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Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal

PATCH In review Thiago Jung Bauermann 5 participants 25 messages Jun 28, 2019 – Aug 28, 2019

Subsystems (12)
Documentation Kbuild Crypto API s390 +8 more subsystems
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#0 lore raw

v12 cover Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal

Hello,

This version is essentially identical to the last one.

It is only a rebase on top of today's linux-integrity/next-queued-testing, prompted by conflicts with Prakhar Srivastava's patches to measure the kernel command line. It also drops two patches that are already present in that branch.

As I mentioned in an earlier email, I believe Mimi is happy with this version but before she can accept it I still need acks from maintainers of the module and asymmetric keys subsystems for the first three patches.

Many thanks to Mimi Zohar for her help with the development of this patch series.

This patch which I sent earlier today needs to be applied first:

ima: Update MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN to fit largest reasonable definition

Original cover letter:

On the OpenPOWER platform, secure boot and trusted boot are being implemented using IMA for taking measurements and verifying signatures. Since the kernel image on Power servers is an ELF binary, kernels are signed using the scripts/sign-file tool and thus use the same signature format as signed kernel modules.

This patch series adds support in IMA for verifying those signatures. It adds flexibility to OpenPOWER secure boot, because it allows it to boot kernels with the signature appended to them as well as kernels where the signature is stored in the IMA extended attribute.

Changes since v11:

- Patch "integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr"
- Dropped since it's already in linux-integrity/next-queued-testing.

- Patch "ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data"
- Dropped since it's already in linux-integrity/next-queued-testing.

Changes since v10:

- Patch "MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions"
- Moved config MODULE_SIG_FORMAT definition before its use. Suggested by Mimi Zohar.
- Added missing kerneldoc for @name parameter. Suggested by Mimi Zohar.

- Patch "ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures"
- Bugfix: don't check status variable when deciding whether to verify modsig in ima_appraise_measurement(). Suggested by Mimi Zohar.
- Bugfix: verify the modsig in ima_appraise_measurement() if the xattr contains a digest. Suggested by Mimi Zohar.

- Patch "ima: Define ima-modsig template"
- Renamed ima_modsig_serialize() to ima_get_raw_modsig().
- Renamed check_current_template_modsig() to check_template_modsig().
- Fixed outdated comment in ima_eventmodsig_init(). Suggested by Mimi Zohar.
- Check either the global or the per-rule template when an appraisal rule allows modsig. Suggested by Mimi Zohar.

- Patch "ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig"
- Bugfix: Only re-measure file containing modsig if it was measured before.
- Check for modsig-related fields in the template_desc obtained in process_measurement() which can be a per-rule template. Suggested by Mimi Zohar.

- Patch "ima: Allow template= option for appraise rules as well"
- New patch. Suggested by Mimi Zohar.

Changes since v9:

- Patch "MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions"
- Moved mod_check_sig() to a new file so that CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG doesn't have to depend on CONFIG_MODULES.
- Changed scripts/Makefile to build sign-file if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT is set.
- Removed Mimi's Reviewed-by because of the changes in this version.

- Patch "PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()"
- Don't add function pkcs7_get_message_sig() anymore, since it's not needed in the current version.

- Patch "PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()"
- Changed 'len' argument from 'u8 *' to 'u32 *'.
- Added 'hash_algo' argument to obtain the algo used for the digest.
- Don't check whether 'buf', 'len' and 'hash_algo' output arguments are NULL, since the function's only caller always sets them.
- Removed Mimi's Reviewed-by because of the changes in this version.

- Patch "integrity: Introduce asymmetric_sig_has_known_key()"
- Dropped.

- Patch "integrity: Introduce integrity_keyring_from_id"
- Squashed into "ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures"
- Changed integrity_keyring_from_id() to a static function (suggested by Mimi

    Zohar).

- Patch "ima: Introduce is_signed()"
- Dropped.

- Patch "ima: Export func_tokens"
- Squashed into "ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures"

- Patch "ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data"
- New patch.

- Patch "ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()"
- New patch.

- Patch "ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures"
- Renamed 'struct modsig_hdr' to 'struct modsig'.
- Added integrity_modsig_verify() to integrity/digsig.c so that it's not necessary to export integrity_keyring_from_id() (Suggested by Mimi Zohar).
- Don't add functions ima_xattr_sig_known_key() and modsig_has_known_key() since they're not necessary anymore.
- Added modsig argument to ima_appraise_measurement().
- Verify modsig in a separate function called by ima_appraise_measurement().
- Renamed ima_read_collect_modsig() to ima_read_modsig(), with a separate collect function added in patch "ima: Collect modsig" (suggested by Mimi Zohar).
- In ima_read_modsig(), moved code saving of raw PKCS7 data to 'struct modsig' to patch "ima: Collect modsig".
- In ima_read_modsig(), moved all parts related to the modsig hash to patch "ima: Collect modsig".
- In ima_read_modsig(), don't check if the buf pointer is NULL since it's never supposed to happen.
- Renamed ima_free_xattr_data() to ima_free_modsig().
- No need to check for modsig in ima_read_xattr() and ima_inode_set_xattr() anymore.
- In ima_modsig_verify(), don't check if the modsig pointer is NULL since it's not supposed to happen.
- Don't define IMA_MODSIG element in enum evm_ima_xattr_type.

- Patch "ima: Collect modsig"
- New patch.

- Patch "ima: Define ima-modsig template"
- Patch renamed from "ima: Add new "d-sig" template field"
- Renamed 'd-sig' template field to 'd-modsig'.
- Added 'modsig' template field.
- Added 'ima-modsig' defined template descriptor.
- Renamed ima_modsig_serialize_data() to ima_modsig_serialize().
- Renamed ima_get_modsig_hash() to ima_get_modsig_digest(). Also the function is a lot simpler now since what it used to do is now done in ima_collect_modsig() and pkcs7_get_digest().
- Added check for failed modsig collection in ima_eventdigest_modsig_init().
- Added modsig argument to ima_store_measurement().
- Added 'modsig' field to struct ima_event_data.
- Removed check for modsig = NULL in ima_get_modsig_digest() and in ima_modsig_serialize_data() since their callers already performs that check.
- Moved check_current_template_modsig() to this patch, previously was in "ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig".

- Patch "ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig"
- Renamed ima_template_has_sig() to ima_template_has_modsig().
- Added a change to ima_collect_measurement(), making it to call

    ima_collect_modsig() even if IMA_COLLECT is set in iint->flags.

- Removed IMA_READ_MEASURE flag.
- Renamed template_has_sig global variable to template_has_modsig.
- Renamed find_sig_in_template() to find_modsig_in_template().

Thiago Jung Bauermann (11):
MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions
PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()
PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()
integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it
ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended
signatures
ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()
ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures
ima: Collect modsig
ima: Define ima-modsig template
ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig
ima: Allow template= option for appraise rules as well

 Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy      |   6 +-
 Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst  |   3 +
 certs/system_keyring.c                    |  61 +++++--
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c     |  33 ++++
 include/crypto/pkcs7.h                    |   4 +
 include/linux/module.h                    |   3 -
 include/linux/module_signature.h          |  44 +++++
 include/linux/verification.h              |  10 ++
 init/Kconfig                              |   6 +-
 kernel/Makefile                           |   1 +
 kernel/module.c                           |   1 +
 kernel/module_signature.c                 |  46 +++++
 kernel/module_signing.c                   |  56 +------
 scripts/Makefile                          |   2 +-
 security/integrity/Kconfig                |   2 +-
 security/integrity/digsig.c               |  43 ++++-
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig            |  13 ++
 security/integrity/ima/Makefile           |   1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h              |  60 ++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c          |  23 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c     | 194 ++++++++++++++--------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c         |  24 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c       | 169 +++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c       |  68 +++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c     |  26 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c |  64 ++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h |   4 +
 security/integrity/integrity.h            |  20 +++
 28 files changed, 819 insertions(+), 168 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/linux/module_signature.h
 create mode 100644 kernel/module_signature.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
#1 lore raw

PATCH v12 1/11 MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions

IMA will use the module_signature format for append signatures, so export the relevant definitions and factor out the code which verifies that the appended signature trailer is valid.

Also, create a CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT option so that IMA can select it and be able to use mod_check_sig() without having to depend on either CONFIG_MODULE_SIG or CONFIG_MODULES.

---
 include/linux/module.h           |  3 --
 include/linux/module_signature.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 init/Kconfig                     |  6 +++-
 kernel/Makefile                  |  1 +
 kernel/module.c                  |  1 +
 kernel/module_signature.c        | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/module_signing.c          | 56 +++++---------------------------
 scripts/Makefile                 |  2 +-
 8 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
include/linux/module.h +0 -3
index 188998d3dca9..aa56f531cf1e 100644
@@ -25,9 +25,6 @@
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
 #include <asm/module.h>
 
-/* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */
-#define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n"
-
 /* Not Yet Implemented */
 #define MODULE_SUPPORTED_DEVICE(name)
 
include/linux/module_signature.h new file +44 -0

44 lines not on this page · raw message

init/Kconfig +5 -1
index 8b9ffe236e4f..c2286a3c74c5 100644
@@ -1852,6 +1852,10 @@ config BASE_SMALL
 	default 0 if BASE_FULL
 	default 1 if !BASE_FULL
 
+config MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+	def_bool n
+	select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+
 menuconfig MODULES
 	bool "Enable loadable module support"
 	option modules
@@ -1929,7 +1933,7 @@ config MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL
 config MODULE_SIG
 	bool "Module signature verification"
 	depends on MODULES
-	select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+	select MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
 	help
 	  Check modules for valid signatures upon load: the signature
 	  is simply appended to the module. For more information see
kernel/Makefile +1 -0
index 33824f0385b3..f29ae2997a43 100644
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ endif
 obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT) += module_signature.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_CORE) += crash_core.o
kernel/module.c +1 -0
index 6e6712b3aaf5..2712f4d217f5 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/extable.h>
 #include <linux/moduleloader.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
 #include <linux/trace_events.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/kallsyms.h>
kernel/module_signature.c new file +46 -0

46 lines not on this page · raw message

kernel/module_signing.c +8 -48

83 lines not on this page · raw message

scripts/Makefile +1 -1
index 9d442ee050bd..52098b080ab7 100644
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ hostprogs-$(CONFIG_VT)           += conmakehash
 hostprogs-$(BUILD_C_RECORDMCOUNT) += recordmcount
 hostprogs-$(CONFIG_BUILDTIME_EXTABLE_SORT) += sortextable
 hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1)	 += asn1_compiler
-hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)	 += sign-file
+hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT) += sign-file
 hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += extract-cert
 hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_EXTRA_CERTIFICATE) += insert-sys-cert
 
#10 lore raw

PATCH v12 2/11 PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()

In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann

IMA will need to verify a PKCS#7 signature which has already been parsed. For this reason, factor out the code which does that from verify_pkcs7_signature() into a new function which takes a struct pkcs7_message instead of a data buffer.

Cc David Howells <[email protected]>
Cc David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Cc "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
---
 certs/system_keyring.c       | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 include/linux/verification.h | 10 ++++++
 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
certs/system_keyring.c +45 -16
index c05c29ae4d5d..4ba82e52e4b4 100644
@@ -194,33 +194,27 @@ late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list);
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
 
 /**
- * verify_pkcs7_signature - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data.
+ * verify_pkcs7_message_sig - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data.
  * @data: The data to be verified (NULL if expecting internal data).
  * @len: Size of @data.
- * @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature.
- * @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7.
+ * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature.
  * @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for builtin trusted keys only,
  *					(void *)1UL for all trusted keys).
  * @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
  * @view_content: Callback to gain access to content.
  * @ctx: Context for callback.
  */
-int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
-			   const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
-			   struct key *trusted_keys,
-			   enum key_being_used_for usage,
-			   int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
-					       const void *data, size_t len,
-					       size_t asn1hdrlen),
-			   void *ctx)
+int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len,
+			     struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+			     struct key *trusted_keys,
+			     enum key_being_used_for usage,
+			     int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
+						 const void *data, size_t len,
+						 size_t asn1hdrlen),
+			     void *ctx)
 {
-	struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
 	int ret;
 
-	pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len);
-	if (IS_ERR(pkcs7))
-		return PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
-
 	/* The data should be detached - so we need to supply it. */
 	if (data && pkcs7_supply_detached_data(pkcs7, data, len) < 0) {
 		pr_err("PKCS#7 signature with non-detached data\n");
@@ -273,6 +267,41 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
 	}
 
 error:
+	pr_devel("<=%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * verify_pkcs7_signature - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data.
+ * @data: The data to be verified (NULL if expecting internal data).
+ * @len: Size of @data.
+ * @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature.
+ * @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7.
+ * @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for builtin trusted keys only,
+ *					(void *)1UL for all trusted keys).
+ * @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
+ * @view_content: Callback to gain access to content.
+ * @ctx: Context for callback.
+ */
+int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
+			   const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
+			   struct key *trusted_keys,
+			   enum key_being_used_for usage,
+			   int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
+					       const void *data, size_t len,
+					       size_t asn1hdrlen),
+			   void *ctx)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
+	int ret;
+
+	pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(pkcs7))
+		return PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
+
+	ret = verify_pkcs7_message_sig(data, len, pkcs7, trusted_keys, usage,
+				       view_content, ctx);
+
 	pkcs7_free_message(pkcs7);
 	pr_devel("<=%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
 	return ret;
include/linux/verification.h +10 -0
index 018fb5f13d44..5e1d41f2b336 100644
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ extern const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR];
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
 
 struct key;
+struct pkcs7_message;
 
 extern int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
 				  const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
@@ -45,6 +46,15 @@ extern int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
 						      const void *data, size_t len,
 						      size_t asn1hdrlen),
 				  void *ctx);
+extern int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len,
+				    struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+				    struct key *trusted_keys,
+				    enum key_being_used_for usage,
+				    int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
+							const void *data,
+							size_t len,
+							size_t asn1hdrlen),
+				    void *ctx);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
 extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
#11 lore raw

PATCH v12 3/11 PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()

In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann

IMA will need to access the digest of the PKCS7 message (as calculated by the kernel) before the signature is verified, so introduce pkcs7_get_digest() for that purpose.

Also, modify pkcs7_digest() to detect when the digest was already calculated so that it doesn't have to do redundant work. Verifying that sinfo->sig->digest isn't NULL is sufficient because both places which allocate sinfo->sig (pkcs7_parse_message() and pkcs7_note_signed_info()) use kzalloc() so sig->digest is always initialized to zero.

Cc David Howells <[email protected]>
Cc David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Cc "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/crypto/pkcs7.h                |  4 ++++
 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c +33 -0
index f7b0980bf02d..3243981152b5 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/asn1.h>
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 #include <crypto/public_key.h>
 #include "pkcs7_parser.h"
 
@@ -33,6 +34,10 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 
 	kenter(",%u,%s", sinfo->index, sinfo->sig->hash_algo);
 
+	/* The digest was calculated already. */
+	if (sig->digest)
+		return 0;
+
 	if (!sinfo->sig->hash_algo)
 		return -ENOPKG;
 
@@ -121,6 +126,34 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 	return ret;
 }
 
+int pkcs7_get_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, const u8 **buf, u32 *len,
+		     enum hash_algo *hash_algo)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos;
+	int i, ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * This function doesn't support messages with more than one signature.
+	 */
+	if (sinfo = NULL || sinfo->next != NULL)
+		return -EBADMSG;
+
+	ret = pkcs7_digest(pkcs7, sinfo);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	*buf = sinfo->sig->digest;
+	*len = sinfo->sig->digest_size;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++)
+		if (!strcmp(hash_algo_name[i], sinfo->sig->hash_algo)) {
+			*hash_algo = i;
+			break;
+		}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Find the key (X.509 certificate) to use to verify a PKCS#7 message.  PKCS#7
  * uses the issuer's name and the issuing certificate serial number for
include/crypto/pkcs7.h +4 -0
index 583f199400a3..3bfe6829eaae 100644
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #define _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H
 
 #include <linux/verification.h>
+#include <linux/hash_info.h>
 #include <crypto/public_key.h>
 
 struct key;
@@ -44,4 +45,7 @@ extern int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 extern int pkcs7_supply_detached_data(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 				      const void *data, size_t datalen);
 
+extern int pkcs7_get_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, const u8 **buf,
+			    u32 *len, enum hash_algo *hash_algo);
+
 #endif /* _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H */
#12 lore raw

PATCH v12 4/11 integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it

In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann

This avoids a dependency cycle in soon-to-be-introduced CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG: it will select CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT which in turn selects CONFIG_KEYS. Kconfig then complains that CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE depends on CONFIG_KEYS.

---
 security/integrity/Kconfig | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/integrity/Kconfig +1 -1
index 3ba1168b1756..93d73902c571 100644
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ if INTEGRITY
 
 config INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
 	bool "Digital signature verification using multiple keyrings"
-	depends on KEYS
 	default n
+	select KEYS
 	select SIGNATURE
 	help
 	  This option enables digital signature verification support
#13 lore raw

PATCH v12 5/11 ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended signatures

In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann

Introduce the modsig keyword to the IMA policy syntax to specify that a given hook should expect the file to have the IMA signature appended to it. Here is how it can be used in a rule:

appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig

With this rule, IMA will accept either a signature stored in the extended attribute or an appended signature.

For now, the rule above will behave exactly the same as if appraise_type=imasig was specified. The actual modsig implementation will be introduced separately.

---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy |  6 +++++-
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig       | 10 +++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/Makefile      |  1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h         |  9 ++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c  | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c  | 12 +++++++++--
 security/integrity/integrity.h       |  1 +
 7 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +5 -1
index fc376a323908..29ebe9afdac4 100644
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Description:
 			euid:= decimal value
 			fowner:= decimal value
 		lsm:  	are LSM specific
-		option:	appraise_type:= [imasig]
+		option:	appraise_type:= [imasig] [imasig|modsig]
 			template:= name of a defined IMA template type
 			(eg, ima-ng). Only valid when action is "measure".
 			pcr:= decimal value
@@ -105,3 +105,7 @@ Description:
 
 			measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4
 			measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK pcr=5
+
+		Example of appraise rule allowing modsig appended signatures:
+
+			appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +10 -0
index df65d2d41905..6fa78fbc8c30 100644
@@ -232,6 +232,16 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
 	  This option enables the different "ima_appraise=" modes
 	  (eg. fix, log) from the boot command line.
 
+config IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
+	bool "Support module-style signatures for appraisal"
+	depends on IMA_APPRAISE
+	default n
+	help
+	   Adds support for signatures appended to files. The format of the
+	   appended signature is the same used for signed kernel modules.
+	   The modsig keyword can be used in the IMA policy to allow a hook
+	   to accept such signatures.
+
 config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 	bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed (deprecated)"
 	depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
security/integrity/ima/Makefile +1 -0
index d921dc4f9eb0..31d57cdf2421 100644
@@ -9,5 +9,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
 ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
 	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) += ima_modsig.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +9 -0
index 6aa28ab53d27..904f7dd78007 100644
@@ -306,6 +306,15 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
+bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func);
+#else
+static inline bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */
+
 /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
 
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c new file +31 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..87503bfe8c8b
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * IMA support for appraising module-style appended signatures.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019  IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Thiago Jung Bauermann <[email protected]>
+ */
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+/**
+ * ima_hook_supports_modsig - can the policy allow modsig for this hook?
+ *
+ * modsig is only supported by hooks using ima_post_read_file(), because only
+ * they preload the contents of the file in a buffer. FILE_CHECK does that in
+ * some cases, but not when reached from vfs_open(). POLICY_CHECK can support
+ * it, but it's not useful in practice because it's a text file so deny.
+ */
+bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func)
+{
+	switch (func) {
+	case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK:
+	case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK:
+	case MODULE_CHECK:
+		return true;
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
+}
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +10 -2
index a3058b03a955..ac258df2f1f4 100644
@@ -1132,6 +1132,10 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from);
 			if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) = 0)
 				entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
+			else if (ima_hook_supports_modsig(entry->func) &&
+				 strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig|modsig") = 0)
+				entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
+						IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED;
 			else
 				result = -EINVAL;
 			break;
@@ -1451,8 +1455,12 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	}
 	if (entry->template)
 		seq_printf(m, "template=%s ", entry->template->name);
-	if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED)
-		seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig ");
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
+		if (entry->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED)
+			seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig|modsig ");
+		else
+			seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig ");
+	}
 	if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
 		seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
 	rcu_read_unlock();
security/integrity/integrity.h +1 -0
index 88a29f72a74f..0e7330a36a9d 100644
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 #define IMA_NEW_FILE		0x04000000
 #define EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG	0x08000000
 #define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS	0x10000000
+#define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED	0x20000000
 
 #define IMA_DO_MASK		(IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
 				 IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
#14 lore raw

PATCH v12 6/11 ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()

In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann

Verify xattr signature in a separate function so that the logic in ima_appraise_measurement() remains clear when it gains the ability to also verify an appended module signature.

The code in the switch statement is unchanged except for having to dereference the status and cause variables (since they're now pointers), and fixing the style of a block comment to appease checkpatch.

---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 141 +++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 81 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +80 -59
index 18bbe753421a..5d4772f39757 100644
@@ -202,6 +202,83 @@ int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/*
+ * xattr_verify - verify xattr digest or signature
+ *
+ * Verify whether the hash or signature matches the file contents.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+			enum integrity_status *status, const char **cause)
+{
+	int rc = -EINVAL, hash_start = 0;
+
+	switch (xattr_value->type) {
+	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
+		/* first byte contains algorithm id */
+		hash_start = 1;
+		/* fall through */
+	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
+		if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
+			*cause = "IMA-signature-required";
+			*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+			break;
+		}
+		clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
+		if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >+				iint->ima_hash->length)
+			/*
+			 * xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous
+			 * version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16
+			 */
+			rc = memcmp(&xattr_value->data[hash_start],
+				    iint->ima_hash->digest,
+				    iint->ima_hash->length);
+		else
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (rc) {
+			*cause = "invalid-hash";
+			*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+			break;
+		}
+		*status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+		break;
+	case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
+		set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
+		rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
+					     (const char *)xattr_value,
+					     xattr_len,
+					     iint->ima_hash->digest,
+					     iint->ima_hash->length);
+		if (rc = -EOPNOTSUPP) {
+			*status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) && rc &&
+		    func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
+			rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM,
+						     (const char *)xattr_value,
+						     xattr_len,
+						     iint->ima_hash->digest,
+						     iint->ima_hash->length);
+		if (rc) {
+			*cause = "invalid-signature";
+			*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+		} else {
+			*status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		*status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+		*cause = "unknown-ima-data";
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
 /*
  * ima_appraise_measurement - appraise file measurement
  *
@@ -221,7 +298,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
 	struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
 	enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	int rc = xattr_len, hash_start = 0;
+	int rc = xattr_len;
 
 	if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
 		return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
@@ -259,65 +336,9 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
 		WARN_ONCE(true, "Unexpected integrity status %d\n", status);
 	}
 
-	switch (xattr_value->type) {
-	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
-		/* first byte contains algorithm id */
-		hash_start = 1;
-		/* fall through */
-	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
-		if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
-			cause = "IMA-signature-required";
-			status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
-			break;
-		}
-		clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
-		if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >-				iint->ima_hash->length)
-			/* xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous
-			   version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16
-			 */
-			rc = memcmp(&xattr_value->data[hash_start],
-				    iint->ima_hash->digest,
-				    iint->ima_hash->length);
-		else
-			rc = -EINVAL;
-		if (rc) {
-			cause = "invalid-hash";
-			status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
-			break;
-		}
-		status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
-		break;
-	case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
-		set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
-		rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
-					     (const char *)xattr_value,
-					     xattr_len,
-					     iint->ima_hash->digest,
-					     iint->ima_hash->length);
-		if (rc = -EOPNOTSUPP) {
-			status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-			break;
-		}
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) && rc &&
-		    func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
-			rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM,
-						     (const char *)xattr_value,
-						     xattr_len,
-						     iint->ima_hash->digest,
-						     iint->ima_hash->length);
-		if (rc) {
-			cause = "invalid-signature";
-			status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
-		} else {
-			status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
-		}
-		break;
-	default:
-		status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-		cause = "unknown-ima-data";
-		break;
-	}
+	if (xattr_value)
+		rc = xattr_verify(func, iint, xattr_value, xattr_len, &status,
+				  &cause);
 
 out:
 	/*
#15 lore raw

PATCH v12 7/11 ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures

In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann

Implement the appraise_type=imasig|modsig option, allowing IMA to read and verify modsig signatures.

In case a file has both an xattr signature and an appended modsig, IMA will only use the appended signature if the key used by the xattr signature isn't present in the IMA or platform keyring.

Because modsig verification needs to convert from an integrity keyring id to the keyring itself, add an integrity_keyring_from_id() function in digsig.c so that integrity_modsig_verify() can use it.

---
 security/integrity/digsig.c           | 43 ++++++++++++----
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig        |  3 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h          | 22 ++++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     | 11 ++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c   | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c   | 12 ++---
 security/integrity/integrity.h        | 19 +++++++
 8 files changed, 209 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
security/integrity/digsig.c +3 -4
index 37869214c243..1c353b1a6ec5 100644
@@ -43,11 +43,10 @@ static const char * const keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
 #define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted
 #endif
 
-int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
-			    const char *digest, int digestlen)
+static struct key *integrity_keyring_from_id(const unsigned int id)
 {
-	if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX || siglen < 2)
-		return -EINVAL;
+	if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
 	if (!keyring[id]) {
 		keyring[id] @@ -56,23 +55,49 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,

int err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]); pr_err("no %s keyring: %d\n", keyring_name[id], err); keyring[id] = NULL;
- return err;
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
}
}

+ return keyring[id];
+}
+
+int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
+ const char *digest, int digestlen)
+{
+ struct key *keyring;
+
+ if (siglen < 2)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ keyring = integrity_keyring_from_id(id);
+ if (IS_ERR(keyring))
+ return PTR_ERR(keyring);
+
switch (sig[1]) {
case 1:
/* v1 API expect signature without xattr type */
- return digsig_verify(keyring[id], sig + 1, siglen - 1,
- digest, digestlen);
+ return digsig_verify(keyring, sig + 1, siglen - 1, digest,
+ digestlen);
case 2:
- return asymmetric_verify(keyring[id], sig, siglen,
- digest, digestlen);
+ return asymmetric_verify(keyring, sig, siglen, digest,
+ digestlen);
}

return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}

+int integrity_modsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const struct modsig *modsig) +{
+ struct key *keyring;
+
+ keyring = integrity_keyring_from_id(id);
+ if (IS_ERR(keyring))
+ return PTR_ERR(keyring);
+
+ return ima_modsig_verify(keyring, modsig);
+}
+
static int __init __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id,
key_perm_t perm,
struct key_restriction *restriction)

security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +3 -0
index 6fa78fbc8c30..5a109707e907 100644
@@ -235,6 +235,9 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
 config IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
 	bool "Support module-style signatures for appraisal"
 	depends on IMA_APPRAISE
+	depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
+	select MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
 	default n
 	help
 	   Adds support for signatures appended to files. The format of the
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +20 -2
index 904f7dd78007..fa188de1cef6 100644
@@ -200,6 +200,10 @@ enum ima_hooks {
 	__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_enumify)
 };
 
+extern const char *const func_tokens[];
+
+struct modsig;
+
 /* LIM API function definitions */
 int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
 		   int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
@@ -253,7 +257,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
 			     struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 			     struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-			     int xattr_len);
+			     int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig);
 int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
 void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
 enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -269,7 +273,8 @@ static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
 					   struct file *file,
 					   const unsigned char *filename,
 					   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-					   int xattr_len)
+					   int xattr_len,
+					   const struct modsig *modsig)
 {
 	return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 }
@@ -308,11 +313,24 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
 bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func);
+int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
+		    struct modsig **modsig);
+void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig);
 #else
 static inline bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func)
 {
 	return false;
 }
+
+static inline int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf,
+				  loff_t buf_len, struct modsig **modsig)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
+{
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */
 
 /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +47 -4

90 lines not on this page · raw message

security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +9 -2
index 317c4b6f2c18..309058c1d50e 100644
@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 	int rc = 0, action, must_appraise = 0;
 	int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
 	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL;
+	struct modsig *modsig = NULL;
 	int xattr_len = 0;
 	bool violation_check;
 	enum hash_algo hash_algo;
@@ -306,10 +307,15 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 	}
 
 	if ((action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) ||
-		    strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0)
+	    strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) {
 		/* read 'security.ima' */
 		xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), &xattr_value);
 
+		/* Read the appended modsig if allowed by the policy. */
+		if (iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED)
+			ima_read_modsig(func, buf, size, &modsig);
+	}
+
 	hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
 
 	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo);
@@ -326,7 +332,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 	if (rc = 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) {
 		inode_lock(inode);
 		rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname,
-					      xattr_value, xattr_len);
+					      xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig);
 		inode_unlock(inode);
 		if (!rc)
 			rc = mmap_violation_check(func, file, &pathbuf,
@@ -343,6 +349,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 		rc = -EACCES;
 	mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
 	kfree(xattr_value);
+	ima_free_modsig(modsig);
 out:
 	if (pathbuf)
 		__putname(pathbuf);
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c +71 -0

82 lines not on this page · raw message

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +6 -6
index ac258df2f1f4..4c5b968c4721 100644
@@ -1260,6 +1260,12 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void)
 	}
 }
 
+#define __ima_hook_stringify(str)	(#str),
+
+const char *const func_tokens[] = {
+	__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_stringify)
+};
+
 #ifdef	CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
 enum {
 	mask_exec = 0, mask_write, mask_read, mask_append
@@ -1272,12 +1278,6 @@ static const char *const mask_tokens[] = {
 	"^MAY_APPEND"
 };
 
-#define __ima_hook_stringify(str)	(#str),
-
-static const char *const func_tokens[] = {
-	__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_stringify)
-};
-
 void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
 {
 	loff_t l = *pos;
security/integrity/integrity.h +19 -0
index 0e7330a36a9d..c6e7f41db470 100644
@@ -153,10 +153,13 @@ int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
 
 extern struct dentry *integrity_dir;
 
+struct modsig;
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
 
 int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 			    const char *digest, int digestlen);
+int integrity_modsig_verify(unsigned int id, const struct modsig *modsig);
 
 int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
 int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path);
@@ -171,6 +174,12 @@ static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
+static inline int integrity_modsig_verify(unsigned int id,
+					  const struct modsig *modsig)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 static inline int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -196,6 +205,16 @@ static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
+int ima_modsig_verify(struct key *keyring, const struct modsig *modsig);
+#else
+static inline int ima_modsig_verify(struct key *keyring,
+				    const struct modsig *modsig)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509
 void __init ima_load_x509(void);
 #else
#16 lore raw

PATCH v12 8/11 ima: Collect modsig

In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann

Obtain the modsig and calculate its corresponding hash in ima_collect_measurement().

---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h          |  8 ++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c      |  5 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c   | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 5 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +7 -1
index fa188de1cef6..baf2ffd52a41 100644
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
 int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
-			    enum hash_algo algo);
+			    enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig);
 void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   const unsigned char *filename,
 			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
@@ -315,6 +315,7 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func);
 int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
 		    struct modsig **modsig);
+void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf, loff_t size);
 void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig);
 #else
 static inline bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func)
@@ -328,6 +329,11 @@ static inline int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf,
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
+static inline void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf,
+				      loff_t size)
+{
+}
+
 static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
 {
 }
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +4 -1
index d426d4d1fe04..ac35bc3d6e35 100644
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
  */
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
-			    enum hash_algo algo)
+			    enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig)
 {
 	const char *audit_cause = "failed";
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
@@ -256,6 +256,9 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length);
 	iint->version = i_version;
 
+	if (modsig)
+		ima_collect_modsig(modsig, buf, size);
+
 	/* Possibly temporary failure due to type of read (eg. O_DIRECT) */
 	if (!result)
 		iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +1 -1
index 70252ac3321d..aa14e3fe25d5 100644
@@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
 	    !(iint->flags & IMA_HASH))
 		return;
 
-	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, 0, ima_hash_algo);
+	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, 0, ima_hash_algo, NULL);
 	if (rc < 0)
 		return;
 
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1 -1
index 309058c1d50e..cc4500f93408 100644
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 
 	hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
 
-	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo);
+	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo, modsig);
 	if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL)
 		goto out_locked;
 
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c +49 -1

73 lines not on this page · raw message

#17 lore raw

PATCH v12 9/11 ima: Define ima-modsig template

In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann

Define new "d-modsig" template field which holds the digest that is expected to match the one contained in the modsig, and also new "modsig" template field which holds the appended file signature.

Add a new "ima-modsig" defined template descriptor with the new fields as well as the ones from the "ima-sig" descriptor.

Change ima_store_measurement() to accept a struct modsig * argument so that it can be passed along to the templates via struct ima_event_data.

---
 Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst  |  3 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h              | 20 ++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c          |  5 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c         |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c       | 19 +++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c       | 41 +++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c     |  7 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h |  4 ++
 9 files changed, 159 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst +3 -0
index 3d1cca287aa4..c5a8432972ef 100644
@@ -68,8 +68,10 @@ descriptors by adding their identifier to the format string
  - 'd-ng': the digest of the event, calculated with an arbitrary hash
    algorithm (field format: [<hash algo>:]digest, where the digest
    prefix is shown only if the hash algorithm is not SHA1 or MD5);
+ - 'd-modsig': the digest of the event without the appended modsig;
  - 'n-ng': the name of the event, without size limitations;
  - 'sig': the file signature;
+ - 'modsig' the appended file signature;
  - 'buf': the buffer data that was used to generate the hash without size limitations;
 
 
@@ -79,6 +81,7 @@ Below, there is the list of defined template descriptors:
  - "ima-ng" (default): its format is ``d-ng|n-ng``;
  - "ima-sig": its format is ``d-ng|n-ng|sig``;
  - "ima-buf": its format is ``d-ng|n-ng|buf``;
+ - "ima-modsig": its format is ``d-ng|n-ng|sig|d-modsig|modsig``;
 
 
 Use
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +19 -1
index baf2ffd52a41..3293dd07b6c9 100644
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ struct ima_event_data {
 	const unsigned char *filename;
 	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value;
 	int xattr_len;
+	const struct modsig *modsig;
 	const char *violation;
 	const void *buf;
 	int buf_len;
@@ -215,7 +216,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   const unsigned char *filename,
 			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-			   int xattr_len, int pcr,
+			   int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
 			   struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
 void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
@@ -316,6 +317,10 @@ bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func);
 int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
 		    struct modsig **modsig);
 void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf, loff_t size);
+int ima_get_modsig_digest(const struct modsig *modsig, enum hash_algo *algo,
+			  const u8 **digest, u32 *digest_size);
+int ima_get_raw_modsig(const struct modsig *modsig, const void **data,
+		       u32 *data_len);
 void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig);
 #else
 static inline bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func)
@@ -334,6 +339,19 @@ static inline void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf,
 {
 }
 
+static inline int ima_get_modsig_digest(const struct modsig *modsig,
+					enum hash_algo *algo, const u8 **digest,
+					u32 *digest_size)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_get_raw_modsig(const struct modsig *modsig,
+				     const void **data, u32 *data_len)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
 {
 }
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +3 -2
index ac35bc3d6e35..9d1fe712a6cc 100644
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			   struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-			   int xattr_len, int pcr,
+			   int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
 			   struct ima_template_desc *template_desc)
 {
 	static const char op[] = "add_template_measure";
@@ -304,7 +304,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 					     .file = file,
 					     .filename = filename,
 					     .xattr_value = xattr_value,
-					     .xattr_len = xattr_len };
+					     .xattr_len = xattr_len,
+					     .modsig = modsig };
 	int violation = 0;
 
 	if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr))
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1 -1
index cc4500f93408..8b35a200e0cc 100644
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 
 	if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
 		ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
-				      xattr_value, xattr_len, pcr,
+				      xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr,
 				      template_desc);
 	if (rc = 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) {
 		inode_lock(inode);
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c +19 -0
index d438b87dba89..b01bbfeb1d98 100644
@@ -140,6 +140,25 @@ int ima_modsig_verify(struct key *keyring, const struct modsig *modsig)
 					VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL);
 }
 
+int ima_get_modsig_digest(const struct modsig *modsig, enum hash_algo *algo,
+			  const u8 **digest, u32 *digest_size)
+{
+	*algo = modsig->hash_algo;
+	*digest = modsig->digest;
+	*digest_size = modsig->digest_size;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int ima_get_raw_modsig(const struct modsig *modsig, const void **data,
+		       u32 *data_len)
+{
+	*data = &modsig->raw_pkcs7;
+	*data_len = modsig->raw_pkcs7_len;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
 {
 	if (!modsig)
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +41 -0

59 lines not on this page · raw message

security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +6 -1
index 7343e8e0ae2f..ac526b34973f 100644
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ static struct ima_template_desc builtin_templates[] = {
 	{.name = "ima-ng", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
 	{.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
 	{.name = "ima-buf", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|buf"},
+	{.name = "ima-modsig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig|d-modsig|modsig"},
 	{.name = "", .fmt = ""},	/* placeholder for a custom format */
 };
 
@@ -46,6 +47,10 @@ static const struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
 	 .field_show = ima_show_template_sig},
 	{.field_id = "buf", .field_init = ima_eventbuf_init,
 	 .field_show = ima_show_template_buf},
+	{.field_id = "d-modsig", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_modsig_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng},
+	{.field_id = "modsig", .field_init = ima_eventmodsig_init,
+	 .field_show = ima_show_template_sig},
 };
 
 /*
@@ -53,7 +58,7 @@ static const struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
  * need to be accounted for since they shouldn't be defined in the same template
  * description as 'd-ng' and 'n-ng' respectively.
  */
-#define MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN sizeof("d-ng|n-ng|sig|buf")
+#define MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN sizeof("d-ng|n-ng|sig|buf|d-modisg|modsig")
 
 static struct ima_template_desc *ima_template;
 
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +63 -1

79 lines not on this page · raw message

security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h +4 -0
index 12f1a8578b31..6544eac1c77d 100644
@@ -40,10 +40,14 @@ int ima_eventname_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 		       struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 			    struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventdigest_modsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+				struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 			  struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 		      struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 int ima_eventbuf_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 		      struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventmodsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			 struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 #endif /* __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H */
#18 lore raw

PATCH v12 10/11 ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig

In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann

If the IMA template contains the "modsig" or "d-modsig" field, then the modsig should be added to the measurement list when the file is appraised.

And that is what normally happens, but if a measurement rule caused a file containing a modsig to be measured before a different rule causes it to be appraised, the resulting measurement entry will not contain the modsig because it is only fetched during appraisal. When the appraisal rule triggers, it won't store a new measurement containing the modsig because the file was already measured.

We need to detect that situation and store an additional measurement with the modsig. This is done by adding an IMA_MEASURE action flag if we read a modsig and the IMA template contains a modsig field.

---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h          |  1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c      | 19 +++++++++++++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     | 15 ++++++++++++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +1 -0
index 3293dd07b6c9..01a7a140bb4a 100644
@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
 			      int *num_fields);
 struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void);
 struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name);
+bool ima_template_has_modsig(const struct ima_template_desc *ima_template);
 int ima_restore_measurement_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
 int ima_restore_measurement_list(loff_t bufsize, void *buf);
 int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +15 -4
index 9d1fe712a6cc..3a78373d835c 100644
@@ -223,6 +223,14 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	} hash;
 
+	/*
+	 * Always collect the modsig, because IMA might have already collected
+	 * the file digest without collecting the modsig in a previous
+	 * measurement rule.
+	 */
+	if (modsig)
+		ima_collect_modsig(modsig, buf, size);
+
 	if (iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -256,9 +264,6 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length);
 	iint->version = i_version;
 
-	if (modsig)
-		ima_collect_modsig(modsig, buf, size);
-
 	/* Possibly temporary failure due to type of read (eg. O_DIRECT) */
 	if (!result)
 		iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
@@ -308,7 +313,13 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 					     .modsig = modsig };
 	int violation = 0;
 
-	if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr))
+	/*
+	 * We still need to store the measurement in the case of MODSIG because
+	 * we only have its contents to put in the list at the time of
+	 * appraisal, but a file measurement from earlier might already exist in
+	 * the measurement list.
+	 */
+	if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr) && !modsig)
 		return;
 
 	result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template_desc);
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +12 -3
index 8b35a200e0cc..e855a4658425 100644
@@ -311,9 +311,18 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 		/* read 'security.ima' */
 		xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), &xattr_value);
 
-		/* Read the appended modsig if allowed by the policy. */
-		if (iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED)
-			ima_read_modsig(func, buf, size, &modsig);
+		/*
+		 * Read the appended modsig if allowed by the policy, and allow
+		 * an additional measurement list entry, if needed, based on the
+		 * template format and whether the file was already measured.
+		 */
+		if (iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED) {
+			rc = ima_read_modsig(func, buf, size, &modsig);
+
+			if (!rc && ima_template_has_modsig(template_desc) &&
+			    iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
+				action |= IMA_MEASURE;
+		}
 	}
 
 	hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +19 -0
index ac526b34973f..536205735456 100644
@@ -62,6 +62,25 @@ static const struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
 
 static struct ima_template_desc *ima_template;
 
+/**
+ * ima_template_has_modsig - Check whether template has modsig-related fields.
+ * @ima_template: IMA template to check.
+ *
+ * Tells whether the given template has fields referencing a file's appended
+ * signature.
+ */
+bool ima_template_has_modsig(const struct ima_template_desc *ima_template)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ima_template->num_fields; i++)
+		if (!strcmp(ima_template->fields[i]->field_id, "modsig") ||
+		    !strcmp(ima_template->fields[i]->field_id, "d-modsig"))
+			return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
 static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str)
 {
 	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
#19 lore raw

PATCH v12 11/11 ima: Allow template= option for appraise rules as well

In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann

It's useful being able to specify a different IMA template on appraise policy rules, so allow it.

---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +2 -1
index 4fc13e591f1d..46ed31a0adfe 100644
@@ -1193,7 +1193,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			break;
 		case Opt_template:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "template", args[0].from);
-			if (entry->action != MEASURE) {
+			if (entry->action != MEASURE &&
+			    entry->action != APPRAISE) {
 				result = -EINVAL;
 				break;
 			}
maintainer
#20 lore raw
In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann
Quoted 8 lines · Thiago Jung Bauermann

Hello,

This version is essentially identical to the last one.

It is only a rebase on top of today's linux-integrity/next-queued-testing, prompted by conflicts with Prakhar Srivastava's patches to measure the kernel command line. It also drops two patches that are already present in that branch.

Thanks, Thiago.  These patches are now in next-queued-testing waiting for some additional reviews/acks.

Mimi

Acked-by on v12 1/11
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v12 01/11] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions

In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann

+++ Thiago Jung Bauermann [27/06/19 23:19 -0300]:

Quoted 27 lines

IMA will use the module_signature format for append signatures, so export the relevant definitions and factor out the code which verifies that the appended signature trailer is valid.

Also, create a CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT option so that IMA can select it and be able to use mod_check_sig() without having to depend on either CONFIG_MODULE_SIG or CONFIG_MODULES.

---

include/linux/module.h           |  3 --
include/linux/module_signature.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
init/Kconfig                     |  6 +++-
kernel/Makefile                  |  1 +
kernel/module.c                  |  1 +
kernel/module_signature.c        | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/module_signing.c          | 56 +++++---------------------------
scripts/Makefile                 |  2 +-
8 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
include/linux/module.h +0 -0
index 188998d3dca9..aa56f531cf1e 100644

include/linux/module.h line 30

Quoted 6 lines
include/linux/module.h +0 -3
@@ -25,9 +25,6 @@
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
 #include <asm/module.h>
 
-/* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */
-#define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n"
-

Hi Thiago, apologies for the delay.

It looks like arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c also relies on MODULE_SIG_STRING being defined, so module_signature.h will need to be included there too, otherwise we'll run into a compilation error.

Other than that, the module-related changes look good to me:

Thanks!

Jessica

Quoted 256 lines
include/linux/module.h +0 -0
 /* Not Yet Implemented */
 #define MODULE_SUPPORTED_DEVICE(name)
 
include/linux/module_signature.h new file +44 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..523617fc5b6a
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * Module signature handling.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells ([email protected])
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_MODULE_SIGNATURE_H
+#define _LINUX_MODULE_SIGNATURE_H
+
+/* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */
+#define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n"
+
+enum pkey_id_type {
+	PKEY_ID_PGP,		/* OpenPGP generated key ID */
+	PKEY_ID_X509,		/* X.509 arbitrary subjectKeyIdentifier */
+	PKEY_ID_PKCS7,		/* Signature in PKCS#7 message */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Module signature information block.
+ *
+ * The constituents of the signature section are, in order:
+ *
+ *	- Signer's name
+ *	- Key identifier
+ *	- Signature data
+ *	- Information block
+ */
+struct module_signature {
+	u8	algo;		/* Public-key crypto algorithm [0] */
+	u8	hash;		/* Digest algorithm [0] */
+	u8	id_type;	/* Key identifier type [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] */
+	u8	signer_len;	/* Length of signer's name [0] */
+	u8	key_id_len;	/* Length of key identifier [0] */
+	u8	__pad[3];
+	__be32	sig_len;	/* Length of signature data */
+};
+
+int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, size_t file_len,
+		  const char *name);
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_MODULE_SIGNATURE_H */
init/Kconfig +4 -0
index 8b9ffe236e4f..c2286a3c74c5 100644
@@ -1852,6 +1852,10 @@ config BASE_SMALL
 	default 0 if BASE_FULL
 	default 1 if !BASE_FULL
 
+config MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+	def_bool n
+	select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+

menuconfig MODULES
bool "Enable loadable module support"
option modules

init/Kconfig +0 -0
@@ -1929,7 +1933,7 @@ config MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL

config MODULE_SIG
bool "Module signature verification"
depends on MODULES

init/Kconfig +1 -1
-	select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+	select MODULE_SIG_FORMAT

help
Check modules for valid signatures upon load: the signature is simply appended to the module. For more information see

kernel/Makefile +0 -0
index 33824f0385b3..f29ae2997a43 100644
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ endif

obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o +obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT) += module_signature.o obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_CORE) += crash_core.o

kernel/module.c +1 -0
index 6e6712b3aaf5..2712f4d217f5 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/extable.h>
 #include <linux/moduleloader.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
 #include <linux/trace_events.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/kallsyms.h>
kernel/module_signature.c new file +46 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4224a1086b7d
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Module signature checker
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells ([email protected])
+ */
+
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
+#include <asm/byteorder.h>
+
+/**
+ * mod_check_sig - check that the given signature is sane
+ *
+ * @ms:		Signature to check.
+ * @file_len:	Size of the file to which @ms is appended.
+ * @name:	What is being checked. Used for error messages.
+ */
+int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, size_t file_len,
+		  const char *name)
+{
+	if (be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len) >= file_len - sizeof(*ms))
+		return -EBADMSG;
+
+	if (ms->id_type != PKEY_ID_PKCS7) {
+		pr_err("%s: Module is not signed with expected PKCS#7 message\n",
+		       name);
+		return -ENOPKG;
+	}
+
+	if (ms->algo != 0 ||
+	    ms->hash != 0 ||
+	    ms->signer_len != 0 ||
+	    ms->key_id_len != 0 ||
+	    ms->__pad[0] != 0 ||
+	    ms->__pad[1] != 0 ||
+	    ms->__pad[2] != 0) {
+		pr_err("%s: PKCS#7 signature info has unexpected non-zero params\n",
+		       name);
+		return -EBADMSG;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
kernel/module_signing.c +8 -48
index 6b9a926fd86b..cdd04a6b8074 100644
@@ -11,37 +11,13 @@
 
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <crypto/public_key.h>
 #include "module-internal.h"
 
-enum pkey_id_type {
-	PKEY_ID_PGP,		/* OpenPGP generated key ID */
-	PKEY_ID_X509,		/* X.509 arbitrary subjectKeyIdentifier */
-	PKEY_ID_PKCS7,		/* Signature in PKCS#7 message */
-};
-
-/*
- * Module signature information block.
- *
- * The constituents of the signature section are, in order:
- *
- *	- Signer's name
- *	- Key identifier
- *	- Signature data
- *	- Information block
- */
-struct module_signature {
-	u8	algo;		/* Public-key crypto algorithm [0] */
-	u8	hash;		/* Digest algorithm [0] */
-	u8	id_type;	/* Key identifier type [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] */
-	u8	signer_len;	/* Length of signer's name [0] */
-	u8	key_id_len;	/* Length of key identifier [0] */
-	u8	__pad[3];
-	__be32	sig_len;	/* Length of signature data */
-};
-
 /*
 * Verify the signature on a module.
 */
@@ -49,6 +25,7 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
 {
 	struct module_signature ms;
 	size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len;
+	int ret;
 
 	pr_devel("=>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen);
 
@@ -56,32 +33,15 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
 		return -EBADMSG;
 
 	memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
-	modlen -= sizeof(ms);
+
+	ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, info->name);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len);
-	if (sig_len >= modlen)
-		return -EBADMSG;
-	modlen -= sig_len;
+	modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms);
 	info->len = modlen;
 
-	if (ms.id_type != PKEY_ID_PKCS7) {
-		pr_err("%s: Module is not signed with expected PKCS#7 message\n",
-		       info->name);
-		return -ENOPKG;
-	}
-
-	if (ms.algo != 0 ||
-	    ms.hash != 0 ||
-	    ms.signer_len != 0 ||
-	    ms.key_id_len != 0 ||
-	    ms.__pad[0] != 0 ||
-	    ms.__pad[1] != 0 ||
-	    ms.__pad[2] != 0) {
-		pr_err("%s: PKCS#7 signature info has unexpected non-zero params\n",
-		       info->name);
-		return -EBADMSG;
-	}
-
 	return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
 				      VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
 				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
scripts/Makefile +0 -0
index 9d442ee050bd..52098b080ab7 100644
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ hostprogs-$(CONFIG_VT)           += conmakehash

hostprogs-$(BUILD_C_RECORDMCOUNT) += recordmcount hostprogs-$(CONFIG_BUILDTIME_EXTABLE_SORT) += sortextable
hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_compiler

scripts/Makefile +1 -1
-hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)	 += sign-file
+hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT) += sign-file

hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += extract-cert hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_EXTRA_CERTIFICATE) += insert-sys-cert

#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v12 01/11] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions

Quoted 31 lines · Jessica Yu

+++ Thiago Jung Bauermann [27/06/19 23:19 -0300]:

Quoted 30 lines

IMA will use the module_signature format for append signatures, so export the relevant definitions and factor out the code which verifies that the appended signature trailer is valid.

Also, create a CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT option so that IMA can select it and be able to use mod_check_sig() without having to depend on either CONFIG_MODULE_SIG or CONFIG_MODULES.

---

include/linux/module.h           |  3 --
include/linux/module_signature.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
init/Kconfig                     |  6 +++-
kernel/Makefile                  |  1 +
kernel/module.c                  |  1 +
kernel/module_signature.c        | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/module_signing.c          | 56 +++++---------------------------
scripts/Makefile                 |  2 +-
8 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
include/linux/module.h +0 -0
index 188998d3dca9..aa56f531cf1e 100644
@@ -25,9 +25,6 @@
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
 #include <asm/module.h>
 
Quoted 5 lines

include/linux/module.h line 30

Quoted 3 lines
include/linux/module.h +0 -3
-/* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */
-#define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n"
-

Hi Thiago, apologies for the delay.

Hello Jessica, thanks for reviewing the patch!

Quoted 3 lines

It looks like arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c also relies on MODULE_SIG_STRING being defined, so module_signature.h will need to be included there too, otherwise we'll run into a compilation error.

Indeed. Thanks for spotting that. The patch below fixes it. It's identical to the previous version except for the changes in arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c and their description in the commit message. I'm also copying some s390 people in this email.

Quoted 3 lines

Other than that, the module-related changes look good to me:

Thank you very much!

Signature · 38 lines
Thiago Jung Bauermann
IBM Linux Technology Center


From 0ca180c66f4cff8b1fcd51f3457cc06dac2f0e81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 17 May 2018 21:46:12 -0300
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions

IMA will use the module_signature format for append signatures, so export
the relevant definitions and factor out the code which verifies that the
appended signature trailer is valid.

Also, create a CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT option so that IMA can select it
and be able to use mod_check_sig() without having to depend on either
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG or CONFIG_MODULES.

s390 duplicated the definition of struct module_signature so now they can
use the new <linux/module_signature.h> header instead.

Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jessica Yu <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Philipp Rudo <[email protected]>
---
 arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 24 +-----------
 include/linux/module.h                |  3 --
 include/linux/module_signature.h      | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++
 init/Kconfig                          |  6 ++-
 kernel/Makefile                       |  1 +
 kernel/module.c                       |  1 +
 kernel/module_signature.c             | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/module_signing.c               | 56 ++++-----------------------
 scripts/Makefile                      |  2 +-
 9 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/linux/module_signature.h
 create mode 100644 kernel/module_signature.c
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +1 -23
index fbdd3ea73667..1ac9fbc6e01e 100644
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 #include <linux/elf.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
-#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
 #include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <asm/boot_data.h>
 #include <asm/ipl.h>
@@ -23,28 +23,6 @@ const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = {
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
-/*
- * Module signature information block.
- *
- * The constituents of the signature section are, in order:
- *
- *	- Signer's name
- *	- Key identifier
- *	- Signature data
- *	- Information block
- */
-struct module_signature {
-	u8	algo;		/* Public-key crypto algorithm [0] */
-	u8	hash;		/* Digest algorithm [0] */
-	u8	id_type;	/* Key identifier type [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] */
-	u8	signer_len;	/* Length of signer's name [0] */
-	u8	key_id_len;	/* Length of key identifier [0] */
-	u8	__pad[3];
-	__be32	sig_len;	/* Length of signature data */
-};
-
-#define PKEY_ID_PKCS7 2
-
 int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
 	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
include/linux/module.h +0 -3
index 188998d3dca9..aa56f531cf1e 100644
@@ -25,9 +25,6 @@
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
 #include <asm/module.h>
 
-/* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */
-#define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n"
-
 /* Not Yet Implemented */
 #define MODULE_SUPPORTED_DEVICE(name)
 
include/linux/module_signature.h new file +44 -0

44 lines not on this page · raw message

init/Kconfig +5 -1
index 8b9ffe236e4f..c2286a3c74c5 100644
@@ -1852,6 +1852,10 @@ config BASE_SMALL
 	default 0 if BASE_FULL
 	default 1 if !BASE_FULL
 
+config MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+	def_bool n
+	select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+
 menuconfig MODULES
 	bool "Enable loadable module support"
 	option modules
@@ -1929,7 +1933,7 @@ config MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL
 config MODULE_SIG
 	bool "Module signature verification"
 	depends on MODULES
-	select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+	select MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
 	help
 	  Check modules for valid signatures upon load: the signature
 	  is simply appended to the module. For more information see
kernel/Makefile +1 -0
index 33824f0385b3..f29ae2997a43 100644
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ endif
 obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT) += module_signature.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_CORE) += crash_core.o
kernel/module.c +1 -0
index 6e6712b3aaf5..2712f4d217f5 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/extable.h>
 #include <linux/moduleloader.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
 #include <linux/trace_events.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/kallsyms.h>
kernel/module_signature.c new file +46 -0

46 lines not on this page · raw message

kernel/module_signing.c +8 -48

83 lines not on this page · raw message

scripts/Makefile +1 -1
index 9d442ee050bd..52098b080ab7 100644
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ hostprogs-$(CONFIG_VT)           += conmakehash
 hostprogs-$(BUILD_C_RECORDMCOUNT) += recordmcount
 hostprogs-$(CONFIG_BUILDTIME_EXTABLE_SORT) += sortextable
 hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1)	 += asn1_compiler
-hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)	 += sign-file
+hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT) += sign-file
 hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += extract-cert
 hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_EXTRA_CERTIFICATE) += insert-sys-cert
 
#21 lore raw
In reply to Mimi Zohar
Quoted 5 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 4 lines · Thiago Jung Bauermann

Hello,

This version is essentially identical to the last one.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

It is only a rebase on top of today's linux-integrity/next-queued-testing, prompted by conflicts with Prakhar Srivastava's patches to measure the kernel command line. It also drops two patches that are already present in that branch.

Thanks, Thiago. These patches are now in next-queued-testing waiting for some additional reviews/acks.

Thank you very much, Mimi! Now I think I'm only missing acks for the PKCS#7 changes in patches 2 and 3, and an ack for the s390 changes in patch 1.

Signature · 2 lines
Thiago Jung Bauermann
IBM Linux Technology Center
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v12 01/11] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions

In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann

Hi Thiago,

Quoted 41 lines · On Thu, 04 Jul 2019 03:42:57 -0300 Thiago Jung Bauermann…
Quoted 31 lines · Jessica Yu

+++ Thiago Jung Bauermann [27/06/19 23:19 -0300]:

Quoted 30 lines

IMA will use the module_signature format for append signatures, so export the relevant definitions and factor out the code which verifies that the appended signature trailer is valid.

Also, create a CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT option so that IMA can select it and be able to use mod_check_sig() without having to depend on either CONFIG_MODULE_SIG or CONFIG_MODULES.

---

include/linux/module.h           |  3 --
include/linux/module_signature.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
init/Kconfig                     |  6 +++-
kernel/Makefile                  |  1 +
kernel/module.c                  |  1 +
kernel/module_signature.c        | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/module_signing.c          | 56 +++++---------------------------
scripts/Makefile                 |  2 +-
8 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
include/linux/module.h +0 -0
index 188998d3dca9..aa56f531cf1e 100644
@@ -25,9 +25,6 @@
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
 #include <asm/module.h>
 
Quoted 5 lines

include/linux/module.h line 30

Quoted 3 lines
include/linux/module.h +0 -3
-/* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */
-#define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n"
-  

Hi Thiago, apologies for the delay.

Hello Jessica, thanks for reviewing the patch!

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines

It looks like arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c also relies on MODULE_SIG_STRING being defined, so module_signature.h will need to be included there too, otherwise we'll run into a compilation error.

Indeed. Thanks for spotting that. The patch below fixes it. It's identical to the previous version except for the changes in arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c and their description in the commit message. I'm also copying some s390 people in this email.

to me the s390 part looks good but for one minor nit.

In arch/s390/Kconfig KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG currently depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION. I'd prefer when you update this to the new MODULE_SIG_FORMAT. It shouldn't make any difference right now, as we don't use mod_check_sig in our code path. But it could cause problems in the future, when more code might be shared.

Thanks
Philipp

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Other than that, the module-related changes look good to me:

Thank you very much!

#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v12 01/11] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions

Hello Philipp,

Quoted 51 lines · Philipp Rudo

Hi Thiago,

Quoted 45 lines · On Thu, 04 Jul 2019 03:42:57 -0300 Thiago Jung Bauermann…
Quoted 31 lines · Jessica Yu

+++ Thiago Jung Bauermann [27/06/19 23:19 -0300]:

Quoted 30 lines

IMA will use the module_signature format for append signatures, so export the relevant definitions and factor out the code which verifies that the appended signature trailer is valid.

Also, create a CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT option so that IMA can select it and be able to use mod_check_sig() without having to depend on either CONFIG_MODULE_SIG or CONFIG_MODULES.

---

include/linux/module.h           |  3 --
include/linux/module_signature.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
init/Kconfig                     |  6 +++-
kernel/Makefile                  |  1 +
kernel/module.c                  |  1 +
kernel/module_signature.c        | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/module_signing.c          | 56 +++++---------------------------
scripts/Makefile                 |  2 +-
8 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
include/linux/module.h +0 -0
index 188998d3dca9..aa56f531cf1e 100644
@@ -25,9 +25,6 @@
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
 #include <asm/module.h>
 
Quoted 5 lines

include/linux/module.h line 30

Quoted 3 lines
include/linux/module.h +0 -3
-/* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */
-#define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n"
-  

Hi Thiago, apologies for the delay.

Hello Jessica, thanks for reviewing the patch!

Quoted 3 lines

It looks like arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c also relies on MODULE_SIG_STRING being defined, so module_signature.h will need to be included there too, otherwise we'll run into a compilation error.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Indeed. Thanks for spotting that. The patch below fixes it. It's identical to the previous version except for the changes in arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c and their description in the commit message. I'm also copying some s390 people in this email.

to me the s390 part looks good but for one minor nit.

Thanks for the prompt review!

Quoted 5 lines

In arch/s390/Kconfig KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG currently depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION. I'd prefer when you update this to the new MODULE_SIG_FORMAT. It shouldn't make any difference right now, as we don't use mod_check_sig in our code path. But it could cause problems in the future, when more code might be shared.

Makes sense. Here is the updated patch with the Kconfig change.

Signature · 39 lines
Thiago Jung Bauermann
IBM Linux Technology Center


From d0e870a6eccc7126c0416ad7369888052c15eb18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 17 May 2018 21:46:12 -0300
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions

IMA will use the module_signature format for append signatures, so export
the relevant definitions and factor out the code which verifies that the
appended signature trailer is valid.

Also, create a CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT option so that IMA can select it
and be able to use mod_check_sig() without having to depend on either
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG or CONFIG_MODULES.

s390 duplicated the definition of struct module_signature so now they can
use the new <linux/module_signature.h> header instead.

Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jessica Yu <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Philipp Rudo <[email protected]>
---
 arch/s390/Kconfig                     |  2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 24 +-----------
 include/linux/module.h                |  3 --
 include/linux/module_signature.h      | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++
 init/Kconfig                          |  6 ++-
 kernel/Makefile                       |  1 +
 kernel/module.c                       |  1 +
 kernel/module_signature.c             | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/module_signing.c               | 56 ++++-----------------------
 scripts/Makefile                      |  2 +-
 10 files changed, 108 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/linux/module_signature.h
 create mode 100644 kernel/module_signature.c
arch/s390/Kconfig +1 -1
index 109243fdb6ec..446b7ffa1294 100644
@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
 
 config KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
 	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
-	depends on KEXEC_FILE && SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
 	help
 	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
 	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +1 -23
index fbdd3ea73667..1ac9fbc6e01e 100644
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 #include <linux/elf.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
-#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
 #include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <asm/boot_data.h>
 #include <asm/ipl.h>
@@ -23,28 +23,6 @@ const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = {
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
-/*
- * Module signature information block.
- *
- * The constituents of the signature section are, in order:
- *
- *	- Signer's name
- *	- Key identifier
- *	- Signature data
- *	- Information block
- */
-struct module_signature {
-	u8	algo;		/* Public-key crypto algorithm [0] */
-	u8	hash;		/* Digest algorithm [0] */
-	u8	id_type;	/* Key identifier type [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] */
-	u8	signer_len;	/* Length of signer's name [0] */
-	u8	key_id_len;	/* Length of key identifier [0] */
-	u8	__pad[3];
-	__be32	sig_len;	/* Length of signature data */
-};
-
-#define PKEY_ID_PKCS7 2
-
 int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
 	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
include/linux/module.h +0 -3
index 188998d3dca9..aa56f531cf1e 100644
@@ -25,9 +25,6 @@
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
 #include <asm/module.h>
 
-/* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */
-#define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n"
-
 /* Not Yet Implemented */
 #define MODULE_SUPPORTED_DEVICE(name)
 
include/linux/module_signature.h new file +44 -0

44 lines not on this page · raw message

init/Kconfig +5 -1
index 8b9ffe236e4f..c2286a3c74c5 100644
@@ -1852,6 +1852,10 @@ config BASE_SMALL
 	default 0 if BASE_FULL
 	default 1 if !BASE_FULL
 
+config MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+	def_bool n
+	select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+
 menuconfig MODULES
 	bool "Enable loadable module support"
 	option modules
@@ -1929,7 +1933,7 @@ config MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL
 config MODULE_SIG
 	bool "Module signature verification"
 	depends on MODULES
-	select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+	select MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
 	help
 	  Check modules for valid signatures upon load: the signature
 	  is simply appended to the module. For more information see
kernel/Makefile +1 -0
index 33824f0385b3..f29ae2997a43 100644
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ endif
 obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT) += module_signature.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_CORE) += crash_core.o
kernel/module.c +1 -0
index 6e6712b3aaf5..2712f4d217f5 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/extable.h>
 #include <linux/moduleloader.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
 #include <linux/trace_events.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/kallsyms.h>
kernel/module_signature.c new file +46 -0

46 lines not on this page · raw message

kernel/module_signing.c +8 -48

83 lines not on this page · raw message

scripts/Makefile +1 -1
index 9d442ee050bd..52098b080ab7 100644
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ hostprogs-$(CONFIG_VT)           += conmakehash
 hostprogs-$(BUILD_C_RECORDMCOUNT) += recordmcount
 hostprogs-$(CONFIG_BUILDTIME_EXTABLE_SORT) += sortextable
 hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1)	 += asn1_compiler
-hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)	 += sign-file
+hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT) += sign-file
 hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += extract-cert
 hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_EXTRA_CERTIFICATE) += insert-sys-cert
 
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v12 01/11] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions

Hi Thiago,

Quoted 64 lines · On Thu, 04 Jul 2019 15:57:34 -0300 Thiago Jung Bauermann…

Hello Philipp,

Quoted 51 lines · Philipp Rudo

Hi Thiago,

Quoted 45 lines · On Thu, 04 Jul 2019 03:42:57 -0300 Thiago Jung Bauermann…
Quoted 31 lines · Jessica Yu

+++ Thiago Jung Bauermann [27/06/19 23:19 -0300]:

Quoted 30 lines

IMA will use the module_signature format for append signatures, so export the relevant definitions and factor out the code which verifies that the appended signature trailer is valid.

Also, create a CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT option so that IMA can select it and be able to use mod_check_sig() without having to depend on either CONFIG_MODULE_SIG or CONFIG_MODULES.

---

include/linux/module.h           |  3 --
include/linux/module_signature.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
init/Kconfig                     |  6 +++-
kernel/Makefile                  |  1 +
kernel/module.c                  |  1 +
kernel/module_signature.c        | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/module_signing.c          | 56 +++++---------------------------
scripts/Makefile                 |  2 +-
8 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
include/linux/module.h +0 -0
index 188998d3dca9..aa56f531cf1e 100644
@@ -25,9 +25,6 @@
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
 #include <asm/module.h>
 
Quoted 5 lines

include/linux/module.h line 30

Quoted 3 lines
include/linux/module.h +0 -3
-/* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */
-#define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n"
-    

Hi Thiago, apologies for the delay.

Hello Jessica, thanks for reviewing the patch!

Quoted 3 lines

It looks like arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c also relies on MODULE_SIG_STRING being defined, so module_signature.h will need to be included there too, otherwise we'll run into a compilation error.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Indeed. Thanks for spotting that. The patch below fixes it. It's identical to the previous version except for the changes in arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c and their description in the commit message. I'm also copying some s390 people in this email.

to me the s390 part looks good but for one minor nit.

Thanks for the prompt review!

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines

In arch/s390/Kconfig KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG currently depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION. I'd prefer when you update this to the new MODULE_SIG_FORMAT. It shouldn't make any difference right now, as we don't use mod_check_sig in our code path. But it could cause problems in the future, when more code might be shared.

Makes sense. Here is the updated patch with the Kconfig change.

The patch looks good now.

Thanks a lot
PHilipp

#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v12 01/11] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions

Hello Philipp,

Quoted 75 lines · Philipp Rudo

Hi Thiago,

Quoted 70 lines · On Thu, 04 Jul 2019 15:57:34 -0300 Thiago Jung Bauermann…

Hello Philipp,

Quoted 51 lines · Philipp Rudo

Hi Thiago,

Quoted 45 lines · On Thu, 04 Jul 2019 03:42:57 -0300 Thiago Jung Bauermann…
Quoted 31 lines · Jessica Yu

+++ Thiago Jung Bauermann [27/06/19 23:19 -0300]:

Quoted 30 lines

IMA will use the module_signature format for append signatures, so export the relevant definitions and factor out the code which verifies that the appended signature trailer is valid.

Also, create a CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT option so that IMA can select it and be able to use mod_check_sig() without having to depend on either CONFIG_MODULE_SIG or CONFIG_MODULES.

---

include/linux/module.h           |  3 --
include/linux/module_signature.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
init/Kconfig                     |  6 +++-
kernel/Makefile                  |  1 +
kernel/module.c                  |  1 +
kernel/module_signature.c        | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/module_signing.c          | 56 +++++---------------------------
scripts/Makefile                 |  2 +-
8 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
include/linux/module.h +0 -0
index 188998d3dca9..aa56f531cf1e 100644
@@ -25,9 +25,6 @@
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
 #include <asm/module.h>
 
Quoted 5 lines

include/linux/module.h line 30

Quoted 3 lines
include/linux/module.h +0 -3
-/* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */
-#define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n"
-    

Hi Thiago, apologies for the delay.

Hello Jessica, thanks for reviewing the patch!

Quoted 3 lines

It looks like arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c also relies on MODULE_SIG_STRING being defined, so module_signature.h will need to be included there too, otherwise we'll run into a compilation error.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Indeed. Thanks for spotting that. The patch below fixes it. It's identical to the previous version except for the changes in arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c and their description in the commit message. I'm also copying some s390 people in this email.

to me the s390 part looks good but for one minor nit.

Thanks for the prompt review!

Quoted 5 lines

In arch/s390/Kconfig KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG currently depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION. I'd prefer when you update this to the new MODULE_SIG_FORMAT. It shouldn't make any difference right now, as we don't use mod_check_sig in our code path. But it could cause problems in the future, when more code might be shared.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Makes sense. Here is the updated patch with the Kconfig change.

The patch looks good now.

Thanks! Can I add your Reviewed-by?

Signature · 2 lines
Thiago Jung Bauermann
IBM Linux Technology Center
Reviewed-by
#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v12 01/11] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions

Hi Thiago,

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

The patch looks good now.

Thanks! Can I add your Reviewed-by?

sorry, for the late answer, but I was on vacation the last two weeks. I hope it's not too late now.

maintainer
#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v12 01/11] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions

Quoted 10 lines · Philipp Rudo

Hi Thiago,

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

The patch looks good now.

Thanks! Can I add your Reviewed-by?

sorry, for the late answer, but I was on vacation the last two weeks. I hope it's not too late now.

Thanks!  This patch set is still in the #next-queued-testing branch.  I'm still hoping for a few more tags, before pushing it out to the #next-integrity branch later today.

Mimi

#22 lore raw
In reply to Thiago Jung Bauermann
Quoted 10 lines · Thiago Jung Bauermann

On the OpenPOWER platform, secure boot and trusted boot are being implemented using IMA for taking measurements and verifying signatures. Since the kernel image on Power servers is an ELF binary, kernels are signed using the scripts/sign-file tool and thus use the same signature format as signed kernel modules.

This patch series adds support in IMA for verifying those signatures. It adds flexibility to OpenPOWER secure boot, because it allows it to boot kernels with the signature appended to them as well as kernels where the signature is stored in the IMA extended attribute.

I know this is pretty late, but I just wanted to let you know that I tested this patch set on x86_64 with QEMU.

That is, I enrolled a key to _ima keyring, signed my kernel and modules with appended signatures (with scripts/sign-file), set the IMA policy to appraise and measure my kernel and modules. Also tested kexec appraisal.

You can add my tested-by if you'd like.

-Jordan

#23 lore raw

Hello Jordan,

Quoted 12 lines · Jordan Hand
Quoted 10 lines · Thiago Jung Bauermann

On the OpenPOWER platform, secure boot and trusted boot are being implemented using IMA for taking measurements and verifying signatures. Since the kernel image on Power servers is an ELF binary, kernels are signed using the scripts/sign-file tool and thus use the same signature format as signed kernel modules.

This patch series adds support in IMA for verifying those signatures. It adds flexibility to OpenPOWER secure boot, because it allows it to boot kernels with the signature appended to them as well as kernels where the signature is stored in the IMA extended attribute.

Quoted 8 lines

I know this is pretty late, but I just wanted to let you know that I tested this patch set on x86_64 with QEMU.

That is, I enrolled a key to _ima keyring, signed my kernel and modules with appended signatures (with scripts/sign-file), set the IMA policy to appraise and measure my kernel and modules. Also tested kexec appraisal.

You can add my tested-by if you'd like.

Thanks for testing!

Signature · 2 lines
Thiago Jung Bauermann
IBM Linux Technology Center
maintainer
#24 lore raw
In reply to Jordan Hand

Hi Jordan,

Quoted 12 lines · Jordan Hand
Quoted 10 lines · Thiago Jung Bauermann

On the OpenPOWER platform, secure boot and trusted boot are being implemented using IMA for taking measurements and verifying signatures. Since the kernel image on Power servers is an ELF binary, kernels are signed using the scripts/sign-file tool and thus use the same signature format as signed kernel modules.

This patch series adds support in IMA for verifying those signatures. It adds flexibility to OpenPOWER secure boot, because it allows it to boot kernels with the signature appended to them as well as kernels where the signature is stored in the IMA extended attribute.

Quoted 8 lines

I know this is pretty late, but I just wanted to let you know that I tested this patch set on x86_64 with QEMU.

That is, I enrolled a key to _ima keyring, signed my kernel and modules with appended signatures (with scripts/sign-file), set the IMA policy to appraise and measure my kernel and modules. Also tested kexec appraisal.

You can add my tested-by if you'd like.

I really appreciate your testing.  Based on the recent Documentation/maintainer/rebasing-and-merging.rst,  I'm trying not to rebase patches already staged in linux-next.  Patches are first being staged in the next-queued-testing branch.

FYI, I just posted a patch that adds IMA appended signature support to test_kexec_file_load.sh.

thanks,

Mimi