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x86/uaccess, kcov: Disable stack protector

PATCH New Sasha Levin 1 participant 17 messages Jun 4, 2019

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lore
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH 10/17 scsi: lpfc: add check for loss of ndlp when sending RRQ

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: James Smart <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c8cb261a072c88ca1aff0e804a30db4c7606521b ]

There was a missing qualification of a valid ndlp structure when calling to send an RRQ for an abort. Add the check.

---
 drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_els.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_els.c +4 -1
index 4905455bbfc7..b5be4df05733 100644
@@ -6789,7 +6789,10 @@ int
 lpfc_send_rrq(struct lpfc_hba *phba, struct lpfc_node_rrq *rrq)
 {
 	struct lpfc_nodelist *ndlp = lpfc_findnode_did(rrq->vport,
-							rrq->nlp_DID);
+						       rrq->nlp_DID);
+	if (!ndlp)
+		return 1;
+
 	if (lpfc_test_rrq_active(phba, ndlp, rrq->xritag))
 		return lpfc_issue_els_rrq(rrq->vport, ndlp,
 					 rrq->nlp_DID, rrq);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#11 lore raw

PATCH 12/17 scsi: bnx2fc: fix incorrect cast to u64 on shift operation

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d0c0d902339249c75da85fd9257a86cbb98dfaa5 ]

Currently an int is being shifted and the result is being cast to a u64 which leads to undefined behaviour if the shift is more than 31 bits. Fix this by casting the integer value 1 to u64 before the shift operation.

Addresses-Coverity: ("Bad shift operation")

Fixes 7b594769120b ("[SCSI] bnx2fc: Handle REC_TOV error code from firmware")
---
 drivers/scsi/bnx2fc/bnx2fc_hwi.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/scsi/bnx2fc/bnx2fc_hwi.c +1 -1
index 5ff9f89c17c7..39b2f60149d9 100644
@@ -829,7 +829,7 @@ static void bnx2fc_process_unsol_compl(struct bnx2fc_rport *tgt, u16 wqe)
 			((u64)err_entry->data.err_warn_bitmap_hi << 32) |
 			(u64)err_entry->data.err_warn_bitmap_lo;
 		for (i = 0; i < BNX2FC_NUM_ERR_BITS; i++) {
-			if (err_warn_bit_map & (u64) (1 << i)) {
+			if (err_warn_bit_map & ((u64)1 << i)) {
 				err_warn = i;
 				break;
 			}
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#12 lore raw

PATCH 13/17 selftests/timers: Add missing fflush(stdout) calls

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org>

[ Upstream commit fe48319243a626c860fd666ca032daacc2ba84a5 ]

When running under a pipe, some timer tests would not report output in real-time because stdout flushes were missing after printf()s that lacked a newline. This adds them to restore real-time status output that humans can enjoy.

Signed-off-by Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org>
Signed-off-by Shuah Khan <skhan at linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by Sasha Levin <sashal at kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/timers/adjtick.c        | 1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/timers/leapcrash.c      | 1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/timers/mqueue-lat.c     | 1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/timers/nanosleep.c      | 1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/timers/nsleep-lat.c     | 1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/timers/raw_skew.c       | 1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/timers/set-tai.c        | 1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/timers/set-tz.c         | 2 ++
 tools/testing/selftests/timers/threadtest.c     | 1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/timers/valid-adjtimex.c | 2 ++
 10 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/timers/adjtick.c +1 -0
index 9887fd538fec..91316ab4b041 100644
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ int check_tick_adj(long tickval)
 
 	eppm = get_ppm_drift();
 	printf("%lld usec, %lld ppm", systick + (systick * eppm / MILLION), eppm);
+	fflush(stdout);
 
 	tx1.modes = 0;
 	adjtimex(&tx1);
tools/testing/selftests/timers/leapcrash.c +1 -0
index a1071bdbdeb7..a77c70b47495 100644
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ int main(void)
 		}
 		clear_time_state();
 		printf(".");
+		fflush(stdout);
 	}
 	printf("[OK]\n");
 	return ksft_exit_pass();
tools/testing/selftests/timers/mqueue-lat.c +1 -0
index a2a3924d0b41..efdb62470052 100644
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 	int ret;
 
 	printf("Mqueue latency :                          ");
+	fflush(stdout);
 
 	ret = mqueue_lat_test();
 	if (ret < 0) {
tools/testing/selftests/timers/nanosleep.c +1 -0
index ff942ff7c9b3..2e6e94c02a33 100644
@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 			continue;
 
 		printf("Nanosleep %-31s ", clockstring(clockid));
+		fflush(stdout);
 
 		length = 10;
 		while (length <= (NSEC_PER_SEC * 10)) {
tools/testing/selftests/timers/nsleep-lat.c +1 -0
index 2d7898fda0f1..ac06cf10a5c2 100644
@@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 			continue;
 
 		printf("nsleep latency %-26s ", clockstring(clockid));
+		fflush(stdout);
 
 		length = 10;
 		while (length <= (NSEC_PER_SEC * 10)) {
tools/testing/selftests/timers/raw_skew.c +1 -0
index 0ab937a17ebb..4e631da7f956 100644
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ int main(int argv, char **argc)
 		printf("WARNING: ADJ_OFFSET in progress, this will cause inaccurate results\n");
 
 	printf("Estimating clock drift: ");
+	fflush(stdout);
 	sleep(120);
 
 	get_monotonic_and_raw(&mon, &raw);
tools/testing/selftests/timers/set-tai.c +1 -0
index dc88dbc8831f..3ae76ab483de 100644
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 	printf("tai offset started at %i\n", ret);
 
 	printf("Checking tai offsets can be properly set: ");
+	fflush(stdout);
 	for (i = 1; i <= 60; i++) {
 		ret = set_tai(i);
 		ret = get_tai();
tools/testing/selftests/timers/set-tz.c +2 -0
index f4184928b16b..b038131c9682 100644
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 	printf("tz_minuteswest started at %i, dst at %i\n", min, dst);
 
 	printf("Checking tz_minuteswest can be properly set: ");
+	fflush(stdout);
 	for (i = -15*60; i < 15*60; i += 30) {
 		ret = set_tz(i, dst);
 		ret = get_tz_min();
@@ -87,6 +88,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 	printf("[OK]\n");
 
 	printf("Checking invalid tz_minuteswest values are caught: ");
+	fflush(stdout);
 
 	if (!set_tz(-15*60-1, dst)) {
 		printf("[FAILED] %i didn't return failure!\n", -15*60-1);
tools/testing/selftests/timers/threadtest.c +1 -0
index e632e116f05e..a4bf736dd842 100644
@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 	strftime(buf, 255, "%a, %d %b %Y %T %z", localtime(&start));
 	printf("%s\n", buf);
 	printf("Testing consistency with %i threads for %ld seconds: ", thread_count, runtime);
+	fflush(stdout);
 
 	/* spawn */
 	for (i = 0; i < thread_count; i++)
tools/testing/selftests/timers/valid-adjtimex.c +2 -0
index 60fe3c569bd9..a747645d79f4 100644
@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ int validate_freq(void)
 	/* Set the leap second insert flag */
 
 	printf("Testing ADJ_FREQ... ");
+	fflush(stdout);
 	for (i = 0; i < NUM_FREQ_VALID; i++) {
 		tx.modes = ADJ_FREQUENCY;
 		tx.freq = valid_freq[i];
@@ -261,6 +262,7 @@ int set_bad_offset(long sec, long usec, int use_nano)
 int validate_set_offset(void)
 {
 	printf("Testing ADJ_SETOFFSET... ");
+	fflush(stdout);
 
 	/* Test valid values */
 	if (set_offset(NSEC_PER_SEC - 1, 1))
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/17 ALSA: seq: Protect in-kernel ioctl calls with mutex

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit feb689025fbb6f0aa6297d3ddf97de945ea4ad32 ]

ALSA OSS sequencer calls the ioctl function indirectly via snd_seq_kernel_client_ctl(). While we already applied the protection against races between the normal ioctls and writes via the client's ioctl_mutex, this code path was left untouched. And this seems to be the cause of still remaining some rare UAF as spontaneously triggered by syzkaller.

For the sake of robustness, wrap the ioctl_mutex also for the call via snd_seq_kernel_client_ctl(), too.

---
 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c | 9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c +7 -2
index 09491b27092e..3b1b2e9fb33e 100644
@@ -2354,14 +2354,19 @@ int snd_seq_kernel_client_ctl(int clientid, unsigned int cmd, void *arg)
 {
 	const struct ioctl_handler *handler;
 	struct snd_seq_client *client;
+	int err;
 
 	client = clientptr(clientid);
 	if (client == NULL)
 		return -ENXIO;
 
 	for (handler = ioctl_handlers; handler->cmd > 0; ++handler) {
-		if (handler->cmd == cmd)
-			return handler->func(client, arg);
+		if (handler->cmd == cmd) {
+			mutex_lock(&client->ioctl_mutex);
+			err = handler->func(client, arg);
+			mutex_unlock(&client->ioctl_mutex);
+			return err;
+		}
 	}
 
 	pr_debug("ALSA: seq unknown ioctl() 0x%x (type='%c', number=0x%02x)\n",
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 6/17 driver core: platform: Fix the usage of platform device name(pdev->name)

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Venkata Narendra Kumar Gutta <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit edb16da34b084c66763f29bee42b4e6bb33c3d66 ]

Platform core is using pdev->name as the platform device name to do the binding of the devices with the drivers. But, when the platform driver overrides the platform device name with dev_set_name(), the pdev->name is pointing to a location which is freed and becomes an invalid parameter to do the binding match.

use-after-free instance:

[   33.325013] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in strcmp+0x8c/0xb0
[   33.330646] Read of size 1 at addr ffffffc10beae600 by task modprobe
[   33.339068] CPU: 5 PID: 518 Comm: modprobe Tainted:
			G S      W  O      4.19.30+ #3
[   33.346835] Hardware name: MTP (DT)
[   33.350419] Call trace:
[   33.352941]  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3b8
[   33.356713]  show_stack+0x24/0x30
[   33.360119]  dump_stack+0x160/0x1d8
[   33.363709]  print_address_description+0x84/0x2e0
[   33.368549]  kasan_report+0x26c/0x2d0
[   33.372322]  __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x2c/0x38
[   33.377248]  strcmp+0x8c/0xb0
[   33.380306]  platform_match+0x70/0x1f8
[   33.384168]  __driver_attach+0x78/0x3a0
[   33.388111]  bus_for_each_dev+0x13c/0x1b8
[   33.392237]  driver_attach+0x4c/0x58
[   33.395910]  bus_add_driver+0x350/0x560
[   33.399854]  driver_register+0x23c/0x328
[   33.403886]  __platform_driver_register+0xd0/0xe0

So, use dev_name(&pdev->dev), which fetches the platform device name from the kobject(dev->kobj->name) of the device instead of the pdev->name.

---
 drivers/base/platform.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/base/platform.c +4 -4
index 14ff40371f01..ffa77b3df4ba 100644
@@ -845,7 +845,7 @@ static ssize_t modalias_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *a,
 	if (len != -ENODEV)
 		return len;
 
-	len = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "platform:%s\n", pdev->name);
+	len = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "platform:%s\n", dev_name(&pdev->dev));
 
 	return (len >= PAGE_SIZE) ? (PAGE_SIZE - 1) : len;
 }
@@ -921,7 +921,7 @@ static int platform_uevent(struct device *dev, struct kobj_uevent_env *env)
 		return rc;
 
 	add_uevent_var(env, "MODALIAS=%s%s", PLATFORM_MODULE_PREFIX,
-			pdev->name);
+			dev_name(&pdev->dev));
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -930,7 +930,7 @@ static const struct platform_device_id *platform_match_id(
 			struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
 	while (id->name[0]) {
-		if (strcmp(pdev->name, id->name) == 0) {
+		if (strcmp(dev_name(&pdev->dev), id->name) == 0) {
 			pdev->id_entry = id;
 			return id;
 		}
@@ -974,7 +974,7 @@ static int platform_match(struct device *dev, struct device_driver *drv)
 		return platform_match_id(pdrv->id_table, pdev) != NULL;
 
 	/* fall-back to driver name match */
-	return (strcmp(pdev->name, drv->name) == 0);
+	return (strcmp(dev_name(&pdev->dev), drv->name) == 0);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH 8/17 configfs: fix possible use-after-free in configfs_register_group

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: YueHaibing <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 35399f87e271f7cf3048eab00a421a6519ac8441 ]

In configfs_register_group(), if create_default_group() failed, we forget to unlink the group. It will left a invalid item in the parent list, which may trigger the use-after-free issue seen below:

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_add_valid+0xd4/0xe0 lib/list_debug.c:26
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881ef61ae20 by task syz-executor.0/5996

CPU: 1 PID: 5996 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G         C        5.0.0+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0xa9/0x10e lib/dump_stack.c:113
 print_address_description+0x65/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:187
 kasan_report+0x149/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:317
 __list_add_valid+0xd4/0xe0 lib/list_debug.c:26
 __list_add include/linux/list.h:60 [inline]
 list_add_tail include/linux/list.h:93 [inline]
 link_obj+0xb0/0x190 fs/configfs/dir.c:759
 link_group+0x1c/0x130 fs/configfs/dir.c:784
 configfs_register_group+0x56/0x1e0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1751
 configfs_register_default_group+0x72/0xc0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1834
 ? 0xffffffffc1be0000
 iio_sw_trigger_init+0x23/0x1000 [industrialio_sw_trigger]
 do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:887
 do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
 load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
 __do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
 do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f494ecbcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f494ecbcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f494ecbd6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004

Allocated by task 5987:
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.3+0xa0/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:497
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:545 [inline]
 kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:740 [inline]
 configfs_register_default_group+0x4c/0xc0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1829
 0xffffffffc1bd0023
 do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:887
 do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
 load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
 __do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
 do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Freed by task 5987:
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:459
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1429 [inline]
 slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1456 [inline]
 slab_free mm/slub.c:3003 [inline]
 kfree+0xe1/0x270 mm/slub.c:3955
 configfs_register_default_group+0x9a/0xc0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1836
 0xffffffffc1bd0023
 do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:887
 do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
 load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
 __do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
 do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881ef61ae00
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192
The buggy address is located 32 bytes inside of
 192-byte region [ffff8881ef61ae00, ffff8881ef61aec0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0007bd8680 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881f6c03000 index:0xffff8881ef61a700
flags: 0x2fffc0000000200(slab)
raw: 02fffc0000000200 ffffea0007ca4740 0000000500000005 ffff8881f6c03000
raw: ffff8881ef61a700 000000008010000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8881ef61ad00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff8881ef61ad80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8881ef61ae00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                               ^
 ffff8881ef61ae80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff8881ef61af00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes 5cf6a51e6062 ("configfs: allow dynamic group creation")
---
 fs/configfs/dir.c | 17 ++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/configfs/dir.c +12 -5
index d2a1a79fa324..d7955dc56737 100644
@@ -1755,12 +1755,19 @@ int configfs_register_group(struct config_group *parent_group,
 
 	inode_lock_nested(d_inode(parent), I_MUTEX_PARENT);
 	ret = create_default_group(parent_group, group);
-	if (!ret) {
-		spin_lock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
-		configfs_dir_set_ready(group->cg_item.ci_dentry->d_fsdata);
-		spin_unlock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
-	}
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_out;
+
+	spin_lock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
+	configfs_dir_set_ready(group->cg_item.ci_dentry->d_fsdata);
+	spin_unlock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
+	inode_unlock(d_inode(parent));
+	return 0;
+err_out:
 	inode_unlock(d_inode(parent));
+	mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
+	unlink_group(group);
+	mutex_unlock(&subsys->su_mutex);
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(configfs_register_group);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH 9/17 ipc: prevent lockup on alloc_msg and free_msg

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Li Rongqing <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d6a2946a88f524a47cc9b79279667137899db807 ]

msgctl10 of ltp triggers the following lockup When CONFIG_KASAN is enabled on large memory SMP systems, the pages initialization can take a long time, if msgctl10 requests a huge block memory, and it will block rcu scheduler, so release cpu actively.

After adding schedule() in free_msg, free_msg can not be called when holding spinlock, so adding msg to a tmp list, and free it out of spinlock

  rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
  rcu:     Tasks blocked on level-1 rcu_node (CPUs 16-31): P32505
  rcu:     Tasks blocked on level-1 rcu_node (CPUs 48-63): P34978
  rcu:     (detected by 11, t=35024 jiffies, g=44237529, q=16542267)
  msgctl10        R  running task    21608 32505   2794 0x00000082
  Call Trace:
   preempt_schedule_irq+0x4c/0xb0
   retint_kernel+0x1b/0x2d
  RIP: 0010:__is_insn_slot_addr+0xfb/0x250
  Code: 82 1d 00 48 8b 9b 90 00 00 00 4c 89 f7 49 c1 ee 03 e8 59 83 1d 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 39 eb 48 89 9d 58 ff ff ff <41> c6 04 06 f8 74 66 4c 8d 75 98 4c 89 f1 48 c1 e9 03 48 01 c8 48
  RSP: 0018:ffff88bce041f758 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
  RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffff8471bc50 RCX: ffffffff828a2a57
  RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff88bce041f780
  RBP: ffff88bce041f828 R08: ffffed15f3f4c5b3 R09: ffffed15f3f4c5b3
  R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed15f3f4c5b2 R12: 000000318aee9b73
  R13: ffffffff8471bc50 R14: 1ffff1179c083ef0 R15: 1ffff1179c083eec
   kernel_text_address+0xc1/0x100
   __kernel_text_address+0xe/0x30
   unwind_get_return_address+0x2f/0x50
   __save_stack_trace+0x92/0x100
   create_object+0x380/0x650
   __kmalloc+0x14c/0x2b0
   load_msg+0x38/0x1a0
   do_msgsnd+0x19e/0xcf0
   do_syscall_64+0x117/0x400
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

  rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
  rcu:     Tasks blocked on level-1 rcu_node (CPUs 0-15): P32170
  rcu:     (detected by 14, t=35016 jiffies, g=44237525, q=12423063)
  msgctl10        R  running task    21608 32170  32155 0x00000082
  Call Trace:
   preempt_schedule_irq+0x4c/0xb0
   retint_kernel+0x1b/0x2d
  RIP: 0010:lock_acquire+0x4d/0x340
  Code: 48 81 ec c0 00 00 00 45 89 c6 4d 89 cf 48 8d 6c 24 20 48 89 3c 24 48 8d bb e4 0c 00 00 89 74 24 0c 48 c7 44 24 20 b3 8a b5 41 <48> c1 ed 03 48 c7 44 24 28 b4 25 18 84 48 c7 44 24 30 d0 54 7a 82
  RSP: 0018:ffff88af83417738 EFLAGS: 00000282 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
  RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88bd335f3080 RCX: 0000000000000002
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88bd335f3d64
  RBP: ffff88af83417758 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed13f3f745b2 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
   is_bpf_text_address+0x32/0xe0
   kernel_text_address+0xec/0x100
   __kernel_text_address+0xe/0x30
   unwind_get_return_address+0x2f/0x50
   __save_stack_trace+0x92/0x100
   save_stack+0x32/0xb0
   __kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180
   kfree+0xfa/0x2d0
   free_msg+0x24/0x50
   do_msgrcv+0x508/0xe60
   do_syscall_64+0x117/0x400
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Davidlohr said:
"So after releasing the lock, the msg rbtree/list is empty and new
calls will not see those in the newly populated tmp_msg list, and therefore they cannot access the delayed msg freeing pointers, which is good. Also the fact that the node_cache is now freed before the actual messages seems to be harmless as this is wanted for msg_insert() avoiding GFP_ATOMIC allocations, and after releasing the info->lock the thing is freed anyway so it should not change things"

---
 ipc/mqueue.c  | 10 ++++++++--
 ipc/msgutil.c |  6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
ipc/mqueue.c +8 -2
index 28a142f1be36..d5491a880751 100644
@@ -371,7 +371,8 @@ static void mqueue_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
 	struct user_struct *user;
 	unsigned long mq_bytes, mq_treesize;
 	struct ipc_namespace *ipc_ns;
-	struct msg_msg *msg;
+	struct msg_msg *msg, *nmsg;
+	LIST_HEAD(tmp_msg);
 
 	clear_inode(inode);
 
@@ -382,10 +383,15 @@ static void mqueue_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
 	info = MQUEUE_I(inode);
 	spin_lock(&info->lock);
 	while ((msg = msg_get(info)) != NULL)
-		free_msg(msg);
+		list_add_tail(&msg->m_list, &tmp_msg);
 	kfree(info->node_cache);
 	spin_unlock(&info->lock);
 
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(msg, nmsg, &tmp_msg, m_list) {
+		list_del(&msg->m_list);
+		free_msg(msg);
+	}
+
 	/* Total amount of bytes accounted for the mqueue */
 	mq_treesize = info->attr.mq_maxmsg * sizeof(struct msg_msg) +
 		min_t(unsigned int, info->attr.mq_maxmsg, MQ_PRIO_MAX) *
ipc/msgutil.c +6 -0
index bf74eaa5c39f..6d90b191c638 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/utsname.h>
 #include <linux/proc_ns.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
 
 #include "util.h"
 
@@ -64,6 +65,9 @@ static struct msg_msg *alloc_msg(size_t len)
 	pseg = &msg->next;
 	while (len > 0) {
 		struct msg_msgseg *seg;
+
+		cond_resched();
+
 		alen = min(len, DATALEN_SEG);
 		seg = kmalloc(sizeof(*seg) + alen, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 		if (seg == NULL)
@@ -176,6 +180,8 @@ void free_msg(struct msg_msg *msg)
 	kfree(msg);
 	while (seg != NULL) {
 		struct msg_msgseg *tmp = seg->next;
+
+		cond_resched();
 		kfree(seg);
 		seg = tmp;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH 11/17 arm64/mm: Inhibit huge-vmap with ptdump

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7ba36eccb3f83983a651efd570b4f933ecad1b5c ]

The arm64 ptdump code can race with concurrent modification of the kernel page tables. At the time this was added, this was sound as:

* Modifications to leaf entries could result in stale information being logged, but would not result in a functional problem.

* Boot time modifications to non-leaf entries (e.g. freeing of initmem) were performed when the ptdump code cannot be invoked.

* At runtime, modifications to non-leaf entries only occurred in the vmalloc region, and these were strictly additive, as intermediate entries were never freed.

However, since commit:

commit 324420bf91f6 ("arm64: add support for ioremap() block mappings")

... it has been possible to create huge mappings in the vmalloc area at runtime, and as part of this existing intermediate levels of table my be removed and freed.

It's possible for the ptdump code to race with this, and continue to walk tables which have been freed (and potentially poisoned or reallocated). As a result of this, the ptdump code may dereference bogus addresses, which could be fatal.

Since huge-vmap is a TLB and memory optimization, we can disable it when the runtime ptdump code is in use to avoid this problem.

Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Fixes 324420bf91f60582 ("arm64: add support for ioremap() block mappings")
---
 arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +8 -3
index 0a56898f8410..efd65fc85238 100644
@@ -765,13 +765,18 @@ void *__init fixmap_remap_fdt(phys_addr_t dt_phys)
 
 int __init arch_ioremap_pud_supported(void)
 {
-	/* only 4k granule supports level 1 block mappings */
-	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_4K_PAGES);
+	/*
+	 * Only 4k granule supports level 1 block mappings.
+	 * SW table walks can't handle removal of intermediate entries.
+	 */
+	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_4K_PAGES) &&
+	       !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PTDUMP_DEBUGFS);
 }
 
 int __init arch_ioremap_pmd_supported(void)
 {
-	return 1;
+	/* See arch_ioremap_pud_supported() */
+	return !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PTDUMP_DEBUGFS);
 }
 
 int pud_set_huge(pud_t *pud, phys_addr_t phys, pgprot_t prot)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#16 lore raw

PATCH 17/17 KVM: s390: fix memory slot handling for KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 19ec166c3f39fe1d3789888a74cc95544ac266d4 ]

kselftests exposed a problem in the s390 handling for memory slots. Right now we only do proper memory slot handling for creation of new memory slots. Neither MOVE, nor DELETION are handled properly. Let us implement those.

---
 arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c +21 -14
index 2032ab81b2d7..07f571900676 100644
@@ -3288,21 +3288,28 @@ void kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
 				const struct kvm_memory_slot *new,
 				enum kvm_mr_change change)
 {
-	int rc;
-
-	/* If the basics of the memslot do not change, we do not want
-	 * to update the gmap. Every update causes several unnecessary
-	 * segment translation exceptions. This is usually handled just
-	 * fine by the normal fault handler + gmap, but it will also
-	 * cause faults on the prefix page of running guest CPUs.
-	 */
-	if (old->userspace_addr == mem->userspace_addr &&
-	    old->base_gfn * PAGE_SIZE == mem->guest_phys_addr &&
-	    old->npages * PAGE_SIZE == mem->memory_size)
-		return;
+	int rc = 0;
 
-	rc = gmap_map_segment(kvm->arch.gmap, mem->userspace_addr,
-		mem->guest_phys_addr, mem->memory_size);
+	switch (change) {
+	case KVM_MR_DELETE:
+		rc = gmap_unmap_segment(kvm->arch.gmap, old->base_gfn * PAGE_SIZE,
+					old->npages * PAGE_SIZE);
+		break;
+	case KVM_MR_MOVE:
+		rc = gmap_unmap_segment(kvm->arch.gmap, old->base_gfn * PAGE_SIZE,
+					old->npages * PAGE_SIZE);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	case KVM_MR_CREATE:
+		rc = gmap_map_segment(kvm->arch.gmap, mem->userspace_addr,
+				      mem->guest_phys_addr, mem->memory_size);
+		break;
+	case KVM_MR_FLAGS_ONLY:
+		break;
+	default:
+		WARN(1, "Unknown KVM MR CHANGE: %d\n", change);
+	}
 	if (rc)
 		pr_warn("failed to commit memory region\n");
 	return;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#14 lore raw

PATCH 15/17 usbnet: fix kernel crash after disconnect

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Kloetzke Jan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ad70411a978d1e6e97b1e341a7bde9a79af0c93d ]

When disconnecting cdc_ncm the kernel sporadically crashes shortly after the disconnect:

  [   57.868812] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000
  ...
  [   58.006653] PC is at 0x0
  [   58.009202] LR is at call_timer_fn+0xec/0x1b4
  [   58.013567] pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffff80080f5130>] pstate: 00000145
  [   58.020976] sp : ffffff8008003da0
  [   58.024295] x29: ffffff8008003da0 x28: 0000000000000001
  [   58.029618] x27: 000000000000000a x26: 0000000000000100
  [   58.034941] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffffff8008003e68
  [   58.040263] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
  [   58.045587] x21: 0000000000000000 x20: ffffffc68fac1808
  [   58.050910] x19: 0000000000000100 x18: 0000000000000000
  [   58.056232] x17: 0000007f885aff8c x16: 0000007f883a9f10
  [   58.061556] x15: 0000000000000001 x14: 000000000000006e
  [   58.066878] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 00000000000000ba
  [   58.072201] x11: ffffffc69ff1db30 x10: 0000000000000020
  [   58.077524] x9 : 8000100008001000 x8 : 0000000000000001
  [   58.082847] x7 : 0000000000000800 x6 : ffffff8008003e70
  [   58.088169] x5 : ffffffc69ff17a28 x4 : 00000000ffff138b
  [   58.093492] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000
  [   58.098814] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
  ...
  [   58.205800] [<          (null)>]           (null)
  [   58.210521] [<ffffff80080f5298>] expire_timers+0xa0/0x14c
  [   58.215937] [<ffffff80080f542c>] run_timer_softirq+0xe8/0x128
  [   58.221702] [<ffffff8008081120>] __do_softirq+0x298/0x348
  [   58.227118] [<ffffff80080a6304>] irq_exit+0x74/0xbc
  [   58.232009] [<ffffff80080e17dc>] __handle_domain_irq+0x78/0xac
  [   58.237857] [<ffffff8008080cf4>] gic_handle_irq+0x80/0xac
  ...

The crash happens roughly 125..130ms after the disconnect. This correlates with the 'delay' timer that is started on certain USB tx/rx errors in the URB completion handler.

The problem is a race of usbnet_stop() with usbnet_start_xmit(). In usbnet_stop() we call usbnet_terminate_urbs() to cancel all URBs in flight. This only makes sense if no new URBs are submitted concurrently, though. But the usbnet_start_xmit() can run at the same time on another CPU which almost unconditionally submits an URB. The error callback of the new URB will then schedule the timer after it was already stopped.

The fix adds a check if the tx queue is stopped after the tx list lock has been taken. This should reliably prevent the submission of new URBs while usbnet_terminate_urbs() does its job. The same thing is done on the rx side even though it might be safe due to other flags that are checked there.

---
 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c +6 -0
index 4ab82b998a0f..a5acbcb3c044 100644
@@ -508,6 +508,7 @@ static int rx_submit (struct usbnet *dev, struct urb *urb, gfp_t flags)
 
 	if (netif_running (dev->net) &&
 	    netif_device_present (dev->net) &&
+	    test_bit(EVENT_DEV_OPEN, &dev->flags) &&
 	    !test_bit (EVENT_RX_HALT, &dev->flags) &&
 	    !test_bit (EVENT_DEV_ASLEEP, &dev->flags)) {
 		switch (retval = usb_submit_urb (urb, GFP_ATOMIC)) {
@@ -1394,6 +1395,11 @@ netdev_tx_t usbnet_start_xmit (struct sk_buff *skb,
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->txq.lock, flags);
 		goto drop;
 	}
+	if (netif_queue_stopped(net)) {
+		usb_autopm_put_interface_async(dev->intf);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->txq.lock, flags);
+		goto drop;
+	}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PM
 	/* if this triggers the device is still a sleep */
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#13 lore raw

PATCH 14/17 usbnet: ipheth: fix racing condition

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Bernd Eckstein <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 94d250fae48e6f873d8362308f5c4d02cd1b1fd2 ]

Fix a racing condition in ipheth.c that can lead to slow performance.

Bug: In ipheth_tx(), netif_wake_queue() may be called on the callback ipheth_sndbulk_callback(), _before_ netif_stop_queue() is called. When this happens, the queue is stopped longer than it needs to be, thus reducing network performance.

Fix: Move netif_stop_queue() in front of usb_submit_urb(). Now the order is always correct. In case, usb_submit_urb() fails, the queue is woken up again as callback will not fire.

Testing: This racing condition is usually not noticeable, as it has to occur very frequently to slowdown the network. The callback from the USB is usually triggered slow enough, so the situation does not appear. However, on a Ubuntu Linux on VMWare Workstation, running on Windows 10, the we loose the race quite often and the following speedup can be noticed:

Without this patch: Download:  4.10 Mbit/s, Upload:  4.01 Mbit/s
With this patch:    Download: 36.23 Mbit/s, Upload: 17.61 Mbit/s
---
 drivers/net/usb/ipheth.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/usb/ipheth.c +2 -1
index 01f95d192d25..2b16a5fed9de 100644
@@ -437,17 +437,18 @@ static int ipheth_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *net)
 			  dev);
 	dev->tx_urb->transfer_flags |= URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP;
 
+	netif_stop_queue(net);
 	retval = usb_submit_urb(dev->tx_urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (retval) {
 		dev_err(&dev->intf->dev, "%s: usb_submit_urb: %d\n",
 			__func__, retval);
 		dev->net->stats.tx_errors++;
 		dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
+		netif_wake_queue(net);
 	} else {
 		dev->net->stats.tx_packets++;
 		dev->net->stats.tx_bytes += skb->len;
 		dev_consume_skb_any(skb);
-		netif_stop_queue(net);
 	}
 
 	return NETDEV_TX_OK;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#15 lore raw

PATCH 16/17 KVM: x86/pmu: do not mask the value that is written to fixed PMUs

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2924b52117b2812e9633d5ea337333299166d373 ]

According to the SDM, for MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0/1 "the lower-order 32 bits of each MSR may be written with any value, and the high-order 8 bits are sign-extended according to the value of bit 31", but the fixed counters in real hardware are limited to the width of the fixed counters ("bits beyond the width of the fixed-function counter are reserved and must be written as zeros"). Fix KVM to do the same.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/pmu_intel.c | 13 ++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/pmu_intel.c +8 -5
index 5ab4a364348e..2729131fe9bf 100644
@@ -235,11 +235,14 @@ static int intel_pmu_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 		}
 		break;
 	default:
-		if ((pmc = get_gp_pmc(pmu, msr, MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0)) ||
-		    (pmc = get_fixed_pmc(pmu, msr))) {
-			if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
-				data = (s64)(s32)data;
-			pmc->counter += data - pmc_read_counter(pmc);
+		if ((pmc = get_gp_pmc(pmu, msr, MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0))) {
+			if (msr_info->host_initiated)
+				pmc->counter = data;
+			else
+				pmc->counter = (s32)data;
+			return 0;
+		} else if ((pmc = get_fixed_pmc(pmu, msr))) {
+			pmc->counter = data;
 			return 0;
 		} else if ((pmc = get_gp_pmc(pmu, msr, MSR_P6_EVNTSEL0))) {
 			if (data == pmc->eventsel)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 4/17 Revert "ALSA: seq: Protect in-kernel ioctl calls with mutex"

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f0654ba94e33699b295ce4f3dc73094db6209035 ]

This reverts commit feb689025fbb6f0aa6297d3ddf97de945ea4ad32.

The fix attempt was incorrect, leading to the mutex deadlock through the close of OSS sequencer client. The proper fix needs more consideration, so let's revert it now.

Fixes feb689025fbb ("ALSA: seq: Protect in-kernel ioctl calls with mutex")
Reported-by [email protected]
---
 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c | 9 ++-------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c +2 -7
index 881c965555c5..bc6d371031fc 100644
@@ -2348,19 +2348,14 @@ int snd_seq_kernel_client_ctl(int clientid, unsigned int cmd, void *arg)
 {
 	const struct ioctl_handler *handler;
 	struct snd_seq_client *client;
-	int err;
 
 	client = clientptr(clientid);
 	if (client == NULL)
 		return -ENXIO;
 
 	for (handler = ioctl_handlers; handler->cmd > 0; ++handler) {
-		if (handler->cmd == cmd) {
-			mutex_lock(&client->ioctl_mutex);
-			err = handler->func(client, arg);
-			mutex_unlock(&client->ioctl_mutex);
-			return err;
-		}
+		if (handler->cmd == cmd)
+			return handler->func(client, arg);
 	}
 
 	pr_debug("ALSA: seq unknown ioctl() 0x%x (type='%c', number=0x%02x)\n",
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH 7/17 Drivers: misc: fix out-of-bounds access in function param_set_kgdbts_var

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Young Xiao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b281218ad4311a0342a40cb02fb17a363df08b48 ]

There is an out-of-bounds access to "config[len - 1]" array when the variable "len" is zero.

See commit dada6a43b040 ("kgdboc: fix KASAN global-out-of-bounds bug in param_set_kgdboc_var()") for details.

---
 drivers/misc/kgdbts.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/misc/kgdbts.c +2 -2
index 99635dd9dbac..bb3a76ad80da 100644
@@ -1132,7 +1132,7 @@ static void kgdbts_put_char(u8 chr)
 
 static int param_set_kgdbts_var(const char *kmessage, struct kernel_param *kp)
 {
-	int len = strlen(kmessage);
+	size_t len = strlen(kmessage);
 
 	if (len >= MAX_CONFIG_LEN) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "kgdbts: config string too long\n");
@@ -1152,7 +1152,7 @@ static int param_set_kgdbts_var(const char *kmessage, struct kernel_param *kp)
 
 	strcpy(config, kmessage);
 	/* Chop out \n char as a result of echo */
-	if (config[len - 1] == '\n')
+	if (len && config[len - 1] == '\n')
 		config[len - 1] = '\0';
 
 	/* Go and configure with the new params. */
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 3/17 ALSA: seq: Fix race of get-subscription call vs port-delete ioctls

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2eabc5ec8ab4d4748a82050dfcb994119b983750 ]

The snd_seq_ioctl_get_subscription() retrieves the port subscriber information as a pointer, while the object isn't protected, hence it may be deleted before the actual reference. This race was spotted by syzkaller and may lead to a UAF.

The fix is simply copying the data in the lookup function that performs in the rwsem to protect against the deletion.

---
 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c | 10 ++--------
 sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c     | 13 ++++++++-----
 sound/core/seq/seq_ports.h     |  5 +++--
 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c +2 -8
index 3b1b2e9fb33e..881c965555c5 100644
@@ -1905,20 +1905,14 @@ static int snd_seq_ioctl_get_subscription(struct snd_seq_client *client,
 	int result;
 	struct snd_seq_client *sender = NULL;
 	struct snd_seq_client_port *sport = NULL;
-	struct snd_seq_subscribers *p;
 
 	result = -EINVAL;
 	if ((sender = snd_seq_client_use_ptr(subs->sender.client)) == NULL)
 		goto __end;
 	if ((sport = snd_seq_port_use_ptr(sender, subs->sender.port)) == NULL)
 		goto __end;
-	p = snd_seq_port_get_subscription(&sport->c_src, &subs->dest);
-	if (p) {
-		result = 0;
-		*subs = p->info;
-	} else
-		result = -ENOENT;
-
+	result = snd_seq_port_get_subscription(&sport->c_src, &subs->dest,
+					       subs);
       __end:
       	if (sport)
 		snd_seq_port_unlock(sport);
sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c +8 -5
index f04714d70bf7..faf7ceffbeca 100644
@@ -635,20 +635,23 @@ int snd_seq_port_disconnect(struct snd_seq_client *connector,
 
 
 /* get matched subscriber */
-struct snd_seq_subscribers *snd_seq_port_get_subscription(struct snd_seq_port_subs_info *src_grp,
-							  struct snd_seq_addr *dest_addr)
+int snd_seq_port_get_subscription(struct snd_seq_port_subs_info *src_grp,
+				  struct snd_seq_addr *dest_addr,
+				  struct snd_seq_port_subscribe *subs)
 {
-	struct snd_seq_subscribers *s, *found = NULL;
+	struct snd_seq_subscribers *s;
+	int err = -ENOENT;
 
 	down_read(&src_grp->list_mutex);
 	list_for_each_entry(s, &src_grp->list_head, src_list) {
 		if (addr_match(dest_addr, &s->info.dest)) {
-			found = s;
+			*subs = s->info;
+			err = 0;
 			break;
 		}
 	}
 	up_read(&src_grp->list_mutex);
-	return found;
+	return err;
 }
 
 /*
sound/core/seq/seq_ports.h +3 -2
index 26bd71f36c41..06003b36652e 100644
@@ -135,7 +135,8 @@ int snd_seq_port_subscribe(struct snd_seq_client_port *port,
 			   struct snd_seq_port_subscribe *info);
 
 /* get matched subscriber */
-struct snd_seq_subscribers *snd_seq_port_get_subscription(struct snd_seq_port_subs_info *src_grp,
-							  struct snd_seq_addr *dest_addr);
+int snd_seq_port_get_subscription(struct snd_seq_port_subs_info *src_grp,
+				  struct snd_seq_addr *dest_addr,
+				  struct snd_seq_port_subscribe *subs);
 
 #endif
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 5/17 ALSA: seq: Cover unsubscribe_port() in list_mutex

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7c32ae35fbf9cffb7aa3736f44dec10c944ca18e ]

The call of unsubscribe_port() which manages the group count and module refcount from delete_and_unsubscribe_port() looks racy; it's not covered by the group list lock, and it's likely a cause of the reported unbalance at port deletion. Let's move the call inside the group list_mutex to plug the hole.

---
 sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c +1 -1
index faf7ceffbeca..9cfe4fcee9a5 100644
@@ -550,10 +550,10 @@ static void delete_and_unsubscribe_port(struct snd_seq_client *client,
 		list_del_init(list);
 	grp->exclusive = 0;
 	write_unlock_irq(&grp->list_lock);
-	up_write(&grp->list_mutex);
 
 	if (!empty)
 		unsubscribe_port(client, port, grp, &subs->info, ack);
+	up_write(&grp->list_mutex);
 }
 
 /* connect two ports */
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1

Sasha Levin

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/17 x86/uaccess, kcov: Disable stack protector

From: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 40ea97290b08be2e038b31cbb33097d1145e8169 ]

New tooling noticed this mishap:

kernel/kcov.o: warning: objtool: write_comp_data()+0x138: call to __stack_chk_fail() with UACCESS enabled kernel/kcov.o: warning: objtool: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc()+0xd9: call to __stack_chk_fail() with UACCESS enabled

All the other instrumentation (KASAN,UBSAN) also have stack protector disabled.

Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
---
 kernel/Makefile | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
kernel/Makefile +1 -0
index 314e7d62f5f0..184fa9aa5802 100644
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT_extable.o := n
 # Don't self-instrument.
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT_kcov.o := n
 KASAN_SANITIZE_kcov.o := n
+CFLAGS_kcov.o := $(call cc-option, -fno-conserve-stack -fno-stack-protector)
 
 # cond_syscall is currently not LTO compatible
 CFLAGS_sys_ni.o = $(DISABLE_LTO)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1