
-		req->max_key_size = SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size;
+		req->max_key_size = hdev->le_max_key_size;
 		req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
 		req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
 		req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
@@ -731,7 +728,7 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 
 	rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
 	rsp->oob_flag = oob_flag;
-	rsp->max_key_size = SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size;
+	rsp->max_key_size = hdev->le_max_key_size;
 	rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
 	rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
 	rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
@@ -745,7 +742,7 @@ static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size)
 	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
 	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 
-	if (max_key_size > SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size ||
+	if (max_key_size > hdev->le_max_key_size ||
 	    max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
 		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
 
@@ -3264,8 +3261,6 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid)
 	smp->tfm_aes = tfm_aes;
 	smp->tfm_cmac = tfm_cmac;
 	smp->tfm_ecdh = tfm_ecdh;
-	smp->min_key_size = SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
-	smp->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
 
 create_chan:
 	chan = l2cap_chan_create();
@@ -3391,7 +3386,7 @@ static ssize_t le_min_key_size_read(struct file *file,
 	struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
 	char buf[4];
 
-	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%2u\n", SMP_DEV(hdev)->min_key_size);
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%2u\n", hdev->le_min_key_size);
 
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, strlen(buf));
 }
@@ -3412,11 +3407,11 @@ static ssize_t le_min_key_size_write(struct file *file,
 
 	sscanf(buf, "%hhu", &key_size);
 
-	if (key_size > SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size ||
+	if (key_size > hdev->le_max_key_size ||
 	    key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	SMP_DEV(hdev)->min_key_size = key_size;
+	hdev->le_min_key_size = key_size;
 
 	return count;
 }
@@ -3435,7 +3430,7 @@ static ssize_t le_max_key_size_read(struct file *file,
 	struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
 	char buf[4];
 
-	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%2u\n", SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size);
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%2u\n", hdev->le_max_key_size);
 
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, strlen(buf));
 }
@@ -3457,10 +3452,10 @@ static ssize_t le_max_key_size_write(struct file *file,
 	sscanf(buf, "%hhu", &key_size);
 
 	if (key_size > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE ||
-	    key_size < SMP_DEV(hdev)->min_key_size)
+	    key_size < hdev->le_min_key_size)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size = key_size;
+	hdev->le_max_key_size = key_size;
 
 	return count;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#15 lore raw

PATCH 16/57 ARM: samsung: Limit SAMSUNG_PM_CHECK config option to non-Exynos platforms

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6862fdf2201ab67cd962dbf0643d37db909f4860 ]

"S3C2410 PM Suspend Memory CRC" feature (controlled by SAMSUNG_PM_CHECK config option) is incompatible with highmem (uses phys_to_virt() instead of proper mapping) which is used by the majority of Exynos boards. The issue manifests itself in OOPS on affected boards, i.e. on Odroid-U3 I got the following one:

Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address f0000000
pgd = 1c0f9bb4
[f0000000] *pgd=00000000
Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[<c0458034>] (crc32_le) from [<c0121f8c>] (s3c_pm_makecheck+0x34/0x54)
[<c0121f8c>] (s3c_pm_makecheck) from [<c0121efc>] (s3c_pm_run_res+0x74/0x8c)
[<c0121efc>] (s3c_pm_run_res) from [<c0121ecc>] (s3c_pm_run_res+0x44/0x8c)
[<c0121ecc>] (s3c_pm_run_res) from [<c01210b8>] (exynos_suspend_enter+0x64/0x148)
[<c01210b8>] (exynos_suspend_enter) from [<c018893c>] (suspend_devices_and_enter+0x9ec/0xe74)
[<c018893c>] (suspend_devices_and_enter) from [<c0189534>] (pm_suspend+0x770/0xc04)
[<c0189534>] (pm_suspend) from [<c0186ce8>] (state_store+0x6c/0xcc)
[<c0186ce8>] (state_store) from [<c09db434>] (kobj_attr_store+0x14/0x20)
[<c09db434>] (kobj_attr_store) from [<c02fa63c>] (sysfs_kf_write+0x4c/0x50)
[<c02fa63c>] (sysfs_kf_write) from [<c02f97a4>] (kernfs_fop_write+0xfc/0x1e4)
[<c02f97a4>] (kernfs_fop_write) from [<c027b198>] (__vfs_write+0x2c/0x140)
[<c027b198>] (__vfs_write) from [<c027b418>] (vfs_write+0xa4/0x160)
[<c027b418>] (vfs_write) from [<c027b5d8>] (ksys_write+0x40/0x8c)
[<c027b5d8>] (ksys_write) from [<c0101000>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x28)

Add PLAT_S3C24XX, ARCH_S3C64XX and ARCH_S5PV210 dependencies to SAMSUNG_PM_CHECK config option to hide it on Exynos platforms.

---
 arch/arm/plat-samsung/Kconfig | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm/plat-samsung/Kconfig +1 -1
index b600e38364eb..377ff9cda667 100644
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ config S3C_PM_DEBUG_LED_SMDK
 
 config SAMSUNG_PM_CHECK
 	bool "S3C2410 PM Suspend Memory CRC"
-	depends on PM
+	depends on PM && (PLAT_S3C24XX || ARCH_S3C64XX || ARCH_S5PV210)
 	select CRC32
 	help
 	  Enable the PM code's memory area checksum over sleep. This option
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#24 lore raw

PATCH 25/57 cifs: fallback to older infolevels on findfirst queryinfo retry

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Steve French <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3b7960caceafdfc2cdfe2850487f8d091eb41144 ]

In cases where queryinfo fails, we have cases in cifs (vers=1.0) where with backupuid mounts we retry the query info with findfirst. This doesn't work to some NetApp servers which don't support WindowsXP (and later) infolevel 261 (SMB_FIND_FILE_ID_FULL_DIR_INFO) so in this case use other info levels (in this case it will usually be level 257, SMB_FIND_FILE_DIRECTORY_INFO).

(Also fixes some indentation)

See kernel bugzilla 201435

---
 fs/cifs/inode.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
fs/cifs/inode.c +37 -30
index 020f49c15b30..b59ebed4f615 100644
@@ -780,43 +780,50 @@ cifs_get_inode_info(struct inode **inode, const char *full_path,
 	} else if ((rc == -EACCES) && backup_cred(cifs_sb) &&
 		   (strcmp(server->vals->version_string, SMB1_VERSION_STRING)
 		      == 0)) {
-			/*
-			 * For SMB2 and later the backup intent flag is already
-			 * sent if needed on open and there is no path based
-			 * FindFirst operation to use to retry with
-			 */
+		/*
+		 * For SMB2 and later the backup intent flag is already
+		 * sent if needed on open and there is no path based
+		 * FindFirst operation to use to retry with
+		 */
 
-			srchinf = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cifs_search_info),
-						GFP_KERNEL);
-			if (srchinf == NULL) {
-				rc = -ENOMEM;
-				goto cgii_exit;
-			}
+		srchinf = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cifs_search_info),
+					GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (srchinf == NULL) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto cgii_exit;
+		}
 
-			srchinf->endOfSearch = false;
+		srchinf->endOfSearch = false;
+		if (tcon->unix_ext)
+			srchinf->info_level = SMB_FIND_FILE_UNIX;
+		else if ((tcon->ses->capabilities &
+			 tcon->ses->server->vals->cap_nt_find) == 0)
+			srchinf->info_level = SMB_FIND_FILE_INFO_STANDARD;
+		else if (cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags & CIFS_MOUNT_SERVER_INUM)
 			srchinf->info_level = SMB_FIND_FILE_ID_FULL_DIR_INFO;
+		else /* no srvino useful for fallback to some netapp */
+			srchinf->info_level = SMB_FIND_FILE_DIRECTORY_INFO;
 
-			srchflgs = CIFS_SEARCH_CLOSE_ALWAYS |
-					CIFS_SEARCH_CLOSE_AT_END |
-					CIFS_SEARCH_BACKUP_SEARCH;
+		srchflgs = CIFS_SEARCH_CLOSE_ALWAYS |
+				CIFS_SEARCH_CLOSE_AT_END |
+				CIFS_SEARCH_BACKUP_SEARCH;
 
-			rc = CIFSFindFirst(xid, tcon, full_path,
-				cifs_sb, NULL, srchflgs, srchinf, false);
-			if (!rc) {
-				data =
-				(FILE_ALL_INFO *)srchinf->srch_entries_start;
+		rc = CIFSFindFirst(xid, tcon, full_path,
+			cifs_sb, NULL, srchflgs, srchinf, false);
+		if (!rc) {
+			data = (FILE_ALL_INFO *)srchinf->srch_entries_start;
 
-				cifs_dir_info_to_fattr(&fattr,
-				(FILE_DIRECTORY_INFO *)data, cifs_sb);
-				fattr.cf_uniqueid = le64_to_cpu(
-				((SEARCH_ID_FULL_DIR_INFO *)data)->UniqueId);
-				validinum = true;
+			cifs_dir_info_to_fattr(&fattr,
+			(FILE_DIRECTORY_INFO *)data, cifs_sb);
+			fattr.cf_uniqueid = le64_to_cpu(
+			((SEARCH_ID_FULL_DIR_INFO *)data)->UniqueId);
+			validinum = true;
 
-				cifs_buf_release(srchinf->ntwrk_buf_start);
-			}
-			kfree(srchinf);
-			if (rc)
-				goto cgii_exit;
+			cifs_buf_release(srchinf->ntwrk_buf_start);
+		}
+		kfree(srchinf);
+		if (rc)
+			goto cgii_exit;
 	} else
 		goto cgii_exit;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#25 lore raw

PATCH 26/57 kernel: hung_task.c: disable on suspend

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a1c6ca3c6de763459a6e93b644ec6518c890ba1c ]

It is possible to observe hung_task complaints when system goes to suspend-to-idle state:

 # echo freeze > /sys/power/state

PM: Syncing filesystems ... done.
Freezing user space processes ... (elapsed 0.001 seconds) done. OOM killer disabled.
Freezing remaining freezable tasks ... (elapsed 0.002 seconds) done. sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Synchronizing SCSI cache

 INFO: task bash:1569 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
       Not tainted 4.19.0-rc3_+ #687
 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
 bash            D    0  1569    604 0x00000000
 Call Trace:
  ? __schedule+0x1fe/0x7e0
  schedule+0x28/0x80
  suspend_devices_and_enter+0x4ac/0x750
  pm_suspend+0x2c0/0x310

Register a PM notifier to disable the detector on suspend and re-enable back on wakeup.

---
 kernel/hung_task.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/hung_task.c +29 -1
index 9eca2371f189..4a9191617076 100644
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/lockdep.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
+#include <linux/suspend.h>
 #include <linux/utsname.h>
 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
 #include <linux/sched/debug.h>
@@ -240,6 +241,28 @@ void reset_hung_task_detector(void)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(reset_hung_task_detector);
 
+static bool hung_detector_suspended;
+
+static int hungtask_pm_notify(struct notifier_block *self,
+			      unsigned long action, void *hcpu)
+{
+	switch (action) {
+	case PM_SUSPEND_PREPARE:
+	case PM_HIBERNATION_PREPARE:
+	case PM_RESTORE_PREPARE:
+		hung_detector_suspended = true;
+		break;
+	case PM_POST_SUSPEND:
+	case PM_POST_HIBERNATION:
+	case PM_POST_RESTORE:
+		hung_detector_suspended = false;
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+	return NOTIFY_OK;
+}
+
 /*
  * kthread which checks for tasks stuck in D state
  */
@@ -259,7 +282,8 @@ static int watchdog(void *dummy)
 		interval = min_t(unsigned long, interval, timeout);
 		t = hung_timeout_jiffies(hung_last_checked, interval);
 		if (t <= 0) {
-			if (!atomic_xchg(&reset_hung_task, 0))
+			if (!atomic_xchg(&reset_hung_task, 0) &&
+			    !hung_detector_suspended)
 				check_hung_uninterruptible_tasks(timeout);
 			hung_last_checked = jiffies;
 			continue;
@@ -273,6 +297,10 @@ static int watchdog(void *dummy)
 static int __init hung_task_init(void)
 {
 	atomic_notifier_chain_register(&panic_notifier_list, &panic_block);
+
+	/* Disable hung task detector on suspend */
+	pm_notifier(hungtask_pm_notify, 0);
+
 	watchdog_task = kthread_run(watchdog, NULL, "khungtaskd");
 
 	return 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#23 lore raw

PATCH 24/57 net: stmmac: Set OWN bit for jumbo frames

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Thor Thayer <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 487e2e22ab7968f2c0c82f37b5ca5883efd1a354 ]

Ping with Jumbo packet does not reply and get a watchdog timeout

[   46.059616] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   46.064268] NETDEV WATCHDOG: eth0 (socfpga-dwmac): transmit queue 0 timed out
[   46.071471] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at net/sched/sch_generic.c:461 dev_watchdog+0x2cc/0x2d8
[   46.079708] Modules linked in:
[   46.082761] CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.18.0-00115-gc262be665854-dirty #264
[   46.091082] Hardware name: SoCFPGA Stratix 10 SoCDK (DT)
[   46.096377] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[   46.101152] pc : dev_watchdog+0x2cc/0x2d8
[   46.105149] lr : dev_watchdog+0x2cc/0x2d8
[   46.109144] sp : ffff00000800bd80
[   46.112447] x29: ffff00000800bd80 x28: ffff80007a9b4940
[   46.117744] x27: 00000000ffffffff x26: ffff80007aa183b0
[   46.123040] x25: 0000000000000001 x24: 0000000000000140
[   46.128336] x23: ffff80007aa1839c x22: ffff80007aa17fb0
[   46.133632] x21: ffff80007aa18000 x20: ffff0000091a7000
[   46.138927] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[   46.144223] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[   46.149519] x15: ffff0000091a96c8 x14: 07740775076f0720
[   46.154814] x13: 07640765076d0769 x12: 0774072007300720
[   46.160110] x11: 0765077507650775 x10: 0771072007740769
[   46.165406] x9 : 076d0773076e0761 x8 : 077207740720073a
[   46.170702] x7 : 072907630761076d x6 : ffff80007ff9a0c0
[   46.175997] x5 : ffff80007ff9a0c0 x4 : 0000000000000002
[   46.181293] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffff0000091ac180
[   46.186589] x1 : e6a742ebe628e800 x0 : 0000000000000000
[   46.191885] Call trace:
[   46.194326]  dev_watchdog+0x2cc/0x2d8
[   46.197980]  call_timer_fn+0x20/0x78
[   46.201544]  expire_timers+0xa4/0xb0
[   46.205108]  run_timer_softirq+0xe4/0x198
[   46.209107]  __do_softirq+0x114/0x210
[   46.212760]  irq_exit+0xd0/0xd8
[   46.215895]  __handle_domain_irq+0x60/0xb0
[   46.219977]  gic_handle_irq+0x58/0xa8
[   46.223628]  el1_irq+0xb0/0x128
[   46.226761]  arch_cpu_idle+0x10/0x18
[   46.230326]  do_idle+0x1d4/0x288
[   46.233544]  cpu_startup_entry+0x24/0x28
[   46.237457]  secondary_start_kernel+0x17c/0x1c0
[   46.241971] ---[ end trace 57048cd1372cd828 ]---

Inspection of queue showed Jumbo packets were not sent out. The ring Jumbo packet function needs to set the OWN bit so the packet is sent.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/ring_mode.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/ring_mode.c +2 -2
index bc83ced94e1b..d8c5bc412219 100644
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ static int jumbo_frm(void *p, struct sk_buff *skb, int csum)
 
 		desc->des3 = cpu_to_le32(des2 + BUF_SIZE_4KiB);
 		stmmac_prepare_tx_desc(priv, desc, 1, bmax, csum,
-				STMMAC_RING_MODE, 0, false, skb->len);
+				STMMAC_RING_MODE, 1, false, skb->len);
 		tx_q->tx_skbuff[entry] = NULL;
 		entry = STMMAC_GET_ENTRY(entry, DMA_TX_SIZE);
 
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static int jumbo_frm(void *p, struct sk_buff *skb, int csum)
 		tx_q->tx_skbuff_dma[entry].is_jumbo = true;
 		desc->des3 = cpu_to_le32(des2 + BUF_SIZE_4KiB);
 		stmmac_prepare_tx_desc(priv, desc, 1, nopaged_len, csum,
-				STMMAC_RING_MODE, 0, true, skb->len);
+				STMMAC_RING_MODE, 1, true, skb->len);
 	}
 
 	tx_q->cur_tx = entry;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#29 lore raw

PATCH 29/57 drm/ttm: Fix bo_global and mem_global kfree error

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Trigger Huang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 30f33126feca0fe16df9e9302ffc28a953e2eb37 ]

ttm_bo_glob and ttm_mem_glob are defined as structure instance, while not allocated by kzalloc, so kfree should not be invoked to release them anymore. Otherwise, it will cause the following kernel BUG when unloading amdgpu module

[   48.419294] kernel BUG at /build/linux-5s7Xkn/linux-4.15.0/mm/slub.c:3894!
[   48.419352] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[   48.419387] Modules linked in: amdgpu(OE-) amdchash(OE) amdttm(OE) amd_sched(OE) amdkcl(OE) amd_iommu_v2 drm_kms_helper drm i2c_algo_bit fb_sys_fops syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel snd_pcm snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi pcbc snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_timer aesni_intel snd soundcore joydev aes_x86_64 crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd input_leds mac_hid serio_raw binfmt_misc nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc sch_fq_codel parport_pc ppdev lp parport ip_tables x_tables autofs4 8139too psmouse i2c_piix4 8139cp mii floppy pata_acpi
[   48.419782] CPU: 1 PID: 1281 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G           OE    4.15.0-20-generic #21-Ubuntu
[   48.419838] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[   48.419901] RIP: 0010:kfree+0x137/0x180
[   48.419934] RSP: 0018:ffffb02101273bf8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   48.419974] RAX: ffffeee1418ad7e0 RBX: ffffffffc075f100 RCX: ffff8fed7fca7ed0
[   48.420025] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000003440e RDI: 0000000022400000
[   48.420073] RBP: ffffb02101273c10 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: ffff8fed7ffd3680
[   48.420121] R10: ffffeee1418ad7c0 R11: ffff8fed7ffd3000 R12: ffffffffc075e2c0
[   48.420169] R13: ffffffffc074ec10 R14: ffff8fed73063900 R15: ffff8fed737428e8
[   48.420216] FS:  00007fdc912ec540(0000) GS:ffff8fed7fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   48.420267] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   48.420308] CR2: 000055fa40c30060 CR3: 000000023470a006 CR4: 00000000003606e0
[   48.420358] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   48.420405] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   48.420452] Call Trace:
[   48.420485]  ttm_bo_global_kobj_release+0x20/0x30 [amdttm]
[   48.420528]  kobject_release+0x6a/0x180
[   48.420562]  kobject_put+0x28/0x50
[   48.420595]  ttm_bo_global_release+0x36/0x50 [amdttm]
[   48.420636]  amdttm_bo_device_release+0x119/0x180 [amdttm]
[   48.420678]  ? amdttm_bo_clean_mm+0xa6/0xf0 [amdttm]
[   48.420760]  amdgpu_ttm_fini+0xc9/0x180 [amdgpu]
[   48.420821]  amdgpu_bo_fini+0x12/0x40 [amdgpu]
[   48.420889]  gmc_v9_0_sw_fini+0x40/0x50 [amdgpu]
[   48.420947]  amdgpu_device_fini+0x36f/0x4c0 [amdgpu]
[   48.421007]  amdgpu_driver_unload_kms+0xb4/0x150 [amdgpu]
[   48.421058]  drm_dev_unregister+0x46/0xf0 [drm]
[   48.421102]  drm_dev_unplug+0x12/0x70 [drm]
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo.c     | 1 -
 drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_memory.c | 9 ---------
 2 files changed, 10 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo.c +0 -1
index 7c484729f9b2..268f5a3b3122 100644
@@ -1445,7 +1445,6 @@ static void ttm_bo_global_kobj_release(struct kobject *kobj)
 		container_of(kobj, struct ttm_bo_global, kobj);
 
 	__free_page(glob->dummy_read_page);
-	kfree(glob);
 }
 
 void ttm_bo_global_release(struct drm_global_reference *ref)
drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_memory.c +0 -9
index 450387c92b63..df73d5ff84a8 100644
@@ -216,14 +216,6 @@ static ssize_t ttm_mem_global_store(struct kobject *kobj,
 	return size;
 }
 
-static void ttm_mem_global_kobj_release(struct kobject *kobj)
-{
-	struct ttm_mem_global *glob =
-		container_of(kobj, struct ttm_mem_global, kobj);
-
-	kfree(glob);
-}
-
 static struct attribute *ttm_mem_global_attrs[] = {
 	&ttm_mem_global_lower_mem_limit,
 	NULL
@@ -235,7 +227,6 @@ static const struct sysfs_ops ttm_mem_global_ops = {
 };
 
 static struct kobj_type ttm_mem_glob_kobj_type = {
-	.release = &ttm_mem_global_kobj_release,
 	.sysfs_ops = &ttm_mem_global_ops,
 	.default_attrs = ttm_mem_global_attrs,
 };
Signature · 6 lines
2.19.1

_______________________________________________
dri-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel
author maintainer
#33 lore raw

PATCH 33/57 blk-mq: protect debugfs_create_files() from failures

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 36991ca68db9dd43bac7f3519f080ee3939263ef ]

If debugfs were to return a non-NULL error for a debugfs call, using that pointer later in debugfs_create_files() would crash.

Fix that by properly checking the pointer before referencing it.

---
 block/blk-mq-debugfs.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
block/blk-mq-debugfs.c +3 -0
index cb1e6cf7ac48..9dc3a0896462 100644
@@ -806,6 +806,9 @@ static const struct blk_mq_debugfs_attr blk_mq_debugfs_ctx_attrs[] = {
 static bool debugfs_create_files(struct dentry *parent, void *data,
 				 const struct blk_mq_debugfs_attr *attr)
 {
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(parent))
+		return false;
+
 	d_inode(parent)->i_private = data;
 
 	for (; attr->name; attr++) {
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#37 lore raw

PATCH 35/57 crypto: sha256/arm - fix crash bug in Thumb2 build

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 69216a545cf81b2b32d01948f7039315abaf75a0 ]

The SHA256 code we adopted from the OpenSSL project uses a rather peculiar way to take the address of the round constant table: it takes the address of the sha256_block_data_order() routine, and substracts a constant known quantity to arrive at the base of the table, which is emitted by the same assembler code right before the routine's entry point.

However, recent versions of binutils have helpfully changed the behavior of references emitted via an ADR instruction when running in Thumb2 mode: it now takes the Thumb execution mode bit into account, which is bit 0 af the address. This means the produced table address also has bit 0 set, and so we end up with an address value pointing 1 byte past the start of the table, which results in crashes such as

  Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address bf825000
  pgd = 42f44b11
  [bf825000] *pgd=80000040206003, *pmd=5f1bd003, *pte=00000000
  Internal error: Oops: 207 [#1] PREEMPT SMP THUMB2
  Modules linked in: sha256_arm(+) sha1_arm_ce sha1_arm ...
  CPU: 7 PID: 396 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 5.0.0-rc6+ #144
  Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  PC is at sha256_block_data_order+0xaaa/0xb30 [sha256_arm]
  LR is at __this_module+0x17fd/0xffffe800 [sha256_arm]
  pc : [<bf820bca>]    lr : [<bf824ffd>]    psr: 800b0033
  sp : ebc8bbe8  ip : faaabe1c  fp : 2fdd3433
  r10: 4c5f1692  r9 : e43037df  r8 : b04b0a5a
  r7 : c369d722  r6 : 39c3693e  r5 : 7a013189  r4 : 1580d26b
  r3 : 8762a9b0  r2 : eea9c2cd  r1 : 3e9ab536  r0 : 1dea4ae7
  Flags: Nzcv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA Thumb  Segment user
  Control: 70c5383d  Table: 6b8467c0  DAC: dbadc0de
  Process cryptomgr_test (pid: 396, stack limit = 0x69e1fe23)
  Stack: (0xebc8bbe8 to 0xebc8c000)
  ...
  unwind: Unknown symbol address bf820bca
  unwind: Index not found bf820bca
  Code: 441a ea80 40f9 440a (f85e) 3b04
  ---[ end trace e560cce92700ef8a ]---

Given that this affects older kernels as well, in case they are built with a recent toolchain, apply a minimal backportable fix, which is to emit another non-code label at the start of the routine, and reference that instead. (This is similar to the current upstream state of this file in OpenSSL)

---
 arch/arm/crypto/sha256-armv4.pl       | 3 ++-
 arch/arm/crypto/sha256-core.S_shipped | 3 ++-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm/crypto/sha256-armv4.pl +2 -1
index b9ec44060ed3..a03cf4dfb781 100644
@@ -212,10 +212,11 @@ K256:
 .global	sha256_block_data_order
 .type	sha256_block_data_order,%function
 sha256_block_data_order:
+.Lsha256_block_data_order:
 #if __ARM_ARCH__<7
 	sub	r3,pc,#8		@ sha256_block_data_order
 #else
-	adr	r3,sha256_block_data_order
+	adr	r3,.Lsha256_block_data_order
 #endif
 #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 && !defined(__KERNEL__)
 	ldr	r12,.LOPENSSL_armcap
arch/arm/crypto/sha256-core.S_shipped +2 -1
index 3b58300d611c..054aae0edfce 100644
@@ -93,10 +93,11 @@ K256:
 .global	sha256_block_data_order
 .type	sha256_block_data_order,%function
 sha256_block_data_order:
+.Lsha256_block_data_order:
 #if __ARM_ARCH__<7
 	sub	r3,pc,#8		@ sha256_block_data_order
 #else
-	adr	r3,sha256_block_data_order
+	adr	r3,.Lsha256_block_data_order
 #endif
 #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 && !defined(__KERNEL__)
 	ldr	r12,.LOPENSSL_armcap
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#39 lore raw

PATCH 37/57 net: ip6_gre: fix possible NULL pointer dereference in ip6erspan_set_version

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit efcc9bcaf77c07df01371a7c34e50424c291f3ac ]

Fix a possible NULL pointer dereference in ip6erspan_set_version checking nlattr data pointer

kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access

general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 7549 Comm: syz-executor432 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc6-next-20190218
#37
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:ip6erspan_set_version+0x5c/0x350 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:1726
Code: 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 9f 02 00 00 49 8d bc 24 b0 00 00 00 c6 43
54 01 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f
85 9a 02 00 00 4d 8b ac 24 b0 00 00 00 4d 85 ed 0f
RSP: 0018:ffff888089ed7168 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8880869d6e58 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000016 RSI: ffffffff862736b4 RDI: 00000000000000b0
RBP: ffff888089ed7180 R08: 1ffff11010d3adcb R09: ffff8880869d6e58
R10: ffffed1010d3add5 R11: ffff8880869d6eaf R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffff8931f8c0 R14: ffffffff862825d0 R15: ffff8880869d6e58
FS:  0000000000b3d880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000184 CR3: 0000000092cc5000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
  ip6erspan_newlink+0x66/0x7b0 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:2210
  __rtnl_newlink+0x107b/0x16c0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3176
  rtnl_newlink+0x69/0xa0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3234
  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x465/0xb00 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5192
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x17a/0x460 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2485
  rtnetlink_rcv+0x1d/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5210
  netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
  netlink_unicast+0x536/0x720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
  netlink_sendmsg+0x8ae/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1925
  sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
  sock_sendmsg+0xdd/0x130 net/socket.c:631
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x806/0x930 net/socket.c:2136
  __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2174
  __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2183 [inline]
  __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2181 [inline]
  __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2181
  do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x440159
Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7

48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fb 13 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fffa69156e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 0000000000440159
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020001340 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00000000004002c8
R10: 0000000000000011 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004019e0
R13: 0000000000401a70 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 09f8a7d13b4faaa1 ]---
RIP: 0010:ip6erspan_set_version+0x5c/0x350 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:1726
Code: 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 9f 02 00 00 49 8d bc 24 b0 00 00 00 c6 43
54 01 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f
85 9a 02 00 00 4d 8b ac 24 b0 00 00 00 4d 85 ed 0f
RSP: 0018:ffff888089ed7168 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8880869d6e58 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000016 RSI: ffffffff862736b4 RDI: 00000000000000b0
RBP: ffff888089ed7180 R08: 1ffff11010d3adcb R09: ffff8880869d6e58
R10: ffffed1010d3add5 R11: ffff8880869d6eaf R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffff8931f8c0 R14: ffffffff862825d0 R15: ffff8880869d6e58
FS:  0000000000b3d880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000184 CR3: 0000000092cc5000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Fixes 4974d5f678ab ("net: ip6_gre: initialize erspan_ver just for erspan tunnels")
Reported-and-tested-by [email protected]
---
 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c +3 -0
index faed98dab913..97994698ffbc 100644
@@ -1738,6 +1738,9 @@ static int ip6erspan_tap_validate(struct nlattr *tb[], struct nlattr *data[],
 static void ip6erspan_set_version(struct nlattr *data[],
 				  struct __ip6_tnl_parm *parms)
 {
+	if (!data)
+		return;
+
 	parms->erspan_ver = 1;
 	if (data[IFLA_GRE_ERSPAN_VER])
 		parms->erspan_ver = nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_GRE_ERSPAN_VER]);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#46 lore raw

PATCH 42/57 ext4: prohibit fstrim in norecovery mode

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: "Darrick J. Wong" <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 18915b5873f07e5030e6fb108a050fa7c71c59fb ]

The ext4 fstrim implementation uses the block bitmaps to find free space that can be discarded. If we haven't replayed the journal, the bitmaps will be stale and we absolutely *cannot* use stale metadata to zap the underlying storage.

---
 fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
fs/ext4/ioctl.c +7 -0
index 2e76fb55d94a..5f24fdc140ad 100644
@@ -999,6 +999,13 @@ long ext4_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 		if (!blk_queue_discard(q))
 			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
+		/*
+		 * We haven't replayed the journal, so we cannot use our
+		 * block-bitmap-guided storage zapping commands.
+		 */
+		if (test_opt(sb, NOLOAD) && ext4_has_feature_journal(sb))
+			return -EROFS;
+
 		if (copy_from_user(&range, (struct fstrim_range __user *)arg,
 		    sizeof(range)))
 			return -EFAULT;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#47 lore raw

PATCH 43/57 lkdtm: Print real addresses

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4c411157a42f122051ae3469bee0b5cabe89e139 ]

Today, when doing a lkdtm test before the readiness of the random generator, (ptrval) is printed instead of the address at which it perform the fault:

[ 1597.337030] lkdtm: Performing direct entry EXEC_USERSPACE
[ 1597.337142] lkdtm: attempting ok execution at (ptrval)
[ 1597.337398] lkdtm: attempting bad execution at (ptrval)
[ 1597.337460] kernel tried to execute user page (77858000) -exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
[ 1597.344769] Unable to handle kernel paging request for instruction fetch
[ 1597.351392] Faulting instruction address: 0x77858000
[ 1597.356312] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]

If the lkdtm test is done later on, it prints an hashed address.

In both cases this is pointless. The purpose of the test is to ensure the kernel generates an Oops at the expected address, so real addresses needs to be printed. This patch fixes that.

---
 drivers/misc/lkdtm/perms.c | 18 +++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/misc/lkdtm/perms.c +9 -9
index 53b85c9d16b8..fa54add6375a 100644
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static noinline void execute_location(void *dst, bool write)
 {
 	void (*func)(void) = dst;
 
-	pr_info("attempting ok execution at %p\n", do_nothing);
+	pr_info("attempting ok execution at %px\n", do_nothing);
 	do_nothing();
 
 	if (write == CODE_WRITE) {
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static noinline void execute_location(void *dst, bool write)
 		flush_icache_range((unsigned long)dst,
 				   (unsigned long)dst + EXEC_SIZE);
 	}
-	pr_info("attempting bad execution at %p\n", func);
+	pr_info("attempting bad execution at %px\n", func);
 	func();
 }
 
@@ -66,14 +66,14 @@ static void execute_user_location(void *dst)
 	/* Intentionally crossing kernel/user memory boundary. */
 	void (*func)(void) = dst;
 
-	pr_info("attempting ok execution at %p\n", do_nothing);
+	pr_info("attempting ok execution at %px\n", do_nothing);
 	do_nothing();
 
 	copied = access_process_vm(current, (unsigned long)dst, do_nothing,
 				   EXEC_SIZE, FOLL_WRITE);
 	if (copied < EXEC_SIZE)
 		return;
-	pr_info("attempting bad execution at %p\n", func);
+	pr_info("attempting bad execution at %px\n", func);
 	func();
 }
 
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ void lkdtm_WRITE_RO(void)
 	/* Explicitly cast away "const" for the test. */
 	unsigned long *ptr = (unsigned long *)&rodata;
 
-	pr_info("attempting bad rodata write at %p\n", ptr);
+	pr_info("attempting bad rodata write at %px\n", ptr);
 	*ptr ^= 0xabcd1234;
 }
 
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ void lkdtm_WRITE_RO_AFTER_INIT(void)
 		return;
 	}
 
-	pr_info("attempting bad ro_after_init write at %p\n", ptr);
+	pr_info("attempting bad ro_after_init write at %px\n", ptr);
 	*ptr ^= 0xabcd1234;
 }
 
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ void lkdtm_WRITE_KERN(void)
 	size = (unsigned long)do_overwritten - (unsigned long)do_nothing;
 	ptr = (unsigned char *)do_overwritten;
 
-	pr_info("attempting bad %zu byte write at %p\n", size, ptr);
+	pr_info("attempting bad %zu byte write at %px\n", size, ptr);
 	memcpy(ptr, (unsigned char *)do_nothing, size);
 	flush_icache_range((unsigned long)ptr, (unsigned long)(ptr + size));
 
@@ -185,11 +185,11 @@ void lkdtm_ACCESS_USERSPACE(void)
 
 	ptr = (unsigned long *)user_addr;
 
-	pr_info("attempting bad read at %p\n", ptr);
+	pr_info("attempting bad read at %px\n", ptr);
 	tmp = *ptr;
 	tmp += 0xc0dec0de;
 
-	pr_info("attempting bad write at %p\n", ptr);
+	pr_info("attempting bad write at %px\n", ptr);
 	*ptr = tmp;
 
 	vm_munmap(user_addr, PAGE_SIZE);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#48 lore raw

PATCH 44/57 lkdtm: Add tests for NULL pointer dereference

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 59a12205d3c32aee4c13ca36889fdf7cfed31126 ]

Introduce lkdtm tests for NULL pointer dereference: check access or exec at NULL address, since these errors tend to be reported differently from the general fault error text. For example from x86:

pr_alert("BUG: unable to handle kernel %s at %px\n",
address < PAGE_SIZE ? "NULL pointer dereference" : "paging request", (void *)address);

---
 drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c  |  2 ++
 drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h |  2 ++
 drivers/misc/lkdtm/perms.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c +2 -0
index 2154d1bfd18b..07caaa2cfe1e 100644
@@ -152,7 +152,9 @@ static const struct crashtype crashtypes[] = {
 	CRASHTYPE(EXEC_VMALLOC),
 	CRASHTYPE(EXEC_RODATA),
 	CRASHTYPE(EXEC_USERSPACE),
+	CRASHTYPE(EXEC_NULL),
 	CRASHTYPE(ACCESS_USERSPACE),
+	CRASHTYPE(ACCESS_NULL),
 	CRASHTYPE(WRITE_RO),
 	CRASHTYPE(WRITE_RO_AFTER_INIT),
 	CRASHTYPE(WRITE_KERN),
drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h +2 -0
index 9e513dcfd809..8c3f2e6af256 100644
@@ -45,7 +45,9 @@ void lkdtm_EXEC_KMALLOC(void);
 void lkdtm_EXEC_VMALLOC(void);
 void lkdtm_EXEC_RODATA(void);
 void lkdtm_EXEC_USERSPACE(void);
+void lkdtm_EXEC_NULL(void);
 void lkdtm_ACCESS_USERSPACE(void);
+void lkdtm_ACCESS_NULL(void);
 
 /* lkdtm_refcount.c */
 void lkdtm_REFCOUNT_INC_OVERFLOW(void);
drivers/misc/lkdtm/perms.c +18 -0
index fa54add6375a..62f76d506f04 100644
@@ -164,6 +164,11 @@ void lkdtm_EXEC_USERSPACE(void)
 	vm_munmap(user_addr, PAGE_SIZE);
 }
 
+void lkdtm_EXEC_NULL(void)
+{
+	execute_location(NULL, CODE_AS_IS);
+}
+
 void lkdtm_ACCESS_USERSPACE(void)
 {
 	unsigned long user_addr, tmp = 0;
@@ -195,6 +200,19 @@ void lkdtm_ACCESS_USERSPACE(void)
 	vm_munmap(user_addr, PAGE_SIZE);
 }
 
+void lkdtm_ACCESS_NULL(void)
+{
+	unsigned long tmp;
+	unsigned long *ptr = (unsigned long *)NULL;
+
+	pr_info("attempting bad read at %px\n", ptr);
+	tmp = *ptr;
+	tmp += 0xc0dec0de;
+
+	pr_info("attempting bad write at %px\n", ptr);
+	*ptr = tmp;
+}
+
 void __init lkdtm_perms_init(void)
 {
 	/* Make sure we can write to __ro_after_init values during __init */
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#38 lore raw

PATCH 36/57 crypto: sha512/arm - fix crash bug in Thumb2 build

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c64316502008064c158fa40cc250665e461b0f2a ]

The SHA512 code we adopted from the OpenSSL project uses a rather peculiar way to take the address of the round constant table: it takes the address of the sha256_block_data_order() routine, and substracts a constant known quantity to arrive at the base of the table, which is emitted by the same assembler code right before the routine's entry point.

However, recent versions of binutils have helpfully changed the behavior of references emitted via an ADR instruction when running in Thumb2 mode: it now takes the Thumb execution mode bit into account, which is bit 0 af the address. This means the produced table address also has bit 0 set, and so we end up with an address value pointing 1 byte past the start of the table, which results in crashes such as

  Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address bf825000
  pgd = 42f44b11
  [bf825000] *pgd=80000040206003, *pmd=5f1bd003, *pte=00000000
  Internal error: Oops: 207 [#1] PREEMPT SMP THUMB2
  Modules linked in: sha256_arm(+) sha1_arm_ce sha1_arm ...
  CPU: 7 PID: 396 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 5.0.0-rc6+ #144
  Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  PC is at sha256_block_data_order+0xaaa/0xb30 [sha256_arm]
  LR is at __this_module+0x17fd/0xffffe800 [sha256_arm]
  pc : [<bf820bca>]    lr : [<bf824ffd>]    psr: 800b0033
  sp : ebc8bbe8  ip : faaabe1c  fp : 2fdd3433
  r10: 4c5f1692  r9 : e43037df  r8 : b04b0a5a
  r7 : c369d722  r6 : 39c3693e  r5 : 7a013189  r4 : 1580d26b
  r3 : 8762a9b0  r2 : eea9c2cd  r1 : 3e9ab536  r0 : 1dea4ae7
  Flags: Nzcv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA Thumb  Segment user
  Control: 70c5383d  Table: 6b8467c0  DAC: dbadc0de
  Process cryptomgr_test (pid: 396, stack limit = 0x69e1fe23)
  Stack: (0xebc8bbe8 to 0xebc8c000)
  ...
  unwind: Unknown symbol address bf820bca
  unwind: Index not found bf820bca
  Code: 441a ea80 40f9 440a (f85e) 3b04
  ---[ end trace e560cce92700ef8a ]---

Given that this affects older kernels as well, in case they are built with a recent toolchain, apply a minimal backportable fix, which is to emit another non-code label at the start of the routine, and reference that instead. (This is similar to the current upstream state of this file in OpenSSL)

---
 arch/arm/crypto/sha512-armv4.pl       | 3 ++-
 arch/arm/crypto/sha512-core.S_shipped | 3 ++-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm/crypto/sha512-armv4.pl +2 -1
index fb5d15048c0b..788c17b56ecc 100644
@@ -274,10 +274,11 @@ WORD64(0x5fcb6fab,0x3ad6faec, 0x6c44198c,0x4a475817)
 .global	sha512_block_data_order
 .type	sha512_block_data_order,%function
 sha512_block_data_order:
+.Lsha512_block_data_order:
 #if __ARM_ARCH__<7
 	sub	r3,pc,#8		@ sha512_block_data_order
 #else
-	adr	r3,sha512_block_data_order
+	adr	r3,.Lsha512_block_data_order
 #endif
 #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 && !defined(__KERNEL__)
 	ldr	r12,.LOPENSSL_armcap
arch/arm/crypto/sha512-core.S_shipped +2 -1
index b1c334a49cda..710ea309769e 100644
@@ -141,10 +141,11 @@ WORD64(0x5fcb6fab,0x3ad6faec, 0x6c44198c,0x4a475817)
 .global	sha512_block_data_order
 .type	sha512_block_data_order,%function
 sha512_block_data_order:
+.Lsha512_block_data_order:
 #if __ARM_ARCH__<7
 	sub	r3,pc,#8		@ sha512_block_data_order
 #else
-	adr	r3,sha512_block_data_order
+	adr	r3,.Lsha512_block_data_order
 #endif
 #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 && !defined(__KERNEL__)
 	ldr	r12,.LOPENSSL_armcap
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#36 lore raw

PATCH 34/57 xfrm: destroy xfrm_state synchronously on net exit path

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f75a2804da391571563c4b6b29e7797787332673 ]

xfrm_state_put() moves struct xfrm_state to the GC list and schedules the GC work to clean it up. On net exit call path, xfrm_state_flush() is called to clean up and xfrm_flush_gc() is called to wait for the GC work to complete before exit.

However, this doesn't work because one of the ->destructor(), ipcomp_destroy(), schedules the same GC work again inside the GC work. It is hard to wait for such a nested async callback. This is also why syzbot still reports the following warning:

 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 33 at net/ipv6/xfrm6_tunnel.c:351 xfrm6_tunnel_net_exit+0x2cb/0x500 net/ipv6/xfrm6_tunnel.c:351
 ...
  ops_exit_list.isra.0+0xb0/0x160 net/core/net_namespace.c:153
  cleanup_net+0x51d/0xb10 net/core/net_namespace.c:551
  process_one_work+0xd0c/0x1ce0 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
  worker_thread+0x143/0x14a0 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
  kthread+0x357/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:246
  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352

In fact, it is perfectly fine to bypass GC and destroy xfrm_state synchronously on net exit call path, because it is in process context and doesn't need a work struct to do any blocking work.

This patch introduces xfrm_state_put_sync() which simply bypasses GC, and lets its callers to decide whether to use this synchronous version. On net exit path, xfrm_state_fini() and xfrm6_tunnel_net_exit() use it. And, as ipcomp_destroy() itself is blocking, it can use xfrm_state_put_sync() directly too.

Also rename xfrm_state_gc_destroy() to ___xfrm_state_destroy() to reflect this change.

Fixes b48c05ab5d32 ("xfrm: Fix warning in xfrm6_tunnel_net_exit.")
Reported-and-tested-by [email protected]
Cc Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
---
 include/net/xfrm.h      | 12 +++++++++---
 net/ipv6/xfrm6_tunnel.c |  2 +-
 net/key/af_key.c        |  2 +-
 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c   | 30 +++++++++++++++++++-----------
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c    |  2 +-
 5 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
include/net/xfrm.h +9 -3
index da588def3c61..5e3daf53b3d1 100644
@@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ static inline void xfrm_pols_put(struct xfrm_policy **pols, int npols)
 		xfrm_pol_put(pols[i]);
 }
 
-void __xfrm_state_destroy(struct xfrm_state *);
+void __xfrm_state_destroy(struct xfrm_state *, bool);
 
 static inline void __xfrm_state_put(struct xfrm_state *x)
 {
@@ -860,7 +860,13 @@ static inline void __xfrm_state_put(struct xfrm_state *x)
 static inline void xfrm_state_put(struct xfrm_state *x)
 {
 	if (refcount_dec_and_test(&x->refcnt))
-		__xfrm_state_destroy(x);
+		__xfrm_state_destroy(x, false);
+}
+
+static inline void xfrm_state_put_sync(struct xfrm_state *x)
+{
+	if (refcount_dec_and_test(&x->refcnt))
+		__xfrm_state_destroy(x, true);
 }
 
 static inline void xfrm_state_hold(struct xfrm_state *x)
@@ -1616,7 +1622,7 @@ struct xfrmk_spdinfo {
 
 struct xfrm_state *xfrm_find_acq_byseq(struct net *net, u32 mark, u32 seq);
 int xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x);
-int xfrm_state_flush(struct net *net, u8 proto, bool task_valid);
+int xfrm_state_flush(struct net *net, u8 proto, bool task_valid, bool sync);
 int xfrm_dev_state_flush(struct net *net, struct net_device *dev, bool task_valid);
 void xfrm_sad_getinfo(struct net *net, struct xfrmk_sadinfo *si);
 void xfrm_spd_getinfo(struct net *net, struct xfrmk_spdinfo *si);
net/ipv6/xfrm6_tunnel.c +1 -1
index f5b4febeaa25..bc65db782bfb 100644
@@ -344,8 +344,8 @@ static void __net_exit xfrm6_tunnel_net_exit(struct net *net)
 	struct xfrm6_tunnel_net *xfrm6_tn = xfrm6_tunnel_pernet(net);
 	unsigned int i;
 
-	xfrm_state_flush(net, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY, false);
 	xfrm_flush_gc();
+	xfrm_state_flush(net, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY, false, true);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < XFRM6_TUNNEL_SPI_BYADDR_HSIZE; i++)
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(!hlist_empty(&xfrm6_tn->spi_byaddr[i]));
net/key/af_key.c +1 -1
index 7da629d59717..7d4bed955060 100644
@@ -1773,7 +1773,7 @@ static int pfkey_flush(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sadb_m
 	if (proto == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	err = xfrm_state_flush(net, proto, true);
+	err = xfrm_state_flush(net, proto, true, false);
 	err2 = unicast_flush_resp(sk, hdr);
 	if (err || err2) {
 		if (err == -ESRCH) /* empty table - go quietly */
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +19 -11
index cc0203efb584..3f729cd512af 100644
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ void xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_state_free);
 
-static void xfrm_state_gc_destroy(struct xfrm_state *x)
+static void ___xfrm_state_destroy(struct xfrm_state *x)
 {
 	tasklet_hrtimer_cancel(&x->mtimer);
 	del_timer_sync(&x->rtimer);
@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ static void xfrm_state_gc_task(struct work_struct *work)
 	synchronize_rcu();
 
 	hlist_for_each_entry_safe(x, tmp, &gc_list, gclist)
-		xfrm_state_gc_destroy(x);
+		___xfrm_state_destroy(x);
 }
 
 static enum hrtimer_restart xfrm_timer_handler(struct hrtimer *me)
@@ -598,14 +598,19 @@ struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_alloc(struct net *net)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_state_alloc);
 
-void __xfrm_state_destroy(struct xfrm_state *x)
+void __xfrm_state_destroy(struct xfrm_state *x, bool sync)
 {
 	WARN_ON(x->km.state != XFRM_STATE_DEAD);
 
-	spin_lock_bh(&xfrm_state_gc_lock);
-	hlist_add_head(&x->gclist, &xfrm_state_gc_list);
-	spin_unlock_bh(&xfrm_state_gc_lock);
-	schedule_work(&xfrm_state_gc_work);
+	if (sync) {
+		synchronize_rcu();
+		___xfrm_state_destroy(x);
+	} else {
+		spin_lock_bh(&xfrm_state_gc_lock);
+		hlist_add_head(&x->gclist, &xfrm_state_gc_list);
+		spin_unlock_bh(&xfrm_state_gc_lock);
+		schedule_work(&xfrm_state_gc_work);
+	}
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__xfrm_state_destroy);
 
@@ -708,7 +713,7 @@ xfrm_dev_state_flush_secctx_check(struct net *net, struct net_device *dev, bool
 }
 #endif
 
-int xfrm_state_flush(struct net *net, u8 proto, bool task_valid)
+int xfrm_state_flush(struct net *net, u8 proto, bool task_valid, bool sync)
 {
 	int i, err = 0, cnt = 0;
 
@@ -730,7 +735,10 @@ int xfrm_state_flush(struct net *net, u8 proto, bool task_valid)
 				err = xfrm_state_delete(x);
 				xfrm_audit_state_delete(x, err ? 0 : 1,
 							task_valid);
-				xfrm_state_put(x);
+				if (sync)
+					xfrm_state_put_sync(x);
+				else
+					xfrm_state_put(x);
 				if (!err)
 					cnt++;
 
@@ -2217,7 +2225,7 @@ void xfrm_state_delete_tunnel(struct xfrm_state *x)
 		if (atomic_read(&t->tunnel_users) == 2)
 			xfrm_state_delete(t);
 		atomic_dec(&t->tunnel_users);
-		xfrm_state_put(t);
+		xfrm_state_put_sync(t);
 		x->tunnel = NULL;
 	}
 }
@@ -2377,8 +2385,8 @@ void xfrm_state_fini(struct net *net)
 	unsigned int sz;
 
 	flush_work(&net->xfrm.state_hash_work);
-	xfrm_state_flush(net, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY, false);
 	flush_work(&xfrm_state_gc_work);
+	xfrm_state_flush(net, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY, false, true);
 
 	WARN_ON(!list_empty(&net->xfrm.state_all));
 
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +1 -1
index ab557827aac0..7e4904b93004 100644
@@ -1932,7 +1932,7 @@ static int xfrm_flush_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
 	struct xfrm_usersa_flush *p = nlmsg_data(nlh);
 	int err;
 
-	err = xfrm_state_flush(net, p->proto, true);
+	err = xfrm_state_flush(net, p->proto, true, false);
 	if (err) {
 		if (err == -ESRCH) /* empty table */
 			return 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#30 lore raw

PATCH 30/57 ALSA: hda: fix front speakers on Huawei MBXP

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ayman Bagabas <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8ac51bbc4cfec4ef08b03bef24b31e2d50ef8b37 ]

This patch solves bug 200501 'Only 2 of 4 speakers playing sound.' It enables the front speakers on Huawei Matebook X Pro laptops. These laptops come with Dolby Atmos sound system and these pins configuration enables the front speakers.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200501

---
 sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +18 -0
index 877293149e3a..61d91b2f3994 100644
@@ -5602,6 +5602,7 @@ enum {
 	ALC298_FIXUP_TPT470_DOCK,
 	ALC255_FIXUP_DUMMY_LINEOUT_VERB,
 	ALC255_FIXUP_DELL_HEADSET_MIC,
+	ALC256_FIXUP_HUAWEI_MBXP_PINS,
 	ALC295_FIXUP_HP_X360,
 	ALC221_FIXUP_HP_HEADSET_MIC,
 	ALC285_FIXUP_LENOVO_HEADPHONE_NOISE,
@@ -5884,6 +5885,22 @@ static const struct hda_fixup alc269_fixups[] = {
 		.chained = true,
 		.chain_id = ALC269_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC
 	},
+	[ALC256_FIXUP_HUAWEI_MBXP_PINS] = {
+		.type = HDA_FIXUP_PINS,
+		.v.pins = (const struct hda_pintbl[]) {
+			{0x12, 0x90a60130},
+			{0x13, 0x40000000},
+			{0x14, 0x90170110},
+			{0x18, 0x411111f0},
+			{0x19, 0x04a11040},
+			{0x1a, 0x411111f0},
+			{0x1b, 0x90170112},
+			{0x1d, 0x40759a05},
+			{0x1e, 0x411111f0},
+			{0x21, 0x04211020},
+			{ }
+		},
+	},
 	[ALC269_FIXUP_ASUS_X101_FUNC] = {
 		.type = HDA_FIXUP_FUNC,
 		.v.func = alc269_fixup_x101_headset_mic,
@@ -6812,6 +6829,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269_fixup_tbl[] = {
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x511f, "Thinkpad", ALC298_FIXUP_TPT470_DOCK),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x3bf8, "Quanta FL1", ALC269_FIXUP_PCM_44K),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x9e54, "LENOVO NB", ALC269_FIXUP_LENOVO_EAPD),
+	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x19e5, 0x3204, "Huawei MBXP", ALC256_FIXUP_HUAWEI_MBXP_PINS),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1b7d, 0xa831, "Ordissimo EVE2 ", ALC269VB_FIXUP_ORDISSIMO_EVE2), /* Also known as Malata PC-B1303 */
 
 #if 0
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#21 lore raw

PATCH 22/57 netfilter: nf_flow_table: remove flowtable hook flush routine in netns exit routine

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b7f1a16d29b2e28d3dcbb070511bd703e306281b ]

When device is unregistered, flowtable flush routine is called by notifier_call(nf_tables_flowtable_event). and exit callback of nftables pernet_operation(nf_tables_exit_net) also has flowtable flush routine. but when network namespace is destroyed, both notifier_call and pernet_operation are called. hence flowtable flush routine in pernet_operation is unnecessary.

test commands:
%ip netns add vm1
%ip netns exec vm1 nft add table ip filter %ip netns exec vm1 nft add flowtable ip filter w \

	{ hook ingress priority 0\; devices = { lo }\; }

%ip netns del vm1

splat looks like:

[  265.187019] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 87 at net/netfilter/core.c:309 nf_hook_entry_head+0xc7/0xf0
[  265.187112] Modules linked in: nf_flow_table_ipv4 nf_flow_table nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables nfnetlink ip_tables x_tables
[  265.187390] CPU: 0 PID: 87 Comm: kworker/u4:2 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc3+ #5
[  265.187453] Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
[  265.187514] RIP: 0010:nf_hook_entry_head+0xc7/0xf0
[  265.187546] Code: 8d 81 68 03 00 00 5b c3 89 d0 83 fa 04 48 8d 84 c7 e8 11 00 00 76 81 0f 0b 31 c0 e9 78 ff ff ff 0f 0b 48 83 c4 08 31 c0 5b c3 <0f> 0b 31 c0 e9 65 ff ff ff 0f 0b 31 c0 e9 5c ff ff ff 48 89 0c 24
[  265.187573] RSP: 0018:ffff88011546f098 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  265.187624] RAX: ffffffff8d90e135 RBX: 1ffff10022a8de1c RCX: 0000000000000000
[  265.187645] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: ffff880116298040
[  265.187645] RBP: ffff88010ea4c1a8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[  265.187645] R10: ffff88011546f1d8 R11: ffffed0022c532c1 R12: ffff88010ea4c1d0
[  265.187645] R13: 0000000000000005 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff88010ea4c1c4
[  265.187645] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88011b200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  265.187645] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  265.187645] CR2: 00007fdfb8d00000 CR3: 0000000057a16000 CR4: 00000000001006f0
[  265.187645] Call Trace:
[  265.187645]  __nf_unregister_net_hook+0xca/0x5d0
[  265.187645]  ? nf_hook_entries_free.part.3+0x80/0x80
[  265.187645]  ? save_trace+0x300/0x300
[  265.187645]  nf_unregister_net_hooks+0x2e/0x40
[  265.187645]  nf_tables_exit_net+0x479/0x1340 [nf_tables]
[  265.187645]  ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1c0
[  265.187645]  ? nf_tables_abort+0x30/0x30 [nf_tables]
[  265.187645]  ? inet_frag_destroy_rcu+0xd0/0xd0
[  265.187645]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x93/0x210
[  265.187645]  ? __bpf_trace_preemptirq_template+0x10/0x10
[  265.187645]  ? inet_frag_destroy_rcu+0xd0/0xd0
[  265.187645]  ? inet_frag_destroy_rcu+0xd0/0xd0
[  265.187645]  ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x17f/0x740
[  265.187645]  ? wait_for_completion+0x710/0x710
[  265.187645]  ? bucket_table_free+0xb2/0x1f0
[  265.187645]  ? nested_table_free+0x130/0x130
[  265.187645]  ? __lock_is_held+0xb4/0x140
[  265.187645]  ops_exit_list.isra.10+0x94/0x140
[  265.187645]  cleanup_net+0x45b/0x900

[ ... ]

This WARNING means that hook unregisteration is failed because all flowtables hooks are already unregistered by notifier_call.

Network namespace exit routine guarantees that all devices will be unregistered first. then, other exit callbacks of pernet_operations are called. so that removing flowtable flush routine in exit callback of pernet_operation(nf_tables_exit_net) doesn't make flowtable leak.

---
 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 3 ---
 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +0 -3
index 7d424fd27025..c06393fc716d 100644
@@ -7203,9 +7203,6 @@ static void __nft_release_tables(struct net *net)
 
 		list_for_each_entry(chain, &table->chains, list)
 			nf_tables_unregister_hook(net, table, chain);
-		list_for_each_entry(flowtable, &table->flowtables, list)
-			nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, flowtable->ops,
-						flowtable->ops_len);
 		/* No packets are walking on these chains anymore. */
 		ctx.table = table;
 		list_for_each_entry(chain, &table->chains, list) {
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#16 lore raw

PATCH 17/57 usbip: fix vhci_hcd controller counting

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Maciej Żenczykowski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e0a2e73e501c77037c8756137e87b12c7c3c9793 ]

Without this usbip fails on a machine with devices that lexicographically come after vhci_hcd.

ie.

  $ ls -l /sys/devices/platform
  ...
  drwxr-xr-x. 4 root root    0 Sep 19 16:21 serial8250
  -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 4096 Sep 19 23:50 uevent
  drwxr-xr-x. 6 root root    0 Sep 20 13:15 vhci_hcd.0
  drwxr-xr-x. 4 root root    0 Sep 19 16:22 w83627hf.656

Because it detects 'w83627hf.656' as another vhci_hcd controller, and then fails to be able to talk to it.

Note: this doesn't actually fix usbip's support for multiple controllers... that's still broken for other reasons ("vhci_hcd.0" is hardcoded in a string macro), but is enough to actually make it work on the above machine.

See also:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1631148

---
 tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/vhci_driver.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/vhci_driver.c +1 -1
index 4204359c9fee..8159fd98680b 100644
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static int get_nports(struct udev_device *hc_device)
 
 static int vhci_hcd_filter(const struct dirent *dirent)
 {
-	return strcmp(dirent->d_name, "vhci_hcd") >= 0;
+	return !strncmp(dirent->d_name, "vhci_hcd.", 9);
 }
 
 static int get_ncontrollers(void)
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH 9/57 netfilter: xt_cgroup: shrink size of v2 path

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0d704967f4a49cc2212350b3e4a8231f8b4283ed ]

cgroup v2 path field is PATH_MAX which is too large, this is placing too much pressure on memory allocation for people with many rules doing cgroup v1 classid matching, side effects of this are bug reports like:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200639

This patch registers a new revision that shrinks the cgroup path to 512 bytes, which is the same approach we follow in similar extensions that have a path field.

---
 include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_cgroup.h | 16 ++++++
 net/netfilter/xt_cgroup.c                | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 88 insertions(+)
include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_cgroup.h +16 -0
index e96dfa1b34f7..b74e370d6133 100644
@@ -22,4 +22,20 @@ struct xt_cgroup_info_v1 {
 	void		*priv __attribute__((aligned(8)));
 };
 
+#define XT_CGROUP_PATH_MAX	512
+
+struct xt_cgroup_info_v2 {
+	__u8		has_path;
+	__u8		has_classid;
+	__u8		invert_path;
+	__u8		invert_classid;
+	union {
+		char	path[XT_CGROUP_PATH_MAX];
+		__u32	classid;
+	};
+
+	/* kernel internal data */
+	void		*priv __attribute__((aligned(8)));
+};
+
 #endif /* _UAPI_XT_CGROUP_H */
net/netfilter/xt_cgroup.c +72 -0

96 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH 7/57 ASoC: Fix UBSAN warning at snd_soc_get/put_volsw_sx()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Rohit kumar <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ae7d1247d8673ebfd686b17e759d4be391165368 ]

In functions snd_soc_get_volsw_sx() or snd_soc_put_volsw_sx(), if the result of (min + max) is negative, then fls() returns signed integer with value as 32. This leads to signed integer overflow as complete operation is considered as signed integer.

UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in sound/soc/soc-ops.c:382:50
signed integer overflow:
-2147483648 - 1 cannot be represented in type 'int'
Call trace:
[<ffffff852f746fe4>] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline]
[<ffffff852f746fe4>] dump_stack+0xec/0x158 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[<ffffff852f7b5f3c>] ubsan_epilogue+0x18/0x50 lib/ubsan.c:164
[<ffffff852f7b6840>] handle_overflow+0xf8/0x130 lib/ubsan.c:195
[<ffffff852f7b68f0>] __ubsan_handle_sub_overflow+0x34/0x44 lib/ubsan.c:211
[<ffffff85307971a0>] snd_soc_get_volsw_sx+0x1a8/0x1f8 sound/soc/soc-ops.c:382

Typecast the operation to unsigned int to fix the issue.

---
 sound/soc/soc-ops.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
sound/soc/soc-ops.c +2 -2
index 592efb370c44..f4dc3d445aae 100644
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ int snd_soc_get_volsw_sx(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,
 	unsigned int rshift = mc->rshift;
 	int max = mc->max;
 	int min = mc->min;
-	unsigned int mask = (1 << (fls(min + max) - 1)) - 1;
+	unsigned int mask = (1U << (fls(min + max) - 1)) - 1;
 	unsigned int val;
 	int ret;
 
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ int snd_soc_put_volsw_sx(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,
 	unsigned int rshift = mc->rshift;
 	int max = mc->max;
 	int min = mc->min;
-	unsigned int mask = (1 << (fls(min + max) - 1)) - 1;
+	unsigned int mask = (1U << (fls(min + max) - 1)) - 1;
 	int err = 0;
 	unsigned int val, val_mask, val2 = 0;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 6/57 9p locks: add mount option for lock retry interval

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Dinu-Razvan Chis-Serban <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5e172f75e51e3de1b4274146d9b990f803cb5c2a ]

The default P9_LOCK_TIMEOUT can be too long for some users exporting a local file system to a guest VM (30s), make this configurable at mount time.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=195727

---
 fs/9p/v9fs.c     | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/9p/v9fs.h     |  1 +
 fs/9p/vfs_file.c |  6 +++++-
 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/9p/v9fs.c +21 -0
index 89bac3d2f05b..619128b55837 100644
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ enum {
 	Opt_cache_loose, Opt_fscache, Opt_mmap,
 	/* Access options */
 	Opt_access, Opt_posixacl,
+	/* Lock timeout option */
+	Opt_locktimeout,
 	/* Error token */
 	Opt_err
 };
@@ -80,6 +82,7 @@ static const match_table_t tokens = {
 	{Opt_cachetag, "cachetag=%s"},
 	{Opt_access, "access=%s"},
 	{Opt_posixacl, "posixacl"},
+	{Opt_locktimeout, "locktimeout=%u"},
 	{Opt_err, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -187,6 +190,7 @@ static int v9fs_parse_options(struct v9fs_session_info *v9ses, char *opts)
 #ifdef CONFIG_9P_FSCACHE
 	v9ses->cachetag = NULL;
 #endif
+	v9ses->session_lock_timeout = P9_LOCK_TIMEOUT;
 
 	if (!opts)
 		return 0;
@@ -359,6 +363,23 @@ static int v9fs_parse_options(struct v9fs_session_info *v9ses, char *opts)
 #endif
 			break;
 
+		case Opt_locktimeout:
+			r = match_int(&args[0], &option);
+			if (r < 0) {
+				p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_ERROR,
+					 "integer field, but no integer?\n");
+				ret = r;
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (option < 1) {
+				p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_ERROR,
+					 "locktimeout must be a greater than zero integer.\n");
+				ret = -EINVAL;
+				continue;
+			}
+			v9ses->session_lock_timeout = (long)option * HZ;
+			break;
+
 		default:
 			continue;
 		}
fs/9p/v9fs.h +1 -0
index 982e017acadb..129e5243a6bf 100644
@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ struct v9fs_session_info {
 	struct p9_client *clnt;	/* 9p client */
 	struct list_head slist; /* list of sessions registered with v9fs */
 	struct rw_semaphore rename_sem;
+	long session_lock_timeout; /* retry interval for blocking locks */
 };
 
 /* cache_validity flags */
fs/9p/vfs_file.c +5 -1
index c87e6d6ec069..05454a7e22dc 100644
@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ static int v9fs_file_do_lock(struct file *filp, int cmd, struct file_lock *fl)
 	uint8_t status = P9_LOCK_ERROR;
 	int res = 0;
 	unsigned char fl_type;
+	struct v9fs_session_info *v9ses;
 
 	fid = filp->private_data;
 	BUG_ON(fid == NULL);
@@ -189,6 +190,8 @@ static int v9fs_file_do_lock(struct file *filp, int cmd, struct file_lock *fl)
 	if (IS_SETLKW(cmd))
 		flock.flags = P9_LOCK_FLAGS_BLOCK;
 
+	v9ses = v9fs_inode2v9ses(file_inode(filp));
+
 	/*
 	 * if its a blocked request and we get P9_LOCK_BLOCKED as the status
 	 * for lock request, keep on trying
@@ -202,7 +205,8 @@ static int v9fs_file_do_lock(struct file *filp, int cmd, struct file_lock *fl)
 			break;
 		if (status == P9_LOCK_BLOCKED && !IS_SETLKW(cmd))
 			break;
-		if (schedule_timeout_interruptible(P9_LOCK_TIMEOUT) != 0)
+		if (schedule_timeout_interruptible(v9ses->session_lock_timeout)
+				!= 0)
 			break;
 		/*
 		 * p9_client_lock_dotl overwrites flock.client_id with the
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 3/57 rsi: improve kernel thread handling to fix kernel panic

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Siva Rebbagondla <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4c62764d0fc21a34ffc44eec1210038c3a2e4473 ]

While running regressions, observed below kernel panic when sdio disconnect called. This is because of, kthread_stop() is taking care of wait_for_completion() by default. When wait_for_completion triggered in kthread_stop and as it was done already, giving kernel panic. Hence, removing redundant wait_for_completion() from rsi_kill_thread().

... skipping ...

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
IP: [<ffffffff810a63df>] exit_creds+0x1f/0x50
PGD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
CPU: 0 PID: 6502 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G  OE   4.15.9-Generic #154-Ubuntu
Hardware name: Dell Inc. Edge Gateway 3003/ , BIOS 01.00.00 04/17/2017
Stack:
ffff88007392e600 ffff880075847dc0 ffffffff8108160a 0000000000000000
ffff88007392e600 ffff880075847de8 ffffffff810a484b ffff880076127000
ffff88003cd3a800 ffff880074f12a00 ffff880075847e28 ffffffffc09bed15
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8108160a>] __put_task_struct+0x5a/0x140
[<ffffffff810a484b>] kthread_stop+0x10b/0x110
[<ffffffffc09bed15>] rsi_disconnect+0x2f5/0x300 [ven_rsi_sdio]
[<ffffffff81578bcb>] ? __pm_runtime_resume+0x5b/0x80
[<ffffffff816f0918>] sdio_bus_remove+0x38/0x100
[<ffffffff8156cc64>] __device_release_driver+0xa4/0x150
[<ffffffff8156d7a5>] driver_detach+0xb5/0xc0
[<ffffffff8156c6c5>] bus_remove_driver+0x55/0xd0
[<ffffffff8156dfbc>] driver_unregister+0x2c/0x50
[<ffffffff816f0b8a>] sdio_unregister_driver+0x1a/0x20
[<ffffffffc09bf0f5>] rsi_module_exit+0x15/0x30 [ven_rsi_sdio]
[<ffffffff8110cad8>] SyS_delete_module+0x1b8/0x210
[<ffffffff81851dc8>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1c/0xbb
---
 drivers/net/wireless/rsi/rsi_common.h | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/rsi/rsi_common.h +0 -1
index d9ff3b8be86e..60f1f286b030 100644
@@ -75,7 +75,6 @@ static inline int rsi_kill_thread(struct rsi_thread *handle)
 	atomic_inc(&handle->thread_done);
 	rsi_set_event(&handle->event);
 
-	wait_for_completion(&handle->completion);
 	return kthread_stop(handle->task);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
#34 lore raw

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 33/57] blk-mq: protect debugfs_create_files() from failures

In reply to Sasha Levin
Quoted 35 lines · Sasha Levin

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 36991ca68db9dd43bac7f3519f080ee3939263ef ]

If debugfs were to return a non-NULL error for a debugfs call, using that pointer later in debugfs_create_files() would crash.

Fix that by properly checking the pointer before referencing it.

---
 block/blk-mq-debugfs.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
block/blk-mq-debugfs.c +3 -0
index cb1e6cf7ac48..9dc3a0896462 100644
@@ -806,6 +806,9 @@ static const struct blk_mq_debugfs_attr blk_mq_debugfs_ctx_attrs[] = {
 static bool debugfs_create_files(struct dentry *parent, void *data,
 				 const struct blk_mq_debugfs_attr *attr)
 {
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(parent))
+		return false;
+
 	d_inode(parent)->i_private = data;
 
 	for (; attr->name; attr++) {
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1

This was a 5.0-only thing, no need for it to be backported anywhere. Please drop it from all of your trees.

thanks,

greg k-h

#43 lore raw

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 40/57] kvm: properly check debugfs dentry before using it

In reply to Sasha Levin
Quoted 41 lines · Sasha Levin

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8ed0579c12b2fe56a1fac2f712f58fc26c1dc49b ]

debugfs can now report an error code if something went wrong instead of just NULL. So if the return value is to be used as a "real" dentry, it needs to be checked if it is an error before dereferencing it.

This is now happening because of ff9fb72bc077 ("debugfs: return error values, not NULL"). syzbot has found a way to trigger multiple debugfs files attempting to be created, which fails, and then the error code gets passed to dentry_path_raw() which obviously does not like it.

---
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +1 -1
index c436d95fd7aa..fb74f994cb63 100644
@@ -3912,7 +3912,7 @@ static void kvm_uevent_notify_change(unsigned int type, struct kvm *kvm)
 	}
 	add_uevent_var(env, "PID=%d", kvm->userspace_pid);
 
-	if (kvm->debugfs_dentry) {
+	if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(kvm->debugfs_dentry)) {
 		char *tmp, *p = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
 
 		if (p) {
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1

Same thing here, this was a 5.0-only thing, no need for it to be backported, please drop it from all trees.

thanks,

greg k-h

#28 lore raw

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 28/57] nvme-pci: fix conflicting p2p resource adds

In reply to Sasha Levin
Quoted 63 lines · Sasha Levin

From: Keith Busch <keith.busch at intel.com>

[ Upstream commit 9fe5c59ff6a1e5e26a39b75489a1420e7eaaf0b1 ]

The nvme pci driver had been adding its CMB resource to the P2P DMA subsystem everytime on on a controller reset. This results in the following warning:

     ------------[ cut here ]------------
     nvme 0000:00:03.0: Conflicting mapping in same section
     WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 81 at kernel/memremap.c:155 devm_memremap_pages+0xa6/0x380
     ...
     Call Trace:
      pci_p2pdma_add_resource+0x153/0x370
      nvme_reset_work+0x28c/0x17b1 [nvme]
      ? add_timer+0x107/0x1e0
      ? dequeue_entity+0x81/0x660
      ? dequeue_entity+0x3b0/0x660
      ? pick_next_task_fair+0xaf/0x610
      ? __switch_to+0xbc/0x410
      process_one_work+0x1cf/0x350
      worker_thread+0x215/0x3d0
      ? process_one_work+0x350/0x350
      kthread+0x107/0x120
      ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80
      ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
     ---[ end trace f7ea76ac6ee72727 ]---
     nvme nvme0: failed to register the CMB

This patch fixes this by registering the CMB with P2P only once.

Signed-off-by Keith Busch <keith.busch at intel.com>
Reviewed-by Logan Gunthorpe <logang at deltatee.com>
Signed-off-by Christoph Hellwig <hch at lst.de>
Signed-off-by Jens Axboe <axboe at kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by Sasha Levin <sashal at kernel.org>
---
  drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 5 ++++-
  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/nvme/host/pci.c +3 -1
index 7b9ef8e734e7..dca87cb485e9 100644
@@ -1649,6 +1649,9 @@ static void nvme_map_cmb(struct nvme_dev *dev)
  	struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(dev->dev);
  	int bar;
 
+	if (dev->cmb_size)
+		return;
+
  	dev->cmbsz = readl(dev->bar + NVME_REG_CMBSZ);
  	if (!dev->cmbsz)
  		return;
@@ -2133,7 +2136,6 @@ static void nvme_pci_disable(struct nvme_dev *dev)
  {
  	struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(dev->dev);
 
-	nvme_release_cmb(dev);
  	pci_free_irq_vectors(pdev);
 
  	if (pci_is_enabled(pdev)) {

drivers/nvme/host/pci.c static void nvme_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev) · line 2593

Quoted 7 lines
drivers/nvme/host/pci.c +1 -0
@@ -2585,6 +2587,7 @@ static void nvme_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev)
  	nvme_stop_ctrl(&dev->ctrl);
  	nvme_remove_namespaces(&dev->ctrl);
  	nvme_dev_disable(dev, true);
+	nvme_release_cmb(dev);
  	nvme_free_host_mem(dev);
  	nvme_dev_remove_admin(dev);
  	nvme_free_queues(dev, 0);

There is no P2P support in the 4.19 kernel so I'm not sure this change is necessary. I would also worry that it might break things if the BARs need to be remapped after a controller reset.

Quoted 1 line
author maintainer
#44 lore raw

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 40/57] kvm: properly check debugfs dentry before using it

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 38 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 37 lines · Sasha Levin

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8ed0579c12b2fe56a1fac2f712f58fc26c1dc49b ]

debugfs can now report an error code if something went wrong instead of just NULL. So if the return value is to be used as a "real" dentry, it needs to be checked if it is an error before dereferencing it.

This is now happening because of ff9fb72bc077 ("debugfs: return error values, not NULL"). syzbot has found a way to trigger multiple debugfs files attempting to be created, which fails, and then the error code gets passed to dentry_path_raw() which obviously does not like it.

---
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +1 -1
index c436d95fd7aa..fb74f994cb63 100644
@@ -3912,7 +3912,7 @@ static void kvm_uevent_notify_change(unsigned int type, struct kvm *kvm)
 	}
 	add_uevent_var(env, "PID=%d", kvm->userspace_pid);
 
-	if (kvm->debugfs_dentry) {
+	if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(kvm->debugfs_dentry)) {
 		char *tmp, *p = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
 
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +0 -1
 		if (p) {
--

2.19.1

Same thing here, this was a 5.0-only thing, no need for it to be backported, please drop it from all trees.

Dropped, thanks!

--
Thanks,
Sasha

author maintainer
#35 lore raw

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 33/57] blk-mq: protect debugfs_create_files() from failures

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 32 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 31 lines · Sasha Levin

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 36991ca68db9dd43bac7f3519f080ee3939263ef ]

If debugfs were to return a non-NULL error for a debugfs call, using that pointer later in debugfs_create_files() would crash.

Fix that by properly checking the pointer before referencing it.

---
 block/blk-mq-debugfs.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
block/blk-mq-debugfs.c +3 -0
index cb1e6cf7ac48..9dc3a0896462 100644
@@ -806,6 +806,9 @@ static const struct blk_mq_debugfs_attr blk_mq_debugfs_ctx_attrs[] = {
 static bool debugfs_create_files(struct dentry *parent, void *data,
 				 const struct blk_mq_debugfs_attr *attr)
 {
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(parent))
+		return false;
+
 	d_inode(parent)->i_private = data;
 
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
block/blk-mq-debugfs.c +0 -1
 	for (; attr->name; attr++) {
--

2.19.1

This was a 5.0-only thing, no need for it to be backported anywhere. Please drop it from all of your trees.

Dropped, thanks.

--
Thanks,
Sasha