4.19.62-stable review
Subsystems (4)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 11/50 net: neigh: fix multiple neigh timer scheduling
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 071c37983d99da07797294ea78e9da1a6e287144 ]
Neigh timer can be scheduled multiple times from userspace adding multiple neigh entries and forcing the neigh timer scheduling passing NTF_USE in the netlink requests.
This will result in a refcount leak and in the following dump stack:
[ 32.465295] NEIGH: BUG, double timer add, state is 8 [ 32.465308] CPU: 0 PID: 416 Comm: double_timer_ad Not tainted 5.2.0+ #65 [ 32.465311] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.12.0-2.fc30 04/01/2014 [ 32.465313] Call Trace: [ 32.465318] dump_stack+0x7c/0xc0 [ 32.465323] __neigh_event_send+0x20c/0x880 [ 32.465326] ? ___neigh_create+0x846/0xfb0 [ 32.465329] ? neigh_lookup+0x2a9/0x410 [ 32.465332] ? neightbl_fill_info.constprop.0+0x800/0x800 [ 32.465334] neigh_add+0x4f8/0x5e0 [ 32.465337] ? neigh_xmit+0x620/0x620 [ 32.465341] ? find_held_lock+0x85/0xa0 [ 32.465345] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x204/0x570 [ 32.465348] ? rtnl_dellink+0x450/0x450 [ 32.465351] ? mark_held_locks+0x90/0x90 [ 32.465354] ? match_held_lock+0x1b/0x230 [ 32.465357] netlink_rcv_skb+0xc4/0x1d0 [ 32.465360] ? rtnl_dellink+0x450/0x450 [ 32.465363] ? netlink_ack+0x420/0x420 [ 32.465366] ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x115/0x560 [ 32.465369] ? __alloc_skb+0xc9/0x2f0 [ 32.465372] netlink_unicast+0x270/0x330 [ 32.465375] ? netlink_attachskb+0x2f0/0x2f0 [ 32.465378] netlink_sendmsg+0x34f/0x5a0 [ 32.465381] ? netlink_unicast+0x330/0x330 [ 32.465385] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.0+0x20/0x20 [ 32.465388] ? netlink_unicast+0x330/0x330 [ 32.465391] sock_sendmsg+0x91/0xa0 [ 32.465394] ___sys_sendmsg+0x407/0x480 [ 32.465397] ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x200/0x200 [ 32.465401] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x37/0x40 [ 32.465404] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x17d/0x250 [ 32.465407] ? __wake_up_common_lock+0xcb/0x110 [ 32.465410] ? __wake_up_common+0x230/0x230 [ 32.465413] ? netlink_bind+0x3e1/0x490 [ 32.465416] ? netlink_setsockopt+0x540/0x540 [ 32.465420] ? __fget_light+0x9c/0xf0 [ 32.465423] ? sockfd_lookup_light+0x8c/0xb0 [ 32.465426] __sys_sendmsg+0xa5/0x110 [ 32.465429] ? __ia32_sys_shutdown+0x30/0x30 [ 32.465432] ? __fd_install+0xe1/0x2c0 [ 32.465435] ? lockdep_hardirqs_off+0xb5/0x100 [ 32.465438] ? mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90 [ 32.465441] ? do_syscall_64+0xf/0x270 [ 32.465444] do_syscall_64+0x63/0x270 [ 32.465448] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Fix the issue unscheduling neigh_timer if selected entry is in 'IN_TIMER' receiving a netlink request with NTF_USE flag set
--- net/core/neighbour.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/core/neighbour.c +2 -0
@@ -1021,6 +1021,7 @@ int __neigh_event_send(struct neighbouratomic_set (&neigh->probes,NEIGH_VAR (neigh->parms,UCAST_PROBES )); +neigh_del_timer (neigh); neigh->nud_state =NUD_INCOMPLETE ; neigh->updated = now; next = now + max(NEIGH_VAR(neigh->parms, RETRANS_TIME),
@@ -1037,6 +1038,7 @@ int __neigh_event_send(struct neighbour } }else if (neigh->nud_state &NUD_STALE ) {neigh_dbg (2 ,"neigh %p is delayed\n" , neigh); +neigh_del_timer (neigh); neigh->nud_state =NUD_DELAY ; neigh->updated = jiffies; neigh_add_timer(neigh, jiffies +
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 10/50 net: make skb_dst_force return true when dst is refcounted
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b60a77386b1d4868f72f6353d35dabe5fbe981f2 ]
netfilter did not expect that skb_dst_force() can cause skb to lose its dst entry.
I got a bug report with a skb->dst NULL dereference in netfilter output path. The backtrace contains nf_reinject(), so the dst might have been cleared when skb got queued to userspace.
Other users were fixed via
if (skb_dst(skb)) {
skb_dst_force(skb);
if (!skb_dst(skb))
goto handle_err;
}But I think its preferable to make the 'dst might be cleared' part of the function explicit.
In netfilter case, skb with a null dst is expected when queueing in prerouting hook, so drop skb for the other hooks.
v2:
v1 of this patch returned true in case skb had no dst entry. Eric said:
Say if we have two skb_dst_force() calls for some reason on the same skb, only the first one will return false.
This now returns false even when skb had no dst, as per Erics suggestion, so callers might need to check skb_dst() first before skb_dst_force().
--- include/net/dst.h | 5 ++++- net/netfilter/nf_queue.c | 6 +++++- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/net/dst.h +4 -1
@@ -313,8 +313,9 @@ static inline bool dst_hold_safe(struct* @skb: buffer * * If dst is not yet refcounted and not destroyed, grab a ref on it. +* Returns true if dst is refcounted. */ -static inline void skb_dst_force (struct sk_buff *skb) +static inline bool skb_dst_force (struct sk_buff *skb) {if (skb_dst_is_noref (skb)) {struct dst_entry *dst =skb_dst (skb);
@@ -325,6 +326,8 @@ static inline void skb_dst_force(struct skb->_skb_refdst = (unsigned long )dst; } + +return skb->_skb_refdst !=0UL ; }
net/netfilter/nf_queue.c +5 -1
@@ -174,6 +174,11 @@ static int __nf_queue(struct sk_buff *sk goto err; } +if (!skb_dst_force (skb) && state->hook !=NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING ) { + status = -ENETDOWN ; + goto err; + } + *entry = (struct nf_queue_entry ) { .skb = skb, .state = *state,
@@ -182,7 +187,6 @@ static int __nf_queue(struct sk_buff *sk };nf_queue_entry_get_refs (entry); -skb_dst_force (skb);switch (entry->state.pf) {case AF_INET :
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 12/50 net: openvswitch: fix csum updates for MPLS actions
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: John Hurley <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0e3183cd2a64843a95b62f8bd4a83605a4cf0615 ]
Skbs may have their checksum value populated by HW. If this is a checksum calculated over the entire packet then the CHECKSUM_COMPLETE field is marked. Changes to the data pointer on the skb throughout the network stack still try to maintain this complete csum value if it is required through functions such as skb_postpush_rcsum.
The MPLS actions in Open vSwitch modify a CHECKSUM_COMPLETE value when changes are made to packet data without a push or a pull. This occurs when the ethertype of the MAC header is changed or when MPLS lse fields are modified.
The modification is carried out using the csum_partial function to get the csum of a buffer and add it into the larger checksum. The buffer is an inversion of the data to be removed followed by the new data. Because the csum is calculated over 16 bits and these values align with 16 bits, the effect is the removal of the old value from the CHECKSUM_COMPLETE and addition of the new value.
However, the csum fed into the function and the outcome of the calculation are also inverted. This would only make sense if it was the new value rather than the old that was inverted in the input buffer.
Fix the issue by removing the bit inverts in the csum_partial calculation.
The bug was verified and the fix tested by comparing the folded value of the updated CHECKSUM_COMPLETE value with the folded value of a full software checksum calculation (reset skb->csum to 0 and run skb_checksum_complete(skb)). Prior to the fix the outcomes differed but after they produce the same result.
--- net/openvswitch/actions.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/openvswitch/actions.c +2 -4
@@ -175,8 +175,7 @@ static void update_ethertype(struct sk_bif (skb->ip_summed ==CHECKSUM_COMPLETE ) {__be16 diff[] = { ~(hdr->h_proto), ethertype }; - skb->csum = ~csum_partial ((char *)diff,sizeof (diff), - ~skb->csum); + skb->csum =csum_partial ((char *)diff,sizeof (diff), skb->csum); } hdr->h_proto = ethertype;
@@ -268,8 +267,7 @@ static int set_mpls(struct sk_buff *skb,if (skb->ip_summed ==CHECKSUM_COMPLETE ) {__be32 diff[] = { ~(stack->label_stack_entry), lse }; - skb->csum = ~csum_partial ((char *)diff,sizeof (diff), - ~skb->csum); + skb->csum =csum_partial ((char *)diff,sizeof (diff), skb->csum); } stack->label_stack_entry = lse;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 13/50 net: phy: sfp: hwmon: Fix scaling of RX power
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0cea0e1148fe134a4a3aaf0b1496f09241fb943a ]
The RX power read from the SFP uses units of 0.1uW. This must be scaled to units of uW for HWMON. This requires a divide by 10, not the current 100.
With this change in place, sensors(1) and ethtool -m agree:
sff2-isa-0000
Adapter: ISA adapter in0: +3.23 V temp1: +33.1 C power1: 270.00 uW power2: 200.00 uW curr1: +0.01 A
Laser output power : 0.2743 mW / -5.62 dBm
Receiver signal average optical power : 0.2014 mW / -6.96 dBm
--- drivers/net/phy/sfp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/phy/sfp.c +1 -1
@@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ static int sfp_hwmon_read_sensor(structstatic void sfp_hwmon_to_rx_power (long *value) { - *value =DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST (*value,100 ); + *value =DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST (*value,10 ); } static void sfp_hwmon_calibrate(struct sfp *sfp, unsigned int slope, int offset,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 15/50 nfc: fix potential illegal memory access
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Yang Wei <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit dd006fc434e107ef90f7de0db9907cbc1c521645 ]
The frags_q is not properly initialized, it may result in illegal memory access when conn_info is NULL.
The "goto free_exit" should be replaced by "goto exit".
--- net/nfc/nci/data.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/nfc/nci/data.c +1 -1
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ static int nci_queue_tx_data_frags(struc conn_info =nci_get_conn_info_by_conn_id (ndev, conn_id);if (!conn_info) { rc = -EPROTO ; - goto free_exit; + goto exit; }__skb_queue_head_init (&frags_q);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 16/50 r8169: fix issue with confused RX unit after PHY power-down on RTL8411b
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Heiner Kallweit <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fe4e8db0392a6c2e795eb89ef5fcd86522e66248 ]
On RTL8411b the RX unit gets confused if the PHY is powered-down. This was reported in [0] and confirmed by Realtek. Realtek provided a sequence to fix the RX unit after PHY wakeup.
The issue itself seems to have been there longer, the Fixes tag refers to where the fix applies properly.
[0] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1692075
--- drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c | 137 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 137 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c +137 -0
@@ -5202,6 +5202,143 @@ static void rtl_hw_start_8411_2(struct r/* disable aspm and clock request before access ephy */ rtl_hw_aspm_clkreq_enable (tp, false);rtl_ephy_init (tp, e_info_8411_2,ARRAY_SIZE (e_info_8411_2)); + +/* The following Realtek-provided magic fixes an issue with the RX unit +* getting confused after the PHY having been powered-down. +*/ +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xFC28 ,0x0000 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xFC2A ,0x0000 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xFC2C ,0x0000 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xFC2E ,0x0000 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xFC30 ,0x0000 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xFC32 ,0x0000 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xFC34 ,0x0000 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xFC36 ,0x0000 ); +mdelay (3 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xFC26 ,0x0000 ); + +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF800 ,0xE008 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF802 ,0xE00A ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF804 ,0xE00C ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF806 ,0xE00E ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF808 ,0xE027 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF80A ,0xE04F ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF80C ,0xE05E ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF80E ,0xE065 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF810 ,0xC602 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF812 ,0xBE00 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF814 ,0x0000 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF816 ,0xC502 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF818 ,0xBD00 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF81A ,0x074C ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF81C ,0xC302 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF81E ,0xBB00 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF820 ,0x080A ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF822 ,0x6420 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF824 ,0x48C2 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF826 ,0x8C20 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF828 ,0xC516 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF82A ,0x64A4 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF82C ,0x49C0 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF82E ,0xF009 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF830 ,0x74A2 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF832 ,0x8CA5 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF834 ,0x74A0 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF836 ,0xC50E ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF838 ,0x9CA2 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF83A ,0x1C11 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF83C ,0x9CA0 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF83E ,0xE006 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF840 ,0x74F8 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF842 ,0x48C4 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF844 ,0x8CF8 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF846 ,0xC404 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF848 ,0xBC00 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF84A ,0xC403 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF84C ,0xBC00 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF84E ,0x0BF2 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF850 ,0x0C0A ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF852 ,0xE434 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF854 ,0xD3C0 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF856 ,0x49D9 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF858 ,0xF01F ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF85A ,0xC526 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF85C ,0x64A5 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF85E ,0x1400 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF860 ,0xF007 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF862 ,0x0C01 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF864 ,0x8CA5 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF866 ,0x1C15 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF868 ,0xC51B ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF86A ,0x9CA0 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF86C ,0xE013 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF86E ,0xC519 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF870 ,0x74A0 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF872 ,0x48C4 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF874 ,0x8CA0 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF876 ,0xC516 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF878 ,0x74A4 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF87A ,0x48C8 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF87C ,0x48CA ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF87E ,0x9CA4 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF880 ,0xC512 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF882 ,0x1B00 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF884 ,0x9BA0 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF886 ,0x1B1C ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF888 ,0x483F ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF88A ,0x9BA2 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF88C ,0x1B04 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF88E ,0xC508 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF890 ,0x9BA0 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF892 ,0xC505 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF894 ,0xBD00 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF896 ,0xC502 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF898 ,0xBD00 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF89A ,0x0300 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF89C ,0x051E ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF89E ,0xE434 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8A0 ,0xE018 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8A2 ,0xE092 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8A4 ,0xDE20 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8A6 ,0xD3C0 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8A8 ,0xC50F ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8AA ,0x76A4 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8AC ,0x49E3 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8AE ,0xF007 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8B0 ,0x49C0 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8B2 ,0xF103 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8B4 ,0xC607 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8B6 ,0xBE00 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8B8 ,0xC606 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8BA ,0xBE00 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8BC ,0xC602 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8BE ,0xBE00 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8C0 ,0x0C4C ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8C2 ,0x0C28 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8C4 ,0x0C2C ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8C6 ,0xDC00 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8C8 ,0xC707 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8CA ,0x1D00 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8CC ,0x8DE2 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8CE ,0x48C1 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8D0 ,0xC502 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8D2 ,0xBD00 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8D4 ,0x00AA ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8D6 ,0xE0C0 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8D8 ,0xC502 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8DA ,0xBD00 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xF8DC ,0x0132 ); + +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xFC26 ,0x8000 ); + +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xFC2A ,0x0743 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xFC2C ,0x0801 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xFC2E ,0x0BE9 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xFC30 ,0x02FD ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xFC32 ,0x0C25 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xFC34 ,0x00A9 ); +r8168_mac_ocp_write (tp,0xFC36 ,0x012D ); +rtl_hw_aspm_clkreq_enable (tp, true); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 17/50 rxrpc: Fix send on a connected, but unbound socket
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: David Howells <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e835ada07091f40dcfb1bc735082bd0a7c005e59 ]
If sendmsg() or sendmmsg() is called on a connected socket that hasn't had bind() called on it, then an oops will occur when the kernel tries to connect the call because no local endpoint has been allocated.
Fix this by implicitly binding the socket if it is in the RXRPC_CLIENT_UNBOUND state, just like it does for the RXRPC_UNBOUND state.
Further, the state should be transitioned to RXRPC_CLIENT_BOUND after this to prevent further attempts to bind it.
This can be tested with:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/rxrpc.h>
static const unsigned char inet6_addr[16] = {
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, -1, 0xac, 0x14, 0x14, 0xaa
};
int main(void)
{
struct sockaddr_rxrpc srx;
struct cmsghdr *cm;
struct msghdr msg;
unsigned char control[16];
int fd;
memset(&srx, 0, sizeof(srx));
srx.srx_family = 0x21;
srx.srx_service = 0;
srx.transport_type = AF_INET;
srx.transport_len = 0x1c;
srx.transport.sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
srx.transport.sin6.sin6_port = htons(0x4e22);
srx.transport.sin6.sin6_flowinfo = htons(0x4e22);
srx.transport.sin6.sin6_scope_id = htons(0xaa3b);
memcpy(&srx.transport.sin6.sin6_addr, inet6_addr, 16);
cm = (struct cmsghdr *)control;
cm->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(unsigned long));
cm->cmsg_level = SOL_RXRPC;
cm->cmsg_type = RXRPC_USER_CALL_ID;
*(unsigned long *)CMSG_DATA(cm) = 0;
msg.msg_name = NULL;
msg.msg_namelen = 0;
msg.msg_iov = NULL;
msg.msg_iovlen = 0;
msg.msg_control = control;
msg.msg_controllen = cm->cmsg_len;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
fd = socket(AF_RXRPC, SOCK_DGRAM, AF_INET);
connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&srx, sizeof(srx));
sendmsg(fd, &msg, 0);
return 0;
}Leading to the following oops:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page ... RIP: 0010:rxrpc_connect_call+0x42/0xa01 ... Call Trace: ? mark_held_locks+0x47/0x59 ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0xb6/0xba rxrpc_new_client_call+0x3b1/0x762 ? rxrpc_do_sendmsg+0x3c0/0x92e rxrpc_do_sendmsg+0x3c0/0x92e rxrpc_sendmsg+0x16b/0x1b5 sock_sendmsg+0x2d/0x39 ___sys_sendmsg+0x1a4/0x22a ? release_sock+0x19/0x9e ? reacquire_held_locks+0x136/0x160 ? release_sock+0x19/0x9e ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x6e ? __lock_acquire+0x268/0xf73 ? rxrpc_connect+0xdd/0xe4 ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0xb6/0xba __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0x94 do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x1bf entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
--- net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c +2 -2
@@ -552,6 +552,7 @@ static int rxrpc_sendmsg(struct socket *switch (rx->sk.sk_state) {case RXRPC_UNBOUND : +case RXRPC_CLIENT_UNBOUND : rx->srx.srx_family =AF_RXRPC ; rx->srx.srx_service =0 ; rx->srx.transport_type =SOCK_DGRAM ;
@@ -576,10 +577,9 @@ static int rxrpc_sendmsg(struct socket * } rx->local = local; - rx->sk.sk_state =RXRPC_CLIENT_UNBOUND ; + rx->sk.sk_state =RXRPC_CLIENT_BOUND ;/* Fall through */ -case RXRPC_CLIENT_UNBOUND :case RXRPC_CLIENT_BOUND :if (!m->msg_name &&test_bit (RXRPC_SOCK_CONNECTED , &rx->flags)) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 19/50 sky2: Disable MSI on ASUS P6T
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a261e3797506bd561700be643fe1a85bf81e9661 ]
The onboard sky2 NIC on ASUS P6T WS PRO doesn't work after PM resume due to the infamous IRQ problem. Disabling MSI works around it, so let's add it to the blacklist.
Unfortunately the BIOS on the machine doesn't fill the standard DMI_SYS_* entry, so we pick up DMI_BOARD_* entries instead.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/sky2.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/sky2.c +7 -0
@@ -4947,6 +4947,13 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id msi_bl DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "P-79"), }, }, + { + .ident = "ASUS P6T", + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_VENDOR, "ASUSTeK Computer INC."), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "P6T"), + }, + }, {} };
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 2/50 caif-hsi: fix possible deadlock in cfhsi_exit_module()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fdd258d49e88a9e0b49ef04a506a796f1c768a8e ]
cfhsi_exit_module() calls unregister_netdev() under rtnl_lock(). but unregister_netdev() internally calls rtnl_lock(). So deadlock would occur.
--- drivers/net/caif/caif_hsi.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/caif/caif_hsi.c +1 -1
@@ -1455,7 +1455,7 @@ static void __exit cfhsi_exit_module(voirtnl_lock ();list_for_each_safe (list_node, n, &cfhsi_list) { cfhsi = list_entry(list_node, struct cfhsi, list); -unregister_netdev (cfhsi->ndev); +unregister_netdevice (cfhsi->ndev); }rtnl_unlock (); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 20/50 tcp: be more careful in tcp_fragment()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b617158dc096709d8600c53b6052144d12b89fab ]
Some applications set tiny SO_SNDBUF values and expect TCP to just work. Recent patches to address CVE-2019-11478 broke them in case of losses, since retransmits might be prevented.
We should allow these flows to make progress.
This patch allows the first and last skb in retransmit queue to be split even if memory limits are hit.
It also adds the some room due to the fact that tcp_sendmsg() and tcp_sendpage() might overshoot sk_wmem_queued by about one full TSO skb (64KB size). Note this allowance was already present in stable backports for kernels < 4.15
Note for < 4.15 backports :
tcp_rtx_queue_tail() will probably look like :
static inline struct sk_buff *tcp_rtx_queue_tail(const struct sock *sk)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = tcp_send_head(sk);
return skb ? tcp_write_queue_prev(sk, skb) : tcp_write_queue_tail(sk);
}--- include/net/tcp.h | 5 +++++ net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/net/tcp.h +5 -0
@@ -1646,6 +1646,11 @@ static inline struct sk_buff *tcp_rtx_qureturn skb_rb_first (&sk->tcp_rtx_queue); } +static inline struct sk_buff *tcp_rtx_queue_tail (const struct sock *sk) +{ +return skb_rb_last (&sk->tcp_rtx_queue); +} +static inline struct sk_buff *tcp_write_queue_head (const struct sock *sk) {return skb_peek (&sk->sk_write_queue);
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +11 -2
@@ -1289,6 +1289,7 @@ int tcp_fragment(struct sock *sk, enum tstruct tcp_sock *tp =tcp_sk (sk);struct sk_buff *buff;int nsize, old_factor; +long limit;int nlen;u8 flags;
@@ -1299,8 +1300,16 @@ int tcp_fragment(struct sock *sk, enum tif (nsize <0 ) nsize =0 ; -if (unlikely ((sk->sk_wmem_queued >>1 ) > sk->sk_sndbuf && - tcp_queue !=TCP_FRAG_IN_WRITE_QUEUE )) { +/* tcp_sendmsg() can overshoot sk_wmem_queued by one full size skb. +* We need some allowance to not penalize applications setting small +* SO_SNDBUF values. +* Also allow first and last skb in retransmit queue to be split. +*/ + limit = sk->sk_sndbuf +2 *SKB_TRUESIZE (GSO_MAX_SIZE ); +if (unlikely ((sk->sk_wmem_queued >>1 ) > limit && + tcp_queue !=TCP_FRAG_IN_WRITE_QUEUE && + skb !=tcp_rtx_queue_head (sk) && + skb !=tcp_rtx_queue_tail (sk))) {NET_INC_STATS (sock_net (sk),LINUX_MIB_TCPWQUEUETOOBIG );return -ENOMEM ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 21/50 tcp: fix tcp_set_congestion_control() use from bpf hook
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8d650cdedaabb33e85e9b7c517c0c71fcecc1de9 ]
Neal reported incorrect use of ns_capable() from bpf hook.
bpf_setsockopt(...TCP_CONGESTION...)
-> tcp_set_congestion_control()
-> ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)
-> ns_capable_common()
-> current_cred()
-> rcu_dereference_protected(current->cred, 1)Accessing 'current' in bpf context makes no sense, since packets are processed from softirq context.
As Neal stated : The capability check in tcp_set_congestion_control() was written assuming a system call context, and then was reused from a BPF call site.
The fix is to add a new parameter to tcp_set_congestion_control(), so that the ns_capable() call is only performed under the right context.
--- include/net/tcp.h | 3 ++- net/core/filter.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 4 +++- net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c | 6 +++--- 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
include/net/tcp.h +2 -1
@@ -1054,7 +1054,8 @@ void tcp_get_default_congestion_control(void tcp_get_available_congestion_control (char *buf,size_t len);void tcp_get_allowed_congestion_control (char *buf,size_t len);int tcp_set_allowed_congestion_control (char *allowed); -int tcp_set_congestion_control (struct sock *sk,const char *name,bool load,bool reinit); +int tcp_set_congestion_control (struct sock *sk,const char *name,bool load, +bool reinit,bool cap_net_admin);u32 tcp_slow_start (struct tcp_sock *tp,u32 acked);void tcp_cong_avoid_ai (struct tcp_sock *tp,u32 w,u32 acked);
net/core/filter.c +1 -1
@@ -3991,7 +3991,7 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_setsockopt, struct bpf_so TCP_CA_NAME_MAX-1)); name[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX -1 ] =0 ; ret =tcp_set_congestion_control (sk, name, false, - reinit); + reinit, true); }else {struct tcp_sock *tp =tcp_sk (sk);
net/ipv4/tcp.c +3 -1
@@ -2729,7 +2729,9 @@ static int do_tcp_setsockopt(struct sock name[val] =0 ;lock_sock (sk); - err =tcp_set_congestion_control (sk, name, true, true); + err =tcp_set_congestion_control (sk, name, true, true, +ns_capable (sock_net (sk)->user_ns, +CAP_NET_ADMIN ));release_sock (sk);return err; }
net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c +3 -3
@@ -332,7 +332,8 @@ out:* tcp_reinit_congestion_control (if the current congestion control was * already initialized. */ -int tcp_set_congestion_control (struct sock *sk,const char *name,bool load,bool reinit) +int tcp_set_congestion_control (struct sock *sk,const char *name,bool load, +bool reinit,bool cap_net_admin) {struct inet_connection_sock *icsk =inet_csk (sk);const struct tcp_congestion_ops *ca;
@@ -368,8 +369,7 @@ int tcp_set_congestion_control(struct so }else { err = -EBUSY ; } - }else if (!((ca->flags &TCP_CONG_NON_RESTRICTED ) || -ns_capable (sock_net (sk)->user_ns,CAP_NET_ADMIN ))) { + }else if (!((ca->flags &TCP_CONG_NON_RESTRICTED ) || cap_net_admin)) { err = -EPERM ; }else if (!try_module_get (ca->owner)) { err = -EBUSY ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 22/50 tcp: Reset bytes_acked and bytes_received when disconnecting
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Christoph Paasch <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e858faf556d4e14c750ba1e8852783c6f9520a0e ]
If an app is playing tricks to reuse a socket via tcp_disconnect(), bytes_acked/received needs to be reset to 0. Otherwise tcp_info will report the sum of the current and the old connection..
--- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/ipv4/tcp.c +2 -0
@@ -2594,6 +2594,8 @@ int tcp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, inttcp_saved_syn_free (tp); tp->compressed_ack =0 ; tp->bytes_sent =0 ; + tp->bytes_acked =0 ; + tp->bytes_received =0 ; tp->bytes_retrans =0 ; tp->dsack_dups =0 ; tp->reord_seen =0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 23/50 vrf: make sure skb->data contains ip header to make routing
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Peter Kosyh <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 107e47cc80ec37cb332bd41b22b1c7779e22e018 ]
vrf_process_v4_outbound() and vrf_process_v6_outbound() do routing using ip/ipv6 addresses, but don't make sure the header is available in skb->data[] (skb_headlen() is less then header size).
Case:
1) igb driver from intel.
2) Packet size is greater then 255.
3) MPLS forwards to VRF device.
So, patch adds pskb_may_pull() calls in vrf_process_v4/v6_outbound() functions.
--- drivers/net/vrf.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
drivers/net/vrf.c +35 -23
@@ -169,23 +169,29 @@ static int vrf_ip6_local_out(struct netstatic netdev_tx_t vrf_process_v6_outbound (struct sk_buff *skb,struct net_device *dev) { -const struct ipv6hdr *iph =ipv6_hdr (skb); +const struct ipv6hdr *iph;struct net *net =dev_net (skb->dev); -struct flowi6 fl6 = { -/* needed to match OIF rule */ - .flowi6_oif = dev->ifindex, - .flowi6_iif =LOOPBACK_IFINDEX , - .daddr = iph->daddr, - .saddr = iph->saddr, - .flowlabel =ip6_flowinfo (iph), - .flowi6_mark = skb->mark, - .flowi6_proto = iph->nexthdr, - .flowi6_flags =FLOWI_FLAG_SKIP_NH_OIF , - }; +struct flowi6 fl6;int ret =NET_XMIT_DROP ;struct dst_entry *dst;struct dst_entry *dst_null = &net->ipv6.ip6_null_entry->dst; +if (!pskb_may_pull (skb,ETH_HLEN +sizeof (struct ipv6hdr ))) + goto err; + + iph =ipv6_hdr (skb); + +memset (&fl6,0 ,sizeof (fl6)); +/* needed to match OIF rule */ + fl6.flowi6_oif = dev->ifindex; + fl6.flowi6_iif =LOOPBACK_IFINDEX ; + fl6.daddr = iph->daddr; + fl6.saddr = iph->saddr; + fl6.flowlabel =ip6_flowinfo (iph); + fl6.flowi6_mark = skb->mark; + fl6.flowi6_proto = iph->nexthdr; + fl6.flowi6_flags =FLOWI_FLAG_SKIP_NH_OIF ; + dst =ip6_route_output (net,NULL , &fl6);if (dst == dst_null) goto err;
@@ -241,21 +247,27 @@ static int vrf_ip_local_out(struct net *static netdev_tx_t vrf_process_v4_outbound (struct sk_buff *skb,struct net_device *vrf_dev) { -struct iphdr *ip4h =ip_hdr (skb); +struct iphdr *ip4h;int ret =NET_XMIT_DROP ; -struct flowi4 fl4 = { -/* needed to match OIF rule */ - .flowi4_oif = vrf_dev->ifindex, - .flowi4_iif =LOOPBACK_IFINDEX , - .flowi4_tos =RT_TOS (ip4h->tos), - .flowi4_flags =FLOWI_FLAG_ANYSRC |FLOWI_FLAG_SKIP_NH_OIF , - .flowi4_proto = ip4h->protocol, - .daddr = ip4h->daddr, - .saddr = ip4h->saddr, - }; +struct flowi4 fl4;struct net *net =dev_net (vrf_dev);struct rtable *rt; +if (!pskb_may_pull (skb,ETH_HLEN +sizeof (struct iphdr ))) + goto err; + + ip4h =ip_hdr (skb); + +memset (&fl4,0 ,sizeof (fl4)); +/* needed to match OIF rule */ + fl4.flowi4_oif = vrf_dev->ifindex; + fl4.flowi4_iif =LOOPBACK_IFINDEX ; + fl4.flowi4_tos =RT_TOS (ip4h->tos); + fl4.flowi4_flags =FLOWI_FLAG_ANYSRC |FLOWI_FLAG_SKIP_NH_OIF ; + fl4.flowi4_proto = ip4h->protocol; + fl4.daddr = ip4h->daddr; + fl4.saddr = ip4h->saddr; + rt =ip_route_output_flow (net, &fl4,NULL );if (IS_ERR (rt)) goto err;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 24/50 net/mlx5e: IPoIB, Add error path in mlx5_rdma_setup_rn
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Aya Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ef1ce7d7b67b46661091c7ccc0396186b7a247ef ]
Check return value from mlx5e_attach_netdev, add error path on failure.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/ipoib/ipoib.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/ipoib/ipoib.c +8 -1
@@ -662,7 +662,9 @@ struct net_device *mlx5_rdma_netdev_allo profile->init (mdev, netdev, profile, ipriv); -mlx5e_attach_netdev (epriv); + err =mlx5e_attach_netdev (epriv); +if (err) + goto detach;netif_carrier_off (netdev);/* set rdma_netdev func pointers */
@@ -678,6 +680,11 @@ struct net_device *mlx5_rdma_netdev_alloreturn netdev; +detach: + profile->cleanup (epriv); +if (ipriv->sub_interface) +return NULL ; +mlx5e_destroy_mdev_resources (mdev); destroy_ht:mlx5i_pkey_qpn_ht_cleanup (netdev); destroy_wq:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 25/50 macsec: fix use-after-free of skb during RX
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Andreas Steinmetz <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 095c02da80a41cf6d311c504d8955d6d1c2add10 ]
Fix use-after-free of skb when rx_handler returns RX_HANDLER_PASS.
--- drivers/net/macsec.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/macsec.c +2 -3
@@ -1103,10 +1103,9 @@ static rx_handler_result_t macsec_handle } skb =skb_unshare (skb,GFP_ATOMIC ); -if (!skb) { - *pskb =NULL ; + *pskb = skb; +if (!skb)return RX_HANDLER_CONSUMED ; - } pulled_sci =pskb_may_pull (skb,macsec_extra_len (true));if (!pulled_sci) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 26/50 macsec: fix checksumming after decryption
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Andreas Steinmetz <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7d8b16b9facb0dd81d1469808dd9a575fa1d525a ]
Fix checksumming after decryption.
--- drivers/net/macsec.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/macsec.c +1 -0
@@ -869,6 +869,7 @@ static void macsec_reset_skb(struct sk_bstatic void macsec_finalize_skb (struct sk_buff *skb,u8 icv_len,u8 hdr_len) { + skb->ip_summed =CHECKSUM_NONE ;memmove (skb->data + hdr_len, skb->data,2 *ETH_ALEN );skb_pull (skb, hdr_len);pskb_trim_unique (skb, skb->len - icv_len);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 3/50 hv_netvsc: Fix extra rcu_read_unlock in netvsc_recv_callback()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Haiyang Zhang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit be4363bdf0ce9530f15aa0a03d1060304d116b15 ]
There is an extra rcu_read_unlock left in netvsc_recv_callback(), after a previous patch that removes RCU from this function. This patch removes the extra RCU unlock.
--- drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c +0 -1
@@ -847,7 +847,6 @@ int netvsc_recv_callback(struct net_devi csum_info, vlan, data, len);if (unlikely (!skb)) { ++net_device_ctx->eth_stats.rx_no_memory; -rcu_read_unlock ();return NVSP_STAT_FAIL ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 4/50 igmp: fix memory leak in igmpv3_del_delrec()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e5b1c6c6277d5a283290a8c033c72544746f9b5b ]
im->tomb and/or im->sources might not be NULL, but we currently overwrite their values blindly.
Using swap() will make sure the following call to kfree_pmc(pmc) will properly free the psf structures.
Tested with the C repro provided by syzbot, which basically does :
socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_IP) = 3
setsockopt(3, SOL_IP, IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP, "\340\0\0\2\177\0\0\1\0\0\0\0", 12) = 0 ioctl(3, SIOCSIFFLAGS, {ifr_name="lo", ifr_flags=0}) = 0
setsockopt(3, SOL_IP, IP_MSFILTER, "\340\0\0\2\177\0\0\1\1\0\0\0\1\0\0\0\377\377\377\377", 20) = 0 ioctl(3, SIOCSIFFLAGS, {ifr_name="lo", ifr_flags=IFF_UP}) = 0
exit_group(0) = ?
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88811450f140 (size 64):
comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4294942448 (age 32.070s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000c7bad083>] kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:43 [inline]
[<00000000c7bad083>] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:439 [inline]
[<00000000c7bad083>] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3326 [inline]
[<00000000c7bad083>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x13d/0x280 mm/slab.c:3553
[<000000009acc4151>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:547 [inline]
[<000000009acc4151>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:742 [inline]
[<000000009acc4151>] ip_mc_add1_src net/ipv4/igmp.c:1976 [inline]
[<000000009acc4151>] ip_mc_add_src+0x36b/0x400 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2100
[<000000004ac14566>] ip_mc_msfilter+0x22d/0x310 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2484
[<0000000052d8f995>] do_ip_setsockopt.isra.0+0x1795/0x1930 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:959
[<000000004ee1e21f>] ip_setsockopt+0x3b/0xb0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1248
[<0000000066cdfe74>] udp_setsockopt+0x4e/0x90 net/ipv4/udp.c:2618
[<000000009383a786>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x38/0x50 net/core/sock.c:3126
[<00000000d8ac0c94>] __sys_setsockopt+0x98/0x120 net/socket.c:2072
[<000000001b1e9666>] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2083 [inline]
[<000000001b1e9666>] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2080 [inline]
[<000000001b1e9666>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x26/0x30 net/socket.c:2080
[<00000000420d395e>] do_syscall_64+0x76/0x1a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301
[<000000007fd83a4b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9--- net/ipv4/igmp.c | 8 ++------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/igmp.c +2 -6
@@ -1218,12 +1218,8 @@ static void igmpv3_del_delrec(struct in_if (pmc) { im->interface = pmc->interface;if (im->sfmode ==MCAST_INCLUDE ) { - im->tomb = pmc->tomb; - pmc->tomb =NULL ; - - im->sources = pmc->sources; - pmc->sources =NULL ; - +swap (im->tomb, pmc->tomb); +swap (im->sources, pmc->sources);for (psf = im->sources; psf; psf = psf->sf_next) psf->sf_crcount = in_dev->mr_qrv ?: net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv; }else {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 5/50 ipv4: dont set IPv6 only flags to IPv4 addresses
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Matteo Croce <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2e60546368165c2449564d71f6005dda9205b5fb ]
Avoid the situation where an IPV6 only flag is applied to an IPv4 address:
# ip addr add 192.0.2.1/24 dev dummy0 nodad home mngtmpaddr noprefixroute
# ip -4 addr show dev dummy0
2: dummy0: <BROADCAST,NOARP,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
inet 192.0.2.1/24 scope global noprefixroute dummy0
valid_lft forever preferred_lft foreverOr worse, by sending a malicious netlink command:
# ip -4 addr show dev dummy0
2: dummy0: <BROADCAST,NOARP,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
inet 192.0.2.1/24 scope global nodad optimistic dadfailed home tentative mngtmpaddr noprefixroute stable-privacy dummy0
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever--- net/ipv4/devinet.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
net/ipv4/devinet.c +8 -0
@@ -66,6 +66,11 @@#include <net/net_namespace.h> #include <net/addrconf.h> +#define IPV6ONLY_FLAGS \ + (IFA_F_NODAD | IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC | IFA_F_DADFAILED | \ + IFA_F_HOMEADDRESS | IFA_F_TENTATIVE | \ + IFA_F_MANAGETEMPADDR | IFA_F_STABLE_PRIVACY) +static struct ipv4_devconf ipv4_devconf = { .data = { [IPV4_DEVCONF_ACCEPT_REDIRECTS -1 ] =1 ,
@@ -462,6 +467,9 @@ static int __inet_insert_ifa(struct in_i ifa->ifa_flags &= ~IFA_F_SECONDARY ; last_primary = &in_dev->ifa_list; +/* Don't set IPv6 only flags to IPv4 addresses */ + ifa->ifa_flags &= ~IPV6ONLY_FLAGS ; +for (ifap = &in_dev->ifa_list; (ifa1 = *ifap) !=NULL ; ifap = &ifa1->ifa_next) { if (!(ifa1->ifa_flags & IFA_F_SECONDARY) &&
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 6/50 ipv6: rt6_check should return NULL if from is NULL
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: David Ahern <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 49d05fe2c9d1b4a27761c9807fec39b8155bef9e ]
Paul reported that l2tp sessions were broken after the commit referenced in the Fixes tag. Prior to this commit rt6_check returned NULL if the rt6_info 'from' was NULL - ie., the dst_entry was disconnected from a FIB entry. Restore that behavior.
--- net/ipv6/route.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv6/route.c +1 -1
@@ -2214,7 +2214,7 @@ static struct dst_entry *rt6_check(struc {u32 rt_cookie =0 ; -if ((from && !fib6_get_cookie_safe (from, &rt_cookie)) || +if (!from || !fib6_get_cookie_safe (from, &rt_cookie) || rt_cookie != cookie)return NULL ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 7/50 ipv6: Unlink sibling route in case of failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 54851aa90cf27041d64b12f65ac72e9f97bd90fd ]
When a route needs to be appended to an existing multipath route, fib6_add_rt2node() first appends it to the siblings list and increments the number of sibling routes on each sibling.
Later, the function notifies the route via call_fib6_entry_notifiers(). In case the notification is vetoed, the route is not unlinked from the siblings list, which can result in a use-after-free.
Fix this by unlinking the route from the siblings list before returning an error.
Audited the rest of the call sites from which the FIB notification chain is called and could not find more problems.
--- net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c +17 -1
@@ -1081,8 +1081,24 @@ add: err =call_fib6_entry_notifiers (info->nl_net,FIB_EVENT_ENTRY_ADD , rt, extack); -if (err) +if (err) { +struct fib6_info *sibling, *next_sibling; + +/* If the route has siblings, then it first +* needs to be unlinked from them. +*/ +if (!rt->fib6_nsiblings) +return err; + +list_for_each_entry_safe (sibling, next_sibling, + &rt->fib6_siblings, + fib6_siblings) + sibling->fib6_nsiblings--; + rt->fib6_nsiblings =0 ; +list_del_init (&rt->fib6_siblings); +rt6_multipath_rebalance (next_sibling);return err; + }rcu_assign_pointer (rt->fib6_next, iter);atomic_inc (&rt->fib6_ref);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 8/50 net: bcmgenet: use promisc for unsupported filters
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Justin Chen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 35cbef9863640f06107144687bd13151bc2e8ce3 ]
Currently we silently ignore filters if we cannot meet the filter requirements. This will lead to the MAC dropping packets that are expected to pass. A better solution would be to set the NIC to promisc mode when the required filters cannot be met.
Also correct the number of MDF filters supported. It should be 17, not 16.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmgenet.c | 57 +++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmgenet.c +26 -31
@@ -3086,39 +3086,42 @@ static void bcmgenet_timeout(struct net_netif_tx_wake_all_queues (dev); } -#define MAX_MC_COUNT 16 +#define MAX_MDF_FILTER 17static inline void bcmgenet_set_mdf_addr (struct bcmgenet_priv *priv,unsigned char *addr, -int *i, -int *mc) +int *i) { -u32 reg; -bcmgenet_umac_writel (priv, addr[0 ] <<8 | addr[1 ],UMAC_MDF_ADDR + (*i *4 ));bcmgenet_umac_writel (priv, addr[2 ] <<24 | addr[3 ] <<16 | addr[4 ] <<8 | addr[5 ],UMAC_MDF_ADDR + ((*i +1 ) *4 )); - reg =bcmgenet_umac_readl (priv,UMAC_MDF_CTRL ); - reg |= (1 << (MAX_MC_COUNT - *mc)); -bcmgenet_umac_writel (priv, reg,UMAC_MDF_CTRL ); *i +=2 ; - (*mc)++; }static void bcmgenet_set_rx_mode (struct net_device *dev) {struct bcmgenet_priv *priv =netdev_priv (dev);struct netdev_hw_addr *ha; -int i, mc; +int i, nfilter;u32 reg;netif_dbg (priv, hw, dev,"%s: %08X\n" , __func__, dev->flags); -/* Promiscuous mode */ +/* Number of filters needed */ + nfilter =netdev_uc_count (dev) +netdev_mc_count (dev) +2 ; + +/* +* Turn on promicuous mode for three scenarios +* 1. IFF_PROMISC flag is set +* 2. IFF_ALLMULTI flag is set +* 3. The number of filters needed exceeds the number filters +* supported by the hardware. +*/ reg =bcmgenet_umac_readl (priv,UMAC_CMD ); -if (dev->flags &IFF_PROMISC ) { +if ((dev->flags & (IFF_PROMISC |IFF_ALLMULTI )) || + (nfilter >MAX_MDF_FILTER )) { reg |=CMD_PROMISC ;bcmgenet_umac_writel (priv, reg,UMAC_CMD );bcmgenet_umac_writel (priv,0 ,UMAC_MDF_CTRL );
@@ -3128,32 +3131,24 @@ static void bcmgenet_set_rx_mode(structbcmgenet_umac_writel (priv, reg,UMAC_CMD ); } -/* UniMac doesn't support ALLMULTI */ -if (dev->flags &IFF_ALLMULTI ) { -netdev_warn (dev,"ALLMULTI is not supported\n" ); -return ; - } -/* update MDF filter */ i =0 ; - mc =0 ;/* Broadcast */ -bcmgenet_set_mdf_addr (priv, dev->broadcast, &i, &mc); +bcmgenet_set_mdf_addr (priv, dev->broadcast, &i);/* my own address.*/ -bcmgenet_set_mdf_addr (priv, dev->dev_addr, &i, &mc); -/* Unicast list*/ -if (netdev_uc_count (dev) > (MAX_MC_COUNT - mc)) -return ; +bcmgenet_set_mdf_addr (priv, dev->dev_addr, &i); -if (!netdev_uc_empty (dev)) -netdev_for_each_uc_addr (ha, dev) -bcmgenet_set_mdf_addr (priv, ha->addr, &i, &mc); -/* Multicast */ -if (netdev_mc_empty (dev) ||netdev_mc_count (dev) >= (MAX_MC_COUNT - mc)) -return ; +/* Unicast */ +netdev_for_each_uc_addr (ha, dev) +bcmgenet_set_mdf_addr (priv, ha->addr, &i); +/* Multicast */ netdev_for_each_mc_addr (ha, dev) -bcmgenet_set_mdf_addr (priv, ha->addr, &i, &mc); +bcmgenet_set_mdf_addr (priv, ha->addr, &i); + +/* Enable filters */ + reg =GENMASK (MAX_MDF_FILTER -1 ,MAX_MDF_FILTER - nfilter); +bcmgenet_umac_writel (priv, reg,UMAC_MDF_CTRL ); }/* Set the hardware MAC address. */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 9/50 net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: wait after reset deactivation
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Baruch Siach <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7b75e49de424ceb53d13e60f35d0a73765626fda ]
Add a 1ms delay after reset deactivation. Otherwise the chip returns bogus ID value. This is observed with 88E6390 (Peridot) chip.
--- drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c +2 -0
@@ -4816,6 +4816,8 @@ static int mv88e6xxx_probe(struct mdio_d err =PTR_ERR (chip->reset); goto out; } +if (chip->reset) +usleep_range (1000 ,2000 ); err =mv88e6xxx_detect (chip);if (err)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainercover 4.19.62-stable review
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.62 release. There are 50 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun 28 Jul 2019 03:21:13 PM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.62-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 4.19.62-rc1
Kuo-Hsin Yang <[email protected]>
mm: vmscan: scan anonymous pages on file refaults
Jan Kiszka <[email protected]>
KVM: nVMX: Clear pending KVM_REQ_GET_VMCS12_PAGES when leaving nested
Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
KVM: nVMX: do not use dangling shadow VMCS after guest reset
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
ext4: allow directory holes
Ross Zwisler <[email protected]>
ext4: use jbd2_inode dirty range scoping
Ross Zwisler <[email protected]>
jbd2: introduce jbd2_inode dirty range scoping
Ross Zwisler <[email protected]>
mm: add filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors()
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
ext4: enforce the immutable flag on open files
Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
ext4: don't allow any modifications to an immutable file
Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
perf/core: Fix race between close() and fork()
Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
perf/core: Fix exclusive events' grouping
Paul Cercueil <[email protected]>
MIPS: lb60: Fix pin mappings
Keerthy <[email protected]>
gpio: davinci: silence error prints in case of EPROBE_DEFER
Chris Wilson <[email protected]>
dma-buf: Discard old fence_excl on retrying get_fences_rcu for realloc
Jérôme Glisse <[email protected]>
dma-buf: balance refcount inbalance
Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
net: bridge: stp: don't cache eth dest pointer before skb pull
Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
net: bridge: don't cache ether dest pointer on input
Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
net: bridge: mcast: fix stale ipv6 hdr pointer when handling v6 query
Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
net: bridge: mcast: fix stale nsrcs pointer in igmp3/mld2 report handling
Xin Long <[email protected]>
sctp: not bind the socket in sctp_connect
Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
net/tls: make sure offload also gets the keys wiped
Cong Wang <[email protected]>
net_sched: unset TCQ_F_CAN_BYPASS when adding filters
Cong Wang <[email protected]>
netrom: hold sock when setting skb->destructor
Cong Wang <[email protected]>
netrom: fix a memory leak in nr_rx_frame()
Andreas Steinmetz <[email protected]>
macsec: fix checksumming after decryption
Andreas Steinmetz <[email protected]>
macsec: fix use-after-free of skb during RX
Aya Levin <[email protected]>
net/mlx5e: IPoIB, Add error path in mlx5_rdma_setup_rn
Peter Kosyh <[email protected]>
vrf: make sure skb->data contains ip header to make routing
Christoph Paasch <[email protected]>
tcp: Reset bytes_acked and bytes_received when disconnecting
Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
tcp: fix tcp_set_congestion_control() use from bpf hook
Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
tcp: be more careful in tcp_fragment()
Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
sky2: Disable MSI on ASUS P6T
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
sctp: fix error handling on stream scheduler initialization
David Howells <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix send on a connected, but unbound socket
Heiner Kallweit <[email protected]>
r8169: fix issue with confused RX unit after PHY power-down on RTL8411b
Yang Wei <[email protected]>
nfc: fix potential illegal memory access
Jose Abreu <[email protected]>
net: stmmac: Re-work the queue selection for TSO packets
Andrew Lunn <[email protected]>
net: phy: sfp: hwmon: Fix scaling of RX power
John Hurley <[email protected]>
net: openvswitch: fix csum updates for MPLS actions
Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]>
net: neigh: fix multiple neigh timer scheduling
Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
net: make skb_dst_force return true when dst is refcounted
Baruch Siach <[email protected]>
net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: wait after reset deactivation
Justin Chen <[email protected]>
net: bcmgenet: use promisc for unsupported filters
Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>
ipv6: Unlink sibling route in case of failure
David Ahern <[email protected]>
ipv6: rt6_check should return NULL if 'from' is NULL
Matteo Croce <[email protected]>
ipv4: don't set IPv6 only flags to IPv4 addresses
Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
igmp: fix memory leak in igmpv3_del_delrec()
Haiyang Zhang <[email protected]>
hv_netvsc: Fix extra rcu_read_unlock in netvsc_recv_callback()
Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>
caif-hsi: fix possible deadlock in cfhsi_exit_module()
Brian King <[email protected]>
bnx2x: Prevent load reordering in tx completion processing
-------------
Diffstat:
Makefile | 4 +- arch/mips/jz4740/board-qi_lb60.c | 16 +-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 10 +- drivers/dma-buf/dma-buf.c | 1 + drivers/dma-buf/reservation.c | 4 + drivers/gpio/gpio-davinci.c | 5 +- drivers/net/caif/caif_hsi.c | 2 +- drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c | 2 + drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c | 3 + drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmgenet.c | 57 ++++----- drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/sky2.c | 7 ++ .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/ipoib/ipoib.c | 9 +- drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c | 137 +++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c | 29 +++-- drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c | 1 - drivers/net/macsec.c | 6 +- drivers/net/phy/sfp.c | 2 +- drivers/net/vrf.c | 58 +++++---- fs/ext4/dir.c | 19 ++- fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.h | 12 +- fs/ext4/file.c | 4 + fs/ext4/inode.c | 24 +++- fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 46 ++++++- fs/ext4/move_extent.c | 3 +- fs/ext4/namei.c | 45 +++++-- fs/jbd2/commit.c | 23 +++- fs/jbd2/journal.c | 4 + fs/jbd2/transaction.c | 49 ++++---- include/linux/fs.h | 2 + include/linux/jbd2.h | 22 ++++ include/linux/perf_event.h | 5 + include/net/dst.h | 5 +- include/net/tcp.h | 8 +- include/net/tls.h | 1 + kernel/events/core.c | 83 ++++++++++--- mm/filemap.c | 22 ++++ mm/vmscan.c | 6 +- net/bridge/br_input.c | 8 +- net/bridge/br_multicast.c | 32 ++--- net/bridge/br_stp_bpdu.c | 3 +- net/core/filter.c | 2 +- net/core/neighbour.c | 2 + net/ipv4/devinet.c | 8 ++ net/ipv4/igmp.c | 8 +- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 6 +- net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c | 6 +- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 13 +- net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c | 18 ++- net/ipv6/route.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_queue.c | 6 +- net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 4 +- net/nfc/nci/data.c | 2 +- net/openvswitch/actions.c | 6 +- net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c | 4 +- net/sched/cls_api.c | 1 + net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c | 2 - net/sched/sch_sfq.c | 2 - net/sctp/socket.c | 20 +-- net/sctp/stream.c | 9 +- net/tls/tls_device.c | 2 +- net/tls/tls_main.c | 2 +- 61 files changed, 669 insertions(+), 235 deletions(-)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 29/50 net_sched: unset TCQ_F_CAN_BYPASS when adding filters
From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3f05e6886a595c9a29a309c52f45326be917823c ]
For qdisc's that support TC filters and set TCQ_F_CAN_BYPASS, notably fq_codel, it makes no sense to let packets bypass the TC filters we setup in any scenario, otherwise our packets steering policy could not be enforced.
This can be reproduced easily with the following script:
ip li add dev dummy0 type dummy
ifconfig dummy0 up
tc qd add dev dummy0 root fq_codel
tc filter add dev dummy0 parent 8001: protocol arp basic action mirred egress redirect dev lo tc filter add dev dummy0 parent 8001: protocol ip basic action mirred egress redirect dev lo ping -I dummy0 192.168.112.1
Without this patch, packets are sent directly to dummy0 without hitting any of the filters. With this patch, packets are redirected to loopback as expected.
This fix is not perfect, it only unsets the flag but does not set it back because we have to save the information somewhere in the qdisc if we really want that. Note, both fq_codel and sfq clear this flag in their ->bind_tcf() but this is clearly not sufficient when we don't use any class ID.
--- net/sched/cls_api.c | 1 + net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c | 2 -- net/sched/sch_sfq.c | 2 -- 3 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/sched/cls_api.c +1 -0
@@ -1325,6 +1325,7 @@ replay:tcf_chain_tp_insert (chain, &chain_info, tp);tfilter_notify (net, skb, n, tp, block, q, parent, fh,RTM_NEWTFILTER , false); + q->flags &= ~TCQ_F_CAN_BYPASS ; }else {if (tp_created)tcf_proto_destroy (tp,NULL );
net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c +0 -2
@@ -600,8 +600,6 @@ static unsigned long fq_codel_find(strucstatic unsigned long fq_codel_bind (struct Qdisc *sch,unsigned long parent,u32 classid) { -/* we cannot bypass queue discipline anymore */ - sch->flags &= ~TCQ_F_CAN_BYPASS ;return 0 ; }
net/sched/sch_sfq.c +0 -2
@@ -828,8 +828,6 @@ static unsigned long sfq_find(struct Qdistatic unsigned long sfq_bind (struct Qdisc *sch,unsigned long parent,u32 classid) { -/* we cannot bypass queue discipline anymore */ - sch->flags &= ~TCQ_F_CAN_BYPASS ;return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 39/50 MIPS: lb60: Fix pin mappings
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Paul Cercueil <[email protected]>
commit 1323c3b72a987de57141cabc44bf9cd83656bc70 upstream.
The pin mappings introduced in commit 636f8ba67fb6
("MIPS: JZ4740: Qi LB60: Add pinctrl configuration for several drivers") are completely wrong. The pinctrl driver name is incorrect, and the function and group fields are swapped.
--- arch/mips/jz4740/board-qi_lb60.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/mips/jz4740/board-qi_lb60.c +8 -8
@@ -471,27 +471,27 @@ static unsigned long pin_cfg_bias_disablstatic struct pinctrl_map pin_map[]__initdata = {/* NAND pin configuration */ PIN_MAP_MUX_GROUP_DEFAULT ("jz4740-nand" , -"10010000.jz4740-pinctrl" ,"nand" ,"nand-cs1" ), +"10010000.pin-controller" ,"nand-cs1" ,"nand" ),/* fbdev pin configuration */ PIN_MAP_MUX_GROUP ("jz4740-fb" ,PINCTRL_STATE_DEFAULT , -"10010000.jz4740-pinctrl" ,"lcd" ,"lcd-8bit" ), +"10010000.pin-controller" ,"lcd-8bit" ,"lcd" ),PIN_MAP_MUX_GROUP ("jz4740-fb" ,PINCTRL_STATE_SLEEP , -"10010000.jz4740-pinctrl" ,"lcd" ,"lcd-no-pins" ), +"10010000.pin-controller" ,"lcd-no-pins" ,"lcd" ),/* MMC pin configuration */ PIN_MAP_MUX_GROUP_DEFAULT ("jz4740-mmc.0" , -"10010000.jz4740-pinctrl" ,"mmc" ,"mmc-1bit" ), +"10010000.pin-controller" ,"mmc-1bit" ,"mmc" ),PIN_MAP_MUX_GROUP_DEFAULT ("jz4740-mmc.0" , -"10010000.jz4740-pinctrl" ,"mmc" ,"mmc-4bit" ), +"10010000.pin-controller" ,"mmc-4bit" ,"mmc" ),PIN_MAP_CONFIGS_PIN_DEFAULT ("jz4740-mmc.0" , -"10010000.jz4740-pinctrl" ,"PD0" , pin_cfg_bias_disable), +"10010000.pin-controller" ,"PD0" , pin_cfg_bias_disable),PIN_MAP_CONFIGS_PIN_DEFAULT ("jz4740-mmc.0" , -"10010000.jz4740-pinctrl" ,"PD2" , pin_cfg_bias_disable), +"10010000.pin-controller" ,"PD2" , pin_cfg_bias_disable),/* PWM pin configuration */ PIN_MAP_MUX_GROUP_DEFAULT ("jz4740-pwm" , -"10010000.jz4740-pinctrl" ,"pwm4" ,"pwm4" ), +"10010000.pin-controller" ,"pwm4" ,"pwm4" ), };
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 40/50 perf/core: Fix exclusive events grouping
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
commit 8a58ddae23796c733c5dfbd717538d89d036c5bd upstream.
So far, we tried to disallow grouping exclusive events for the fear of complications they would cause with moving between contexts. Specifically, moving a software group to a hardware context would violate the exclusivity rules if both groups contain matching exclusive events.
This attempt was, however, unsuccessful: the check that we have in the perf_event_open() syscall is both wrong (looks at wrong PMU) and insufficient (group leader may still be exclusive), as can be illustrated by running:
$ perf record -e '{intel_pt//,cycles}' uname
$ perf record -e '{cycles,intel_pt//}' unameultimately successfully.
Furthermore, we are completely free to trigger the exclusivity violation by:
perf -e '{cycles,intel_pt//}' -e '{intel_pt//,instructions}'
even though the helpful perf record will not allow that, the ABI will.
The warning later in the perf_event_open() path will also not trigger, because it's also wrong.
Fix all this by validating the original group before moving, getting rid of broken safeguards and placing a useful one to perf_install_in_context().
--- include/linux/perf_event.h | 5 +++++ kernel/events/core.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
include/linux/perf_event.h +5 -0
@@ -1030,6 +1030,11 @@ static inline int in_software_context(streturn event->ctx->pmu->task_ctx_nr == perf_sw_context; } +static inline int is_exclusive_pmu (struct pmu *pmu) +{ +return pmu->capabilities &PERF_PMU_CAP_EXCLUSIVE ; +} +extern struct static_key perf_swevent_enabled[PERF_COUNT_SW_MAX ];extern void ___perf_sw_event (u32 ,u64 ,struct pt_regs *,u64 );
kernel/events/core.c +22 -12
@@ -2541,6 +2541,9 @@ unlock:return ret; } +static bool exclusive_event_installable (struct perf_event *event, +struct perf_event_context *ctx); +/* * Attach a performance event to a context. *
@@ -2555,6 +2558,8 @@ perf_install_in_context(struct perf_evenlockdep_assert_held (&ctx->mutex); +WARN_ON_ONCE (!exclusive_event_installable (event, ctx)); +if (event->cpu !=-1 ) event->cpu = cpu;
@@ -4341,7 +4346,7 @@ static int exclusive_event_init(struct p {struct pmu *pmu = event->pmu; -if (!(pmu->capabilities &PERF_PMU_CAP_EXCLUSIVE )) +if (!is_exclusive_pmu (pmu))return 0 ;/*
@@ -4372,7 +4377,7 @@ static void exclusive_event_destroy(stru {struct pmu *pmu = event->pmu; -if (!(pmu->capabilities &PERF_PMU_CAP_EXCLUSIVE )) +if (!is_exclusive_pmu (pmu))return ;/* see comment in exclusive_event_init() */
@@ -4392,14 +4397,15 @@ static bool exclusive_event_match(structreturn false; } -/* Called under the same ctx::mutex as perf_install_in_context() */ static bool exclusive_event_installable (struct perf_event *event,struct perf_event_context *ctx) {struct perf_event *iter_event;struct pmu *pmu = event->pmu; -if (!(pmu->capabilities &PERF_PMU_CAP_EXCLUSIVE )) +lockdep_assert_held (&ctx->mutex); + +if (!is_exclusive_pmu (pmu))return true;list_for_each_entry (iter_event, &ctx->event_list, event_entry) {
@@ -10613,11 +10619,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, goto err_alloc; } -if ((pmu->capabilities &PERF_PMU_CAP_EXCLUSIVE ) && group_leader) { - err = -EBUSY ; - goto err_context; - } -/* * Look up the group leader (we will attach this event to it): */
@@ -10705,6 +10706,18 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, move_group =0 ; } } + +/* +* Failure to create exclusive events returns -EBUSY. +*/ + err = -EBUSY ; +if (!exclusive_event_installable (group_leader, ctx)) + goto err_locked; + +for_each_sibling_event (sibling, group_leader) { +if (!exclusive_event_installable (sibling, ctx)) + goto err_locked; + } }else {mutex_lock (&ctx->mutex); }
@@ -10741,9 +10754,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,* because we need to serialize with concurrent event creation. */ if (!exclusive_event_installable (event, ctx)) { -/* exclusive and group stuff are assumed mutually exclusive */ -WARN_ON_ONCE (move_group); - err = -EBUSY ; goto err_locked; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 41/50 perf/core: Fix race between close() and fork()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
commit 1cf8dfe8a661f0462925df943140e9f6d1ea5233 upstream.
Syzcaller reported the following Use-after-Free bug:
close() clone() copy_process() perf_event_init_task() perf_event_init_context() mutex_lock(parent_ctx->mutex) inherit_task_group() inherit_group() inherit_event() mutex_lock(event->child_mutex) // expose event on child list list_add_tail() mutex_unlock(event->child_mutex) mutex_unlock(parent_ctx->mutex) ... goto bad_fork_* bad_fork_cleanup_perf: perf_event_free_task() perf_release() perf_event_release_kernel() list_for_each_entry() mutex_lock(ctx->mutex) mutex_lock(event->child_mutex) // event is from the failing inherit // on the other CPU perf_remove_from_context() list_move() mutex_unlock(event->child_mutex) mutex_unlock(ctx->mutex) mutex_lock(ctx->mutex) list_for_each_entry_safe() // event already stolen mutex_unlock(ctx->mutex) delayed_free_task() free_task() list_for_each_entry_safe() list_del() free_event() _free_event() // and so event->hw.target // is the already freed failed clone() if (event->hw.target) put_task_struct(event->hw.target) // WHOOPSIE, already quite dead
Which puts the lie to the the comment on perf_event_free_task():
'unexposed, unused context' not so much.
Which is a 'fun' confluence of fail; copy_process() doing an unconditional free_task() and not respecting refcounts, and perf having creative locking. In particular:
82d94856fa22 ("perf/core: Fix lock inversion between perf,trace,cpuhp")
seems to have overlooked this 'fun' parade.
Solve it by using the fact that detached events still have a reference count on their (previous) context. With this perf_event_free_task() can detect when events have escaped and wait for their destruction.
--- kernel/events/core.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel/events/core.c +41 -8
@@ -4452,12 +4452,20 @@ static void _free_event(struct perf_evenif (event->destroy) event->destroy (event); -if (event->ctx) -put_ctx (event->ctx); - +/* +* Must be after ->destroy(), due to uprobe_perf_close() using +* hw.target. +*/ if (event->hw.target)put_task_struct (event->hw.target); +/* +* perf_event_free_task() relies on put_ctx() being 'last', in particular +* all task references must be cleaned up. +*/ +if (event->ctx) +put_ctx (event->ctx); +exclusive_event_destroy (event);module_put (event->pmu->module);
@@ -4637,8 +4645,17 @@ again:mutex_unlock (&event->child_mutex);list_for_each_entry_safe (child, tmp, &free_list, child_list) { +void *var = &child->ctx->refcount; +list_del (&child->child_list);free_event (child); + +/* +* Wake any perf_event_free_task() waiting for this event to be +* freed. +*/ +smp_mb ();/* pairs with wait_var_event() */ +wake_up_var (var); } no_ctx:
@@ -11220,11 +11237,11 @@ static void perf_free_event(struct perf_ }/* -* Free an unexposed, unused context as created by inheritance by -* perf_event_init_task below, used by fork() in case of fail. +* Free a context as created by inheritance by perf_event_init_task() below, +* used by fork() in case of fail. * -* Not all locks are strictly required, but take them anyway to be nice and -* help out with the lockdep assertions. +* Even though the task has never lived, the context and events have been +* exposed through the child_list, so we must take care tearing it all down. */ void perf_event_free_task (struct task_struct *task) {
@@ -11254,7 +11271,23 @@ void perf_event_free_task(struct task_stperf_free_event (event, ctx);mutex_unlock (&ctx->mutex); -put_ctx (ctx); + +/* +* perf_event_release_kernel() could've stolen some of our +* child events and still have them on its free_list. In that +* case we must wait for these events to have been freed (in +* particular all their references to this task must've been +* dropped). +* +* Without this copy_process() will unconditionally free this +* task (irrespective of its reference count) and +* _free_event()'s put_task_struct(event->hw.target) will be a +* use-after-free. +* +* Wait for all events to drop their context reference. +*/ +wait_var_event (&ctx->refcount,atomic_read (&ctx->refcount) ==1 ); +put_ctx (ctx);/* must be last */ } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 43/50 ext4: enforce the immutable flag on open files
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit 02b016ca7f99229ae6227e7b2fc950c4e140d74a upstream.
According to the chattr man page, "a file with the 'i' attribute cannot be modified..." Historically, this was only enforced when the file was opened, per the rest of the description, "... and the file can not be opened in write mode".
There is general agreement that we should standardize all file systems to prevent modifications even for files that were opened at the time the immutable flag is set. Eventually, a change to enforce this at the VFS layer should be landing in mainline. Until then, enforce this at the ext4 level to prevent xfstests generic/553 from failing.
--- fs/ext4/file.c | 4 ++++ fs/ext4/inode.c | 11 +++++++++++ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
fs/ext4/file.c +4 -0
@@ -165,6 +165,10 @@ static ssize_t ext4_write_checks(struct ret =generic_write_checks (iocb, from);if (ret <=0 )return ret; + +if (unlikely (IS_IMMUTABLE (inode))) +return -EPERM ; +/* * If we have encountered a bitmap-format file, the size limit * is smaller than s_maxbytes, which is for extent-mapped files.
fs/ext4/inode.c +11 -0
@@ -5491,6 +5491,14 @@ int ext4_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,if (unlikely (ext4_forced_shutdown (EXT4_SB (inode->i_sb))))return -EIO ; +if (unlikely (IS_IMMUTABLE (inode))) +return -EPERM ; + +if (unlikely (IS_APPEND (inode) && + (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE |ATTR_UID | +ATTR_GID |ATTR_TIMES_SET )))) +return -EPERM ; + error =setattr_prepare (dentry, attr);if (error)return error;
@@ -6190,6 +6198,9 @@ int ext4_page_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *vget_block_t *get_block;int retries =0 ; +if (unlikely (IS_IMMUTABLE (inode))) +return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS ; +sb_start_pagefault (inode->i_sb);file_update_time (vma->vm_file);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 44/50 mm: add filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ross Zwisler <[email protected]>
commit aa0bfcd939c30617385ffa28682c062d78050eba upstream.
In the spirit of filemap_fdatawait_range() and filemap_fdatawait_keep_errors(), introduce filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors() which both takes a range upon which to wait and does not clear errors from the address space.
--- include/linux/fs.h | 2 ++ mm/filemap.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
include/linux/fs.h +2 -0
@@ -2651,6 +2651,8 @@ extern int filemap_flush(struct address_extern int filemap_fdatawait_keep_errors (struct address_space *mapping);extern int filemap_fdatawait_range (struct address_space *,loff_t lstart,loff_t lend); +extern int filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors (struct address_space *mapping, +loff_t start_byte,loff_t end_byte);static inline int filemap_fdatawait (struct address_space *mapping) {
mm/filemap.c +22 -0
@@ -562,6 +562,28 @@ int filemap_fdatawait_range(struct addreEXPORT_SYMBOL (filemap_fdatawait_range);/** +* filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors - wait for writeback to complete +* @mapping: address space structure to wait for +* @start_byte: offset in bytes where the range starts +* @end_byte: offset in bytes where the range ends (inclusive) +* +* Walk the list of under-writeback pages of the given address space in the +* given range and wait for all of them. Unlike filemap_fdatawait_range(), +* this function does not clear error status of the address space. +* +* Use this function if callers don't handle errors themselves. Expected +* call sites are system-wide / filesystem-wide data flushers: e.g. sync(2), +* fsfreeze(8) +*/ +int filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors (struct address_space *mapping, +loff_t start_byte,loff_t end_byte) +{ +__filemap_fdatawait_range (mapping, start_byte, end_byte); +return filemap_check_and_keep_errors (mapping); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors); + +/** * file_fdatawait_range - wait for writeback to complete * @file: file pointing to address space structure to wait for * @start_byte: offset in bytes where the range starts
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 45/50 jbd2: introduce jbd2_inode dirty range scoping
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ross Zwisler <[email protected]>
commit 6ba0e7dc64a5adcda2fbe65adc466891795d639e upstream.
Currently both journal_submit_inode_data_buffers() and journal_finish_inode_data_buffers() operate on the entire address space of each of the inodes associated with a given journal entry. The consequence of this is that if we have an inode where we are constantly appending dirty pages we can end up waiting for an indefinite amount of time in journal_finish_inode_data_buffers() while we wait for all the pages under writeback to be written out.
The easiest way to cause this type of workload is do just dd from /dev/zero to a file until it fills the entire filesystem. This can cause journal_finish_inode_data_buffers() to wait for the duration of the entire dd operation.
We can improve this situation by scoping each of the inode dirty ranges associated with a given transaction. We do this via the jbd2_inode structure so that the scoping is contained within jbd2 and so that it follows the lifetime and locking rules for that structure.
This allows us to limit the writeback & wait in journal_submit_inode_data_buffers() and journal_finish_inode_data_buffers() respectively to the dirty range for a given struct jdb2_inode, keeping us from waiting forever if the inode in question is still being appended to.
--- fs/jbd2/commit.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++------ fs/jbd2/journal.c | 4 ++++ fs/jbd2/transaction.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- include/linux/jbd2.h | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
fs/jbd2/commit.c +17 -6
@@ -187,14 +187,15 @@ static int journal_wait_on_commit_record* use writepages() because with dealyed allocation we may be doing * block allocation in writepages(). */ -static int journal_submit_inode_data_buffers (struct address_space *mapping) +static int journal_submit_inode_data_buffers (struct address_space *mapping, +loff_t dirty_start,loff_t dirty_end) {int ret;struct writeback_control wbc = { .sync_mode =WB_SYNC_ALL , .nr_to_write = mapping->nrpages *2 , - .range_start =0 , - .range_end =i_size_read (mapping->host), + .range_start = dirty_start, + .range_end = dirty_end, }; ret =generic_writepages (mapping, &wbc);
@@ -218,6 +219,9 @@ static int journal_submit_data_buffers(jspin_lock (&journal->j_list_lock);list_for_each_entry (jinode, &commit_transaction->t_inode_list, i_list) { +loff_t dirty_start = jinode->i_dirty_start; +loff_t dirty_end = jinode->i_dirty_end; +if (!(jinode->i_flags &JI_WRITE_DATA ))continue ; mapping = jinode->i_vfs_inode->i_mapping;
@@ -230,7 +234,8 @@ static int journal_submit_data_buffers(j* only allocated blocks here. */ trace_jbd2_submit_inode_data (jinode->i_vfs_inode); - err =journal_submit_inode_data_buffers (mapping); + err =journal_submit_inode_data_buffers (mapping, dirty_start, + dirty_end);if (!ret) ret = err;spin_lock (&journal->j_list_lock);
@@ -257,12 +262,16 @@ static int journal_finish_inode_data_buf/* For locking, see the comment in journal_submit_data_buffers() */ spin_lock (&journal->j_list_lock);list_for_each_entry (jinode, &commit_transaction->t_inode_list, i_list) { +loff_t dirty_start = jinode->i_dirty_start; +loff_t dirty_end = jinode->i_dirty_end; +if (!(jinode->i_flags &JI_WAIT_DATA ))continue ; jinode->i_flags |=JI_COMMIT_RUNNING ;spin_unlock (&journal->j_list_lock); - err =filemap_fdatawait_keep_errors ( - jinode->i_vfs_inode->i_mapping); + err =filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors ( + jinode->i_vfs_inode->i_mapping, dirty_start, + dirty_end);if (!ret) ret = err;spin_lock (&journal->j_list_lock);
@@ -282,6 +291,8 @@ static int journal_finish_inode_data_buf &jinode->i_transaction->t_inode_list); }else { jinode->i_transaction =NULL ; + jinode->i_dirty_start =0 ; + jinode->i_dirty_end =0 ; } }spin_unlock (&journal->j_list_lock);
fs/jbd2/journal.c +4 -0
@@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(jbd2_journal_try_to_free_bEXPORT_SYMBOL (jbd2_journal_force_commit);EXPORT_SYMBOL (jbd2_journal_inode_add_write);EXPORT_SYMBOL (jbd2_journal_inode_add_wait); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (jbd2_journal_inode_ranged_write); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (jbd2_journal_inode_ranged_wait);EXPORT_SYMBOL (jbd2_journal_init_jbd_inode);EXPORT_SYMBOL (jbd2_journal_release_jbd_inode);EXPORT_SYMBOL (jbd2_journal_begin_ordered_truncate);
@@ -2588,6 +2590,8 @@ void jbd2_journal_init_jbd_inode(struct jinode->i_next_transaction =NULL ; jinode->i_vfs_inode = inode; jinode->i_flags =0 ; + jinode->i_dirty_start =0 ; + jinode->i_dirty_end =0 ;INIT_LIST_HEAD (&jinode->i_list); }
fs/jbd2/transaction.c +28 -21
73 lines not on this page · raw message
include/linux/jbd2.h +22 -0
@@ -454,6 +454,22 @@ struct jbd2_inode {* @i_flags: Flags of inode [j_list_lock] */ unsigned long i_flags; + +/** +* @i_dirty_start: +* +* Offset in bytes where the dirty range for this inode starts. +* [j_list_lock] +*/ +loff_t i_dirty_start; + +/** +* @i_dirty_end: +* +* Inclusive offset in bytes where the dirty range for this inode +* ends. [j_list_lock] +*/ +loff_t i_dirty_end; };struct jbd2_revoke_table_s ;
@@ -1399,6 +1415,12 @@ extern int jbd2_journal_force_commit(extern int jbd2_journal_force_commit_nested (journal_t *);extern int jbd2_journal_inode_add_write (handle_t *handle,struct jbd2_inode *inode);extern int jbd2_journal_inode_add_wait (handle_t *handle,struct jbd2_inode *inode); +extern int jbd2_journal_inode_ranged_write (handle_t *handle, +struct jbd2_inode *inode,loff_t start_byte, +loff_t length); +extern int jbd2_journal_inode_ranged_wait (handle_t *handle, +struct jbd2_inode *inode,loff_t start_byte, +loff_t length);extern int jbd2_journal_begin_ordered_truncate (journal_t *journal,struct jbd2_inode *inode,loff_t new_size);extern void jbd2_journal_init_jbd_inode (struct jbd2_inode *jinode,struct inode *inode);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 46/50 ext4: use jbd2_inode dirty range scoping
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ross Zwisler <[email protected]>
commit 73131fbb003b3691cfcf9656f234b00da497fcd6 upstream.
Use the newly introduced jbd2_inode dirty range scoping to prevent us from waiting forever when trying to complete a journal transaction.
--- fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.h | 12 ++++++------ fs/ext4/inode.c | 13 ++++++++++--- fs/ext4/move_extent.c | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.h +6 -6
@@ -361,20 +361,20 @@ static inline int ext4_journal_force_com }static inline int ext4_jbd2_inode_add_write (handle_t *handle, -struct inode *inode) +struct inode *inode,loff_t start_byte,loff_t length) {if (ext4_handle_valid (handle)) -return jbd2_journal_inode_add_write (handle, -EXT4_I (inode)->jinode); +return jbd2_journal_inode_ranged_write (handle, +EXT4_I (inode)->jinode, start_byte, length);return 0 ; }static inline int ext4_jbd2_inode_add_wait (handle_t *handle, -struct inode *inode) +struct inode *inode,loff_t start_byte,loff_t length) {if (ext4_handle_valid (handle)) -return jbd2_journal_inode_add_wait (handle, -EXT4_I (inode)->jinode); +return jbd2_journal_inode_ranged_wait (handle, +EXT4_I (inode)->jinode, start_byte, length);return 0 ; }
fs/ext4/inode.c +10 -3
@@ -729,10 +729,16 @@ out_sem: !(flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_ZERO) && !ext4_is_quota_file(inode) && ext4_should_order_data(inode)) { +loff_t start_byte = + (loff_t )map->m_lblk << inode->i_blkbits; +loff_t length = (loff_t )map->m_len << inode->i_blkbits; +if (flags &EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_IO_SUBMIT ) - ret =ext4_jbd2_inode_add_wait (handle, inode); + ret =ext4_jbd2_inode_add_wait (handle, inode, + start_byte, length);else - ret =ext4_jbd2_inode_add_write (handle, inode); + ret =ext4_jbd2_inode_add_write (handle, inode, + start_byte, length);if (ret)return ret; }
@@ -4058,7 +4064,8 @@ static int __ext4_block_zero_page_range( err =0 ;mark_buffer_dirty (bh);if (ext4_should_order_data (inode)) - err =ext4_jbd2_inode_add_write (handle, inode); + err =ext4_jbd2_inode_add_write (handle, inode, from, + length); } unlock:
fs/ext4/move_extent.c +2 -1
@@ -390,7 +390,8 @@ data_copy:/* Even in case of data=writeback it is reasonable to pin * inode to transaction, to prevent unexpected data loss */ - *err =ext4_jbd2_inode_add_write (handle, orig_inode); + *err =ext4_jbd2_inode_add_write (handle, orig_inode, + (loff_t )orig_page_offset <<PAGE_SHIFT , replaced_size); unlock_pages:unlock_page (pagep[0 ]);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 30/50 net/tls: make sure offload also gets the keys wiped
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit acd3e96d53a24d219f720ed4012b62723ae05da1 ]
Commit 86029d10af18 ("tls: zero the crypto information from tls_context before freeing") added memzero_explicit() calls to clear the key material before freeing struct tls_context, but it missed tls_device.c has its own way of freeing this structure. Replace the missing free.
--- include/net/tls.h | 1 + net/tls/tls_device.c | 2 +- net/tls/tls_main.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/net/tls.h +1 -0
@@ -234,6 +234,7 @@ struct tls_offload_context_rx { (ALIGN (sizeof (struct tls_offload_context_rx ),sizeof (void *)) + \ TLS_DRIVER_STATE_SIZE) +void tls_ctx_free (struct tls_context *ctx);int wait_on_pending_writer (struct sock *sk,long *timeo);int tls_sk_query (struct sock *sk,int optname,char __user *optval,int __user *optlen);
net/tls/tls_device.c +1 -1
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ static void tls_device_free_ctx(struct tif (ctx->rx_conf ==TLS_HW )kfree (tls_offload_ctx_rx (ctx)); -kfree (ctx); +tls_ctx_free (ctx); }static void tls_device_gc_task (struct work_struct *work)
net/tls/tls_main.c +1 -1
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ static void tls_write_space(struct sock ctx->sk_write_space (sk); } -static void tls_ctx_free (struct tls_context *ctx) +void tls_ctx_free (struct tls_context *ctx) {if (!ctx)return ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 48/50 KVM: nVMX: do not use dangling shadow VMCS after guest reset
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
commit 88dddc11a8d6b09201b4db9d255b3394d9bc9e57 upstream.
If a KVM guest is reset while running a nested guest, free_nested will disable the shadow VMCS execution control in the vmcs01. However, on the next KVM_RUN vmx_vcpu_run would nevertheless try to sync the VMCS12 to the shadow VMCS which has since been freed.
This causes a vmptrld of a NULL pointer on my machime, but Jan reports the host to hang altogether. Let's see how much this trivial patch fixes.
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +7 -1
@@ -8457,6 +8457,7 @@ static void vmx_disable_shadow_vmcs(stru {vmcs_clear_bits (SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL ,SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS );vmcs_write64 (VMCS_LINK_POINTER ,-1ull ); + vmx->nested.sync_shadow_vmcs = false; }static inline void nested_release_vmcs12 (struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
@@ -8468,7 +8469,6 @@ static inline void nested_release_vmcs12/* copy to memory all shadowed fields in case they were modified */ copy_shadow_to_vmcs12 (vmx); - vmx->nested.sync_shadow_vmcs = false;vmx_disable_shadow_vmcs (vmx); } vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv =-1 ;
@@ -8668,6 +8668,9 @@ static void copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(structu64 field_value;struct vmcs *shadow_vmcs = vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs; +if (WARN_ON (!shadow_vmcs)) +return ; +preempt_disable ();vmcs_load (shadow_vmcs);
@@ -8706,6 +8709,9 @@ static void copy_vmcs12_to_shadow(structu64 field_value =0 ;struct vmcs *shadow_vmcs = vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs; +if (WARN_ON (!shadow_vmcs)) +return ; +vmcs_load (shadow_vmcs);for (q =0 ; q <ARRAY_SIZE (fields); q++) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 49/50 KVM: nVMX: Clear pending KVM_REQ_GET_VMCS12_PAGES when leaving nested
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jan Kiszka <[email protected]>
commit cf64527bb33f6cec2ed50f89182fc4688d0056b6 upstream.
Letting this pend may cause nested_get_vmcs12_pages to run against an invalid state, corrupting the effective vmcs of L1.
This was triggerable in QEMU after a guest corruption in L2, followed by a L1 reset.
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +2 -0
@@ -8490,6 +8490,8 @@ static void free_nested(struct vcpu_vmxif (!vmx->nested.vmxon && !vmx->nested.smm.vmxon)return ; +kvm_clear_request (KVM_REQ_GET_VMCS12_PAGES , &vmx->vcpu); +hrtimer_cancel (&vmx->nested.preemption_timer); vmx->nested.vmxon = false; vmx->nested.smm.vmxon = false;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 31/50 sctp: not bind the socket in sctp_connect
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Xin Long <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9b6c08878e23adb7cc84bdca94d8a944b03f099e ]
Now when sctp_connect() is called with a wrong sa_family, it binds to a port but doesn't set bp->port, then sctp_get_af_specific will return NULL and sctp_connect() returns -EINVAL.
Then if sctp_bind() is called to bind to another port, the last port it has bound will leak due to bp->port is NULL by then.
sctp_connect() doesn't need to bind ports, as later __sctp_connect will do it if bp->port is NULL. So remove it from sctp_connect(). While at it, remove the unnecessary sockaddr.sa_family len check as it's already done in sctp_inet_connect.
--- net/sctp/socket.c | 20 ++------------------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
net/sctp/socket.c +2 -18
@@ -4507,34 +4507,18 @@ out_nounlock:static int sctp_connect (struct sock *sk,struct sockaddr *addr,int addr_len,int flags) { -struct inet_sock *inet =inet_sk (sk);struct sctp_af *af; -int err =0 ; +int err = -EINVAL ;lock_sock (sk);pr_debug ("%s: sk:%p, sockaddr:%p, addr_len:%d\n" , __func__, sk, addr, addr_len); -/* We may need to bind the socket. */ -if (!inet->inet_num) { -if (sk->sk_prot->get_port (sk,0 )) { -release_sock (sk); -return -EAGAIN ; - } - inet->inet_sport =htons (inet->inet_num); - } -/* Validate addr_len before calling common connect/connectx routine. */ af =sctp_get_af_specific (addr->sa_family); -if (!af || addr_len < af->sockaddr_len) { - err = -EINVAL ; - }else { -/* Pass correct addr len to common routine (so it knows there -* is only one address being passed. -*/ +if (af && addr_len >= af->sockaddr_len) err =__sctp_connect (sk, addr, af->sockaddr_len, flags,NULL ); - }release_sock (sk);return err;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 32/50 net: bridge: mcast: fix stale nsrcs pointer in igmp3/mld2 report handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e57f61858b7cf478ed6fa23ed4b3876b1c9625c4 ]
We take a pointer to grec prior to calling pskb_may_pull and use it afterwards to get nsrcs so record nsrcs before the pull when handling igmp3 and we get a pointer to nsrcs and call pskb_may_pull when handling mld2 which again could lead to reading 2 bytes out-of-bounds.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in br_multicast_rcv+0x480c/0x4ad0 [bridge]
Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880421302b4 by task ksoftirqd/1/16
CPU: 1 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Tainted: G OE 5.2.0-rc6+ #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x71/0xab
print_address_description+0x6a/0x280
? br_multicast_rcv+0x480c/0x4ad0 [bridge]
__kasan_report+0x152/0x1aa
? br_multicast_rcv+0x480c/0x4ad0 [bridge]
? br_multicast_rcv+0x480c/0x4ad0 [bridge]
kasan_report+0xe/0x20
br_multicast_rcv+0x480c/0x4ad0 [bridge]
? br_multicast_disable_port+0x150/0x150 [bridge]
? ktime_get_with_offset+0xb4/0x150
? __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.6+0xa6/0xf0
? __netif_receive_skb+0x1b0/0x1b0
? br_fdb_update+0x10e/0x6e0 [bridge]
? br_handle_frame_finish+0x3c6/0x11d0 [bridge]
br_handle_frame_finish+0x3c6/0x11d0 [bridge]
? br_pass_frame_up+0x3a0/0x3a0 [bridge]
? virtnet_probe+0x1c80/0x1c80 [virtio_net]
br_handle_frame+0x731/0xd90 [bridge]
? select_idle_sibling+0x25/0x7d0
? br_handle_frame_finish+0x11d0/0x11d0 [bridge]
__netif_receive_skb_core+0xced/0x2d70
? virtqueue_get_buf_ctx+0x230/0x1130 [virtio_ring]
? do_xdp_generic+0x20/0x20
? virtqueue_napi_complete+0x39/0x70 [virtio_net]
? virtnet_poll+0x94d/0xc78 [virtio_net]
? receive_buf+0x5120/0x5120 [virtio_net]
? __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x97/0x1d0
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x97/0x1d0
? __netif_receive_skb_core+0x2d70/0x2d70
? _raw_write_trylock+0x100/0x100
? __queue_work+0x41e/0xbe0
process_backlog+0x19c/0x650
? _raw_read_lock_irq+0x40/0x40
net_rx_action+0x71e/0xbc0
? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
? napi_complete_done+0x360/0x360
? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
? __schedule+0x85e/0x14d0
__do_softirq+0x1db/0x5f9
? takeover_tasklets+0x5f0/0x5f0
run_ksoftirqd+0x26/0x40
smpboot_thread_fn+0x443/0x680
? sort_range+0x20/0x20
? schedule+0x94/0x210
? __kthread_parkme+0x78/0xf0
? sort_range+0x20/0x20
kthread+0x2ae/0x3a0
? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0001084c00 refcount:0 mapcount:-128 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
flags: 0xffffc000000000()
raw: 00ffffc000000000 ffffea0000cfca08 ffffea0001098608 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000003 00000000ffffff7f 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888042130180: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff888042130200: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
> ffff888042130280: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
^
ffff888042130300: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff888042130380: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
==================================================================
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint--- net/bridge/br_multicast.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
net/bridge/br_multicast.c +16 -11
@@ -1147,6 +1147,7 @@ static int br_ip4_multicast_igmp3_reportint type;int err =0 ;__be32 group; +u16 nsrcs; ih =igmpv3_report_hdr (skb); num =ntohs (ih->ngrec);
@@ -1160,8 +1161,9 @@ static int br_ip4_multicast_igmp3_report grec = (void *)(skb->data + len -sizeof (*grec)); group = grec->grec_mca; type = grec->grec_type; + nsrcs =ntohs (grec->grec_nsrcs); - len +=ntohs (grec->grec_nsrcs) *4 ; + len += nsrcs *4 ;if (!pskb_may_pull (skb, len))return -EINVAL ;
@@ -1182,7 +1184,7 @@ static int br_ip4_multicast_igmp3_report src =eth_hdr (skb)->h_source;if ((type ==IGMPV3_CHANGE_TO_INCLUDE || type ==IGMPV3_MODE_IS_INCLUDE ) && -ntohs (grec->grec_nsrcs) ==0 ) { + nsrcs ==0 ) {br_ip4_multicast_leave_group (br, port, group, vid, src); }else { err = br_ip4_multicast_add_group(br, port, group, vid,
@@ -1217,23 +1219,26 @@ static int br_ip6_multicast_mld2_report( len =skb_transport_offset (skb) +sizeof (*icmp6h);for (i =0 ; i < num; i++) { -__be16 *nsrcs, _nsrcs; +__be16 *_nsrcs, __nsrcs; +u16 nsrcs; - nsrcs =skb_header_pointer (skb, - len + offsetof(struct mld2_grec , - grec_nsrcs), -sizeof (_nsrcs), &_nsrcs); -if (!nsrcs) + _nsrcs =skb_header_pointer (skb, + len + offsetof(struct mld2_grec , + grec_nsrcs), +sizeof (__nsrcs), &__nsrcs); +if (!_nsrcs)return -EINVAL ; + nsrcs =ntohs (*_nsrcs); +if (!pskb_may_pull (skb, len +sizeof (*grec) + -sizeof (struct in6_addr ) *ntohs (*nsrcs))) +sizeof (struct in6_addr ) * nsrcs))return -EINVAL ; grec = (struct mld2_grec *)(skb->data + len); len +=sizeof (*grec) + -sizeof (struct in6_addr ) *ntohs (*nsrcs); +sizeof (struct in6_addr ) * nsrcs;/* We treat these as MLDv1 reports for now. */ switch (grec->grec_type) {
@@ -1252,7 +1257,7 @@ static int br_ip6_multicast_mld2_report( src =eth_hdr (skb)->h_source;if ((grec->grec_type ==MLD2_CHANGE_TO_INCLUDE || grec->grec_type ==MLD2_MODE_IS_INCLUDE ) && -ntohs (*nsrcs) ==0 ) { + nsrcs ==0 ) {br_ip6_multicast_leave_group (br, port, &grec->grec_mca, vid, src); }else {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 50/50 mm: vmscan: scan anonymous pages on file refaults
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kuo-Hsin Yang <[email protected]>
commit 2c012a4ad1a2cd3fb5a0f9307b9d219f84eda1fa upstream.
When file refaults are detected and there are many inactive file pages, the system never reclaim anonymous pages, the file pages are dropped aggressively when there are still a lot of cold anonymous pages and system thrashes. This issue impacts the performance of applications with large executable, e.g. chrome.
With this patch, when file refault is detected, inactive_list_is_low() always returns true for file pages in get_scan_count() to enable scanning anonymous pages.
The problem can be reproduced by the following test program.
---8<---
void fallocate_file(const char *filename, off_t size)
{
struct stat st;
int fd;
if (!stat(filename, &st) && st.st_size >= size)
return;
fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600);
if (fd < 0) {
perror("create file");
exit(1);
}
if (posix_fallocate(fd, 0, size)) {
perror("fallocate");
exit(1);
}
close(fd);
}long *alloc_anon(long size)
{
long *start = malloc(size);
memset(start, 1, size);
return start;
}long access_file(const char *filename, long size, long rounds)
{
int fd, i;
volatile char *start1, *end1, *start2;
const int page_size = getpagesize();
long sum = 0;
fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
if (fd == -1) {
perror("open");
exit(1);
}
/*
* Some applications, e.g. chrome, use a lot of executable file
* pages, map some of the pages with PROT_EXEC flag to simulate
* the behavior.
*/
start1 = mmap(NULL, size / 2, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, MAP_SHARED,
fd, 0);
if (start1 == MAP_FAILED) {
perror("mmap");
exit(1);
}
end1 = start1 + size / 2;
start2 = mmap(NULL, size / 2, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd, size / 2);
if (start2 == MAP_FAILED) {
perror("mmap");
exit(1);
}
for (i = 0; i < rounds; ++i) {
struct timeval before, after;
volatile char *ptr1 = start1, *ptr2 = start2;
gettimeofday(&before, NULL);
for (; ptr1 < end1; ptr1 += page_size, ptr2 += page_size)
sum += *ptr1 + *ptr2;
gettimeofday(&after, NULL);
printf("File access time, round %d: %f (sec)
", i,
(after.tv_sec - before.tv_sec) +
(after.tv_usec - before.tv_usec) / 1000000.0);
}
return sum;
}int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
const long MB = 1024 * 1024;
long anon_mb, file_mb, file_rounds;
const char filename[] = "large";
long *ret1;
long ret2;
if (argc != 4) {
printf("usage: thrash ANON_MB FILE_MB FILE_ROUNDS
");
exit(0);
}
anon_mb = atoi(argv[1]);
file_mb = atoi(argv[2]);
file_rounds = atoi(argv[3]);
fallocate_file(filename, file_mb * MB);
printf("Allocate %ld MB anonymous pages
", anon_mb);
ret1 = alloc_anon(anon_mb * MB);
printf("Access %ld MB file pages
", file_mb);
ret2 = access_file(filename, file_mb * MB, file_rounds);
printf("Print result to prevent optimization: %ld
",
*ret1 + ret2);
return 0;
}---8<---
Running the test program on 2GB RAM VM with kernel 5.2.0-rc5, the program fills ram with 2048 MB memory, access a 200 MB file for 10 times. Without this patch, the file cache is dropped aggresively and every access to the file is from disk.
$ ./thrash 2048 200 10 Allocate 2048 MB anonymous pages Access 200 MB file pages File access time, round 0: 2.489316 (sec) File access time, round 1: 2.581277 (sec) File access time, round 2: 2.487624 (sec) File access time, round 3: 2.449100 (sec) File access time, round 4: 2.420423 (sec) File access time, round 5: 2.343411 (sec) File access time, round 6: 2.454833 (sec) File access time, round 7: 2.483398 (sec) File access time, round 8: 2.572701 (sec) File access time, round 9: 2.493014 (sec)
With this patch, these file pages can be cached.
$ ./thrash 2048 200 10 Allocate 2048 MB anonymous pages Access 200 MB file pages File access time, round 0: 2.475189 (sec) File access time, round 1: 2.440777 (sec) File access time, round 2: 2.411671 (sec) File access time, round 3: 1.955267 (sec) File access time, round 4: 0.029924 (sec) File access time, round 5: 0.000808 (sec) File access time, round 6: 0.000771 (sec) File access time, round 7: 0.000746 (sec) File access time, round 8: 0.000738 (sec) File access time, round 9: 0.000747 (sec)
Checked the swap out stats during the test [1], 19006 pages swapped out with this patch, 3418 pages swapped out without this patch. There are more swap out, but I think it's within reasonable range when file backed data set doesn't fit into the memory.
$ ./thrash 2000 100 2100 5 1 # ANON_MB FILE_EXEC FILE_NOEXEC ROUNDS PROCESSES Allocate 2000 MB anonymous pages active_anon: 1613644, inactive_anon: 348656, active_file: 892, inactive_file: 1384 (kB) pswpout: 7972443, pgpgin: 478615246 Access 100 MB executable file pages Access 2100 MB regular file pages File access time, round 0: 12.165, (sec) active_anon: 1433788, inactive_anon: 478116, active_file: 17896, inactive_file: 24328 (kB) File access time, round 1: 11.493, (sec) active_anon: 1430576, inactive_anon: 477144, active_file: 25440, inactive_file: 26172 (kB) File access time, round 2: 11.455, (sec) active_anon: 1427436, inactive_anon: 476060, active_file: 21112, inactive_file: 28808 (kB) File access time, round 3: 11.454, (sec) active_anon: 1420444, inactive_anon: 473632, active_file: 23216, inactive_file: 35036 (kB) File access time, round 4: 11.479, (sec) active_anon: 1413964, inactive_anon: 471460, active_file: 31728, inactive_file: 32224 (kB) pswpout: 7991449 (+ 19006), pgpgin: 489924366 (+ 11309120)
With 4 processes accessing non-overlapping parts of a large file, 30316 pages swapped out with this patch, 5152 pages swapped out without this patch. The swapout number is small comparing to pgpgin.
[1]: https://github.com/vovo/testing/blob/master/mem_thrash.c
--- mm/vmscan.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
mm/vmscan.c +3 -3
@@ -2190,7 +2190,7 @@ static void shrink_active_list(unsigned* 10TB 320 32GB */ static bool inactive_list_is_low (struct lruvec *lruvec,bool file, -struct scan_control *sc,bool actual_reclaim) +struct scan_control *sc,bool trace) {enum lru_list active_lru = file *LRU_FILE +LRU_ACTIVE ;struct pglist_data *pgdat =lruvec_pgdat (lruvec);
@@ -2216,7 +2216,7 @@ static bool inactive_list_is_low(struct* rid of the stale workingset quickly. */ refaults =lruvec_page_state (lruvec,WORKINGSET_ACTIVATE ); -if (file && actual_reclaim && lruvec->refaults != refaults) { +if (file && lruvec->refaults != refaults) { inactive_ratio =0 ; }else { gb = (inactive + active) >> (30 -PAGE_SHIFT );
@@ -2226,7 +2226,7 @@ static bool inactive_list_is_low(struct inactive_ratio =1 ; } -if (actual_reclaim) +if (trace) trace_mm_vmscan_inactive_list_is_low(pgdat->node_id, sc->reclaim_idx, lruvec_lru_size(lruvec, inactive_lru, MAX_NR_ZONES), inactive, lruvec_lru_size(lruvec, active_lru, MAX_NR_ZONES), active,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 35/50 net: bridge: stp: dont cache eth dest pointer before skb pull
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2446a68ae6a8cee6d480e2f5b52f5007c7c41312 ]
Don't cache eth dest pointer before calling pskb_may_pull.
--- net/bridge/br_stp_bpdu.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/bridge/br_stp_bpdu.c +1 -2
@@ -147,7 +147,6 @@ void br_send_tcn_bpdu(struct net_bridge_void br_stp_rcv (const struct stp_proto *proto,struct sk_buff *skb,struct net_device *dev) { -const unsigned char *dest =eth_hdr (skb)->h_dest;struct net_bridge_port *p;struct net_bridge *br;const unsigned char *buf;
@@ -176,7 +175,7 @@ void br_stp_rcv(const struct stp_proto *if (p->state ==BR_STATE_DISABLED ) goto out; -if (!ether_addr_equal (dest, br->group_addr)) +if (!ether_addr_equal (eth_hdr (skb)->h_dest, br->group_addr)) goto out;if (p->flags &BR_BPDU_GUARD ) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 36/50 dma-buf: balance refcount inbalance
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jérôme Glisse <[email protected]>
commit 5e383a9798990c69fc759a4930de224bb497e62c upstream.
The debugfs take reference on fence without dropping them.
--- drivers/dma-buf/dma-buf.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/dma-buf/dma-buf.c +1 -0
@@ -1069,6 +1069,7 @@ static int dma_buf_debug_show(struct seq fence->ops->get_driver_name (fence), fence->ops->get_timeline_name (fence), dma_fence_is_signaled(fence) ? "" : "un"); +dma_fence_put (fence); }rcu_read_unlock ();
_______________________________________________
dri-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 34/50 net: bridge: dont cache ether dest pointer on input
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3d26eb8ad1e9b906433903ce05f775cf038e747f ]
We would cache ether dst pointer on input in br_handle_frame_finish but after the neigh suppress code that could lead to a stale pointer since both ipv4 and ipv6 suppress code do pskb_may_pull. This means we have to always reload it after the suppress code so there's no point in having it cached just retrieve it directly.
--- net/bridge/br_input.c | 8 +++----- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/bridge/br_input.c +3 -5
@@ -79,7 +79,6 @@ int br_handle_frame_finish(struct net *nstruct net_bridge_fdb_entry *dst =NULL ;struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mdst;bool local_rcv, mcast_hit = false; -const unsigned char *dest;struct net_bridge *br;u16 vid =0 ;
@@ -97,10 +96,9 @@ int br_handle_frame_finish(struct net *nbr_fdb_update (br, p,eth_hdr (skb)->h_source, vid, false); local_rcv = !!(br->dev->flags &IFF_PROMISC ); - dest =eth_hdr (skb)->h_dest; -if (is_multicast_ether_addr (dest)) { +if (is_multicast_ether_addr (eth_hdr (skb)->h_dest)) {/* by definition the broadcast is also a multicast address */ -if (is_broadcast_ether_addr (dest)) { +if (is_broadcast_ether_addr (eth_hdr (skb)->h_dest)) { pkt_type =BR_PKT_BROADCAST ; local_rcv = true; }else {
@@ -150,7 +148,7 @@ int br_handle_frame_finish(struct net *n }break ;case BR_PKT_UNICAST : - dst =br_fdb_find_rcu (br, dest, vid); + dst =br_fdb_find_rcu (br,eth_hdr (skb)->h_dest, vid);default :break ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 28/50 netrom: hold sock when setting skb->destructor
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4638faac032756f7eab5524be7be56bee77e426b ]
sock_efree() releases the sock refcnt, if we don't hold this refcnt when setting skb->destructor to it, the refcnt would not be balanced. This leads to several bug reports from syzbot.
I have checked other users of sock_efree(), all of them hold the sock refcnt.
--- net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/netrom/af_netrom.c +1 -0
@@ -970,6 +970,7 @@ int nr_rx_frame(struct sk_buff *skb, str window = skb->data[20 ]; +sock_hold (make); skb->sk = make; skb->destructor = sock_efree; make->sk_state =TCP_ESTABLISHED ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 37/50 dma-buf: Discard old fence_excl on retrying get_fences_rcu for realloc
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>
commit f5b07b04e5f090a85d1e96938520f2b2b58e4a8e upstream.
If we have to drop the seqcount & rcu lock to perform a krealloc, we have to restart the loop. In doing so, be careful not to lose track of the already acquired exclusive fence.
--- drivers/dma-buf/reservation.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/dma-buf/reservation.c +4 -0
@@ -416,6 +416,10 @@ int reservation_object_get_fences_rcu(st GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN);if (!nshared) {rcu_read_unlock (); + +dma_fence_put (fence_excl); + fence_excl =NULL ; + nshared =krealloc (shared, sz,GFP_KERNEL );if (nshared) { shared = nshared;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 33/50 net: bridge: mcast: fix stale ipv6 hdr pointer when handling v6 query
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3b26a5d03d35d8f732d75951218983c0f7f68dff ]
We get a pointer to the ipv6 hdr in br_ip6_multicast_query but we may call pskb_may_pull afterwards and end up using a stale pointer. So use the header directly, it's just 1 place where it's needed.
--- net/bridge/br_multicast.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/bridge/br_multicast.c +1 -2
@@ -1510,7 +1510,6 @@ static int br_ip6_multicast_query(struct struct sk_buff *skb, u16 vid) { -const struct ipv6hdr *ip6h =ipv6_hdr (skb);struct mld_msg *mld;struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mp;struct mld2_query *mld2q;
@@ -1554,7 +1553,7 @@ static int br_ip6_multicast_query(structif (is_general_query) { saddr.proto =htons (ETH_P_IPV6 ); - saddr.u.ip6 = ip6h->saddr; + saddr.u.ip6 =ipv6_hdr (skb)->saddr;br_multicast_query_received (br, port, &br->ip6_other_query, &saddr, max_delay);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 47/50 ext4: allow directory holes
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit 4e19d6b65fb4fc42e352ce9883649e049da14743 upstream.
The largedir feature was intended to allow ext4 directories to have unmapped directory blocks (e.g., directory holes). And so the released e2fsprogs no longer enforces this for largedir file systems; however, the corresponding change to the kernel-side code was not made.
This commit fixes this oversight.
--- fs/ext4/dir.c | 19 +++++++++---------- fs/ext4/namei.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/dir.c +9 -10
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *filstruct inode *inode =file_inode (file);struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;struct buffer_head *bh =NULL ; -int dir_has_error =0 ;struct fscrypt_str fstr =FSTR_INIT (NULL ,0 );if (ext4_encrypted_inode (inode)) {
@@ -144,8 +143,6 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *filreturn err; } - offset = ctx->pos & (sb->s_blocksize -1 ); -while (ctx->pos < inode->i_size) {struct ext4_map_blocks map;
@@ -154,9 +151,18 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *fil goto errout; }cond_resched (); + offset = ctx->pos & (sb->s_blocksize -1 ); map.m_lblk = ctx->pos >>EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS (sb); map.m_len =1 ; err =ext4_map_blocks (NULL , inode, &map,0 ); +if (err ==0 ) { +/* m_len should never be zero but let's avoid +* an infinite loop if it somehow is */ +if (map.m_len ==0 ) + map.m_len =1 ; + ctx->pos += map.m_len * sb->s_blocksize; +continue ; + }if (err >0 ) {pgoff_t index = map.m_pblk >> (PAGE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits);
@@ -175,13 +181,6 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *fil }if (!bh) { -if (!dir_has_error) { -EXT4_ERROR_FILE (file,0 , -"directory contains a " -"hole at offset %llu" , - (unsigned long long ) ctx->pos); - dir_has_error =1 ; - }/* corrupt size? Maybe no more blocks to read */ if (ctx->pos > inode->i_blocks <<9 )break ;
fs/ext4/namei.c +37 -8
109 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 42/50 ext4: dont allow any modifications to an immutable file
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
commit 2e53840362771c73eb0a5ff71611507e64e8eecd upstream.
Don't allow any modifications to a file that's marked immutable, which means that we have to flush all the writable pages to make the readonly and we have to check the setattr/setflags parameters more closely.
--- fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/ioctl.c +45 -1
@@ -268,6 +268,29 @@ static int uuid_is_zero(__u8 u[16]) }#endif +/* +* If immutable is set and we are not clearing it, we're not allowed to change +* anything else in the inode. Don't error out if we're only trying to set +* immutable on an immutable file. +*/ +static int ext4_ioctl_check_immutable (struct inode *inode,__u32 new_projid, +unsigned int flags) +{ +struct ext4_inode_info *ei =EXT4_I (inode); +unsigned int oldflags = ei->i_flags; + +if (!(oldflags &EXT4_IMMUTABLE_FL ) || !(flags &EXT4_IMMUTABLE_FL )) +return 0 ; + +if ((oldflags & ~EXT4_IMMUTABLE_FL ) != (flags & ~EXT4_IMMUTABLE_FL )) +return -EPERM ; +if (ext4_has_feature_project (inode->i_sb) && +__kprojid_val (ei->i_projid) != new_projid) +return -EPERM ; + +return 0 ; +} +static int ext4_ioctl_setflags (struct inode *inode,unsigned int flags) {
@@ -321,6 +344,20 @@ static int ext4_ioctl_setflags(struct in goto flags_out; } +/* +* Wait for all pending directio and then flush all the dirty pages +* for this file. The flush marks all the pages readonly, so any +* subsequent attempt to write to the file (particularly mmap pages) +* will come through the filesystem and fail. +*/ +if (S_ISREG (inode->i_mode) && !IS_IMMUTABLE (inode) && + (flags &EXT4_IMMUTABLE_FL )) { +inode_dio_wait (inode); + err =filemap_write_and_wait (inode->i_mapping); +if (err) + goto flags_out; + } + handle =ext4_journal_start (inode,EXT4_HT_INODE ,1 );if (IS_ERR (handle)) { err =PTR_ERR (handle);
@@ -750,7 +787,11 @@ long ext4_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigreturn err;inode_lock (inode); - err =ext4_ioctl_setflags (inode, flags); + err =ext4_ioctl_check_immutable (inode, +from_kprojid (&init_user_ns, ei->i_projid), + flags); +if (!err) + err =ext4_ioctl_setflags (inode, flags);inode_unlock (inode);mnt_drop_write_file (filp);return err;
@@ -1120,6 +1161,9 @@ resizefs_out: goto out; flags = (ei->i_flags & ~EXT4_FL_XFLAG_VISIBLE ) | (flags &EXT4_FL_XFLAG_VISIBLE ); + err =ext4_ioctl_check_immutable (inode, fa.fsx_projid, flags); +if (err) + goto out; err =ext4_ioctl_setflags (inode, flags);if (err) goto out;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 38/50 gpio: davinci: silence error prints in case of EPROBE_DEFER
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Keerthy <[email protected]>
commit 541e4095f388c196685685633c950cb9b97f8039 upstream.
Silence error prints in case of EPROBE_DEFER. This avoids multiple/duplicate defer prints during boot.
--- drivers/gpio/gpio-davinci.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpio/gpio-davinci.c +3 -2
@@ -222,8 +222,9 @@ static int davinci_gpio_probe(struct plafor (i =0 ; i < nirq; i++) { chips->irqs[i] =platform_get_irq (pdev, i);if (chips->irqs[i] <0 ) { -dev_info (dev,"IRQ not populated, err = %d\n" , - chips->irqs[i]); +if (chips->irqs[i] != -EPROBE_DEFER ) +dev_info (dev,"IRQ not populated, err = %d\n" , + chips->irqs[i]);return chips->irqs[i]; } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 27/50 netrom: fix a memory leak in nr_rx_frame()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c8c8218ec5af5d2598381883acbefbf604e56b5e ]
When the skb is associated with a new sock, just assigning it to skb->sk is not sufficient, we have to set its destructor to free the sock properly too.
--- net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/netrom/af_netrom.c +2 -1
@@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ int nr_rx_frame(struct sk_buff *skb, strunsigned short frametype, flags, window, timeout;int ret; - skb->sk =NULL ;/* Initially we don't know who it's for */ +skb_orphan (skb);/* * skb->data points to the netrom frame start
@@ -971,6 +971,7 @@ int nr_rx_frame(struct sk_buff *skb, str window = skb->data[20 ]; skb->sk = make; + skb->destructor = sock_efree; make->sk_state =TCP_ESTABLISHED ;/* Fill in his circuit details */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 18/50 sctp: fix error handling on stream scheduler initialization
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4d1415811e492d9a8238f8a92dd0d51612c788e9 ]
It allocates the extended area for outbound streams only on sendmsg calls, if they are not yet allocated. When using the priority stream scheduler, this initialization may imply into a subsequent allocation, which may fail. In this case, it was aborting the stream scheduler initialization but leaving the ->ext pointer (allocated) in there, thus in a partially initialized state. On a subsequent call to sendmsg, it would notice the ->ext pointer in there, and trip on uninitialized stuff when trying to schedule the data chunk.
The fix is undo the ->ext initialization if the stream scheduler initialization fails and avoid the partially initialized state.
Although syzkaller bisected this to commit 4ff40b86262b ("sctp: set chunk transport correctly when it's a new asoc"), this bug was actually introduced on the commit I marked below.
--- net/sctp/stream.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/sctp/stream.c +8 -1
@@ -253,13 +253,20 @@ out:int sctp_stream_init_ext (struct sctp_stream *stream,__u16 sid) {struct sctp_stream_out_ext *soute; +int ret; soute =kzalloc (sizeof (*soute),GFP_KERNEL );if (!soute)return -ENOMEM ;SCTP_SO (stream, sid)->ext = soute; -return sctp_sched_init_sid (stream, sid,GFP_KERNEL ); + ret =sctp_sched_init_sid (stream, sid,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (ret) { +kfree (SCTP_SO (stream, sid)->ext); +SCTP_SO (stream, sid)->ext =NULL ; + } + +return ret; }void sctp_stream_free (struct sctp_stream *stream)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 14/50 net: stmmac: Re-work the queue selection for TSO packets
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jose Abreu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4993e5b37e8bcb55ac90f76eb6d2432647273747 ]
Ben Hutchings says:
"This is the wrong place to change the queue mapping. stmmac_xmit() is called with a specific TX queue locked, and accessing a different TX queue results in a data race for all of that queue's state.
I think this commit should be reverted upstream and in all stable branches. Instead, the driver should implement the ndo_select_queue operation and override the queue mapping there."
--- drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c | 29 ++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c +19 -10
@@ -3036,17 +3036,8 @@ static netdev_tx_t stmmac_xmit(struct sk/* Manage oversized TCP frames for GMAC4 device */ if (skb_is_gso (skb) && priv->tso) { -if (skb_shinfo (skb)->gso_type & (SKB_GSO_TCPV4 |SKB_GSO_TCPV6 )) { -/* -* There is no way to determine the number of TSO -* capable Queues. Let's use always the Queue 0 -* because if TSO is supported then at least this -* one will be capable. -*/ -skb_set_queue_mapping (skb,0 ); - +if (skb_shinfo (skb)->gso_type & (SKB_GSO_TCPV4 |SKB_GSO_TCPV6 ))return stmmac_tso_xmit (skb, dev); - } }if (unlikely (stmmac_tx_avail (priv, queue) < nfrags +1 )) {
@@ -3855,6 +3846,23 @@ static int stmmac_setup_tc(struct net_de } } +static u16 stmmac_select_queue (struct net_device *dev,struct sk_buff *skb, +struct net_device *sb_dev, +select_queue_fallback_t fallback) +{ +if (skb_shinfo (skb)->gso_type & (SKB_GSO_TCPV4 |SKB_GSO_TCPV6 )) { +/* +* There is no way to determine the number of TSO +* capable Queues. Let's use always the Queue 0 +* because if TSO is supported then at least this +* one will be capable. +*/ +return 0 ; + } + +return fallback (dev, skb,NULL ) % dev->real_num_tx_queues; +} +static int stmmac_set_mac_address (struct net_device *ndev,void *addr) {struct stmmac_priv *priv =netdev_priv (ndev);
@@ -4097,6 +4105,7 @@ static const struct net_device_ops stmma .ndo_tx_timeout = stmmac_tx_timeout, .ndo_do_ioctl = stmmac_ioctl, .ndo_setup_tc = stmmac_setup_tc, + .ndo_select_queue = stmmac_select_queue,#ifdef CONFIG_NET_POLL_CONTROLLER .ndo_poll_controller = stmmac_poll_controller,#endif
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 1/50 bnx2x: Prevent load reordering in tx completion processing
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Brian King <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ea811b795df24644a8eb760b493c43fba4450677 ]
This patch fixes an issue seen on Power systems with bnx2x which results in the skb is NULL WARN_ON in bnx2x_free_tx_pkt firing due to the skb pointer getting loaded in bnx2x_free_tx_pkt prior to the hw_cons load in bnx2x_tx_int. Adding a read memory barrier resolves the issue.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c +3 -0
@@ -286,6 +286,9 @@ int bnx2x_tx_int(struct bnx2x *bp, struc hw_cons =le16_to_cpu (*txdata->tx_cons_sb); sw_cons = txdata->tx_pkt_cons; +/* Ensure subsequent loads occur after hw_cons */ +smp_rmb (); +while (sw_cons != hw_cons) {u16 pkt_cons;
stable-rc/linux-4.19.y boot: 118 boots: 1 failed, 77 passed with 40 offline (v4.19.61-51-g213a5f3ac1f5)
stable-rc/linux-4.19.y boot: 118 boots: 1 failed, 77 passed with 40 offline (v4.19.61-51-g213a5f3ac1f5)
Full Boot Summary: https://kernelci.org/boot/all/job/stable-rc/branch/linux-4.19.y/kernel/v4.19.61-51-g213a5f3ac1f5/
Full Build Summary: https://kernelci.org/build/stable-rc/branch/linux-4.19.y/kernel/v4.19.61-51-g213a5f3ac1f5/
Tree: stable-rc
Branch: linux-4.19.y
Git Describe: v4.19.61-51-g213a5f3ac1f5
Git Commit: 213a5f3ac1f5e2af0e25fd4b26497590ec290be0
Git URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
Tested: 68 unique boards, 27 SoC families, 17 builds out of 206
Boot Failure Detected:
arc:
hsdk_defconfig:
gcc-8:
hsdk: 1 failed lab
Offline Platforms:
arm64:
defconfig:
gcc-8
meson-axg-s400: 1 offline lab
meson-gxbb-odroidc2: 1 offline lab
meson-gxl-s905d-p230: 1 offline lab meson-gxl-s905x-libretech-cc: 1 offline lab meson-gxl-s905x-nexbox-a95x: 1 offline lab
meson-gxl-s905x-p212: 1 offline lab
meson-gxm-nexbox-a1: 1 offline lab
rk3399-firefly: 1 offline lab
sun50i-a64-pine64-plus: 1 offline lab
mips:
pistachio_defconfig:
gcc-8
pistachio_marduk: 1 offline lab
arm:
exynos_defconfig:
gcc-8
exynos5250-arndale: 1 offline lab
exynos5420-arndale-octa: 1 offline lab
exynos5800-peach-pi: 1 offline lab
multi_v7_defconfig:
gcc-8
exynos5250-arndale: 1 offline lab
exynos5420-arndale-octa: 1 offline lab
exynos5800-peach-pi: 1 offline lab
imx6dl-wandboard_dual: 1 offline lab
imx6dl-wandboard_solo: 1 offline lab
imx6q-wandboard: 1 offline lab
imx7s-warp: 1 offline lab
meson8b-odroidc1: 1 offline lab
omap3-beagle: 1 offline lab
omap4-panda: 1 offline lab
qcom-apq8064-ifc6410: 1 offline lab
stih410-b2120: 1 offline lab
sun4i-a10-cubieboard: 1 offline lab
sun7i-a20-bananapi: 1 offline lab
vf610-colibri-eval-v3: 1 offline lab
omap2plus_defconfig:
gcc-8
omap3-beagle: 1 offline lab
omap4-panda: 1 offline lab
qcom_defconfig:
gcc-8
qcom-apq8064-ifc6410: 1 offline lab
davinci_all_defconfig:
gcc-8
da850-evm: 1 offline lab
dm365evm,legacy: 1 offline lab
imx_v6_v7_defconfig:
gcc-8
imx6dl-wandboard_dual: 1 offline lab
imx6dl-wandboard_solo: 1 offline lab
imx6q-wandboard: 1 offline lab
imx7s-warp: 1 offline lab
vf610-colibri-eval-v3: 1 offline lab
sunxi_defconfig:
gcc-8
sun4i-a10-cubieboard: 1 offline lab
sun7i-a20-bananapi: 1 offline lab
---
For more info write to <[email protected]>
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.62 release. There are 50 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun 28 Jul 2019 03:21:13 PM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 9 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.62-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks,
-- Shuah
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.62 release. There are 50 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun 28 Jul 2019 03:21:13 PM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.62-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------
kernel: 4.19.62-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.19.y
git commit: 213a5f3ac1f5e2af0e25fd4b26497590ec290be0
git describe: v4.19.61-51-g213a5f3ac1f5
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.19-oe/build/v4.19.61-51-g213a5f3ac1f5
No regressions (compared to build v4.19.61)
No fixes (compared to build v4.19.61)
Ran 23490 total tests in the following environments and test suites.
Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c - arm64
- hi6220-hikey - arm64
- i386
- juno-r2 - arm64
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15 - arm
- x86_64
Test Suites
-----------
* build
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest
* libgpiod
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-timers-tests
* network-basic-tests
* perf
* spectre-meltdown-checker-test
* v4l2-compliance
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* kvm-unit-tests
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none
Signature · 2 lines
Linaro LKFT https://lkft.linaro.org
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.62 release. There are 50 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun 28 Jul 2019 03:21:13 PM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Build results:
total: 156 pass: 156 fail: 0 Qemu test results: total: 364 pass: 364 fail: 0
Guenter
Jon Hunter
maintainerQuoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.62 release. There are 50 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun 28 Jul 2019 03:21:13 PM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.62-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
All tests are passing for Tegra ...
Test results for stable-v4.19:
12 builds: 12 pass, 0 fail
22 boots: 22 pass, 0 fail
32 tests: 32 pass, 0 failLinux version: 4.19.62-g64f4694072aa
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,
tegra194-p2972-0000, tegra20-ventana,
tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04Cheers
Jon
Signature · 1 line
nvpublic