ima-evm-utils: Assorted fixes and improvements
cover ima-evm-utils: Assorted fixes and improvements
There is small fixes and improvements to ima-evm-utils. Tested on x86_64.
Vitaly Chikunov (5):
ima-evm-utils: Fix EVP_MD_CTX leak in ima_calc_hash
ima-evm-utils: Fix memory leak in init_public_keys
ima-evm-utils: Preload public keys for ima_verify
ima-evm-utils: Allow multiple files in ima_verify
ima-evm-utils: Fix clang warning about possible unaligned pointer for
hdr->keyid
src/evmctl.c | 11 ++++++++--- src/libimaevm.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
PATCH 1/5 ima-evm-utils: Fix EVP_MD_CTX leak in ima_calc_hash
When pctx is allocated using EVP_MD_CTX_new() it should be freed. Found with ASan.
--- src/libimaevm.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
src/libimaevm.c +16 -8
@@ -252,19 +252,21 @@ int ima_calc_hash(const char *file, uint8_t *hash) err =lstat (file, &st);if (err <0 ) {log_err ("Failed to stat: %s\n" , file); -return err; + goto err; } md =EVP_get_digestbyname (params.hash_algo);if (!md) {log_err ("EVP_get_digestbyname(%s) failed\n" , params.hash_algo); -return 1 ; + err =1 ; + goto err; } err =EVP_DigestInit (pctx, md);if (!err) {log_err ("EVP_DigestInit() failed\n" ); -return 1 ; + err =1 ; + goto err; }switch (st.st_mode &S_IFMT ) {
@@ -283,19 +285,25 @@ int ima_calc_hash(const char *file, uint8_t *hash)break ;default :log_errno ("Unsupported file type" ); -return -1 ; + err =-1 ; + goto err; }if (err) -return err; + goto err; err =EVP_DigestFinal (pctx, hash, &mdlen);if (!err) {log_err ("EVP_DigestFinal() failed\n" ); -return 1 ; + err =1 ; + goto err; } - -return mdlen; + err = mdlen; +err: +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >=0x10100000 +EVP_MD_CTX_free (pctx); +#endif +return err; }EVP_PKEY *read_pub_pkey (const char *keyfile,int x509)
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
PATCH 2/5 ima-evm-utils: Fix memory leak in init_public_keys
In reply to Vitaly Chikunovstrdup'ed string should be freed. Found with ASan.
--- src/libimaevm.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
src/libimaevm.c +3 -1
@@ -421,11 +421,12 @@ static EVP_PKEY *find_keyid(uint32_t keyid)void init_public_keys (const char *keyfiles) {struct public_key_entry *entry; -char *tmp_keyfiles; +char *tmp_keyfiles, *keyfiles_free;char *keyfile;int i =1 ; tmp_keyfiles =strdup (keyfiles); + keyfiles_free = tmp_keyfiles;while ((keyfile =strsep (&tmp_keyfiles,", \t" )) !=NULL ) {if (!keyfile)
@@ -452,6 +453,7 @@ void init_public_keys(const char *keyfiles) entry->next = public_keys; public_keys = entry; } +free (keyfiles_free); }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
PATCH 3/5 ima-evm-utils: Preload public keys for ima_verify
In reply to Vitaly ChikunovThis allows testing verify_hash_v2() with multiple public keys.
--- src/evmctl.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
src/evmctl.c +3 -0
@@ -840,6 +840,9 @@ static int cmd_verify_ima(struct command *cmd)char *file = g_argv[optind++];int err; +if (params.keyfile) +init_public_keys (params.keyfile); + errno =0 ;if (!file) {log_err ("Parameters missing\n" );
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
PATCH 4/5 ima-evm-utils: Allow multiple files in ima_verify
In reply to Vitaly ChikunovThis allows testing multiple verify in a row, similar to ima_measurement.
--- src/evmctl.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
src/evmctl.c +5 -3
@@ -850,9 +850,11 @@ static int cmd_verify_ima(struct command *cmd)return -1 ; } - err =verify_ima (file); -if (!err && params.verbose >=LOG_INFO ) -log_info ("%s: verification is OK\n" , file); +do { + err =verify_ima (file); +if (!err && params.verbose >=LOG_INFO ) +log_info ("%s: verification is OK\n" , file); + }while ((file = g_argv[optind++]));return err; }
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
PATCH 5/5 ima-evm-utils: Fix clang warning about possible unaligned pointer for hdr->keyid
In reply to Vitaly ChikunovStruct signature_v2_hdr is packed so clang complains that taking address of packed member may result in an unaligned pointer value:
libimaevm.c:481:21: warning: taking address of packed member 'keyid' of class or structure 'signature_v2_hdr' may result in an unaligned pointer value
[-Waddress-of-packed-member]
__be32_to_cpup(&hdr->keyid));
^~~~~~~~~~libimaevm.c:905:17: warning: taking address of packed member 'keyid' of class or structure 'signature_v2_hdr' may result in an unaligned pointer value
[-Waddress-of-packed-member]
calc_keyid_v2(&hdr->keyid, name, pkey);
^~~~~~~~~~--- src/libimaevm.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
src/libimaevm.c +7 -3
@@ -475,10 +475,12 @@ int verify_hash_v2(const char *file, const unsigned char *hash, int size, }if (public_keys) { - pkey =find_keyid (hdr->keyid); +uint32_t keyid = hdr->keyid; + + pkey =find_keyid (keyid);if (!pkey) {log_err ("%s: unknown keyid: %x\n" , file, -__be32_to_cpup (&hdr->keyid)); +__be32_to_cpup (&keyid));return -1 ; } }else {
@@ -869,6 +871,7 @@ int sign_hash_v2(const char *algo, const unsigned char *hash, int size, const chconst EVP_MD *md;size_t sigsize;const char *st; +uint32_t keyid;if (!hash) {log_err ("sign_hash_v2: hash is null\n" );
@@ -902,7 +905,8 @@ int sign_hash_v2(const char *algo, const unsigned char *hash, int size, const ch hdr->hash_algo =get_hash_algo (algo); -calc_keyid_v2 (&hdr->keyid, name, pkey); +calc_keyid_v2 (&keyid, name, pkey); + hdr->keyid = keyid; st ="EVP_PKEY_CTX_new" ;if (!(ctx =EVP_PKEY_CTX_new (pkey,NULL )))
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
Mimi Zohar
maintainer[Cc'ing Roberto, Petr, Thiago, Prakhar]
Hi Vitaly,
Quoted 9 lines · Vitaly Chikunov
There is small fixes and improvements to ima-evm-utils. Tested on
x86_64.Vitaly Chikunov (5):
ima-evm-utils: FixEVP_MD_CTXleak inima_calc_hash
ima-evm-utils: Fix memory leak ininit_public_keys
ima-evm-utils: Preload public keys forima_verify
ima-evm-utils: Allow multiple files inima_verify
ima-evm-utils: Fix clang warning about possible unaligned pointer for
Quoted 5 lines
hdr->keyidsrc/evmctl.c | 11 ++++++++--- src/libimaevm.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
Thanks, this patch set looks good. These patches, the "ima-evm-utils:
Convert v2 signatures from RSA to EVP_PKEY AP", and the two patches I posted today are now in #next, but I'd really appreciate some additional Review's/Tested's on these patches.
Now that we're including ALL the kernel exported hash_info algorithms, a colleague suggested defining a list of deprecated hash algorithms. Instead of preventing the usage of these deprecated hash algorithms, initially I would start out with a warning. It would be helpful to indicate which standard deprecated the hash algorithm and year. At some point, we might want to prevent their usage in signing files, but not verifying file signatures.
evmctl "ima_measurement" doesn't support custom template definitions. Also missing is support for verifying the "ima-buf" kexec command boot command line and the "ima-modsig" template appended signature.
David Jacobson started writing a regression framework and posted a v2 version. I'd really appreciate help with cleaning up that code.
Any other comments/suggestions/ideas?
thanks,
Mimi
Mimi,
Quoted 8 lines · Mimi Zohar
[Cc'ing Roberto, Petr, Thiago, Prakhar]
Now that we're including ALL the kernel exportedhash_infoalgorithms, a colleague suggested defining a list of deprecated hash algorithms. Instead of preventing the usage of these deprecated hash algorithms, initially I would start out with a warning. It would be helpful to indicate which standard deprecated the hash algorithm and year. At some point, we might want to prevent their usage in signing files, but not verifying file signatures.
I think this is not a problem, because user explicitly states which hash algorithm he wants to use. Except for SHA1, which is also silent fallback algorithm. I think this fallback mechanism should be removed.
Also, return values of sign_hash/ima_calc_hash/etc are not defined clearly and callers have weird checks such as if (len <= 1). I think this should be conceptually simplified and made them return -1 on any error.
Quoted 6 lines
evmctl "
ima_measurement" doesn't support custom template definitions. Also missing is support for verifying the "ima-buf" kexec command boot command line and the "ima-modsig" template appended signature.David Jacobson started writing a regression framework and posted a v2 version. I'd really appreciate help with cleaning up that code.
Maybe tests should be integrated into ima-evm-utils too.
Thanks,
Mimi Zohar
maintainerQuoted 10 lines · Vitaly Chikunov
Quoted 8 lines · Mimi Zohar
[Cc'ing Roberto, Petr, Thiago, Prakhar]
Now that we're including ALL the kernel exportedhash_infoalgorithms, a colleague suggested defining a list of deprecated hash algorithms. Instead of preventing the usage of these deprecated hash algorithms, initially I would start out with a warning. It would be helpful to indicate which standard deprecated the hash algorithm and year. At some point, we might want to prevent their usage in signing files, but not verifying file signatures.
Quoted 3 lines
I think this is not a problem, because user explicitly states which hash algorithm he wants to use. Except for SHA1, which is also silent fallback algorithm. I think this fallback mechanism should be removed.
I don't see a problem with informing whoever is using ima-evm-utils, that the requested hash algorithm has been deprecated. Just as NIST has deprecated the use of sha1 for most usecases, certain versions of the gost standard have also been deprecated.
Someone verifying the measurement list or the filesystem signatures should be informed that although the verification succeeded, or not, some of the signatures verified were based on deprecated hash algorithms. Maybe something along the lines of "<algorithm> hash algorithm was deprecated (<year> - <standard>)"? In verbose mode, the message could include the filename.
The EVM hmac is still sha1 based, but that shouldn't affect ima-evm- utils. So yes we should explicitly require a valid hash algorithm and not fall back to using sha1.
Quoted 5 lines
Also, return values of sign_hash/ima_calc_hash/etc are not defined clearly and callers have weird checks such as
if (len <= 1). I think this should be conceptually simplified and made themreturn -1on any error.
Agreed. Mostly these functions are returning "-1" on error. There are a few places returning 1 instead.
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 8 lines
evmctl "
ima_measurement" doesn't support custom template definitions. Also missing is support for verifying the "ima-buf" kexec command boot command line and the "ima-modsig" template appended signature.David Jacobson started writing a regression framework and posted a v2 version. I'd really appreciate help with cleaning up that code.
Maybe tests should be integrated into ima-evm-utils too.
Including regression tests in ima-evm-utils is the plan. :)
Mimi
Hi Mimi, Vitaly,
Quoted 11 lines
Mimi,
Quoted 8 lines · Mimi Zohar
[Cc'ing Roberto, Petr, Thiago, Prakhar]
Now that we're including ALL the kernel exportedhash_infoalgorithms, a colleague suggested defining a list of deprecated hash algorithms. Instead of preventing the usage of these deprecated hash algorithms, initially I would start out with a warning. It would be helpful to indicate which standard deprecated the hash algorithm and year. At some point, we might want to prevent their usage in signing files, but not verifying file signatures.
Looks useful to me.
Quoted 3 lines
I think this is not a problem, because user explicitly states which hash algorithm he wants to use. Except for SHA1, which is also silent fallback algorithm. I think this fallback mechanism should be removed.
Agree with removing fallback mechanism.
Quoted 6 lines
Also, return values of sign_hash/ima_calc_hash/etc are not defined clearly and callers have weird checks such as
if (len <= 1). I think this should be conceptually simplified and made themreturn -1on any error.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
evmctl "
ima_measurement" doesn't support custom template definitions. Also missing is support for verifying the "ima-buf" kexec command boot command line and the "ima-modsig" template appended signature.David Jacobson started writing a regression framework and posted a v2 version. I'd really appreciate help with cleaning up that code.
Maybe tests should be integrated into ima-evm-utils too.
https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-integrity/list/?series=95303
Quoted 1 line
Thanks,
Kind regards,
Petr
Re: [PATCH v1 4/5] ima-evm-utils: Allow multiple files in ima_verify
In reply to Vitaly ChikunovMimi,
Quoted 13 lines · Vitaly Chikunov
This allows testing multiple verify in a row, similar to
ima_measurement.Signed-off-by Vitaly Chikunov <[email protected]>--- src/evmctl.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)src/evmctl.c +0
-0@@ -850,9 +850,11 @@ static int cmd_verify_ima(struct command *cmd)return -1 ;
src/evmctl.c static int cmd_verify_ima(struct command *cmd) · line 857
Quoted 10 lines
src/evmctl.c +5
-3} - err =verify_ima (file); -if (!err && params.verbose >=LOG_INFO ) -log_info ("%s: verification is OK\n" , file); +do { + err =verify_ima (file); +if (!err && params.verbose >=LOG_INFO ) +log_info ("%s: verification is OK\n" , file); + }while ((file = g_argv[optind++]));
Currently `err' is affected only by the last verified file. But I think value of err should be affected by results from all files. But how? Should we AND verification results or OR? I think it should be ANDed and will send new version of this patch.
Thanks,
Quoted 5 lines
src/evmctl.c +0
-0return err; }Signature · 1 line
2.11.0