iio: dac: ds4422/ds4424 fix chip verification
Subsystems (16)
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 6/49 ipvs: Fix use-after-free in ip_vs_in
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 719c7d563c17b150877cee03a4b812a424989dfa ]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ip_vs_in.part.29+0xe8/0xd20 [ip_vs] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881e9b26e2c by task sshd/5603 CPU: 0 PID: 5603 Comm: sshd Not tainted 4.19.39+ #30 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x71/0xab print_address_description+0x6a/0x270 kasan_report+0x179/0x2c0 ip_vs_in.part.29+0xe8/0xd20 [ip_vs] ip_vs_in+0xd8/0x170 [ip_vs] nf_hook_slow+0x5f/0xe0 __ip_local_out+0x1d5/0x250 ip_local_out+0x19/0x60 __tcp_transmit_skb+0xba1/0x14f0 tcp_write_xmit+0x41f/0x1ed0 ? _copy_from_iter_full+0xca/0x340 __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x52/0x140 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x787/0x1600 ? tcp_sendpage+0x60/0x60 ? inet_sk_set_state+0xb0/0xb0 tcp_sendmsg+0x27/0x40 sock_sendmsg+0x6d/0x80 sock_write_iter+0x121/0x1c0 ? sock_sendmsg+0x80/0x80 __vfs_write+0x23e/0x370 vfs_write+0xe7/0x230 ksys_write+0xa1/0x120 ? __ia32_sys_read+0x50/0x50 ? __audit_syscall_exit+0x3ce/0x450 do_syscall_64+0x73/0x200 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7ff6f6147c60 Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 28 12 2d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d 5d 73 2d 00 00 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 RSP: 002b:00007ffd772ead18 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000034 RCX: 00007ff6f6147c60 RDX: 0000000000000034 RSI: 000055df30a31270 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000055df30a31270 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007ffd772ead70 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd772ead74 R13: 00007ffd772eae20 R14: 00007ffd772eae24 R15: 000055df2f12ddc0 Allocated by task 6052: kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0 __kmalloc+0x10a/0x220 ops_init+0x97/0x190 register_pernet_operations+0x1ac/0x360 register_pernet_subsys+0x24/0x40 0xffffffffc0ea016d do_one_initcall+0x8b/0x253 do_init_module+0xe3/0x335 load_module+0x2fc0/0x3890 __do_sys_finit_module+0x192/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x73/0x200 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Freed by task 6067: __kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 kfree+0x90/0x1a0 ops_free_list.part.7+0xa6/0xc0 unregister_pernet_operations+0x18b/0x1f0 unregister_pernet_subsys+0x1d/0x30 ip_vs_cleanup+0x1d/0xd2f [ip_vs] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x20c/0x300 do_syscall_64+0x73/0x200 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881e9b26600 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4096 of size 4096 The buggy address is located 2092 bytes inside of 4096-byte region [ffff8881e9b26600, ffff8881e9b27600) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0007a6c800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff888107c0e600 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x17ffffc0008100(slab|head) raw: 0017ffffc0008100 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff888107c0e600 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080070007 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
while unregistering ipvs module, ops_free_list calls __ip_vs_cleanup, then nf_unregister_net_hooks be called to do remove nf hook entries. It need a RCU period to finish, however net->ipvs is set to NULL immediately, which will trigger NULL pointer dereference when a packet is hooked and handled by ip_vs_in where net->ipvs is dereferenced.
Another scene is ops_free_list call ops_free to free the net_generic directly while __ip_vs_cleanup finished, then calling ip_vs_in will triggers use-after-free.
This patch moves nf_unregister_net_hooks from __ip_vs_cleanup() to __ip_vs_dev_cleanup(), where rcu_barrier() is called by unregister_pernet_device -> unregister_pernet_operations, that will do the needed grace period.
--- net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c +1 -1
@@ -2280,7 +2280,6 @@ static void __net_exit __ip_vs_cleanup(struct net *net) {struct netns_ipvs *ipvs =net_ipvs (net); -nf_unregister_net_hooks (net, ip_vs_ops,ARRAY_SIZE (ip_vs_ops));ip_vs_service_net_cleanup (ipvs);/* ip_vs_flush() with locks */ ip_vs_conn_net_cleanup (ipvs);ip_vs_app_net_cleanup (ipvs);
@@ -2295,6 +2294,7 @@ static void __net_exit __ip_vs_dev_cleanup(struct net *net) {struct netns_ipvs *ipvs =net_ipvs (net);EnterFunction (2 ); +nf_unregister_net_hooks (net, ip_vs_ops,ARRAY_SIZE (ip_vs_ops)); ipvs->enable =0 ;/* Disable packet reception */ smp_wmb ();ip_vs_sync_net_cleanup (ipvs);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 7/49 selftests: netfilter: missing error check when setting up veth interface
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Jeffrin Jose T <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 82ce6eb1dd13fd12e449b2ee2c2ec051e6f52c43 ]
A test for the basic NAT functionality uses ip command which needs veth device. There is a condition where the kernel support for veth is not compiled into the kernel and the test script breaks. This patch contains code for reasonable error display and correct code exit.
--- tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_nat.sh | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_nat.sh +5 -1
@@ -23,7 +23,11 @@ ip netns add ns0 ip netns add ns1 ip netns add ns2 -ip link add veth0 netns ns0 type veth peer name eth0 netns ns1 +ip link add veth0 netns ns0 type veth peer name eth0 netns ns1 > /dev/null 2>&1 +if [ $? -ne 0 ];then + echo "SKIP: No virtual ethernet pair device support in kernel" + exit $ksft_skip +fi ip link add veth1 netns ns0 type veth peer name eth0 netns ns2 ip -net ns0 link set lo up
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 8/49 clk: ti: clkctrl: Fix clkdm_clk handling
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1cc54078d104f5b4d7e9f8d55362efa5a8daffdb ]
We need to always call clkdm_clk_enable() and clkdm_clk_disable() even the clkctrl clock(s) enabled for the domain do not have any gate register bits. Otherwise clockdomains may never get enabled except when devices get probed with the legacy "ti,hwmods" devicetree property.
--- drivers/clk/ti/clkctrl.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/clk/ti/clkctrl.c +4 -4
@@ -137,9 +137,6 @@ static int _omap4_clkctrl_clk_enable(struct clk_hw *hw)int ret;union omap4_timeout timeout = {0 }; -if (!clk->enable_bit) -return 0 ; -if (clk->clkdm) { ret = ti_clk_ll_ops->clkdm_clk_enable (clk->clkdm, hw->clk);if (ret) {
@@ -151,6 +148,9 @@ static int _omap4_clkctrl_clk_enable(struct clk_hw *hw) } } +if (!clk->enable_bit) +return 0 ; + val = ti_clk_ll_ops->clk_readl (&clk->enable_reg); val &= ~OMAP4_MODULEMODE_MASK ;
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static void _omap4_clkctrl_clk_disable(struct clk_hw *hw)union omap4_timeout timeout = {0 };if (!clk->enable_bit) -return ; + goto exit; val = ti_clk_ll_ops->clk_readl (&clk->enable_reg);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 16/49 gpio: fix gpio-adp5588 build errors
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e9646f0f5bb62b7d43f0968f39d536cfe7123b53 ]
The gpio-adp5588 driver uses interfaces that are provided by GPIOLIB_IRQCHIP, so select that symbol in its Kconfig entry.
Fixes these build errors:
../drivers/gpio/gpio-adp5588.c: In function ‘adp5588_irq_handler’:../drivers/gpio/gpio-adp5588.c:266:26: error: ‘struct gpio_chip’ has no member named ‘irq’
dev->gpio_chip.irq.domain, gpio));
^../drivers/gpio/gpio-adp5588.c: In function ‘adp5588_irq_setup’:../drivers/gpio/gpio-adp5588.c:298:2: error: implicit declaration of function ‘gpiochip_irqchip_add_nested’ [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
ret = gpiochip_irqchip_add_nested(&dev->gpio_chip,
^../drivers/gpio/gpio-adp5588.c:307:2: error: implicit declaration of function ‘gpiochip_set_nested_irqchip’ [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
gpiochip_set_nested_irqchip(&dev->gpio_chip,
^
--- drivers/gpio/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/gpio/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -784,6 +784,7 @@ config GPIO_ADP5588 config GPIO_ADP5588_IRQ bool "Interrupt controller support for ADP5588" depends on GPIO_ADP5588=y + select GPIOLIB_IRQCHIP help Say yes here to enable the adp5588 to be used as an interrupt controller. It requires the driver to be built in the kernel.
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 17/49 efi/x86/Add missing error handling to old_memmap 1:1 mapping code
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Gen Zhang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4e78921ba4dd0aca1cc89168f45039add4183f8e ]
The old_memmap flow in efi_call_phys_prolog() performs numerous memory allocations, and either does not check for failure at all, or it does but fails to propagate it back to the caller, which may end up calling into the firmware with an incomplete 1:1 mapping.
So let's fix this by returning NULL from efi_call_phys_prolog() on memory allocation failures only, and by handling this condition in the caller. Also, clean up any half baked sets of page tables that we may have created before returning with a NULL return value.
Note that any failure at this level will trigger a panic() two levels up, so none of this makes a huge difference, but it is a nice cleanup nonetheless.
[ardb: update commit log, add efi_call_phys_epilog() call on error path]
--- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 2 ++ arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 9 ++++++--- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c +2 -0
@@ -86,6 +86,8 @@ static efi_status_t __init phys_efi_set_virtual_address_map(pgd_t *save_pgd; save_pgd =efi_call_phys_prolog (); +if (!save_pgd) +return EFI_ABORTED ;/* Disable interrupts around EFI calls: */ local_irq_save (flags);
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c +6 -3
@@ -84,13 +84,15 @@ pgd_t * __init efi_call_phys_prolog(void)if (!efi_enabled (EFI_OLD_MEMMAP )) {efi_switch_mm (&efi_mm); -return NULL ; +return efi_mm.pgd; }early_code_mapping_set_exec (1 ); n_pgds =DIV_ROUND_UP ((max_pfn <<PAGE_SHIFT ),PGDIR_SIZE ); save_pgd =kmalloc_array (n_pgds,sizeof (*save_pgd),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!save_pgd) +return NULL ;/* * Build 1:1 identity mapping for efi=old_map usage. Note that
@@ -138,10 +140,11 @@ pgd_t * __init efi_call_phys_prolog(void)pgd_offset_k (pgd *PGDIR_SIZE )->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX; } -out:__flush_tlb_all (); -return save_pgd; +out: +efi_call_phys_epilog (save_pgd); +return NULL ; }void __init efi_call_phys_epilog (pgd_t *save_pgd)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 26/49 i2c: dev: fix potential memory leak in i2cdev_ioctl_rdwr
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Yingjoe Chen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a0692f0eef91354b62c2b4c94954536536be5425 ]
If I2C_M_RECV_LEN check failed, msgs[i].buf allocated by memdup_user will not be freed. Pump index up so it will be freed.
--- drivers/i2c/i2c-dev.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/i2c/i2c-dev.c +1 -0
@@ -283,6 +283,7 @@ static noinline int i2cdev_ioctl_rdwr(struct i2c_client *client, msgs[i].len < 1 || msgs[i].buf[0] < 1 || msgs[i].len < msgs[i].buf[0] + I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX) { + i++; res = -EINVAL ;break ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 27/49 i2c: mlxcpld: Fix wrong initialization order in probe
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Vadim Pasternak <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 13067ef73f337336e3149f5bb9f3fd05fe7f87a0 ]
Fix wrong order in probing routine initialization - field base_addr' is used before it's initialized. Move assignment of 'priv->base_addr to the beginning, prior the call to mlxcpld_i2c_read_comm(). Wrong order caused the first read of capability register to be executed at wrong offset 0x0 instead of 0x2000. By chance it was a "good garbage" at 0x0 offset.
--- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-mlxcpld.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-mlxcpld.c +1 -1
@@ -503,6 +503,7 @@ static int mlxcpld_i2c_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)platform_set_drvdata (pdev, priv); priv->dev = &pdev->dev; + priv->base_addr =MLXPLAT_CPLD_LPC_I2C_BASE_ADDR ;/* Register with i2c layer */ mlxcpld_i2c_adapter.timeout =usecs_to_jiffies (MLXCPLD_I2C_XFER_TO );
@@ -518,7 +519,6 @@ static int mlxcpld_i2c_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) mlxcpld_i2c_adapter.nr = pdev->id; priv->adap = mlxcpld_i2c_adapter; priv->adap.dev.parent = &pdev->dev; - priv->base_addr =MLXPLAT_CPLD_LPC_I2C_BASE_ADDR ;i2c_set_adapdata (&priv->adap, priv); err =i2c_add_numbered_adapter (&priv->adap);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 33/49 ia64: fix build errors by exporting paddr_to_nid()
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9a626c4a6326da4433a0d4d4a8a7d1571caf1ed3 ]
Fix build errors on ia64 when DISCONTIGMEM=y and NUMA=y by exporting paddr_to_nid().
Fixes these build errors:
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [sound/core/snd-pcm.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [net/sunrpc/sunrpc.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [fs/cifs/cifs.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/video/fbdev/core/fb.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/usb/mon/usbmon.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/usb/core/usbcore.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/md/raid1.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/md/dm-mod.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/md/dm-crypt.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/md/dm-bufio.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/ide/ide-core.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/ide/ide-cd_mod.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/gpu/drm/drm.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/char/agp/agpgart.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/block/nbd.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/block/loop.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/block/brd.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [crypto/ccm.ko] undefined!
--- arch/ia64/mm/numa.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/ia64/mm/numa.c +1 -0
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ paddr_to_nid(unsigned long paddr)return (i < num_node_memblks) ? node_memblk[i].nid : (num_node_memblks ?-1 :0 ); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL (paddr_to_nid);#if defined(CONFIG_SPARSEMEM ) && defined(CONFIG_NUMA )/*
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 36/49 KVM: PPC: Book3S: Use new mutex to synchronize access to rtas token list
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1659e27d2bc1ef47b6d031abe01b467f18cb72d9 ]
Currently the Book 3S KVM code uses kvm->lock to synchronize access to the kvm->arch.rtas_tokens list. Because this list is scanned inside kvmppc_rtas_hcall(), which is called with the vcpu mutex held, taking kvm->lock cause a lock inversion problem, which could lead to a deadlock.
To fix this, we add a new mutex, kvm->arch.rtas_token_lock, which nests inside the vcpu mutexes, and use that instead of kvm->lock when accessing the rtas token list.
This removes the lockdep_assert_held() in kvmppc_rtas_tokens_free(). At this point we don't hold the new mutex, but that is OK because kvmppc_rtas_tokens_free() is only called when the whole VM is being destroyed, and at that point nothing can be looking up a token in the list.
--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 + arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s.c | 1 + arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_rtas.c | 14 ++++++-------- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -0
@@ -299,6 +299,7 @@ struct kvm_arch {#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 struct list_head spapr_tce_tables;struct list_head rtas_tokens; +struct mutex rtas_token_lock;DECLARE_BITMAP (enabled_hcalls,MAX_HCALL_OPCODE /4 +1 );#endif #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_MPIC
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s.c +1 -0
@@ -840,6 +840,7 @@ int kvmppc_core_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm)#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64 INIT_LIST_HEAD_RCU (&kvm->arch.spapr_tce_tables);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&kvm->arch.rtas_tokens); +mutex_init (&kvm->arch.rtas_token_lock);#endif return kvm->arch.kvm_ops->init_vm (kvm);
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_rtas.c +6 -8
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ static int rtas_token_undefine(struct kvm *kvm, char *name) {struct rtas_token_definition *d, *tmp; -lockdep_assert_held (&kvm->lock); +lockdep_assert_held (&kvm->arch.rtas_token_lock);list_for_each_entry_safe (d, tmp, &kvm->arch.rtas_tokens, list) {if (rtas_name_matches (d->handler->name, name)) {
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ static int rtas_token_define(struct kvm *kvm, char *name, u64 token)bool found;int i; -lockdep_assert_held (&kvm->lock); +lockdep_assert_held (&kvm->arch.rtas_token_lock);list_for_each_entry (d, &kvm->arch.rtas_tokens, list) {if (d->token = token)
@@ -206,14 +206,14 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_rtas_define_token(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)if (copy_from_user (&args, argp,sizeof (args)))return -EFAULT ; -mutex_lock (&kvm->lock); +mutex_lock (&kvm->arch.rtas_token_lock);if (args.token) rc =rtas_token_define (kvm, args.name, args.token);else rc =rtas_token_undefine (kvm, args.name); -mutex_unlock (&kvm->lock); +mutex_unlock (&kvm->arch.rtas_token_lock);return rc; }
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ int kvmppc_rtas_hcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) orig_rets = args.rets; args.rets = &args.args[be32_to_cpu (args.nargs)]; -mutex_lock (&vcpu->kvm->lock); +mutex_lock (&vcpu->kvm->arch.rtas_token_lock); rc = -ENOENT ;list_for_each_entry (d, &vcpu->kvm->arch.rtas_tokens, list) {
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ int kvmppc_rtas_hcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) } } -mutex_unlock (&vcpu->kvm->lock); +mutex_unlock (&vcpu->kvm->arch.rtas_token_lock);if (rc =0 ) { args.rets = orig_rets;
@@ -282,8 +282,6 @@ void kvmppc_rtas_tokens_free(struct kvm *kvm) {struct rtas_token_definition *d, *tmp; -lockdep_assert_held (&kvm->lock); -list_for_each_entry_safe (d, tmp, &kvm->arch.rtas_tokens, list) {list_del (&d->list);kfree (d);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 37/49 KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Don't take kvm->lock around kvm_for_each_vcpu
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5a3f49364c3ffa1107bd88f8292406e98c5d206c ]
Currently the HV KVM code takes the kvm->lock around calls to kvm_for_each_vcpu() and kvm_get_vcpu_by_id() (which can call kvm_for_each_vcpu() internally). However, that leads to a lock order inversion problem, because these are called in contexts where the vcpu mutex is held, but the vcpu mutexes nest within kvm->lock according to Documentation/virtual/kvm/locking.txt. Hence there is a possibility of deadlock.
To fix this, we simply don't take the kvm->lock mutex around these calls. This is safe because the implementations of kvm_for_each_vcpu() and kvm_get_vcpu_by_id() have been designed to be able to be called locklessly.
--- arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c | 9 +-------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c +1 -8
@@ -426,12 +426,7 @@ static void kvmppc_dump_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)static struct kvm_vcpu *kvmppc_find_vcpu (struct kvm *kvm,int id) { -struct kvm_vcpu *ret; - -mutex_lock (&kvm->lock); - ret =kvm_get_vcpu_by_id (kvm, id); -mutex_unlock (&kvm->lock); -return ret; +return kvm_get_vcpu_by_id (kvm, id); }static void init_vpa (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct lppaca *vpa)
@@ -1309,7 +1304,6 @@ static void kvmppc_set_lpcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 new_lpcr,struct kvmppc_vcore *vc = vcpu->arch.vcore;u64 mask; -mutex_lock (&kvm->lock);spin_lock (&vc->lock);/* * If ILE (interrupt little-endian) has changed, update the
@@ -1349,7 +1343,6 @@ static void kvmppc_set_lpcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 new_lpcr, mask &=0xFFFFFFFF ; vc->lpcr = (vc->lpcr & ~mask) | (new_lpcr & mask);spin_unlock (&vc->lock); -mutex_unlock (&kvm->lock); } static int kvmppc_get_one_reg_hv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 id,
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 1/49 iio: dac: ds4422/ds4424 fix chip verification
From: Ruslan Babayev <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 60f2208699ec08ff9fdf1f97639a661a92a18f1c ]
The ds4424_get_value function takes channel number as it's 3rd argument and translates it internally into I2C address using DS4424_DAC_ADDR macro. The caller ds4424_verify_chip was passing an already translated I2C address as its last argument.
--- drivers/iio/dac/ds4424.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iio/dac/ds4424.c +1 -1
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ static int ds4424_verify_chip(struct iio_dev *indio_dev) {int ret, val; - ret =ds4424_get_value (indio_dev, &val,DS4424_DAC_ADDR (0 )); + ret =ds4424_get_value (indio_dev, &val,0 );if (ret <0 )dev_err (&indio_dev->dev,"%s failed. ret: %d\n" , __func__, ret);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 2/49 iio: adc: ti-ads8688: fix timestamp is not updated in buffer
From: Sean Nyekjaer <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e6d12298310fa1dc11f1d747e05b168016057fdd ]
When using the hrtimer iio trigger timestamp isn't updated. If we use iio_get_time_ns it is updated correctly.
--- drivers/iio/adc/ti-ads8688.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iio/adc/ti-ads8688.c +1 -1
@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ static irqreturn_t ads8688_trigger_handler(int irq, void *p) }iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp (indio_dev, buffer, - pf->timestamp); +iio_get_time_ns (indio_dev));iio_trigger_notify_done (indio_dev->trig);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 4/49 perf/x86/intel/ds: Fix EVENT vs. UEVENT PEBS constraints
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 23e3983a466cd540ffdd2bbc6e0c51e31934f941 ]
This patch fixes an bug revealed by the following commit:
6b89d4c1ae85 ("perf/x86/intel: Fix INTEL_FLAGS_EVENT_CONSTRAINT* masking")
That patch modified INTEL_FLAGS_EVENT_CONSTRAINT() to only look at the event code when matching a constraint. If code+umask were needed, then the INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT() macro was needed instead.
This broke with some of the constraints for PEBS events.
Several of them, including the one used for cycles:p, cycles:pp, cycles:ppp fell in that category and caused the event to be rejected in PEBS mode. In other words, on some platforms a cmdline such as:
$ perf top -e cycles:pp
would fail with -EINVAL.
This patch fixes this bug by properly using INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT() when needed in the PEBS constraint tables.
--- arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c | 28 ++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c +14 -14
@@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ struct event_constraint intel_core2_pebs_event_constraints[] = {INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x1fc7 ,0x1 ),/* SIMD_INST_RETURED.ANY */ INTEL_FLAGS_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xcb ,0x1 ),/* MEM_LOAD_RETIRED.* */ /* INST_RETIRED.ANY_P, inv=1, cmask=16 (cycles:p). */ -INTEL_FLAGS_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108000c0 ,0x01 ), +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108000c0 ,0x01 ), EVENT_CONSTRAINT_END };
@@ -693,7 +693,7 @@ struct event_constraint intel_atom_pebs_event_constraints[] = {INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x00c5 ,0x1 ),/* MISPREDICTED_BRANCH_RETIRED */ INTEL_FLAGS_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xcb ,0x1 ),/* MEM_LOAD_RETIRED.* */ /* INST_RETIRED.ANY_P, inv=1, cmask=16 (cycles:p). */ -INTEL_FLAGS_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108000c0 ,0x01 ), +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108000c0 ,0x01 ),/* Allow all events as PEBS with no flags */ INTEL_ALL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0 ,0x1 ),EVENT_CONSTRAINT_END
@@ -701,7 +701,7 @@ struct event_constraint intel_atom_pebs_event_constraints[] = {struct event_constraint intel_slm_pebs_event_constraints[] = {/* INST_RETIRED.ANY_P, inv=1, cmask=16 (cycles:p). */ -INTEL_FLAGS_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108000c0 ,0x1 ), +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108000c0 ,0x1 ),/* Allow all events as PEBS with no flags */ INTEL_ALL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0 ,0x1 ),EVENT_CONSTRAINT_END
@@ -726,7 +726,7 @@ struct event_constraint intel_nehalem_pebs_event_constraints[] = {INTEL_FLAGS_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xcb ,0xf ),/* MEM_LOAD_RETIRED.* */ INTEL_FLAGS_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xf7 ,0xf ),/* FP_ASSIST.* */ /* INST_RETIRED.ANY_P, inv=1, cmask=16 (cycles:p). */ -INTEL_FLAGS_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108000c0 ,0x0f ), +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108000c0 ,0x0f ), EVENT_CONSTRAINT_END };
@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ struct event_constraint intel_westmere_pebs_event_constraints[] = {INTEL_FLAGS_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xcb ,0xf ),/* MEM_LOAD_RETIRED.* */ INTEL_FLAGS_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xf7 ,0xf ),/* FP_ASSIST.* */ /* INST_RETIRED.ANY_P, inv=1, cmask=16 (cycles:p). */ -INTEL_FLAGS_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108000c0 ,0x0f ), +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108000c0 ,0x0f ), EVENT_CONSTRAINT_END };
@@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ struct event_constraint intel_snb_pebs_event_constraints[] = {INTEL_PLD_CONSTRAINT (0x01cd ,0x8 ),/* MEM_TRANS_RETIRED.LAT_ABOVE_THR */ INTEL_PST_CONSTRAINT (0x02cd ,0x8 ),/* MEM_TRANS_RETIRED.PRECISE_STORES */ /* UOPS_RETIRED.ALL, inv=1, cmask=16 (cycles:p). */ -INTEL_FLAGS_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108001c2 ,0xf ), +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108001c2 ,0xf ),INTEL_EXCLEVT_CONSTRAINT (0xd0 ,0xf ),/* MEM_UOP_RETIRED.* */ INTEL_EXCLEVT_CONSTRAINT (0xd1 ,0xf ),/* MEM_LOAD_UOPS_RETIRED.* */ INTEL_EXCLEVT_CONSTRAINT(0xd2, 0xf), /* MEM_LOAD_UOPS_LLC_HIT_RETIRED.* */
@@ -767,9 +767,9 @@ struct event_constraint intel_ivb_pebs_event_constraints[] = {INTEL_PLD_CONSTRAINT (0x01cd ,0x8 ),/* MEM_TRANS_RETIRED.LAT_ABOVE_THR */ INTEL_PST_CONSTRAINT (0x02cd ,0x8 ),/* MEM_TRANS_RETIRED.PRECISE_STORES */ /* UOPS_RETIRED.ALL, inv=1, cmask=16 (cycles:p). */ -INTEL_FLAGS_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108001c2 ,0xf ), +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108001c2 ,0xf ),/* INST_RETIRED.PREC_DIST, inv=1, cmask=16 (cycles:ppp). */ -INTEL_FLAGS_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108001c0 ,0x2 ), +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108001c0 ,0x2 ),INTEL_EXCLEVT_CONSTRAINT (0xd0 ,0xf ),/* MEM_UOP_RETIRED.* */ INTEL_EXCLEVT_CONSTRAINT (0xd1 ,0xf ),/* MEM_LOAD_UOPS_RETIRED.* */ INTEL_EXCLEVT_CONSTRAINT(0xd2, 0xf), /* MEM_LOAD_UOPS_LLC_HIT_RETIRED.* */
@@ -783,9 +783,9 @@ struct event_constraint intel_hsw_pebs_event_constraints[] = {INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x01c0 ,0x2 ),/* INST_RETIRED.PRECDIST */ INTEL_PLD_CONSTRAINT (0x01cd ,0xf ),/* MEM_TRANS_RETIRED.* */ /* UOPS_RETIRED.ALL, inv=1, cmask=16 (cycles:p). */ -INTEL_FLAGS_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108001c2 ,0xf ), +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108001c2 ,0xf ),/* INST_RETIRED.PREC_DIST, inv=1, cmask=16 (cycles:ppp). */ -INTEL_FLAGS_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108001c0 ,0x2 ), +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108001c0 ,0x2 ),INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT_DATALA_NA (0x01c2 ,0xf ),/* UOPS_RETIRED.ALL */ INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT_DATALA_XLD (0x11d0 ,0xf ),/* MEM_UOPS_RETIRED.STLB_MISS_LOADS */ INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT_DATALA_XLD(0x21d0, 0xf), /* MEM_UOPS_RETIRED.LOCK_LOADS */
@@ -806,9 +806,9 @@ struct event_constraint intel_bdw_pebs_event_constraints[] = {INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x01c0 ,0x2 ),/* INST_RETIRED.PRECDIST */ INTEL_PLD_CONSTRAINT (0x01cd ,0xf ),/* MEM_TRANS_RETIRED.* */ /* UOPS_RETIRED.ALL, inv=1, cmask=16 (cycles:p). */ -INTEL_FLAGS_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108001c2 ,0xf ), +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108001c2 ,0xf ),/* INST_RETIRED.PREC_DIST, inv=1, cmask=16 (cycles:ppp). */ -INTEL_FLAGS_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108001c0 ,0x2 ), +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108001c0 ,0x2 ),INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT_DATALA_NA (0x01c2 ,0xf ),/* UOPS_RETIRED.ALL */ INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT_DATALA_LD (0x11d0 ,0xf ),/* MEM_UOPS_RETIRED.STLB_MISS_LOADS */ INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT_DATALA_LD(0x21d0, 0xf), /* MEM_UOPS_RETIRED.LOCK_LOADS */
@@ -829,9 +829,9 @@ struct event_constraint intel_bdw_pebs_event_constraints[] = {struct event_constraint intel_skl_pebs_event_constraints[] = {INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x1c0 ,0x2 ),/* INST_RETIRED.PREC_DIST */ /* INST_RETIRED.PREC_DIST, inv=1, cmask=16 (cycles:ppp). */ -INTEL_FLAGS_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108001c0 ,0x2 ), +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108001c0 ,0x2 ),/* INST_RETIRED.TOTAL_CYCLES_PS (inv=1, cmask=16) (cycles:p). */ -INTEL_FLAGS_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108000c0 ,0x0f ), +INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x108000c0 ,0x0f ),INTEL_PLD_CONSTRAINT (0x1cd ,0xf ),/* MEM_TRANS_RETIRED.* */ INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT_DATALA_LD (0x11d0 ,0xf ),/* MEM_INST_RETIRED.STLB_MISS_LOADS */ INTEL_FLAGS_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT_DATALA_ST (0x12d0 ,0xf ),/* MEM_INST_RETIRED.STLB_MISS_STORES */
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 3/49 Staging: vc04_services: Fix a couple error codes
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ca4e4efbefbbdde0a7bb3023ea08d491f4daf9b9 ]
These are accidentally returning positive EINVAL instead of negative -EINVAL. Some of the callers treat positive values as success.
--- drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/controls.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/controls.c +2 -2
@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ static int ctrl_set_image_effect(struct bm2835_mmal_dev *dev, dev->colourfx.enable ?"true" :"false" , dev->colourfx.u, dev->colourfx.v, ret, (ret == 0 ? 0 : -EINVAL)); -return (ret ==0 ?0 :EINVAL ); +return (ret ==0 ?0 : -EINVAL ); } static int ctrl_set_colfx(struct bm2835_mmal_dev *dev,
@@ -600,7 +600,7 @@ static int ctrl_set_colfx(struct bm2835_mmal_dev *dev,"%s: After: mmal_ctrl:%p ctrl id:0x%x ctrl val:%d ret %d(%d)\n" , __func__, mmal_ctrl, ctrl->id, ctrl->val, ret, (ret == 0 ? 0 : -EINVAL)); -return (ret ==0 ?0 :EINVAL ); +return (ret ==0 ?0 : -EINVAL ); } static int ctrl_set_bitrate(struct bm2835_mmal_dev *dev,
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 5/49 netfilter: nf_queue: fix reinject verdict handling
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Jagdish Motwani <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 946c0d8e6ed43dae6527e878d0077c1e11015db0 ]
This patch fixes netfilter hook traversal when there are more than 1 hooks returning NF_QUEUE verdict. When the first queue reinjects the packet, 'nf_reinject' starts traversing hooks with a proper hook_index. However, if it again receives a NF_QUEUE verdict (by some other netfilter hook), it queues the packet with a wrong hook_index. So, when the second queue reinjects the packet, it re-executes hooks in between.
--- net/netfilter/nf_queue.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/netfilter/nf_queue.c +1 -0
@@ -238,6 +238,7 @@ static unsigned int nf_iterate(struct sk_buff *skb, repeat: verdict =nf_hook_entry_hookfn (hook, skb, state);if (verdict !=NF_ACCEPT ) { + *index = i;if (verdict !=NF_REPEAT )return verdict; goto repeat;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 10/49 usb: xhci: Fix a potential null pointer dereference in xhci_debugfs_create_endpoint()
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Jia-Ju Bai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5bce256f0b528624a34fe907db385133bb7be33e ]
In xhci_debugfs_create_slot(), kzalloc() can fail and dev->debugfs_private will be NULL.
In xhci_debugfs_create_endpoint(), dev->debugfs_private is used without any null-pointer check, and can cause a null pointer dereference.
To fix this bug, a null-pointer check is added inxhci_debugfs_create_endpoint().
This bug is found by a runtime fuzzing tool named FIZZER written by us.
--- drivers/usb/host/xhci-debugfs.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/host/xhci-debugfs.c +3 -0
@@ -440,6 +440,9 @@ void xhci_debugfs_create_endpoint(struct xhci_hcd *xhci,struct xhci_ep_priv *epriv;struct xhci_slot_priv *spriv = dev->debugfs_private; +if (!spriv) +return ; +if (spriv->eps[ep_index])return ;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 14/49 perf/ring_buffer: Add ordering to rb->nest increment
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3f9fbe9bd86c534eba2faf5d840fd44c6049f50e ]
Similar to how decrementing rb->next too early can cause data_head to (temporarily) be observed to go backward, so too can this happen when we increment too late.
This barrier() ensures the rb->head load happens after the increment, both the one in the 'goto again' path, as the one from perf_output_get_handle() -- albeit very unlikely to matter for the latter.
--- kernel/events/ring_buffer.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
kernel/events/ring_buffer.c +9 -0
@@ -49,6 +49,15 @@ static void perf_output_put_handle(struct perf_output_handle *handle)unsigned long head; again: +/* +* In order to avoid publishing a head value that goes backwards, +* we must ensure the load of @rb->head happens after we've +* incremented @rb->nest. +* +* Otherwise we can observe a @rb->head value before one published +* by an IRQ/NMI happening between the load and the increment. +*/ +barrier (); head =local_read (&rb->head);/*
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 12/49 x86/CPU/AMD: Don't force the CPB cap when running under a hypervisor
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Frank van der Linden <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2ac44ab608705948564791ce1d15d43ba81a1e38 ]
For F17h AMD CPUs, the CPB capability ('Core Performance Boost') is forcibly set, because some versions of that chip incorrectly report that they do not have it.
However, a hypervisor may filter out the CPB capability, for good reasons. For example, KVM currently does not emulate setting the CPB bit in MSR_K7_HWCR, and unchecked MSR access errors will be thrown when trying to set it as a guest:
unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0xc0010015 (tried to write 0x0000000001000011) at rIP: 0xffffffff890638f4 (native_write_msr+0x4/0x20) Call Trace: boost_set_msr+0x50/0x80 [acpi_cpufreq] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x86/0x560 sort_range+0x20/0x20 cpuhp_thread_fun+0xb0/0x110 smpboot_thread_fn+0xef/0x160 kthread+0x113/0x130 kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
To avoid this issue, don't forcibly set the CPB capability for a CPU when running under a hypervisor.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +5 -2
@@ -819,8 +819,11 @@ static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {set_cpu_cap (c,X86_FEATURE_ZEN ); -/* Fix erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID. */ -if (!cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_CPB )) +/* +* Fix erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID. +* Always set it, except when running under a hypervisor. +*/ +if (!cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR ) && !cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_CPB ))set_cpu_cap (c,X86_FEATURE_CPB ); }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 13/49 perf/ring_buffer: Fix exposing a temporarily decreased data_head
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Yabin Cui <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1b038c6e05ff70a1e66e3e571c2e6106bdb75f53 ]
In perf_output_put_handle(), an IRQ/NMI can happen in below location and write records to the same ring buffer:
... local_dec_and_test(&rb->nest) ... <-- an IRQ/NMI can happen here rb->user_page->data_head = head; ...
In this case, a value A is written to data_head in the IRQ, then a value B is written to data_head after the IRQ. And A > B. As a result, data_head is temporarily decreased from A to B. And a reader may see data_head < data_tail if it read the buffer frequently enough, which creates unexpected behaviors.
This can be fixed by moving dec(&rb->nest) to after updating data_head, which prevents the IRQ/NMI above from updating data_head.
[ Split up by peterz. ]
--- kernel/events/ring_buffer.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
kernel/events/ring_buffer.c +20 -4
@@ -52,11 +52,18 @@ static void perf_output_put_handle(struct perf_output_handle *handle) head =local_read (&rb->head);/* -* IRQ/NMI can happen here, which means we can miss a head update. +* IRQ/NMI can happen here and advance @rb->head, causing our +* load above to be stale. */ -if (!local_dec_and_test (&rb->nest)) +/* +* If this isn't the outermost nesting, we don't have to update +* @rb->user_page->data_head. +*/ +if (local_read (&rb->nest) >1 ) { +local_dec (&rb->nest); goto out; + }/* * Since the mmap() consumer (userspace) can run on a different CPU:
@@ -88,9 +95,18 @@ static void perf_output_put_handle(struct perf_output_handle *handle) rb->user_page->data_head = head;/* -* Now check if we missed an update -- rely on previous implied -* compiler barriers to force a re-read. +* We must publish the head before decrementing the nest count, +* otherwise an IRQ/NMI can publish a more recent head value and our +* write will (temporarily) publish a stale value. +*/ +barrier (); +local_set (&rb->nest,0 ); + +/* +* Ensure we decrement @rb->nest before we validate the @rb->head. +* Otherwise we cannot be sure we caught the 'last' nested update. */ +barrier ();if (unlikely (head !=local_read (&rb->head))) {local_inc (&rb->nest); goto again;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 18/49 net: stmmac: update rx tail pointer register to fix rx dma hang issue.
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Biao Huang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4523a5611526709ec9b4e2574f1bb7818212651e ]
Currently we will not update the receive descriptor tail pointer in stmmac_rx_refill. Rx dma will think no available descriptors and stop once received packets exceed DMA_RX_SIZE, so that the rx only test will fail.
Update the receive tail pointer in stmmac_rx_refill to add more descriptors to the rx channel, so packets can be received continually
--- drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c +1 -0
@@ -3319,6 +3319,7 @@ static inline void stmmac_rx_refill(struct stmmac_priv *priv, u32 queue) entry =STMMAC_GET_ENTRY (entry,DMA_RX_SIZE ); } rx_q->dirty_rx = entry; +stmmac_set_rx_tail_ptr (priv, priv->ioaddr, rx_q->rx_tail_addr, queue); }/**
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 23/49 drm/etnaviv: lock MMU while dumping core
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Lucas Stach <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1396500d673bd027683a0609ff84dca7eb6ea2e7 ]
The devcoredump needs to operate on a stable state of the MMU while it is writing the MMU state to the coredump. The missing lock allowed both the userspace submit, as well as the GPU job finish paths to mutate the MMU state while a coredump is under way.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/etnaviv/etnaviv_dump.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/etnaviv/etnaviv_dump.c +5 -0
@@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ void etnaviv_core_dump(struct etnaviv_gpu *gpu)return ; etnaviv_dump_core = false; +mutex_lock (&gpu->mmu->lock); + mmu_size =etnaviv_iommu_dump_size (gpu->mmu);/* We always dump registers, mmu, ring and end marker */
@@ -166,6 +168,7 @@ void etnaviv_core_dump(struct etnaviv_gpu *gpu) iter.start =__vmalloc (file_size,GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_NORETRY,PAGE_KERNEL );if (!iter.start) { +mutex_unlock (&gpu->mmu->lock);dev_warn (gpu->dev,"failed to allocate devcoredump file\n" );return ; }
@@ -233,6 +236,8 @@ void etnaviv_core_dump(struct etnaviv_gpu *gpu) obj->base.size); } +mutex_unlock (&gpu->mmu->lock); +etnaviv_core_dump_header (&iter,ETDUMP_BUF_END , iter.data);dev_coredumpv (gpu->dev, iter.start, iter.data - iter.start,GFP_KERNEL );
Signature · 6 lines
2.20.1 _______________________________________________ dri-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 24/49 net: aquantia: tx clean budget logic error
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Igor Russkikh <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 31bafc49a7736989e4c2d9f7280002c66536e590 ]
In case no other traffic happening on the ring, full tx cleanup may not be completed. That may cause socket buffer to overflow and tx traffic to stuck until next activity on the ring happens.
This is due to logic error in budget variable decrementor. Variable is compared with zero, and then post decremented, causing it to become MAX_INT. Solution is remove decrementor from the for statement and rewrite it in a clear way.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/aquantia/atlantic/aq_ring.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/aquantia/atlantic/aq_ring.c +4 -3
@@ -139,10 +139,10 @@ void aq_ring_queue_stop(struct aq_ring_s *ring)bool aq_ring_tx_clean (struct aq_ring_s *self) {struct device *dev =aq_nic_get_dev (self->aq_nic); -unsigned int budget =AQ_CFG_TX_CLEAN_BUDGET ; +unsigned int budget; -for (; self->sw_head != self->hw_head && budget--; - self->sw_head =aq_ring_next_dx (self, self->sw_head)) { +for (budget =AQ_CFG_TX_CLEAN_BUDGET ; + budget && self->sw_head != self->hw_head; budget--) {struct aq_ring_buff_s *buff = &self->buff_ring[self->sw_head];if (likely (buff->is_mapped)) {
@@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ bool aq_ring_tx_clean(struct aq_ring_s *self) buff->pa =0U ; buff->eop_index =0xffffU ; + self->sw_head =aq_ring_next_dx (self, self->sw_head); }return !!budget;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 25/49 net: aquantia: fix LRO with FCS error
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Dmitry Bogdanov <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit eaeb3b7494ba9159323814a8ce8af06a9277d99b ]
Driver stops producing skbs on ring if a packet with FCS error was coalesced into LRO session. Ring gets hang forever.
Thats a logical error in driver processing descriptors:
When rx_stat indicates MAC Error, next pointer and eop flags are not filled. This confuses driver so it waits for descriptor 0 to be filled by HW.
Solution is fill next pointer and eop flag even for packets with FCS error.
--- .../aquantia/atlantic/hw_atl/hw_atl_b0.c | 61 ++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/aquantia/atlantic/hw_atl/hw_atl_b0.c +32 -29
@@ -695,38 +695,41 @@ static int hw_atl_b0_hw_ring_rx_receive(struct aq_hw_s *self,if ((rx_stat &BIT (0 )) || rxd_wb->type &0x1000U ) {/* MAC error or DMA error */ buff->is_error =1U ; - }else { -if (self->aq_nic_cfg->is_rss) { -/* last 4 byte */ -u16 rss_type = rxd_wb->type &0xFU ; - -if (rss_type && rss_type <0x8U ) { - buff->is_hash_l4 = (rss_type ==0x4 || - rss_type ==0x5 ); - buff->rss_hash = rxd_wb->rss_hash; - } + } +if (self->aq_nic_cfg->is_rss) { +/* last 4 byte */ +u16 rss_type = rxd_wb->type &0xFU ; + +if (rss_type && rss_type <0x8U ) { + buff->is_hash_l4 = (rss_type ==0x4 || + rss_type ==0x5 ); + buff->rss_hash = rxd_wb->rss_hash; } + } -if (HW_ATL_B0_RXD_WB_STAT2_EOP & rxd_wb->status) { - buff->len = rxd_wb->pkt_len % -AQ_CFG_RX_FRAME_MAX ; - buff->len = buff->len ? - buff->len :AQ_CFG_RX_FRAME_MAX ; - buff->next =0U ; - buff->is_eop =1U ; +if (HW_ATL_B0_RXD_WB_STAT2_EOP & rxd_wb->status) { + buff->len = rxd_wb->pkt_len % +AQ_CFG_RX_FRAME_MAX ; + buff->len = buff->len ? + buff->len :AQ_CFG_RX_FRAME_MAX ; + buff->next =0U ; + buff->is_eop =1U ; + }else { + buff->len = + rxd_wb->pkt_len >AQ_CFG_RX_FRAME_MAX ? +AQ_CFG_RX_FRAME_MAX : rxd_wb->pkt_len; + +if (HW_ATL_B0_RXD_WB_STAT2_RSCCNT & + rxd_wb->status) { +/* LRO */ + buff->next = rxd_wb->next_desc_ptr; + ++ring->stats.rx.lro_packets; }else { -if (HW_ATL_B0_RXD_WB_STAT2_RSCCNT & - rxd_wb->status) { -/* LRO */ - buff->next = rxd_wb->next_desc_ptr; - ++ring->stats.rx.lro_packets; - }else { -/* jumbo */ - buff->next = -aq_ring_next_dx (ring, - ring->hw_head); - ++ring->stats.rx.jumbo_packets; - } +/* jumbo */ + buff->next = +aq_ring_next_dx (ring, + ring->hw_head); + ++ring->stats.rx.jumbo_packets; } } }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 28/49 ALSA: hda - Force polling mode on CNL for fixing codec communication
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Bard Liao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fa763f1b2858752e6150ffff46886a1b7faffc82 ]
We observed the same issue as reported by commit a8d7bde23e7130686b7662 ("ALSA: hda - Force polling mode on CFL for fixing codec communication") We don't have a better solution. So apply the same workaround to CNL.
--- sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c +3 -2
@@ -378,6 +378,7 @@ enum {#define IS_BXT (pci) ((pci)->vendor == 0x8086 && (pci)->device == 0x5a98)#define IS_CFL (pci) ((pci)->vendor == 0x8086 && (pci)->device == 0xa348) +#define IS_CNL (pci) ((pci)->vendor == 0x8086 && (pci)->device == 0x9dc8)static char *driver_short_names[] = { [AZX_DRIVER_ICH ] ="HDA Intel" ,
@@ -1795,8 +1796,8 @@ static int azx_create(struct snd_card *card, struct pci_dev *pci,else chip->bdl_pos_adj = bdl_pos_adj[dev]; -/* Workaround for a communication error on CFL (bko#199007) */ -if (IS_CFL (pci)) +/* Workaround for a communication error on CFL (bko#199007) and CNL */ +if (IS_CFL (pci) ||IS_CNL (pci)) chip->polling_mode =1 ; err =azx_bus_init (chip, model[dev], &pci_hda_io_ops);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 29/49 configfs: Fix use-after-free when accessing sd->s_dentry
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Sahitya Tummala <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f6122ed2a4f9c9c1c073ddf6308d1b2ac10e0781 ]
In the vfs_statx() context, during path lookup, the dentry gets added to sd->s_dentry via configfs_attach_attr(). In the end, vfs_statx() kills the dentry by calling path_put(), which invokes configfs_d_iput(). Ideally, this dentry must be removed from sd->s_dentry but it doesn't if the sd->s_count >= 3. As a result, sd->s_dentry is holding reference to a stale dentry pointer whose memory is already freed up. This results in use-after-free issue, when this stale sd->s_dentry is accessed later in configfs_readdir() path.
This issue can be easily reproduced, by running the LTP test case - sh fs_racer_file_list.sh /config
(https://github.com/linux-test-project/ltp/blob/master/testcases/kernel/fs/racer/fs_racer_file_list.sh)
--- fs/configfs/dir.c | 14 ++++++-------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
fs/configfs/dir.c +6 -8
@@ -58,15 +58,13 @@ static void configfs_d_iput(struct dentry * dentry,if (sd) {/* Coordinate with configfs_readdir */ spin_lock (&configfs_dirent_lock); -/* Coordinate with configfs_attach_attr where will increase -* sd->s_count and update sd->s_dentry to new allocated one. -* Only set sd->dentry to null when this dentry is the only -* sd owner. -* If not do so, configfs_d_iput may run just after -* configfs_attach_attr and set sd->s_dentry to null -* even it's still in use. +/* +* Set sd->s_dentry to null only when this dentry is the one +* that is going to be killed. Otherwise configfs_d_iput may +* run just after configfs_attach_attr and set sd->s_dentry to +* NULL even it's still in use. */ -if (atomic_read (&sd->s_count) <=2 ) +if (sd->s_dentry == dentry) sd->s_dentry =NULL ;spin_unlock (&configfs_dirent_lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 30/49 perf data: Fix 'strncat may truncate' build failure with recent gcc
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Shawn Landden <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 97acec7df172cd1e450f81f5e293c0aa145a2797 ]
This strncat() is safe because the buffer was allocated with zalloc(), however gcc doesn't know that. Since the string always has 4 non-null bytes, just use memcpy() here.
CC /home/shawn/linux/tools/perf/util/data-convert-bt.o
In file included from /usr/include/string.h:494,
from /home/shawn/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.h:27,
from util/data-convert-bt.c:22:
In function ‘strncat’,
inlined from ‘string_set_value’ at util/data-convert-bt.c:274:4:
/usr/include/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/bits/string_fortified.h:136:10: error: ‘__builtin_strncat’ output may be truncated copying 4 bytes from a string of length 4 [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
136 | return __builtin___strncat_chk (__dest, __src, __len, __bos (__dest));
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~LPU-Reference: [email protected]
--- tools/perf/util/data-convert-bt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/perf/util/data-convert-bt.c +1 -1
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static int string_set_value(struct bt_ctf_field *field, const char *string)if (i >0 )strncpy (buffer, string, i); } -strncat (buffer + p, numstr,4 ); +memcpy (buffer + p, numstr,4 ); p +=3 ; } }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 31/49 perf namespace: Protect reading thread's namespace
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6584140ba9e6762dd7ec73795243289b914f31f9 ]
It seems that the current code lacks holding the namespace lock in thread__namespaces(). Otherwise it can see inconsistent results.
--- tools/perf/util/thread.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/thread.c +13 -2
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ void thread__put(struct thread *thread) } } -struct namespaces *thread__namespaces (const struct thread *thread) +static struct namespaces *__thread__namespaces (const struct thread *thread) {if (list_empty (&thread->namespaces_list))return NULL ;
@@ -136,10 +136,21 @@ struct namespaces *thread__namespaces(const struct thread *thread) return list_first_entry(&thread->namespaces_list, struct namespaces, list); } +struct namespaces *thread__namespaces (const struct thread *thread) +{ +struct namespaces *ns; + +down_read ((struct rw_semaphore *)&thread->namespaces_lock); + ns =__thread__namespaces (thread); +up_read ((struct rw_semaphore *)&thread->namespaces_lock); + +return ns; +} +static int __thread__set_namespaces (struct thread *thread,u64 timestamp,struct namespaces_event *event) { -struct namespaces *new, *curr =thread__namespaces (thread); +struct namespaces *new, *curr =__thread__namespaces (thread); new =namespaces__new (event);if (!new)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 32/49 perf record: Fix s390 missing module symbol and warning for non-root users
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Thomas Richter <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6738028dd57df064b969d8392c943ef3b3ae705d ]
Command 'perf record' and 'perf report' on a system without kernel debuginfo packages uses /proc/kallsyms and /proc/modules to find addresses for kernel and module symbols. On x86 this works for root and non-root users.
On s390, when invoked as non-root user, many of the following warnings are shown and module symbols are missing:
proc/{kallsyms,modules} inconsistency while looking for
"[sha1_s390]" module!
Command 'perf record' creates a list of module start addresses by parsing the output of /proc/modules and creates a PERF_RECORD_MMAP record for the kernel and each module. The following function call sequence is executed:
machine__create_kernel_maps
machine__create_module
modules__parse
machine__create_module --> for each line in /proc/modules
arch__fix_module_text_startFunction arch__fix_module_text_start() is s390 specific. It opens file /sys/module/<name>/sections/.text to extract the module's .text section start address. On s390 the module loader prepends a header before the first section, whereas on x86 the module's text section address is identical the the module's load address.
However module section files are root readable only. For non-root the read operation fails and machine__create_module() returns an error. Command perf record does not generate any PERF_RECORD_MMAP record for loaded modules. Later command perf report complains about missing module maps.
To fix this function arch__fix_module_text_start() always returns success. For root users there is no change, for non-root users the module's load address is used as module's text start address (the prepended header then counts as part of the text section).
This enable non-root users to use module symbols and avoid the warning when perf report is executed.
Output before:
[tmricht@m83lp54 perf]$ ./perf report -D | fgrep MMAP 0 0x168 [0x50]: PERF_RECORD_MMAP ... x [kernel.kallsyms]_text
Output after:
[tmricht@m83lp54 perf]$ ./perf report -D | fgrep MMAP
0 0x168 [0x50]: PERF_RECORD_MMAP ... x [kernel.kallsyms]_text 0 0x1b8 [0x98]: PERF_RECORD_MMAP ... x /lib/modules/.../autofs4.ko.xz 0 0x250 [0xa8]: PERF_RECORD_MMAP ... x /lib/modules/.../sha_common.ko.xz 0 0x2f8 [0x98]: PERF_RECORD_MMAP ... x /lib/modules/.../des_generic.ko.xz
--- tools/perf/arch/s390/util/machine.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
tools/perf/arch/s390/util/machine.c +6 -3
@@ -5,16 +5,19 @@#include "util.h" #include "machine.h" #include "api/fs/fs.h" +#include "debug.h" int arch__fix_module_text_start (u64 *start,const char *name) { +u64 m_start = *start;char path[PATH_MAX ];snprintf (path,PATH_MAX ,"module/%.*s/sections/.text" , (int )strlen (name) -2 , name +1 ); - -if (sysfs__read_ull (path, (unsigned long long *)start) <0 ) -return -1 ; +if (sysfs__read_ull (path, (unsigned long long *)start) <0 ) { +pr_debug2 ("Using module %s start:%#lx\n" , path, m_start); + *start = m_start; + }return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 22/49 loop: Don't change loop device under exclusive opener
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 33ec3e53e7b1869d7851e59e126bdb0fe0bd1982 ]
Loop module allows calling LOOP_SET_FD while there are other openers of the loop device. Even exclusive ones. This can lead to weird consequences such as kernel deadlocks like:
mount_bdev() lo_ioctl()
udf_fill_super()
udf_load_vrs()
sb_set_blocksize() - sets desired block size B
udf_tread()
sb_bread()
__bread_gfp(bdev, block, B)
loop_set_fd()
set_blocksize()
- now __getblk_slow() indefinitely loops because B != bdev
block sizeFix the problem by disallowing LOOP_SET_FD ioctl when there are exclusive openers of a loop device.
[Deliberately chosen not to CC stable as a user with priviledges to trigger this race has other means of taking the system down and this has a potential of breaking some weird userspace setup]
--- drivers/block/loop.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/block/loop.c +17 -1
@@ -920,9 +920,20 @@ static int loop_set_fd(struct loop_device *lo, fmode_t mode,if (!file) goto out; +/* +* If we don't hold exclusive handle for the device, upgrade to it +* here to avoid changing device under exclusive owner. +*/ +if (!(mode &FMODE_EXCL )) { +bdgrab (bdev); + error =blkdev_get (bdev, mode |FMODE_EXCL , loop_set_fd); +if (error) + goto out_putf; + } + error =mutex_lock_killable (&loop_ctl_mutex);if (error) - goto out_putf; + goto out_bdev; error = -EBUSY ;if (lo->lo_state != Lo_unbound)
@@ -986,10 +997,15 @@ static int loop_set_fd(struct loop_device *lo, fmode_t mode,mutex_unlock (&loop_ctl_mutex);if (partscan)loop_reread_partitions (lo, bdev); +if (!(mode &FMODE_EXCL )) +blkdev_put (bdev, mode |FMODE_EXCL );return 0 ; out_unlock:mutex_unlock (&loop_ctl_mutex); +out_bdev: +if (!(mode &FMODE_EXCL )) +blkdev_put (bdev, mode |FMODE_EXCL ); out_putf:fput (file); out:
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 21/49 PCI: PM: Avoid possible suspend-to-idle issue
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d491f2b75237ef37d8867830ab7fad8d9659e853 ]
If a PCI driver leaves the device handled by it in D0 and calls pci_save_state() on the device in its ->suspend() or ->suspend_late() callback, it can expect the device to stay in D0 over the whole s2idle cycle. However, that may not be the case if there is a spurious wakeup while the system is suspended, because in that case pci_pm_suspend_noirq() will run again after pci_pm_resume_noirq() which calls pci_restore_state(), via pci_pm_default_resume_early(), so state_saved is cleared and the second iteration of pci_pm_suspend_noirq() will invoke pci_prepare_to_sleep() which may change the power state of the device.
To avoid that, add a new internal flag, skip_bus_pm, that will be set by pci_pm_suspend_noirq() when it runs for the first time during the given system suspend-resume cycle if the state of the device has been saved already and the device is still in D0. Setting that flag will cause the next iterations of pci_pm_suspend_noirq() to set state_saved for pci_pm_resume_noirq(), so that it always restores the device state from the originally saved data, and avoid calling pci_prepare_to_sleep() for the device.
--- drivers/pci/pci-driver.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- include/linux/pci.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/pci/pci-driver.c +16 -1
@@ -734,6 +734,8 @@ static int pci_pm_suspend(struct device *dev)struct pci_dev *pci_dev =to_pci_dev (dev);const struct dev_pm_ops *pm = dev->driver ? dev->driver->pm :NULL ; + pci_dev->skip_bus_pm = false; +if (pci_has_legacy_pm_support (pci_dev))return pci_legacy_suspend (dev,PMSG_SUSPEND );
@@ -827,7 +829,20 @@ static int pci_pm_suspend_noirq(struct device *dev) } } -if (!pci_dev->state_saved) { +if (pci_dev->skip_bus_pm) { +/* +* The function is running for the second time in a row without +* going through full resume, which is possible only during +* suspend-to-idle in a spurious wakeup case. Moreover, the +* device was originally left in D0, so its power state should +* not be changed here and the device register values saved +* originally should be restored on resume again. +*/ + pci_dev->state_saved = true; + }else if (pci_dev->state_saved) { +if (pci_dev->current_state ==PCI_D0 ) + pci_dev->skip_bus_pm = true; + }else {pci_save_state (pci_dev);if (pci_power_manageable (pci_dev))pci_prepare_to_sleep (pci_dev);
include/linux/pci.h +1 -0
@@ -342,6 +342,7 @@ struct pci_dev {D3cold, not set for devices powered on/off by the corresponding bridge */ + unsigned int skip_bus_pm:1; /* Internal: Skip bus-level PM */ unsigned int ignore_hotplug:1; /* Ignore hotplug events */ unsigned int hotplug_user_indicators:1; /* SlotCtl indicatorscontrolled exclusively by
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 34/49 xen/pvcalls: Remove set but not used variable
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 41349672e3cbc2e8349831f21253509c3415aa2b ]
Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning:
drivers/xen/pvcalls-front.c: In function pvcalls_front_sendmsg:drivers/xen/pvcalls-front.c:543:25: warning: variable bedata set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] drivers/xen/pvcalls-front.c: In function pvcalls_front_recvmsg:drivers/xen/pvcalls-front.c:638:25: warning: variable bedata set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
They are never used since introduction.
--- drivers/xen/pvcalls-front.c | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
drivers/xen/pvcalls-front.c +0 -4
@@ -538,7 +538,6 @@ static int __write_ring(struct pvcalls_data_intf *intf,int pvcalls_front_sendmsg (struct socket *sock,struct msghdr *msg,size_t len) { -struct pvcalls_bedata *bedata;struct sock_mapping *map;int sent, tot_sent =0 ;int count =0 , flags;
@@ -550,7 +549,6 @@ int pvcalls_front_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, map =pvcalls_enter_sock (sock);if (IS_ERR (map))return PTR_ERR (map); - bedata =dev_get_drvdata (&pvcalls_front_dev->dev);mutex_lock (&map->active.out_mutex);if ((flags &MSG_DONTWAIT ) && !pvcalls_front_write_todo (map)) {
@@ -633,7 +631,6 @@ static int __read_ring(struct pvcalls_data_intf *intf,int pvcalls_front_recvmsg (struct socket *sock,struct msghdr *msg,size_t len,int flags) { -struct pvcalls_bedata *bedata;int ret;struct sock_mapping *map;
@@ -643,7 +640,6 @@ int pvcalls_front_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, map =pvcalls_enter_sock (sock);if (IS_ERR (map))return PTR_ERR (map); - bedata =dev_get_drvdata (&pvcalls_front_dev->dev);mutex_lock (&map->active.in_mutex);if (len >XEN_FLEX_RING_SIZE (PVCALLS_RING_ORDER ))
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 20/49 ACPI/PCI: PM: Add missing wakeup.flags.valid checks
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9a51c6b1f9e0239a9435db036b212498a2a3b75c ]
Both acpi_pci_need_resume() and acpi_dev_needs_resume() check if the current ACPI wakeup configuration of the device matches what is expected as far as system wakeup from sleep states is concerned, as reflected by the device_may_wakeup() return value for the device.
However, they only should do that if wakeup.flags.valid is set for the device's ACPI companion, because otherwise the wakeup.prepare_count value for it is meaningless.
Add the missing wakeup.flags.valid checks to these functions.
--- drivers/acpi/device_pm.c | 4 ++-- drivers/pci/pci-acpi.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/acpi/device_pm.c +2 -2
@@ -948,8 +948,8 @@ static bool acpi_dev_needs_resume(struct device *dev, struct acpi_device *adev)u32 sys_target =acpi_target_system_state ();int ret, state; -if (!pm_runtime_suspended (dev) || !adev || -device_may_wakeup (dev) != !!adev->wakeup.prepare_count) +if (!pm_runtime_suspended (dev) || !adev || (adev->wakeup.flags.valid && +device_may_wakeup (dev) != !!adev->wakeup.prepare_count))return true;if (sys_target ==ACPI_STATE_S0 )
drivers/pci/pci-acpi.c +2 -1
@@ -625,7 +625,8 @@ static bool acpi_pci_need_resume(struct pci_dev *dev)if (!adev || !acpi_device_power_manageable (adev))return false; -if (device_may_wakeup (&dev->dev) != !!adev->wakeup.prepare_count) +if (adev->wakeup.flags.valid && +device_may_wakeup (&dev->dev) != !!adev->wakeup.prepare_count)return true;if (acpi_target_system_state () ==ACPI_STATE_S0 )
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 19/49 net: tulip: de4x5: Drop redundant MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE()
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3e66b7cc50ef921121babc91487e1fb98af1ba6e ]
Building with Clang reports the redundant use of MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE():
drivers/net/ethernet/dec/tulip/de4x5.c:2110:1: error: redefinition of '__mod_eisa__de4x5_eisa_ids_device_table' MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(eisa, de4x5_eisa_ids);
^./include/linux/module.h:229:21: note: expanded from macro 'MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE'
extern typeof(name) __mod_##type##__##name##_device_table \
^<scratch space>:90:1: note: expanded from here __mod_eisa__de4x5_eisa_ids_device_table
^drivers/net/ethernet/dec/tulip/de4x5.c:2100:1: note: previous definition is here MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(eisa, de4x5_eisa_ids);
^./include/linux/module.h:229:21: note: expanded from macro 'MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE'
extern typeof(name) __mod_##type##__##name##_device_table \
^<scratch space>:85:1: note: expanded from here__mod_eisa__de4x5_eisa_ids_device_table
^
This drops the one further from the table definition to match the common use of MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE().
--- drivers/net/ethernet/dec/tulip/de4x5.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/dec/tulip/de4x5.c +0 -1
@@ -2107,7 +2107,6 @@ static struct eisa_driver de4x5_eisa_driver = { .remove = de4x5_eisa_remove, } }; -MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE (eisa, de4x5_eisa_ids);#endif #ifdef CONFIG_PCI
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 15/49 perf/ring-buffer: Always use {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() for rb->user_page data
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4d839dd9e4356bbacf3eb0ab13a549b83b008c21 ]
We must use {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() on rb->user_page data such that concurrent usage will see whole values. A few key sites were missing this.
--- kernel/events/ring_buffer.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
kernel/events/ring_buffer.c +3 -3
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static void perf_output_put_handle(struct perf_output_handle *handle)* See perf_output_begin(). */ smp_wmb ();/* B, matches C */ - rb->user_page->data_head = head; +WRITE_ONCE (rb->user_page->data_head, head);/* * We must publish the head before decrementing the nest count,
@@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ void perf_aux_output_end(struct perf_output_handle *handle, unsigned long size) handle->aux_flags); } - rb->user_page->aux_head = rb->aux_head; +WRITE_ONCE (rb->user_page->aux_head, rb->aux_head);if (rb_need_aux_wakeup (rb)) wakeup = true;
@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ int perf_aux_output_skip(struct perf_output_handle *handle, unsigned long size) rb->aux_head += size; - rb->user_page->aux_head = rb->aux_head; +WRITE_ONCE (rb->user_page->aux_head, rb->aux_head);if (rb_need_aux_wakeup (rb)) {perf_output_wakeup (handle); handle->wakeup = rb->aux_wakeup + rb->aux_watermark;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 35/49 xenbus: Avoid deadlock during suspend due to open transactions
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Ross Lagerwall <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d10e0cc113c9e1b64b5c6e3db37b5c839794f3df ]
During a suspend/resume, the xenwatch thread waits for all outstanding xenstore requests and transactions to complete. This does not work correctly for transactions started by userspace because it waits for them to complete after freezing userspace threads which means the transactions have no way of completing, resulting in a deadlock. This is trivial to reproduce by running this script and then suspending the VM:
import pyxs, time
c = pyxs.client.Client(xen_bus_path="/dev/xen/xenbus") c.connect()
c.transaction()
time.sleep(3600)
Even if this deadlock were resolved, misbehaving userspace should not prevent a VM from being migrated. So, instead of waiting for these transactions to complete before suspending, store the current generation id for each transaction when it is started. The global generation id is incremented during resume. If the caller commits the transaction and the generation id does not match the current generation id, return EAGAIN so that they try again. If the transaction was instead discarded, return OK since no changes were made anyway.
This only affects users of the xenbus file interface. In-kernel users of xenbus are assumed to be well-behaved and complete all transactions before freezing.
--- drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus.h | 3 +++ drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_dev_frontend.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_xs.c | 7 +++++-- 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus.h +3 -0
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ struct xb_req_data {int num_vecs;int err;enum xb_req_state state; +bool user_req;void (*cb)(struct xb_req_data *);void *par; };
@@ -133,4 +134,6 @@ void xenbus_ring_ops_init(void);int xenbus_dev_request_and_reply (struct xsd_sockmsg *msg,void *par);void xenbus_dev_queue_reply (struct xb_req_data *req); +extern unsigned int xb_dev_generation_id; +#endif
drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_dev_frontend.c +18 -0
@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@#include "xenbus.h" +unsigned int xb_dev_generation_id; +/* * An element of a list of outstanding transactions, for which we're * still waiting a reply.
@@ -69,6 +71,7 @@struct xenbus_transaction_holder {struct list_head list;struct xenbus_transaction handle; +unsigned int generation_id; };/*
@@ -441,6 +444,7 @@ static int xenbus_write_transaction(unsigned msg_type, rc = -ENOMEM ; goto out; } + trans->generation_id = xb_dev_generation_id;list_add (&trans->list, &u->transactions); }else if (msg->hdr.tx_id !=0 && !xenbus_get_transaction (u, msg->hdr.tx_id))
@@ -449,6 +453,20 @@ static int xenbus_write_transaction(unsigned msg_type, !(msg->hdr.len == 2 && (!strcmp(msg->body, "T") || !strcmp(msg->body, "F"))))return xenbus_command_reply (u,XS_ERROR ,"EINVAL" ); + else if (msg_type == XS_TRANSACTION_END) { + trans =xenbus_get_transaction (u, msg->hdr.tx_id); +if (trans && trans->generation_id != xb_dev_generation_id) { +list_del (&trans->list); +kfree (trans); +if (!strcmp (msg->body,"T" )) +return xenbus_command_reply (u,XS_ERROR , +"EAGAIN" ); +else +return xenbus_command_reply (u, +XS_TRANSACTION_END , +"OK" ); + } + } rc =xenbus_dev_request_and_reply (&msg->hdr, u);if (rc && trans) {
drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_xs.c +5 -2
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ static void xs_suspend_enter(void)static void xs_suspend_exit (void ) { + xb_dev_generation_id++;spin_lock (&xs_state_lock); xs_suspend_active--;spin_unlock (&xs_state_lock);
@@ -125,7 +126,7 @@ static uint32_t xs_request_enter(struct xb_req_data *req)spin_lock (&xs_state_lock); } -if (req->type ==XS_TRANSACTION_START ) +if (req->type ==XS_TRANSACTION_START && !req->user_req) xs_state_users++; xs_state_users++; rq_id = xs_request_id++;
@@ -140,7 +141,7 @@ void xs_request_exit(struct xb_req_data *req)spin_lock (&xs_state_lock); xs_state_users--;if ((req->type ==XS_TRANSACTION_START && req->msg.type ==XS_ERROR ) || - (req->type ==XS_TRANSACTION_END && + (req->type ==XS_TRANSACTION_END && !req->user_req && !WARN_ON_ONCE (req->msg.type ==XS_ERROR && !strcmp (req->body,"ENOENT" )))) xs_state_users--;
@@ -286,6 +287,7 @@ int xenbus_dev_request_and_reply(struct xsd_sockmsg *msg, void *par) req->num_vecs =1 ; req->cb = xenbus_dev_queue_reply; req->par = par; + req->user_req = true;xs_send (req, msg);
@@ -313,6 +315,7 @@ static void *xs_talkv(struct xenbus_transaction t, req->vec = iovec; req->num_vecs = num_vecs; req->cb = xs_wake_up; + req->user_req = false; msg.req_id =0 ; msg.tx_id = t.id;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 38/49 arm64: fix syscall_fn_t type
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Sami Tolvanen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8ef8f368ce72b5e17f7c1f1ef15c38dcfd0fef64 ]
Syscall wrappers in <asm/syscall_wrapper.h> use const struct pt_regs * as the argument type. Use const in syscall_fn_t as well to fix indirect call type mismatches with Control-Flow Integrity checking.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/syscall.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/syscall.h +1 -1
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@#include <linux/compat.h> #include <linux/err.h> -typedef long (*syscall_fn_t )(struct pt_regs *regs); +typedef long (*syscall_fn_t )(const struct pt_regs *regs);extern const syscall_fn_t sys_call_table[];
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 11/49 mISDN: make sure device name is NUL terminated
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ccfb62f27beb295103e9392462b20a6ed807d0ea ]
The user can change the device_name with the IMSETDEVNAME ioctl, but we need to ensure that the user's name is NUL terminated. Otherwise it could result in a buffer overflow when we copy the name back to the user with IMGETDEVINFO ioctl.
I also changed two strcpy() calls which handle the name to strscpy(). Hopefully, there aren't any other ways to create a too long name, but it's nice to do this as a kernel hardening measure.
--- drivers/isdn/mISDN/socket.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/isdn/mISDN/socket.c +3 -2
@@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ data_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)memcpy (di.channelmap, dev->channelmap,sizeof (di.channelmap)); di.nrbchan = dev->nrbchan; -strcpy (di.name,dev_name (&dev->dev)); +strscpy (di.name,dev_name (&dev->dev),sizeof (di.name));if (copy_to_user ((void __user *)arg, &di,sizeof (di))) err = -EFAULT ; }else
@@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ base_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)memcpy (di.channelmap, dev->channelmap,sizeof (di.channelmap)); di.nrbchan = dev->nrbchan; -strcpy (di.name,dev_name (&dev->dev)); +strscpy (di.name,dev_name (&dev->dev),sizeof (di.name));if (copy_to_user ((void __user *)arg, &di,sizeof (di))) err = -EFAULT ; }else
@@ -691,6 +691,7 @@ base_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) err = -EFAULT ;break ; } + dn.name[sizeof (dn.name) -1 ] ='\0' ; dev =get_mdevice (dn.id);if (dev) err =device_rename (&dev->dev, dn.name);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 9/49 powerpc/powernv: Return for invalid IMC domain
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Anju T Sudhakar <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b59bd3527fe3c1939340df558d7f9d568fc9f882 ]
Currently init_imc_pmu() can fail either because we try to register an IMC unit with an invalid domain (i.e an IMC node not supported by the kernel) or something went wrong while registering a valid IMC unit. In both the cases kernel provides a 'Register failed' error message.
For example when trace-imc node is not supported by the kernel, but skiboot advertises a trace-imc node we print:
IMC Unknown Device type
IMC PMU (null) Register failed
To avoid confusion just print the unknown device type message, before attempting PMU registration, so the second message isn't printed.
--- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-imc.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-imc.c +4 -0
@@ -161,6 +161,10 @@ static int imc_pmu_create(struct device_node *parent, int pmu_index, int domain)struct imc_pmu *pmu_ptr;u32 offset; +/* Return for unknown domain */ +if (domain <0 ) +return -EINVAL ; +/* memory for pmu */ pmu_ptr =kzalloc (sizeof (*pmu_ptr),GFP_KERNEL );if (!pmu_ptr)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 17/49] efi/x86/Add missing error handling to old_memmap 1:1 mapping code
In reply to Sasha LevinQuoted 21 lines · Sasha Levin
From: Gen Zhang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit
4e78921ba4dd0aca1cc89168f45039add4183f8e]The
old_memmapflow inefi_call_phys_prolog()performs numerous memory allocations, and either does not check for failure at all, or it does but fails to propagate it back to the caller, which may end up calling into the firmware with an incomplete 1:1 mapping.So let's fix this by returning NULL from
efi_call_phys_prolog()on memory allocation failures only, and by handling this condition in the caller. Also, clean up any half baked sets of page tables that we may have created before returning with a NULL return value.Note that any failure at this level will trigger a
panic()two levels up, so none of this makes a huge difference, but it is a nice cleanup nonetheless.[ardb: update commit log, add
efi_call_phys_epilog()call on error path]
Quoted 10 lines
Signed-off-by Gen Zhang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>Cc Rob Bradford <[email protected]>Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
This was already discussed in the thread that proposed this patch for
stable: please don't queue this right now, the patches are more likely to harm than hurt, and they certainly don't fix a security vulnerability, as has been claimed.
Quoted 56 lines
--- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 2 ++ arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 9 ++++++--- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c +2
-0@@ -86,6 +86,8 @@ static efi_status_t __init phys_efi_set_virtual_address_map(pgd_t *save_pgd; save_pgd =efi_call_phys_prolog (); +if (!save_pgd) +return EFI_ABORTED ;/* Disable interrupts around EFI calls: */ local_irq_save (flags);arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c +6
-4@@ -84,13 +84,15 @@ pgd_t * __init efi_call_phys_prolog(void)if (!efi_enabled (EFI_OLD_MEMMAP )) {efi_switch_mm (&efi_mm); -return NULL ; +return efi_mm.pgd; }early_code_mapping_set_exec (1 ); n_pgds =DIV_ROUND_UP ((max_pfn <<PAGE_SHIFT ),PGDIR_SIZE ); save_pgd =kmalloc_array (n_pgds,sizeof (*save_pgd),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!save_pgd) +return NULL ;/* * Build 1:1 identity mapping for efi=old_map usage. Note that @@ -138,10 +140,11 @@ pgd_t * __init efi_call_phys_prolog(void)pgd_offset_k (pgd *PGDIR_SIZE )->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX; } -out:__flush_tlb_all (); -return save_pgd; +out: +efi_call_phys_epilog (save_pgd); +return NULL ; }void __init efi_call_phys_epilog (pgd_t *save_pgd) --2.20.1
Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 22/49] loop: Don't change loop device under exclusive opener
In reply to Sasha LevinQuoted 3 lines · Sasha Levin
From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit
33ec3e53e7b1869d7851e59e126bdb0fe0bd1982]
The same as for 5.1 - please don't merge to stable.
Honza
Signature · 2 lines
Jan Kara <[email protected]> SUSE Labs, CR
Sasha Levin
maintainerRe: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 17/49] efi/x86/Add missing error handling to old_memmap 1:1 mapping code
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelQuoted 33 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 21 lines · Sasha Levin
From: Gen Zhang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit
4e78921ba4dd0aca1cc89168f45039add4183f8e]The
old_memmapflow inefi_call_phys_prolog()performs numerous memory allocations, and either does not check for failure at all, or it does but fails to propagate it back to the caller, which may end up calling into the firmware with an incomplete 1:1 mapping.So let's fix this by returning NULL from
efi_call_phys_prolog()on memory allocation failures only, and by handling this condition in the caller. Also, clean up any half baked sets of page tables that we may have created before returning with a NULL return value.Note that any failure at this level will trigger a
panic()two levels up, so none of this makes a huge difference, but it is a nice cleanup nonetheless.[ardb: update commit log, add
efi_call_phys_epilog()call on error path]Quoted 10 lines
Signed-off-by Gen Zhang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>Cc Rob Bradford <[email protected]>Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Quoted 4 lines
This was already discussed in the thread that proposed this patch for
stable: please don't queue this right now, the patches are more likely to harm than hurt, and they certainly don't fix a security vulnerability, as has been claimed.
I've dropped this, thank you.
--
Thanks,
Sasha