Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal
Subsystems (11)
v10 cover Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal
Hello,
There are two big changes in this version:
1. The modsig contents aren't stored anymore in the struct xattr_value which is passed around in IMA for the xattr sig or digest. Instead, a new struct modsig argument is passed alongside xattr_value in relevant IMA functions. This change was suggested by Mimi Zohar, and allowed cleaner handling of the modsig in the code (especially in process_measurement()).
2. There are separate template fields for the modsig and its digest. This was also suggested by Mimi Zhoar. Because of this change, we don't need to know anymore at measurement time whether the modsig or the xattr sig will be used for appraisal (in the case where a file has both types of signature available). This avoids needing to peek at the xattr sig and at the modsig to see if their signatures use known keys, which we had to do before in order to know at measurement time which sig would be used for appraisal, so that we would store the correct signature in the measurement list.
The changelog below has the details. The patches apply on today's linux-integrity/next-integrity.
Original cover letter:
On the OpenPOWER platform, secure boot and trusted boot are being implemented using IMA for taking measurements and verifying signatures. Since the kernel image on Power servers is an ELF binary, kernels are signed using the scripts/sign-file tool and thus use the same signature format as signed kernel modules.
This patch series adds support in IMA for verifying those signatures. It adds flexibility to OpenPOWER secure boot, because it allows it to boot kernels with the signature appended to them as well as kernels where the signature is stored in the IMA extended attribute.
Changes since v9:
- Patch "MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions"
- Moved mod_check_sig() to a new file so that CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG doesn't have to depend on CONFIG_MODULES.
- Changed scripts/Makefile to build sign-file if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT is set.
- Removed Mimi's Reviewed-by because of the changes in this version.
- Patch "PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()"
- Don't add function pkcs7_get_message_sig() anymore, since it's not needed in the current version.
- Patch "PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()"
- Changed 'len' argument from 'u8 *' to 'u32 *'.
- Added 'hash_algo' argument to obtain the algo used for the digest.
- Don't check whether 'buf', 'len' and 'hash_algo' output arguments are NULL, since the function's only caller always sets them.
- Removed Mimi's Reviewed-by because of the changes in this version.
- Patch "integrity: Introduce asymmetric_sig_has_known_key()"
- Dropped.
- Patch "integrity: Introduce integrity_keyring_from_id"
- Squashed into "ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures"
- Changed integrity_keyring_from_id() to a static function (suggested by Mimi
Zohar).
- Patch "ima: Introduce is_signed()"
- Dropped.
- Patch "ima: Export func_tokens"
- Squashed into "ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures"
- Patch "ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data"
- New patch.
- Patch "ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()"
- New patch.
- Patch "ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures"
- Renamed 'struct modsig_hdr' to 'struct modsig'.
- Added integrity_modsig_verify() to integrity/digsig.c so that it's not necessary to export integrity_keyring_from_id() (Suggested by Mimi Zohar).
- Don't add functions ima_xattr_sig_known_key() and modsig_has_known_key() since they're not necessary anymore.
- Added modsig argument to ima_appraise_measurement().
- Verify modsig in a separate function called by ima_appraise_measurement().
- Renamed ima_read_collect_modsig() to ima_read_modsig(), with a separate collect function added in patch "ima: Collect modsig" (suggested by Mimi Zohar).
- In ima_read_modsig(), moved code saving of raw PKCS7 data to 'struct modsig' to patch "ima: Collect modsig".
- In ima_read_modsig(), moved all parts related to the modsig hash to patch "ima: Collect modsig".
- In ima_read_modsig(), don't check if the buf pointer is NULL since it's never supposed to happen.
- Renamed ima_free_xattr_data() to ima_free_modsig().
- No need to check for modsig in ima_read_xattr() and ima_inode_set_xattr() anymore.
- In ima_modsig_verify(), don't check if the modsig pointer is NULL since it's not supposed to happen.
- Don't define IMA_MODSIG element in enum evm_ima_xattr_type.
- Patch "ima: Collect modsig"
- New patch.
- Patch "ima: Define ima-modsig template"
- Patch renamed from "ima: Add new "d-sig" template field"
- Renamed 'd-sig' template field to 'd-modsig'.
- Added 'modsig' template field.
- Added 'ima-modsig' defined template descriptor.
- Renamed ima_modsig_serialize_data() to ima_modsig_serialize().
- Renamed ima_get_modsig_hash() to ima_get_modsig_digest(). Also the function is a lot simpler now since what it used to do is now done in ima_collect_modsig() and pkcs7_get_digest().
- Added check for failed modsig collection in ima_eventdigest_modsig_init().
- Added modsig argument to ima_store_measurement().
- Added 'modsig' field to struct ima_event_data.
- Removed check for modsig = NULL in ima_get_modsig_digest() and in ima_modsig_serialize_data() since their callers already performs that check.
- Moved check_current_template_modsig() to this patch, previously was in "ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig".
- Patch "ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig"
- Renamed ima_template_has_sig() to ima_template_has_modsig().
- Added a change to ima_collect_measurement(), making it to call
ima_collect_modsig() even if IMA_COLLECT is set in iint->flags.
- Removed IMA_READ_MEASURE flag.
- Renamed template_has_sig global variable to template_has_modsig.
- Renamed find_sig_in_template() to find_modsig_in_template().
Changes since v8:
- Patch "MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions"
- Renamed validate_module_sig() to mod_check_sig(). (Suggested by Mimi Zohar).
- Patch "integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr"
- Added comment mentioning that the evm_xattr usage is limited to HMAC before the structure definition. (Suggested by Mimi Zohar)
- Patch "ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended signatures"
- Added MODULE_CHECK to whitelist of hooks allowed to use modsig, and removed FIRMWARE_CHECK. (Suggested by Mimi Zohar and James Morris)
- Patch "ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures"
- Moved call to ima_modsig_verify() from ima_appraise_measurement() to integrity_digsig_verify(). (Suggested by Mimi Zohar)
- Renamed ima_read_modsig() to ima_read_collect_modsig() and made it force PKCS7 code to calculate the file hash. (Suggested by Mimi Zohar)
- Build sign-file tool if IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG is enabled.
- Check whether the signing key is in the platform keyring as a fallback for the KEXEC_KERNEL hook. (Suggested by Mimi Zohar)
- Patch "ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig"
- In process_measurement(), when a new measurement needs to be stored re-add IMA_MEASURE flag when the modsig is read rather than changing the if condition when calling ima_store_measurement(). (Suggested by Mimi Zohar)
- Check whether ima_template has "sig" and "d-sig" fields at initialization rather than at the first time the check is needed. (suggested by Mimi Zohar)
Changes since v7:
- Patch "MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions"
- Added module name parameter to validate_module_sig() so that it can be shown in error messages.
- Patch "integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr"
- Dropped use of struct evm_xattr in evm_update_evmxattr() and evm_verify_hmac(). It's not needed there anymore because of changes to support portable EVM signatures.
Thiago Jung Bauermann (12):
MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions
PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()
PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()
integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr
integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it
ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data
ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended
signatures
ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()
ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures
ima: Collect modsig
ima: Define ima-modsig template
ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 6 +- Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst | 7 +- certs/system_keyring.c | 61 +++++-- crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 33 ++++ include/crypto/pkcs7.h | 4 + include/linux/module.h | 3 - include/linux/module_signature.h | 44 +++++ include/linux/verification.h | 10 ++ init/Kconfig | 6 +- kernel/Makefile | 1 + kernel/module.c | 1 + kernel/module_signature.c | 45 +++++ kernel/module_signing.c | 56 +----- scripts/Makefile | 2 +- security/integrity/Kconfig | 2 +- security/integrity/digsig.c | 39 ++++- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 8 +- security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 13 ++ security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 61 ++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 33 +++- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 198 ++++++++++++++-------- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 4 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 23 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 169 ++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 64 ++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 31 +++- security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 60 ++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h | 4 + security/integrity/integrity.h | 26 +++ 30 files changed, 836 insertions(+), 179 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/module_signature.h create mode 100644 kernel/module_signature.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
PATCH v10 1/12 MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions
IMA will use the module_signature format for append signatures, so export the relevant definitions and factor out the code which verifies that the appended signature trailer is valid.
Also, create a CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT option so that IMA can select it and be able to use mod_check_sig() without having to depend on either CONFIG_MODULE_SIG or CONFIG_MODULES.
--- include/linux/module.h | 3 -- include/linux/module_signature.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ init/Kconfig | 6 +++- kernel/Makefile | 1 + kernel/module.c | 1 + kernel/module_signature.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/module_signing.c | 56 +++++--------------------------- scripts/Makefile | 2 +- 8 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
include/linux/module.h +0 -3
@@ -25,9 +25,6 @@#include <linux/percpu.h> #include <asm/module.h> -/* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */ -#define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n" -/* Not Yet Implemented */ #define MODULE_SUPPORTED_DEVICE (name)
include/linux/module_signature.h new file +44 -0
44 lines not on this page · raw message
init/Kconfig +5 -1
@@ -1906,7 +1906,7 @@ config MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL config MODULE_SIG bool "Module signature verification" depends on MODULES - select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + select MODULE_SIG_FORMAT help Check modules for valid signatures upon load: the signature is simply appended to the module. For more information see
@@ -2036,6 +2036,10 @@ config TRIM_UNUSED_KSYMS endif # MODULES +config MODULE_SIG_FORMAT + def_bool n + select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + config MODULES_TREE_LOOKUP def_bool y depends on PERF_EVENTS || TRACING
kernel/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ endif obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o +obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT) += module_signature.o obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_CORE) += crash_core.o
kernel/module.c +1 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@#include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/extable.h> #include <linux/moduleloader.h> +#include <linux/module_signature.h> #include <linux/trace_events.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/kallsyms.h>
kernel/module_signature.c new file +45 -0
45 lines not on this page · raw message
kernel/module_signing.c +8 -48
83 lines not on this page · raw message
scripts/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ hostprogs-$(CONFIG_VT) += conmakehash hostprogs-$(BUILD_C_RECORDMCOUNT) += recordmcount hostprogs-$(CONFIG_BUILDTIME_EXTABLE_SORT) += sortextable hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_compiler -hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += sign-file +hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT) += sign-file hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += extract-cert hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_EXTRA_CERTIFICATE) += insert-sys-cert
PATCH v10 2/12 PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannIMA will need to verify a PKCS#7 signature which has already been parsed. For this reason, factor out the code which does that from verify_pkcs7_signature() into a new function which takes a struct pkcs7_message instead of a data buffer.
--- certs/system_keyring.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- include/linux/verification.h | 10 ++++++ 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
certs/system_keyring.c +45 -16
@@ -194,33 +194,27 @@ late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list);#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION /** -* verify_pkcs7_signature - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data. +* verify_pkcs7_message_sig - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data. * @data: The data to be verified (NULL if expecting internal data). * @len: Size of @data. -* @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature. -* @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7. +* @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature. * @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for builtin trusted keys only, * (void *)1UL for all trusted keys). * @usage: The use to which the key is being put. * @view_content: Callback to gain access to content. * @ctx: Context for callback. */ -int verify_pkcs7_signature (const void *data,size_t len, -const void *raw_pkcs7,size_t pkcs7_len, -struct key *trusted_keys, -enum key_being_used_for usage, -int (*view_content)(void *ctx, -const void *data,size_t len, -size_t asn1hdrlen), -void *ctx) +int verify_pkcs7_message_sig (const void *data,size_t len, +struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, +struct key *trusted_keys, +enum key_being_used_for usage, +int (*view_content)(void *ctx, +const void *data,size_t len, +size_t asn1hdrlen), +void *ctx) { -struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;int ret; - pkcs7 =pkcs7_parse_message (raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len); -if (IS_ERR (pkcs7)) -return PTR_ERR (pkcs7); -/* The data should be detached - so we need to supply it. */ if (data &&pkcs7_supply_detached_data (pkcs7, data, len) <0 ) {pr_err ("PKCS#7 signature with non-detached data\n" );
@@ -273,6 +267,41 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len, } error: +pr_devel ("<=%s() = %d\n" , __func__, ret); +return ret; +} + +/** +* verify_pkcs7_signature - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data. +* @data: The data to be verified (NULL if expecting internal data). +* @len: Size of @data. +* @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature. +* @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7. +* @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for builtin trusted keys only, +* (void *)1UL for all trusted keys). +* @usage: The use to which the key is being put. +* @view_content: Callback to gain access to content. +* @ctx: Context for callback. +*/ +int verify_pkcs7_signature (const void *data,size_t len, +const void *raw_pkcs7,size_t pkcs7_len, +struct key *trusted_keys, +enum key_being_used_for usage, +int (*view_content)(void *ctx, +const void *data,size_t len, +size_t asn1hdrlen), +void *ctx) +{ +struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7; +int ret; + + pkcs7 =pkcs7_parse_message (raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len); +if (IS_ERR (pkcs7)) +return PTR_ERR (pkcs7); + + ret =verify_pkcs7_message_sig (data, len, pkcs7, trusted_keys, usage, + view_content, ctx); +pkcs7_free_message (pkcs7);pr_devel ("<=%s() = %d\n" , __func__, ret);return ret;
include/linux/verification.h +10 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ extern const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR];#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION struct key ; +struct pkcs7_message ; extern int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len, const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
@@ -45,6 +46,15 @@ extern int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len, const void *data, size_t len, size_t asn1hdrlen), void *ctx); +extern int verify_pkcs7_message_sig (const void *data,size_t len, +struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, +struct key *trusted_keys, +enum key_being_used_for usage, +int (*view_content)(void *ctx, +const void *data, +size_t len, +size_t asn1hdrlen), +void *ctx);#ifdef CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
PATCH v10 3/12 PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannIMA will need to access the digest of the PKCS7 message (as calculated by the kernel) before the signature is verified, so introduce pkcs7_get_digest() for that purpose.
Also, modify pkcs7_digest() to detect when the digest was already calculated so that it doesn't have to do redundant work. Verifying that sinfo->sig->digest isn't NULL is sufficient because both places which allocate sinfo->sig (pkcs7_parse_message() and pkcs7_note_signed_info()) use kzalloc() so sig->digest is always initialized to zero.
--- crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/pkcs7.h | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c +33 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@#include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/asn1.h> #include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <crypto/hash_info.h> #include <crypto/public_key.h> #include "pkcs7_parser.h"
@@ -33,6 +34,10 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,kenter (",%u,%s" , sinfo->index, sinfo->sig->hash_algo); +/* The digest was calculated already. */ +if (sig->digest) +return 0 ; +if (!sinfo->sig->hash_algo)return -ENOPKG ;
@@ -122,6 +127,34 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,return ret; } +int pkcs7_get_digest (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,const u8 **buf,u32 *len, +enum hash_algo *hash_algo) +{ +struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; +int i, ret; + +/* +* This function doesn't support messages with more than one signature. +*/ +if (sinfo =NULL || sinfo->next !=NULL ) +return -EBADMSG ; + + ret =pkcs7_digest (pkcs7, sinfo); +if (ret) +return ret; + + *buf = sinfo->sig->digest; + *len = sinfo->sig->digest_size; + +for (i =0 ; i <HASH_ALGO__LAST ; i++) +if (!strcmp (hash_algo_name[i], sinfo->sig->hash_algo)) { + *hash_algo = i; +break ; + } + +return 0 ; +} +/* * Find the key (X.509 certificate) to use to verify a PKCS#7 message. PKCS#7 * uses the issuer's name and the issuing certificate serial number for
include/crypto/pkcs7.h +4 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#define _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H#include <linux/verification.h> +#include <linux/hash_info.h> #include <crypto/public_key.h> struct key ;
@@ -44,4 +45,7 @@ extern int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,extern int pkcs7_supply_detached_data (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,const void *data,size_t datalen); +extern int pkcs7_get_digest (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,const u8 **buf, +u32 *len,enum hash_algo *hash_algo); +#endif /* _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H */
PATCH v10 4/12 integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannEven though struct evm_ima_xattr_data includes a fixed-size array to hold a SHA1 digest, most of the code ignores the array and uses the struct to mean "type indicator followed by data of unspecified size" and tracks the real size of what the struct represents in a separate length variable.
The only exception to that is the EVM code, which correctly uses the definition of struct evm_ima_xattr_data.
So make this explicit in the code by removing the length specification from the array in struct evm_ima_xattr_data. Also, change the name of the element from digest to data since in most places the array doesn't hold a digest.
A separate struct evm_xattr is introduced, with the original definition of evm_ima_xattr_data to be used in the places that actually expect that definition, specifically the EVM HMAC code.
--- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 8 ++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 7 ++++--- security/integrity/integrity.h | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +4 -4
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,/* check value type */ switch (xattr_data->type) {case EVM_XATTR_HMAC : -if (xattr_len !=sizeof (struct evm_ima_xattr_data )) { +if (xattr_len !=sizeof (struct evm_xattr )) { evm_status =INTEGRITY_FAIL ; goto out; }
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, xattr_value_len, &digest);if (rc)break ; - rc =crypto_memneq (xattr_data->digest, digest.digest, + rc =crypto_memneq (xattr_data->data, digest.digest,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE );if (rc) rc = -EINVAL ;
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, struct xattr *evm_xattr) { - struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data; + struct evm_xattr *xattr_data;int rc;if (!evm_key_loaded () || !evm_protected_xattr (lsm_xattr->name))
@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,if (!xattr_data)return -ENOMEM ; - xattr_data->type =EVM_XATTR_HMAC ; + xattr_data->data.type =EVM_XATTR_HMAC ; rc =evm_init_hmac (inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest);if (rc <0 ) goto out;
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +4 -3
@@ -168,7 +168,8 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,return sig->hash_algo;break ;case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG : - ret = xattr_value->digest[0 ]; +/* first byte contains algorithm id */ + ret = xattr_value->data[0 ];if (ret <HASH_ALGO__LAST )return ret;break ;
@@ -176,7 +177,7 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,/* this is for backward compatibility */ if (xattr_len =21 ) {unsigned int zero =0 ; -if (!memcmp (&xattr_value->digest[16 ], &zero,4 )) +if (!memcmp (&xattr_value->data[16 ], &zero,4 ))return HASH_ALGO_MD5 ;else return HASH_ALGO_SHA1 ;
@@ -275,7 +276,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,/* xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16 */ - rc =memcmp (&xattr_value->digest[hash_start], + rc =memcmp (&xattr_value->data[hash_start], iint->ima_hash->digest, iint->ima_hash->length); else
security/integrity/integrity.h +6 -0
@@ -79,6 +79,12 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type {struct evm_ima_xattr_data {u8 type; +u8 data[]; +} __packed; + +/* Only used in the EVM HMAC code. */ +struct evm_xattr { +struct evm_ima_xattr_data data;u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ]; } __packed;
PATCH v10 5/12 integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannThis avoids a dependency cycle in soon-to-be-introduced CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG: it will select CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT which in turn selects CONFIG_KEYS. Kconfig then complains that CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE depends on CONFIG_KEYS.
--- security/integrity/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/integrity/Kconfig +1 -1
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ if INTEGRITY config INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE bool "Digital signature verification using multiple keyrings" - depends on KEYS default n + select KEYS select SIGNATURE help This option enables digital signature verification support
PATCH v10 6/12 ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannDesignated initializers allow specifying only the members of the struct that need initialization. Non-mentioned members are initialized to zero.
This makes the code a bit clearer (particularly in ima_add_boot_aggregate() and also allows adding a new member to the struct without having to update all struct initializations.
--- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 11 +++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +7 -4
@@ -133,8 +133,9 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, {struct ima_template_entry *entry;struct inode *inode =file_inode (file); -struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint, file, filename,NULL ,0 , - cause}; +struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint, .file = file, + .filename = filename, + .violation = cause };int violation =1 ;int result;
@@ -284,8 +285,10 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,int result = -ENOMEM ;struct inode *inode =file_inode (file);struct ima_template_entry *entry; -struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint, file, filename, xattr_value, - xattr_len,NULL }; +struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint, .file = file, + .filename = filename, + .xattr_value = xattr_value, + .xattr_len = xattr_len };int violation =0 ;if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr))
security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +2 -2
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)const char *audit_cause ="ENOMEM" ;struct ima_template_entry *entry;struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint; -struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint,NULL , boot_aggregate_name, -NULL ,0 ,NULL }; +struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint, + .filename = boot_aggregate_name };int result = -ENOMEM ;int violation =0 ;struct {
PATCH v10 7/12 ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended signatures
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannIntroduce the modsig keyword to the IMA policy syntax to specify that a given hook should expect the file to have the IMA signature appended to it. Here is how it can be used in a rule:
appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig
With this rule, IMA will accept either a signature stored in the extended attribute or an appended signature.
For now, the rule above will behave exactly the same as if appraise_type=imasig was specified. The actual modsig implementation will be introduced separately.
--- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 6 +++++- security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 10 +++++++++ security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 9 ++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 12 +++++++++-- security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +5 -1
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Description: euid:= decimal value fowner:= decimal value lsm: are LSM specific - option: appraise_type:= [imasig] + option: appraise_type:= [imasig] [imasig|modsig] pcr:= decimal value default policy:
@@ -103,3 +103,7 @@ Description: measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4 measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK pcr=5 + + Example of appraise rule allowing modsig appended signatures: + + appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +10 -0
@@ -231,6 +231,16 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM This option enables the different "ima_appraise=" modes (eg. fix, log) from the boot command line. +config IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG + bool "Support module-style signatures for appraisal" + depends on IMA_APPRAISE + default n + help + Adds support for signatures appended to files. The format of the + appended signature is the same used for signed kernel modules. + The modsig keyword can be used in the IMA policy to allow a hook + to accept such signatures. + config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed (deprecated)" depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
security/integrity/ima/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -9,5 +9,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \ ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o +ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) += ima_modsig.o ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +9 -0
@@ -293,6 +293,15 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG +bool ima_hook_supports_modsig (enum ima_hooks func); +#else +static inline bool ima_hook_supports_modsig (enum ima_hooks func) +{ +return false; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */ +/* LSM based policy rules require audit */ #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c new file +31 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +/* +* IMA support for appraising module-style appended signatures. +* +* Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation +* +* Author: +* Thiago Jung Bauermann <[email protected]> +*/ + +#include "ima.h" + +/** +* ima_hook_supports_modsig - can the policy allow modsig for this hook? +* +* modsig is only supported by hooks using ima_post_read_file(), because only +* they preload the contents of the file in a buffer. FILE_CHECK does that in +* some cases, but not when reached from vfs_open(). POLICY_CHECK can support +* it, but it's not useful in practice because it's a text file so deny. +*/ +bool ima_hook_supports_modsig (enum ima_hooks func) +{ +switch (func) { +case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK : +case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK : +case MODULE_CHECK : +return true; +default : +return false; + } +}
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +10 -2
@@ -1038,6 +1038,10 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)ima_log_string (ab,"appraise_type" , args[0 ].from);if ((strcmp (args[0 ].from,"imasig" )) =0 ) entry->flags |=IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED ; +else if (ima_hook_supports_modsig (entry->func) && +strcmp (args[0 ].from,"imasig|modsig" ) =0 ) + entry->flags |=IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED + |IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED ;else result = -EINVAL ;break ;
@@ -1330,8 +1334,12 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) } } } -if (entry->flags &IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED ) -seq_puts (m,"appraise_type=imasig " ); +if (entry->flags &IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED ) { +if (entry->flags &IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED ) +seq_puts (m,"appraise_type=imasig|modsig " ); +else +seq_puts (m,"appraise_type=imasig " ); + }if (entry->flags &IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO )seq_puts (m,"permit_directio " );rcu_read_unlock ();
security/integrity/integrity.h +1 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@#define IMA_NEW_FILE 0x04000000#define EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG 0x08000000#define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS 0x10000000 +#define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED 0x20000000#define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \ IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
PATCH v10 8/12 ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannVerify xattr signature in a separate function so that the logic in ima_appraise_measurement() remains clear when it gains the ability to also verify an appended module signature.
The code in the switch statement is unchanged except for having to dereference the status and cause variables (since they're now pointers), and fixing the style of a block comment to appease checkpatch.
--- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 141 +++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 81 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +80 -59
@@ -202,6 +202,83 @@ int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,return ret; } +/* +* xattr_verify - verify xattr digest or signature +* +* Verify whether the hash or signature matches the file contents. +* +* Return 0 on success, error code otherwise. +*/ +static int xattr_verify (enum ima_hooks func,struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,int xattr_len, +enum integrity_status *status,const char **cause) +{ +int rc = -EINVAL , hash_start =0 ; + +switch (xattr_value->type) { +case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG : +/* first byte contains algorithm id */ + hash_start =1 ; +/* fall through */ +case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST : +if (iint->flags &IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED ) { + *cause ="IMA-signature-required" ; + *status =INTEGRITY_FAIL ; +break ; + } +clear_bit (IMA_DIGSIG , &iint->atomic_flags); +if (xattr_len -sizeof (xattr_value->type) - hash_start >+ iint->ima_hash->length) +/* +* xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous +* version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16 +*/ + rc =memcmp (&xattr_value->data[hash_start], + iint->ima_hash->digest, + iint->ima_hash->length); +else + rc = -EINVAL ; +if (rc) { + *cause ="invalid-hash" ; + *status =INTEGRITY_FAIL ; +break ; + } + *status =INTEGRITY_PASS ; +break ; +case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG : +set_bit (IMA_DIGSIG , &iint->atomic_flags); + rc =integrity_digsig_verify (INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA , + (const char *)xattr_value, + xattr_len, + iint->ima_hash->digest, + iint->ima_hash->length); +if (rc = -EOPNOTSUPP ) { + *status =INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN ; +break ; + } +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING ) && rc && + func =KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK ) + rc =integrity_digsig_verify (INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM , + (const char *)xattr_value, + xattr_len, + iint->ima_hash->digest, + iint->ima_hash->length); +if (rc) { + *cause ="invalid-signature" ; + *status =INTEGRITY_FAIL ; + }else { + *status =INTEGRITY_PASS ; + } +break ; +default : + *status =INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN ; + *cause ="unknown-ima-data" ; +break ; + } + +return rc; +} +/* * ima_appraise_measurement - appraise file measurement *
@@ -221,7 +298,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,struct dentry *dentry =file_dentry (file);struct inode *inode =d_backing_inode (dentry);enum integrity_status status =INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN ; -int rc = xattr_len, hash_start =0 ; +int rc = xattr_len;if (!(inode->i_opflags &IOP_XATTR ))return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN ;
@@ -259,65 +336,9 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,WARN_ONCE (true,"Unexpected integrity status %d\n" , status); } -switch (xattr_value->type) { -case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG : -/* first byte contains algorithm id */ - hash_start =1 ; -/* fall through */ -case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST : -if (iint->flags &IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED ) { - cause ="IMA-signature-required" ; - status =INTEGRITY_FAIL ; -break ; - } -clear_bit (IMA_DIGSIG , &iint->atomic_flags); -if (xattr_len -sizeof (xattr_value->type) - hash_start >- iint->ima_hash->length) -/* xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous -version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16 -*/ - rc =memcmp (&xattr_value->data[hash_start], - iint->ima_hash->digest, - iint->ima_hash->length); -else - rc = -EINVAL ; -if (rc) { - cause ="invalid-hash" ; - status =INTEGRITY_FAIL ; -break ; - } - status =INTEGRITY_PASS ; -break ; -case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG : -set_bit (IMA_DIGSIG , &iint->atomic_flags); - rc =integrity_digsig_verify (INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA , - (const char *)xattr_value, - xattr_len, - iint->ima_hash->digest, - iint->ima_hash->length); -if (rc = -EOPNOTSUPP ) { - status =INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN ; -break ; - } -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING ) && rc && - func =KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK ) - rc =integrity_digsig_verify (INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM , - (const char *)xattr_value, - xattr_len, - iint->ima_hash->digest, - iint->ima_hash->length); -if (rc) { - cause ="invalid-signature" ; - status =INTEGRITY_FAIL ; - }else { - status =INTEGRITY_PASS ; - } -break ; -default : - status =INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN ; - cause ="unknown-ima-data" ; -break ; - } +if (xattr_value) + rc =xattr_verify (func, iint, xattr_value, xattr_len, &status, + &cause); out:/*
PATCH v10 9/12 ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannImplement the appraise_type=imasig|modsig option, allowing IMA to read and verify modsig signatures.
In case a file has both an xattr signature and an appended modsig, IMA will only use the appended signature if the key used by the xattr signature isn't present in the IMA or platform keyring.
Because modsig verification needs to convert from an integrity keyring id to the keyring itself, add an integrity_keyring_from_id() function in digsig.c so that integrity_modsig_verify() can use it.
--- security/integrity/digsig.c | 39 ++++++++++++--- security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 3 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 22 ++++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 11 ++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 12 ++--- security/integrity/integrity.h | 19 +++++++ 8 files changed, 206 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
security/integrity/digsig.c +3 -4
@@ -43,11 +43,10 @@ static const char * const keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted#endif -int integrity_digsig_verify (const unsigned int id,const char *sig,int siglen, -const char *digest,int digestlen) +static struct key *integrity_keyring_from_id (const unsigned int id) { -if (id >=INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX || siglen <2 ) -return -EINVAL ; +if (id >=INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX ) +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL );if (!keyring[id]) { keyring[id] @@ -56,23 +55,49 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
int err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]); pr_err("no %s keyring: %d\n", keyring_name[id], err); keyring[id] = NULL;
- return err;
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
}
}
+ return keyring[id];
+}
+
+int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
+ const char *digest, int digestlen)
+{
+ struct key *keyring;
+
+ if (siglen < 2)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ keyring = integrity_keyring_from_id(id);
+ if (IS_ERR(keyring))
+ return PTR_ERR(keyring);
+
switch (sig[1]) {
case 1:
/* v1 API expect signature without xattr type */
- return digsig_verify(keyring[id], sig + 1, siglen - 1,
+ return digsig_verify(keyring, sig + 1, siglen - 1,
digest, digestlen);
case 2:
- return asymmetric_verify(keyring[id], sig, siglen,
+ return asymmetric_verify(keyring, sig, siglen,
digest, digestlen);
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
+int integrity_modsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const struct modsig *modsig) +{
+ struct key *keyring;
+
+ keyring = integrity_keyring_from_id(id);
+ if (IS_ERR(keyring))
+ return PTR_ERR(keyring);
+
+ return ima_modsig_verify(keyring, modsig);
+}
+
static int __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id, key_perm_t perm,
struct key_restriction *restriction)
{
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +3 -0
@@ -234,6 +234,9 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM config IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG bool "Support module-style signatures for appraisal" depends on IMA_APPRAISE + depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER + select MODULE_SIG_FORMAT default n help Adds support for signatures appended to files. The format of the
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +20 -2
@@ -191,6 +191,10 @@ enum ima_hooks { __ima_hooks(__ima_hook_enumify) }; +extern const char *const func_tokens[]; + +struct modsig ; +/* LIM API function definitions */ int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid,int mask,enum ima_hooks func,int *pcr);
@@ -240,7 +244,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, - int xattr_len); + int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig);int ima_must_appraise (struct inode *inode,int mask,enum ima_hooks func);void ima_update_xattr (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,struct file *file); enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -256,7 +260,8 @@ static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, - int xattr_len) + int xattr_len, + const struct modsig *modsig) { return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; }
@@ -295,11 +300,24 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG bool ima_hook_supports_modsig (enum ima_hooks func); +int ima_read_modsig (enum ima_hooks func,const void *buf,loff_t buf_len, +struct modsig **modsig); +void ima_free_modsig (struct modsig *modsig);#else static inline bool ima_hook_supports_modsig (enum ima_hooks func) {return false; } + +static inline int ima_read_modsig (enum ima_hooks func,const void *buf, +loff_t buf_len,struct modsig **modsig) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +} + +static inline void ima_free_modsig (struct modsig *modsig) +{ +}#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */ /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +46 -4
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security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +9 -2
@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,int rc =0 , action, must_appraise =0 ;int pcr =CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX ;struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value =NULL ; +struct modsig *modsig =NULL ;int xattr_len =0 ;bool violation_check;enum hash_algo hash_algo;
@@ -277,10 +278,15 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, template_desc =ima_template_desc_current ();if ((action &IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK ) || -strcmp (template_desc->name,IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME ) !=0 ) +strcmp (template_desc->name,IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME ) !=0 ) {/* read 'security.ima' */ xattr_len =ima_read_xattr (file_dentry (file), &xattr_value); +/* Read the appended modsig if allowed by the policy. */ +if (iint->flags &IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED ) +ima_read_modsig (func, buf, size, &modsig); + } + hash_algo =ima_get_hash_algo (xattr_value, xattr_len); rc =ima_collect_measurement (iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo);
@@ -296,7 +302,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,if (rc =0 && (action &IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK )) {inode_lock (inode); rc =ima_appraise_measurement (func, iint, file, pathname, - xattr_value, xattr_len); + xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig);inode_unlock (inode); }if (action &IMA_AUDIT )
@@ -310,6 +316,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, rc = -EACCES ;mutex_unlock (&iint->mutex);kfree (xattr_value); +ima_free_modsig (modsig); out:if (pathbuf)__putname (pathbuf);
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c +71 -0
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security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +6 -6
@@ -1144,6 +1144,12 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void) } } +#define __ima_hook_stringify (str) (#str), + +const char *const func_tokens[] = { +__ima_hooks (__ima_hook_stringify) +}; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY enum { mask_exec = 0, mask_write, mask_read, mask_append
@@ -1156,12 +1162,6 @@ static const char *const mask_tokens[] = { "MAY_APPEND" }; -#define __ima_hook_stringify (str) (#str), - -static const char *const func_tokens[] = { -__ima_hooks (__ima_hook_stringify) -}; -void *ima_policy_start (struct seq_file *m,loff_t *pos) {loff_t l = *pos;
security/integrity/integrity.h +19 -0
@@ -153,10 +153,13 @@ int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,extern struct dentry *integrity_dir; +struct modsig ; +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE int integrity_digsig_verify (const unsigned int id,const char *sig,int siglen,const char *digest,int digestlen); +int integrity_modsig_verify (unsigned int id,const struct modsig *modsig);int __init integrity_init_keyring (const unsigned int id);int __init integrity_load_x509 (const unsigned int id,const char *path);
@@ -171,6 +174,12 @@ static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } +static inline int integrity_modsig_verify (unsigned int id, +const struct modsig *modsig) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +} +static inline int integrity_init_keyring (const unsigned int id) {return 0 ;
@@ -196,6 +205,16 @@ static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, }#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG +int ima_modsig_verify (struct key *keyring,const struct modsig *modsig); +#else +static inline int ima_modsig_verify (struct key *keyring, +const struct modsig *modsig) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +} +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509 void __init ima_load_x509 (void );#else
PATCH v10 10/12 ima: Collect modsig
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannObtain the modsig and calculate its corresponding hash in ima_collect_measurement().
--- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 8 ++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 5 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 5 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +7 -1
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,int ima_must_measure (struct inode *inode,int mask,enum ima_hooks func);int ima_collect_measurement (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,struct file *file,void *buf,loff_t size, -enum hash_algo algo); +enum hash_algo algo,struct modsig *modsig); void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
@@ -302,6 +302,7 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,bool ima_hook_supports_modsig (enum ima_hooks func);int ima_read_modsig (enum ima_hooks func,const void *buf,loff_t buf_len,struct modsig **modsig); +void ima_collect_modsig (struct modsig *modsig,const void *buf,loff_t size);void ima_free_modsig (struct modsig *modsig);#else static inline bool ima_hook_supports_modsig (enum ima_hooks func)
@@ -315,6 +316,11 @@ static inline int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf,return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } +static inline void ima_collect_modsig (struct modsig *modsig,const void *buf, +loff_t size) +{ +} +static inline void ima_free_modsig (struct modsig *modsig) { }
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +4 -1
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,*/ int ima_collect_measurement (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,struct file *file,void *buf,loff_t size, -enum hash_algo algo) +enum hash_algo algo,struct modsig *modsig) {const char *audit_cause ="failed" ;struct inode *inode =file_inode (file);
@@ -245,6 +245,9 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,memcpy (iint->ima_hash, &hash, length); iint->version = i_version; +if (modsig) +ima_collect_modsig (modsig, buf, size); +/* Possibly temporary failure due to type of read (eg. O_DIRECT) */ if (!result) iint->flags |=IMA_COLLECTED ;
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +1 -1
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file) !(iint->flags & IMA_HASH))return ; - rc =ima_collect_measurement (iint, file,NULL ,0 , ima_hash_algo); + rc =ima_collect_measurement (iint, file,NULL ,0 , ima_hash_algo,NULL );if (rc <0 )return ;
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1 -1
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, hash_algo =ima_get_hash_algo (xattr_value, xattr_len); - rc =ima_collect_measurement (iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo); + rc =ima_collect_measurement (iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo, modsig);if (rc !=0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL ) goto out_locked;
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c +49 -1
73 lines not on this page · raw message
PATCH v10 11/12 ima: Define ima-modsig template
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannDefine new "d-modsig" template field which holds the digest that is expected to match the one contained in the modsig, and also new "modsig" template field which holds the appended file signature.
Add a new "ima-modsig" defined template descriptor with the new fields as well as the ones from the "ima-sig" descriptor.
Change ima_store_measurement() to accept a struct modsig * argument so that it can be passed along to the templates via struct ima_event_data.
--- Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst | 7 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 21 +++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 6 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 19 +++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 42 +++++++++++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 7 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h | 4 ++ 9 files changed, 158 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst +5 -2
@@ -68,15 +68,18 @@ descriptors by adding their identifier to the format string - 'd-ng': the digest of the event, calculated with an arbitrary hash algorithm (field format: [<hash algo>:]digest, where the digest prefix is shown only if the hash algorithm is not SHA1 or MD5); + - 'd-modsig': the digest of the event without the appended modsig; - 'n-ng': the name of the event, without size limitations; - - 'sig': the file signature. + - 'sig': the file signature; + - 'modsig' the appended file signature. Below, there is the list of defined template descriptors: - "ima": its format is ``d|n``; - "ima-ng" (default): its format is ``d-ng|n-ng``; - - "ima-sig": its format is ``d-ng|n-ng|sig``. + - "ima-sig": its format is ``d-ng|n-ng|sig``; + - "ima-modsig": its format is ``d-ng|n-ng|sig|d-modsig|modsig``.
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +20 -1
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ struct ima_event_data {const unsigned char *filename;struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value;int xattr_len; +const struct modsig *modsig;const char *violation; };
@@ -205,7 +206,8 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,void ima_store_measurement (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,struct file *file,const unsigned char *filename,struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, -int xattr_len,int pcr); +int xattr_len,const struct modsig *modsig, +int pcr);void ima_audit_measurement (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,const unsigned char *filename); int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
@@ -303,6 +305,10 @@ bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func);int ima_read_modsig (enum ima_hooks func,const void *buf,loff_t buf_len,struct modsig **modsig);void ima_collect_modsig (struct modsig *modsig,const void *buf,loff_t size); +int ima_get_modsig_digest (const struct modsig *modsig,enum hash_algo *algo, +const u8 **digest,u32 *digest_size); +int ima_modsig_serialize (const struct modsig *modsig,const void **data, +u32 *data_len);void ima_free_modsig (struct modsig *modsig);#else static inline bool ima_hook_supports_modsig (enum ima_hooks func)
@@ -321,6 +327,19 @@ static inline void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf, { } +static inline int ima_get_modsig_digest (const struct modsig *modsig, +enum hash_algo *algo, +const u8 **digest,u32 *digest_size) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +} + +static inline int ima_modsig_serialize (const struct modsig *modsig, +const void **data,u32 *data_len) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +} +static inline void ima_free_modsig (struct modsig *modsig) { }
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +4 -2
@@ -281,7 +281,8 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,void ima_store_measurement (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,struct file *file,const unsigned char *filename,struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, -int xattr_len,int pcr) +int xattr_len,const struct modsig *modsig, +int pcr) {static const char op[] ="add_template_measure" ;static const char audit_cause[] ="ENOMEM" ;
@@ -291,7 +292,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint, .file = file, .filename = filename, .xattr_value = xattr_value, - .xattr_len = xattr_len }; + .xattr_len = xattr_len, + .modsig = modsig };int violation =0 ;if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr))
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1 -1
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,if (action &IMA_MEASURE )ima_store_measurement (iint, file, pathname, - xattr_value, xattr_len, pcr); + xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr);if (rc =0 && (action &IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK )) {inode_lock (inode); rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname,
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c +19 -0
@@ -140,6 +140,25 @@ int ima_modsig_verify(struct key *keyring, const struct modsig *modsig) VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL); } +int ima_get_modsig_digest (const struct modsig *modsig,enum hash_algo *algo, +const u8 **digest,u32 *digest_size) +{ + *algo = modsig->hash_algo; + *digest = modsig->digest; + *digest_size = modsig->digest_size; + +return 0 ; +} + +int ima_modsig_serialize (const struct modsig *modsig,const void **data, +u32 *data_len) +{ + *data = &modsig->raw_pkcs7; + *data_len = modsig->raw_pkcs7_len; + +return 0 ; +} +void ima_free_modsig (struct modsig *modsig) {if (!modsig)
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +40 -2
62 lines not on this page · raw message
security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +6 -1
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ static struct ima_template_desc builtin_templates[] = { {.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT}, {.name = "ima-ng", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"}, {.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"}, + {.name = "ima-modsig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig|d-modsig|modsig"}, {.name = "", .fmt = ""}, /* placeholder for a custom format */ };
@@ -43,8 +44,12 @@ static const struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = { .field_show = ima_show_template_string}, {.field_id = "sig", .field_init = ima_eventsig_init, .field_show = ima_show_template_sig}, + {.field_id = "d-modsig", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_modsig_init, + .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng}, + {.field_id = "modsig", .field_init = ima_eventmodsig_init, + .field_show = ima_show_template_sig}, }; -#define MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN 15 +#define MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN sizeof("d|n|d-ng|n-ng|sig|d-modisg|modsig")static struct ima_template_desc *ima_template;static struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc (const char *name);
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +59 -1
75 lines not on this page · raw message
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h +4 -0
@@ -38,8 +38,12 @@ int ima_eventname_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data);int ima_eventdigest_ng_init (struct ima_event_data *event_data,struct ima_field_data *field_data); +int ima_eventdigest_modsig_init (struct ima_event_data *event_data, +struct ima_field_data *field_data);int ima_eventname_ng_init (struct ima_event_data *event_data,struct ima_field_data *field_data);int ima_eventsig_init (struct ima_event_data *event_data,struct ima_field_data *field_data); +int ima_eventmodsig_init (struct ima_event_data *event_data, +struct ima_field_data *field_data);#endif /* __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H */
PATCH v10 12/12 ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannIf the IMA template contains the "modsig" or "d-modsig" field, then the modsig should be added to the measurement list when the file is appraised.
And that is what normally happens, but if a measurement rule caused a file containing a modsig to be measured before a different rule causes it to be appraised, the resulting measurement entry will not contain the modsig because it is only fetched during appraisal. When the appraisal rule triggers, it won't store a new measurement containing the modsig because the file was already measured.
We need to detect that situation and store an additional measurement with the modsig. This is done by adding an IMA_MEASURE action flag if we read a modsig and the IMA template contains a modsig field.
--- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 19 +++++++++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 14 +++++++++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +1 -0
@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ int ima_init_crypto(void);void ima_putc (struct seq_file *m,void *data,int datalen);void ima_print_digest (struct seq_file *m,u8 *digest,u32 size);struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current (void ); +bool ima_template_has_modsig (void );int ima_restore_measurement_entry (struct ima_template_entry *entry);int ima_restore_measurement_list (loff_t bufsize,void *buf);int ima_measurements_show (struct seq_file *m,void *v);
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +15 -4
@@ -212,6 +212,14 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE ]; } hash; +/* +* Always collect the modsig, because IMA might have already collected +* the file digest without collecting the modsig in a previous +* measurement rule. +*/ +if (modsig) +ima_collect_modsig (modsig, buf, size); +if (iint->flags &IMA_COLLECTED ) goto out;
@@ -245,9 +253,6 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,memcpy (iint->ima_hash, &hash, length); iint->version = i_version; -if (modsig) -ima_collect_modsig (modsig, buf, size); -/* Possibly temporary failure due to type of read (eg. O_DIRECT) */ if (!result) iint->flags |=IMA_COLLECTED ;
@@ -296,7 +301,13 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, .modsig = modsig };int violation =0 ; -if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr)) +/* +* We still need to store the measurement in the case of MODSIG because +* we only have its contents to put in the list at the time of +* appraisal, but a file measurement from earlier might already exist in +* the measurement list. +*/ +if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr) && !modsig)return ; result =ima_alloc_init_template (&event_data, &entry);
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +11 -3
@@ -282,9 +282,17 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,/* read 'security.ima' */ xattr_len =ima_read_xattr (file_dentry (file), &xattr_value); -/* Read the appended modsig if allowed by the policy. */ -if (iint->flags &IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED ) -ima_read_modsig (func, buf, size, &modsig); +/* +* Read the appended modsig, if allowed by the policy, and allow +* an additional measurement list entry, if needed, based on the +* template format. +*/ +if (iint->flags &IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED ) { + rc =ima_read_modsig (func, buf, size, &modsig); + +if (!rc &&ima_template_has_modsig ()) + action |=IMA_MEASURE ; + } } hash_algo =ima_get_hash_algo (xattr_value, xattr_len);
security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +24 -0
@@ -57,6 +57,26 @@ static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,const struct ima_template_field ***fields, int *num_fields); +/* Whether the current template has fields referencing a file's signature. */ +static bool template_has_modsig; + +static bool find_modsig_in_template (void ) +{ +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i < ima_template->num_fields; i++) +if (!strcmp (ima_template->fields[i]->field_id,"modsig" ) || + !strcmp (ima_template->fields[i]->field_id,"d-modsig" )) +return true; + +return false; +} + +bool ima_template_has_modsig (void ) +{ +return template_has_modsig; +} +static int __init ima_template_setup (char *str) {struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
@@ -89,6 +109,8 @@ static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str) } ima_template = template_desc; + template_has_modsig =find_modsig_in_template (); +return 1 ; }__setup ("ima_template=" , ima_template_setup);
@@ -108,6 +130,7 @@ static int __init ima_template_fmt_setup(char *str) builtin_templates[num_templates -1 ].fmt = str; ima_template = builtin_templates + num_templates -1 ; + template_has_modsig =find_modsig_in_template ();return 1 ; }
@@ -230,6 +253,7 @@ struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void)ima_init_template_list ();ima_template lookup_template_desc (CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE ); + template_has_modsig =find_modsig_in_template (); }return ima_template; }
Re: [PATCH v10 01/12] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannQuoted 10 lines · Thiago Jung Bauermann
IMA will use the
module_signatureformat for append signatures, so export the relevant definitions and factor out the code which verifies that the appended signature trailer is valid.Also, create a
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAToption so that IMA can select it and be able to usemod_check_sig()without having to depend on eitherCONFIG_MODULE_SIGorCONFIG_MODULES.Signed-off-by Thiago Jung Bauermann <[email protected]>Cc Jessica Yu <[email protected]>
Just a couple minor questions/comments below.
Quoted 1 line
---
< snip >
Quoted 14 lines
init/Kconfig +1
-1@@ -1906,7 +1906,7 @@ config MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL config MODULE_SIG bool "Module signature verification" depends on MODULES - select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + select MODULE_SIG_FORMAT help Check modules for valid signatures upon load: the signature is simply appended to the module. For more information see
init/Kconfig config TRIM_UNUSED_KSYMS · line 2041
Quoted 6 lines
init/Kconfig +3
-0@@ -2036,6 +2036,10 @@ config TRIM_UNUSED_KSYMS endif # MODULES +config MODULE_SIG_FORMAT + def_bool n + select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
Normally Kconfigs, in the same file, are defined before they are used.
I'm not sure if that is required or just a convention.
Quoted 41 lines
init/Kconfig +0
-0config MODULES_TREE_LOOKUP def_bool y depends on PERF_EVENTS || TRACINGkernel/Makefile +1
-0@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ endif obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o +obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT) += module_signature.o obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_CORE) += crash_core.okernel/module.c +1
-0@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@#include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/extable.h> #include <linux/moduleloader.h> +#include <linux/module_signature.h> #include <linux/trace_events.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/kallsyms.h> kernel/module_signature.c new file +8
-0@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +/* +* Module signature checker +* +* Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +* Written by David Howells ([email protected]) +*/ +
kernel/module_signature.c line 18
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/module_signature.c new file +10
-0+#include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/printk.h> +#include <linux/module_signature.h> +#include <asm/byteorder.h> + +/** +* mod_check_sig - check that the given signature is sane +* +* @ms: Signature to check. +* @file_len: Size of the file to which @ms is appended.
"name" is missing.
Mimi
Quoted 1 line
kernel/module_signature.c new file +1
-0+*/
Re: [PATCH v10 03/12] PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannQuoted 10 lines · Thiago Jung Bauermann
IMA will need to access the digest of the PKCS7 message (as calculated by the kernel) before the signature is verified, so introduce
pkcs7_get_digest()for that purpose.Also, modify
pkcs7_digest()to detect when the digest was already calculated so that it doesn't have to do redundant work. Verifying thatsinfo->sig->digestisn't NULL is sufficient because both places which allocatesinfo->sig(pkcs7_parse_message()andpkcs7_note_signed_info()) usekzalloc()sosig->digestis always initialized to zero.
Quoted 4 lines
Signed-off-by Thiago Jung Bauermann <[email protected]>Cc David Howells <[email protected]>Cc Herbert Xu <[email protected]>Cc "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
Re: [PATCH v10 02/12] PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannQuoted 11 lines · Thiago Jung Bauermann
IMA will need to verify a PKCS#7 signature which has already been parsed. For this reason, factor out the code which does that from
verify_pkcs7_signature()into a new function which takes a structpkcs7_messageinstead of a data buffer.Signed-off-by Thiago Jung Bauermann <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Cc David Howells <[email protected]>Cc David Woodhouse <[email protected]>Cc Herbert Xu <[email protected]>Cc "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
Re: [PATCH v10 06/12] ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannQuoted 8 lines · Thiago Jung Bauermann
Designated initializers allow specifying only the members of the struct that need initialization. Non-mentioned members are initialized to zero.
This makes the code a bit clearer (particularly in
ima_add_boot_aggregate()and also allows adding a new member to the struct without having to update all struct initializations.Signed-off-by Thiago Jung Bauermann <[email protected]>
Quoted 49 lines
--- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 11 +++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +7
-4@@ -133,8 +133,9 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, {struct ima_template_entry *entry;struct inode *inode =file_inode (file); -struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint, file, filename,NULL ,0 , - cause}; +struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint, .file = file, + .filename = filename, + .violation = cause };int violation =1 ;int result;@@ -284,8 +285,10 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,int result = -ENOMEM ;struct inode *inode =file_inode (file);struct ima_template_entry *entry; -struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint, file, filename, xattr_value, - xattr_len,NULL }; +struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint, .file = file, + .filename = filename, + .xattr_value = xattr_value, + .xattr_len = xattr_len };int violation =0 ;if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr))security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +2
-2@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)const char *audit_cause ="ENOMEM" ;struct ima_template_entry *entry;struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint; -struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint,NULL , boot_aggregate_name, -NULL ,0 ,NULL }; +struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint, + .filename = boot_aggregate_name };int result = -ENOMEM ;int violation =0 ;struct {
Re: [PATCH v10 08/12] ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannQuoted 10 lines · Thiago Jung Bauermann
Verify xattr signature in a separate function so that the logic in
ima_appraise_measurement()remains clear when it gains the ability to also verify an appended module signature.The code in the switch statement is unchanged except for having to dereference the status and cause variables (since they're now pointers), and fixing the style of a block comment to appease checkpatch.
Suggested-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Thiago Jung Bauermann <[email protected]>
Mimi Zohar
maintainerRe: [PATCH v10 09/12] ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannHi Thiago,
Quoted 20 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +6
-0@@ -1144,6 +1144,12 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void) } } +#define __ima_hook_stringify (str) (#str), + +const char *const func_tokens[] = { +__ima_hooks (__ima_hook_stringify) +}; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY enum { mask_exec = 0, mask_write, mask_read, mask_append@@ -1156,12 +1162,6 @@ static const char *const mask_tokens[] = { "MAY_APPEND" };
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static const char *const mask_tokens[] = { · line 1167
Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0
-6-#define __ima_hook_stringify (str) (#str), - -static const char *const func_tokens[] = { -__ima_hooks (__ima_hook_stringify) -}; -void *ima_policy_start (struct seq_file *m,loff_t *pos) {loff_t l = *pos;
Is moving this something left over from previous versions or there is a need for this change?
Other than this, the patch looks good.
Mimi
Re: [PATCH v10 11/12] ima: Define ima-modsig template
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannQuoted 4 lines · Thiago Jung Bauermann
Define new "d-modsig" template field which holds the digest that is expected to match the one contained in the modsig, and also new "modsig" template field which holds the appended file signature.
Quoted 8 lines
Add a new "ima-modsig" defined template descriptor with the new fields as well as the ones from the "ima-sig" descriptor.
Change
ima_store_measurement()to accept a struct modsig * argument so that it can be passed along to the templates via structima_event_data.Suggested-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Thiago Jung Bauermann <[email protected]>
Thanks, Roberto. Just some thoughts inline below.
Quoted 1 line
---
<snip>
Quoted 24 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +24
-0+/* +* Validating the appended signature included in the measurement list requires +* the file hash calculated without the appended signature (i.e., the 'd-modsig' +* field). Therefore, notify the user if they have the 'modsig' field but not +* the 'd-modsig' field in the template. +*/ +static void check_current_template_modsig (void ) +{ +#define MSG "template with 'modsig' field also needs 'd-modsig' field\n" +struct ima_template_desc *template; +bool has_modsig, has_dmodsig; +static bool checked; +int i; + +/* We only need to notify the user once. */ +if (checked) +return ; + + has_modsig = has_dmodsig = false; + template =ima_template_desc_current (); +for (i =0 ; i < template->num_fields; i++) { +if (!strcmp (template->fields[i]->field_id,"modsig" )) + has_modsig = true; +else if (!strcmp (template->fields[i]->field_id,"d-modsig" ))
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value) · line 795
Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +10
-0+ has_dmodsig = true; + } + +if (has_modsig && !has_dmodsig) +pr_notice (MSG ); + + checked = true; +#undef MSG +} +
There was some recent discussion about supporting per IMA policy rule template formats. This feature will allow just the kexec kernel image to require ima-modsig. When per policy rule template formats support is upstreamed, this function will need to be updated.
<snip>
Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +5
-0@@ -389,3 +425,25 @@ int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,return ima_write_template_field_data (xattr_value, event_data->xattr_len,DATA_FMT_HEX , field_data); } + +int ima_eventmodsig_init (struct ima_event_data *event_data, +struct ima_field_data *field_data) +{ +const void *data;
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, · line 442
Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +10
-0+u32 data_len; +int rc; + +if (!event_data->modsig) +return 0 ; + +/* +* The xattr_value for IMA_MODSIG is a runtime structure containing +* pointers. Get its raw data instead. +*/
"xattr_value"? The comment needs some clarification.
Mimi
Quoted 7 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +7
-0+ rc =ima_modsig_serialize (event_data->modsig, &data, &data_len); +if (rc) +return rc; + +return ima_write_template_field_data (data, data_len, +DATA_FMT_HEX , field_data); +}
Mimi Zohar
maintainerRe: [PATCH v10 09/12] ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannHi Thiago,
Quoted 15 lines · Thiago Jung Bauermann
(quoted diff) +0
-0@@ -326,6 +356,10 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,case
INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN:
break;
case INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS: /* No EVM protected xattrs. */ + /* It's fine not to have xattrs when using a modsig. */ + if (try_modsig)
+ break;
+ /* fall through */
case INTEGRITY_NOLABEL: /* No security.evm xattr. */ cause = "missing-HMAC";
goto out;security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +0
-0@@ -340,6 +374,14 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, rc = xattr_verify(func, iint, xattr_value, xattr_len, &status, &cause);
Quoted 8 lines
+ /*
+ * If we have a modsig and either no imasig or the imasig's key isn't + * known, then try verifying the modsig.
+ */
+ if (status !=INTEGRITY_PASS&&try_modsig&&
+ (!xattr_value || rc =-ENOKEY))
+ rc =modsig_verify(func, modsig, &status, &cause);
EVM protects other security xattrs, not just security.ima, if they exist. As a result, evm_verifyxattr() could pass based on the other security xattrs.
Mimi
Quoted 4 lines
+
out:
/*
* File signatures on some filesystems can not be properly verified.
Mimi Zohar
maintainerRe: [PATCH v10 12/12] ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannHi Thiago,
Quoted 10 lines · Thiago Jung Bauermann
If the IMA template contains the "modsig" or "d-modsig" field, then the modsig should be added to the measurement list when the file is appraised.
And that is what normally happens, but if a measurement rule caused a file containing a modsig to be measured before a different rule causes it to be appraised, the resulting measurement entry will not contain the modsig because it is only fetched during appraisal. When the appraisal rule triggers, it won't store a new measurement containing the modsig because the file was already measured.
Quoted 3 lines
We need to detect that situation and store an additional measurement with the modsig. This is done by adding an
IMA_MEASUREaction flag if we read a modsig and the IMA template contains a modsig field.
With the new per policy rule "template" support being added, this patch needs to be modified so that the per policy "template" format is checked. ima_template_has_modsig() should be called with the template_desc being used.
thanks,
Mimi
Quoted 23 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +11
-3@@ -282,9 +282,17 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,/* read 'security.ima' */ xattr_len =ima_read_xattr (file_dentry (file), &xattr_value); -/* Read the appended modsig if allowed by the policy. */ -if (iint->flags &IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED ) -ima_read_modsig (func, buf, size, &modsig); +/* +* Read the appended modsig, if allowed by the policy, and allow +* an additional measurement list entry, if needed, based on the +* template format. +*/ +if (iint->flags &IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED ) { + rc =ima_read_modsig (func, buf, size, &modsig); + +if (!rc &&ima_template_has_modsig ()) + action |=IMA_MEASURE ; + }
Re: [PATCH v10 01/12] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions
In reply to Mimi ZoharQuoted 9 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 8 lines · Thiago Jung Bauermann
IMA will use the
module_signatureformat for append signatures, so export the relevant definitions and factor out the code which verifies that the appended signature trailer is valid.Also, create a
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAToption so that IMA can select it and be able to usemod_check_sig()without having to depend on eitherCONFIG_MODULE_SIGorCONFIG_MODULES.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Thiago Jung Bauermann <[email protected]>Cc Jessica Yu <[email protected]>Just a couple minor questions/comments below.
Reviewed-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Thanks for your review and your comments!
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 15 lines
init/Kconfig +1
-1@@ -1906,7 +1906,7 @@ config MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL config MODULE_SIG bool "Module signature verification" depends on MODULES - select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + select MODULE_SIG_FORMAT help Check modules for valid signatures upon load: the signature is simply appended to the module. For more information see@@ -2036,6 +2036,10 @@ config TRIM_UNUSED_KSYMS
Quoted 8 lines
init/Kconfig config TRIM_UNUSED_KSYMS · line 2041
Quoted 5 lines
init/Kconfig +3
-0endif # MODULES +config MODULE_SIG_FORMAT + def_bool n + select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATIONNormally Kconfigs, in the same file, are defined before they are used.
I'm not sure if that is required or just a convention.
I think it's a convention, because it seemed to work in the current way. For the next version I moved the config MODULE_SIG_FORMAT definition to just before "menuconfig MODULES"
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 18 lines
kernel/module_signature.c new file +12
-0@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +/* +* Module signature checker +* +* Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +* Written by David Howells ([email protected]) +*/ + +#include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/printk.h> +#include <linux/module_signature.h> +#include <asm/byteorder.h>
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/module_signature.c line 18
Quoted 6 lines
kernel/module_signature.c new file +6
-0+ +/** +* mod_check_sig - check that the given signature is sane +* +* @ms: Signature to check. +* @file_len: Size of the file to which @ms is appended. "name" is missing.
Fixed.
Signature · 2 lines
Thiago Jung Bauermann IBM Linux Technology Center
Re: [PATCH v10 11/12] ima: Define ima-modsig template
In reply to Mimi ZoharQuoted 11 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 10 lines · Thiago Jung Bauermann
Define new "d-modsig" template field which holds the digest that is expected to match the one contained in the modsig, and also new "modsig" template field which holds the appended file signature.
Add a new "ima-modsig" defined template descriptor with the new fields as well as the ones from the "ima-sig" descriptor.
Change
ima_store_measurement()to accept a struct modsig * argument so that it can be passed along to the templates via structima_event_data.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Suggested-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Thiago Jung Bauermann <[email protected]>Thanks, Roberto. Just some thoughts inline below.
Reviewed-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Thanks!
Quoted 31 lines
Quoted 31 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +31
-0+/* +* Validating the appended signature included in the measurement list requires +* the file hash calculated without the appended signature (i.e., the 'd-modsig' +* field). Therefore, notify the user if they have the 'modsig' field but not +* the 'd-modsig' field in the template. +*/ +static void check_current_template_modsig (void ) +{ +#define MSG "template with 'modsig' field also needs 'd-modsig' field\n" +struct ima_template_desc *template; +bool has_modsig, has_dmodsig; +static bool checked; +int i; + +/* We only need to notify the user once. */ +if (checked) +return ; + + has_modsig = has_dmodsig = false; + template =ima_template_desc_current (); +for (i =0 ; i < template->num_fields; i++) { +if (!strcmp (template->fields[i]->field_id,"modsig" )) + has_modsig = true; +else if (!strcmp (template->fields[i]->field_id,"d-modsig" )) + has_dmodsig = true; + } + +if (has_modsig && !has_dmodsig) +pr_notice (MSG ); + + checked = true;
Quoted 8 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value) · line 795
Quoted 3 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +3
-0+#undef MSG +} +There was some recent discussion about supporting per IMA policy rule template formats. This feature will allow just the kexec kernel image to require ima-modsig. When per policy rule template formats support is upstreamed, this function will need to be updated.
Indeed. Thanks for the clarification. For the next iteration I rebased on top of Matthew Garret's "IMA: Allow profiles to define the desired IMA template" patch. I'm currently adapting this check accordingly.
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 13 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +9
-0@@ -389,3 +425,25 @@ int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,return ima_write_template_field_data (xattr_value, event_data->xattr_len,DATA_FMT_HEX , field_data); } + +int ima_eventmodsig_init (struct ima_event_data *event_data, +struct ima_field_data *field_data) +{ +const void *data; +u32 data_len; +int rc; + +if (!event_data->modsig)
Quoted 8 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, · line 442
Quoted 6 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +6
-0+return 0 ; + +/* +* The xattr_value for IMA_MODSIG is a runtime structure containing +* pointers. Get its raw data instead. +*/ "
xattr_value"? The comment needs some clarification.
Oops, forgot to update this comment. This is the new version:
/* * modsig is a runtime structure containing pointers. Get its raw data * instead. */
--
Thiago Jung Bauermann
IBM Linux Technology Center
Re: [PATCH v10 12/12] ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig
In reply to Mimi ZoharQuoted 13 lines · Mimi Zohar
Hi Thiago,
Quoted 10 lines · Thiago Jung Bauermann
If the IMA template contains the "modsig" or "d-modsig" field, then the modsig should be added to the measurement list when the file is appraised.
And that is what normally happens, but if a measurement rule caused a file containing a modsig to be measured before a different rule causes it to be appraised, the resulting measurement entry will not contain the modsig because it is only fetched during appraisal. When the appraisal rule triggers, it won't store a new measurement containing the modsig because the file was already measured.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
We need to detect that situation and store an additional measurement with the modsig. This is done by adding an
IMA_MEASUREaction flag if we read a modsig and the IMA template contains a modsig field.With the new per policy rule "template" support being added, this patch needs to be modified so that the per policy "template" format is checked.
ima_template_has_modsig()should be called with thetemplate_descbeing used.
Right. Thanks for point out what needs to be done. After rebasing on top of Matthew Garret's "IMA: Allow profiles to define the desired IMA template" patch I changed ima_template_has_modsig() to check the template_desc obtained from process_measurement().
--
Thiago Jung Bauermann
IBM Linux Technology Center
Re: [PATCH v10 09/12] ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures
In reply to Mimi ZoharQuoted 23 lines · Mimi Zohar
Hi Thiago,
Quoted 21 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +6
-0@@ -1144,6 +1144,12 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void) } } +#define __ima_hook_stringify (str) (#str), + +const char *const func_tokens[] = { +__ima_hooks (__ima_hook_stringify) +}; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY enum { mask_exec = 0, mask_write, mask_read, mask_append@@ -1156,12 +1162,6 @@ static const char *const mask_tokens[] = { "MAY_APPEND" };
Quoted 12 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static const char *const mask_tokens[] = { · line 1167
Quoted 9 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0
-6-#define __ima_hook_stringify (str) (#str), - -static const char *const func_tokens[] = { -__ima_hooks (__ima_hook_stringify) -}; -void *ima_policy_start (struct seq_file *m,loff_t *pos) {loff_t l = *pos;Is moving this something left over from previous versions or there is a need for this change?
Well, it's not a strong need, but it's still relevant in the current version. I use func_tokens in ima_read_modsig() in order to be able to mention the hook name in mod_check_sig()'s error message:
In ima_read_modsig():
rc = mod_check_sig(sig, buf_len, func_tokens[func]);
And in mod_check_sig():
pr_err("%s: Module is not signed with expected PKCS#7 message\n",
name);If you think it's not worth it to expose func_tokens, I can make ima_read_modsig() pass a more generic const string such as "IMA modsig" for example.
Quoted 1 line
Other than this, the patch looks good.
Nice!
--
Thiago Jung Bauermann
IBM Linux Technology Center
Re: [PATCH v10 09/12] ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures
In reply to Mimi ZoharQuoted 19 lines · Mimi Zohar
Hi Thiago,
Quoted 16 lines · Thiago Jung Bauermann
(quoted diff) +0
-0@@ -326,6 +356,10 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,case
INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN:
break;
case INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS:/* No EVM protected xattrs. */security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +4
-0+/* It's fine not to have xattrs when using a modsig. */ +if (try_modsig) +break ; +/* fall through */ case INTEGRITY_NOLABEL:/* No security.evm xattr. */ cause = "missing-HMAC";
goto out;security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +0
-0@@ -340,6 +374,14 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, rc =xattr_verify (func, iint, xattr_value, xattr_len, &status, &cause);
Quoted 11 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, · line 383
Quoted 7 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +7
-0+/* +* If we have a modsig and either no imasig or the imasig's key isn't +* known, then try verifying the modsig. +*/ +if (status !=INTEGRITY_PASS && try_modsig && + (!xattr_value || rc = -ENOKEY )) +rc =modsig_verify (func, modsig, &status, &cause);EVM protects other security xattrs, not just security.ima, if they exist. As a result,
evm_verifyxattr()could pass based on the other security xattrs.
Indeed! It doesn't make sense to test for status != INTEGRITY_PASS here. Not sure what I was thinking. Thanks for spotting it. With your other comments about this if clause, this code now reads:
/* * If we have a modsig and either no imasig or the imasig's key isn't * known, then try verifying the modsig. */ if (try_modsig && (!xattr_value || xattr_value->type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG || rc = -ENOKEY)) rc = modsig_verify(func, modsig, &status, &cause);
Signature · 2 lines
Thiago Jung Bauermann IBM Linux Technology Center
Mimi Zohar
maintainerRe: [PATCH v10 09/12] ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures
In reply to Thiago Jung BauermannQuoted 46 lines · Thiago Jung Bauermann
Quoted 23 lines · Mimi Zohar
Hi Thiago,
Quoted 21 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +6
-0@@ -1144,6 +1144,12 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void) } } +#define __ima_hook_stringify (str) (#str), + +const char *const func_tokens[] = { +__ima_hooks (__ima_hook_stringify) +}; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY enum { mask_exec = 0, mask_write, mask_read, mask_append@@ -1156,12 +1162,6 @@ static const char *const mask_tokens[] = { "MAY_APPEND" };Quoted 12 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static const char *const mask_tokens[] = { · line 1167
Quoted 9 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0
-6-#define __ima_hook_stringify (str) (#str), - -static const char *const func_tokens[] = { -__ima_hooks (__ima_hook_stringify) -}; -void *ima_policy_start (struct seq_file *m,loff_t *pos) {loff_t l = *pos;Is moving this something left over from previous versions or there is a need for this change?
Well, it's not a strong need, but it's still relevant in the current version. I use
func_tokensinima_read_modsig()in order to be able to mention the hook name in mod_check_sig()'s error message:In
ima_read_modsig():rc = mod_check_sig(sig, buf_len, func_tokens[func]);
Quoted 8 lines
And in
mod_check_sig():pr_err("%s: Module is not signed with expected PKCS#7 message\n", name);If you think it's not worth it to expose
func_tokens, I can makeima_read_modsig()pass a more generic const string such as "IMA modsig" for example.
This is fine. I somehow missed moving func_tokens[] outside of the ifdef was in order to make it independent of "CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY".
thanks,
Mimi