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Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal

PATCH Superseded Thiago Jung Bauermann 1 participant 16 messages Jun 11, 2019 – Jun 24, 2019

Subsystems (11)

v11 of 12 Superseded Latest is v12 →

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#0 lore raw

v11 cover Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal

Hello,

Nothing big in this version. Noteworthy changes are:

1. Fixes for two bugs in ima_appraise_measurements() which were spotted and resolved by Mimi Zohar. The changelog points them out.

2. One bugfix in process_measurement() which would cause all files appraised with modsig to be measured as well, even if the policy didn't request it.

3. Adapted to work with per policy rule template formats.

Plus small cosmetic changes in some places. The changelog has the details.

This has been tested with signed modules and with signed kernels loaded via kexec_file_load().

Many thanks to Mimi Zohar for her help with the development of this patch series.

The patches apply on today's linux-integrity/next-queued-testing.

Original cover letter:

On the OpenPOWER platform, secure boot and trusted boot are being implemented using IMA for taking measurements and verifying signatures. Since the kernel image on Power servers is an ELF binary, kernels are signed using the scripts/sign-file tool and thus use the same signature format as signed kernel modules.

This patch series adds support in IMA for verifying those signatures. It adds flexibility to OpenPOWER secure boot, because it allows it to boot kernels with the signature appended to them as well as kernels where the signature is stored in the IMA extended attribute.

Changes since v10:

- Patch "MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions"
- Moved config MODULE_SIG_FORMAT definition before its use. Suggested by Mimi Zohar.
- Added missing kerneldoc for @name parameter. Suggested by Mimi Zohar.

- Patch "ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures"
- Bugfix: don't check status variable when deciding whether to verify modsig in ima_appraise_measurement(). Suggested by Mimi Zohar.
- Bugfix: verify the modsig in ima_appraise_measurement() if the xattr contains a digest. Suggested by Mimi Zohar.

- Patch "ima: Define ima-modsig template"
- Renamed ima_modsig_serialize() to ima_get_raw_modsig().
- Renamed check_current_template_modsig() to check_template_modsig().
- Fixed outdated comment in ima_eventmodsig_init(). Suggested by Mimi Zohar.
- Check either the global or the per-rule template when an appraisal rule allows modsig. Suggested by Mimi Zohar.

- Patch "ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig"
- Bugfix: Only re-measure file containing modsig if it was measured before.
- Check for modsig-related fields in the template_desc obtained in process_measurement() which can be a per-rule template. Suggested by Mimi Zohar.

- Patch "ima: Allow template= option for appraise rules as well"
- New patch. Suggested by Mimi Zohar.

Changes since v9:

- Patch "MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions"
- Moved mod_check_sig() to a new file so that CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG doesn't have to depend on CONFIG_MODULES.
- Changed scripts/Makefile to build sign-file if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT is set.
- Removed Mimi's Reviewed-by because of the changes in this version.

- Patch "PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()"
- Don't add function pkcs7_get_message_sig() anymore, since it's not needed in the current version.

- Patch "PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()"
- Changed 'len' argument from 'u8 *' to 'u32 *'.
- Added 'hash_algo' argument to obtain the algo used for the digest.
- Don't check whether 'buf', 'len' and 'hash_algo' output arguments are NULL, since the function's only caller always sets them.
- Removed Mimi's Reviewed-by because of the changes in this version.

- Patch "integrity: Introduce asymmetric_sig_has_known_key()"
- Dropped.

- Patch "integrity: Introduce integrity_keyring_from_id"
- Squashed into "ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures"
- Changed integrity_keyring_from_id() to a static function (suggested by Mimi

    Zohar).

- Patch "ima: Introduce is_signed()"
- Dropped.

- Patch "ima: Export func_tokens"
- Squashed into "ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures"

- Patch "ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data"
- New patch.

- Patch "ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()"
- New patch.

- Patch "ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures"
- Renamed 'struct modsig_hdr' to 'struct modsig'.
- Added integrity_modsig_verify() to integrity/digsig.c so that it's not necessary to export integrity_keyring_from_id() (Suggested by Mimi Zohar).
- Don't add functions ima_xattr_sig_known_key() and modsig_has_known_key() since they're not necessary anymore.
- Added modsig argument to ima_appraise_measurement().
- Verify modsig in a separate function called by ima_appraise_measurement().
- Renamed ima_read_collect_modsig() to ima_read_modsig(), with a separate collect function added in patch "ima: Collect modsig" (suggested by Mimi Zohar).
- In ima_read_modsig(), moved code saving of raw PKCS7 data to 'struct modsig' to patch "ima: Collect modsig".
- In ima_read_modsig(), moved all parts related to the modsig hash to patch "ima: Collect modsig".
- In ima_read_modsig(), don't check if the buf pointer is NULL since it's never supposed to happen.
- Renamed ima_free_xattr_data() to ima_free_modsig().
- No need to check for modsig in ima_read_xattr() and ima_inode_set_xattr() anymore.
- In ima_modsig_verify(), don't check if the modsig pointer is NULL since it's not supposed to happen.
- Don't define IMA_MODSIG element in enum evm_ima_xattr_type.

- Patch "ima: Collect modsig"
- New patch.

- Patch "ima: Define ima-modsig template"
- Patch renamed from "ima: Add new "d-sig" template field"
- Renamed 'd-sig' template field to 'd-modsig'.
- Added 'modsig' template field.
- Added 'ima-modsig' defined template descriptor.
- Renamed ima_modsig_serialize_data() to ima_modsig_serialize().
- Renamed ima_get_modsig_hash() to ima_get_modsig_digest(). Also the function is a lot simpler now since what it used to do is now done in ima_collect_modsig() and pkcs7_get_digest().
- Added check for failed modsig collection in ima_eventdigest_modsig_init().
- Added modsig argument to ima_store_measurement().
- Added 'modsig' field to struct ima_event_data.
- Removed check for modsig = NULL in ima_get_modsig_digest() and in ima_modsig_serialize_data() since their callers already performs that check.
- Moved check_current_template_modsig() to this patch, previously was in "ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig".

- Patch "ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig"
- Renamed ima_template_has_sig() to ima_template_has_modsig().
- Added a change to ima_collect_measurement(), making it to call

    ima_collect_modsig() even if IMA_COLLECT is set in iint->flags.

- Removed IMA_READ_MEASURE flag.
- Renamed template_has_sig global variable to template_has_modsig.
- Renamed find_sig_in_template() to find_modsig_in_template().

Thiago Jung Bauermann (13):
MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions
PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()
PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()
integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr
integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it
ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data
ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended
signatures
ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()
ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures
ima: Collect modsig
ima: Define ima-modsig template
ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig
ima: Allow template= option for appraise rules as well

 Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy      |   6 +-
 Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst  |   7 +-
 certs/system_keyring.c                    |  61 +++++--
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c     |  33 ++++
 include/crypto/pkcs7.h                    |   4 +
 include/linux/module.h                    |   3 -
 include/linux/module_signature.h          |  44 +++++
 include/linux/verification.h              |  10 ++
 init/Kconfig                              |   6 +-
 kernel/Makefile                           |   1 +
 kernel/module.c                           |   1 +
 kernel/module_signature.c                 |  46 +++++
 kernel/module_signing.c                   |  56 +-----
 scripts/Makefile                          |   2 +-
 security/integrity/Kconfig                |   2 +-
 security/integrity/digsig.c               |  43 ++++-
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c         |   8 +-
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig            |  13 ++
 security/integrity/ima/Makefile           |   1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h              |  60 ++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c          |  34 +++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c     | 199 ++++++++++++++--------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c         |   4 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c         |  24 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c       | 169 ++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c       |  68 +++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c     |  26 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c |  60 ++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h |   4 +
 security/integrity/integrity.h            |  26 +++
 30 files changed, 840 insertions(+), 181 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/linux/module_signature.h
 create mode 100644 kernel/module_signature.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
#1 lore raw

PATCH v11 1/13 MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions

IMA will use the module_signature format for append signatures, so export the relevant definitions and factor out the code which verifies that the appended signature trailer is valid.

Also, create a CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT option so that IMA can select it and be able to use mod_check_sig() without having to depend on either CONFIG_MODULE_SIG or CONFIG_MODULES.

---
 include/linux/module.h           |  3 --
 include/linux/module_signature.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 init/Kconfig                     |  6 +++-
 kernel/Makefile                  |  1 +
 kernel/module.c                  |  1 +
 kernel/module_signature.c        | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/module_signing.c          | 56 +++++---------------------------
 scripts/Makefile                 |  2 +-
 8 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
include/linux/module.h +0 -3
index 188998d3dca9..aa56f531cf1e 100644
@@ -25,9 +25,6 @@
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
 #include <asm/module.h>
 
-/* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */
-#define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n"
-
 /* Not Yet Implemented */
 #define MODULE_SUPPORTED_DEVICE(name)
 
include/linux/module_signature.h new file +44 -0

44 lines not on this page · raw message

init/Kconfig +5 -1
index 8b9ffe236e4f..c2286a3c74c5 100644
@@ -1852,6 +1852,10 @@ config BASE_SMALL
 	default 0 if BASE_FULL
 	default 1 if !BASE_FULL
 
+config MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+	def_bool n
+	select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+
 menuconfig MODULES
 	bool "Enable loadable module support"
 	option modules
@@ -1929,7 +1933,7 @@ config MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL
 config MODULE_SIG
 	bool "Module signature verification"
 	depends on MODULES
-	select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+	select MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
 	help
 	  Check modules for valid signatures upon load: the signature
 	  is simply appended to the module. For more information see
kernel/Makefile +1 -0
index 33824f0385b3..f29ae2997a43 100644
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ endif
 obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT) += module_signature.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_CORE) += crash_core.o
kernel/module.c +1 -0
index 6e6712b3aaf5..2712f4d217f5 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/extable.h>
 #include <linux/moduleloader.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
 #include <linux/trace_events.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/kallsyms.h>
kernel/module_signature.c new file +46 -0

46 lines not on this page · raw message

kernel/module_signing.c +8 -48

83 lines not on this page · raw message

scripts/Makefile +1 -1
index 9d442ee050bd..52098b080ab7 100644
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ hostprogs-$(CONFIG_VT)           += conmakehash
 hostprogs-$(BUILD_C_RECORDMCOUNT) += recordmcount
 hostprogs-$(CONFIG_BUILDTIME_EXTABLE_SORT) += sortextable
 hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1)	 += asn1_compiler
-hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)	 += sign-file
+hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT) += sign-file
 hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += extract-cert
 hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_EXTRA_CERTIFICATE) += insert-sys-cert
 
#3 lore raw

PATCH v11 2/13 PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()

In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann

IMA will need to verify a PKCS#7 signature which has already been parsed. For this reason, factor out the code which does that from verify_pkcs7_signature() into a new function which takes a struct pkcs7_message instead of a data buffer.

Cc David Howells <[email protected]>
Cc David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Cc "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
---
 certs/system_keyring.c       | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 include/linux/verification.h | 10 ++++++
 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
certs/system_keyring.c +45 -16
index c05c29ae4d5d..4ba82e52e4b4 100644
@@ -194,33 +194,27 @@ late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list);
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
 
 /**
- * verify_pkcs7_signature - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data.
+ * verify_pkcs7_message_sig - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data.
  * @data: The data to be verified (NULL if expecting internal data).
  * @len: Size of @data.
- * @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature.
- * @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7.
+ * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature.
  * @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for builtin trusted keys only,
  *					(void *)1UL for all trusted keys).
  * @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
  * @view_content: Callback to gain access to content.
  * @ctx: Context for callback.
  */
-int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
-			   const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
-			   struct key *trusted_keys,
-			   enum key_being_used_for usage,
-			   int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
-					       const void *data, size_t len,
-					       size_t asn1hdrlen),
-			   void *ctx)
+int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len,
+			     struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+			     struct key *trusted_keys,
+			     enum key_being_used_for usage,
+			     int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
+						 const void *data, size_t len,
+						 size_t asn1hdrlen),
+			     void *ctx)
 {
-	struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
 	int ret;
 
-	pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len);
-	if (IS_ERR(pkcs7))
-		return PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
-
 	/* The data should be detached - so we need to supply it. */
 	if (data && pkcs7_supply_detached_data(pkcs7, data, len) < 0) {
 		pr_err("PKCS#7 signature with non-detached data\n");
@@ -273,6 +267,41 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
 	}
 
 error:
+	pr_devel("<=%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * verify_pkcs7_signature - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data.
+ * @data: The data to be verified (NULL if expecting internal data).
+ * @len: Size of @data.
+ * @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature.
+ * @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7.
+ * @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for builtin trusted keys only,
+ *					(void *)1UL for all trusted keys).
+ * @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
+ * @view_content: Callback to gain access to content.
+ * @ctx: Context for callback.
+ */
+int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
+			   const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
+			   struct key *trusted_keys,
+			   enum key_being_used_for usage,
+			   int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
+					       const void *data, size_t len,
+					       size_t asn1hdrlen),
+			   void *ctx)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
+	int ret;
+
+	pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(pkcs7))
+		return PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
+
+	ret = verify_pkcs7_message_sig(data, len, pkcs7, trusted_keys, usage,
+				       view_content, ctx);
+
 	pkcs7_free_message(pkcs7);
 	pr_devel("<=%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
 	return ret;
include/linux/verification.h +10 -0
index 018fb5f13d44..5e1d41f2b336 100644
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ extern const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR];
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
 
 struct key;
+struct pkcs7_message;
 
 extern int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
 				  const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
@@ -45,6 +46,15 @@ extern int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
 						      const void *data, size_t len,
 						      size_t asn1hdrlen),
 				  void *ctx);
+extern int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len,
+				    struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+				    struct key *trusted_keys,
+				    enum key_being_used_for usage,
+				    int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
+							const void *data,
+							size_t len,
+							size_t asn1hdrlen),
+				    void *ctx);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
 extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
#5 lore raw

PATCH v11 3/13 PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()

In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann

IMA will need to access the digest of the PKCS7 message (as calculated by the kernel) before the signature is verified, so introduce pkcs7_get_digest() for that purpose.

Also, modify pkcs7_digest() to detect when the digest was already calculated so that it doesn't have to do redundant work. Verifying that sinfo->sig->digest isn't NULL is sufficient because both places which allocate sinfo->sig (pkcs7_parse_message() and pkcs7_note_signed_info()) use kzalloc() so sig->digest is always initialized to zero.

Cc David Howells <[email protected]>
Cc David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Cc "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/crypto/pkcs7.h                |  4 ++++
 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c +33 -0
index f7b0980bf02d..3243981152b5 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/asn1.h>
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 #include <crypto/public_key.h>
 #include "pkcs7_parser.h"
 
@@ -33,6 +34,10 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 
 	kenter(",%u,%s", sinfo->index, sinfo->sig->hash_algo);
 
+	/* The digest was calculated already. */
+	if (sig->digest)
+		return 0;
+
 	if (!sinfo->sig->hash_algo)
 		return -ENOPKG;
 
@@ -121,6 +126,34 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 	return ret;
 }
 
+int pkcs7_get_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, const u8 **buf, u32 *len,
+		     enum hash_algo *hash_algo)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos;
+	int i, ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * This function doesn't support messages with more than one signature.
+	 */
+	if (sinfo = NULL || sinfo->next != NULL)
+		return -EBADMSG;
+
+	ret = pkcs7_digest(pkcs7, sinfo);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	*buf = sinfo->sig->digest;
+	*len = sinfo->sig->digest_size;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++)
+		if (!strcmp(hash_algo_name[i], sinfo->sig->hash_algo)) {
+			*hash_algo = i;
+			break;
+		}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Find the key (X.509 certificate) to use to verify a PKCS#7 message.  PKCS#7
  * uses the issuer's name and the issuing certificate serial number for
include/crypto/pkcs7.h +4 -0
index 583f199400a3..3bfe6829eaae 100644
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #define _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H
 
 #include <linux/verification.h>
+#include <linux/hash_info.h>
 #include <crypto/public_key.h>
 
 struct key;
@@ -44,4 +45,7 @@ extern int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 extern int pkcs7_supply_detached_data(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 				      const void *data, size_t datalen);
 
+extern int pkcs7_get_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, const u8 **buf,
+			    u32 *len, enum hash_algo *hash_algo);
+
 #endif /* _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H */
#6 lore raw

PATCH v11 4/13 integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr

In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann

Even though struct evm_ima_xattr_data includes a fixed-size array to hold a SHA1 digest, most of the code ignores the array and uses the struct to mean "type indicator followed by data of unspecified size" and tracks the real size of what the struct represents in a separate length variable.

The only exception to that is the EVM code, which correctly uses the definition of struct evm_ima_xattr_data.

So make this explicit in the code by removing the length specification from the array in struct evm_ima_xattr_data. Also, change the name of the element from digest to data since in most places the array doesn't hold a digest.

A separate struct evm_xattr is introduced, with the original definition of evm_ima_xattr_data to be used in the places that actually expect that definition, specifically the EVM HMAC code.

---
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c     | 8 ++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 7 ++++---
 security/integrity/integrity.h        | 6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +4 -4
index b6d9f14bc234..588f22f1b5bd 100644
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
 	/* check value type */
 	switch (xattr_data->type) {
 	case EVM_XATTR_HMAC:
-		if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_ima_xattr_data)) {
+		if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_xattr)) {
 			evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
 			goto out;
 		}
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
 				   xattr_value_len, &digest);
 		if (rc)
 			break;
-		rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->digest, digest.digest,
+		rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->data, digest.digest,
 				   SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
 		if (rc)
 			rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
 				 const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
 				 struct xattr *evm_xattr)
 {
-	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data;
+	struct evm_xattr *xattr_data;
 	int rc;
 
 	if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name))
@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
 	if (!xattr_data)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	xattr_data->type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
+	xattr_data->data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
 	rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest);
 	if (rc < 0)
 		goto out;
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +4 -3
index 2f6536ab69e8..18bbe753421a 100644
@@ -168,7 +168,8 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 		return sig->hash_algo;
 		break;
 	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
-		ret = xattr_value->digest[0];
+		/* first byte contains algorithm id */
+		ret = xattr_value->data[0];
 		if (ret < HASH_ALGO__LAST)
 			return ret;
 		break;
@@ -176,7 +177,7 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 		/* this is for backward compatibility */
 		if (xattr_len = 21) {
 			unsigned int zero = 0;
-			if (!memcmp(&xattr_value->digest[16], &zero, 4))
+			if (!memcmp(&xattr_value->data[16], &zero, 4))
 				return HASH_ALGO_MD5;
 			else
 				return HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
@@ -275,7 +276,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
 			/* xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous
 			   version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16
 			 */
-			rc = memcmp(&xattr_value->digest[hash_start],
+			rc = memcmp(&xattr_value->data[hash_start],
 				    iint->ima_hash->digest,
 				    iint->ima_hash->length);
 		else
security/integrity/integrity.h +6 -0
index 7de59f44cba3..88a29f72a74f 100644
@@ -79,6 +79,12 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
 
 struct evm_ima_xattr_data {
 	u8 type;
+	u8 data[];
+} __packed;
+
+/* Only used in the EVM HMAC code. */
+struct evm_xattr {
+	struct evm_ima_xattr_data data;
 	u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
 } __packed;
 
#7 lore raw

PATCH v11 5/13 integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it

In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann

This avoids a dependency cycle in soon-to-be-introduced CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG: it will select CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT which in turn selects CONFIG_KEYS. Kconfig then complains that CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE depends on CONFIG_KEYS.

---
 security/integrity/Kconfig | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/integrity/Kconfig +1 -1
index 3ba1168b1756..93d73902c571 100644
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ if INTEGRITY
 
 config INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
 	bool "Digital signature verification using multiple keyrings"
-	depends on KEYS
 	default n
+	select KEYS
 	select SIGNATURE
 	help
 	  This option enables digital signature verification support
#8 lore raw

PATCH v11 6/13 ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data

In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann

Designated initializers allow specifying only the members of the struct that need initialization. Non-mentioned members are initialized to zero.

This makes the code a bit clearer (particularly in ima_add_boot_aggregate) and also allows adding a new member to the struct without having to update all struct initializations.

---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c  | 13 +++++++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c |  4 ++--
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +9 -4
index 78eb11c7ac07..c0cf4bcfc82f 100644
@@ -139,8 +139,10 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 {
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
-	struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint, file, filename, NULL, 0,
-					    cause};
+	struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint,
+					     .file = file,
+					     .filename = filename,
+					     .violation = cause };
 	int violation = 1;
 	int result;
 
@@ -294,8 +296,11 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	int result = -ENOMEM;
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
-	struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint, file, filename, xattr_value,
-					    xattr_len, NULL};
+	struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint,
+					     .file = file,
+					     .filename = filename,
+					     .xattr_value = xattr_value,
+					     .xattr_len = xattr_len };
 	int violation = 0;
 
 	if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr))
security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +2 -2
index 993d0f1915ff..368ef658a1cd 100644
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
 	struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint;
-	struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint, NULL, boot_aggregate_name,
-					    NULL, 0, NULL};
+	struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint,
+					     .filename = boot_aggregate_name };
 	int result = -ENOMEM;
 	int violation = 0;
 	struct {
#9 lore raw

PATCH v11 7/13 ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended signatures

In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann

Introduce the modsig keyword to the IMA policy syntax to specify that a given hook should expect the file to have the IMA signature appended to it. Here is how it can be used in a rule:

appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig

With this rule, IMA will accept either a signature stored in the extended attribute or an appended signature.

For now, the rule above will behave exactly the same as if appraise_type=imasig was specified. The actual modsig implementation will be introduced separately.

---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy |  6 +++++-
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig       | 10 +++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/Makefile      |  1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h         |  9 ++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c  | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c  | 12 +++++++++--
 security/integrity/integrity.h       |  1 +
 7 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +5 -1
index b383c1763610..e622cdafe0af 100644
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Description:
 			euid:= decimal value
 			fowner:= decimal value
 		lsm:  	are LSM specific
-		option:	appraise_type:= [imasig]
+		option:	appraise_type:= [imasig] [imasig|modsig]
 			template:= name of a defined IMA template type
 			(eg, ima-ng). Only valid when action is "measure".
 			pcr:= decimal value
@@ -104,3 +104,7 @@ Description:
 
 			measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4
 			measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK pcr=5
+
+		Example of appraise rule allowing modsig appended signatures:
+
+			appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +10 -0
index a18f8c6d13b5..bba19f9ea184 100644
@@ -231,6 +231,16 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
 	  This option enables the different "ima_appraise=" modes
 	  (eg. fix, log) from the boot command line.
 
+config IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
+	bool "Support module-style signatures for appraisal"
+	depends on IMA_APPRAISE
+	default n
+	help
+	   Adds support for signatures appended to files. The format of the
+	   appended signature is the same used for signed kernel modules.
+	   The modsig keyword can be used in the IMA policy to allow a hook
+	   to accept such signatures.
+
 config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 	bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed (deprecated)"
 	depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
security/integrity/ima/Makefile +1 -0
index d921dc4f9eb0..31d57cdf2421 100644
@@ -9,5 +9,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
 ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
 	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) += ima_modsig.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +9 -0
index 18b48a6d0b80..9e2580164e97 100644
@@ -298,6 +298,15 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
+bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func);
+#else
+static inline bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */
+
 /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
 
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c new file +31 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..87503bfe8c8b
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * IMA support for appraising module-style appended signatures.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019  IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Thiago Jung Bauermann <[email protected]>
+ */
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+/**
+ * ima_hook_supports_modsig - can the policy allow modsig for this hook?
+ *
+ * modsig is only supported by hooks using ima_post_read_file(), because only
+ * they preload the contents of the file in a buffer. FILE_CHECK does that in
+ * some cases, but not when reached from vfs_open(). POLICY_CHECK can support
+ * it, but it's not useful in practice because it's a text file so deny.
+ */
+bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func)
+{
+	switch (func) {
+	case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK:
+	case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK:
+	case MODULE_CHECK:
+		return true;
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
+}
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +10 -2
index fd9b01881d17..06ae4b7b3676 100644
@@ -1049,6 +1049,10 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from);
 			if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) = 0)
 				entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
+			else if (ima_hook_supports_modsig(entry->func) &&
+				 strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig|modsig") = 0)
+				entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
+						IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED;
 			else
 				result = -EINVAL;
 			break;
@@ -1358,8 +1362,12 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	}
 	if (entry->template)
 		seq_printf(m, "template=%s ", entry->template->name);
-	if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED)
-		seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig ");
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
+		if (entry->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED)
+			seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig|modsig ");
+		else
+			seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig ");
+	}
 	if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
 		seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
 	rcu_read_unlock();
security/integrity/integrity.h +1 -0
index 88a29f72a74f..0e7330a36a9d 100644
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 #define IMA_NEW_FILE		0x04000000
 #define EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG	0x08000000
 #define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS	0x10000000
+#define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED	0x20000000
 
 #define IMA_DO_MASK		(IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
 				 IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
#10 lore raw

PATCH v11 8/13 ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()

In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann

Verify xattr signature in a separate function so that the logic in ima_appraise_measurement() remains clear when it gains the ability to also verify an appended module signature.

The code in the switch statement is unchanged except for having to dereference the status and cause variables (since they're now pointers), and fixing the style of a block comment to appease checkpatch.

---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 141 +++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 81 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +80 -59
index 18bbe753421a..5d4772f39757 100644
@@ -202,6 +202,83 @@ int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/*
+ * xattr_verify - verify xattr digest or signature
+ *
+ * Verify whether the hash or signature matches the file contents.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+			enum integrity_status *status, const char **cause)
+{
+	int rc = -EINVAL, hash_start = 0;
+
+	switch (xattr_value->type) {
+	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
+		/* first byte contains algorithm id */
+		hash_start = 1;
+		/* fall through */
+	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
+		if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
+			*cause = "IMA-signature-required";
+			*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+			break;
+		}
+		clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
+		if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >+				iint->ima_hash->length)
+			/*
+			 * xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous
+			 * version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16
+			 */
+			rc = memcmp(&xattr_value->data[hash_start],
+				    iint->ima_hash->digest,
+				    iint->ima_hash->length);
+		else
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (rc) {
+			*cause = "invalid-hash";
+			*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+			break;
+		}
+		*status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+		break;
+	case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
+		set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
+		rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
+					     (const char *)xattr_value,
+					     xattr_len,
+					     iint->ima_hash->digest,
+					     iint->ima_hash->length);
+		if (rc = -EOPNOTSUPP) {
+			*status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) && rc &&
+		    func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
+			rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM,
+						     (const char *)xattr_value,
+						     xattr_len,
+						     iint->ima_hash->digest,
+						     iint->ima_hash->length);
+		if (rc) {
+			*cause = "invalid-signature";
+			*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+		} else {
+			*status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		*status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+		*cause = "unknown-ima-data";
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
 /*
  * ima_appraise_measurement - appraise file measurement
  *
@@ -221,7 +298,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
 	struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
 	enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	int rc = xattr_len, hash_start = 0;
+	int rc = xattr_len;
 
 	if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
 		return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
@@ -259,65 +336,9 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
 		WARN_ONCE(true, "Unexpected integrity status %d\n", status);
 	}
 
-	switch (xattr_value->type) {
-	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
-		/* first byte contains algorithm id */
-		hash_start = 1;
-		/* fall through */
-	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
-		if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
-			cause = "IMA-signature-required";
-			status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
-			break;
-		}
-		clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
-		if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >-				iint->ima_hash->length)
-			/* xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous
-			   version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16
-			 */
-			rc = memcmp(&xattr_value->data[hash_start],
-				    iint->ima_hash->digest,
-				    iint->ima_hash->length);
-		else
-			rc = -EINVAL;
-		if (rc) {
-			cause = "invalid-hash";
-			status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
-			break;
-		}
-		status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
-		break;
-	case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
-		set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
-		rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
-					     (const char *)xattr_value,
-					     xattr_len,
-					     iint->ima_hash->digest,
-					     iint->ima_hash->length);
-		if (rc = -EOPNOTSUPP) {
-			status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-			break;
-		}
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) && rc &&
-		    func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
-			rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM,
-						     (const char *)xattr_value,
-						     xattr_len,
-						     iint->ima_hash->digest,
-						     iint->ima_hash->length);
-		if (rc) {
-			cause = "invalid-signature";
-			status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
-		} else {
-			status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
-		}
-		break;
-	default:
-		status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-		cause = "unknown-ima-data";
-		break;
-	}
+	if (xattr_value)
+		rc = xattr_verify(func, iint, xattr_value, xattr_len, &status,
+				  &cause);
 
 out:
 	/*
#11 lore raw

PATCH v11 9/13 ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures

In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann

Implement the appraise_type=imasig|modsig option, allowing IMA to read and verify modsig signatures.

In case a file has both an xattr signature and an appended modsig, IMA will only use the appended signature if the key used by the xattr signature isn't present in the IMA or platform keyring.

Because modsig verification needs to convert from an integrity keyring id to the keyring itself, add an integrity_keyring_from_id() function in digsig.c so that integrity_modsig_verify() can use it.

---
 security/integrity/digsig.c           | 43 ++++++++++++----
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig        |  3 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h          | 22 ++++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     | 11 ++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c   | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c   | 12 ++---
 security/integrity/integrity.h        | 19 +++++++
 8 files changed, 209 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
security/integrity/digsig.c +3 -4
index e19c2eb72c51..3399a7e32830 100644
@@ -43,11 +43,10 @@ static const char * const keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
 #define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted
 #endif
 
-int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
-			    const char *digest, int digestlen)
+static struct key *integrity_keyring_from_id(const unsigned int id)
 {
-	if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX || siglen < 2)
-		return -EINVAL;
+	if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
 	if (!keyring[id]) {
 		keyring[id] @@ -56,23 +55,49 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,

int err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]); pr_err("no %s keyring: %d\n", keyring_name[id], err); keyring[id] = NULL;
- return err;
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
}
}

+ return keyring[id];
+}
+
+int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
+ const char *digest, int digestlen)
+{
+ struct key *keyring;
+
+ if (siglen < 2)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ keyring = integrity_keyring_from_id(id);
+ if (IS_ERR(keyring))
+ return PTR_ERR(keyring);
+
switch (sig[1]) {
case 1:
/* v1 API expect signature without xattr type */
- return digsig_verify(keyring[id], sig + 1, siglen - 1,
- digest, digestlen);
+ return digsig_verify(keyring, sig + 1, siglen - 1, digest,
+ digestlen);
case 2:
- return asymmetric_verify(keyring[id], sig, siglen,
- digest, digestlen);
+ return asymmetric_verify(keyring, sig, siglen, digest,
+ digestlen);
}

return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}

+int integrity_modsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const struct modsig *modsig) +{
+ struct key *keyring;
+
+ keyring = integrity_keyring_from_id(id);
+ if (IS_ERR(keyring))
+ return PTR_ERR(keyring);
+
+ return ima_modsig_verify(keyring, modsig);
+}
+
static int __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id, key_perm_t perm,
struct key_restriction *restriction)
{

security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +3 -0
index bba19f9ea184..0fb542455698 100644
@@ -234,6 +234,9 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
 config IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
 	bool "Support module-style signatures for appraisal"
 	depends on IMA_APPRAISE
+	depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
+	select MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
 	default n
 	help
 	   Adds support for signatures appended to files. The format of the
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +20 -2
index 9e2580164e97..ebbfae10f174 100644
@@ -192,6 +192,10 @@ enum ima_hooks {
 	__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_enumify)
 };
 
+extern const char *const func_tokens[];
+
+struct modsig;
+
 /* LIM API function definitions */
 int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
 		   int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
@@ -245,7 +249,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
 			     struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 			     struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-			     int xattr_len);
+			     int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig);
 int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
 void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
 enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -261,7 +265,8 @@ static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
 					   struct file *file,
 					   const unsigned char *filename,
 					   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-					   int xattr_len)
+					   int xattr_len,
+					   const struct modsig *modsig)
 {
 	return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 }
@@ -300,11 +305,24 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
 bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func);
+int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
+		    struct modsig **modsig);
+void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig);
 #else
 static inline bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func)
 {
 	return false;
 }
+
+static inline int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf,
+				  loff_t buf_len, struct modsig **modsig)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
+{
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */
 
 /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +47 -4

90 lines not on this page · raw message

security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +9 -2
index af341a80118f..8ddf9faa8d02 100644
@@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 	int rc = 0, action, must_appraise = 0;
 	int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
 	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL;
+	struct modsig *modsig = NULL;
 	int xattr_len = 0;
 	bool violation_check;
 	enum hash_algo hash_algo;
@@ -302,10 +303,15 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 	}
 
 	if ((action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) ||
-		    strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0)
+	    strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) {
 		/* read 'security.ima' */
 		xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), &xattr_value);
 
+		/* Read the appended modsig if allowed by the policy. */
+		if (iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED)
+			ima_read_modsig(func, buf, size, &modsig);
+	}
+
 	hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
 
 	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo);
@@ -322,7 +328,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 	if (rc = 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) {
 		inode_lock(inode);
 		rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname,
-					      xattr_value, xattr_len);
+					      xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig);
 		inode_unlock(inode);
 		if (!rc)
 			rc = mmap_violation_check(func, file, &pathbuf,
@@ -339,6 +345,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 		rc = -EACCES;
 	mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
 	kfree(xattr_value);
+	ima_free_modsig(modsig);
 out:
 	if (pathbuf)
 		__putname(pathbuf);
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c +71 -0

82 lines not on this page · raw message

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +6 -6
index 06ae4b7b3676..f64ef84516db 100644
@@ -1167,6 +1167,12 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void)
 	}
 }
 
+#define __ima_hook_stringify(str)	(#str),
+
+const char *const func_tokens[] = {
+	__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_stringify)
+};
+
 #ifdef	CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
 enum {
 	mask_exec = 0, mask_write, mask_read, mask_append
@@ -1179,12 +1185,6 @@ static const char *const mask_tokens[] = {
 	"^MAY_APPEND"
 };
 
-#define __ima_hook_stringify(str)	(#str),
-
-static const char *const func_tokens[] = {
-	__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_stringify)
-};
-
 void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
 {
 	loff_t l = *pos;
security/integrity/integrity.h +19 -0
index 0e7330a36a9d..c6e7f41db470 100644
@@ -153,10 +153,13 @@ int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
 
 extern struct dentry *integrity_dir;
 
+struct modsig;
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
 
 int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 			    const char *digest, int digestlen);
+int integrity_modsig_verify(unsigned int id, const struct modsig *modsig);
 
 int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
 int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path);
@@ -171,6 +174,12 @@ static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
+static inline int integrity_modsig_verify(unsigned int id,
+					  const struct modsig *modsig)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 static inline int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -196,6 +205,16 @@ static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
+int ima_modsig_verify(struct key *keyring, const struct modsig *modsig);
+#else
+static inline int ima_modsig_verify(struct key *keyring,
+				    const struct modsig *modsig)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509
 void __init ima_load_x509(void);
 #else
#12 lore raw

PATCH v11 10/13 ima: Collect modsig

In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann

Obtain the modsig and calculate its corresponding hash in ima_collect_measurement().

---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h          |  8 ++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c      |  5 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c   | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 5 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +7 -1
index ebbfae10f174..0acc8e56ec73 100644
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
 int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
-			    enum hash_algo algo);
+			    enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig);
 void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   const unsigned char *filename,
 			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
@@ -307,6 +307,7 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func);
 int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
 		    struct modsig **modsig);
+void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf, loff_t size);
 void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig);
 #else
 static inline bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func)
@@ -320,6 +321,11 @@ static inline int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf,
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
+static inline void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf,
+				      loff_t size)
+{
+}
+
 static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
 {
 }
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +4 -1
index c0cf4bcfc82f..c351b8c37278 100644
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
  */
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
-			    enum hash_algo algo)
+			    enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig)
 {
 	const char *audit_cause = "failed";
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
@@ -255,6 +255,9 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length);
 	iint->version = i_version;
 
+	if (modsig)
+		ima_collect_modsig(modsig, buf, size);
+
 	/* Possibly temporary failure due to type of read (eg. O_DIRECT) */
 	if (!result)
 		iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +1 -1
index 70252ac3321d..aa14e3fe25d5 100644
@@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
 	    !(iint->flags & IMA_HASH))
 		return;
 
-	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, 0, ima_hash_algo);
+	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, 0, ima_hash_algo, NULL);
 	if (rc < 0)
 		return;
 
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1 -1
index 8ddf9faa8d02..2c9d3cf85726 100644
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 
 	hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
 
-	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo);
+	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo, modsig);
 	if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL)
 		goto out_locked;
 
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c +49 -1

73 lines not on this page · raw message

#13 lore raw

PATCH v11 11/13 ima: Define ima-modsig template

In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann

Define new "d-modsig" template field which holds the digest that is expected to match the one contained in the modsig, and also new "modsig" template field which holds the appended file signature.

Add a new "ima-modsig" defined template descriptor with the new fields as well as the ones from the "ima-sig" descriptor.

Change ima_store_measurement() to accept a struct modsig * argument so that it can be passed along to the templates via struct ima_event_data.

---
 Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst  |  7 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h              | 20 +++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c          |  5 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c         |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c       | 19 +++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c       | 41 ++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c     |  7 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h |  4 ++
 9 files changed, 157 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst +5 -2
index 2cd0e273cc9a..8da20b444be0 100644
@@ -68,15 +68,18 @@ descriptors by adding their identifier to the format string
  - 'd-ng': the digest of the event, calculated with an arbitrary hash
    algorithm (field format: [<hash algo>:]digest, where the digest
    prefix is shown only if the hash algorithm is not SHA1 or MD5);
+ - 'd-modsig': the digest of the event without the appended modsig;
  - 'n-ng': the name of the event, without size limitations;
- - 'sig': the file signature.
+ - 'sig': the file signature;
+ - 'modsig' the appended file signature.
 
 
 Below, there is the list of defined template descriptors:
 
  - "ima": its format is ``d|n``;
  - "ima-ng" (default): its format is ``d-ng|n-ng``;
- - "ima-sig": its format is ``d-ng|n-ng|sig``.
+ - "ima-sig": its format is ``d-ng|n-ng|sig``;
+ - "ima-modsig": its format is ``d-ng|n-ng|sig|d-modsig|modsig``.
 
 
 
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +19 -1
index 0acc8e56ec73..a2b2c13ceda8 100644
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ struct ima_event_data {
 	const unsigned char *filename;
 	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value;
 	int xattr_len;
+	const struct modsig *modsig;
 	const char *violation;
 };
 
@@ -207,7 +208,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   const unsigned char *filename,
 			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-			   int xattr_len, int pcr,
+			   int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
 			   struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
 void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
@@ -308,6 +309,10 @@ bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func);
 int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
 		    struct modsig **modsig);
 void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf, loff_t size);
+int ima_get_modsig_digest(const struct modsig *modsig, enum hash_algo *algo,
+			  const u8 **digest, u32 *digest_size);
+int ima_get_raw_modsig(const struct modsig *modsig, const void **data,
+		       u32 *data_len);
 void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig);
 #else
 static inline bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func)
@@ -326,6 +331,19 @@ static inline void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf,
 {
 }
 
+static inline int ima_get_modsig_digest(const struct modsig *modsig,
+					enum hash_algo *algo, const u8 **digest,
+					u32 *digest_size)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_get_raw_modsig(const struct modsig *modsig,
+				     const void **data, u32 *data_len)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
 {
 }
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +3 -2
index c351b8c37278..32297d1e6164 100644
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			   struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-			   int xattr_len, int pcr,
+			   int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
 			   struct ima_template_desc *template_desc)
 {
 	static const char op[] = "add_template_measure";
@@ -303,7 +303,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 					     .file = file,
 					     .filename = filename,
 					     .xattr_value = xattr_value,
-					     .xattr_len = xattr_len };
+					     .xattr_len = xattr_len,
+					     .modsig = modsig };
 	int violation = 0;
 
 	if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr))
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1 -1
index 2c9d3cf85726..85afb31fafe0 100644
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 
 	if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
 		ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
-				      xattr_value, xattr_len, pcr,
+				      xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr,
 				      template_desc);
 	if (rc = 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) {
 		inode_lock(inode);
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c +19 -0
index d438b87dba89..b01bbfeb1d98 100644
@@ -140,6 +140,25 @@ int ima_modsig_verify(struct key *keyring, const struct modsig *modsig)
 					VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL);
 }
 
+int ima_get_modsig_digest(const struct modsig *modsig, enum hash_algo *algo,
+			  const u8 **digest, u32 *digest_size)
+{
+	*algo = modsig->hash_algo;
+	*digest = modsig->digest;
+	*digest_size = modsig->digest_size;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int ima_get_raw_modsig(const struct modsig *modsig, const void **data,
+		       u32 *data_len)
+{
+	*data = &modsig->raw_pkcs7;
+	*data_len = modsig->raw_pkcs7_len;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
 {
 	if (!modsig)
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +41 -0

59 lines not on this page · raw message

security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +6 -1
index e6e892f31cbd..e25bef419c87 100644
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ static struct ima_template_desc builtin_templates[] = {
 	{.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT},
 	{.name = "ima-ng", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
 	{.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
+	{.name = "ima-modsig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig|d-modsig|modsig"},
 	{.name = "", .fmt = ""},	/* placeholder for a custom format */
 };
 
@@ -43,8 +44,12 @@ static const struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
 	 .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
 	{.field_id = "sig", .field_init = ima_eventsig_init,
 	 .field_show = ima_show_template_sig},
+	{.field_id = "d-modsig", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_modsig_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng},
+	{.field_id = "modsig", .field_init = ima_eventmodsig_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_sig},
 };
-#define MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN 15
+#define MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN sizeof("d|n|d-ng|n-ng|sig|d-modisg|modsig")
 
 static struct ima_template_desc *ima_template;
 static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +59 -1

75 lines not on this page · raw message

security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h +4 -0
index 6a3d8b831deb..1d7c690ebae5 100644
@@ -38,8 +38,12 @@ int ima_eventname_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 		       struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 			    struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventdigest_modsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+				struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 			  struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 		      struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventmodsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			 struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 #endif /* __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H */
#14 lore raw

PATCH v11 12/13 ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig

In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann

If the IMA template contains the "modsig" or "d-modsig" field, then the modsig should be added to the measurement list when the file is appraised.

And that is what normally happens, but if a measurement rule caused a file containing a modsig to be measured before a different rule causes it to be appraised, the resulting measurement entry will not contain the modsig because it is only fetched during appraisal. When the appraisal rule triggers, it won't store a new measurement containing the modsig because the file was already measured.

We need to detect that situation and store an additional measurement with the modsig. This is done by adding an IMA_MEASURE action flag if we read a modsig and the IMA template contains a modsig field.

---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h          |  1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c      | 19 +++++++++++++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     | 15 ++++++++++++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +1 -0
index a2b2c13ceda8..44f5f60424c2 100644
@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen);
 void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, u32 size);
 struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void);
 struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name);
+bool ima_template_has_modsig(const struct ima_template_desc *ima_template);
 int ima_restore_measurement_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
 int ima_restore_measurement_list(loff_t bufsize, void *buf);
 int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +15 -4
index 32297d1e6164..bb887ed3d8a7 100644
@@ -222,6 +222,14 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	} hash;
 
+	/*
+	 * Always collect the modsig, because IMA might have already collected
+	 * the file digest without collecting the modsig in a previous
+	 * measurement rule.
+	 */
+	if (modsig)
+		ima_collect_modsig(modsig, buf, size);
+
 	if (iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -255,9 +263,6 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length);
 	iint->version = i_version;
 
-	if (modsig)
-		ima_collect_modsig(modsig, buf, size);
-
 	/* Possibly temporary failure due to type of read (eg. O_DIRECT) */
 	if (!result)
 		iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
@@ -307,7 +312,13 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 					     .modsig = modsig };
 	int violation = 0;
 
-	if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr))
+	/*
+	 * We still need to store the measurement in the case of MODSIG because
+	 * we only have its contents to put in the list at the time of
+	 * appraisal, but a file measurement from earlier might already exist in
+	 * the measurement list.
+	 */
+	if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr) && !modsig)
 		return;
 
 	result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template_desc);
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +12 -3
index 85afb31fafe0..e0ca39f81a59 100644
@@ -307,9 +307,18 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 		/* read 'security.ima' */
 		xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), &xattr_value);
 
-		/* Read the appended modsig if allowed by the policy. */
-		if (iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED)
-			ima_read_modsig(func, buf, size, &modsig);
+		/*
+		 * Read the appended modsig if allowed by the policy, and allow
+		 * an additional measurement list entry, if needed, based on the
+		 * template format and whether the file was already measured.
+		 */
+		if (iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED) {
+			rc = ima_read_modsig(func, buf, size, &modsig);
+
+			if (!rc && ima_template_has_modsig(template_desc) &&
+			    iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
+				action |= IMA_MEASURE;
+		}
 	}
 
 	hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +19 -0
index e25bef419c87..00d9a6cc8a60 100644
@@ -56,6 +56,25 @@ static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
 				     const struct ima_template_field ***fields,
 				     int *num_fields);
 
+/**
+ * ima_template_has_modsig - Check whether template has modsig-related fields.
+ * @ima_template: IMA template to check.
+ *
+ * Tells whether the given template has fields referencing a file's appended
+ * signature.
+ */
+bool ima_template_has_modsig(const struct ima_template_desc *ima_template)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ima_template->num_fields; i++)
+		if (!strcmp(ima_template->fields[i]->field_id, "modsig") ||
+		    !strcmp(ima_template->fields[i]->field_id, "d-modsig"))
+			return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
 static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str)
 {
 	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
#15 lore raw

PATCH v11 13/13 ima: Allow template= option for appraise rules as well

In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann

It's useful being able to specify a different IMA template on appraise policy rules, so allow it.

---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +2 -1
index 6463ab8921ea..1ac1ef458f2e 100644
@@ -1110,7 +1110,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			break;
 		case Opt_template:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "template", args[0].from);
-			if (entry->action != MEASURE) {
+			if (entry->action != MEASURE &&
+			    entry->action != APPRAISE) {
 				result = -EINVAL;
 				break;
 			}
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v11 01/13] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions

In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann

Hello Jessica,

AFAIK Mimi is happy with this patch set, but I still need acks from maintainers of other subsystems that my changes touch before she can accept it.

Is this patch OK from your PoV?

--
Thiago Jung Bauermann
IBM Linux Technology Center

Quoted 289 lines · Thiago Jung Bauermann

IMA will use the module_signature format for append signatures, so export the relevant definitions and factor out the code which verifies that the appended signature trailer is valid.

Also, create a CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT option so that IMA can select it and be able to use mod_check_sig() without having to depend on either CONFIG_MODULE_SIG or CONFIG_MODULES.

---
 include/linux/module.h           |  3 --
 include/linux/module_signature.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 init/Kconfig                     |  6 +++-
 kernel/Makefile                  |  1 +
 kernel/module.c                  |  1 +
 kernel/module_signature.c        | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/module_signing.c          | 56 +++++---------------------------
 scripts/Makefile                 |  2 +-
 8 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
include/linux/module.h +0 -3
index 188998d3dca9..aa56f531cf1e 100644
@@ -25,9 +25,6 @@
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
 #include <asm/module.h>
 
-/* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */
-#define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n"
-
 /* Not Yet Implemented */
 #define MODULE_SUPPORTED_DEVICE(name)
 
include/linux/module_signature.h new file +44 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..523617fc5b6a
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * Module signature handling.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells ([email protected])
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_MODULE_SIGNATURE_H
+#define _LINUX_MODULE_SIGNATURE_H
+
+/* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */
+#define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n"
+
+enum pkey_id_type {
+	PKEY_ID_PGP,		/* OpenPGP generated key ID */
+	PKEY_ID_X509,		/* X.509 arbitrary subjectKeyIdentifier */
+	PKEY_ID_PKCS7,		/* Signature in PKCS#7 message */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Module signature information block.
+ *
+ * The constituents of the signature section are, in order:
+ *
+ *	- Signer's name
+ *	- Key identifier
+ *	- Signature data
+ *	- Information block
+ */
+struct module_signature {
+	u8	algo;		/* Public-key crypto algorithm [0] */
+	u8	hash;		/* Digest algorithm [0] */
+	u8	id_type;	/* Key identifier type [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] */
+	u8	signer_len;	/* Length of signer's name [0] */
+	u8	key_id_len;	/* Length of key identifier [0] */
+	u8	__pad[3];
+	__be32	sig_len;	/* Length of signature data */
+};
+
+int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, size_t file_len,
+		  const char *name);
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_MODULE_SIGNATURE_H */
init/Kconfig +5 -1
index 8b9ffe236e4f..c2286a3c74c5 100644
@@ -1852,6 +1852,10 @@ config BASE_SMALL
 	default 0 if BASE_FULL
 	default 1 if !BASE_FULL
 
+config MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+	def_bool n
+	select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+
 menuconfig MODULES
 	bool "Enable loadable module support"
 	option modules
@@ -1929,7 +1933,7 @@ config MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL
 config MODULE_SIG
 	bool "Module signature verification"
 	depends on MODULES
-	select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+	select MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
 	help
 	  Check modules for valid signatures upon load: the signature
 	  is simply appended to the module. For more information see
kernel/Makefile +1 -0
index 33824f0385b3..f29ae2997a43 100644
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ endif
 obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT) += module_signature.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_CORE) += crash_core.o
kernel/module.c +1 -0
index 6e6712b3aaf5..2712f4d217f5 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/extable.h>
 #include <linux/moduleloader.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
 #include <linux/trace_events.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/kallsyms.h>
kernel/module_signature.c new file +46 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4224a1086b7d
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Module signature checker
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells ([email protected])
+ */
+
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
+#include <asm/byteorder.h>
+
+/**
+ * mod_check_sig - check that the given signature is sane
+ *
+ * @ms:		Signature to check.
+ * @file_len:	Size of the file to which @ms is appended.
+ * @name:	What is being checked. Used for error messages.
+ */
+int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, size_t file_len,
+		  const char *name)
+{
+	if (be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len) >= file_len - sizeof(*ms))
+		return -EBADMSG;
+
+	if (ms->id_type != PKEY_ID_PKCS7) {
+		pr_err("%s: Module is not signed with expected PKCS#7 message\n",
+		       name);
+		return -ENOPKG;
+	}
+
+	if (ms->algo != 0 ||
+	    ms->hash != 0 ||
+	    ms->signer_len != 0 ||
+	    ms->key_id_len != 0 ||
+	    ms->__pad[0] != 0 ||
+	    ms->__pad[1] != 0 ||
+	    ms->__pad[2] != 0) {
+		pr_err("%s: PKCS#7 signature info has unexpected non-zero params\n",
+		       name);
+		return -EBADMSG;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
kernel/module_signing.c +8 -48
index 6b9a926fd86b..cdd04a6b8074 100644
@@ -11,37 +11,13 @@
 
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <crypto/public_key.h>
 #include "module-internal.h"
 
-enum pkey_id_type {
-	PKEY_ID_PGP,		/* OpenPGP generated key ID */
-	PKEY_ID_X509,		/* X.509 arbitrary subjectKeyIdentifier */
-	PKEY_ID_PKCS7,		/* Signature in PKCS#7 message */
-};
-
-/*
- * Module signature information block.
- *
- * The constituents of the signature section are, in order:
- *
- *	- Signer's name
- *	- Key identifier
- *	- Signature data
- *	- Information block
- */
-struct module_signature {
-	u8	algo;		/* Public-key crypto algorithm [0] */
-	u8	hash;		/* Digest algorithm [0] */
-	u8	id_type;	/* Key identifier type [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] */
-	u8	signer_len;	/* Length of signer's name [0] */
-	u8	key_id_len;	/* Length of key identifier [0] */
-	u8	__pad[3];
-	__be32	sig_len;	/* Length of signature data */
-};
-
 /*
  * Verify the signature on a module.
  */
@@ -49,6 +25,7 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
 {
 	struct module_signature ms;
 	size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len;
+	int ret;
 
 	pr_devel("=>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen);
 
@@ -56,32 +33,15 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
 		return -EBADMSG;
 
 	memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
-	modlen -= sizeof(ms);
+
+	ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, info->name);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len);
-	if (sig_len >= modlen)
-		return -EBADMSG;
-	modlen -= sig_len;
+	modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms);
 	info->len = modlen;
 
-	if (ms.id_type != PKEY_ID_PKCS7) {
-		pr_err("%s: Module is not signed with expected PKCS#7 message\n",
-		       info->name);
-		return -ENOPKG;
-	}
-
-	if (ms.algo != 0 ||
-	    ms.hash != 0 ||
-	    ms.signer_len != 0 ||
-	    ms.key_id_len != 0 ||
-	    ms.__pad[0] != 0 ||
-	    ms.__pad[1] != 0 ||
-	    ms.__pad[2] != 0) {
-		pr_err("%s: PKCS#7 signature info has unexpected non-zero params\n",
-		       info->name);
-		return -EBADMSG;
-	}
-
 	return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
 				      VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
 				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
scripts/Makefile +1 -1
index 9d442ee050bd..52098b080ab7 100644
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ hostprogs-$(CONFIG_VT)           += conmakehash
 hostprogs-$(BUILD_C_RECORDMCOUNT) += recordmcount
 hostprogs-$(CONFIG_BUILDTIME_EXTABLE_SORT) += sortextable
 hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1)	 += asn1_compiler
-hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)	 += sign-file
+hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT) += sign-file
 hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += extract-cert
 hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_EXTRA_CERTIFICATE) += insert-sys-cert
 
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v11 02/13] PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()

In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann

Hello David,

AFAIK Mimi is happy with this patch set, but I still need acks from maintainers of other subsystems that my changes touch before she can accept it.

Are this patch and the next one ("PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()") OK from your PoV?

--
Thiago Jung Bauermann
IBM Linux Technology Center

Quoted 134 lines · Thiago Jung Bauermann

IMA will need to verify a PKCS#7 signature which has already been parsed. For this reason, factor out the code which does that from verify_pkcs7_signature() into a new function which takes a struct pkcs7_message instead of a data buffer.

Cc David Howells <[email protected]>
Cc David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Cc "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
---
 certs/system_keyring.c       | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 include/linux/verification.h | 10 ++++++
 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
certs/system_keyring.c +45 -16
index c05c29ae4d5d..4ba82e52e4b4 100644
@@ -194,33 +194,27 @@ late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list);
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
 
 /**
- * verify_pkcs7_signature - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data.
+ * verify_pkcs7_message_sig - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data.
  * @data: The data to be verified (NULL if expecting internal data).
  * @len: Size of @data.
- * @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature.
- * @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7.
+ * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature.
  * @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for builtin trusted keys only,
  *					(void *)1UL for all trusted keys).
  * @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
  * @view_content: Callback to gain access to content.
  * @ctx: Context for callback.
  */
-int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
-			   const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
-			   struct key *trusted_keys,
-			   enum key_being_used_for usage,
-			   int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
-					       const void *data, size_t len,
-					       size_t asn1hdrlen),
-			   void *ctx)
+int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len,
+			     struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+			     struct key *trusted_keys,
+			     enum key_being_used_for usage,
+			     int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
+						 const void *data, size_t len,
+						 size_t asn1hdrlen),
+			     void *ctx)
 {
-	struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
 	int ret;
 
-	pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len);
-	if (IS_ERR(pkcs7))
-		return PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
-
 	/* The data should be detached - so we need to supply it. */
 	if (data && pkcs7_supply_detached_data(pkcs7, data, len) < 0) {
 		pr_err("PKCS#7 signature with non-detached data\n");
@@ -273,6 +267,41 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
 	}
 
 error:
+	pr_devel("<=%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * verify_pkcs7_signature - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data.
+ * @data: The data to be verified (NULL if expecting internal data).
+ * @len: Size of @data.
+ * @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature.
+ * @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7.
+ * @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for builtin trusted keys only,
+ *					(void *)1UL for all trusted keys).
+ * @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
+ * @view_content: Callback to gain access to content.
+ * @ctx: Context for callback.
+ */
+int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
+			   const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
+			   struct key *trusted_keys,
+			   enum key_being_used_for usage,
+			   int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
+					       const void *data, size_t len,
+					       size_t asn1hdrlen),
+			   void *ctx)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
+	int ret;
+
+	pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(pkcs7))
+		return PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
+
+	ret = verify_pkcs7_message_sig(data, len, pkcs7, trusted_keys, usage,
+				       view_content, ctx);
+
 	pkcs7_free_message(pkcs7);
 	pr_devel("<=%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
 	return ret;
include/linux/verification.h +10 -0
index 018fb5f13d44..5e1d41f2b336 100644
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ extern const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR];
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
 
 struct key;
+struct pkcs7_message;
 
 extern int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
 				  const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
@@ -45,6 +46,15 @@ extern int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
 						      const void *data, size_t len,
 						      size_t asn1hdrlen),
 				  void *ctx);
+extern int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len,
+				    struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+				    struct key *trusted_keys,
+				    enum key_being_used_for usage,
+				    int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
+							const void *data,
+							size_t len,
+							size_t asn1hdrlen),
+				    void *ctx);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
 extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,