fs-verity: read-only file-based authenticity protection
Subsystems (8)
Eric Biggers
maintainerv4 cover fs-verity: read-only file-based authenticity protection
Hello,
This is a redesigned version of the fs-verity patchset, implementing Ted's suggestion to build the Merkle tree in the kernel
(https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/[email protected]/).
This greatly simplifies the UAPI, since the verity metadata no longer needs to be transferred to the kernel. Now to enable fs-verity on a file, one simply calls FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY, passing it this structure:
struct fsverity_enable_arg {
__u32 version;
__u32 hash_algorithm;
__u32 block_size;
__u32 salt_size;
__u64 salt_ptr;
__u32 sig_size;
__u32 __reserved1;
__u64 sig_ptr;
__u64 __reserved2[11];
};The filesystem then builds the file's Merkle tree and stores it in a filesystem-specific location associated with the file. Afterwards, FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY can be used to retrieve the file measurement ("root hash"). The way the file measurement is computed is also effectively part of the API (it has to be), but it's logically independent of where/how the filesystem stores the Merkle tree.
The API is fully documented in Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst, along with other aspects of fs-verity. I also added an FAQ section that answers frequently asked questions about fs-verity, e.g. why isn't it all at the VFS level, why isn't it part of IMA, why does the Merkle tree need to be stored on-disk, etc.
Overview
--------
This patchset implements fs-verity for ext4 and f2fs. fs-verity is similar to dm-verity, but implemented on a per-file basis: a Merkle tree is used to measure (hash) a read-only file's data as it is paged in. ext4 and f2fs hide this Merkle tree beyond the end of the file, but other filesystems can implement it differently if desired.
In general, fs-verity is intended for use on writable filesystems; dm-verity is still recommended on read-only ones.
Similar to fscrypt, most of the code is in fs/verity/, and not too many filesystem-specific changes are needed. The Merkle tree is built by the filesystem when the FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY ioctl is executed.
fs-verity provides a file measurement (hash) in constant time and verifies data on-demand. Thus, it is useful for efficiently verifying the authenticity of large files of which only a small portion may be accessed, such as Android application package (APK) files. It may also be useful in "audit" use cases where file hashes are logged.
fs-verity can also provide better protection against malicious disks than an ahead-of-time hash, since fs-verity re-verifies data each time it's paged in. Note, however, that any authenticity guarantee is still dependent on verification of the file measurement and other relevant metadata in a way that makes sense for the overall system; fs-verity is only a tool to help with this.
This patchset doesn't include IMA support for fs-verity file measurements. This is planned and we'd like to collaborate with the IMA maintainers. Although fs-verity can be used on its own without IMA, fs-verity is primarily a lower level feature (think of it as a way of hashing a file), so some users may still need IMA's policy mechanism. However, an optional in-kernel signature verification mechanism within fs-verity itself is also included.
This patchset is based on v5.2-rc3. It can also be found in git at tag fsverity_2019-06-06 of:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux.git
fs-verity has a userspace utility:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/fsverity-utils.git
xfstests for fs-verity can be found at branch "fsverity" of:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/xfstests-dev.git
fs-verity is supported by f2fs-tools v1.11.0+ and e2fsprogs v1.45.2+.
Examples of setting up fs-verity protected files can be found in the README.md file of fsverity-utils.
Other useful references include:
- Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst, added by the first patch.
- LWN coverage of v3 patchset: https://lwn.net/Articles/790185/
- LWN coverage of v2 patchset: https://lwn.net/Articles/775872/
- LWN coverage of v1 patchset: https://lwn.net/Articles/763729/
- Presentation at Linux Security Summit North America 2018:
- Slides: https://schd.ws/hosted_files/lssna18/af/fs-verity%20slide%20deck.pdf
- Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Aw5h6aBhu6M
(This corresponded to the v1 patchset; changes have been made since then.)
- LWN coverage of LSFMM 2018 discussion: https://lwn.net/Articles/752614/
Changed since v3:
- The FS_IOC_GETFLAGS ioctl now returns the verity flag.
- Fixed setting i_verity_info too early.
- Restored pagecache invalidation in FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY.
- Fixed truncation of fsverity_enable_arg::hash_algorithm.
- Reject empty files for both open and enable, not just enable.
- Added a couple more FAQ entries to the documentation.
- A few minor cleanups.
- Rebased onto v5.2-rc3.
Changed since v2:
- Large redesign: the Merkle tree is now built by FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY, rather than being provided by userspace. The fsverity_operations provide an interface for filesystems to read and write the Merkle tree from/to a filesystem-specific location.
- Lot of refactoring, cleanups, and documentation improvements.
- Many simplifications, such as simplifying the fsverity_descriptor format, dropping CRC-32 support, and limiting the salt size.
- ext4 and f2fs now store an xattr that gives the location of the fsverity_descriptor, so loading it is more straightforward.
- f2fs no longer counts the verity metadata in the on-disk i_size, making it consistent with ext4.
- Replaced the filesystem-specific fs-verity kconfig options with CONFIG_FS_VERITY.
- Replaced the filesystem-specific verity bit checks with IS_VERITY().
Changed since v1:
- Added documentation file.
- Require write permission for FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY, rather than CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
- Eliminated dependency on CONFIG_BLOCK and clarified that filesystems can verify a page at a time rather than a bio at a time.
- Fixed conditions for verifying holes.
- ext4 now only allows fs-verity on extent-based files.
- Eliminated most of the assumptions that the verity metadata is stored beyond EOF, in case filesystems want to do things differently.
- Other cleanups.
Eric Biggers (16):
fs-verity: add a documentation file
fs-verity: add MAINTAINERS file entry
fs-verity: add UAPI header
fs: uapi: define verity bit for FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
fs-verity: add Kconfig and the helper functions for hashing
fs-verity: add inode and superblock fields
fs-verity: add the hook for file ->open()
fs-verity: add the hook for file ->setattr()
fs-verity: add data verification hooks for ->readpages()
fs-verity: implement FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY ioctl
fs-verity: implement FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY ioctl
fs-verity: add SHA-512 support
fs-verity: support builtin file signatures
ext4: add basic fs-verity support
ext4: add fs-verity read support
f2fs: add fs-verity support
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 708 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ Documentation/filesystems/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt | 1 + MAINTAINERS | 12 + fs/Kconfig | 2 + fs/Makefile | 1 + fs/ext4/Makefile | 1 + fs/ext4/ext4.h | 23 +- fs/ext4/file.c | 4 + fs/ext4/inode.c | 48 +- fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 12 + fs/ext4/readpage.c | 207 +++++++- fs/ext4/super.c | 18 +- fs/ext4/sysfs.c | 6 + fs/ext4/verity.c | 272 ++++++++++ fs/ext4/xattr.h | 2 + fs/f2fs/Makefile | 1 + fs/f2fs/data.c | 72 ++- fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 23 +- fs/f2fs/file.c | 40 ++ fs/f2fs/inode.c | 5 +- fs/f2fs/super.c | 3 + fs/f2fs/sysfs.c | 11 + fs/f2fs/verity.c | 224 ++++++++ fs/f2fs/xattr.h | 2 + fs/verity/Kconfig | 55 ++ fs/verity/Makefile | 10 + fs/verity/enable.c | 353 ++++++++++++ fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 188 +++++++ fs/verity/hash_algs.c | 279 ++++++++++ fs/verity/init.c | 61 +++ fs/verity/measure.c | 57 ++ fs/verity/open.c | 363 +++++++++++++ fs/verity/signature.c | 207 ++++++++ fs/verity/verify.c | 281 ++++++++++ include/linux/fs.h | 11 + include/linux/fsverity.h | 209 ++++++++ include/uapi/linux/fs.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h | 40 ++ 39 files changed, 3755 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst create mode 100644 fs/ext4/verity.c create mode 100644 fs/f2fs/verity.c create mode 100644 fs/verity/Kconfig create mode 100644 fs/verity/Makefile create mode 100644 fs/verity/enable.c create mode 100644 fs/verity/fsverity_private.h create mode 100644 fs/verity/hash_algs.c create mode 100644 fs/verity/init.c create mode 100644 fs/verity/measure.c create mode 100644 fs/verity/open.c create mode 100644 fs/verity/signature.c create mode 100644 fs/verity/verify.c create mode 100644 include/linux/fsverity.h create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h
Signature · 1 line
2.22.0.rc1.311.g5d7573a151-goog
Eric Biggers
maintainerPATCH v4 1/16 fs-verity: add a documentation file
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add a documentation file for fs-verity, covering:
- Introduction
- Use cases
- User API
- FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY
- FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY
- FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
- Accessing verity files
- File measurement computation
- Merkle tree
- fs-verity descriptor
- Built-in signature verification
- Filesystem support
- ext4
- f2fs
- Implementation details
- Verifying data
- Pagecache
- Block device based filesystems
- Userspace utility
- Tests
- FAQ
--- Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 708 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ Documentation/filesystems/index.rst | 1 + 2 files changed, 709 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst new file +708 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,708 @@ +======================================================= +fs-verity: read-only file-based authenticity protection +======================================================= + +Introduction +============ + +fs-verity (``fs/verity/``) is a support layer that filesystems can +hook into to support transparent integrity and authenticity protection +of read-only files. Currently, it is supported by the ext4 and f2fs +filesystems. Like fscrypt, not too much filesystem-specific code is +needed to support fs-verity. + +fs-verity is similar to `dm-verity +<https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/device-mapper/verity.txt>`_ +but works on files rather than block devices. On regular files on +filesystems supporting fs-verity, userspace can execute an ioctl that +causes the filesystem to build a Merkle tree for the file and persist +it to a filesystem-specific location associated with the file. + +After this, the file is made readonly, and all reads from the file are +automatically verified against the file's Merkle tree. Reads of any +corrupted data, including mmap reads, will fail. + +Userspace can use another ioctl to retrieve the root hash (actually +the "file measurement", which is a hash that includes the root hash) +that fs-verity is enforcing for the file. This ioctl executes in +constant time, regardless of the file size. + +fs-verity is essentially a way to hash a file in constant time, +subject to the caveat that reads which would violate the hash will +fail at runtime. + +Use cases +========= + +By itself, the base fs-verity feature only provides integrity +protection, i.e. detection of accidental (non-malicious) corruption. + +However, because fs-verity makes retrieving the file hash extremely +efficient, it's primarily meant to be used as a tool to support +authentication (detection of malicious modifications) or auditing +(logging file hashes before use). + +Trusted userspace code (e.g. operating system code running on a +read-only partition that is itself authenticated by dm-verity) can +authenticate the contents of an fs-verity file by using the +`FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY`_ ioctl to retrieve its hash, then verifying a +digital signature of it. + +A standard file hash could be used instead of fs-verity. However, +this is inefficient if the file is large and only a small portion may +be accessed. This is often the case for Android application package +(APK) files, for example. These typically contain many translations, +classes, and other resources that are infrequently or even never +accessed on a particular device. It would be slow and wasteful to +read and hash the entire file before starting the application. + +Unlike an ahead-of-time hash, fs-verity also re-verifies data each +time it's paged in. This ensures that malicious disk firmware can't +undetectably change the contents of the file at runtime. + +fs-verity does not replace or obsolete dm-verity. dm-verity should +still be used on read-only filesystems. fs-verity is for files that +must live on a read-write filesystem because they are independently +updated and potentially user-installed, so dm-verity cannot be used. + +The base fs-verity feature is a hashing mechanism only; actually +authenticating the files is up to userspace. However, to meet some +users' needs, fs-verity optionally supports a simple signature +verification mechanism where users can configure the kernel to require +that all fs-verity files be signed by a key loaded into a keyring; see +`Built-in signature verification`_. Support for fs-verity file hashes +in IMA (Integrity Measurement Architecture) policies is also planned. + +User API +======== + +FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY +-------------------- + +The FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY ioctl enables fs-verity on a file. It takes +in a pointer to a :c:type:`struct fsverity_enable_arg`, defined as +follows:: + + struct fsverity_enable_arg { + __u32 version; + __u32 hash_algorithm; + __u32 block_size; + __u32 salt_size; + __u64 salt_ptr; + __u32 sig_size; + __u32 __reserved1; + __u64 sig_ptr; + __u64 __reserved2[11]; + }; + +This structure contains the parameters of the Merkle tree to build for +the file, and optionally contains a signature. It must be initialized +as follows: + +- ``version`` must be 1. +- ``hash_algorithm`` must be the identifier for the hash algorithm to + use for the Merkle tree, such as FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_SHA256. See + ``include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h`` for the list of possible values. +- ``block_size`` must be the Merkle tree block size. Currently, this + must be equal to the system page size, which is usually 4096 bytes. + Other sizes may be supported in the future. This value is not + necessarily the same as the filesystem block size. +- ``salt_size`` is the size of the salt in bytes, or 0 if no salt is + provided. The salt is a value that is prepended to every hashed + block; it can be used to personalize the hashing for a particular + file or device. Currently the maximum salt size is 32 bytes. +- ``salt_ptr`` is the pointer to the salt, or NULL if no salt is + provided. +- ``sig_size`` is the size of the signature in bytes, or 0 if no + signature is provided. Currently the signature is (somewhat + arbitrarily) limited to 16128 bytes. See `Built-in signature + verification`_ for more information. +- ``sig_ptr`` is the pointer to the signature, or NULL if no + signature is provided. +- All reserved fields must be zeroed. + +FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY causes the filesystem to build a Merkle tree for +the file and persist it to a filesystem-specific location associated +with the file, then mark the file as a verity file. This ioctl may +take a long time to execute on large files, and it is interruptible by +fatal signals. + +FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY checks for write access to the inode. However, +it must be executed on an O_RDONLY file descriptor and no processes +can have the file open for writing. Attempts to open the file for +writing while this ioctl is executing will fail with ETXTBSY. (This +is necessary to guarantee that no writable file descriptors will exist +after verity is enabled, and to guarantee that the file's contents are +stable while the Merkle tree is being built over it.) + +On success, FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY returns 0, and the file becomes a +verity file. On failure (including the case of interruption by a +fatal signal), no changes are made to the file. + +FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY can fail with the following errors: + +- ``EACCES``: the process does not have write access to the file +- ``EEXIST``: the file already has verity enabled +- ``EFAULT``: the caller provided inaccessible memory +- ``EINTR``: the operation was interrupted by a fatal signal +- ``EINVAL``: unsupported version, hash algorithm, or block size; or + reserved bits are set; or the file descriptor refers to neither a + regular file nor a directory; or the file is empty. +- ``EISDIR``: the file descriptor refers to a directory +- ``EMSGSIZE``: the salt or signature is too long +- ``ENOENT``: fs-verity recognizes the hash algorithm, but it's not + available in the kernel's crypto API as currently configured (e.g. + for SHA-512, missing CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512). +- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement fs-verity +- ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with fs-verity + support, or the filesystem superblock has not had the 'verity' + feature enabled on it. (See `Filesystem support`_.) +- ``EPERM``: the file is append-only +- ``EROFS``: the filesystem is read-only +- ``ETXTBSY``: someone has the file open for writing. This can be the + caller's file descriptor, another open file descriptor, or the file + reference held by a writable memory map. + +FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY +--------------------- + +The FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY ioctl retrieves the measurement of a verity +file. The file measurement is a digest that cryptographically +identifies the file contents that are being enforced on reads. + +This ioctl takes in a pointer to a variable-length structure:: + + struct fsverity_digest { + __u16 digest_algorithm; + __u16 digest_size; /* input/output */ + __u8 digest[]; + }; + +``digest_size`` is an input/output field. On input, it must be +initialized to the number of bytes allocated for the variable-length +``digest`` field. + +On success, 0 is returned and the kernel fills in the structure as +follows: + +- ``digest_algorithm`` will be the hash algorithm used for the file + measurement. It will match ``fsverity_enable_arg::hash_algorithm``. +- ``digest_size`` will be the size of the digest in bytes, e.g. 32 + for SHA-256. (This can be redundant with ``digest_algorithm``.) +- ``digest`` will be the actual bytes of the digest. + +FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY is guaranteed to execute in constant time, +regardless of the size of the file. + +FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY can fail with the following errors: + +- ``EFAULT``: the caller provided inaccessible memory +- ``ENODATA``: the file is not a verity file +- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement fs-verity +- ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with fs-verity + support, or the filesystem superblock has not had the 'verity' + feature enabled on it. (See `Filesystem support`_.) +- ``EOVERFLOW``: the digest is longer than the specified + ``digest_size`` bytes. Try providing a larger buffer. + +FS_IOC_GETFLAGS +--------------- + +The existing ioctl FS_IOC_GETFLAGS (which isn't specific to fs-verity) +can also be used to check whether a file has fs-verity enabled or not. +To do so, check for FS_VERITY_FL (0x00100000) in the returned flags. + +The verity flag is not settable via FS_IOC_SETFLAGS. You must use +FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY instead, since parameters must be provided. + +Accessing verity files +====================== + +Applications can transparently access a verity file just like a +non-verity one, with the following exceptions: + +- Verity files are readonly. They cannot be opened for writing or + truncate()d, even if the file mode bits allow it. Attempts to do + one of these things will fail with EPERM. However, changes to + metadata such as owner, mode, timestamps, and xattrs are still + allowed, since these are not measured by fs-verity. Verity files + can also still be renamed, deleted, and linked to. + +- Direct I/O is not supported on verity files. Attempts to use direct + I/O on such files will fall back to buffered I/O. + +- DAX (Direct Access) is not supported on verity files, because this + would circumvent the data verification. + +- Reads of data that doesn't match the verity Merkle tree will fail + with EIO (for read()) or SIGBUS (for mmap() reads). + +- If the sysctl "fs.verity.require_signatures" is set to 1 and the + file's verity measurement is not signed by a key in the fs-verity + keyring, then opening the file will fail. See `Built-in signature + verification`_. + +Direct access to the Merkle tree is not supported. Therefore, if a +verity file is copied, or is backed up and restored, then it will lose +its "verity"-ness. fs-verity is primarily meant for files like +executables that are managed by a package manager. + +File measurement computation +============================ + +This section describes how fs-verity hashes the file contents using a +Merkle tree to produce the "file measurement" which cryptographically +identifies the file contents. This algorithm is the same for all +filesystems that support fs-verity. + +Userspace only needs to be aware of this algorithm if it needs to +compute the file measurement itself, e.g. in order to sign the file. + +Merkle tree +----------- + +The file contents is divided into blocks, where the block size is +configurable but is usually 4096 bytes. The end of the last block is +zero-padded if needed. Each block is then hashed, producing the first +level of hashes. Then, the hashes in this first level are grouped +into 'blocksize'-byte blocks (zero-padding the ends as needed) and +these blocks are hashed, producing the second level of hashes. This +proceeds up the tree until only a single block remains. The hash of +this block is the "Merkle tree root hash". + +If the entire file contents fit in one block, then the "Merkle tree +root hash" is simply the hash of the single data block. Empty files +are not supported. + +The "blocks" here are not necessarily the same as "filesystem blocks". + +If a salt was specified, then it's zero-padded to the closest multiple +of the input size of the hash algorithm's compression function, e.g. +64 bytes for for SHA-256 or 128 bytes for SHA-512. The padded salt is +prepended to every data or Merkle tree block that is hashed. + +The purpose of the block padding is to cause every hash to be taken +over the same amount of data, which simplifies the implementation and +keeps open more possibilities for hardware acceleration. The purpose +of the salt padding is to make the salting "free" when the salted hash +state is precomputed, then imported for each hash. + +Example: in the recommended configuration of SHA-256 and 4K blocks, +128 hash values fit in each block. Thus, each level of the Merkle +tree is approximately 128 times smaller than the previous, and for +large files the Merkle tree's size converges to approximately 1/127 of +the original file size. However, for small files, the padding is +significant, making the space overhead proportionally more. + +fs-verity descriptor +-------------------- + +By itself, the Merkle tree root hash is ambiguous. For example, it +can't a distinguish a large file from a small second file whose data +is exactly the top-level hash block of the first file. Ambiguities +also arise from the convention of padding to the next block boundary. + +To solve this problem, the verity file measurement is actually +computed as a hash of the following structure, which contains the +Merkle tree root hash as well as other fields such as the file size:: + + struct fsverity_descriptor { + __u8 version; /* must be 1 */ + __u8 hash_algorithm; /* Merkle tree hash algorithm */ + __u8 log_blocksize; /* log2 of size of data and tree blocks */ + __u8 salt_size; /* size of salt in bytes; 0 if none */ + __le32 sig_size; /* must be 0 */ + __le64 data_size; /* size of file the Merkle tree is built over */ + __u8 root_hash[64]; /* Merkle tree root hash */ + __u8 salt[32]; /* salt prepended to each hashed block */ + __u8 __reserved[144]; /* must be 0's */ + }; + +Note that the ``sig_size`` field must be set to 0 for the purpose of +computing the file measurement, even if a signature was provided (or +will be provided) to `FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY`_. + +Built-in signature verification +=============================== + +With CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES=y, fs-verity supports putting +a portion of an authentication policy (see `Use cases`_) in the +kernel. Specifically, it adds support for: + +1. At fs-verity module initialization time, a keyring ".fs-verity" is + created. The root user can add trusted X.509 certificates to this + keyring using the add_key() system call, then (when done) + optionally use keyctl_restrict_keyring() to prevent additional + certificates from being added. + +2. `FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY`_ accepts a pointer to a PKCS#7 formatted + signature in DER format of the file measurement. On success, this + signature is persisted alongside the Merkle tree. Then, any time + the file is opened, the kernel will verify this signature against + the certificates in the ".fs-verity" keyring, and verify that it + matches the actual file measurement. + +3. A new sysctl "fs.verity.require_signatures" is made available. + When set to 1, the kernel requires that all verity files have a + correctly signed file measurement as described in (2). + +File measurements must be signed in the following format, which is +similar to the structure used by `FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY`_:: + + struct fsverity_signed_digest { + char magic[8]; /* must be "FSVerity" */ + __le16 digest_algorithm; + __le16 digest_size; + __u8 digest[]; + }; + +fs-verity's built-in signature verification support is meant as a +relatively simple mechanism that can be used to provide some level of +authenticity protection for verity files, as an alternative to doing +the signature verification in userspace or using IMA-appraisal. +However, with this mechanism, userspace programs still need to check +that the verity bit is set, and there is no protection against verity +files being swapped around. + +Filesystem support +================== + +fs-verity is currently supported by the ext4 and f2fs filesystems. +The CONFIG_FS_VERITY kconfig option must be enabled to use fs-verity +on either filesystem. + +``include/linux/fsverity.h`` declares the interface between the +``fs/verity/`` support layer and filesystems. Briefly, filesystems +must provide an ``fsverity_operations`` structure that provides +methods to read and write the verity metadata to a filesystem-specific +location, including the Merkle tree blocks and +``fsverity_descriptor``. Filesystems must also call functions in +``fs/verity/`` at certain times, such as when a file is opened or when +pages have been read into the pagecache. (See `Verifying data`_.) + +ext4 +---- + +ext4 supports fs-verity since Linux TODO and e2fsprogs v1.45.2. + +To create verity files on an ext4 filesystem, the filesystem must have +been formatted with ``-O verity`` or had ``tune2fs -O verity`` run on +it. "verity" is an RO_COMPAT filesystem feature, so once set, old +kernels will only be able to mount the filesystem readonly, and old +versions of e2fsck will be unable to check the filesystem. Moreover, +currently ext4 only supports mounting a filesystem with the "verity" +feature when its block size is equal to PAGE_SIZE (often 4096 bytes). + +ext4 sets the EXT4_VERITY_FL on-disk inode flag on verity files. It +can only be set by `FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY`_, and it cannot be cleared. + +ext4 also supports encryption, which can be used simultaneously with +fs-verity. In this case, the plaintext data is verified rather than +the ciphertext. This is necessary in order to make the file +measurement meaningful, since every file is encrypted differently. + +ext4 stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and fsverity_descriptor) +past the end of the file, starting at the first page fully beyond +i_size. This approach works because (a) verity files are readonly, +and (b) pages fully beyond i_size aren't visible to userspace but can +be read/written internally by ext4 with only some relatively small +changes to ext4. This approach avoids having to depend on the +EA_INODE feature and on rearchitecturing ext4's xattr support to +support paging multi-gigabyte xattrs into memory, and to support +encrypting xattrs. Note that the verity metadata *must* be encrypted +when the file is, since it contains hashes of the plaintext data. + +Currently, ext4 verity only supports the case where the Merkle tree +block size, filesystem block size, and page size are all the same. + +f2fs +---- + +f2fs supports fs-verity since Linux TODO and f2fs-tools v1.11.0. + +To create verity files on an f2fs filesystem, the filesystem must have +been formatted with ``-O verity``. + +f2fs sets the FADVISE_VERITY_BIT on-disk inode flag on verity files. +It can only be set by `FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY`_, and it cannot be +cleared. + +Like ext4, f2fs stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and +fsverity_descriptor) past the end of the file, starting at the first +page fully beyond i_size. See explanation for ext4 above. Moreover, +f2fs supports at most 4096 bytes of xattr entries per inode which +wouldn't be enough for even a single Merkle tree block. + +Currently, f2fs verity only supports a Merkle tree block size of 4096. + +Implementation details +====================== + +Verifying data +-------------- + +fs-verity ensures that all reads of a verity file's data are verified, +regardless of which syscall is used to do the read (e.g. mmap(), +read(), pread()) and regardless of whether it's the first read or a +later read (unless the later read can return cached data that was +already verified). Below, we describe how filesystems implement this. + +Pagecache +~~~~~~~~~ + +For filesystems using Linux's pagecache, the ``->readpage()`` and +``->readpages()`` methods must be modified to verify pages before they +are marked Uptodate. Merely hooking ``->read_iter()`` would be +insufficient, since ``->read_iter()`` is not used for memory maps. + +Therefore, fs/verity/ provides a function fsverity_verify_page() which +verifies a page that has been read into the pagecache of a verity +inode, but is still locked and not Uptodate, so it's not yet readable +by userspace. As needed to do the verification, +fsverity_verify_page() will call back into the filesystem to read +Merkle tree pages via fsverity_operations::read_merkle_tree_page(). + +fsverity_verify_page() returns false if verification failed; in this +case, the filesystem must not set the page Uptodate. Following this, +as per the usual Linux pagecache behavior, attempts by userspace to +read() from the part of the file containing the page will fail with +EIO, and accesses to the page within a memory map will raise SIGBUS. + +fsverity_verify_page() currently only supports the case where the +Merkle tree block size is equal to PAGE_SIZE (often 4096 bytes). + +In principle, fsverity_verify_page() verifies the entire path in the +Merkle tree from the data page to the root hash. However, for +efficiency the filesystem may cache the hash pages. Therefore, +fsverity_verify_page() only ascends the tree reading hash pages until +an already-verified hash page is seen, as indicated by the PageChecked +bit being set. It then verifies the path to that page. + +This optimization, which is also used by dm-verity, results in +excellent sequential read performance. This is because usually (e.g. +127 in 128 times for 4K blocks and SHA-256) the hash page from the +bottom level of the tree will already be cached and checked from +reading a previous data page. However, random reads perform worse. + +Block device based filesystems +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Block device based filesystems (e.g. ext4 and f2fs) in Linux also use +the pagecache, so the above subsection applies too. However, they +also usually read many pages from a file at once, grouped into a +structure called a "bio". To make it easier for these types of +filesystems to support fs-verity, fs/verity/ also provides a function +fsverity_verify_bio() which verifies all pages in a bio. + +ext4 and f2fs also support encryption. If a verity file is also +encrypted, the pages must be decrypted before being verified. To +support this, these filesystems allocate a "post-read context" for +each bio and store it in ``->bi_private``:: + + struct bio_post_read_ctx { + struct bio *bio; + struct work_struct work; + unsigned int cur_step; + unsigned int enabled_steps; + }; + +``enabled_steps`` is a bitmask that specifies whether decryption, +verity, or both is enabled. After the bio completes, for each needed +postprocessing step the filesystem enqueues the bio_post_read_ctx on a +workqueue, and then the workqueue work does the decryption or +verification. Finally, pages where no decryption or verity error +occurred are marked Uptodate, and the pages are unlocked. + +Files on ext4 and f2fs may contain holes. Normally, ``->readpages()`` +simply zeroes holes and sets the corresponding pages Uptodate; no bios +are issued. To prevent this case from bypassing fs-verity, these +filesystems use fsverity_verify_page() to verify hole pages. + +ext4 and f2fs disable direct I/O on verity files, since otherwise +direct I/O would bypass fs-verity. (They also do the same for +encrypted files.) + +Userspace utility +================= + +This document focuses on the kernel, but a userspace utility for +fs-verity can be found at: + + https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/fsverity-utils.git + +See the README.md file in the fsverity-utils source tree for details, +including examples of setting up fs-verity protected files. + +Tests +===== + +To test fs-verity, use xfstests. For example, using `kvm-xfstests +<https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/ext2/xfstests-bld.git/tree/Documentation/kvm-quickstart.md>`_:: + + kvm-xfstests -c ext4,f2fs -g verity + +FAQ +=== + +This section answers frequently asked questions about fs-verity that +weren't already directly answered in other parts of this document. + +:Q: Why isn't fs-verity part of IMA? +:A: fs-verity and IMA (Integrity Measurement Architecture) have + different focuses. fs-verity is a filesystem-level mechanism for + hashing individual files using a Merkle tree. In contrast, IMA + specifies a system-wide policy that specifies which files are + hashed and what to do with those hashes, such as log them, + authenticate them, or add them to a measurement list. + + IMA is planned to support the fs-verity hashing mechanism as an + alternative to doing full file hashes, for people who want the + performance and security benefits of the Merkle tree based hash. + But it doesn't make sense to force all uses of fs-verity to be + through IMA. As a standalone filesystem feature, fs-verity + already meets many users' needs, and it's testable like other + filesystem features e.g. with xfstests. + +:Q: Isn't fs-verity useless because the attacker can just modify the + hashes in the Merkle tree, which is stored on-disk? +:A: To verify the authenticity of an fs-verity file you must verify + the authenticity of the "file measurement", which is basically the + root hash of the Merkle tree. See `Use cases`_. + +:Q: Isn't fs-verity useless because the attacker can just replace a + verity file with a non-verity one? +:A: See `Use cases`_. In the initial use case, it's really trusted + userspace code that authenticates the files; fs-verity is just a + tool to do this job efficiently and securely. The trusted + userspace code will consider non-verity files to be inauthentic. + +:Q: Why does the Merkle tree need to be stored on-disk? Couldn't you + store just the root hash? +:A: If the Merkle tree wasn't stored on-disk, then you'd have to + compute the entire tree when the file is first accessed, even if + just one byte is being read. This is a fundamental consequence of + how Merkle tree hashing works. To verify a leaf node, you need to + verify the whole path to the root hash, including the root node + (the thing which the root hash is a hash of). But if the root + node isn't stored on-disk, you have to compute it by hashing its + children, and so on until you've actually hashed the entire file. + + That defeats most of the point of doing a Merkle tree-based hash, + since if you have to hash the whole file ahead of time anyway, + then you could simply do sha256(file) instead. That would be much + simpler, and a bit faster too. + + It's true that an in-memory Merkle tree could still provide the + advantage of verification on every read rather than just on the + first read. However, it would be inefficient because every time a + hash page gets evicted (you can't pin the entire Merkle tree into + memory, since it may be very large), in order to restore it you + again need to hash everything below it in the tree. This again + defeats most of the point of doing a Merkle tree-based hash, since + a single block read could trigger re-hashing gigabytes of data. + +:Q: But couldn't you store just the leaf nodes and compute the rest? +:A: See previous answer; this really just moves up one level, since + one could alternatively interpret the data blocks as being the + leaf nodes of the Merkle tree. It's true that the tree can be + computed much faster if the leaf level is stored rather than just + the data, but that's only because each level is less than 1% the + size of the level below (assuming the recommended settings of + SHA-256 and 4K blocks). For the exact same reason, by storing + "just the leaf nodes" you'd already be storing over 99% of the + tree, so you might as well simply store the whole tree. + +:Q: Can the Merkle tree be built ahead of time, e.g. distributed as + part of a package that is installed to many computers? +:A: This isn't currently supported. It was part of the original + design, but was removed to simplify the kernel UAPI and because it + wasn't a critical use case. Files are usually installed once and + used many times, and cryptographic hashing is somewhat fast on + most modern processors. + +:Q: Why doesn't fs-verity support writes? +:A: Write support would be very difficult and would require a + completely different design, so it's well outside the scope of + fs-verity. Write support would require: + + - A way to maintain consistency between the data and hashes, + including all levels of hashes, since corruption after a crash + (especially of potentially the entire file!) is unacceptable. + The main options for solving this are data journalling, + copy-on-write, and log-structured volume. But it's very hard to + retrofit existing filesystems with new consistency mechanisms. + Data journalling is available on ext4, but is very slow. + + - Rebuilding the the Merkle tree after every write, which would be + extremely inefficient. Alternatively, a different authenticated + dictionary structure such as an "authenticated skiplist" could + be used. However, this would be far more complex. + + Compare it to dm-verity vs. dm-integrity. dm-verity is very + simple: the kernel just verifies read-only data against a + read-only Merkle tree. In contrast, dm-integrity supports writes + but is slow, is much more complex, and doesn't actually support + full-device authentication since it authenticates each sector + independently, i.e. there is no "root hash". It doesn't really + make sense for the same device-mapper target to support these two + very different cases; the same applies to fs-verity. + +:Q: Since verity files are immutable, why isn't the immutable bit set? +:A: The existing "immutable" bit (FS_IMMUTABLE_FL) already has a + specific set of semantics which not only make the file contents + read-only, but also prevent the file from being deleted, renamed, + linked to, or having its owner or mode changed. These extra + properties are unwanted for fs-verity, so reusing the immutable + bit isn't appropriate. + +:Q: Why does the API use ioctls instead of setxattr() and getxattr()? +:A: Abusing the xattr interface for basically arbitrary syscalls is + heavily frowned upon by most of the Linux filesystem developers. + An xattr should really just be an xattr on-disk, not an API to + e.g. magically trigger construction of a Merkle tree. + +:Q: Does fs-verity support remote filesystems? +:A: Only ext4 and f2fs support is implemented currently, but in + principle any filesystem that can store per-file verity metadata + can support fs-verity, regardless of whether it's local or remote. + Some filesystems may have fewer options of where to store the + verity metadata; one possibility is to store it past the end of + the file and "hide" it from userspace by manipulating i_size. The + data verification functions provided by ``fs/verity/`` also assume + that the filesystem uses the Linux pagecache, but both local and + remote filesystems normally do so. + +:Q: Why is anything filesystem-specific at all? Shouldn't fs-verity + be implemented entirely at the VFS level? +:A: There are many reasons why this is not possible or would be very + difficult, including the following: + + - To prevent bypassing verification, pages must not be marked + Uptodate until they've been verified. Currently, each + filesystem is responsible for marking pages Uptodate via + ``->readpages()``. Therefore, currently it's not possible for + the VFS to do the verification on its own. Changing this would + require significant changes to the VFS and all filesystems. + + - It would require defining a filesystem-independent way to store + the verity metadata. Extended attributes don't work for this + because (a) the Merkle tree may be gigabytes, but many + filesystems assume that all xattrs fit into a single 4K + filesystem block, and (b) ext4 and f2fs encryption doesn't + encrypt xattrs, yet the Merkle tree *must* be encrypted when the + file contents are, because it stores hashes of the plaintext + file contents. + + So the verity metadata would have to be stored in an actual + file. Using a separate file would be very ugly, since the + metadata is fundamentally part of the file to be protected, and + it could cause problems where users could delete the real file + but not the metadata file or vice versa. On the other hand, + having it be in the same file would break applications unless + filesystems' notion of i_size were divorced from the VFS's, + which would be complex and require changes to all filesystems. + + - It's desirable that FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY uses the filesystem's + transaction mechanism so that either the file ends up with + verity enabled, or no changes were made. Allowing intermediate + states to occur after a crash may cause problems.
Documentation/filesystems/index.rst +1 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ filesystem implementations. journalling fscrypt + fsverity Filesystem-specific documentation =================================
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Eric Biggers
maintainerPATCH v4 2/16 fs-verity: add MAINTAINERS file entry
In reply to Eric BiggersFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
fs-verity will be jointly maintained by Eric Biggers and Theodore Ts'o.
--- MAINTAINERS | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
MAINTAINERS +12 -0
@@ -6505,6 +6505,18 @@ S: Maintained F: fs/notify/ F: include/linux/fsnotify*.h +FSVERITY: READ-ONLY FILE-BASED AUTHENTICITY PROTECTION +M: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> +M: Theodore Y. Ts'o <[email protected]> +L: [email protected] +Q: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-fscrypt/list/ +T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/fscrypt.git fsverity +S: Supported +F: fs/verity/ +F: include/linux/fsverity.h +F: include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h +F: Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst + FUJITSU LAPTOP EXTRAS M: Jonathan Woithe <[email protected]> L: [email protected]
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Eric Biggers
maintainerPATCH v4 3/16 fs-verity: add UAPI header
In reply to Eric BiggersFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add the UAPI header for fs-verity, including two ioctls:
- FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY
- FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY
These ioctls are documented in the "User API" section of Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst.
Examples of using these ioctls can be found in fsverity-utils
(https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/fsverity-utils.git).
I've also written xfstests that test these ioctls
(https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/xfstests-dev.git/log/?h=fsverity).
--- Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt | 1 + include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h
Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt +1 -0
@@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ Code Seq#(hex) Include File Comments 'f' 00-0F fs/ext4/ext4.h conflict! 'f' 00-0F linux/fs.h conflict! 'f' 00-0F fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_fs.h conflict! +'f' 81-8F linux/fsverity.h 'g' 00-0F linux/usb/gadgetfs.h 'g' 20-2F linux/usb/g_printer.h 'h' 00-7F conflict! Charon filesystem
include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h new file +39 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ +/* +* fs-verity user API +* +* These ioctls can be used on filesystems that support fs-verity. See the +* "User API" section of Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst. +* +* Copyright 2019 Google LLC +*/ +#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_FSVERITY_H +#define _UAPI_LINUX_FSVERITY_H + +#include <linux/ioctl.h> +#include <linux/types.h> + +#define FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_SHA256 1 + +struct fsverity_enable_arg { +__u32 version; +__u32 hash_algorithm; +__u32 block_size; +__u32 salt_size; +__u64 salt_ptr; +__u32 sig_size; +__u32 __reserved1; +__u64 sig_ptr; +__u64 __reserved2[11 ]; +}; + +struct fsverity_digest { +__u16 digest_algorithm; +__u16 digest_size;/* input/output */ +__u8 digest[]; +}; + +#define FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY _IOW('f', 133, struct fsverity_enable_arg) +#define FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY _IOWR('f', 134, struct fsverity_digest) + +#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_FSVERITY_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Eric Biggers
maintainerPATCH v4 4/16 fs: uapi: define verity bit for FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
In reply to Eric BiggersFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add FS_VERITY_FL to the flags for FS_IOC_GETFLAGS, so that applications can easily determine whether a file is a verity file at the same time as they're checking other file flags. This flag will be gettable only; FS_IOC_SETFLAGS won't allow setting it, since an ioctl must be used instead to provide more parameters.
This flag matches the on-disk bit that was already allocated for ext4.
--- include/uapi/linux/fs.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
include/uapi/linux/fs.h +1 -0
@@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ struct fscrypt_key {#define FS_TOPDIR_FL 0x00020000/* Top of directory hierarchies*/ #define FS_HUGE_FILE_FL 0x00040000/* Reserved for ext4 */ #define FS_EXTENT_FL 0x00080000/* Extents */ +#define FS_VERITY_FL 0x00100000/* Verity protected inode */ #define FS_EA_INODE_FL 0x00200000/* Inode used for large EA */ #define FS_EOFBLOCKS_FL 0x00400000/* Reserved for ext4 */ #define FS_NOCOW_FL 0x00800000/* Do not cow file */
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Eric Biggers
maintainerPATCH v4 5/16 fs-verity: add Kconfig and the helper functions for hashing
In reply to Eric BiggersFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add the beginnings of the fs/verity/ support layer, including the Kconfig option and various helper functions for hashing. To start, only SHA-256 is supported, but other hash algorithms can easily be added.
--- fs/Kconfig | 2 + fs/Makefile | 1 + fs/verity/Kconfig | 38 +++++ fs/verity/Makefile | 4 + fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 91 ++++++++++++ fs/verity/hash_algs.c | 274 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/verity/init.c | 41 ++++++ 7 files changed, 451 insertions(+) create mode 100644 fs/verity/Kconfig create mode 100644 fs/verity/Makefile create mode 100644 fs/verity/fsverity_private.h create mode 100644 fs/verity/hash_algs.c create mode 100644 fs/verity/init.c
fs/Kconfig +2 -0
@@ -113,6 +113,8 @@ config MANDATORY_FILE_LOCKING source "fs/crypto/Kconfig" +source "fs/verity/Kconfig" + source "fs/notify/Kconfig" source "fs/quota/Kconfig"
fs/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_AIO) += aio.o obj-$(CONFIG_IO_URING) += io_uring.o obj-$(CONFIG_FS_DAX) += dax.o obj-$(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) += crypto/ +obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += verity/ obj-$(CONFIG_FILE_LOCKING) += locks.o obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) += compat.o compat_ioctl.o obj-$(CONFIG_BINFMT_AOUT) += binfmt_aout.o
fs/verity/Kconfig new file +38 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +config FS_VERITY + bool "FS Verity (read-only file-based authenticity protection)" + select CRYPTO + # SHA-256 is selected as it's intended to be the default hash algorithm. + # To avoid bloat, other wanted algorithms must be selected explicitly. + select CRYPTO_SHA256 + help + This option enables fs-verity. fs-verity is the dm-verity + mechanism implemented at the file level. On supported + filesystems (currently EXT4 and F2FS), userspace can use an + ioctl to enable verity for a file, which causes the filesystem + to build a Merkle tree for the file. The filesystem will then + transparently verify any data read from the file against the + Merkle tree. The file is also made read-only. + + This serves as an integrity check, but the availability of the + Merkle tree root hash also allows efficiently supporting + various use cases where normally the whole file would need to + be hashed at once, such as: (a) auditing (logging the file's + hash), or (b) authenticity verification (comparing the hash + against a known good value, e.g. from a digital signature). + + fs-verity is especially useful on large files where not all + the contents may actually be needed. Also, fs-verity verifies + data each time it is paged back in, which provides better + protection against malicious disks vs. an ahead-of-time hash. + + If unsure, say N. + +config FS_VERITY_DEBUG + bool "FS Verity debugging" + depends on FS_VERITY + help + Enable debugging messages related to fs-verity by default. + + Say N unless you are an fs-verity developer.
fs/verity/Makefile new file +4 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += hash_algs.o \ + init.o
fs/verity/fsverity_private.h new file +91 -0
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fs/verity/hash_algs.c new file +274 -0
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fs/verity/init.c new file +41 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Eric Biggers
maintainerPATCH v4 6/16 fs-verity: add inode and superblock fields
In reply to Eric BiggersFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Analogous to fs/crypto/, add fields to the VFS inode and superblock for use by the fs/verity/ support layer:
- ->s_vop: points to the fsverity_operations if the filesystem supports fs-verity, otherwise is NULL.
- ->i_verity_info: points to cached fs-verity information for the inode after someone opens it, otherwise is NULL.
- S_VERITY: bit in ->i_flags that identifies verity inodes, even when they haven't been opened yet and thus still have NULL ->i_verity_info.
--- include/linux/fs.h | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
include/linux/fs.h +11 -0
@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ struct workqueue_struct;struct iov_iter ;struct fscrypt_info ;struct fscrypt_operations ; +struct fsverity_info ; +struct fsverity_operations ;struct fs_context ;struct fs_parameter_description ;
@@ -723,6 +725,10 @@ struct inode {struct fscrypt_info *i_crypt_info;#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY +struct fsverity_info *i_verity_info; +#endif +void *i_private;/* fs or device private pointer */ } __randomize_layout;
@@ -1429,6 +1435,9 @@ struct super_block {const struct xattr_handler **s_xattr;#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION const struct fscrypt_operations *s_cop; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY +const struct fsverity_operations *s_vop;#endif struct hlist_bl_head s_roots;/* alternate root dentries for NFS */ struct list_head s_mounts;/* list of mounts; _not_ for fs use */
@@ -1964,6 +1973,7 @@ struct super_operations {#endif #define S_ENCRYPTED 16384/* Encrypted file (using fs/crypto/) */ #define S_CASEFOLD 32768/* Casefolded file */ +#define S_VERITY 65536/* Verity file (using fs/verity/) */ /* * Note that nosuid etc flags are inode-specific: setting some file-system
@@ -2005,6 +2015,7 @@ static inline bool sb_rdonly(const struct super_block *sb) { return sb->s_flags#define IS_DAX (inode) ((inode)->i_flags & S_DAX)#define IS_ENCRYPTED (inode) ((inode)->i_flags & S_ENCRYPTED)#define IS_CASEFOLDED (inode) ((inode)->i_flags & S_CASEFOLD) +#define IS_VERITY (inode) ((inode)->i_flags & S_VERITY)#define IS_WHITEOUT (inode) (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && \ (inode)->i_rdev == WHITEOUT_DEV)
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Eric Biggers
maintainerPATCH v4 7/16 fs-verity: add the hook for file ->open()
In reply to Eric BiggersFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add the fsverity_file_open() function, which prepares an fs-verity file to be read from. If not already done, it loads the fs-verity descriptor from the filesystem and sets up an fsverity_info structure for the inode which describes the Merkle tree and contains the file measurement. It also denies all attempts to open verity files for writing.
This commit also begins the include/linux/fsverity.h header, which declares the interface between fs/verity/ and filesystems.
--- fs/verity/Makefile | 3 +- fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 54 +++++- fs/verity/init.c | 6 + fs/verity/open.c | 325 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/fsverity.h | 71 ++++++++ 5 files changed, 456 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 fs/verity/open.c create mode 100644 include/linux/fsverity.h
fs/verity/Makefile +2 -1
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += hash_algs.o \ - init.o + init.o \ + open.o
fs/verity/fsverity_private.h +52 -2
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fs/verity/init.c +6 -0
@@ -33,8 +33,14 @@ void fsverity_msg(const struct inode *inode, const char *level,static int __init fsverity_init (void ) { +int err; +fsverity_check_hash_algs (); + err =fsverity_init_info_cache (); +if (err) +return err; +pr_debug ("Initialized fs-verity\n" );return 0 ; }
fs/verity/open.c new file +325 -0
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include/linux/fsverity.h new file +71 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Eric Biggers
maintainerPATCH v4 8/16 fs-verity: add the hook for file ->setattr()
In reply to Eric BiggersFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add a function fsverity_prepare_setattr() which filesystems that support fs-verity must call to deny truncates of verity files.
--- fs/verity/open.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/fsverity.h | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
fs/verity/open.c +21 -0
@@ -302,6 +302,27 @@ int fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (fsverity_file_open); +/** +* fsverity_prepare_setattr - prepare to change a verity inode's attributes +* @dentry: dentry through which the inode is being changed +* @attr: attributes to change +* +* Verity files are immutable, so deny truncates. This isn't covered by the +* open-time check because sys_truncate() takes a path, not a file descriptor. +* +* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure +*/ +int fsverity_prepare_setattr (struct dentry *dentry,struct iattr *attr) +{ +if (IS_VERITY (d_inode (dentry)) && (attr->ia_valid &ATTR_SIZE )) { +pr_debug ("Denying truncate of verity file (ino %lu)\n" , +d_inode (dentry)->i_ino); +return -EPERM ; + } +return 0 ; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (fsverity_prepare_setattr); +/** * fsverity_cleanup_inode - free the inode's verity info, if present *
include/linux/fsverity.h +7 -0
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ static inline struct fsverity_info *fsverity_get_info(const struct inode *inode)/* open.c */ extern int fsverity_file_open (struct inode *inode,struct file *filp); +extern int fsverity_prepare_setattr (struct dentry *dentry,struct iattr *attr);extern void fsverity_cleanup_inode (struct inode *inode);#else /* !CONFIG_FS_VERITY */
@@ -62,6 +63,12 @@ static inline int fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)return IS_VERITY (inode) ? -EOPNOTSUPP :0 ; } +static inline int fsverity_prepare_setattr (struct dentry *dentry, +struct iattr *attr) +{ +return IS_VERITY (d_inode (dentry)) ? -EOPNOTSUPP :0 ; +} +static inline void fsverity_cleanup_inode (struct inode *inode) { }
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Eric Biggers
maintainerPATCH v4 9/16 fs-verity: add data verification hooks for ->readpages()
In reply to Eric BiggersFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add functions that verify data pages that have been read from a fs-verity file, against that file's Merkle tree. These will be called from filesystems' ->readpage() and ->readpages() methods.
Since data verification can block, a workqueue is provided for these methods to enqueue verification work from their bio completion callback.
See the "Verifying data" section of Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for more information.
--- fs/verity/Makefile | 3 +- fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 5 + fs/verity/init.c | 8 + fs/verity/open.c | 6 + fs/verity/verify.c | 275 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/fsverity.h | 56 +++++++ 6 files changed, 352 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 fs/verity/verify.c
fs/verity/Makefile +2 -1
@@ -2,4 +2,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += hash_algs.o \ init.o \ - open.o + open.o \ + verify.o
fs/verity/fsverity_private.h +5 -0
@@ -137,5 +137,10 @@ void fsverity_set_info(struct inode *inode, struct fsverity_info *vi);void fsverity_free_info (struct fsverity_info *vi);int __init fsverity_init_info_cache (void ); +void __init fsverity_exit_info_cache (void ); + +/* verify.c */ + +int __init fsverity_init_workqueue (void );#endif /* _FSVERITY_PRIVATE_H */
fs/verity/init.c +8 -0
@@ -41,7 +41,15 @@ static int __init fsverity_init(void)if (err)return err; + err =fsverity_init_workqueue (); +if (err) + goto err_exit_info_cache; +pr_debug ("Initialized fs-verity\n" );return 0 ; + +err_exit_info_cache: +fsverity_exit_info_cache (); +return err; }late_initcall (fsverity_init)
fs/verity/open.c +6 -0
@@ -344,3 +344,9 @@ int __init fsverity_init_info_cache(void)return -ENOMEM ;return 0 ; } + +void __init fsverity_exit_info_cache (void ) +{ +kmem_cache_destroy (fsverity_info_cachep); + fsverity_info_cachep =NULL ; +}
fs/verity/verify.c new file +275 -0
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include/linux/fsverity.h +56 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Eric Biggers
maintainerPATCH v4 10/16 fs-verity: implement FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY ioctl
In reply to Eric BiggersFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add a function for filesystems to call to implement the FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY ioctl. This ioctl enables fs-verity on a file.
See the "FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY" section of Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the documentation.
--- fs/verity/Makefile | 3 +- fs/verity/enable.c | 339 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/fsverity.h | 64 ++++++++ 3 files changed, 405 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 fs/verity/enable.c
fs/verity/Makefile +2 -1
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += hash_algs.o \ +obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += enable.o \ + hash_algs.o \ init.o \ open.o \ verify.o
fs/verity/enable.c new file +339 -0
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include/linux/fsverity.h +64 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Eric Biggers
maintainerPATCH v4 11/16 fs-verity: implement FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY ioctl
In reply to Eric BiggersFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add a function for filesystems to call to implement the FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY ioctl. This ioctl retrieves the file measurement that fs-verity calculated for the given file and is enforcing for reads; i.e., reads that don't match this hash will fail. This ioctl can be used for authentication or logging of file measurements in userspace.
See the "FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY" section of Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the documentation.
--- fs/verity/Makefile | 1 + fs/verity/measure.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/fsverity.h | 11 ++++++++ 3 files changed, 69 insertions(+) create mode 100644 fs/verity/measure.c
fs/verity/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -3,5 +3,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += enable.o \ hash_algs.o \ init.o \ + measure.o \ open.o \ verify.o
fs/verity/measure.c new file +57 -0
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include/linux/fsverity.h +11 -0
@@ -116,6 +116,10 @@ static inline struct fsverity_info *fsverity_get_info(const struct inode *inode)extern int fsverity_ioctl_enable (struct file *filp,const void __user *arg); +/* measure.c */ + +extern int fsverity_ioctl_measure (struct file *filp,void __user *arg); +/* open.c */ extern int fsverity_file_open (struct inode *inode,struct file *filp);
@@ -143,6 +147,13 @@ static inline int fsverity_ioctl_enable(struct file *filp,return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } +/* measure.c */ + +static inline int fsverity_ioctl_measure (struct file *filp,void __user *arg) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +} +/* open.c */ static inline int fsverity_file_open (struct inode *inode,struct file *filp)
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Eric Biggers
maintainerPATCH v4 12/16 fs-verity: add SHA-512 support
In reply to Eric BiggersFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add SHA-512 support to fs-verity. This is primarily a demonstration of the trivial changes needed to support a new hash algorithm in fs-verity; most users will still use SHA-256, due to the smaller space required to store the hashes. But some users may prefer SHA-512.
--- fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 2 +- fs/verity/hash_algs.c | 5 +++++ include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/verity/fsverity_private.h +1 -1
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ struct ahash_request;* Largest digest size among all hash algorithms supported by fs-verity. * Currently assumed to be <= size of fsverity_descriptor::root_hash. */ -#define FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE +#define FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE/* A hash algorithm supported by fs-verity */ struct fsverity_hash_alg {
fs/verity/hash_algs.c +5 -0
@@ -17,6 +17,11 @@ struct fsverity_hash_alg fsverity_hash_algs[] = { .digest_size = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, .block_size = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE, }, + [FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_SHA512] = { + .name = "sha512", + .digest_size = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, + .block_size = SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE, + }, };/**
include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h +1 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <linux/types.h> #define FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_SHA256 1 +#define FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_SHA512 2struct fsverity_enable_arg {__u32 version;
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Eric Biggers
maintainerPATCH v4 13/16 fs-verity: support builtin file signatures
In reply to Eric BiggersFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
To meet some users' needs, add optional support for having fs-verity handle a portion of the authentication policy in the kernel. An ".fs-verity" keyring is created to which X.509 certificates can be added; then a sysctl 'fs.verity.require_signatures' can be set to cause the kernel to enforce that all fs-verity files contain a signature of their file measurement by a key in this keyring.
See the "Built-in signature verification" section of Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the full documentation.
--- fs/verity/Kconfig | 17 +++ fs/verity/Makefile | 2 + fs/verity/enable.c | 20 +++- fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 48 +++++++- fs/verity/init.c | 6 + fs/verity/open.c | 25 +++-- fs/verity/signature.c | 207 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/verity/verify.c | 6 + 8 files changed, 318 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) create mode 100644 fs/verity/signature.c
fs/verity/Kconfig +17 -0
@@ -36,3 +36,20 @@ config FS_VERITY_DEBUG Enable debugging messages related to fs-verity by default. Say N unless you are an fs-verity developer. + +config FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES + bool "FS Verity builtin signature support" + depends on FS_VERITY + select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + help + Support verifying signatures of verity files against the X.509 + certificates that have been loaded into the ".fs-verity" + kernel keyring. + + This is meant as a relatively simple mechanism that can be + used to provide an authenticity guarantee for verity files, as + an alternative to IMA appraisal. Userspace programs still + need to check that the verity bit is set in order to get an + authenticity guarantee. + + If unsure, say N.
fs/verity/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -6,3 +6,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += enable.o \ measure.o \ open.o \ verify.o + +obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES) += signature.o
fs/verity/enable.c +17 -3
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ static int enable_verity(struct file *filp,const struct fsverity_operations *vops = inode->i_sb->s_vop;struct merkle_tree_params params = { };struct fsverity_descriptor *desc; -size_t desc_size =sizeof (*desc); +size_t desc_size =sizeof (*desc) + arg->sig_size;struct fsverity_info *vi;int err;
@@ -169,6 +169,16 @@ static int enable_verity(struct file *filp, } desc->salt_size = arg->salt_size; +/* Get the signature if the user provided one */ +if (arg->sig_size && +copy_from_user (desc->signature, + (const u8 __user *)(uintptr_t )arg->sig_ptr, + arg->sig_size)) { + err = -EFAULT ; + goto out; + } + desc->sig_size =cpu_to_le32 (arg->sig_size); + desc->data_size =cpu_to_le64 (inode->i_size);pr_debug ("Building Merkle tree...\n" );
@@ -209,6 +219,10 @@ static int enable_verity(struct file *filp, goto rollback; } +if (arg->sig_size) +pr_debug ("Storing a %u-byte PKCS#7 signature alongside the file\n" , + arg->sig_size); +/* Tell the filesystem to finish enabling verity on the file */ err = vops->end_enable_verity (filp, desc, desc_size, params.tree_size);if (err) {
@@ -267,8 +281,8 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_enable(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg) if (arg.salt_size > FIELD_SIZEOF(struct fsverity_descriptor, salt))return -EMSGSIZE ; -if (arg.sig_size) -return -EINVAL ; +if (arg.sig_size >FS_VERITY_MAX_SIGNATURE_SIZE ) +return -EMSGSIZE ;/* * Require a regular file with write access. But the actual fd must
fs/verity/fsverity_private.h +45 -3
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fs/verity/init.c +6 -0
@@ -45,9 +45,15 @@ static int __init fsverity_init(void)if (err) goto err_exit_info_cache; + err =fsverity_init_signature (); +if (err) + goto err_exit_workqueue; +pr_debug ("Initialized fs-verity\n" );return 0 ; +err_exit_workqueue: +fsverity_exit_workqueue (); err_exit_info_cache:fsverity_exit_info_cache ();return err;
fs/verity/open.c +18 -7
@@ -128,12 +128,22 @@ int fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(struct merkle_tree_params *params,return err; } -/* Compute the file measurement by hashing the fsverity_descriptor. */ +/* +* Compute the file measurement by hashing the fsverity_descriptor excluding the +* signature and with the sig_size field set to 0. +*/ static int compute_file_measurement (const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg, -const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc, +struct fsverity_descriptor *desc,u8 *measurement) { -return fsverity_hash_buffer (hash_alg, desc,sizeof (*desc), measurement); +__le32 sig_size = desc->sig_size; +int err; + + desc->sig_size =0 ; + err =fsverity_hash_buffer (hash_alg, desc,sizeof (*desc), measurement); + desc->sig_size = sig_size; + +return err; }/*
@@ -141,9 +151,9 @@ static int compute_file_measurement(const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg,* it. The signature (if present) is also checked. */ struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info (const struct inode *inode, -const void *_desc,size_t desc_size) +void *_desc,size_t desc_size) { -const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc = _desc; +struct fsverity_descriptor *desc = _desc;struct fsverity_info *vi;int err;
@@ -159,8 +169,7 @@ struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode,return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); } -if (desc->sig_size || -memchr_inv (desc->__reserved,0 ,sizeof (desc->__reserved))) { +if (memchr_inv (desc->__reserved,0 ,sizeof (desc->__reserved))) {fsverity_err (inode,"Reserved bits set in descriptor" );return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); }
@@ -205,6 +214,8 @@ struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode,pr_debug ("Computed file measurement: %s:%*phN\n" , vi->tree_params.hash_alg->name, vi->tree_params.digest_size, vi->measurement); + + err =fsverity_verify_signature (vi, desc, desc_size); out:if (err) {fsverity_free_info (vi);
fs/verity/signature.c new file +207 -0
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fs/verity/verify.c +6 -0
@@ -273,3 +273,9 @@ int __init fsverity_init_workqueue(void)return -ENOMEM ;return 0 ; } + +void __init fsverity_exit_workqueue (void ) +{ +destroy_workqueue (fsverity_read_workqueue); + fsverity_read_workqueue =NULL ; +}
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Eric Biggers
maintainerPATCH v4 14/16 ext4: add basic fs-verity support
In reply to Eric BiggersFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add most of fs-verity support to ext4. fs-verity is a filesystem feature that enables transparent integrity protection and authentication of read-only files. It uses a dm-verity like mechanism at the file
level: a Merkle tree is used to verify any block in the file in log(filesize) time. It is implemented mainly by helper functions in fs/verity/. See Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the full documentation.
This commit adds all of ext4 fs-verity support except for the actual data verification, including:
- Adding a filesystem feature flag and an inode flag for fs-verity.
- Implementing the fsverity_operations to support enabling verity on an inode and reading/writing the verity metadata.
- Updating ->write_begin(), ->write_end(), and ->writepages() to support writing verity metadata pages.
- Calling the fs-verity hooks for ->open(), ->setattr(), and ->ioctl().
ext4 stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and fsverity_descriptor) past the end of the file, starting at the first page fully beyond i_size. This approach works because (a) verity files are readonly, and
(b) pages fully beyond i_size aren't visible to userspace but can be read/written internally by ext4 with only some relatively small changes to ext4. This approach avoids having to depend on the EA_INODE feature and on rearchitecturing ext4's xattr support to support paging multi-gigabyte xattrs into memory, and to support encrypting xattrs. Note that the verity metadata *must* be encrypted when the file is, since it contains hashes of the plaintext data.
This patch incorporates work by Theodore Ts'o and Chandan Rajendra.
--- fs/ext4/Makefile | 1 + fs/ext4/ext4.h | 21 +++- fs/ext4/file.c | 4 + fs/ext4/inode.c | 46 +++++--- fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 12 +++ fs/ext4/super.c | 9 ++ fs/ext4/sysfs.c | 6 ++ fs/ext4/verity.c | 272 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ext4/xattr.h | 2 + 9 files changed, 358 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) create mode 100644 fs/ext4/verity.c
fs/ext4/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -13,3 +13,4 @@ ext4-y := balloc.o bitmap.o block_validity.o dir.o ext4_jbd2.o extents.o \ ext4-$(CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL) += acl.o ext4-$(CONFIG_EXT4_FS_SECURITY) += xattr_security.o +ext4-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += verity.o
fs/ext4/ext4.h +19 -2
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@#endif #include <linux/fscrypt.h> +#include <linux/fsverity.h> #include <linux/compiler.h>
@@ -395,6 +396,7 @@ struct flex_groups {#define EXT4_TOPDIR_FL 0x00020000/* Top of directory hierarchies*/ #define EXT4_HUGE_FILE_FL 0x00040000/* Set to each huge file */ #define EXT4_EXTENTS_FL 0x00080000/* Inode uses extents */ +#define EXT4_VERITY_FL 0x00100000/* Verity protected inode */ #define EXT4_EA_INODE_FL 0x00200000/* Inode used for large EA */ #define EXT4_EOFBLOCKS_FL 0x00400000/* Blocks allocated beyond EOF */ #define EXT4_INLINE_DATA_FL 0x10000000/* Inode has inline data. */
@@ -402,7 +404,7 @@ struct flex_groups {#define EXT4_CASEFOLD_FL 0x40000000/* Casefolded file */ #define EXT4_RESERVED_FL 0x80000000/* reserved for ext4 lib */ -#define EXT4_FL_USER_VISIBLE 0x704BDFFF/* User visible flags */ +#define EXT4_FL_USER_VISIBLE 0x705BDFFF/* User visible flags */ #define EXT4_FL_USER_MODIFIABLE 0x604BC0FF/* User modifiable flags */ /* Flags we can manipulate with through EXT4_IOC_FSSETXATTR */
@@ -466,6 +468,7 @@ enum {EXT4_INODE_TOPDIR =17 ,/* Top of directory hierarchies*/ EXT4_INODE_HUGE_FILE =18 ,/* Set to each huge file */ EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS =19 ,/* Inode uses extents */ +EXT4_INODE_VERITY =20 ,/* Verity protected inode */ EXT4_INODE_EA_INODE =21 ,/* Inode used for large EA */ EXT4_INODE_EOFBLOCKS =22 ,/* Blocks allocated beyond EOF */ EXT4_INODE_INLINE_DATA = 28, /* Data in inode. */
@@ -511,6 +514,7 @@ static inline void ext4_check_flag_values(void)CHECK_FLAG_VALUE (TOPDIR );CHECK_FLAG_VALUE (HUGE_FILE );CHECK_FLAG_VALUE (EXTENTS ); +CHECK_FLAG_VALUE (VERITY );CHECK_FLAG_VALUE (EA_INODE );CHECK_FLAG_VALUE (EOFBLOCKS );CHECK_FLAG_VALUE (INLINE_DATA );
@@ -1559,6 +1563,7 @@ enum {EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA ,/* may have in-inode data */ EXT4_STATE_EXT_PRECACHED ,/* extents have been precached */ EXT4_STATE_LUSTRE_EA_INODE ,/* Lustre-style ea_inode */ + EXT4_STATE_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS, /* building fs-verity Merkle tree */ };#define EXT4_INODE_BIT_FNS (name, field, offset) \
@@ -1609,6 +1614,12 @@ static inline void ext4_clear_state_flags(struct ext4_inode_info *ei)#define EXT4_SB (sb) (sb)#endif +static inline bool ext4_verity_in_progress (struct inode *inode) +{ +return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_FS_VERITY ) && +ext4_test_inode_state (inode,EXT4_STATE_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS ); +} +#define NEXT_ORPHAN (inode) EXT4_I(inode)->i_dtime/*
@@ -1661,6 +1672,7 @@ static inline void ext4_clear_state_flags(struct ext4_inode_info *ei)#define EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_METADATA_CSUM 0x0400#define EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_READONLY 0x1000#define EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_PROJECT 0x2000 +#define EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_VERITY 0x8000#define EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_COMPRESSION 0x0001#define EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FILETYPE 0x0002
@@ -1755,6 +1767,7 @@ EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_FUNCS(bigalloc, BIGALLOC) EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_FUNCS(metadata_csum, METADATA_CSUM) EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_FUNCS(readonly, READONLY) EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_FUNCS(project, PROJECT) +EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_FUNCS(verity, VERITY) EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FUNCS(compression, COMPRESSION)EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FUNCS (filetype,FILETYPE )
@@ -1812,7 +1825,8 @@ EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FUNCS(casefold, CASEFOLD) EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_BIGALLOC |\ EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_METADATA_CSUM|\ EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_QUOTA |\ - EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_PROJECT) + EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_PROJECT |\ + EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_VERITY)#define EXTN_FEATURE_FUNCS (ver) \ static inline bool ext4_has_unknown_ext##ver##_compat_features(struct super_block *sb) \
@@ -3250,6 +3264,9 @@ extern int ext4_bio_write_page(struct ext4_io_submit *io,/* mmp.c */ extern int ext4_multi_mount_protect (struct super_block *,ext4_fsblk_t ); +/* verity.c */ +extern const struct fsverity_operations ext4_verityops; +/* * Add new method to test whether block and inode bitmaps are properly * initialized. With uninit_bg reading the block from disk is not enough
fs/ext4/file.c +4 -0
@@ -451,6 +451,10 @@ static int ext4_file_open(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)if (ret)return ret; + ret =fsverity_file_open (inode, filp); +if (ret) +return ret; +/* * Set up the jbd2_inode if we are opening the inode for * writing and the journal is present
fs/ext4/inode.c +33 -13
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fs/ext4/ioctl.c +12 -0
@@ -1092,6 +1092,16 @@ long ext4_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)case EXT4_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY :return fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy (filp, (void __user *)arg); +case FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY : +if (!ext4_has_feature_verity (sb)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +return fsverity_ioctl_enable (filp, (const void __user *)arg); + +case FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY : +if (!ext4_has_feature_verity (sb)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +return fsverity_ioctl_measure (filp, (void __user *)arg); +case EXT4_IOC_FSGETXATTR : {struct fsxattr fa;
@@ -1210,6 +1220,8 @@ long ext4_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)case EXT4_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY :case EXT4_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_PWSALT :case EXT4_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY : +case FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY : +case FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY :case EXT4_IOC_SHUTDOWN :case FS_IOC_GETFSMAP :break ;
fs/ext4/super.c +9 -0
@@ -1179,6 +1179,7 @@ void ext4_clear_inode(struct inode *inode)EXT4_I (inode)->jinode =NULL ; }fscrypt_put_encryption_info (inode); +fsverity_cleanup_inode (inode); } static struct inode *ext4_nfs_get_inode(struct super_block *sb,
@@ -4272,6 +4273,9 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION sb->s_cop = &ext4_cryptops;#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY + sb->s_vop = &ext4_verityops; +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA sb->dq_op = &ext4_quota_operations;if (ext4_has_feature_quota (sb))
@@ -4419,6 +4423,11 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) goto failed_mount_wq; } +if (ext4_has_feature_verity (sb) && blocksize !=PAGE_SIZE ) { +ext4_msg (sb,KERN_ERR ,"Unsupported blocksize for fs-verity" ); + goto failed_mount_wq; + } +if (DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED (sbi) && !sb_rdonly (sb) && !ext4_has_feature_encrypt (sb)) {ext4_set_feature_encrypt (sb);
fs/ext4/sysfs.c +6 -0
@@ -241,6 +241,9 @@ EXT4_ATTR_FEATURE(encryption);#ifdef CONFIG_UNICODE EXT4_ATTR_FEATURE (casefold);#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY +EXT4_ATTR_FEATURE (verity); +#endif EXT4_ATTR_FEATURE (metadata_csum_seed);static struct attribute *ext4_feat_attrs[] = {
@@ -252,6 +255,9 @@ static struct attribute *ext4_feat_attrs[] = {#endif #ifdef CONFIG_UNICODE ATTR_LIST(casefold), +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY +ATTR_LIST (verity), #endifATTR_LIST (metadata_csum_seed), NULL,
fs/ext4/verity.c new file +272 -0
272 lines not on this page · raw message
fs/ext4/xattr.h +2 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@#define EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_RICHACL 8#define EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_ENCRYPTION 9#define EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_HURD 10/* Reserved for Hurd */ +#define EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_VERITY 11struct ext4_xattr_header {__le32 h_magic;/* magic number for identification */
@@ -126,6 +127,7 @@ extern const struct xattr_handler ext4_xattr_trusted_handler;extern const struct xattr_handler ext4_xattr_security_handler;#define EXT4_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT "c" +#define EXT4_XATTR_NAME_VERITY "v"/* * The EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND is overloaded and used for two purposes.
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Eric Biggers
maintainerPATCH v4 15/16 ext4: add fs-verity read support
In reply to Eric BiggersFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Make ext4_mpage_readpages() verify data as it is read from fs-verity files, using the helper functions from fs/verity/.
To support both encryption and verity simultaneously, this required refactoring the decryption workflow into a generic "post-read processing" workflow which can do decryption, verification, or both.
The case where the ext4 block size is not equal to the PAGE_SIZE is not supported yet, since in that case ext4_mpage_readpages() sometimes falls back to block_read_full_page(), which does not support fs-verity yet.
--- fs/ext4/ext4.h | 2 + fs/ext4/inode.c | 2 + fs/ext4/readpage.c | 207 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- fs/ext4/super.c | 9 +- 4 files changed, 190 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/ext4.h +2 -0
@@ -3158,6 +3158,8 @@ static inline void ext4_set_de_type(struct super_block *sb,extern int ext4_mpage_readpages (struct address_space *mapping,struct list_head *pages,struct page *page,unsigned nr_pages,bool is_readahead); +extern int __init ext4_init_post_read_processing (void ); +extern void ext4_exit_post_read_processing (void );/* symlink.c */ extern const struct inode_operations ext4_encrypted_symlink_inode_operations;
fs/ext4/inode.c +2 -0
@@ -3893,6 +3893,8 @@ static ssize_t ext4_direct_IO(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter)if (IS_ENCRYPTED (inode) &&S_ISREG (inode->i_mode))return 0 ;#endif +if (fsverity_active (inode)) +return 0 ;/* * If we are doing data journalling we don't support O_DIRECT
fs/ext4/readpage.c +178 -29
254 lines not on this page · raw message
fs/ext4/super.c +8 -1
@@ -6103,6 +6103,10 @@ static int __init ext4_init_fs(void)return err; err =ext4_init_pending (); +if (err) + goto out7; + + err =ext4_init_post_read_processing ();if (err) goto out6;
@@ -6144,8 +6148,10 @@ static int __init ext4_init_fs(void) out4:ext4_exit_pageio (); out5: -ext4_exit_pending (); +ext4_exit_post_read_processing (); out6: +ext4_exit_pending (); +out7:ext4_exit_es ();return err;
@@ -6162,6 +6168,7 @@ static void __exit ext4_exit_fs(void)ext4_exit_sysfs ();ext4_exit_system_zone ();ext4_exit_pageio (); +ext4_exit_post_read_processing ();ext4_exit_es ();ext4_exit_pending (); }
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Eric Biggers
maintainerPATCH v4 16/16 f2fs: add fs-verity support
In reply to Eric BiggersFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add fs-verity support to f2fs. fs-verity is a filesystem feature that enables transparent integrity protection and authentication of read-only files. It uses a dm-verity like mechanism at the file level: a Merkle tree is used to verify any block in the file in log(filesize) time. It is implemented mainly by helper functions in fs/verity/. See Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the full documentation.
The f2fs support for fs-verity consists of:
- Adding a filesystem feature flag and an inode flag for fs-verity.
- Implementing the fsverity_operations to support enabling verity on an inode and reading/writing the verity metadata.
- Updating ->readpages() to verify data as it's read from verity files and to support reading verity metadata pages.
- Updating ->write_begin(), ->write_end(), and ->writepages() to support writing verity metadata pages.
- Calling the fs-verity hooks for ->open(), ->setattr(), and ->ioctl().
Like ext4, f2fs stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and fsverity_descriptor) past the end of the file, starting at the first page fully beyond i_size. This approach works because (a) verity files are readonly, and (b) pages fully beyond i_size aren't visible to userspace but can be read/written internally by f2fs with only some relatively small changes to f2fs. Extended attributes cannot be used because (a) f2fs limits the total size of an inode's xattr entries to 4096 bytes, which wouldn't be enough for even a single Merkle tree block, and (b) f2fs encryption doesn't encrypt xattrs, yet the verity metadata *must* be encrypted when the file is because it contains hashes of the plaintext data.
--- fs/f2fs/Makefile | 1 + fs/f2fs/data.c | 72 +++++++++++++-- fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 23 ++++- fs/f2fs/file.c | 40 +++++++++ fs/f2fs/inode.c | 5 +- fs/f2fs/super.c | 3 + fs/f2fs/sysfs.c | 11 +++ fs/f2fs/verity.c | 224 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/f2fs/xattr.h | 2 + 9 files changed, 367 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) create mode 100644 fs/f2fs/verity.c
fs/f2fs/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ f2fs-$(CONFIG_F2FS_STAT_FS) += debug.o f2fs-$(CONFIG_F2FS_FS_XATTR) += xattr.o f2fs-$(CONFIG_F2FS_FS_POSIX_ACL) += acl.o f2fs-$(CONFIG_F2FS_IO_TRACE) += trace.o +f2fs-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += verity.o
fs/f2fs/data.c +63 -9
165 lines not on this page · raw message
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +19 -4
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@#include <crypto/hash.h> #include <linux/fscrypt.h> +#include <linux/fsverity.h> #ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS #define f2fs_bug_on (sbi, condition) BUG_ON(condition)
@@ -148,7 +149,7 @@ struct f2fs_mount_info {#define F2FS_FEATURE_QUOTA_INO 0x0080#define F2FS_FEATURE_INODE_CRTIME 0x0100#define F2FS_FEATURE_LOST_FOUND 0x0200 -#define F2FS_FEATURE_VERITY 0x0400/* reserved */ +#define F2FS_FEATURE_VERITY 0x0400#define F2FS_FEATURE_SB_CHKSUM 0x0800#define __F2FS_HAS_FEATURE (raw_super, mask) \
@@ -626,7 +627,7 @@ enum {#define FADVISE_ENC_NAME_BIT 0x08#define FADVISE_KEEP_SIZE_BIT 0x10#define FADVISE_HOT_BIT 0x20 -#define FADVISE_VERITY_BIT 0x40/* reserved */ +#define FADVISE_VERITY_BIT 0x40#define FADVISE_MODIFIABLE_BITS (FADVISE_COLD_BIT | FADVISE_HOT_BIT)
@@ -646,6 +647,8 @@ enum {#define file_is_hot (inode) is_file(inode, FADVISE_HOT_BIT)#define file_set_hot (inode) set_file(inode, FADVISE_HOT_BIT)#define file_clear_hot (inode) clear_file(inode, FADVISE_HOT_BIT) +#define file_is_verity (inode) is_file(inode, FADVISE_VERITY_BIT) +#define file_set_verity (inode) set_file(inode, FADVISE_VERITY_BIT)#define DEF_DIR_LEVEL 0
@@ -2344,6 +2347,7 @@ static inline void f2fs_change_bit(unsigned int nr, char *addr)#define F2FS_TOPDIR_FL 0x00020000/* Top of directory hierarchies*/ #define F2FS_HUGE_FILE_FL 0x00040000/* Set to each huge file */ #define F2FS_EXTENTS_FL 0x00080000/* Inode uses extents */ +#define F2FS_VERITY_FL 0x00100000/* Verity protected inode */ #define F2FS_EA_INODE_FL 0x00200000/* Inode used for large EA */ #define F2FS_EOFBLOCKS_FL 0x00400000/* Blocks allocated beyond EOF */ #define F2FS_NOCOW_FL 0x00800000/* Do not cow file */
@@ -2351,7 +2355,7 @@ static inline void f2fs_change_bit(unsigned int nr, char *addr)#define F2FS_PROJINHERIT_FL 0x20000000/* Create with parents projid */ #define F2FS_RESERVED_FL 0x80000000/* reserved for ext4 lib */ -#define F2FS_FL_USER_VISIBLE 0x30CBDFFF/* User visible flags */ +#define F2FS_FL_USER_VISIBLE 0x30DBDFFF/* User visible flags */ #define F2FS_FL_USER_MODIFIABLE 0x204BC0FF/* User modifiable flags */ /* Flags we can manipulate with through F2FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR */
@@ -2417,6 +2421,7 @@ enum {FI_PROJ_INHERIT ,/* indicate file inherits projectid */ FI_PIN_FILE ,/* indicate file should not be gced */ FI_ATOMIC_REVOKE_REQUEST ,/* request to drop atomic data */ + FI_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS, /* building fs-verity Merkle tree */ }; static inline void __mark_inode_dirty_flag(struct inode *inode,
@@ -2456,6 +2461,12 @@ static inline void clear_inode_flag(struct inode *inode, int flag)__mark_inode_dirty_flag (inode, flag, false); } +static inline bool f2fs_verity_in_progress (struct inode *inode) +{ +return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_FS_VERITY ) && +is_inode_flag_set (inode,FI_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS ); +} +static inline void set_acl_inode (struct inode *inode,umode_t mode) {F2FS_I (inode)->i_acl_mode = mode;
@@ -3524,6 +3535,9 @@ void f2fs_exit_sysfs(void);int f2fs_register_sysfs (struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi);void f2fs_unregister_sysfs (struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi); +/* verity.c */ +extern const struct fsverity_operations f2fs_verityops; +/* * crypto support */
@@ -3546,7 +3560,7 @@ static inline void f2fs_set_encrypted_inode(struct inode *inode)*/ static inline bool f2fs_post_read_required (struct inode *inode) { -return f2fs_encrypted_file (inode); +return f2fs_encrypted_file (inode) ||fsverity_active (inode); }#define F2FS_FEATURE_FUNCS (name, flagname) \
@@ -3564,6 +3578,7 @@ F2FS_FEATURE_FUNCS(flexible_inline_xattr, FLEXIBLE_INLINE_XATTR);F2FS_FEATURE_FUNCS (quota_ino,QUOTA_INO );F2FS_FEATURE_FUNCS (inode_crtime,INODE_CRTIME );F2FS_FEATURE_FUNCS (lost_found,LOST_FOUND ); +F2FS_FEATURE_FUNCS (verity,VERITY );F2FS_FEATURE_FUNCS (sb_chksum,SB_CHKSUM );#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_ZONED
fs/f2fs/file.c +40 -0
@@ -493,6 +493,10 @@ static int f2fs_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) {int err =fscrypt_file_open (inode, filp); +if (err) +return err; + + err =fsverity_file_open (inode, filp);if (err)return err;
@@ -781,6 +785,10 @@ int f2fs_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)if (err)return err; + err =fsverity_prepare_setattr (dentry, attr); +if (err) +return err; +if (is_quota_modification (inode, attr)) { err =dquot_initialize (inode);if (err)
@@ -1656,6 +1664,8 @@ static int f2fs_ioc_getflags(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg)if (IS_ENCRYPTED (inode)) flags |=F2FS_ENCRYPT_FL ; +if (IS_VERITY (inode)) + flags |=F2FS_VERITY_FL ;if (f2fs_has_inline_data (inode) ||f2fs_has_inline_dentry (inode)) flags |=F2FS_INLINE_DATA_FL ;if (is_inode_flag_set (inode,FI_PIN_FILE ))
@@ -2980,6 +2990,30 @@ static int f2fs_ioc_precache_extents(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg)return f2fs_precache_extents (file_inode (filp)); } +static int f2fs_ioc_enable_verity (struct file *filp,unsigned long arg) +{ +struct inode *inode =file_inode (filp); + +f2fs_update_time (F2FS_I_SB (inode),REQ_TIME ); + +if (!f2fs_sb_has_verity (F2FS_I_SB (inode))) { +f2fs_msg (inode->i_sb,KERN_WARNING , +"Can't enable fs-verity on inode %lu: the verity feature is not enabled on this filesystem.\n" , + inode->i_ino); +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + } + +return fsverity_ioctl_enable (filp, (const void __user *)arg); +} + +static int f2fs_ioc_measure_verity (struct file *filp,unsigned long arg) +{ +if (!f2fs_sb_has_verity (F2FS_I_SB (file_inode (filp)))) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + +return fsverity_ioctl_measure (filp, (void __user *)arg); +} +long f2fs_ioctl (struct file *filp,unsigned int cmd,unsigned long arg) {if (unlikely (f2fs_cp_error (F2FS_I_SB (file_inode (filp)))))
@@ -3036,6 +3070,10 @@ long f2fs_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)return f2fs_ioc_set_pin_file (filp, arg);case F2FS_IOC_PRECACHE_EXTENTS :return f2fs_ioc_precache_extents (filp, arg); +case FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY : +return f2fs_ioc_enable_verity (filp, arg); +case FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY : +return f2fs_ioc_measure_verity (filp, arg);default :return -ENOTTY ; }
@@ -3149,6 +3187,8 @@ long f2fs_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)case F2FS_IOC_GET_PIN_FILE :case F2FS_IOC_SET_PIN_FILE :case F2FS_IOC_PRECACHE_EXTENTS : +case FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY : +case FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY :break ;default :return -ENOIOCTLCMD ;
fs/f2fs/inode.c +4 -1
@@ -46,9 +46,11 @@ void f2fs_set_inode_flags(struct inode *inode) new_fl |=S_DIRSYNC ;if (file_is_encrypt (inode)) new_fl |=S_ENCRYPTED ; +if (file_is_verity (inode)) + new_fl |=S_VERITY ;inode_set_flags (inode, new_fl,S_SYNC |S_APPEND |S_IMMUTABLE |S_NOATIME |S_DIRSYNC | -S_ENCRYPTED ); +S_ENCRYPTED |S_VERITY ); }static void __get_inode_rdev (struct inode *inode,struct f2fs_inode *ri)
@@ -749,6 +751,7 @@ void f2fs_evict_inode(struct inode *inode) } out_clear:fscrypt_put_encryption_info (inode); +fsverity_cleanup_inode (inode);clear_inode (inode); }
fs/f2fs/super.c +3 -0
@@ -3177,6 +3177,9 @@ static int f2fs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) sb->s_op = &f2fs_sops;#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION sb->s_cop = &f2fs_cryptops; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY + sb->s_vop = &f2fs_verityops;#endif sb->s_xattr = f2fs_xattr_handlers; sb->s_export_op = &f2fs_export_ops;
fs/f2fs/sysfs.c +11 -0
@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ static ssize_t features_show(struct f2fs_attr *a,if (f2fs_sb_has_lost_found (sbi)) len +=snprintf (buf + len,PAGE_SIZE - len,"%s%s" , len ?", " :"" ,"lost_found" ); +if (f2fs_sb_has_verity (sbi)) + len +=snprintf (buf + len,PAGE_SIZE - len,"%s%s" , + len ?", " :"" ,"verity" );if (f2fs_sb_has_sb_chksum (sbi)) len +=snprintf (buf + len,PAGE_SIZE - len,"%s%s" , len ?", " :"" ,"sb_checksum" );
@@ -350,6 +353,7 @@ enum feat_id {FEAT_QUOTA_INO ,FEAT_INODE_CRTIME ,FEAT_LOST_FOUND , +FEAT_VERITY , FEAT_SB_CHECKSUM, };
@@ -367,6 +371,7 @@ static ssize_t f2fs_feature_show(struct f2fs_attr *a,case FEAT_QUOTA_INO :case FEAT_INODE_CRTIME :case FEAT_LOST_FOUND : +case FEAT_VERITY :case FEAT_SB_CHECKSUM :return snprintf (buf,PAGE_SIZE ,"supported\n" ); }
@@ -455,6 +460,9 @@ F2FS_FEATURE_RO_ATTR(flexible_inline_xattr, FEAT_FLEXIBLE_INLINE_XATTR);F2FS_FEATURE_RO_ATTR (quota_ino,FEAT_QUOTA_INO );F2FS_FEATURE_RO_ATTR (inode_crtime,FEAT_INODE_CRTIME );F2FS_FEATURE_RO_ATTR (lost_found,FEAT_LOST_FOUND ); +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY +F2FS_FEATURE_RO_ATTR (verity,FEAT_VERITY ); +#endif F2FS_FEATURE_RO_ATTR (sb_checksum,FEAT_SB_CHECKSUM );#define ATTR_LIST (name) (&f2fs_attr_##name.attr)
@@ -517,6 +525,9 @@ static struct attribute *f2fs_feat_attrs[] = {ATTR_LIST (quota_ino),ATTR_LIST (inode_crtime),ATTR_LIST (lost_found), +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY +ATTR_LIST (verity), +#endifATTR_LIST (sb_checksum), NULL, };
fs/f2fs/verity.c new file +224 -0
224 lines not on this page · raw message
fs/f2fs/xattr.h +2 -0
@@ -34,8 +34,10 @@#define F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_ADVISE 7/* Should be same as EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_ENCRYPTION */ #define F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_ENCRYPTION 9 +#define F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_VERITY 11#define F2FS_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT "c" +#define F2FS_XATTR_NAME_VERITY "v"struct f2fs_xattr_header {__le32 h_magic;/* magic number for identification */
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Quoted 6 lines · Eric Biggers
This is a redesigned version of the fs-verity patchset, implementing Ted's suggestion to build the Merkle tree in the kernel
(https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/[email protected]/).
This greatly simplifies the UAPI, since the verity metadata no longer needs to be transferred to the kernel.
Interfaces look sane to me. My only real concern is whether it would make sense to make the FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY ioctl be something that could be done incrementally, since the way it is done now it looks like any random user could create a big file and then do the FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY to make the kernel do a _very_ expensive operation.
Yes, I see the
+ if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
+ return -EINTR;
+ cond_resched();
in there, so it's not like it's some entirely unkillable thing, and maybe we don't care as a result. But maybe the ioctl interface could be fundamentally restartable?
If that was already considered and people just went "too complex", never mind.
Linus
Eric Biggers
maintainerQuoted 21 lines · Linus Torvalds
Quoted 6 lines · Eric Biggers
This is a redesigned version of the fs-verity patchset, implementing Ted's suggestion to build the Merkle tree in the kernel
(https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/[email protected]/).
This greatly simplifies the UAPI, since the verity metadata no longer needs to be transferred to the kernel.Interfaces look sane to me. My only real concern is whether it would make sense to make the
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITYioctl be something that could be done incrementally, since the way it is done now it looks like any random user could create a big file and then do theFS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITYto make the kernel do a _very_ expensive operation.Yes, I see the
(quoted diff) +3
-0+ if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) + return -EINTR; + cond_resched();
Quoted 7 lines
in there, so it's not like it's some entirely unkillable thing, and maybe we don't care as a result. But maybe the ioctl interface could be fundamentally restartable?
If that was already considered and people just went "too complex", never mind.
Linus
Making it incremental would be complex. We could make FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY write checkpoints periodically, and make it resume from the checkpoint if present. But then we'd have to worry about sync'ing the Merkle tree before writing each checkpoint, and storing the Merkle tree parameters in each checkpoint so that if the second call to FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY is made with different parameters it knows to delete everything and restart from scratch.
Or we could make it explicit in the UAPI, where userspace calls ioctls to build blocks 0 through 9999, then 10000 through 19999, etc. But that would make the UAPI much more complex, and the kernel would need to do lots of extra validation of the parameters passed in. This approach would also not be crash-safe unless userspace did its own checkpointing, whereas the all-or-nothing API naturally avoids inconsistent states.
And either way of making it incremental, the "partial Merkle tree" would also become a valid on-disk state. Conceptually that adds a lot of complexity, and probably people would want fsck to support removing all the partial trees, similar to how e2fsck supports optimizing directories and extent trees.
So in the end, it's not something I decided to add.
- Eric
Re: [PATCH v4 01/16] fs-verity: add a documentation file
In reply to Eric BiggersQuoted 5 lines · Eric Biggers
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add a documentation file for fs-verity, covering....
Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Looks good; you can add:
One minor design point below:
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst line 405
Quoted 2 lines
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst new file +2
-0+ext4 stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and fsverity_descriptor) +past the end of the file, starting at the first page fully beyond
^^^^
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst line 413
Quoted 8 lines
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst new file +8
-0+i_size. This approach works because (a) verity files are readonly, +and (b) pages fully beyond i_size aren't visible to userspace but can +be read/written internally by ext4 with only some relatively small +changes to ext4. This approach avoids having to depend on the +EA_INODE feature and on rearchitecturing ext4's xattr support to +support paging multi-gigabyte xattrs into memory, and to support +encrypting xattrs. Note that the verity metadata *must* be encrypted +when the file is, since it contains hashes of the plaintext data.
If we ever want to support mounting, say, a file system with 4k blocks and fsverity enabled on a architecture with a 16k or 64k page size, then "page" in that first sentence will need to become "block". At the moment we only support fsverity when page size == block size, so it's not an issue.
However, it's worth reflecting on what this means. In order to satisfy this requirement (from the mmap man page):
A file is mapped in multiples of the page size. For a file that is not a multiple of the page size, the remaining memory is zeroed when mapped...
we're going to have to special case how the last page gets mmaped. The simplest way to do this will be to map in an anonymous page which just has the blocks that are part of the data block copied in, and the rest of the page can be zero'ed.
One thing we might consider doing just to make life much easier for ourselves (should we ever want to support page size != block size --- which I could imagine some folks like Chandan might find desirable) is to specify that the fsverity metadata begins at an offset which begins at i_size rounded up to the next 64k binary, which should handle all current and future architectures' page sizes.
- Ted
Theodore Ts'o
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 02/16] fs-verity: add MAINTAINERS file entry
In reply to Eric BiggersQuoted 5 lines · Eric Biggers
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
fs-verity will be jointly maintained by Eric Biggers and Theodore Ts'o.
Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Looks good; you can add:
- Ted
Theodore Ts'o
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 04/16] fs: uapi: define verity bit for FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
In reply to Eric BiggersQuoted 11 lines · Eric Biggers
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add
FS_VERITY_FLto the flags forFS_IOC_GETFLAGS, so that applications can easily determine whether a file is a verity file at the same time as they're checking other file flags. This flag will be gettable only;FS_IOC_SETFLAGSwon't allow setting it, since an ioctl must be used instead to provide more parameters.This flag matches the on-disk bit that was already allocated for ext4.
Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Looks good; you can add:
- Ted
Theodore Ts'o
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 05/16] fs-verity: add Kconfig and the helper functions for hashing
In reply to Eric BiggersQuoted 7 lines · Eric Biggers
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add the beginnings of the
fs/verity/support layer, including theKconfigoption and various helper functions for hashing. To start, only SHA-256 is supported, but other hash algorithms can easily be added.Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Looks good; you can add:
One thought for consideration below...
fs/verity/fsverity_private.h line 29
Quoted 8 lines
fs/verity/fsverity_private.h new file +8
-0+ +/* +* Maximum depth of the Merkle tree. Up to 64 levels are theoretically possible +* with a very small block size, but we'd like to limit stack usage during +* verification, and in practice this is plenty. E.g., with SHA-256 and 4K +* blocks, a file with size UINT64_MAX bytes needs just 8 levels. +*/ +#define FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS 16
Maybe we should make FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS 8 for now? This is an implementation-level restriction, and currently we don't support any architectures that have a page size < 4k. We can always bump this number up in the future if it ever becomes necessary, and limiting max levels to 8 saves almost 100 bytes of stack space in verify_page().
- Ted
Theodore Ts'o
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 06/16] fs-verity: add inode and superblock fields
In reply to Eric BiggersQuoted 8 lines · Eric Biggers
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Analogous to
fs/crypto/, add fields to the VFS inode and superblock for use by thefs/verity/support layer:- ->s_vop: points to the
fsverity_operationsif the filesystem supports fs-verity, otherwise is NULL.
Quoted 7 lines
- ->i_verity_info: points to cached fs-verity information for the inode after someone opens it, otherwise is NULL.
-
S_VERITY: bit in ->i_flags that identifies verity inodes, even when they haven't been opened yet and thus still have NULL ->i_verity_info.Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Looks good; you can add:
- Ted
Theodore Ts'o
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 07/16] fs-verity: add the hook for file ->open()
In reply to Eric BiggersQuoted 8 lines · Eric Biggers
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add the
fsverity_file_open()function, which prepares an fs-verity file to be read from. If not already done, it loads the fs-verity descriptor from the filesystem and sets up anfsverity_infostructure for the inode which describes the Merkle tree and contains the file measurement. It also denies all attempts to open verity files for writing.
Quoted 4 lines
This commit also begins the
include/linux/fsverity.hheader, which declares the interface betweenfs/verity/and filesystems.Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Looks good; you can add:
- Ted
fs/verity/open.c line 144
Quoted 6 lines
fs/verity/open.c new file +6
-0+/* +* Validate the given fsverity_descriptor and create a new fsverity_info from +* it. The signature (if present) is also checked. +*/ +struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info (const struct inode *inode, +const void *_desc,size_t desc_size)
Well, technically it's not checked (yet). It doesn't get checked until [PATCH 13/16]: support builtin file signatures. If we want to be really nit-picky, that portion of the comment could be moved to later in the series.
Theodore Ts'o
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 08/16] fs-verity: add the hook for file ->setattr()
In reply to Eric BiggersQuoted 6 lines · Eric Biggers
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add a function
fsverity_prepare_setattr()which filesystems that support fs-verity must call to deny truncates of verity files.Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Looks good; you can add:
- Ted
Theodore Ts'o
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 09/16] fs-verity: add data verification hooks for ->readpages()
In reply to Eric BiggersQuoted 6 lines · Eric Biggers
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add functions that verify data pages that have been read from a fs-verity file, against that file's Merkle tree. These will be called from filesystems' ->readpage() and ->readpages() methods.
Quoted 7 lines
Since data verification can block, a workqueue is provided for these methods to enqueue verification work from their bio completion callback.
See the "Verifying data" section of
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rstfor more information.Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Looks good; you can add:
- Ted
Theodore Ts'o
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 10/16] fs-verity: implement FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY ioctl
In reply to Eric BiggersQuoted 23 lines · Eric Biggers
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add a function for filesystems to call to implement the
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITYioctl. This ioctl enables fs-verity on a file.See the "
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY" section ofDocumentation/filesystems/fsverity.rstfor the documentation.Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>fs/verity/enable.c new file +8
-0+/* Tell the filesystem to finish enabling verity on the file */ + err = vops->end_enable_verity (filp, desc, desc_size, params.tree_size); +if (err) { +fsverity_err (inode,"%ps() failed with err %d" , + vops->end_enable_verity, err); +fsverity_free_info (vi); + }else { +/* Successfully enabled verity */
fs/verity/enable.c line 229
Quoted 10 lines
fs/verity/enable.c new file +10
-0+ +WARN_ON (!IS_VERITY (inode)); + +/* +* Readers can start using ->i_verity_info immediately, so it +* can't be rolled back once set. So don't set it until just +* after the filesystem has successfully enabled verity. +*/ +fsverity_set_info (inode, vi); + }
If end_enable_Verity() retuns success, and IS_VERITY is not set, I would think that we should report the error via fsverity_err() and return an error to userspace, and *not* call fsverity_set_info(). I don't think the stack trace printed by WARN_ON is going to very interesting, since the call path which gets us to enable_verity() is not going to be surprising.
fs/verity/enable.c line 311
Quoted 5 lines
fs/verity/enable.c new file +5
-0+ +if (inode->i_size <=0 ) { + err = -EINVAL ; + goto out_unlock; + }
How hard would it be to support fsverity for zero-length files? There would be no Merkle tree, but there still would be an fsverity header file on which we can calculate a checksum for the digital signature.
- Ted
Theodore Ts'o
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 11/16] fs-verity: implement FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY ioctl
In reply to Eric BiggersQuoted 8 lines · Eric Biggers
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add a function for filesystems to call to implement the
FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITYioctl. This ioctl retrieves the file measurement that fs-verity calculated for the given file and is enforcing for reads; i.e., reads that don't match this hash will fail. This ioctl can be used for authentication or logging of file measurements in userspace.
Quoted 4 lines
See the "
FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY" section ofDocumentation/filesystems/fsverity.rstfor the documentation.Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Looks good; you can add:
- Ted
Theodore Ts'o
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 12/16] fs-verity: add SHA-512 support
In reply to Eric BiggersQuoted 8 lines · Eric Biggers
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add SHA-512 support to fs-verity. This is primarily a demonstration of the trivial changes needed to support a new hash algorithm in fs-verity; most users will still use SHA-256, due to the smaller space required to store the hashes. But some users may prefer SHA-512.
Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Looks good; you can add:
- Ted
Theodore Ts'o
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 13/16] fs-verity: support builtin file signatures
In reply to Eric BiggersQuoted 8 lines · Eric Biggers
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
To meet some users' needs, add optional support for having fs-verity handle a portion of the authentication policy in the kernel. An ".fs-verity" keyring is created to which X.509 certificates can be added; then a sysctl 'fs.verity.require_signatures' can be set to cause the kernel to enforce that all fs-verity files contain a signature of their file measurement by a key in this keyring.
I think it might be a good idea to allow the require_signatures setting to be set on a per-file system basis, via a mount option? We could plumb it in via a flag in fsverity_info, set by the file system.
Other than this feature request, looks good; you can add:
- Ted
Theodore Ts'o
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 14/16] ext4: add basic fs-verity support
In reply to Eric Biggersfs/ext4/verity.c line 109
Quoted 11 lines · Eric Biggers
fs/ext4/verity.c new file +11
-0+/* +* Format of ext4 verity xattr. This points to the location of the verity +* descriptor within the file data rather than containing it directly because +* the verity descriptor *must* be encrypted when ext4 encryption is used. But, +* ext4 encryption does not encrypt xattrs. +*/ +struct fsverity_descriptor_location { +__le32 version; +__le32 size; +__le64 pos; +};
What's the benefit of storing the location in an xattr as opposed to just keying it off the end of i_size, rounded up to next page size (or 64k) as I had suggested earlier?
Using an xattr burns xattr space, which is a limited resource, and it adds some additional code complexity. Does the benefits outweigh the added complexity?
- Ted
Eric Biggers
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 01/16] fs-verity: add a documentation file
In reply to Theodore Ts'oHi Ted,
Quoted 44 lines · Theodore Ts'o
Quoted 5 lines · Eric Biggers
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add a documentation file for fs-verity, covering....
Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>Looks good; you can add:
Reviewed-by Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>One minor design point below:
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst line 405
Quoted 2 lines
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst new file +2
-0+ext4 stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and fsverity_descriptor) +past the end of the file, starting at the first page fully beyond^^^^Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst line 413
Quoted 8 lines
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst new file +8
-0+i_size. This approach works because (a) verity files are readonly, +and (b) pages fully beyond i_size aren't visible to userspace but can +be read/written internally by ext4 with only some relatively small +changes to ext4. This approach avoids having to depend on the +EA_INODE feature and on rearchitecturing ext4's xattr support to +support paging multi-gigabyte xattrs into memory, and to support +encrypting xattrs. Note that the verity metadata *must* be encrypted +when the file is, since it contains hashes of the plaintext data.If we ever want to support mounting, say, a file system with 4k blocks and fsverity enabled on a architecture with a 16k or 64k page size, then "page" in that first sentence will need to become "block". At the moment we only support fsverity when page size == block size, so it's not an issue.
However, it's worth reflecting on what this means. In order to satisfy this requirement (from the mmap man page):
A file is mapped in multiples of the page size. For a file that is not a multiple of the page size, the remaining memory is zeroed when mapped...
we're going to have to special case how the last page gets mmaped. The simplest way to do this will be to map in an anonymous page which just has the blocks that are part of the data block copied in, and the rest of the page can be zero'ed.
Quoted 7 lines
One thing we might consider doing just to make life much easier for ourselves (should we ever want to support page size != block size --- which I could imagine some folks like Chandan might find desirable) is to specify that the fsverity metadata begins at an offset which begins at
i_sizerounded up to the next 64k binary, which should handle all current and future architectures' page sizes.
Thanks for the review. Good point; I think we should just go with the "always round up to the next 64K boundary" method. Special-casing how the last page gets mmap()ed seems it would be really painful.
Since there can be a hole between the end of the file and the start of the verity metadata, this doesn't even necessarily use any additional disk space.
For consistency and since there is little downside I think I'll do the same for f2fs too, though f2fs doesn't currently support PAGE_SIZE != 4096 at all anyway.
- Eric
Eric Biggers
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 05/16] fs-verity: add Kconfig and the helper functions for hashing
In reply to Theodore Ts'oQuoted 31 lines · Theodore Ts'o
Quoted 7 lines · Eric Biggers
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add the beginnings of the
fs/verity/support layer, including theKconfigoption and various helper functions for hashing. To start, only SHA-256 is supported, but other hash algorithms can easily be added.Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>Looks good; you can add:
Reviewed-off-by Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>One thought for consideration below...
fs/verity/fsverity_private.h line 29
Quoted 8 lines
fs/verity/fsverity_private.h new file +8
-0+ +/* +* Maximum depth of the Merkle tree. Up to 64 levels are theoretically possible +* with a very small block size, but we'd like to limit stack usage during +* verification, and in practice this is plenty. E.g., with SHA-256 and 4K +* blocks, a file with size UINT64_MAX bytes needs just 8 levels. +*/ +#define FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS 16Maybe we should make
FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS8 for now? This is an implementation-level restriction, and currently we don't support any architectures that have a page size < 4k. We can always bump this number up in the future if it ever becomes necessary, and limiting max levels to 8 saves almost 100 bytes of stack space inverify_page().
Quoted 1 line
- Ted
Yes, I agree. I'll reduce MAX_LEVELS to 8 for now and tweak the comment.
- Eric
Eric Biggers
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 07/16] fs-verity: add the hook for file ->open()
In reply to Theodore Ts'oQuoted 20 lines · Theodore Ts'o
Quoted 8 lines · Eric Biggers
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add the
fsverity_file_open()function, which prepares an fs-verity file to be read from. If not already done, it loads the fs-verity descriptor from the filesystem and sets up anfsverity_infostructure for the inode which describes the Merkle tree and contains the file measurement. It also denies all attempts to open verity files for writing.Quoted 4 lines
This commit also begins the
include/linux/fsverity.hheader, which declares the interface betweenfs/verity/and filesystems.Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>Looks good; you can add:
Reviewed-off-by Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>- Ted
Quoted 12 lines
fs/verity/open.c line 144
Quoted 6 lines
fs/verity/open.c new file +6
-0+/* +* Validate the given fsverity_descriptor and create a new fsverity_info from +* it. The signature (if present) is also checked. +*/ +struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info (const struct inode *inode, +const void *_desc,size_t desc_size)Well, technically it's not checked (yet). It doesn't get checked until [PATCH 13/16]: support builtin file signatures. If we want to be really nit-picky, that portion of the comment could be moved to later in the series.
Yes, I missed this when splitting out the patches. I'll move it to patch 13.
- Eric
Eric Biggers
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 10/16] fs-verity: implement FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY ioctl
In reply to Theodore Ts'oQuoted 33 lines · Theodore Ts'o
Quoted 32 lines · Eric Biggers
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add a function for filesystems to call to implement the
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITYioctl. This ioctl enables fs-verity on a file.See the "
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY" section ofDocumentation/filesystems/fsverity.rstfor the documentation.Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>fs/verity/enable.c new file +17
-0+/* Tell the filesystem to finish enabling verity on the file */ + err = vops->end_enable_verity (filp, desc, desc_size, params.tree_size); +if (err) { +fsverity_err (inode,"%ps() failed with err %d" , + vops->end_enable_verity, err); +fsverity_free_info (vi); + }else { +/* Successfully enabled verity */ + +WARN_ON (!IS_VERITY (inode)); + +/* +* Readers can start using ->i_verity_info immediately, so it +* can't be rolled back once set. So don't set it until just +* after the filesystem has successfully enabled verity. +*/ +fsverity_set_info (inode, vi);
Quoted 9 lines
fs/verity/enable.c
Quoted 1 line
fs/verity/enable.c new file +1
-0+ }If
end_enable_Verity()retuns success, andIS_VERITYis not set, I would think that we should report the error viafsverity_err()and return an error to userspace, and *not* callfsverity_set_info(). I don't think the stack trace printed byWARN_ONis going to very interesting, since the call path which gets us toenable_verity()is not going to be surprising.
I want to keep it as WARN_ON() because if it happens it's a kernel bug, and WARNs are reported as bugs by automated tools. But I can do the following so it returns an error code too:
@@ -229,11 +235,12 @@ static int enable_verity(struct file *filp,
fsverity_err(inode, "%ps() failed with err %d",
vops->end_enable_verity, err);
fsverity_free_info(vi);
+ } else if (WARN_ON(!IS_VERITY(inode))) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ fsverity_free_info(vi);
} else {
/* Successfully enabled verity */
- WARN_ON(!IS_VERITY(inode));
-
/*
* Readers can start using ->i_verity_info immediately, so it
* can't be rolled back once set. So don't set it until just
Quoted 10 lines
fs/verity/enable.c
Quoted 5 lines
fs/verity/enable.c new file +5
-0+ +if (inode->i_size <=0 ) { + err = -EINVAL ; + goto out_unlock; + }How hard would it be to support fsverity for zero-length files? There would be no Merkle tree, but there still would be an fsverity header file on which we can calculate a checksum for the digital signature.
Quoted 2 lines
- Ted
Empty files would have to be special-cased, e.g. defining the root hash to be all 0's, since there are no blocks to checksum. It would be straightforward, but it would still be a special case, e.g.:
fs/verity/enable.c +6 -0
@@ -112,6 +112,12 @@ static int build_merkle_tree(struct inode *inode,unsigned int level;int err = -ENOMEM ; +if (inode->i_size ==0 ) { +/* Empty file is a special case; root hash is all 0's */ +memset (root_hash,0 , params->digest_size); +return 0 ; + } +
On the other hand, *not* supporting empty files is a special case from the user's point of view. It means that fs-verity isn't supported on every possible file. Thinking about it, that's probably worse than having a special case in the *implementation*.
So now I'm leaning towards changing it to support empty files.
- Eric
Eric Biggers
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 13/16] fs-verity: support builtin file signatures
In reply to Theodore Ts'oQuoted 10 lines · Theodore Ts'o
Quoted 8 lines · Eric Biggers
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
To meet some users' needs, add optional support for having fs-verity handle a portion of the authentication policy in the kernel. An ".fs-verity" keyring is created to which X.509 certificates can be added; then a sysctl 'fs.verity.require_signatures' can be set to cause the kernel to enforce that all fs-verity files contain a signature of their file measurement by a key in this keyring.
Quoted 3 lines
I think it might be a good idea to allow the
require_signaturessetting to be set on a per-file system basis, via a mount option? We could plumb it in via a flag infsverity_info, set by the file system.
Perhaps, but this is something that can be added later, so I think we should hold off on it until someone needs it.
Quoted 5 lines
Other than this feature request, looks good; you can add:
Reviewed-off-by Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
I assume you mean "Reviewed-by" :-)
- Eric
Eric Biggers
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 14/16] ext4: add basic fs-verity support
In reply to Theodore Ts'oQuoted 17 lines · Theodore Ts'o
fs/ext4/verity.c line 109
Quoted 11 lines · Eric Biggers
fs/ext4/verity.c new file +11
-0+/* +* Format of ext4 verity xattr. This points to the location of the verity +* descriptor within the file data rather than containing it directly because +* the verity descriptor *must* be encrypted when ext4 encryption is used. But, +* ext4 encryption does not encrypt xattrs. +*/ +struct fsverity_descriptor_location { +__le32 version; +__le32 size; +__le64 pos; +};What's the benefit of storing the location in an xattr as opposed to just keying it off the end of
i_size, rounded up to next page size (or 64k) as I had suggested earlier?
Quoted 5 lines
Using an xattr burns xattr space, which is a limited resource, and it adds some additional code complexity. Does the benefits outweigh the added complexity?
- Ted
It means that only the fs/verity/ support layer has to be aware of the format of the fsverity_descriptor, and the filesystem can just treat it an as opaque blob.
Otherwise the filesystem would need to read the first 'sizeof(struct fsverity_descriptor)' bytes and use those to calculate the size as 'sizeof(struct fsverity_descriptor) + le32_to_cpu(desc.sig_size)', then read the rest. Is this what you have in mind?
Alternatively the filesystem could prepend the fsverity_descriptor with its size, similar to how in the v1 and v2 patchsets there was an fsverity_footer appended to the fsverity_descriptor. But an xattr seems a cleaner approach to store a few bytes that don't need to be encrypted.
Putting the verity descriptor before the Merkle tree also means that we'd have to pass the desc_size to ->begin_enable_verity(), ->read_merkle_tree_page(), and ->write_merkle_tree_block(), versus just passing the merkle_tree_size to ->end_enable_verity(). This would be easy, but it would still add a bit of complexity in the fsverity_operations rather than reduce it.
It's also somewhat nice to have the version number in the xattr, in case we ever introduce a new fs-verity format for ext4 or f2fs.
So to me, it doesn't seem like the other possible solutions are better.
- Eric
Theodore Ts'o
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 14/16] ext4: add basic fs-verity support
Quoted 24 lines · Eric Biggers
Quoted 17 lines · Theodore Ts'o
fs/ext4/verity.c line 109
Quoted 11 lines · Eric Biggers
fs/ext4/verity.c new file +11
-0+/* +* Format of ext4 verity xattr. This points to the location of the verity +* descriptor within the file data rather than containing it directly because +* the verity descriptor *must* be encrypted when ext4 encryption is used. But, +* ext4 encryption does not encrypt xattrs. +*/ +struct fsverity_descriptor_location { +__le32 version; +__le32 size; +__le64 pos; +};What's the benefit of storing the location in an xattr as opposed to just keying it off the end of
i_size, rounded up to next page size (or 64k) as I had suggested earlier?Quoted 5 lines
Using an xattr burns xattr space, which is a limited resource, and it adds some additional code complexity. Does the benefits outweigh the added complexity?
- Ted
Quoted 7 lines
It means that only the
fs/verity/support layer has to be aware of the format of thefsverity_descriptor, and the filesystem can just treat it an as opaque blob.Otherwise the filesystem would need to read the first '
sizeof(struct fsverity_descriptor)' bytes and use those to calculate the size as 'sizeof(struct fsverity_descriptor)+le32_to_cpu(desc.sig_size)', then read the rest. Is this what you have in mind?
So right now, the way enable_verity() works is that it appends the Merkle tree to the data file, rounding up to the next page (but we might change so we round up to the next 64k boundary). Then it calls end_enable_verity(), which is a file system specific function, passing in the descriptor and the descriptor size.
Today ext4 and f2fs appends the descriptor after the Merkle, and then sets the xattr containing the fsverity_descriptor_location. Correct?
What I'm suggesting that ext4 do instead is that it appends the descriptor to the Merkle tree, and then assuming that there is the (descriptor size % block_size) is less than PAGE_SIZE-4, we can write the descriptor size into the last 4 bytes of the last block in the file. If there is not enough space at the end of the descriptor, then we append a block to the file, and then write the descriptor_size into last 4 bytes of that block.
When ext4 needs to find the descriptor, it simply reads the last block from the file, reads it into the page cache, reads the last 4 bytes from that block to fetch the descriptor size, and it can use the logical offset of the last block and the descriptor size to calculate the beginning offset of the descriptor size.
We can then fake up the fsverity_descriptor_location structure, and pass that into fsverity.
It does add a bit of extra complexity, but 99.9% of the time, it requires no extra space. The last 0.098% of the time, the file size will grow by 4k, but if we can avoid spilling over to an external xattr block, it will all be worth it.
And in the V1 version of the fsverity code, I had already written the code to descend the extent tree to find the last logical block in the extent tree.
Quoted 2 lines
It's also somewhat nice to have the version number in the xattr, in case we ever introduce a new fs-verity format for ext4 or f2fs.
We already have a version number in the fsverity descriptor. Surely that is what we would bump if we need to itnroduce a new fs-verity format?
- Ted
Eric Biggers
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 14/16] ext4: add basic fs-verity support
Quoted 33 lines · Theodore Ts'o
Quoted 24 lines · Eric Biggers
Quoted 17 lines · Theodore Ts'o
fs/ext4/verity.c line 109
Quoted 11 lines · Eric Biggers
fs/ext4/verity.c new file +11
-0+/* +* Format of ext4 verity xattr. This points to the location of the verity +* descriptor within the file data rather than containing it directly because +* the verity descriptor *must* be encrypted when ext4 encryption is used. But, +* ext4 encryption does not encrypt xattrs. +*/ +struct fsverity_descriptor_location { +__le32 version; +__le32 size; +__le64 pos; +};What's the benefit of storing the location in an xattr as opposed to just keying it off the end of
i_size, rounded up to next page size (or 64k) as I had suggested earlier?Quoted 5 lines
Using an xattr burns xattr space, which is a limited resource, and it adds some additional code complexity. Does the benefits outweigh the added complexity?
- Ted
Quoted 7 lines
It means that only the
fs/verity/support layer has to be aware of the format of thefsverity_descriptor, and the filesystem can just treat it an as opaque blob.Otherwise the filesystem would need to read the first '
sizeof(struct fsverity_descriptor)' bytes and use those to calculate the size as 'sizeof(struct fsverity_descriptor)+le32_to_cpu(desc.sig_size)', then read the rest. Is this what you have in mind?
Quoted 8 lines
So right now, the way
enable_verity()works is that it appends the Merkle tree to the data file, rounding up to the next page (but we might change so we round up to the next 64k boundary). Then it callsend_enable_verity(), which is a file system specific function, passing in the descriptor and the descriptor size.Today ext4 and f2fs appends the descriptor after the Merkle, and then sets the xattr containing the
fsverity_descriptor_location. Correct?
That's all correct, except that enable_verity() itself doesn't know or care that the Merkle tree is being appended to the file. That's up to the ->write_merkle_tree_block() and ->read_merkle_tree_page() methods which are filesystem-specific.
Quoted 18 lines
What I'm suggesting that ext4 do instead is that it appends the descriptor to the Merkle tree, and then assuming that there is the (descriptor size %
block_size) is less than PAGE_SIZE-4, we can write the descriptor size into the last 4 bytes of the last block in the file. If there is not enough space at the end of the descriptor, then we append a block to the file, and then write thedescriptor_sizeinto last 4 bytes of that block.When ext4 needs to find the descriptor, it simply reads the last block from the file, reads it into the page cache, reads the last 4 bytes from that block to fetch the descriptor size, and it can use the logical offset of the last block and the descriptor size to calculate the beginning offset of the descriptor size.
We can then fake up the
fsverity_descriptor_locationstructure, and pass that into fsverity.
Quoted 9 lines
It does add a bit of extra complexity, but 99.9% of the time, it requires no extra space. The last 0.098% of the time, the file size will grow by 4k, but if we can avoid spilling over to an external xattr block, it will all be worth it.
And in the V1 version of the fsverity code, I had already written the code to descend the extent tree to find the last logical block in the extent tree.
I don't think your proposed solution is so simple. By definition the last extent ends on a filesystem block boundary, while the Merkle tree ends on a Merkle tree block boundary. In the future we might support the case where these differ, so we don't want to preclude that in the on-disk format we choose now. Therefore, just storing the desc_size isn't enough; we'd actually have to store (desc_pos, desc_size), like I'm doing in the xattr.
Also, using ext4_find_extent() to find the last mapped block (as the v1 and v2 patchsets did) assumes the file actually uses extents. So we'd have to forbid non-extents based files as a special case, as the v2 patchset did. We'd also have to find a way to implement the same functionality on f2fs (which should be possible, but it seems it would require some new code; there's nothing like f2fs_get_extent()) unless we did something different for f2fs.
Note that on Android devices (the motivating use case for fs-verity), the xattrs of user data files on ext4 already spill into an external xattr block, due to the fscrypt and SELinux xattrs. If/when people actually start caring about this, they'll need to increase the inode size to 512 bytes anyway, in which case there will be plenty of space for a few more in-line xattrs. So I don't think we should jump through too many hoops to avoid using an xattr.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
It's also somewhat nice to have the version number in the xattr, in case we ever introduce a new fs-verity format for ext4 or f2fs.
We already have a version number in the fsverity descriptor. Surely that is what we would bump if we need to itnroduce a new fs-verity format?
I'm talking about if we ever wanted to make a filesystem-specific change to where the verity metadata is stored. That's what the version number in the filesystem-specific xattr is for. The version number in the fsverity_descriptor is different: that's for if we made a change to fs-verity for *all* filesystems. We hopefully won't ever need the filesystem-specific version number, but as long as we have to store the (desc_pos, desc_size) anyway, I think it's wise to add a version number just in case; it doesn't really cost anything.
- Eric
Theodore Ts'o
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 14/16] ext4: add basic fs-verity support
Quoted 7 lines · Eric Biggers
I don't think your proposed solution is so simple. By definition the last extent ends on a filesystem block boundary, while the Merkle tree ends on a Merkle tree block boundary. In the future we might support the case where these differ, so we don't want to preclude that in the on-disk format we choose now. Therefore, just storing the
desc_sizeisn't enough; we'd actually have to store (desc_pos,desc_size), like I'm doing in the xattr.
I don't think any of this matters much, since what you're describing above is all about the Merkle tree, and that doesn't affect how we find the fsverity descriptor information. We can just say that fsverity descriptor block begins on the next file system block boundary after the Merkle tree. And in the case where say, the Merkle tree is 4k and the file system block size is 64k, that's fine --- the fs descriptor would just begin at the next 64k (fs blocksize) boundary.
Quoted 6 lines
Also, using
ext4_find_extent()to find the last mapped block (as the v1 and v2 patchsets did) assumes the file actually uses extents. So we'd have to forbid non-extents based files as a special case, as the v2 patchset did. We'd also have to find a way to implement the same functionality on f2fs (which should be possible, but it seems it would require some new code; there's nothing likef2fs_get_extent()) unless we did something different for f2fs.
So first, if f2fs wants to continue using the xattr, that's fine. The code to write and fetch the fsverity descriptor is in file system specific code, and so this is something I'm happy to support just for ext4, and it shouldn't require any special changes in the common fsverity code at all. Secondly, I suspect it's not *that* hard to find the last logical block mapping in f2fs, but I'll let Jaeguk comment on that.
Finally, it's not that hard to find the last mapped block for indirect blocks, if we really care about supporting that combination. (There are enough other things --- like fallocate --- which don't work with indirect mapped files, so I don't feel especially bad forbidding that combination. A quick check in enable_verity() to return EOPNOTSUPP if the EXTENTS_FL flag is not present is not all that different from what we do with fallocate today.)
But if we *did* want to support it, it's actually quite easy to find the last mapped block for an indirect mapped inode. I just didn't bother to write the code, but it requires at most 3 block reads if there is a triple indirection block. Otherwise, if there is a double indirection block in the inode, it requires at most 2 block reads, and otherwise, at most a single block read.
Quoted 6 lines
Note that on Android devices (the motivating use case for fs-verity), the xattrs of user data files on ext4 already spill into an external xattr block, due to the fscrypt and SELinux xattrs. If/when people actually start caring about this, they'll need to increase the inode size to 512 bytes anyway, in which case there will be plenty of space for a few more in-line xattrs. So I don't think we should jump through too many hoops to avoid using an xattr.
I'm thinking about other cases where we might not be using fscrypt, but where we might still be using fsverity and SELinux --- or maybe cases where the file systems are using 128 byte inodes, and where only fsverity is required. (There are a *vast* number of production file systems using 128 byte inodes.)
Cheers,
- Ted
Eric Biggers
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 14/16] ext4: add basic fs-verity support
Quoted 9 lines · Theodore Ts'o
Quoted 7 lines · Eric Biggers
I don't think your proposed solution is so simple. By definition the last extent ends on a filesystem block boundary, while the Merkle tree ends on a Merkle tree block boundary. In the future we might support the case where these differ, so we don't want to preclude that in the on-disk format we choose now. Therefore, just storing the
desc_sizeisn't enough; we'd actually have to store (desc_pos,desc_size), like I'm doing in the xattr.
Quoted 9 lines
I don't think any of this matters much, since what you're describing above is all about the Merkle tree, and that doesn't affect how we find the fsverity descriptor information. We can just say that fsverity descriptor block begins on the next file system block boundary after the Merkle tree. And in the case where say, the Merkle tree is 4k and the file system block size is 64k, that's fine --- the fs descriptor would just begin at the next 64k (fs blocksize) boundary.
Sure, that works.
I implemented this for ext4 and extents only, and it does work, though it's a bit more complex than the xattr solution -- about 70 extra lines of code including comments. See diff for fs/ext4/verity.c below.
But we can go with it if you think it's worthwhile to avoid using xattrs at all.
fs/ext4/verity.c +152 -70
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@* Implementation of fsverity_operations for ext4. * * ext4 stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and fsverity_descriptor) past -* the end of the file, starting at the first page fully beyond i_size. This +* the end of the file, starting at the first 64K boundary beyond i_size. This * approach works because (a) verity files are readonly, and (b) pages fully * beyond i_size aren't visible to userspace but can be read/written internally * by ext4 with only some relatively small changes to ext4. This approach
@@ -17,13 +17,22 @@* ext4's xattr support to support paging multi-gigabyte xattrs into memory, and * to support encrypting xattrs. Note that the verity metadata *must* be * encrypted when the file is, since it contains hashes of the plaintext data. +* +* Using a 64K boundary rather than a 4K one keeps things ready for +* architectures with 64K pages, and it doesn't necessarily waste space on-disk +* since there can be a hole between i_size and the start of the Merkle tree. */ #include <linux/quotaops.h> #include "ext4.h" +#include "ext4_extents.h" #include "ext4_jbd2.h" -#include "xattr.h" + +static inline loff_t ext4_verity_metadata_pos (const struct inode *inode) +{ +return round_up (inode->i_size,65536 ); +}/* * Read some verity metadata from the inode. __vfs_read() can't be used because
@@ -32,8 +41,6 @@static int pagecache_read (struct inode *inode,void *buf,size_t count,loff_t pos) { -const size_t orig_count = count; -while (count) {size_t n =min_t (size_t, count,PAGE_SIZE -offset_in_page (pos));
@@ -55,7 +62,7 @@ static int pagecache_read(struct inode *inode, void *buf, size_t count, pos += n; count -= n; } -return orig_count; +return 0 ; }/*
@@ -96,22 +103,10 @@ static int pagecache_write(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, size_t count,return 0 ; } -/* -* Format of ext4 verity xattr. This points to the location of the verity -* descriptor within the file data rather than containing it directly because -* the verity descriptor *must* be encrypted when ext4 encryption is used. But, -* ext4 encryption does not encrypt xattrs. -*/ -struct fsverity_descriptor_location { -__le32 version; -__le32 size; -__le64 pos; -}; -static int ext4_begin_enable_verity (struct file *filp) {struct inode *inode =file_inode (filp); -int credits =2 ;/* superblock and inode for ext4_orphan_add() */ +const int credits =2 ;/* superblock and inode for ext4_orphan_add() */ handle_t *handle;int err;
@@ -119,10 +114,24 @@ static int ext4_begin_enable_verity(struct file *filp)if (err)return err; +if (!ext4_test_inode_flag (inode,EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS )) { +ext4_warning_inode (inode, +"verity is only allowed on extent-based files" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + err =ext4_inode_attach_jinode (inode);if (err)return err; +/* +* ext4 uses the last allocated block to find the verity descriptor, so +* we must remove any other blocks which might confuse things. +*/ + err =ext4_truncate (inode); +if (err) +return err; + err =dquot_initialize (inode);if (err)return err;
@@ -139,32 +148,55 @@ static int ext4_begin_enable_verity(struct file *filp)return err; } +/* +* ext4 stores the verity descriptor beginning on the next filesystem block +* boundary after the Merkle tree. Then, the descriptor size is stored in the +* last 4 bytes of the last allocated filesystem block --- which is either the +* block in which the descriptor ends, or the next block after that if there +* weren't at least 4 bytes remaining. +* +* We can't simply store the descriptor in an xattr because it *must* be +* encrypted when ext4 encryption is used, but ext4 encryption doesn't encrypt +* xattrs. Also, if the descriptor includes a large signature blob it may be +* too large to store in an xattr without the EA_INODE feature. +*/ +static int ext4_write_verity_descriptor (struct inode *inode,const void *desc, +size_t desc_size,u64 merkle_tree_size) +{ +const u64 desc_pos =round_up (ext4_verity_metadata_pos (inode) + + merkle_tree_size,i_blocksize (inode)); +const u64 desc_end = desc_pos + desc_size; +const __le32 desc_size_disk =cpu_to_le32 (desc_size); +const u64 desc_size_pos =round_up (desc_end +sizeof (desc_size_disk), +i_blocksize (inode)) - +sizeof (desc_size_disk); +int err; + + err =pagecache_write (inode, desc, desc_size, desc_pos); +if (err) +return err; + +return pagecache_write (inode, &desc_size_disk,sizeof (desc_size_disk), + desc_size_pos); +} +static int ext4_end_enable_verity (struct file *filp,const void *desc,size_t desc_size,u64 merkle_tree_size) {struct inode *inode =file_inode (filp); -u64 desc_pos =round_up (inode->i_size,PAGE_SIZE ) + merkle_tree_size; -struct fsverity_descriptor_location dloc = { - .version =cpu_to_le32 (1 ), - .size =cpu_to_le32 (desc_size), - .pos =cpu_to_le64 (desc_pos), - }; -int credits =0 ; +const int credits =2 ;/* superblock and inode for ext4_orphan_add() */ handle_t *handle;int err1 =0 ;int err;if (desc !=NULL ) {/* Succeeded; write the verity descriptor. */ - err1 =pagecache_write (inode, desc, desc_size, desc_pos); + err1 =ext4_write_verity_descriptor (inode, desc, desc_size, + merkle_tree_size);/* Write all pages before clearing VERITY_IN_PROGRESS. */ if (!err1) err1 =filemap_write_and_wait (inode->i_mapping); - -if (!err1) - err1 =ext4_xattr_set_credits (inode,sizeof (dloc), true, - &credits); }else {/* Failed; truncate anything we wrote past i_size. */ ext4_truncate (inode);
@@ -173,14 +205,12 @@ static int ext4_end_enable_verity(struct file *filp, const void *desc,/* * We must always clean up by clearing EXT4_STATE_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS and * deleting the inode from the orphan list, even if something failed. -* If everything succeeded, we'll also set the verity bit and descriptor -* location xattr in the same transaction. +* If everything succeeded, we'll also set the verity bit in the same +* transaction. */ ext4_clear_inode_state (inode,EXT4_STATE_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS ); - credits +=2 ;/* superblock and inode for ext4_orphan_del() */ - handle =ext4_journal_start (inode,EXT4_HT_INODE , credits);if (IS_ERR (handle)) {ext4_orphan_del (NULL , inode);
@@ -194,13 +224,6 @@ static int ext4_end_enable_verity(struct file *filp, const void *desc,if (desc !=NULL && !err1) {struct ext4_iloc iloc; - err =ext4_xattr_set_handle (handle, inode, -EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_VERITY , -EXT4_XATTR_NAME_VERITY , - &dloc,sizeof (dloc),XATTR_CREATE ); -if (err) - goto out_stop; - err =ext4_reserve_inode_write (handle, inode, &iloc);if (err) goto out_stop;
@@ -213,43 +236,103 @@ static int ext4_end_enable_verity(struct file *filp, const void *desc,return err ?: err1; } -static int ext4_get_verity_descriptor (struct inode *inode,void *buf, -size_t buf_size) +static int ext4_get_verity_descriptor_location (struct inode *inode, +size_t *desc_size_ret, +u64 *desc_pos_ret) { -struct fsverity_descriptor_location dloc; -int res; -u32 size; -u64 pos; - -/* Get the descriptor location */ - res =ext4_xattr_get (inode,EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_VERITY , -EXT4_XATTR_NAME_VERITY , &dloc,sizeof (dloc)); -if (res <0 && res != -ERANGE ) -return res; -if (res !=sizeof (dloc) || dloc.version !=cpu_to_le32 (1 )) { -ext4_warning_inode (inode,"unknown verity xattr format" ); -return -EINVAL ; +struct ext4_ext_path *path; +struct ext4_extent *last_extent; +u32 end_lblk; +u64 desc_size_pos; +__le32 desc_size_disk; +u32 desc_size; +u64 desc_pos; +int err; + +/* +* Descriptor size is in last 4 bytes of last allocated block. +* See ext4_write_verity_descriptor(). +*/ + +if (!ext4_test_inode_flag (inode,EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS )) { +EXT4_ERROR_INODE (inode,"verity file doesn't use extents" ); +return -EFSCORRUPTED ; } - size =le32_to_cpu (dloc.size); - pos =le64_to_cpu (dloc.pos); -/* Get the descriptor */ -if (pos + size < pos || pos + size > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes || - pos <round_up (inode->i_size,PAGE_SIZE ) || size >INT_MAX ) { -ext4_warning_inode (inode,"invalid verity xattr" ); + path =ext4_find_extent (inode,EXT_MAX_BLOCKS -1 ,NULL ,0 ); +if (IS_ERR (path)) +return PTR_ERR (path); + + last_extent = path[path->p_depth].p_ext; +if (!last_extent) { +EXT4_ERROR_INODE (inode,"verity file has no extents" ); +ext4_ext_drop_refs (path); +kfree (path);return -EFSCORRUPTED ; } -if (buf_size ==0 ) -return size; -if (size > buf_size) -return -ERANGE ; -return pagecache_read (inode, buf, size, pos); + + end_lblk =le32_to_cpu (last_extent->ee_block) + +ext4_ext_get_actual_len (last_extent); + desc_size_pos = (u64 )end_lblk << inode->i_blkbits; +ext4_ext_drop_refs (path); +kfree (path); + +if (desc_size_pos <sizeof (desc_size_disk)) + goto bad; + desc_size_pos -=sizeof (desc_size_disk); + + err =pagecache_read (inode, &desc_size_disk,sizeof (desc_size_disk), + desc_size_pos); +if (err) +return err; + desc_size =le32_to_cpu (desc_size_disk); + +/* +* The descriptor is stored just before the desc_size_disk, but starting +* on a filesystem block boundary. +*/ + +if (desc_size >INT_MAX || desc_size > desc_size_pos) + goto bad; + + desc_pos =round_down (desc_size_pos - desc_size,i_blocksize (inode)); +if (desc_pos <ext4_verity_metadata_pos (inode)) + goto bad; + + *desc_size_ret = desc_size; + *desc_pos_ret = desc_pos; +return 0 ; + +bad: +EXT4_ERROR_INODE (inode,"verity file corrupted; can't find descriptor" ); +return -EFSCORRUPTED ; +} + +static int ext4_get_verity_descriptor (struct inode *inode,void *buf, +size_t buf_size) +{ +size_t desc_size =0 ; +u64 desc_pos =0 ; +int err; + + err =ext4_get_verity_descriptor_location (inode, &desc_size, &desc_pos); +if (err) +return err; + +if (buf_size) { +if (desc_size > buf_size) +return -ERANGE ; + err =pagecache_read (inode, buf, desc_size, desc_pos); +if (err) +return err; + } +return desc_size; }static struct page *ext4_read_merkle_tree_page (struct inode *inode,pgoff_t index) { - index +=DIV_ROUND_UP (inode->i_size,PAGE_SIZE ); + index +=ext4_verity_metadata_pos (inode) >>PAGE_SHIFT ;return read_mapping_page (inode->i_mapping, index,NULL ); }
@@ -257,8 +340,7 @@ static struct page *ext4_read_merkle_tree_page(struct inode *inode,static int ext4_write_merkle_tree_block (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,u64 index,int log_blocksize) { -loff_t pos =round_up (inode->i_size,PAGE_SIZE ) + - (index << log_blocksize); +loff_t pos =ext4_verity_metadata_pos (inode) + (index << log_blocksize);return pagecache_write (inode, buf,1 << log_blocksize, pos); }