4.19.40-stable review
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 1/23 ipv4: ip_do_fragment: Preserve skb_iif during fragmentation
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Shmulik Ladkani <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d2f0c961148f65bc73eda72b9fa3a4e80973cb49 ]
Previously, during fragmentation after forwarding, skb->skb_iif isn't preserved, i.e. 'ip_copy_metadata' does not copy skb_iif from given 'from' skb.
As a result, ip_do_fragment's creates fragments with zero skb_iif, leading to inconsistent behavior.
Assume for example an eBPF program attached at tc egress (post forwarding) that examines __sk_buff->ingress_ifindex:
- the correct iif is observed if forwarding path does not involve fragmentation/refragmentation
- a bogus iif is observed if forwarding path involves fragmentation/refragmentatiom
Fix, by preserving skb_iif during 'ip_copy_metadata'.
--- net/ipv4/ip_output.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/ipv4/ip_output.c +1 -0
@@ -519,6 +519,7 @@ static void ip_copy_metadata(struct sk_b to->pkt_type = from->pkt_type; to->priority = from->priority; to->protocol = from->protocol; + to->skb_iif = from->skb_iif;skb_dst_drop (to);skb_dst_copy (to, from); to->dev = from->dev;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 11/23 rxrpc: Fix net namespace cleanup
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: David Howells <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b13023421b5179413421333f602850914f6a7ad8 ]
In rxrpc_destroy_all_calls(), there are two phases: (1) make sure the ->calls list is empty, emitting error messages if not, and (2) wait for the RCU cleanup to happen on outstanding calls (ie. ->nr_calls becomes 0).
To avoid taking the call_lock, the function prechecks ->calls and if empty, it returns to avoid taking the lock - this is wrong, however: it still needs to go and do the second phase and wait for ->nr_calls to become 0.
Without this, the rxrpc_net struct may get deallocated before we get to the RCU cleanup for the last calls. This can lead to:
Slab corruption (Not tainted): kmalloc-16k start=ffff88802b178000, len=16384 050: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 61 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkakkkkkkk
Note the "61" at offset 0x58. This corresponds to the ->nr_calls member of struct rxrpc_net (which is >9k in size, and thus allocated out of the 16k slab).
Fix this by flipping the condition on the if-statement, putting the locked section inside the if-body and dropping the return from there. The function will then always go on to wait for the RCU cleanup on outstanding calls.
--- net/rxrpc/call_object.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
net/rxrpc/call_object.c +19 -19
@@ -701,30 +701,30 @@ void rxrpc_destroy_all_calls(struct rxrp_enter ("" ); -if (list_empty (&rxnet->calls)) -return ; - -write_lock (&rxnet->call_lock); +if (!list_empty (&rxnet->calls)) { +write_lock (&rxnet->call_lock); -while (!list_empty (&rxnet->calls)) { - call = list_entry(rxnet->calls.next, struct rxrpc_call, link); -_debug ("Zapping call %p" , call); - -rxrpc_see_call (call); -list_del_init (&call->link); - -pr_err ("Call %p still in use (%d,%s,%lx,%lx)!\n" , - call,atomic_read (&call->usage), - rxrpc_call_states[call->state], - call->flags, call->events); +while (!list_empty (&rxnet->calls)) { + call =list_entry (rxnet->calls.next, + struct rxrpc_call, link); +_debug ("Zapping call %p" , call); + +rxrpc_see_call (call); +list_del_init (&call->link); + +pr_err ("Call %p still in use (%d,%s,%lx,%lx)!\n" , + call,atomic_read (&call->usage), + rxrpc_call_states[call->state], + call->flags, call->events); + +write_unlock (&rxnet->call_lock); +cond_resched (); +write_lock (&rxnet->call_lock); + }write_unlock (&rxnet->call_lock); -cond_resched (); -write_lock (&rxnet->call_lock); } -write_unlock (&rxnet->call_lock); -atomic_dec (&rxnet->nr_calls);wait_var_event (&rxnet->nr_calls, !atomic_read (&rxnet->nr_calls)); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 12/23 sctp: avoid running the sctp state machine recursively
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Xin Long <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fbd019737d71e405f86549fd738f81e2ff3dd073 ]
Ying triggered a call trace when doing an asconf testing:
BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/12/0/0x10000100 Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffffa4375904>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b [<ffffffffa436fcaf>] __schedule_bug+0x64/0x72 [<ffffffffa437b93a>] __schedule+0x9ba/0xa00 [<ffffffffa3cd5326>] __cond_resched+0x26/0x30 [<ffffffffa437bc4a>] _cond_resched+0x3a/0x50 [<ffffffffa3e22be8>] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x38/0x200 [<ffffffffa423512d>] __alloc_skb+0x5d/0x2d0 [<ffffffffc0995320>] sctp_packet_transmit+0x610/0xa20 [sctp] [<ffffffffc098510e>] sctp_outq_flush+0x2ce/0xc00 [sctp] [<ffffffffc098646c>] sctp_outq_uncork+0x1c/0x20 [sctp] [<ffffffffc0977338>] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.22+0xc8/0x1460 [sctp] [<ffffffffc0976ad1>] sctp_do_sm+0xe1/0x350 [sctp] [<ffffffffc099443d>] sctp_primitive_ASCONF+0x3d/0x50 [sctp] [<ffffffffc0977384>] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.22+0x114/0x1460 [sctp] [<ffffffffc0976ad1>] sctp_do_sm+0xe1/0x350 [sctp] [<ffffffffc097b3a4>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xf4/0x1b0 [sctp] [<ffffffffc09840f1>] sctp_inq_push+0x51/0x70 [sctp] [<ffffffffc099732b>] sctp_rcv+0xa8b/0xbd0 [sctp]
As it shows, the first sctp_do_sm() running under atomic context (NET_RX softirq) invoked sctp_primitive_ASCONF() that uses GFP_KERNEL flag later, and this flag is supposed to be used in non-atomic context only. Besides, sctp_do_sm() was called recursively, which is not expected.
Vlad tried to fix this recursive call in Commit c0786693404c ("sctp: Fix oops when sending queued ASCONF chunks") by introducing a new command SCTP_CMD_SEND_NEXT_ASCONF. But it didn't work as this command is still used in the first sctp_do_sm() call, and sctp_primitive_ASCONF() will be called in this command again.
To avoid calling sctp_do_sm() recursively, we send the next queued ASCONF not by sctp_primitive_ASCONF(), but by sctp_sf_do_prm_asconf() in the 1st sctp_do_sm() directly.
--- include/net/sctp/command.h | 1 - net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c | 29 ----------------------------- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
include/net/sctp/command.h +0 -1
@@ -105,7 +105,6 @@ enum sctp_verb {SCTP_CMD_T1_RETRAN ,/* Mark for retransmission after T1 timeout */ SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_INITTAG ,/* Update peer inittag */ SCTP_CMD_SEND_MSG ,/* Send the whole use message */ -SCTP_CMD_SEND_NEXT_ASCONF ,/* Send the next ASCONF after ACK */ SCTP_CMD_PURGE_ASCONF_QUEUE ,/* Purge all asconf queues.*/ SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC ,/* Restore association context */ SCTP_CMD_LAST
net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c +0 -29
@@ -1112,32 +1112,6 @@ static void sctp_cmd_send_msg(struct sct } -/* Sent the next ASCONF packet currently stored in the association. -* This happens after the ASCONF_ACK was succeffully processed. -*/ -static void sctp_cmd_send_asconf (struct sctp_association *asoc) -{ -struct net *net =sock_net (asoc->base.sk); - -/* Send the next asconf chunk from the addip chunk -* queue. -*/ -if (!list_empty (&asoc->addip_chunk_list)) { -struct list_head *entry = asoc->addip_chunk_list.next; -struct sctp_chunk *asconf =list_entry (entry, - struct sctp_chunk, list); -list_del_init (entry); - -/* Hold the chunk until an ASCONF_ACK is received. */ -sctp_chunk_hold (asconf); -if (sctp_primitive_ASCONF (net, asoc, asconf)) -sctp_chunk_free (asconf); -else - asoc->addip_last_asconf = asconf; - } -} - -/* These three macros allow us to pull the debugging code out of the * main flow of sctp_do_sm() to keep attention focused on the real * functionality there.
@@ -1783,9 +1757,6 @@ static int sctp_cmd_interpreter(enum sct }sctp_cmd_send_msg (asoc, cmd->obj.msg, gfp);break ; -case SCTP_CMD_SEND_NEXT_ASCONF : -sctp_cmd_send_asconf (asoc); -break ;case SCTP_CMD_PURGE_ASCONF_QUEUE :sctp_asconf_queue_teardown (asoc);break ;
net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +27 -8
@@ -3824,6 +3824,29 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_asconf(return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME ; } +static enum sctp_disposition sctp_send_next_asconf ( +struct net *net, +const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, +struct sctp_association *asoc, +const union sctp_subtype type, +struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands) +{ +struct sctp_chunk *asconf; +struct list_head *entry; + +if (list_empty (&asoc->addip_chunk_list)) +return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME ; + + entry = asoc->addip_chunk_list.next; + asconf = list_entry(entry, struct sctp_chunk, list); + +list_del_init (entry); +sctp_chunk_hold (asconf); + asoc->addip_last_asconf = asconf; + +return sctp_sf_do_prm_asconf (net, ep, asoc, type, asconf, commands); +} +/* * ADDIP Section 4.3 General rules for address manipulation * When building TLV parameters for the ASCONF Chunk that will add or
@@ -3915,14 +3938,10 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_asconf_ SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T4_RTO));if (!sctp_process_asconf_ack ((struct sctp_association *)asoc, - asconf_ack)) { -/* Successfully processed ASCONF_ACK. We can -* release the next asconf if we have one. -*/ -sctp_add_cmd_sf (commands,SCTP_CMD_SEND_NEXT_ASCONF , -SCTP_NULL ()); -return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME ; - } + asconf_ack)) +return sctp_send_next_asconf (net, ep, + (struct sctp_association *)asoc, + type, commands); abort =sctp_make_abort (asoc, asconf_ack,sizeof (struct sctp_errhdr ));
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 13/23 selftests: fib_rule_tests: print the result and return 1 if any tests failed
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f68d7c44e76532e46f292ad941aa3706cb9e6e40 ]
--- tools/testing/selftests/net/fib_rule_tests.sh | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/net/fib_rule_tests.sh +6 -0
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ log_test() nsuccess=$((nsuccess+1)) printf "\n TEST: %-50s [ OK ]\n" "${msg}" else + ret=1 nfail=$((nfail+1)) printf "\n TEST: %-50s [FAIL]\n" "${msg}" if [ "${PAUSE_ON_FAIL}" = "yes" ]; then
@@ -245,4 +246,9 @@ setup run_fibrule_tests cleanup +if [ "$TESTS" != "none" ]; then + printf "\nTests passed: %3d\n" ${nsuccess} + printf "Tests failed: %3d\n" ${nfail} +fi + exit $ret
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 14/23 packet: validate msg_namelen in send directly
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 486efdc8f6ce802b27e15921d2353cc740c55451 ]
Packet sockets in datagram mode take a destination address. Verify its length before passing to dev_hard_header.
Prior to 2.6.14-rc3, the send code ignored sll_halen. This is established behavior. Directly compare msg_namelen to dev->addr_len.
Change v1->v2: initialize addr in all paths
--- net/packet/af_packet.c | 24 ++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
net/packet/af_packet.c +14 -10
@@ -2603,8 +2603,8 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_socvoid *ph; DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_ll *, saddr, msg->msg_name);bool need_wait = !(msg->msg_flags &MSG_DONTWAIT ); +unsigned char *addr =NULL ;int tp_len, size_max; -unsigned char *addr;void *data;int len_sum =0 ;int status =TP_STATUS_AVAILABLE ;
@@ -2615,7 +2615,6 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_socif (likely (saddr ==NULL )) { dev =packet_cached_dev_get (po); proto = po->num; - addr =NULL ; }else { err = -EINVAL ;if (msg->msg_namelen <sizeof (struct sockaddr_ll ))
@@ -2625,10 +2624,13 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_soc sll_addr))) goto out; proto = saddr->sll_protocol; - addr = saddr->sll_halen ? saddr->sll_addr :NULL ; dev =dev_get_by_index (sock_net (&po->sk), saddr->sll_ifindex); -if (addr && dev && saddr->sll_halen < dev->addr_len) - goto out_put; +if (po->sk.sk_socket->type ==SOCK_DGRAM ) { +if (dev && msg->msg_namelen < dev->addr_len + + offsetof(struct sockaddr_ll , sll_addr)) + goto out_put; + addr = saddr->sll_addr; + } } err = -ENXIO ;
@@ -2800,7 +2802,7 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *socstruct sk_buff *skb;struct net_device *dev;__be16 proto; -unsigned char *addr; +unsigned char *addr =NULL ;int err, reserve =0 ;struct sockcm_cookie sockc;struct virtio_net_hdr vnet_hdr = {0 };
@@ -2817,7 +2819,6 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *socif (likely (saddr ==NULL )) { dev =packet_cached_dev_get (po); proto = po->num; - addr =NULL ; }else { err = -EINVAL ;if (msg->msg_namelen <sizeof (struct sockaddr_ll ))
@@ -2825,10 +2826,13 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *socif (msg->msg_namelen < (saddr->sll_halen + offsetof(struct sockaddr_ll , sll_addr))) goto out; proto = saddr->sll_protocol; - addr = saddr->sll_halen ? saddr->sll_addr :NULL ; dev =dev_get_by_index (sock_net (sk), saddr->sll_ifindex); -if (addr && dev && saddr->sll_halen < dev->addr_len) - goto out_unlock; +if (sock->type ==SOCK_DGRAM ) { +if (dev && msg->msg_namelen < dev->addr_len + + offsetof(struct sockaddr_ll , sll_addr)) + goto out_unlock; + addr = saddr->sll_addr; + } } err = -ENXIO ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 15/23 bnxt_en: Improve multicast address setup logic.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Michael Chan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b4e30e8e7ea1d1e35ffd64ca46f7d9a7f227b4bf ]
The driver builds a list of multicast addresses and sends it to the firmware when the driver's ndo_set_rx_mode() is called. In rare cases, the firmware can fail this call if internal resources to add multicast addresses are exhausted. In that case, we should try the call again by setting the ALL_MCAST flag which is more guaranteed to succeed.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c +8 -1
@@ -7441,8 +7441,15 @@ static int bnxt_cfg_rx_mode(struct bnxt skip_uc: rc =bnxt_hwrm_cfa_l2_set_rx_mask (bp,0 ); +if (rc && vnic->mc_list_count) { +netdev_info (bp->dev,"Failed setting MC filters rc: %d, turning on ALL_MCAST mode\n" , + rc); + vnic->rx_mask |=CFA_L2_SET_RX_MASK_REQ_MASK_ALL_MCAST ; + vnic->mc_list_count =0 ; + rc =bnxt_hwrm_cfa_l2_set_rx_mask (bp,0 ); + }if (rc) -netdev_err (bp->dev,"HWRM cfa l2 rx mask failure rc: %x\n" , +netdev_err (bp->dev,"HWRM cfa l2 rx mask failure rc: %d\n" , rc);return rc;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 16/23 bnxt_en: Free short FW command HWRM memory in error path in bnxt_init_one()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Vasundhara Volam <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f9099d611449836a51a65f40ea7dc9cb5f2f665e ]
In the bnxt_init_one() error path, short FW command request memory is not freed. This patch fixes it.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c +1 -0
@@ -9084,6 +9084,7 @@ init_err_cleanup_tc:bnxt_clear_int_mode (bp); init_err_pci_clean: +bnxt_free_hwrm_short_cmd_req (bp);bnxt_free_hwrm_resources (bp);bnxt_cleanup_pci (bp);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 17/23 bnxt_en: Fix uninitialized variable usage in bnxt_rx_pkt().
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Michael Chan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0b397b17a4120cb80f7bf89eb30587b3dd9b0d1d ]
In bnxt_rx_pkt(), if the driver encounters BD errors, it will recycle the buffers and jump to the end where the uninitailized variable "len" is referenced. Fix it by adding a new jump label that will skip the length update. This is the most correct fix since the length may not be valid when we get this type of error.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c +5 -4
@@ -1584,7 +1584,7 @@ static int bnxt_rx_pkt(struct bnxt *bp,netdev_warn (bp->dev,"RX buffer error %x\n" , rx_err);bnxt_sched_reset (bp, rxr); } - goto next_rx; + goto next_rx_no_len; } len =le32_to_cpu (rxcmp->rx_cmp_len_flags_type) >>RX_CMP_LEN_SHIFT ;
@@ -1665,12 +1665,13 @@ static int bnxt_rx_pkt(struct bnxt *bp, rc =1 ; next_rx: - rxr->rx_prod =NEXT_RX (prod); - rxr->rx_next_cons =NEXT_RX (cons); - cpr->rx_packets +=1 ; cpr->rx_bytes += len; +next_rx_no_len: + rxr->rx_prod =NEXT_RX (prod); + rxr->rx_next_cons =NEXT_RX (cons); + next_rx_no_prod_no_len: *raw_cons = tmp_raw_cons;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 18/23 net/tls: dont copy negative amounts of data in reencrypt
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 97e1caa517e22d62a283b876fb8aa5f4672c83dd ]
There is no guarantee the record starts before the skb frags. If we don't check for this condition copy amount will get negative, leading to reads and writes to random memory locations. Familiar hilarity ensues.
--- net/tls/tls_device.c | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/tls/tls_device.c +8 -6
@@ -600,14 +600,16 @@ static int tls_device_reencrypt(struct selse err =0 ; - copy =min_t (int,skb_pagelen (skb) - offset, - rxm->full_len -TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_TAG_SIZE ); +if (skb_pagelen (skb) > offset) { + copy =min_t (int,skb_pagelen (skb) - offset, + rxm->full_len -TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_TAG_SIZE ); -if (skb->decrypted) -skb_store_bits (skb, offset, buf, copy); +if (skb->decrypted) +skb_store_bits (skb, offset, buf, copy); - offset += copy; - buf += copy; + offset += copy; + buf += copy; + } skb_walk_frags(skb, skb_iter) { copy = min_t(int, skb_iter->len,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 19/23 net/tls: fix copy to fragments in reencrypt
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit eb3d38d5adb520435d4e4af32529ccb13ccc9935 ]
Fragments may contain data from other records so we have to account for that when we calculate the destination and max length of copy we can perform. Note that 'offset' is the offset within the message, so it can't be passed as offset within the frag..
Here skb_store_bits() would have realised the call is wrong and simply not copy data.
--- net/tls/tls_device.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
net/tls/tls_device.c +22 -7
@@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ void handle_device_resync(struct sock *sstatic int tls_device_reencrypt (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb) {struct strp_msg *rxm =strp_msg (skb); -int err =0 , offset = rxm->offset, copy, nsg; +int err =0 , offset = rxm->offset, copy, nsg, data_len, pos;struct sk_buff *skb_iter, *unused;struct scatterlist sg[1 ];char *orig_buf, *buf;
@@ -600,9 +600,10 @@ static int tls_device_reencrypt(struct selse err =0 ; + data_len = rxm->full_len -TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_TAG_SIZE ; +if (skb_pagelen (skb) > offset) { - copy =min_t (int,skb_pagelen (skb) - offset, - rxm->full_len -TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_TAG_SIZE ); + copy =min_t (int,skb_pagelen (skb) - offset, data_len);if (skb->decrypted)skb_store_bits (skb, offset, buf, copy);
@@ -611,16 +612,30 @@ static int tls_device_reencrypt(struct s buf += copy; } + pos =skb_pagelen (skb); skb_walk_frags(skb, skb_iter) { - copy =min_t (int, skb_iter->len, - rxm->full_len - offset + rxm->offset - -TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_TAG_SIZE ); +int frag_pos; + +/* Practically all frags must belong to msg if reencrypt +* is needed with current strparser and coalescing logic, +* but strparser may "get optimized", so let's be safe. +*/ +if (pos + skb_iter->len <= offset) + goto done_with_frag; +if (pos >= data_len + rxm->offset) +break ; + + frag_pos = offset - pos; + copy =min_t (int, skb_iter->len - frag_pos, + data_len + rxm->offset - offset);if (skb_iter->decrypted) -skb_store_bits (skb_iter, offset, buf, copy); +skb_store_bits (skb_iter, frag_pos, buf, copy); offset += copy; buf += copy; +done_with_frag: + pos += skb_iter->len; } free_buf:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 20/23 KVM: x86: Whitelist port 0x7e for pre-incrementing %rip
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
commit 8764ed55c9705e426d889ff16c26f398bba70b9b upstream.
KVM's recent bug fix to update %rip after emulating I/O broke userspace that relied on the previous behavior of incrementing %rip prior to exiting to userspace. When running a Windows XP guest on AMD hardware, Qemu may patch "OUT 0x7E" instructions in reaction to the OUT itself. Because KVM's old behavior was to increment %rip before exiting to userspace to handle the I/O, Qemu manually adjusted %rip to account for the OUT instruction.
Arguably this is a userspace bug as KVM requires userspace to re-enter the kernel to complete instruction emulation before taking any other actions. That being said, this is a bit of a grey area and breaking userspace that has worked for many years is bad.
Pre-increment %rip on OUT to port 0x7e before exiting to userspace to hack around the issue.
--- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +1 -0
@@ -378,6 +378,7 @@ struct kvm_sync_regs {#define KVM_X86_QUIRK_LINT0_REENABLED (1 << 0)#define KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED (1 << 1)#define KVM_X86_QUIRK_LAPIC_MMIO_HOLE (1 << 2) +#define KVM_X86_QUIRK_OUT_7E_INC_RIP (1 << 3)#define KVM_STATE_NESTED_GUEST_MODE 0x00000001#define KVM_STATE_NESTED_RUN_PENDING 0x00000002
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +19 -2
@@ -6328,6 +6328,12 @@ int kvm_emulate_instruction_from_buffer( }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (kvm_emulate_instruction_from_buffer); +static int complete_fast_pio_out_port_0x7e (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + vcpu->arch.pio.count =0 ; +return 1 ; +} +static int complete_fast_pio_out (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { vcpu->arch.pio.count =0 ;
@@ -6344,12 +6350,23 @@ static int kvm_fast_pio_out(struct kvm_vunsigned long val =kvm_register_read (vcpu,VCPU_REGS_RAX );int ret =emulator_pio_out_emulated (&vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt, size, port, &val,1 ); +if (ret) +return ret; -if (!ret) { +/* +* Workaround userspace that relies on old KVM behavior of %rip being +* incremented prior to exiting to userspace to handle "OUT 0x7e". +*/ +if (port ==0x7e && +kvm_check_has_quirk (vcpu->kvm,KVM_X86_QUIRK_OUT_7E_INC_RIP )) { + vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = + complete_fast_pio_out_port_0x7e; +kvm_skip_emulated_instruction (vcpu); + }else { vcpu->arch.pio.linear_rip =kvm_get_linear_rip (vcpu); vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_fast_pio_out; } -return ret; +return 0 ; }static int complete_fast_pio_in (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 21/23 KVM: nVMX: Fix size checks in vmx_set_nested_state
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
commit e8ab8d24b488632d07ce5ddb261f1d454114415b upstream.
The size checks in vmx_nested_state are wrong because the calculations are made based on the size of a pointer to a struct kvm_nested_state rather than the size of a struct kvm_nested_state.
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +2 -2
@@ -14236,7 +14236,7 @@ static int vmx_set_nested_state(struct kreturn ret;/* Empty 'VMXON' state is permitted */ -if (kvm_state->size <sizeof (kvm_state) +sizeof (*vmcs12)) +if (kvm_state->size <sizeof (*kvm_state) +sizeof (*vmcs12))return 0 ; if (kvm_state->vmx.vmcs_pa == kvm_state->vmx.vmxon_pa ||
@@ -14269,7 +14269,7 @@ static int vmx_set_nested_state(struct kif (nested_cpu_has_shadow_vmcs (vmcs12) && vmcs12->vmcs_link_pointer !=-1ull ) {struct vmcs12 *shadow_vmcs12 =get_shadow_vmcs12 (vcpu); -if (kvm_state->size <sizeof (kvm_state) +2 *sizeof (*vmcs12)) +if (kvm_state->size <sizeof (*kvm_state) +2 *sizeof (*vmcs12))return -EINVAL ; if (copy_from_user(shadow_vmcs12,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 22/23 ALSA: line6: use dynamic buffers
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit e5c812e84f0dece3400d5caf42522287e6ef139f upstream.
The line6 driver uses a lot of USB buffers off of the stack, which is not allowed on many systems, causing the driver to crash on some of them. Fix this up by dynamically allocating the buffers with kmalloc() which allows for proper DMA-able memory.
--- sound/usb/line6/driver.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- sound/usb/line6/podhd.c | 21 +++++++++------ sound/usb/line6/toneport.c | 24 +++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
sound/usb/line6/driver.c +35 -25
@@ -351,12 +351,16 @@ int line6_read_data(struct usb_line6 *li {struct usb_device *usbdev = line6->usbdev;int ret; -unsigned char len; +unsigned char *len;unsigned count;if (address >0xffff || datalen >0xff )return -EINVAL ; + len =kmalloc (sizeof (*len),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!len) +return -ENOMEM ; +/* query the serial number: */ ret = usb_control_msg(usbdev, usb_sndctrlpipe(usbdev, 0), 0x67, USB_TYPE_VENDOR | USB_RECIP_DEVICE | USB_DIR_OUT,
@@ -365,7 +369,7 @@ int line6_read_data(struct usb_line6 *liif (ret <0 ) {dev_err (line6->ifcdev,"read request failed (error %d)\n" , ret); -return ret; + goto exit; }/* Wait for data length. We'll get 0xff until length arrives. */
@@ -375,28 +379,29 @@ int line6_read_data(struct usb_line6 *li ret =usb_control_msg (usbdev,usb_rcvctrlpipe (usbdev,0 ),0x67 ,USB_TYPE_VENDOR |USB_RECIP_DEVICE |USB_DIR_IN , -0x0012 ,0x0000 , &len,1 , +0x0012 ,0x0000 , len,1 ,LINE6_TIMEOUT *HZ );if (ret <0 ) {dev_err (line6->ifcdev,"receive length failed (error %d)\n" , ret); -return ret; + goto exit; } -if (len !=0xff ) +if (*len !=0xff )break ; } -if (len ==0xff ) { + ret = -EIO ; +if (*len ==0xff ) {dev_err (line6->ifcdev,"read failed after %d retries\n" , count); -return -EIO ; - }else if (len != datalen) { + goto exit; + }else if (*len != datalen) {/* should be equal or something went wrong */ dev_err (line6->ifcdev,"length mismatch (expected %d, got %d)\n" , - (int )datalen, (int )len); -return -EIO ; + (int )datalen, (int )*len); + goto exit; }/* receive the result: */
@@ -405,12 +410,12 @@ int line6_read_data(struct usb_line6 *li0x0013 ,0x0000 , data, datalen, LINE6_TIMEOUT * HZ); -if (ret <0 ) { +if (ret <0 )dev_err (line6->ifcdev,"read failed (error %d)\n" , ret); -return ret; - } -return 0 ; +exit: +kfree (len); +return ret; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (line6_read_data);
@@ -422,12 +427,16 @@ int line6_write_data(struct usb_line6 *l {struct usb_device *usbdev = line6->usbdev;int ret; -unsigned char status; +unsigned char *status;int count;if (address >0xffff || datalen >0xffff )return -EINVAL ; + status =kmalloc (sizeof (*status),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!status) +return -ENOMEM ; + ret = usb_control_msg(usbdev, usb_sndctrlpipe(usbdev, 0), 0x67, USB_TYPE_VENDOR | USB_RECIP_DEVICE | USB_DIR_OUT, 0x0022, address, data, datalen,
@@ -436,7 +445,7 @@ int line6_write_data(struct usb_line6 *lif (ret <0 ) {dev_err (line6->ifcdev,"write request failed (error %d)\n" , ret); -return ret; + goto exit; }for (count =0 ; count <LINE6_READ_WRITE_MAX_RETRIES ; count++) {
@@ -447,28 +456,29 @@ int line6_write_data(struct usb_line6 *lUSB_TYPE_VENDOR |USB_RECIP_DEVICE |USB_DIR_IN ,0x0012 ,0x0000 , - &status, 1, LINE6_TIMEOUT * HZ); + status, 1, LINE6_TIMEOUT * HZ);if (ret <0 ) {dev_err (line6->ifcdev,"receiving status failed (error %d)\n" , ret); -return ret; + goto exit; } -if (status !=0xff ) +if (*status !=0xff )break ; } -if (status ==0xff ) { +if (*status ==0xff ) {dev_err (line6->ifcdev,"write failed after %d retries\n" , count); -return -EIO ; - }else if (status !=0 ) { + ret = -EIO ; + }else if (*status !=0 ) {dev_err (line6->ifcdev,"write failed (error %d)\n" , ret); -return -EIO ; + ret = -EIO ; } - -return 0 ; +exit: +kfree (status); +return ret; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (line6_write_data);
sound/usb/line6/podhd.c +12 -9
@@ -225,28 +225,32 @@ static void podhd_startup_start_workqueustatic int podhd_dev_start (struct usb_line6_podhd *pod) {int ret; -u8 init_bytes[8 ]; +u8 *init_bytes;int i;struct usb_device *usbdev = pod->line6.usbdev; + init_bytes =kmalloc (8 ,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!init_bytes) +return -ENOMEM ; + ret =usb_control_msg (usbdev,usb_sndctrlpipe (usbdev,0 ),0x67 ,USB_TYPE_VENDOR |USB_RECIP_DEVICE |USB_DIR_OUT ,0x11 ,0 ,NULL ,0 ,LINE6_TIMEOUT *HZ );if (ret <0 ) {dev_err (pod->line6.ifcdev,"read request failed (error %d)\n" , ret); -return ret; + goto exit; }/* NOTE: looks like some kind of ping message */ ret =usb_control_msg (usbdev,usb_rcvctrlpipe (usbdev,0 ),0x67 ,USB_TYPE_VENDOR |USB_RECIP_DEVICE |USB_DIR_IN ,0x11 ,0x0 , - &init_bytes,3 ,LINE6_TIMEOUT *HZ ); + init_bytes,3 ,LINE6_TIMEOUT *HZ );if (ret <0 ) {dev_err (pod->line6.ifcdev,"receive length failed (error %d)\n" , ret); -return ret; + goto exit; } pod->firmware_version =
@@ -255,7 +259,7 @@ static int podhd_dev_start(struct usb_lifor (i =0 ; i <=16 ; i++) { ret =line6_read_data (&pod->line6,0xf000 +0x08 * i, init_bytes,8 );if (ret <0 ) -return ret; + goto exit; } ret = usb_control_msg(usbdev, usb_sndctrlpipe(usbdev, 0),
@@ -263,10 +267,9 @@ static int podhd_dev_start(struct usb_liUSB_TYPE_STANDARD |USB_RECIP_DEVICE |USB_DIR_OUT ,1 ,0 , NULL, 0, LINE6_TIMEOUT * HZ); -if (ret <0 ) -return ret; - -return 0 ; +exit: +kfree (init_bytes); +return ret; }static void podhd_startup_workqueue (struct work_struct *work)
sound/usb/line6/toneport.c +18 -6
@@ -365,16 +365,21 @@ static bool toneport_has_source_select(s/* Setup Toneport device. */ -static void toneport_setup (struct usb_line6_toneport *toneport) +static int toneport_setup (struct usb_line6_toneport *toneport) { -u32 ticks; +u32 *ticks;struct usb_line6 *line6 = &toneport->line6;struct usb_device *usbdev = line6->usbdev; + ticks =kmalloc (sizeof (*ticks),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!ticks) +return -ENOMEM ; +/* sync time on device with host: */ /* note: 32-bit timestamps overflow in year 2106 */ - ticks = (u32 )ktime_get_real_seconds (); -line6_write_data (line6,0x80c6 , &ticks,4 ); + *ticks = (u32 )ktime_get_real_seconds (); +line6_write_data (line6,0x80c6 , ticks,4 ); +kfree (ticks);/* enable device: */ toneport_send_cmd (usbdev,0x0301 ,0x0000 );
@@ -389,6 +394,7 @@ static void toneport_setup(struct usb_litoneport_update_led (toneport);mod_timer (&toneport->timer, jiffies +TONEPORT_PCM_DELAY *HZ ); +return 0 ; }/*
@@ -451,7 +457,9 @@ static int toneport_init(struct usb_linereturn err; } -toneport_setup (toneport); + err =toneport_setup (toneport); +if (err) +return err;/* register audio system: */ return snd_card_register (line6->card);
@@ -463,7 +471,11 @@ static int toneport_init(struct usb_line*/ static int toneport_reset_resume (struct usb_interface *interface) { -toneport_setup (usb_get_intfdata (interface)); +int err; + + err =toneport_setup (usb_get_intfdata (interface)); +if (err) +return err;return line6_resume (interface); }#endif
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 23/23 ath10k: Drop WARN_ON()s that always trigger during system resume
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
commit 9e80ad37f6788ed52b89a3cfcd593e0aa69b216d upstream.
ath10k_mac_vif_chan() always returns an error for the given vif during system-wide resume which reliably triggers two WARN_ON()s in ath10k_bss_info_changed() and they are not particularly useful in that code path, so drop them.
Tested: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI with WLAN.RM.2.0-00180-QCARMSWPZ-1
Tested: QCA6174 hw3.2 SDIO with WLAN.RMH.4.4.1-00007-QCARMSWP-1
--- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/mac.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/mac.c +1 -1
@@ -5622,7 +5622,7 @@ static void ath10k_bss_info_changed(stru }if (changed &BSS_CHANGED_MCAST_RATE && - !WARN_ON (ath10k_mac_vif_chan (arvif->vif, &def))) { + !ath10k_mac_vif_chan (arvif->vif, &def)) { band = def.chan->band; rateidx = vif->bss_conf.mcast_rate[band] -1 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 3/23 ipv6: fix races in ip6_dst_destroy()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0e2338749192ce0e52e7174c5352f627632f478a ]
We had many syzbot reports that seem to be caused by use-after-free of struct fib6_info.
ip6_dst_destroy(), fib6_drop_pcpu_from() and rt6_remove_exception() are writers vs rt->from, and use non consistent synchronization among themselves.
Switching to xchg() will solve the issues with no possible lockdep issues.
BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in atomic_dec_and_test include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:747 [inline] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in fib6_info_release include/net/ip6_fib.h:294 [inline] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in fib6_info_release include/net/ip6_fib.h:292 [inline] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in fib6_drop_pcpu_from net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:927 [inline] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in fib6_purge_rt+0x4f6/0x670 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:960 Write of size 4 at addr 0000000000ffffb4 by task syz-executor.1/7649 CPU: 0 PID: 7649 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc6+ #183 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kasan_report.cold+0x5/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:321 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline] check_memory_region+0x123/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:191 kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:108 atomic_dec_and_test include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:747 [inline] fib6_info_release include/net/ip6_fib.h:294 [inline] fib6_info_release include/net/ip6_fib.h:292 [inline] fib6_drop_pcpu_from net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:927 [inline] fib6_purge_rt+0x4f6/0x670 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:960 fib6_del_route net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1813 [inline] fib6_del+0xac2/0x10a0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1844 fib6_clean_node+0x3a8/0x590 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2006 fib6_walk_continue+0x495/0x900 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1928 fib6_walk+0x9d/0x100 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1976 fib6_clean_tree+0xe0/0x120 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2055 __fib6_clean_all+0x118/0x2a0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2071 fib6_clean_all+0x2b/0x40 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2082 rt6_sync_down_dev+0x134/0x150 net/ipv6/route.c:4057 rt6_disable_ip+0x27/0x5f0 net/ipv6/route.c:4062 addrconf_ifdown+0xa2/0x1220 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3705 addrconf_notify+0x19a/0x2260 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3630 notifier_call_chain+0xc7/0x240 kernel/notifier.c:93 __raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:394 [inline] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x2e/0x40 kernel/notifier.c:401 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x3f/0x90 net/core/dev.c:1753 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:1765 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1779 [inline] dev_close_many+0x33f/0x6f0 net/core/dev.c:1522 rollback_registered_many+0x43b/0xfd0 net/core/dev.c:8177 rollback_registered+0x109/0x1d0 net/core/dev.c:8242 unregister_netdevice_queue net/core/dev.c:9289 [inline] unregister_netdevice_queue+0x1ee/0x2c0 net/core/dev.c:9282 unregister_netdevice include/linux/netdevice.h:2658 [inline] __tun_detach+0xd5b/0x1000 drivers/net/tun.c:727 tun_detach drivers/net/tun.c:744 [inline] tun_chr_close+0xe0/0x180 drivers/net/tun.c:3443 __fput+0x2e5/0x8d0 fs/file_table.c:278 ____fput+0x16/0x20 fs/file_table.c:309 task_work_run+0x14a/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:113 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:22 [inline] do_exit+0x90a/0x2fa0 kernel/exit.c:876 do_group_exit+0x135/0x370 kernel/exit.c:980 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:991 [inline] __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:989 [inline] __x64_sys_exit_group+0x44/0x50 kernel/exit.c:989 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x458da9 Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffeafc2a6a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000001c RCX: 0000000000458da9 RDX: 0000000000412a80 RSI: 0000000000a54ef0 RDI: 0000000000000043 RBP: 00000000004be552 R08: 000000000000000c R09: 000000000004c0d1 R10: 0000000002341940 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 00007ffeafc2a7f0 R14: 000000000004c065 R15: 00007ffeafc2a800
--- net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c | 4 +--- net/ipv6/route.c | 9 ++------- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c +1 -3
@@ -889,9 +889,7 @@ static void fib6_drop_pcpu_from(struct fif (pcpu_rt) {struct fib6_info *from; - from =rcu_dereference_protected (pcpu_rt->from, -lockdep_is_held (&table->tb6_lock)); -rcu_assign_pointer (pcpu_rt->from,NULL ); + from =xchg ((__force struct fib6_info **)&pcpu_rt->from,NULL );fib6_info_release (from); } }
net/ipv6/route.c +2 -7
@@ -382,11 +382,8 @@ static void ip6_dst_destroy(struct dst_ein6_dev_put (idev); } -rcu_read_lock (); - from =rcu_dereference (rt->from); -rcu_assign_pointer (rt->from,NULL ); + from =xchg ((__force struct fib6_info **)&rt->from,NULL );fib6_info_release (from); -rcu_read_unlock (); } static void ip6_dst_ifdown(struct dst_entry *dst, struct net_device *dev,
@@ -1296,9 +1293,7 @@ static void rt6_remove_exception(struct/* purge completely the exception to allow releasing the held resources: * some [sk] cache may keep the dst around for unlimited time */ - from =rcu_dereference_protected (rt6_ex->rt6i->from, -lockdep_is_held (&rt6_exception_lock)); -rcu_assign_pointer (rt6_ex->rt6i->from,NULL ); + from =xchg ((__force struct fib6_info **)&rt6_ex->rt6i->from,NULL );fib6_info_release (from);dst_dev_put (&rt6_ex->rt6i->dst);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 5/23 ipv6: invert flowlabel sharing check in process and user mode
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 95c169251bf734aa555a1e8043e4d88ec97a04ec ]
A request for a flowlabel fails in process or user exclusive mode must fail if the caller pid or uid does not match. Invert the test.
Previously, the test was unsafe wrt PID recycling, but indeed tested for inequality: fl1->owner != fl->owner
--- net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c +2 -2
@@ -639,9 +639,9 @@ recheck:if (fl1->share ==IPV6_FL_S_EXCL || fl1->share != fl->share || ((fl1->share ==IPV6_FL_S_PROCESS ) && - (fl1->owner.pid == fl->owner.pid)) || + (fl1->owner.pid != fl->owner.pid)) || ((fl1->share ==IPV6_FL_S_USER ) && -uid_eq (fl1->owner.uid, fl->owner.uid))) + !uid_eq (fl1->owner.uid, fl->owner.uid))) goto release; err = -ENOMEM ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 6/23 l2ip: fix possible use-after-free
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a622b40035d16196bf19b2b33b854862595245fc ]
Before taking a refcount on a rcu protected structure, we need to make sure the refcount is not zero.
syzbot reported :
refcount_t: increment on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 23533 at lib/refcount.c:156 refcount_inc_checked lib/refcount.c:156 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 23533 at lib/refcount.c:156 refcount_inc_checked+0x61/0x70 lib/refcount.c:154 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 1 PID: 23533 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc7+ #93 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 panic+0x2cb/0x65c kernel/panic.c:214 __warn.cold+0x20/0x45 kernel/panic.c:571 report_bug+0x263/0x2b0 lib/bug.c:186 fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:179 [inline] fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:174 [inline] do_error_trap+0x11b/0x200 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:272 do_invalid_op+0x37/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:291 invalid_op+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:973 RIP: 0010:refcount_inc_checked lib/refcount.c:156 [inline] RIP: 0010:refcount_inc_checked+0x61/0x70 lib/refcount.c:154 Code: 1d 98 2b 2a 06 31 ff 89 de e8 db 2c 40 fe 84 db 75 dd e8 92 2b 40 fe 48 c7 c7 20 7a a1 87 c6 05 78 2b 2a 06 01 e8 7d d9 12 fe <0f> 0b eb c1 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 RSP: 0018:ffff888069f0fba8 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000f353 RSI: ffffffff815afcb6 RDI: ffffed100d3e1f67 RBP: ffff888069f0fbb8 R08: ffff88809b1845c0 R09: ffffed1015d23ef1 R10: ffffed1015d23ef0 R11: ffff8880ae91f787 R12: ffff8880a8f26968 R13: 0000000000000004 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff8880a49a6440 l2tp_tunnel_inc_refcount net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h:240 [inline] l2tp_tunnel_get+0x250/0x580 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:173 pppol2tp_connect+0xc00/0x1c70 net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c:702 __sys_connect+0x266/0x330 net/socket.c:1808 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1819 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1816 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1816
--- net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c +4 -4
@@ -169,8 +169,8 @@ struct l2tp_tunnel *l2tp_tunnel_get(consrcu_read_lock_bh ();list_for_each_entry_rcu (tunnel, &pn->l2tp_tunnel_list, list) { -if (tunnel->tunnel_id == tunnel_id) { -l2tp_tunnel_inc_refcount (tunnel); +if (tunnel->tunnel_id == tunnel_id && +refcount_inc_not_zero (&tunnel->ref_count)) {rcu_read_unlock_bh ();return tunnel;
@@ -190,8 +190,8 @@ struct l2tp_tunnel *l2tp_tunnel_get_nth(rcu_read_lock_bh ();list_for_each_entry_rcu (tunnel, &pn->l2tp_tunnel_list, list) { -if (++count > nth) { -l2tp_tunnel_inc_refcount (tunnel); +if (++count > nth && +refcount_inc_not_zero (&tunnel->ref_count)) {rcu_read_unlock_bh ();return tunnel; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 7/23 l2tp: use rcu_dereference_sk_user_data() in l2tp_udp_encap_recv()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c1c477217882c610a2ba0268f5faf36c9c092528 ]
Canonical way to fetch sk_user_data from an encap_rcv() handler called from UDP stack in rcu protected section is to use rcu_dereference_sk_user_data(), otherwise compiler might read it multiple times.
--- net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c +1 -1
@@ -909,7 +909,7 @@ int l2tp_udp_encap_recv(struct sock *sk, {struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel; - tunnel =l2tp_tunnel (sk); + tunnel =rcu_dereference_sk_user_data (sk);if (tunnel ==NULL ) goto pass_up;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 8/23 net: dsa: bcm_sf2: fix buffer overflow doing set_rxnfc
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f949a12fd697479f68d99dc65e9bbab68ee49043 ]
The "fs->location" is a u32 that comes from the user in ethtool_set_rxnfc(). We can't pass unclamped values to test_bit() or it results in an out of bounds access beyond the end of the bitmap.
--- drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2_cfp.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2_cfp.c +6 -0
@@ -742,6 +742,9 @@ static int bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_set(struct d fs->m_ext.data[1]))return -EINVAL ; +if (fs->location !=RX_CLS_LOC_ANY && fs->location >=CFP_NUM_RULES ) +return -EINVAL ; +if (fs->location !=RX_CLS_LOC_ANY &&test_bit (fs->location, priv->cfp.used))return -EBUSY ;
@@ -836,6 +839,9 @@ static int bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_del(struct bu32 next_loc =0 ;int ret; +if (loc >=CFP_NUM_RULES ) +return -EINVAL ; +/* Refuse deleting unused rules, and those that are not unique since * that could leave IPv6 rules with one of the chained rule in the * table.
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainercover 4.19.40-stable review
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.40 release. There are 23 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Mon 06 May 2019 10:24:19 AM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.40-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 4.19.40-rc1
Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
ath10k: Drop WARN_ON()s that always trigger during system resume
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
ALSA: line6: use dynamic buffers
Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
KVM: nVMX: Fix size checks in vmx_set_nested_state
Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM: x86: Whitelist port 0x7e for pre-incrementing %rip
Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
net/tls: fix copy to fragments in reencrypt
Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
net/tls: don't copy negative amounts of data in reencrypt
Michael Chan <[email protected]>
bnxt_en: Fix uninitialized variable usage in bnxt_rx_pkt().
Vasundhara Volam <[email protected]>
bnxt_en: Free short FW command HWRM memory in error path in bnxt_init_one()
Michael Chan <[email protected]>
bnxt_en: Improve multicast address setup logic.
Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
packet: validate msg_namelen in send directly
Hangbin Liu <[email protected]>
selftests: fib_rule_tests: print the result and return 1 if any tests failed
Xin Long <[email protected]>
sctp: avoid running the sctp state machine recursively
David Howells <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix net namespace cleanup
Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
net/tls: avoid NULL pointer deref on nskb->sk in fallback
Andrew Lunn <[email protected]>
net: phy: marvell: Fix buffer overrun with stats counters
Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
net: dsa: bcm_sf2: fix buffer overflow doing set_rxnfc
Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
l2tp: use rcu_dereference_sk_user_data() in l2tp_udp_encap_recv()
Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
l2ip: fix possible use-after-free
Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
ipv6: invert flowlabel sharing check in process and user mode
Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
ipv6/flowlabel: wait rcu grace period before put_pid()
Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
ipv6: fix races in ip6_dst_destroy()
Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]>
ipv6: A few fixes on dereferencing rt->from
Shmulik Ladkani <[email protected]>
ipv4: ip_do_fragment: Preserve skb_iif during fragmentation
-------------
Diffstat:
Makefile | 4 +- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 21 +++++++++- drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2_cfp.c | 6 +++ drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c | 19 ++++++--- drivers/net/phy/marvell.c | 6 ++- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/mac.c | 2 +- include/net/sctp/command.h | 1 - net/ipv4/ip_output.c | 1 + net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c | 4 +- net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c | 22 ++++++---- net/ipv6/route.c | 47 +++++++++------------ net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c | 10 ++--- net/packet/af_packet.c | 24 ++++++----- net/rxrpc/call_object.c | 32 +++++++------- net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c | 29 ------------- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 35 ++++++++++++---- net/tls/tls_device.c | 39 ++++++++++++----- net/tls/tls_device_fallback.c | 3 +- sound/usb/line6/driver.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++----------- sound/usb/line6/podhd.c | 21 ++++++---- sound/usb/line6/toneport.c | 24 ++++++++--- tools/testing/selftests/net/fib_rule_tests.sh | 6 +++ 24 files changed, 248 insertions(+), 173 deletions(-)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 9/23 net: phy: marvell: Fix buffer overrun with stats counters
From: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fdfdf86720a34527f777cbe0d8599bf0528fa146 ]
marvell_get_sset_count() returns how many statistics counters there are. If the PHY supports fibre, there are 3, otherwise two.
marvell_get_strings() does not make this distinction, and always returns 3 strings. This then often results in writing past the end of the buffer for the strings.
--- drivers/net/phy/marvell.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/phy/marvell.c +4 -2
@@ -1513,9 +1513,10 @@ static int marvell_get_sset_count(structstatic void marvell_get_strings (struct phy_device *phydev,u8 *data) { +int count =marvell_get_sset_count (phydev);int i; -for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (marvell_hw_stats); i++) { +for (i =0 ; i < count; i++) {strlcpy (data + i *ETH_GSTRING_LEN , marvell_hw_stats[i].string,ETH_GSTRING_LEN ); }
@@ -1543,9 +1544,10 @@ static u64 marvell_get_stat(struct phy_dstatic void marvell_get_stats (struct phy_device *phydev,struct ethtool_stats *stats,u64 *data) { +int count =marvell_get_sset_count (phydev);int i; -for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (marvell_hw_stats); i++) +for (i =0 ; i < count; i++) data[i] =marvell_get_stat (phydev, i); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 4/23 ipv6/flowlabel: wait rcu grace period before put_pid()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6c0afef5fb0c27758f4d52b2210c61b6bd8b4470 ]
syzbot was able to catch a use-after-free read in pid_nr_ns() [1]
ip6fl_seq_show() seems to use RCU protection, dereferencing fl->owner.pid but fl_free() releases fl->owner.pid before rcu grace period is started.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in pid_nr_ns+0x128/0x140 kernel/pid.c:407
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888094012a04 by task syz-executor.0/18087
CPU: 0 PID: 18087 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc6+ #89
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187
kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317
__asan_report_load4_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:131
pid_nr_ns+0x128/0x140 kernel/pid.c:407
ip6fl_seq_show+0x2f8/0x4f0 net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c:794
seq_read+0xad3/0x1130 fs/seq_file.c:268
proc_reg_read+0x1fe/0x2c0 fs/proc/inode.c:227
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:701 [inline]
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:688 [inline]
do_iter_read+0x4a9/0x660 fs/read_write.c:922
vfs_readv+0xf0/0x160 fs/read_write.c:984
kernel_readv fs/splice.c:358 [inline]
default_file_splice_read+0x475/0x890 fs/splice.c:413
do_splice_to+0x12a/0x190 fs/splice.c:876
splice_direct_to_actor+0x2d2/0x970 fs/splice.c:953
do_splice_direct+0x1da/0x2a0 fs/splice.c:1062
do_sendfile+0x597/0xd00 fs/read_write.c:1443
__do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1498 [inline]
__se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1490 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendfile64+0x15a/0x220 fs/read_write.c:1490
do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x458da9
Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f300d24bc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000028
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000458da9
RDX: 00000000200000c0 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 000000000000005a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f300d24c6d4
R13: 00000000004c5fa3 R14: 00000000004da748 R15: 00000000ffffffff
Allocated by task 17543:
save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:75
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:497 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:470
kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:505
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:437 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3393 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0x11a/0x6f0 mm/slab.c:3555
alloc_pid+0x55/0x8f0 kernel/pid.c:168
copy_process.part.0+0x3b08/0x7980 kernel/fork.c:1932
copy_process kernel/fork.c:1709 [inline]
_do_fork+0x257/0xfd0 kernel/fork.c:2226
__do_sys_clone kernel/fork.c:2333 [inline]
__se_sys_clone kernel/fork.c:2327 [inline]
__x64_sys_clone+0xbf/0x150 kernel/fork.c:2327
do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 7789:
save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:75
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:459
kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:467
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3499 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x260 mm/slab.c:3765
put_pid.part.0+0x111/0x150 kernel/pid.c:111
put_pid+0x20/0x30 kernel/pid.c:105
fl_free+0xbe/0xe0 net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c:102
ip6_fl_gc+0x295/0x3e0 net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c:152
call_timer_fn+0x190/0x720 kernel/time/timer.c:1325
expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1362 [inline]
__run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1681 [inline]
__run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1649 [inline]
run_timer_softirq+0x652/0x1700 kernel/time/timer.c:1694
__do_softirq+0x266/0x95a kernel/softirq.c:293
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888094012a00
which belongs to the cache pid_2 of size 88
The buggy address is located 4 bytes inside of
88-byte region [ffff888094012a00, ffff888094012a58)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0002500480 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88809a483080 index:0xffff888094012980
flags: 0x1fffc0000000200(slab)
raw: 01fffc0000000200 ffffea00018a3508 ffffea0002524a88 ffff88809a483080
raw: ffff888094012980 ffff888094012000 000000010000001b 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888094012900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc
ffff888094012980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff888094012a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff888094012a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc
ffff888094012b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc--- net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c +12 -6
@@ -94,15 +94,21 @@ static struct ip6_flowlabel *fl_lookup(sreturn fl; } +static void fl_free_rcu (struct rcu_head *head) +{ + struct ip6_flowlabel *fl = container_of(head, struct ip6_flowlabel, rcu); + +if (fl->share ==IPV6_FL_S_PROCESS ) +put_pid (fl->owner.pid); +kfree (fl->opt); +kfree (fl); +} +static void fl_free (struct ip6_flowlabel *fl) { -if (fl) { -if (fl->share ==IPV6_FL_S_PROCESS ) -put_pid (fl->owner.pid); -kfree (fl->opt); -kfree_rcu (fl, rcu); - } +if (fl) +call_rcu (&fl->rcu, fl_free_rcu); }static void fl_release (struct ip6_flowlabel *fl)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 2/23 ipv6: A few fixes on dereferencing rt->from
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 886b7a50100a50f1cbd08a6f8ec5884dfbe082dc ]
It is a followup after the fix in
commit 9c69a1320515 ("route: Avoid crash from dereferencing NULL rt->from")
rt6_do_redirect():
1. NULL checking is needed on rt->from because a parallel fib6_info delete could happen that sets rt->from to NULL. (e.g. rt6_remove_exception() and fib6_drop_pcpu_from()).
2. fib6_info_hold() is not enough. Same reason as (1). Meaning, holding dst->__refcnt cannot ensure rt->from is not NULL or rt->from->fib6_ref is not 0.
Instead of using fib6_info_hold_safe() which ip6_rt_cache_alloc() is already doing, this patch chooses to extend the rcu section to keep "from" dereference-able after checking for NULL.
inet6_rtm_getroute():
1. NULL checking is also needed on rt->from for a similar reason. Note that inet6_rtm_getroute() is using RTNL_FLAG_DOIT_UNLOCKED.
--- net/ipv6/route.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/route.c +18 -20
@@ -3454,11 +3454,8 @@ static void rt6_do_redirect(struct dst_ercu_read_lock (); from =rcu_dereference (rt->from); -/* This fib6_info_hold() is safe here because we hold reference to rt -* and rt already holds reference to fib6_info. -*/ -fib6_info_hold (from); -rcu_read_unlock (); +if (!from) + goto out; nrt =ip6_rt_cache_alloc (from, &msg->dest,NULL );if (!nrt)
@@ -3470,10 +3467,7 @@ static void rt6_do_redirect(struct dst_e nrt->rt6i_gateway = *(struct in6_addr *)neigh->primary_key; -/* No need to remove rt from the exception table if rt is -* a cached route because rt6_insert_exception() will -* takes care of it -*/ +/* rt6_insert_exception() will take care of duplicated exceptions */ if (rt6_insert_exception (nrt, from)) {dst_release_immediate (&nrt->dst); goto out;
@@ -3486,7 +3480,7 @@ static void rt6_do_redirect(struct dst_ecall_netevent_notifiers (NETEVENT_REDIRECT , &netevent); out: -fib6_info_release (from); +rcu_read_unlock ();neigh_release (neigh); }
@@ -4991,16 +4985,20 @@ static int inet6_rtm_getroute(struct sk_rcu_read_lock (); from =rcu_dereference (rt->from); - -if (fibmatch) - err =rt6_fill_node (net, skb, from,NULL ,NULL ,NULL , iif, -RTM_NEWROUTE ,NETLINK_CB (in_skb).portid, - nlh->nlmsg_seq,0 ); -else - err =rt6_fill_node (net, skb, from, dst, &fl6.daddr, - &fl6.saddr, iif,RTM_NEWROUTE , -NETLINK_CB (in_skb).portid, nlh->nlmsg_seq, -0 ); +if (from) { +if (fibmatch) + err =rt6_fill_node (net, skb, from,NULL ,NULL ,NULL , + iif,RTM_NEWROUTE , +NETLINK_CB (in_skb).portid, + nlh->nlmsg_seq,0 ); +else + err =rt6_fill_node (net, skb, from, dst, &fl6.daddr, + &fl6.saddr, iif,RTM_NEWROUTE , +NETLINK_CB (in_skb).portid, + nlh->nlmsg_seq,0 ); + }else { + err = -ENETUNREACH ; + }rcu_read_unlock ();if (err <0 ) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 10/23 net/tls: avoid NULL pointer deref on nskb->sk in fallback
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2dcb003314032c6efb13a065ffae60d164b2dd35 ]
update_chksum() accesses nskb->sk before it has been set by complete_skb(), move the init up.
--- net/tls/tls_device_fallback.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/tls/tls_device_fallback.c +2 -1
@@ -200,13 +200,14 @@ static void complete_skb(struct sk_buffskb_put (nskb, skb->len);memcpy (nskb->data, skb->data, headln); -update_chksum (nskb, headln); nskb->destructor = skb->destructor; nskb->sk = sk; skb->destructor =NULL ; skb->sk =NULL ; +update_chksum (nskb, headln); + delta = nskb->truesize - skb->truesize;if (likely (delta <0 ))WARN_ON_ONCE (refcount_sub_and_test (-delta, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc));
stable-rc/linux-4.19.y boot: 128 boots: 0 failed, 123 passed with 4 offline, 1 untried/unknown (v4.19.39-24-gb0d6421bd855)
stable-rc/linux-4.19.y boot: 128 boots: 0 failed, 123 passed with 4 offline, 1 untried/unknown (v4.19.39-24-gb0d6421bd855)
Full Boot Summary: https://kernelci.org/boot/all/job/stable-rc/branch/linux-4.19.y/kernel/v4.19.39-24-gb0d6421bd855/
Full Build Summary: https://kernelci.org/build/stable-rc/branch/linux-4.19.y/kernel/v4.19.39-24-gb0d6421bd855/
Tree: stable-rc
Branch: linux-4.19.y
Git Describe: v4.19.39-24-gb0d6421bd855
Git Commit: b0d6421bd85515e878edcf33121a818666df7749
Git URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
Tested: 70 unique boards, 24 SoC families, 14 builds out of 206
Offline Platforms:
arm:
davinci_all_defconfig:
gcc-7
dm365evm,legacy: 1 offline lab
exynos_defconfig:
gcc-7
exynos5800-peach-pi: 1 offline lab
multi_v7_defconfig:
gcc-7
exynos5800-peach-pi: 1 offline lab
stih410-b2120: 1 offline lab---
For more info write to <[email protected]>
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.40 release. There are 23 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Mon 06 May 2019 10:24:19 AM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Build results:
total: 156 pass: 156 fail: 0 Qemu test results: total: 349 pass: 349 fail: 0
Guenter
Quoted 7 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.40 release. There are 23 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Mon 06 May 2019 10:24:19 AM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
Regressions detected.
Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------
kernel: 4.19.40-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.19.y
git commit: b0d6421bd85515e878edcf33121a818666df7749
git describe: v4.19.39-24-gb0d6421bd855
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.19-oe/build/v4.19.39-24-gb0d6421bd855
No regressions (compared to build v4.19.38-73-gdb2d00a74567)
No fixes (compared to build v4.19.38-73-gdb2d00a74567)
Ran 25058 total tests in the following environments and test suites.
Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c - arm64
- hi6220-hikey - arm64
- i386
- juno-r2 - arm64
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15 - arm
- x86_64
Test Suites
-----------
* build
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest
* libgpiod
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-timers-tests
* perf
* spectre-meltdown-checker-test
* v4l2-compliance
* kvm-unit-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none
Signature · 2 lines
Linaro LKFT https://lkft.linaro.org
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 6 lines · Dan Rue
Quoted 5 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.40 release. There are 23 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Responses should be made by Mon 06 May 2019 10:24:19 AM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
Regressions detected.
Really? Where?
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 6 lines · Dan Rue
Quoted 5 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.40 release. There are 23 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Responses should be made by Mon 06 May 2019 10:24:19 AM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
Regressions detected.Really? Where?
Not really.
selftest: net: msg_zerocopy.sh is an intermittent failure on qemu_i386 device. We could ignore this failure as known issues.
- Naresh
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 14 lines · Naresh Kamboju
Quoted 12 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 10 lines · Dan Rue
Quoted 7 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.40 release. There are 23 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Mon 06 May 2019 10:24:19 AM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
Regressions detected.Really? Where?
Not really.
selftest: net:msg_zerocopy.shis an intermittent failure onqemu_i386device.
Is that a test problem, or a qemu problem?
Quoted 1 line
We could ignore this failure as known issues.
It wasn't listed in the report, or did I miss it?
Built and booted on my x86_64 machine. No dmesg regressions observed.
Thanks
Bharath
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 1 line · Bharath Vedartham
Built and booted on my
x86_64machine. No dmesg regressions observed.
Wonderful, thanks for testing and letting me know.
greg k-h
Quoted 20 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 19 lines · Naresh Kamboju
Quoted 16 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 6 lines · Dan Rue
Quoted 5 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.40 release. There are 23 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Responses should be made by Mon 06 May 2019 10:24:19 AM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
Regressions detected.Really? Where?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Not really.
selftest: net:msg_zerocopy.shis an intermittent failure onqemu_i386device.Is that a test problem, or a qemu problem?
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We could ignore this failure as known issues.
It wasn't listed in the report, or did I miss it?
It needs further investigation, but it's unrelated to this RC. It's an intermittent failure that we see sometimes but only ever on qemu. With the amount of tests that we run, this is common - our process is to investigate the failure and determine if the failure is a regression or not. In this case, I determined that it was not a real regression, but I did not run the right command to generate the report accordingly.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
Dan