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5.1.21-stable review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 6 participants 68 messages Jul 26, 2019 – Jul 29, 2019

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author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/62 bnx2x: Prevent load reordering in tx completion processing

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Brian King <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ea811b795df24644a8eb760b493c43fba4450677 ]

This patch fixes an issue seen on Power systems with bnx2x which results in the skb is NULL WARN_ON in bnx2x_free_tx_pkt firing due to the skb pointer getting loaded in bnx2x_free_tx_pkt prior to the hw_cons load in bnx2x_tx_int. Adding a read memory barrier resolves the issue.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c +3 -0
@@ -285,6 +285,9 @@ int bnx2x_tx_int(struct bnx2x *bp, struc
 	hw_cons = le16_to_cpu(*txdata->tx_cons_sb);
 	sw_cons = txdata->tx_pkt_cons;
 
+	/* Ensure subsequent loads occur after hw_cons */
+	smp_rmb();
+
 	while (sw_cons != hw_cons) {
 		u16 pkt_cons;
 
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH 10/62 net: make skb_dst_force return true when dst is refcounted

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b60a77386b1d4868f72f6353d35dabe5fbe981f2 ]

netfilter did not expect that skb_dst_force() can cause skb to lose its dst entry.

I got a bug report with a skb->dst NULL dereference in netfilter output path. The backtrace contains nf_reinject(), so the dst might have been cleared when skb got queued to userspace.

Other users were fixed via

if (skb_dst(skb)) {
	skb_dst_force(skb);
	if (!skb_dst(skb))
		goto handle_err;
}

But I think its preferable to make the 'dst might be cleared' part of the function explicit.

In netfilter case, skb with a null dst is expected when queueing in prerouting hook, so drop skb for the other hooks.

v2:
v1 of this patch returned true in case skb had no dst entry. Eric said:
Say if we have two skb_dst_force() calls for some reason on the same skb, only the first one will return false.

This now returns false even when skb had no dst, as per Erics suggestion, so callers might need to check skb_dst() first before skb_dst_force().

---
 include/net/dst.h        |    5 ++++-
 net/netfilter/nf_queue.c |    6 +++++-
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/net/dst.h +4 -1
@@ -313,8 +313,9 @@ static inline bool dst_hold_safe(struct
  * @skb: buffer
  *
  * If dst is not yet refcounted and not destroyed, grab a ref on it.
+ * Returns true if dst is refcounted.
  */
-static inline void skb_dst_force(struct sk_buff *skb)
+static inline bool skb_dst_force(struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	if (skb_dst_is_noref(skb)) {
 		struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
@@ -325,6 +326,8 @@ static inline void skb_dst_force(struct
 
 		skb->_skb_refdst = (unsigned long)dst;
 	}
+
+	return skb->_skb_refdst != 0UL;
 }
 
 
net/netfilter/nf_queue.c +5 -1
@@ -190,6 +190,11 @@ static int __nf_queue(struct sk_buff *sk
 		goto err;
 	}
 
+	if (!skb_dst_force(skb) && state->hook != NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING) {
+		status = -ENETDOWN;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
 	*entry = (struct nf_queue_entry) {
 		.skb	= skb,
 		.state	= *state,
@@ -198,7 +203,6 @@ static int __nf_queue(struct sk_buff *sk
 	};
 
 	nf_queue_entry_get_refs(entry);
-	skb_dst_force(skb);
 
 	switch (entry->state.pf) {
 	case AF_INET:
author maintainer
#11 lore raw

PATCH 11/62 net: neigh: fix multiple neigh timer scheduling

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 071c37983d99da07797294ea78e9da1a6e287144 ]

Neigh timer can be scheduled multiple times from userspace adding multiple neigh entries and forcing the neigh timer scheduling passing NTF_USE in the netlink requests.
This will result in a refcount leak and in the following dump stack:

[   32.465295] NEIGH: BUG, double timer add, state is 8
[   32.465308] CPU: 0 PID: 416 Comm: double_timer_ad Not tainted 5.2.0+ #65
[   32.465311] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.12.0-2.fc30 04/01/2014
[   32.465313] Call Trace:
[   32.465318]  dump_stack+0x7c/0xc0
[   32.465323]  __neigh_event_send+0x20c/0x880
[   32.465326]  ? ___neigh_create+0x846/0xfb0
[   32.465329]  ? neigh_lookup+0x2a9/0x410
[   32.465332]  ? neightbl_fill_info.constprop.0+0x800/0x800
[   32.465334]  neigh_add+0x4f8/0x5e0
[   32.465337]  ? neigh_xmit+0x620/0x620
[   32.465341]  ? find_held_lock+0x85/0xa0
[   32.465345]  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x204/0x570
[   32.465348]  ? rtnl_dellink+0x450/0x450
[   32.465351]  ? mark_held_locks+0x90/0x90
[   32.465354]  ? match_held_lock+0x1b/0x230
[   32.465357]  netlink_rcv_skb+0xc4/0x1d0
[   32.465360]  ? rtnl_dellink+0x450/0x450
[   32.465363]  ? netlink_ack+0x420/0x420
[   32.465366]  ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x115/0x560
[   32.465369]  ? __alloc_skb+0xc9/0x2f0
[   32.465372]  netlink_unicast+0x270/0x330
[   32.465375]  ? netlink_attachskb+0x2f0/0x2f0
[   32.465378]  netlink_sendmsg+0x34f/0x5a0
[   32.465381]  ? netlink_unicast+0x330/0x330
[   32.465385]  ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.0+0x20/0x20
[   32.465388]  ? netlink_unicast+0x330/0x330
[   32.465391]  sock_sendmsg+0x91/0xa0
[   32.465394]  ___sys_sendmsg+0x407/0x480
[   32.465397]  ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x200/0x200
[   32.465401]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x37/0x40
[   32.465404]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x17d/0x250
[   32.465407]  ? __wake_up_common_lock+0xcb/0x110
[   32.465410]  ? __wake_up_common+0x230/0x230
[   32.465413]  ? netlink_bind+0x3e1/0x490
[   32.465416]  ? netlink_setsockopt+0x540/0x540
[   32.465420]  ? __fget_light+0x9c/0xf0
[   32.465423]  ? sockfd_lookup_light+0x8c/0xb0
[   32.465426]  __sys_sendmsg+0xa5/0x110
[   32.465429]  ? __ia32_sys_shutdown+0x30/0x30
[   32.465432]  ? __fd_install+0xe1/0x2c0
[   32.465435]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_off+0xb5/0x100
[   32.465438]  ? mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90
[   32.465441]  ? do_syscall_64+0xf/0x270
[   32.465444]  do_syscall_64+0x63/0x270
[   32.465448]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Fix the issue unscheduling neigh_timer if selected entry is in 'IN_TIMER' receiving a netlink request with NTF_USE flag set

Fixes 0c5c2d308906 ("neigh: Allow for user space users of the neighbour table")
---
 net/core/neighbour.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/core/neighbour.c +2 -0
@@ -1126,6 +1126,7 @@ int __neigh_event_send(struct neighbour
 
 			atomic_set(&neigh->probes,
 				   NEIGH_VAR(neigh->parms, UCAST_PROBES));
+			neigh_del_timer(neigh);
 			neigh->nud_state     = NUD_INCOMPLETE;
 			neigh->updated = now;
 			next = now + max(NEIGH_VAR(neigh->parms, RETRANS_TIME),
@@ -1142,6 +1143,7 @@ int __neigh_event_send(struct neighbour
 		}
 	} else if (neigh->nud_state & NUD_STALE) {
 		neigh_dbg(2, "neigh %p is delayed\n", neigh);
+		neigh_del_timer(neigh);
 		neigh->nud_state = NUD_DELAY;
 		neigh->updated = jiffies;
 		neigh_add_timer(neigh, jiffies +
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/62 caif-hsi: fix possible deadlock in cfhsi_exit_module()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fdd258d49e88a9e0b49ef04a506a796f1c768a8e ]

cfhsi_exit_module() calls unregister_netdev() under rtnl_lock(). but unregister_netdev() internally calls rtnl_lock(). So deadlock would occur.

Fixes c41254006377 ("caif-hsi: Add rtnl support")
---
 drivers/net/caif/caif_hsi.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/caif/caif_hsi.c +1 -1
@@ -1455,7 +1455,7 @@ static void __exit cfhsi_exit_module(voi
 	rtnl_lock();
 	list_for_each_safe(list_node, n, &cfhsi_list) {
 		cfhsi = list_entry(list_node, struct cfhsi, list);
-		unregister_netdev(cfhsi->ndev);
+		unregister_netdevice(cfhsi->ndev);
 	}
 	rtnl_unlock();
 }
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/62 igmp: fix memory leak in igmpv3_del_delrec()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e5b1c6c6277d5a283290a8c033c72544746f9b5b ]

im->tomb and/or im->sources might not be NULL, but we currently overwrite their values blindly.

Using swap() will make sure the following call to kfree_pmc(pmc) will properly free the psf structures.

Tested with the C repro provided by syzbot, which basically does :

socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_IP) = 3
setsockopt(3, SOL_IP, IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP, "\340\0\0\2\177\0\0\1\0\0\0\0", 12) = 0 ioctl(3, SIOCSIFFLAGS, {ifr_name="lo", ifr_flags=0}) = 0
setsockopt(3, SOL_IP, IP_MSFILTER, "\340\0\0\2\177\0\0\1\1\0\0\0\1\0\0\0\377\377\377\377", 20) = 0 ioctl(3, SIOCSIFFLAGS, {ifr_name="lo", ifr_flags=IFF_UP}) = 0
exit_group(0) = ?

BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88811450f140 (size 64):
  comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4294942448 (age 32.070s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00  ................
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
  backtrace:
    [<00000000c7bad083>] kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:43 [inline]
    [<00000000c7bad083>] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:439 [inline]
    [<00000000c7bad083>] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3326 [inline]
    [<00000000c7bad083>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x13d/0x280 mm/slab.c:3553
    [<000000009acc4151>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:547 [inline]
    [<000000009acc4151>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:742 [inline]
    [<000000009acc4151>] ip_mc_add1_src net/ipv4/igmp.c:1976 [inline]
    [<000000009acc4151>] ip_mc_add_src+0x36b/0x400 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2100
    [<000000004ac14566>] ip_mc_msfilter+0x22d/0x310 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2484
    [<0000000052d8f995>] do_ip_setsockopt.isra.0+0x1795/0x1930 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:959
    [<000000004ee1e21f>] ip_setsockopt+0x3b/0xb0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1248
    [<0000000066cdfe74>] udp_setsockopt+0x4e/0x90 net/ipv4/udp.c:2618
    [<000000009383a786>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x38/0x50 net/core/sock.c:3126
    [<00000000d8ac0c94>] __sys_setsockopt+0x98/0x120 net/socket.c:2072
    [<000000001b1e9666>] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2083 [inline]
    [<000000001b1e9666>] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2080 [inline]
    [<000000001b1e9666>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x26/0x30 net/socket.c:2080
    [<00000000420d395e>] do_syscall_64+0x76/0x1a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301
    [<000000007fd83a4b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fixes 24803f38a5c0 ("igmp: do not remove igmp souce list info when set link down")
Cc Hangbin Liu <[email protected]>
Reported-by [email protected]
---
 net/ipv4/igmp.c |    8 ++------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/igmp.c +2 -6
@@ -1232,12 +1232,8 @@ static void igmpv3_del_delrec(struct in_
 	if (pmc) {
 		im->interface = pmc->interface;
 		if (im->sfmode == MCAST_INCLUDE) {
-			im->tomb = pmc->tomb;
-			pmc->tomb = NULL;
-
-			im->sources = pmc->sources;
-			pmc->sources = NULL;
-
+			swap(im->tomb, pmc->tomb);
+			swap(im->sources, pmc->sources);
 			for (psf = im->sources; psf; psf = psf->sf_next)
 				psf->sf_crcount = in_dev->mr_qrv ?: net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv;
 		} else {
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/62 ipv4: dont set IPv6 only flags to IPv4 addresses

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Matteo Croce <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2e60546368165c2449564d71f6005dda9205b5fb ]

Avoid the situation where an IPV6 only flag is applied to an IPv4 address:

    # ip addr add 192.0.2.1/24 dev dummy0 nodad home mngtmpaddr noprefixroute
    # ip -4 addr show dev dummy0
    2: dummy0: <BROADCAST,NOARP,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
        inet 192.0.2.1/24 scope global noprefixroute dummy0
           valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever

Or worse, by sending a malicious netlink command:

    # ip -4 addr show dev dummy0
    2: dummy0: <BROADCAST,NOARP,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
        inet 192.0.2.1/24 scope global nodad optimistic dadfailed home tentative mngtmpaddr noprefixroute stable-privacy dummy0
           valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
---
 net/ipv4/devinet.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
net/ipv4/devinet.c +8 -0
@@ -66,6 +66,11 @@
 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
 #include <net/addrconf.h>
 
+#define IPV6ONLY_FLAGS	\
+		(IFA_F_NODAD | IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC | IFA_F_DADFAILED | \
+		 IFA_F_HOMEADDRESS | IFA_F_TENTATIVE | \
+		 IFA_F_MANAGETEMPADDR | IFA_F_STABLE_PRIVACY)
+
 static struct ipv4_devconf ipv4_devconf = {
 	.data = {
 		[IPV4_DEVCONF_ACCEPT_REDIRECTS - 1] = 1,
@@ -472,6 +477,9 @@ static int __inet_insert_ifa(struct in_i
 	ifa->ifa_flags &= ~IFA_F_SECONDARY;
 	last_primary = &in_dev->ifa_list;
 
+	/* Don't set IPv6 only flags to IPv4 addresses */
+	ifa->ifa_flags &= ~IPV6ONLY_FLAGS;
+
 	for (ifap = &in_dev->ifa_list; (ifa1 = *ifap) != NULL;
 	     ifap = &ifa1->ifa_next) {
 		if (!(ifa1->ifa_flags & IFA_F_SECONDARY) &&
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/62 ipv6: rt6_check should return NULL if from is NULL

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: David Ahern <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 49d05fe2c9d1b4a27761c9807fec39b8155bef9e ]

Paul reported that l2tp sessions were broken after the commit referenced in the Fixes tag. Prior to this commit rt6_check returned NULL if the rt6_info 'from' was NULL - ie., the dst_entry was disconnected from a FIB entry. Restore that behavior.

Fixes 93531c674315 ("net/ipv6: separate handling of FIB entries from dst based routes")
---
 net/ipv6/route.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv6/route.c +1 -1
@@ -2183,7 +2183,7 @@ static struct dst_entry *rt6_check(struc
 {
 	u32 rt_cookie = 0;
 
-	if ((from && !fib6_get_cookie_safe(from, &rt_cookie)) ||
+	if (!from || !fib6_get_cookie_safe(from, &rt_cookie) ||
 	    rt_cookie != cookie)
 		return NULL;
 
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/62 ipv6: Unlink sibling route in case of failure

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 54851aa90cf27041d64b12f65ac72e9f97bd90fd ]

When a route needs to be appended to an existing multipath route, fib6_add_rt2node() first appends it to the siblings list and increments the number of sibling routes on each sibling.

Later, the function notifies the route via call_fib6_entry_notifiers(). In case the notification is vetoed, the route is not unlinked from the siblings list, which can result in a use-after-free.

Fix this by unlinking the route from the siblings list before returning an error.

Audited the rest of the call sites from which the FIB notification chain is called and could not find more problems.

Fixes 2233000cba40 ("net/ipv6: Move call_fib6_entry_notifiers up for route adds")
---
 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c |   18 +++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c +17 -1
@@ -1113,8 +1113,24 @@ add:
 		err = call_fib6_entry_notifiers(info->nl_net,
 						FIB_EVENT_ENTRY_ADD,
 						rt, extack);
-		if (err)
+		if (err) {
+			struct fib6_info *sibling, *next_sibling;
+
+			/* If the route has siblings, then it first
+			 * needs to be unlinked from them.
+			 */
+			if (!rt->fib6_nsiblings)
+				return err;
+
+			list_for_each_entry_safe(sibling, next_sibling,
+						 &rt->fib6_siblings,
+						 fib6_siblings)
+				sibling->fib6_nsiblings--;
+			rt->fib6_nsiblings = 0;
+			list_del_init(&rt->fib6_siblings);
+			rt6_multipath_rebalance(next_sibling);
 			return err;
+		}
 
 		rcu_assign_pointer(rt->fib6_next, iter);
 		atomic_inc(&rt->fib6_ref);
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH 9/62 net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: wait after reset deactivation

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Baruch Siach <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7b75e49de424ceb53d13e60f35d0a73765626fda ]

Add a 1ms delay after reset deactivation. Otherwise the chip returns bogus ID value. This is observed with 88E6390 (Peridot) chip.

---
 drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c +2 -0
@@ -4910,6 +4910,8 @@ static int mv88e6xxx_probe(struct mdio_d
 		err = PTR_ERR(chip->reset);
 		goto out;
 	}
+	if (chip->reset)
+		usleep_range(1000, 2000);
 
 	err = mv88e6xxx_detect(chip);
 	if (err)

Greg Kroah-Hartman

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

cover 5.1.21-stable review

Note, this will be the LAST 5.1.y kernel release. Everyone should move to the 5.2.y series at this point in time.

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.1.21 release. There are 62 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun 28 Jul 2019 03:21:13 PM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.1.21-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.1.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 5.1.21-rc1

Kuo-Hsin Yang <[email protected]>
mm: vmscan: scan anonymous pages on file refaults

Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>
block: Limit zone array allocation size

Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>
sd_zbc: Fix report zones buffer allocation

Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Revert "kvm: x86: Use task structs fpu field for user"

Jan Kiszka <[email protected]>
KVM: nVMX: Clear pending KVM_REQ_GET_VMCS12_PAGES when leaving nested

Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
KVM: nVMX: do not use dangling shadow VMCS after guest reset

Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
ext4: allow directory holes

Ross Zwisler <[email protected]>
ext4: use jbd2_inode dirty range scoping

Ross Zwisler <[email protected]>
jbd2: introduce jbd2_inode dirty range scoping

Ross Zwisler <[email protected]>
mm: add filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors()

Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
ext4: enforce the immutable flag on open files

Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
ext4: don't allow any modifications to an immutable file

Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
perf/core: Fix race between close() and fork()

Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
perf/core: Fix exclusive events' grouping

Song Liu <[email protected]>
perf script: Assume native_arch for pipe mode

Paul Cercueil <[email protected]>
MIPS: lb60: Fix pin mappings

Keerthy <[email protected]>
gpio: davinci: silence error prints in case of EPROBE_DEFER

Nishka Dasgupta <[email protected]>
gpiolib: of: fix a memory leak in of_gpio_flags_quirks()

Chris Wilson <[email protected]>
dma-buf: Discard old fence_excl on retrying get_fences_rcu for realloc

Jérôme Glisse <[email protected]>
dma-buf: balance refcount inbalance

Aya Levin <[email protected]>
net/mlx5e: Fix error flow in tx reporter diagnose

Aya Levin <[email protected]>
net/mlx5e: Fix return value from timeout recover function

Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
net/mlx5e: Rx, Fix checksum calculation for new hardware

Eli Britstein <[email protected]>
net/mlx5e: Fix port tunnel GRE entropy control

Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
net/tls: reject offload of TLS 1.3

Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
net/tls: fix poll ignoring partially copied records

Frank de Brabander <[email protected]>
selftests: txring_overwrite: fix incorrect test of mmap() return value

Cong Wang <[email protected]>

    netrom: hold sock when setting skb->destructor

Cong Wang <[email protected]>
netrom: fix a memory leak in nr_rx_frame()

Andreas Steinmetz <[email protected]>
macsec: fix checksumming after decryption

Andreas Steinmetz <[email protected]>
macsec: fix use-after-free of skb during RX

Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
net: bridge: stp: don't cache eth dest pointer before skb pull

Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
net: bridge: don't cache ether dest pointer on input

Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
net: bridge: mcast: fix stale ipv6 hdr pointer when handling v6 query

Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
net: bridge: mcast: fix stale nsrcs pointer in igmp3/mld2 report handling

Aya Levin <[email protected]>
net/mlx5e: IPoIB, Add error path in mlx5_rdma_setup_rn

Peter Kosyh <[email protected]>

    vrf: make sure skb->data contains ip header to make routing

Christoph Paasch <[email protected]>
tcp: Reset bytes_acked and bytes_received when disconnecting

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
tcp: fix tcp_set_congestion_control() use from bpf hook

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
tcp: be more careful in tcp_fragment()

Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
sky2: Disable MSI on ASUS P6T

Xin Long <[email protected]>
sctp: not bind the socket in sctp_connect

Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
sctp: fix error handling on stream scheduler initialization

David Howells <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix send on a connected, but unbound socket

Heiner Kallweit <[email protected]>
r8169: fix issue with confused RX unit after PHY power-down on RTL8411b

Yang Wei <[email protected]>
nfc: fix potential illegal memory access

Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
net/tls: make sure offload also gets the keys wiped

Jose Abreu <[email protected]>
net: stmmac: Re-work the queue selection for TSO packets

Cong Wang <[email protected]>
net_sched: unset TCQ_F_CAN_BYPASS when adding filters

Andrew Lunn <[email protected]>
net: phy: sfp: hwmon: Fix scaling of RX power

John Hurley <[email protected]>
net: openvswitch: fix csum updates for MPLS actions

Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]>
net: neigh: fix multiple neigh timer scheduling

Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
net: make skb_dst_force return true when dst is refcounted

Baruch Siach <[email protected]>
net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: wait after reset deactivation

Justin Chen <[email protected]>
net: bcmgenet: use promisc for unsupported filters

Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>
ipv6: Unlink sibling route in case of failure

David Ahern <[email protected]>
ipv6: rt6_check should return NULL if 'from' is NULL

Matteo Croce <[email protected]>
ipv4: don't set IPv6 only flags to IPv4 addresses

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
igmp: fix memory leak in igmpv3_del_delrec()

Haiyang Zhang <[email protected]>
hv_netvsc: Fix extra rcu_read_unlock in netvsc_recv_callback()

Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>
caif-hsi: fix possible deadlock in cfhsi_exit_module()

Brian King <[email protected]>
bnx2x: Prevent load reordering in tx completion processing

-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                           |   4 +-
 arch/mips/jz4740/board-qi_lb60.c                   |  16 +--
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h                    |   7 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c                          |  10 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                                 |   4 +-
 block/blk-zoned.c                                  |  46 ++++---
 drivers/dma-buf/dma-buf.c                          |   1 +
 drivers/dma-buf/reservation.c                      |   4 +
 drivers/gpio/gpio-davinci.c                        |   5 +-
 drivers/gpio/gpiolib-of.c                          |   1 +
 drivers/net/caif/caif_hsi.c                        |   2 +-
 drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c                   |   2 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c    |   3 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmgenet.c     |  57 ++++-----
 drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/sky2.c                |   7 ++
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en.h       |   1 +
 .../ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/reporter_tx.c   |  10 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c  |   3 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rx.c    |   7 +-
 .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/ipoib/ipoib.c  |   9 +-
 .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lib/port_tun.c |  23 +---
 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c               | 137 +++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c  |  29 +++--
 drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c                    |   1 -
 drivers/net/macsec.c                               |   6 +-
 drivers/net/phy/sfp.c                              |   2 +-
 drivers/net/vrf.c                                  |  58 +++++----
 drivers/scsi/sd_zbc.c                              | 104 +++++++++++-----
 fs/ext4/dir.c                                      |  19 ++-
 fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.h                                |  12 +-
 fs/ext4/file.c                                     |   4 +
 fs/ext4/inode.c                                    |  24 +++-
 fs/ext4/ioctl.c                                    |  46 ++++++-
 fs/ext4/move_extent.c                              |   3 +-
 fs/ext4/namei.c                                    |  45 +++++--
 fs/jbd2/commit.c                                   |  23 +++-
 fs/jbd2/journal.c                                  |   4 +
 fs/jbd2/transaction.c                              |  49 ++++----
 include/linux/blkdev.h                             |   5 +
 include/linux/fs.h                                 |   2 +
 include/linux/jbd2.h                               |  22 ++++
 include/linux/mlx5/mlx5_ifc.h                      |   3 +-
 include/linux/perf_event.h                         |   5 +
 include/net/dst.h                                  |   5 +-
 include/net/tcp.h                                  |   8 +-
 include/net/tls.h                                  |   1 +
 kernel/events/core.c                               |  83 ++++++++++---
 mm/filemap.c                                       |  22 ++++
 mm/vmscan.c                                        |   6 +-
 net/bridge/br_input.c                              |   8 +-
 net/bridge/br_multicast.c                          |  23 ++--
 net/bridge/br_stp_bpdu.c                           |   3 +-
 net/core/filter.c                                  |   2 +-
 net/core/neighbour.c                               |   2 +
 net/ipv4/devinet.c                                 |   8 ++
 net/ipv4/igmp.c                                    |   8 +-
 net/ipv4/tcp.c                                     |   6 +-
 net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c                                |   6 +-
 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c                              |  13 +-
 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c                                 |  18 ++-
 net/ipv6/route.c                                   |   2 +-
 net/netfilter/nf_queue.c                           |   6 +-
 net/netrom/af_netrom.c                             |   4 +-
 net/nfc/nci/data.c                                 |   2 +-
 net/openvswitch/actions.c                          |   6 +-
 net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c                               |   4 +-
 net/sched/cls_api.c                                |   1 +
 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c                           |   2 -
 net/sched/sch_sfq.c                                |   2 -
 net/sctp/socket.c                                  |  24 +---
 net/sctp/stream.c                                  |   9 +-
 net/tls/tls_device.c                               |  10 +-
 net/tls/tls_main.c                                 |   4 +-
 net/tls/tls_sw.c                                   |   3 +-
 tools/perf/builtin-script.c                        |   3 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/net/txring_overwrite.c     |   2 +-
 76 files changed, 816 insertions(+), 315 deletions(-)
author maintainer
#22 lore raw

PATCH 22/62 sky2: Disable MSI on ASUS P6T

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a261e3797506bd561700be643fe1a85bf81e9661 ]

The onboard sky2 NIC on ASUS P6T WS PRO doesn't work after PM resume due to the infamous IRQ problem. Disabling MSI works around it, so let's add it to the blacklist.

Unfortunately the BIOS on the machine doesn't fill the standard DMI_SYS_* entry, so we pick up DMI_BOARD_* entries instead.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/sky2.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/sky2.c +7 -0
@@ -4933,6 +4933,13 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id msi_bl
 			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "P-79"),
 		},
 	},
+	{
+		.ident = "ASUS P6T",
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_VENDOR, "ASUSTeK Computer INC."),
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "P6T"),
+		},
+	},
 	{}
 };
 
author maintainer
#23 lore raw

PATCH 23/62 tcp: be more careful in tcp_fragment()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b617158dc096709d8600c53b6052144d12b89fab ]

Some applications set tiny SO_SNDBUF values and expect TCP to just work. Recent patches to address CVE-2019-11478 broke them in case of losses, since retransmits might be prevented.

We should allow these flows to make progress.

This patch allows the first and last skb in retransmit queue to be split even if memory limits are hit.

It also adds the some room due to the fact that tcp_sendmsg() and tcp_sendpage() might overshoot sk_wmem_queued by about one full TSO skb (64KB size). Note this allowance was already present in stable backports for kernels < 4.15

Note for < 4.15 backports :
tcp_rtx_queue_tail() will probably look like :

static inline struct sk_buff *tcp_rtx_queue_tail(const struct sock *sk)

{
	struct sk_buff *skb = tcp_send_head(sk);

	return skb ? tcp_write_queue_prev(sk, skb) : tcp_write_queue_tail(sk);
}
---
 include/net/tcp.h     |    5 +++++
 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c |   13 +++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/net/tcp.h +5 -0
@@ -1679,6 +1679,11 @@ static inline struct sk_buff *tcp_rtx_qu
 	return skb_rb_first(&sk->tcp_rtx_queue);
 }
 
+static inline struct sk_buff *tcp_rtx_queue_tail(const struct sock *sk)
+{
+	return skb_rb_last(&sk->tcp_rtx_queue);
+}
+
 static inline struct sk_buff *tcp_write_queue_head(const struct sock *sk)
 {
 	return skb_peek(&sk->sk_write_queue);
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +11 -2
@@ -1289,6 +1289,7 @@ int tcp_fragment(struct sock *sk, enum t
 	struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
 	struct sk_buff *buff;
 	int nsize, old_factor;
+	long limit;
 	int nlen;
 	u8 flags;
 
@@ -1299,8 +1300,16 @@ int tcp_fragment(struct sock *sk, enum t
 	if (nsize < 0)
 		nsize = 0;
 
-	if (unlikely((sk->sk_wmem_queued >> 1) > sk->sk_sndbuf &&
-		     tcp_queue != TCP_FRAG_IN_WRITE_QUEUE)) {
+	/* tcp_sendmsg() can overshoot sk_wmem_queued by one full size skb.
+	 * We need some allowance to not penalize applications setting small
+	 * SO_SNDBUF values.
+	 * Also allow first and last skb in retransmit queue to be split.
+	 */
+	limit = sk->sk_sndbuf + 2 * SKB_TRUESIZE(GSO_MAX_SIZE);
+	if (unlikely((sk->sk_wmem_queued >> 1) > limit &&
+		     tcp_queue != TCP_FRAG_IN_WRITE_QUEUE &&
+		     skb != tcp_rtx_queue_head(sk) &&
+		     skb != tcp_rtx_queue_tail(sk))) {
 		NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPWQUEUETOOBIG);
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
author maintainer
#24 lore raw

PATCH 24/62 tcp: fix tcp_set_congestion_control() use from bpf hook

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8d650cdedaabb33e85e9b7c517c0c71fcecc1de9 ]

Neal reported incorrect use of ns_capable() from bpf hook.

bpf_setsockopt(...TCP_CONGESTION...)
-> tcp_set_congestion_control()
-> ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)

    -> ns_capable_common()
     -> current_cred()
      -> rcu_dereference_protected(current->cred, 1)

Accessing 'current' in bpf context makes no sense, since packets are processed from softirq context.

As Neal stated : The capability check in tcp_set_congestion_control() was written assuming a system call context, and then was reused from a BPF call site.

The fix is to add a new parameter to tcp_set_congestion_control(), so that the ns_capable() call is only performed under the right context.

Fixes 91b5b21c7c16 ("bpf: Add support for changing congestion control")
Cc Lawrence Brakmo <[email protected]>
---
 include/net/tcp.h   |    3 ++-
 net/core/filter.c   |    2 +-
 net/ipv4/tcp.c      |    4 +++-
 net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c |    6 +++---
 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
include/net/tcp.h +2 -1
@@ -1067,7 +1067,8 @@ void tcp_get_default_congestion_control(
 void tcp_get_available_congestion_control(char *buf, size_t len);
 void tcp_get_allowed_congestion_control(char *buf, size_t len);
 int tcp_set_allowed_congestion_control(char *allowed);
-int tcp_set_congestion_control(struct sock *sk, const char *name, bool load, bool reinit);
+int tcp_set_congestion_control(struct sock *sk, const char *name, bool load,
+			       bool reinit, bool cap_net_admin);
 u32 tcp_slow_start(struct tcp_sock *tp, u32 acked);
 void tcp_cong_avoid_ai(struct tcp_sock *tp, u32 w, u32 acked);
 
net/core/filter.c +1 -1
@@ -4211,7 +4211,7 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_setsockopt, struct bpf_so
 						    TCP_CA_NAME_MAX-1));
 			name[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX-1] = 0;
 			ret = tcp_set_congestion_control(sk, name, false,
-							 reinit);
+							 reinit, true);
 		} else {
 			struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
 
net/ipv4/tcp.c +3 -1
@@ -2784,7 +2784,9 @@ static int do_tcp_setsockopt(struct sock
 		name[val] = 0;
 
 		lock_sock(sk);
-		err = tcp_set_congestion_control(sk, name, true, true);
+		err = tcp_set_congestion_control(sk, name, true, true,
+						 ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns,
+							    CAP_NET_ADMIN));
 		release_sock(sk);
 		return err;
 	}
net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c +3 -3
@@ -332,7 +332,8 @@ out:
  * tcp_reinit_congestion_control (if the current congestion control was
  * already initialized.
  */
-int tcp_set_congestion_control(struct sock *sk, const char *name, bool load, bool reinit)
+int tcp_set_congestion_control(struct sock *sk, const char *name, bool load,
+			       bool reinit, bool cap_net_admin)
 {
 	struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
 	const struct tcp_congestion_ops *ca;
@@ -368,8 +369,7 @@ int tcp_set_congestion_control(struct so
 		} else {
 			err = -EBUSY;
 		}
-	} else if (!((ca->flags & TCP_CONG_NON_RESTRICTED) ||
-		     ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))) {
+	} else if (!((ca->flags & TCP_CONG_NON_RESTRICTED) || cap_net_admin)) {
 		err = -EPERM;
 	} else if (!try_module_get(ca->owner)) {
 		err = -EBUSY;
author maintainer
#25 lore raw

PATCH 25/62 tcp: Reset bytes_acked and bytes_received when disconnecting

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Christoph Paasch <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e858faf556d4e14c750ba1e8852783c6f9520a0e ]

If an app is playing tricks to reuse a socket via tcp_disconnect(), bytes_acked/received needs to be reset to 0. Otherwise tcp_info will report the sum of the current and the old connection..

Cc Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Fixes 0df48c26d841 ("tcp: add tcpi_bytes_acked to tcp_info")
Fixes bdd1f9edacb5 ("tcp: add tcpi_bytes_received to tcp_info")
---
 net/ipv4/tcp.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/ipv4/tcp.c +2 -0
@@ -2630,6 +2630,8 @@ int tcp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int
 	tcp_saved_syn_free(tp);
 	tp->compressed_ack = 0;
 	tp->bytes_sent = 0;
+	tp->bytes_acked = 0;
+	tp->bytes_received = 0;
 	tp->bytes_retrans = 0;
 	tp->duplicate_sack[0].start_seq = 0;
 	tp->duplicate_sack[0].end_seq = 0;
author maintainer
#27 lore raw

PATCH 27/62 net/mlx5e: IPoIB, Add error path in mlx5_rdma_setup_rn

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Aya Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ef1ce7d7b67b46661091c7ccc0396186b7a247ef ]

Check return value from mlx5e_attach_netdev, add error path on failure.

Fixes 48935bbb7ae8 ("net/mlx5e: IPoIB, Add netdevice profile skeleton")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/ipoib/ipoib.c |    9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/ipoib/ipoib.c +8 -1
@@ -698,7 +698,9 @@ static int mlx5_rdma_setup_rn(struct ib_
 
 	prof->init(mdev, netdev, prof, ipriv);
 
-	mlx5e_attach_netdev(epriv);
+	err = mlx5e_attach_netdev(epriv);
+	if (err)
+		goto detach;
 	netif_carrier_off(netdev);
 
 	/* set rdma_netdev func pointers */
@@ -714,6 +716,11 @@ static int mlx5_rdma_setup_rn(struct ib_
 
 	return 0;
 
+detach:
+	prof->cleanup(epriv);
+	if (ipriv->sub_interface)
+		return err;
+	mlx5e_destroy_mdev_resources(mdev);
 destroy_ht:
 	mlx5i_pkey_qpn_ht_cleanup(netdev);
 	return err;
author maintainer
#28 lore raw

PATCH 28/62 net: bridge: mcast: fix stale nsrcs pointer in igmp3/mld2 report handling

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e57f61858b7cf478ed6fa23ed4b3876b1c9625c4 ]

We take a pointer to grec prior to calling pskb_may_pull and use it afterwards to get nsrcs so record nsrcs before the pull when handling igmp3 and we get a pointer to nsrcs and call pskb_may_pull when handling mld2 which again could lead to reading 2 bytes out-of-bounds.

==================================================================

 BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in br_multicast_rcv+0x480c/0x4ad0 [bridge]
 Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880421302b4 by task ksoftirqd/1/16

 CPU: 1 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Tainted: G           OE     5.2.0-rc6+ #1
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x71/0xab
  print_address_description+0x6a/0x280
  ? br_multicast_rcv+0x480c/0x4ad0 [bridge]
  __kasan_report+0x152/0x1aa
  ? br_multicast_rcv+0x480c/0x4ad0 [bridge]
  ? br_multicast_rcv+0x480c/0x4ad0 [bridge]
  kasan_report+0xe/0x20
  br_multicast_rcv+0x480c/0x4ad0 [bridge]
  ? br_multicast_disable_port+0x150/0x150 [bridge]
  ? ktime_get_with_offset+0xb4/0x150
  ? __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.6+0xa6/0xf0
  ? __netif_receive_skb+0x1b0/0x1b0
  ? br_fdb_update+0x10e/0x6e0 [bridge]
  ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x3c6/0x11d0 [bridge]
  br_handle_frame_finish+0x3c6/0x11d0 [bridge]
  ? br_pass_frame_up+0x3a0/0x3a0 [bridge]
  ? virtnet_probe+0x1c80/0x1c80 [virtio_net]
  br_handle_frame+0x731/0xd90 [bridge]
  ? select_idle_sibling+0x25/0x7d0
  ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x11d0/0x11d0 [bridge]
  __netif_receive_skb_core+0xced/0x2d70
  ? virtqueue_get_buf_ctx+0x230/0x1130 [virtio_ring]
  ? do_xdp_generic+0x20/0x20
  ? virtqueue_napi_complete+0x39/0x70 [virtio_net]
  ? virtnet_poll+0x94d/0xc78 [virtio_net]
  ? receive_buf+0x5120/0x5120 [virtio_net]
  ? __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x97/0x1d0
  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x97/0x1d0
  ? __netif_receive_skb_core+0x2d70/0x2d70
  ? _raw_write_trylock+0x100/0x100
  ? __queue_work+0x41e/0xbe0
  process_backlog+0x19c/0x650
  ? _raw_read_lock_irq+0x40/0x40
  net_rx_action+0x71e/0xbc0
  ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
  ? napi_complete_done+0x360/0x360
  ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
  ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
  ? __schedule+0x85e/0x14d0
  __do_softirq+0x1db/0x5f9
  ? takeover_tasklets+0x5f0/0x5f0
  run_ksoftirqd+0x26/0x40
  smpboot_thread_fn+0x443/0x680
  ? sort_range+0x20/0x20
  ? schedule+0x94/0x210
  ? __kthread_parkme+0x78/0xf0
  ? sort_range+0x20/0x20
  kthread+0x2ae/0x3a0
  ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:ffffea0001084c00 refcount:0 mapcount:-128 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
 flags: 0xffffc000000000()
 raw: 00ffffc000000000 ffffea0000cfca08 ffffea0001098608 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000003 00000000ffffff7f 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff888042130180: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
 ffff888042130200: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
 > ffff888042130280: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
                                     ^
 ffff888042130300: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
 ffff888042130380: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
 ==================================================================
 Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
Fixes bc8c20acaea1 ("bridge: multicast: treat igmpv3 report with INCLUDE and no sources as a leave")
---
 net/bridge/br_multicast.c |   20 ++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
net/bridge/br_multicast.c +12 -8
@@ -934,6 +934,7 @@ static int br_ip4_multicast_igmp3_report
 	int type;
 	int err = 0;
 	__be32 group;
+	u16 nsrcs;
 
 	ih = igmpv3_report_hdr(skb);
 	num = ntohs(ih->ngrec);
@@ -947,8 +948,9 @@ static int br_ip4_multicast_igmp3_report
 		grec = (void *)(skb->data + len - sizeof(*grec));
 		group = grec->grec_mca;
 		type = grec->grec_type;
+		nsrcs = ntohs(grec->grec_nsrcs);
 
-		len += ntohs(grec->grec_nsrcs) * 4;
+		len += nsrcs * 4;
 		if (!ip_mc_may_pull(skb, len))
 			return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -969,7 +971,7 @@ static int br_ip4_multicast_igmp3_report
 		src = eth_hdr(skb)->h_source;
 		if ((type == IGMPV3_CHANGE_TO_INCLUDE ||
 		     type == IGMPV3_MODE_IS_INCLUDE) &&
-		    ntohs(grec->grec_nsrcs) == 0) {
+		    nsrcs == 0) {
 			br_ip4_multicast_leave_group(br, port, group, vid, src);
 		} else {
 			err = br_ip4_multicast_add_group(br, port, group, vid,
@@ -1006,7 +1008,8 @@ static int br_ip6_multicast_mld2_report(
 	len = skb_transport_offset(skb) + sizeof(*icmp6h);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
-		__be16 *nsrcs, _nsrcs;
+		__be16 *_nsrcs, __nsrcs;
+		u16 nsrcs;
 
 		nsrcs_offset = len + offsetof(struct mld2_grec, grec_nsrcs);
 
@@ -1014,12 +1017,13 @@ static int br_ip6_multicast_mld2_report(
 		    nsrcs_offset + sizeof(_nsrcs))
 			return -EINVAL;
 
-		nsrcs = skb_header_pointer(skb, nsrcs_offset,
-					   sizeof(_nsrcs), &_nsrcs);
-		if (!nsrcs)
+		_nsrcs = skb_header_pointer(skb, nsrcs_offset,
+					    sizeof(__nsrcs), &__nsrcs);
+		if (!_nsrcs)
 			return -EINVAL;
 
-		grec_len = struct_size(grec, grec_src, ntohs(*nsrcs));
+		nsrcs = ntohs(*_nsrcs);
+		grec_len = struct_size(grec, grec_src, nsrcs);
 
 		if (!ipv6_mc_may_pull(skb, len + grec_len))
 			return -EINVAL;
@@ -1044,7 +1048,7 @@ static int br_ip6_multicast_mld2_report(
 		src = eth_hdr(skb)->h_source;
 		if ((grec->grec_type == MLD2_CHANGE_TO_INCLUDE ||
 		     grec->grec_type == MLD2_MODE_IS_INCLUDE) &&
-		    ntohs(*nsrcs) == 0) {
+		    nsrcs == 0) {
 			br_ip6_multicast_leave_group(br, port, &grec->grec_mca,
 						     vid, src);
 		} else {
author maintainer
#29 lore raw

PATCH 29/62 net: bridge: mcast: fix stale ipv6 hdr pointer when handling v6 query

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3b26a5d03d35d8f732d75951218983c0f7f68dff ]

We get a pointer to the ipv6 hdr in br_ip6_multicast_query but we may call pskb_may_pull afterwards and end up using a stale pointer. So use the header directly, it's just 1 place where it's needed.

Fixes 08b202b67264 ("bridge br_multicast: IPv6 MLD support.")
---
 net/bridge/br_multicast.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/bridge/br_multicast.c +1 -2
@@ -1302,7 +1302,6 @@ static int br_ip6_multicast_query(struct
 				  u16 vid)
 {
 	unsigned int transport_len = ipv6_transport_len(skb);
-	const struct ipv6hdr *ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
 	struct mld_msg *mld;
 	struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mp;
 	struct mld2_query *mld2q;
@@ -1346,7 +1345,7 @@ static int br_ip6_multicast_query(struct
 
 	if (is_general_query) {
 		saddr.proto = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
-		saddr.u.ip6 = ip6h->saddr;
+		saddr.u.ip6 = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
 
 		br_multicast_query_received(br, port, &br->ip6_other_query,
 					    &saddr, max_delay);
author maintainer
#30 lore raw

PATCH 30/62 net: bridge: dont cache ether dest pointer on input

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3d26eb8ad1e9b906433903ce05f775cf038e747f ]

We would cache ether dst pointer on input in br_handle_frame_finish but after the neigh suppress code that could lead to a stale pointer since both ipv4 and ipv6 suppress code do pskb_may_pull. This means we have to always reload it after the suppress code so there's no point in having it cached just retrieve it directly.

Fixes 057658cb33fbf ("bridge: suppress arp pkts on BR_NEIGH_SUPPRESS ports")
Fixes ed842faeb2bd ("bridge: suppress nd pkts on BR_NEIGH_SUPPRESS ports")
---
 net/bridge/br_input.c |    8 +++-----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/bridge/br_input.c +3 -5
@@ -79,7 +79,6 @@ int br_handle_frame_finish(struct net *n
 	struct net_bridge_fdb_entry *dst = NULL;
 	struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mdst;
 	bool local_rcv, mcast_hit = false;
-	const unsigned char *dest;
 	struct net_bridge *br;
 	u16 vid = 0;
 
@@ -97,10 +96,9 @@ int br_handle_frame_finish(struct net *n
 		br_fdb_update(br, p, eth_hdr(skb)->h_source, vid, false);
 
 	local_rcv = !!(br->dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC);
-	dest = eth_hdr(skb)->h_dest;
-	if (is_multicast_ether_addr(dest)) {
+	if (is_multicast_ether_addr(eth_hdr(skb)->h_dest)) {
 		/* by definition the broadcast is also a multicast address */
-		if (is_broadcast_ether_addr(dest)) {
+		if (is_broadcast_ether_addr(eth_hdr(skb)->h_dest)) {
 			pkt_type = BR_PKT_BROADCAST;
 			local_rcv = true;
 		} else {
@@ -150,7 +148,7 @@ int br_handle_frame_finish(struct net *n
 		}
 		break;
 	case BR_PKT_UNICAST:
-		dst = br_fdb_find_rcu(br, dest, vid);
+		dst = br_fdb_find_rcu(br, eth_hdr(skb)->h_dest, vid);
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
author maintainer
#31 lore raw

PATCH 31/62 net: bridge: stp: dont cache eth dest pointer before skb pull

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2446a68ae6a8cee6d480e2f5b52f5007c7c41312 ]

Don't cache eth dest pointer before calling pskb_may_pull.

Fixes cf0f02d04a83 ("[BRIDGE]: use llc for receiving STP packets")
---
 net/bridge/br_stp_bpdu.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/bridge/br_stp_bpdu.c +1 -2
@@ -147,7 +147,6 @@ void br_send_tcn_bpdu(struct net_bridge_
 void br_stp_rcv(const struct stp_proto *proto, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		struct net_device *dev)
 {
-	const unsigned char *dest = eth_hdr(skb)->h_dest;
 	struct net_bridge_port *p;
 	struct net_bridge *br;
 	const unsigned char *buf;
@@ -176,7 +175,7 @@ void br_stp_rcv(const struct stp_proto *
 	if (p->state == BR_STATE_DISABLED)
 		goto out;
 
-	if (!ether_addr_equal(dest, br->group_addr))
+	if (!ether_addr_equal(eth_hdr(skb)->h_dest, br->group_addr))
 		goto out;
 
 	if (p->flags & BR_BPDU_GUARD) {
author maintainer
#14 lore raw

PATCH 14/62 net_sched: unset TCQ_F_CAN_BYPASS when adding filters

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3f05e6886a595c9a29a309c52f45326be917823c ]

For qdisc's that support TC filters and set TCQ_F_CAN_BYPASS, notably fq_codel, it makes no sense to let packets bypass the TC filters we setup in any scenario, otherwise our packets steering policy could not be enforced.

This can be reproduced easily with the following script:

ip li add dev dummy0 type dummy
ifconfig dummy0 up
tc qd add dev dummy0 root fq_codel
tc filter add dev dummy0 parent 8001: protocol arp basic action mirred egress redirect dev lo tc filter add dev dummy0 parent 8001: protocol ip basic action mirred egress redirect dev lo ping -I dummy0 192.168.112.1

Without this patch, packets are sent directly to dummy0 without hitting any of the filters. With this patch, packets are redirected to loopback as expected.

This fix is not perfect, it only unsets the flag but does not set it back because we have to save the information somewhere in the qdisc if we really want that. Note, both fq_codel and sfq clear this flag in their ->bind_tcf() but this is clearly not sufficient when we don't use any class ID.

Fixes 23624935e0c4 ("net_sched: TCQ_F_CAN_BYPASS generalization")
Cc Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
---
 net/sched/cls_api.c      |    1 +
 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c |    2 --
 net/sched/sch_sfq.c      |    2 --
 3 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/sched/cls_api.c +1 -0
@@ -2162,6 +2162,7 @@ replay:
 		tfilter_notify(net, skb, n, tp, block, q, parent, fh,
 			       RTM_NEWTFILTER, false, rtnl_held);
 		tfilter_put(tp, fh);
+		q->flags &= ~TCQ_F_CAN_BYPASS;
 	}
 
 errout:
net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c +0 -2
@@ -600,8 +600,6 @@ static unsigned long fq_codel_find(struc
 static unsigned long fq_codel_bind(struct Qdisc *sch, unsigned long parent,
 			      u32 classid)
 {
-	/* we cannot bypass queue discipline anymore */
-	sch->flags &= ~TCQ_F_CAN_BYPASS;
 	return 0;
 }
 
net/sched/sch_sfq.c +0 -2
@@ -828,8 +828,6 @@ static unsigned long sfq_find(struct Qdi
 static unsigned long sfq_bind(struct Qdisc *sch, unsigned long parent,
 			      u32 classid)
 {
-	/* we cannot bypass queue discipline anymore */
-	sch->flags &= ~TCQ_F_CAN_BYPASS;
 	return 0;
 }
 
author maintainer
#33 lore raw

PATCH 33/62 macsec: fix checksumming after decryption

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Andreas Steinmetz <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7d8b16b9facb0dd81d1469808dd9a575fa1d525a ]

Fix checksumming after decryption.

---
 drivers/net/macsec.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/macsec.c +1 -0
@@ -869,6 +869,7 @@ static void macsec_reset_skb(struct sk_b
 
 static void macsec_finalize_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 icv_len, u8 hdr_len)
 {
+	skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
 	memmove(skb->data + hdr_len, skb->data, 2 * ETH_ALEN);
 	skb_pull(skb, hdr_len);
 	pskb_trim_unique(skb, skb->len - icv_len);
author maintainer
#34 lore raw

PATCH 34/62 netrom: fix a memory leak in nr_rx_frame()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c8c8218ec5af5d2598381883acbefbf604e56b5e ]

When the skb is associated with a new sock, just assigning it to skb->sk is not sufficient, we have to set its destructor to free the sock properly too.

---
 net/netrom/af_netrom.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/netrom/af_netrom.c +2 -1
@@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ int nr_rx_frame(struct sk_buff *skb, str
 	unsigned short frametype, flags, window, timeout;
 	int ret;
 
-	skb->sk = NULL;		/* Initially we don't know who it's for */
+	skb_orphan(skb);
 
 	/*
 	 *	skb->data points to the netrom frame start
@@ -971,6 +971,7 @@ int nr_rx_frame(struct sk_buff *skb, str
 	window = skb->data[20];
 
 	skb->sk             = make;
+	skb->destructor     = sock_efree;
 	make->sk_state	    = TCP_ESTABLISHED;
 
 	/* Fill in his circuit details */
author maintainer
#35 lore raw

PATCH 35/62 netrom: hold sock when setting skb->destructor

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4638faac032756f7eab5524be7be56bee77e426b ]

sock_efree() releases the sock refcnt, if we don't hold this refcnt when setting skb->destructor to it, the refcnt would not be balanced. This leads to several bug reports from syzbot.

I have checked other users of sock_efree(), all of them hold the sock refcnt.

Fixes c8c8218ec5af ("netrom: fix a memory leak in nr_rx_frame()")
Reported-and-tested-by <[email protected]>
Reported-and-tested-by <[email protected]>
Reported-and-tested-by <[email protected]>
Reported-and-tested-by <[email protected]>
Cc Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
---
 net/netrom/af_netrom.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/netrom/af_netrom.c +1 -0
@@ -970,6 +970,7 @@ int nr_rx_frame(struct sk_buff *skb, str
 
 	window = skb->data[20];
 
+	sock_hold(make);
 	skb->sk             = make;
 	skb->destructor     = sock_efree;
 	make->sk_state	    = TCP_ESTABLISHED;
author maintainer
#36 lore raw

PATCH 36/62 selftests: txring_overwrite: fix incorrect test of mmap() return value

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Frank de Brabander <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cecaa76b2919aac2aa584ce476e9fcd5b084add5 ]

If mmap() fails it returns MAP_FAILED, which is defined as ((void *) -1). The current if-statement incorrectly tests if *ring is NULL.

Fixes 358be656406d ("selftests/net: add txring_overwrite")
---
 tools/testing/selftests/net/txring_overwrite.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/testing/selftests/net/txring_overwrite.c +1 -1
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static int setup_tx(char **ring)
 
 	*ring = mmap(0, req.tp_block_size * req.tp_block_nr,
 		     PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fdt, 0);
-	if (!*ring)
+	if (*ring == MAP_FAILED)
 		error(1, errno, "mmap");
 
 	return fdt;
author maintainer
#37 lore raw

PATCH 37/62 net/tls: fix poll ignoring partially copied records

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 13aecb17acabc2a92187d08f7ca93bb8aad62c6f ]

David reports that RPC applications which use epoll() occasionally get stuck, and that TLS ULP causes the kernel to not wake applications, even though read() will return data.

This is indeed true. The ctx->rx_list which holds partially copied records is not consulted when deciding whether socket is readable.

Note that SO_RCVLOWAT with epoll() is and has always been broken for kernel TLS. We'd need to parse all records from the TCP layer, instead of just the first one.

Fixes 692d7b5d1f91 ("tls: Fix recvmsg() to be able to peek across multiple records")
---
 net/tls/tls_sw.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/tls/tls_sw.c +2 -1
@@ -1931,7 +1931,8 @@ bool tls_sw_stream_read(const struct soc
 		ingress_empty = list_empty(&psock->ingress_msg);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
-	return !ingress_empty || ctx->recv_pkt;
+	return !ingress_empty || ctx->recv_pkt ||
+		!skb_queue_empty(&ctx->rx_list);
 }
 
 static int tls_read_size(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb)
author maintainer
#38 lore raw

PATCH 38/62 net/tls: reject offload of TLS 1.3

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 618bac45937a3dc6126ac0652747481e97000f99 ]

Neither drivers nor the tls offload code currently supports TLS version 1.3. Check the TLS version when installing connection state. TLS 1.3 will just fallback to the kernel crypto for now.

Fixes 130b392c6cd6 ("net: tls: Add tls 1.3 support")
---
 net/tls/tls_device.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
net/tls/tls_device.c +8 -0
@@ -746,6 +746,11 @@ int tls_set_device_offload(struct sock *
 	}
 
 	crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_send.info;
+	if (crypto_info->version != TLS_1_2_VERSION) {
+		rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		goto free_offload_ctx;
+	}
+
 	switch (crypto_info->cipher_type) {
 	case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128:
 		nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE;
@@ -880,6 +885,9 @@ int tls_set_device_offload_rx(struct soc
 	struct net_device *netdev;
 	int rc = 0;
 
+	if (ctx->crypto_recv.info.version != TLS_1_2_VERSION)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
 	/* We support starting offload on multiple sockets
 	 * concurrently, so we only need a read lock here.
 	 * This lock must precede get_netdev_for_sock to prevent races between
author maintainer
#39 lore raw

PATCH 39/62 net/mlx5e: Fix port tunnel GRE entropy control

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Eli Britstein <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 914adbb1bcf89478ac138318d28b302704564d59 ]

GRE entropy calculation is a single bit per card, and not per port. Force disable GRE entropy calculation upon the first GRE encap rule, and release the force at the last GRE encap rule removal. This is done per port.

Fixes 97417f6182f8 ("net/mlx5e: Fix GRE key by controlling port tunnel entropy calculation")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lib/port_tun.c |   23 ++---------------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/lib/port_tun.c +4 -19
@@ -100,27 +100,12 @@ static int mlx5_set_entropy(struct mlx5_
 	 */
 	if (entropy_flags.gre_calc_supported &&
 	    reformat_type == MLX5_REFORMAT_TYPE_L2_TO_NVGRE) {
-		/* Other applications may change the global FW entropy
-		 * calculations settings. Check that the current entropy value
-		 * is the negative of the updated value.
-		 */
-		if (entropy_flags.force_enabled &&
-		    enable == entropy_flags.gre_calc_enabled) {
-			mlx5_core_warn(tun_entropy->mdev,
-				       "Unexpected GRE entropy calc setting - expected %d",
-				       !entropy_flags.gre_calc_enabled);
-			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-		}
-		err = mlx5_set_port_gre_tun_entropy_calc(tun_entropy->mdev, enable,
-							 entropy_flags.force_supported);
+		if (!entropy_flags.force_supported)
+			return 0;
+		err = mlx5_set_port_gre_tun_entropy_calc(tun_entropy->mdev,
+							 enable, !enable);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
-		/* if we turn on the entropy we don't need to force it anymore */
-		if (entropy_flags.force_supported && enable) {
-			err = mlx5_set_port_gre_tun_entropy_calc(tun_entropy->mdev, 1, 0);
-			if (err)
-				return err;
-		}
 	} else if (entropy_flags.calc_supported) {
 		/* Other applications may change the global FW entropy
 		 * calculations settings. Check that the current entropy value
author maintainer
#41 lore raw

PATCH 41/62 net/mlx5e: Fix return value from timeout recover function

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Aya Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 39825350ae2a52f8513741b36e42118bd80dd689 ]

Fix timeout recover function to return a meaningful return value. When an interrupt was not sent by the FW, return IO error instead of 'true'.

Fixes c7981bea48fb ("net/mlx5e: Fix return status of TX reporter timeout recover")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/reporter_tx.c |    6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/reporter_tx.c +2 -4
@@ -142,22 +142,20 @@ static int mlx5e_tx_reporter_timeout_rec
 {
 	struct mlx5_eq_comp *eq = sq->cq.mcq.eq;
 	u32 eqe_count;
-	int ret;
 
 	netdev_err(sq->channel->netdev, "EQ 0x%x: Cons = 0x%x, irqn = 0x%x\n",
 		   eq->core.eqn, eq->core.cons_index, eq->core.irqn);
 
 	eqe_count = mlx5_eq_poll_irq_disabled(eq);
-	ret = eqe_count ? false : true;
 	if (!eqe_count) {
 		clear_bit(MLX5E_SQ_STATE_ENABLED, &sq->state);
-		return ret;
+		return -EIO;
 	}
 
 	netdev_err(sq->channel->netdev, "Recover %d eqes on EQ 0x%x\n",
 		   eqe_count, eq->core.eqn);
 	sq->channel->stats->eq_rearm++;
-	return ret;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 int mlx5e_tx_reporter_timeout(struct mlx5e_txqsq *sq)
author maintainer
#42 lore raw

PATCH 42/62 net/mlx5e: Fix error flow in tx reporter diagnose

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Aya Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 99d31cbd8953c6929da978bf049ab0f0b4e503d9 ]

Fix tx reporter's diagnose callback. Propagate error when failing to gather diagnostics information or failing to print diagnostic data per queue.

Fixes de8650a82071 ("net/mlx5e: Add tx reporter support")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/reporter_tx.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/reporter_tx.c +2 -2
@@ -262,13 +262,13 @@ static int mlx5e_tx_reporter_diagnose(st
 
 		err = mlx5_core_query_sq_state(priv->mdev, sq->sqn, &state);
 		if (err)
-			break;
+			goto unlock;
 
 		err = mlx5e_tx_reporter_build_diagnose_output(fmsg, sq->sqn,
 							      state,
 							      netif_xmit_stopped(sq->txq));
 		if (err)
-			break;
+			goto unlock;
 	}
 	err = devlink_fmsg_arr_pair_nest_end(fmsg);
 	if (err)
author maintainer
#43 lore raw

PATCH 43/62 dma-buf: balance refcount inbalance

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jérôme Glisse <[email protected]>

commit 5e383a9798990c69fc759a4930de224bb497e62c upstream.

The debugfs take reference on fence without dropping them.

---
 drivers/dma-buf/dma-buf.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/dma-buf/dma-buf.c +1 -0
@@ -1068,6 +1068,7 @@ static int dma_buf_debug_show(struct seq
 				   fence->ops->get_driver_name(fence),
 				   fence->ops->get_timeline_name(fence),
 				   dma_fence_is_signaled(fence) ? "" : "un");
+			dma_fence_put(fence);
 		}
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 

_______________________________________________
dri-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel

author maintainer
#44 lore raw

PATCH 44/62 dma-buf: Discard old fence_excl on retrying get_fences_rcu for realloc

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>

commit f5b07b04e5f090a85d1e96938520f2b2b58e4a8e upstream.

If we have to drop the seqcount & rcu lock to perform a krealloc, we have to restart the loop. In doing so, be careful not to lose track of the already acquired exclusive fence.

Fixes fedf54132d24 ("dma-buf: Restart reservation_object_get_fences_rcu() after writes")
Cc Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
Cc Maarten Lankhorst <[email protected]>
Cc Christian König <[email protected]>
Cc Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Cc Sumit Semwal <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/dma-buf/reservation.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/dma-buf/reservation.c +4 -0
@@ -357,6 +357,10 @@ int reservation_object_get_fences_rcu(st
 					   GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN);
 			if (!nshared) {
 				rcu_read_unlock();
+
+				dma_fence_put(fence_excl);
+				fence_excl = NULL;
+
 				nshared = krealloc(shared, sz, GFP_KERNEL);
 				if (nshared) {
 					shared = nshared;
author maintainer
#45 lore raw

PATCH 45/62 gpiolib: of: fix a memory leak in of_gpio_flags_quirks()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nishka Dasgupta <[email protected]>

commit 89fea04c85e85f21ef4937611055abce82330d48 upstream.

Each iteration of for_each_child_of_node puts the previous node, but in the case of a break from the middle of the loop, there is no put, thus causing a memory leak. Hence add an of_node_put before the break. Issue found with Coccinelle.

---
 drivers/gpio/gpiolib-of.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/gpio/gpiolib-of.c +1 -0
@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ static void of_gpio_flags_quirks(struct
 							of_node_full_name(child));
 					*flags |= OF_GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW;
 				}
+				of_node_put(child);
 				break;
 			}
 		}
author maintainer
#47 lore raw

PATCH 47/62 MIPS: lb60: Fix pin mappings

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Paul Cercueil <[email protected]>

commit 1323c3b72a987de57141cabc44bf9cd83656bc70 upstream.

The pin mappings introduced in commit 636f8ba67fb6
("MIPS: JZ4740: Qi LB60: Add pinctrl configuration for several drivers") are completely wrong. The pinctrl driver name is incorrect, and the function and group fields are swapped.

Fixes 636f8ba67fb6 ("MIPS: JZ4740: Qi LB60: Add pinctrl configuration for several drivers")
Cc Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc James Hogan <[email protected]>
---
 arch/mips/jz4740/board-qi_lb60.c |   16 ++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/mips/jz4740/board-qi_lb60.c +8 -8
@@ -469,27 +469,27 @@ static unsigned long pin_cfg_bias_disabl
 static struct pinctrl_map pin_map[] __initdata = {
 	/* NAND pin configuration */
 	PIN_MAP_MUX_GROUP_DEFAULT("jz4740-nand",
-			"10010000.jz4740-pinctrl", "nand", "nand-cs1"),
+			"10010000.pin-controller", "nand-cs1", "nand"),
 
 	/* fbdev pin configuration */
 	PIN_MAP_MUX_GROUP("jz4740-fb", PINCTRL_STATE_DEFAULT,
-			"10010000.jz4740-pinctrl", "lcd", "lcd-8bit"),
+			"10010000.pin-controller", "lcd-8bit", "lcd"),
 	PIN_MAP_MUX_GROUP("jz4740-fb", PINCTRL_STATE_SLEEP,
-			"10010000.jz4740-pinctrl", "lcd", "lcd-no-pins"),
+			"10010000.pin-controller", "lcd-no-pins", "lcd"),
 
 	/* MMC pin configuration */
 	PIN_MAP_MUX_GROUP_DEFAULT("jz4740-mmc.0",
-			"10010000.jz4740-pinctrl", "mmc", "mmc-1bit"),
+			"10010000.pin-controller", "mmc-1bit", "mmc"),
 	PIN_MAP_MUX_GROUP_DEFAULT("jz4740-mmc.0",
-			"10010000.jz4740-pinctrl", "mmc", "mmc-4bit"),
+			"10010000.pin-controller", "mmc-4bit", "mmc"),
 	PIN_MAP_CONFIGS_PIN_DEFAULT("jz4740-mmc.0",
-			"10010000.jz4740-pinctrl", "PD0", pin_cfg_bias_disable),
+			"10010000.pin-controller", "PD0", pin_cfg_bias_disable),
 	PIN_MAP_CONFIGS_PIN_DEFAULT("jz4740-mmc.0",
-			"10010000.jz4740-pinctrl", "PD2", pin_cfg_bias_disable),
+			"10010000.pin-controller", "PD2", pin_cfg_bias_disable),
 
 	/* PWM pin configuration */
 	PIN_MAP_MUX_GROUP_DEFAULT("jz4740-pwm",
-			"10010000.jz4740-pinctrl", "pwm4", "pwm4"),
+			"10010000.pin-controller", "pwm4", "pwm4"),
 };
 
 
author maintainer
#48 lore raw

PATCH 48/62 perf script: Assume native_arch for pipe mode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Song Liu <[email protected]>

commit 9d49169c5958e429ffa6874fbef734ae7502ad65 upstream.

In pipe mode, session->header.env.arch is not populated until the events are processed. Therefore, the following command crashes:

perf record -o - | perf script

(gdb) bt

It fails when we try to compare env.arch against uts.machine:

        if (!strcmp(uts.machine, session->header.env.arch) ||
            (!strcmp(uts.machine, "x86_64") &&
             !strcmp(session->header.env.arch, "i386")))
                native_arch = true;

In pipe mode, it is tricky to find env.arch at this stage. To keep it simple, let's just assume native_arch is always true for pipe mode.

---
 tools/perf/builtin-script.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/perf/builtin-script.c +2 -1
@@ -3669,7 +3669,8 @@ int cmd_script(int argc, const char **ar
 		goto out_delete;
 
 	uname(&uts);
-	if (!strcmp(uts.machine, session->header.env.arch) ||
+	if (data.is_pipe ||  /* assume pipe_mode indicates native_arch */
+	    !strcmp(uts.machine, session->header.env.arch) ||
 	    (!strcmp(uts.machine, "x86_64") &&
 	     !strcmp(session->header.env.arch, "i386")))
 		native_arch = true;
author maintainer
#16 lore raw

PATCH 16/62 net/tls: make sure offload also gets the keys wiped

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit acd3e96d53a24d219f720ed4012b62723ae05da1 ]

Commit 86029d10af18 ("tls: zero the crypto information from tls_context before freeing") added memzero_explicit() calls to clear the key material before freeing struct tls_context, but it missed tls_device.c has its own way of freeing this structure. Replace the missing free.

Fixes 86029d10af18 ("tls: zero the crypto information from tls_context before freeing")
---
 include/net/tls.h    |    1 +
 net/tls/tls_device.c |    2 +-
 net/tls/tls_main.c   |    4 ++--
 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/net/tls.h +1 -0
@@ -285,6 +285,7 @@ struct tls_offload_context_rx {
 	(ALIGN(sizeof(struct tls_offload_context_rx), sizeof(void *)) + \
 	 TLS_DRIVER_STATE_SIZE)
 
+void tls_ctx_free(struct tls_context *ctx);
 int wait_on_pending_writer(struct sock *sk, long *timeo);
 int tls_sk_query(struct sock *sk, int optname, char __user *optval,
 		int __user *optlen);
net/tls/tls_device.c +1 -1
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ static void tls_device_free_ctx(struct t
 	if (ctx->rx_conf == TLS_HW)
 		kfree(tls_offload_ctx_rx(ctx));
 
-	kfree(ctx);
+	tls_ctx_free(ctx);
 }
 
 static void tls_device_gc_task(struct work_struct *work)
net/tls/tls_main.c +2 -2
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ static void tls_write_space(struct sock
 	ctx->sk_write_space(sk);
 }
 
-static void tls_ctx_free(struct tls_context *ctx)
+void tls_ctx_free(struct tls_context *ctx)
 {
 	if (!ctx)
 		return;
@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ static void tls_hw_sk_destruct(struct so
 
 	ctx->sk_destruct(sk);
 	/* Free ctx */
-	kfree(ctx);
+	tls_ctx_free(ctx);
 	icsk->icsk_ulp_data = NULL;
 }
 
author maintainer
#19 lore raw

PATCH 19/62 rxrpc: Fix send on a connected, but unbound socket

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: David Howells <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e835ada07091f40dcfb1bc735082bd0a7c005e59 ]

If sendmsg() or sendmmsg() is called on a connected socket that hasn't had bind() called on it, then an oops will occur when the kernel tries to connect the call because no local endpoint has been allocated.

Fix this by implicitly binding the socket if it is in the RXRPC_CLIENT_UNBOUND state, just like it does for the RXRPC_UNBOUND state.

Further, the state should be transitioned to RXRPC_CLIENT_BOUND after this to prevent further attempts to bind it.

This can be tested with:

	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <string.h>
	#include <sys/socket.h>
	#include <arpa/inet.h>
	#include <linux/rxrpc.h>
	static const unsigned char inet6_addr[16] = {
		0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, -1, 0xac, 0x14, 0x14, 0xaa
	};
	int main(void)
	{
		struct sockaddr_rxrpc srx;
		struct cmsghdr *cm;
		struct msghdr msg;
		unsigned char control[16];
		int fd;
		memset(&srx, 0, sizeof(srx));
		srx.srx_family = 0x21;
		srx.srx_service = 0;
		srx.transport_type = AF_INET;
		srx.transport_len = 0x1c;
		srx.transport.sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
		srx.transport.sin6.sin6_port = htons(0x4e22);
		srx.transport.sin6.sin6_flowinfo = htons(0x4e22);
		srx.transport.sin6.sin6_scope_id = htons(0xaa3b);
		memcpy(&srx.transport.sin6.sin6_addr, inet6_addr, 16);
		cm = (struct cmsghdr *)control;
		cm->cmsg_len	= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(unsigned long));
		cm->cmsg_level	= SOL_RXRPC;
		cm->cmsg_type	= RXRPC_USER_CALL_ID;
		*(unsigned long *)CMSG_DATA(cm) = 0;
		msg.msg_name = NULL;
		msg.msg_namelen = 0;
		msg.msg_iov = NULL;
		msg.msg_iovlen = 0;
		msg.msg_control = control;
		msg.msg_controllen = cm->cmsg_len;
		msg.msg_flags = 0;
		fd = socket(AF_RXRPC, SOCK_DGRAM, AF_INET);
		connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&srx, sizeof(srx));
		sendmsg(fd, &msg, 0);
		return 0;
	}

Leading to the following oops:

	BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018
	#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
	#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
	...
	RIP: 0010:rxrpc_connect_call+0x42/0xa01
	...
	Call Trace:
	 ? mark_held_locks+0x47/0x59
	 ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0xb6/0xba
	 rxrpc_new_client_call+0x3b1/0x762
	 ? rxrpc_do_sendmsg+0x3c0/0x92e
	 rxrpc_do_sendmsg+0x3c0/0x92e
	 rxrpc_sendmsg+0x16b/0x1b5
	 sock_sendmsg+0x2d/0x39
	 ___sys_sendmsg+0x1a4/0x22a
	 ? release_sock+0x19/0x9e
	 ? reacquire_held_locks+0x136/0x160
	 ? release_sock+0x19/0x9e
	 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x6e
	 ? __lock_acquire+0x268/0xf73
	 ? rxrpc_connect+0xdd/0xe4
	 ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0xb6/0xba
	 __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0x94
	 do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x1bf
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Fixes 2341e0775747 ("rxrpc: Simplify connect() implementation and simplify sendmsg() op")
Reported-by [email protected]
---
 net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c +2 -2
@@ -521,6 +521,7 @@ static int rxrpc_sendmsg(struct socket *
 
 	switch (rx->sk.sk_state) {
 	case RXRPC_UNBOUND:
+	case RXRPC_CLIENT_UNBOUND:
 		rx->srx.srx_family = AF_RXRPC;
 		rx->srx.srx_service = 0;
 		rx->srx.transport_type = SOCK_DGRAM;
@@ -545,10 +546,9 @@ static int rxrpc_sendmsg(struct socket *
 		}
 
 		rx->local = local;
-		rx->sk.sk_state = RXRPC_CLIENT_UNBOUND;
+		rx->sk.sk_state = RXRPC_CLIENT_BOUND;
 		/* Fall through */
 
-	case RXRPC_CLIENT_UNBOUND:
 	case RXRPC_CLIENT_BOUND:
 		if (!m->msg_name &&
 		    test_bit(RXRPC_SOCK_CONNECTED, &rx->flags)) {
author maintainer
#20 lore raw

PATCH 20/62 sctp: fix error handling on stream scheduler initialization

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4d1415811e492d9a8238f8a92dd0d51612c788e9 ]

It allocates the extended area for outbound streams only on sendmsg calls, if they are not yet allocated. When using the priority stream scheduler, this initialization may imply into a subsequent allocation, which may fail. In this case, it was aborting the stream scheduler initialization but leaving the ->ext pointer (allocated) in there, thus in a partially initialized state. On a subsequent call to sendmsg, it would notice the ->ext pointer in there, and trip on uninitialized stuff when trying to schedule the data chunk.

The fix is undo the ->ext initialization if the stream scheduler initialization fails and avoid the partially initialized state.

Although syzkaller bisected this to commit 4ff40b86262b ("sctp: set chunk transport correctly when it's a new asoc"), this bug was actually introduced on the commit I marked below.

Reported-by [email protected]
Fixes 5bbbbe32a431 ("sctp: introduce stream scheduler foundations")
---
 net/sctp/stream.c |    9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/sctp/stream.c +8 -1
@@ -168,13 +168,20 @@ out:
 int sctp_stream_init_ext(struct sctp_stream *stream, __u16 sid)
 {
 	struct sctp_stream_out_ext *soute;
+	int ret;
 
 	soute = kzalloc(sizeof(*soute), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!soute)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	SCTP_SO(stream, sid)->ext = soute;
 
-	return sctp_sched_init_sid(stream, sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	ret = sctp_sched_init_sid(stream, sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (ret) {
+		kfree(SCTP_SO(stream, sid)->ext);
+		SCTP_SO(stream, sid)->ext = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 void sctp_stream_free(struct sctp_stream *stream)
author maintainer
#21 lore raw

PATCH 21/62 sctp: not bind the socket in sctp_connect

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Xin Long <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9b6c08878e23adb7cc84bdca94d8a944b03f099e ]

Now when sctp_connect() is called with a wrong sa_family, it binds to a port but doesn't set bp->port, then sctp_get_af_specific will return NULL and sctp_connect() returns -EINVAL.

Then if sctp_bind() is called to bind to another port, the last port it has bound will leak due to bp->port is NULL by then.

sctp_connect() doesn't need to bind ports, as later __sctp_connect will do it if bp->port is NULL. So remove it from sctp_connect(). While at it, remove the unnecessary sockaddr.sa_family len check as it's already done in sctp_inet_connect.

Fixes 644fbdeacf1d ("sctp: fix the issue that flags are ignored when using kernel_connect")
Reported-by [email protected]
---
 net/sctp/socket.c |   24 +++---------------------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
net/sctp/socket.c +3 -21
@@ -4828,35 +4828,17 @@ out_nounlock:
 static int sctp_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr,
 			int addr_len, int flags)
 {
-	struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
 	struct sctp_af *af;
-	int err = 0;
+	int err = -EINVAL;
 
 	lock_sock(sk);
-
 	pr_debug("%s: sk:%p, sockaddr:%p, addr_len:%d\n", __func__, sk,
 		 addr, addr_len);
 
-	/* We may need to bind the socket. */
-	if (!inet->inet_num) {
-		if (sk->sk_prot->get_port(sk, 0)) {
-			release_sock(sk);
-			return -EAGAIN;
-		}
-		inet->inet_sport = htons(inet->inet_num);
-	}
-
 	/* Validate addr_len before calling common connect/connectx routine. */
-	af = addr_len < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family) ? NULL :
-		sctp_get_af_specific(addr->sa_family);
-	if (!af || addr_len < af->sockaddr_len) {
-		err = -EINVAL;
-	} else {
-		/* Pass correct addr len to common routine (so it knows there
-		 * is only one address being passed.
-		 */
+	af = sctp_get_af_specific(addr->sa_family);
+	if (af && addr_len >= af->sockaddr_len)
 		err = __sctp_connect(sk, addr, af->sockaddr_len, flags, NULL);
-	}
 
 	release_sock(sk);
 	return err;
author maintainer
#12 lore raw

PATCH 12/62 net: openvswitch: fix csum updates for MPLS actions

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: John Hurley <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0e3183cd2a64843a95b62f8bd4a83605a4cf0615 ]

Skbs may have their checksum value populated by HW. If this is a checksum calculated over the entire packet then the CHECKSUM_COMPLETE field is marked. Changes to the data pointer on the skb throughout the network stack still try to maintain this complete csum value if it is required through functions such as skb_postpush_rcsum.

The MPLS actions in Open vSwitch modify a CHECKSUM_COMPLETE value when changes are made to packet data without a push or a pull. This occurs when the ethertype of the MAC header is changed or when MPLS lse fields are modified.

The modification is carried out using the csum_partial function to get the csum of a buffer and add it into the larger checksum. The buffer is an inversion of the data to be removed followed by the new data. Because the csum is calculated over 16 bits and these values align with 16 bits, the effect is the removal of the old value from the CHECKSUM_COMPLETE and addition of the new value.

However, the csum fed into the function and the outcome of the calculation are also inverted. This would only make sense if it was the new value rather than the old that was inverted in the input buffer.

Fix the issue by removing the bit inverts in the csum_partial calculation.

The bug was verified and the fix tested by comparing the folded value of the updated CHECKSUM_COMPLETE value with the folded value of a full software checksum calculation (reset skb->csum to 0 and run skb_checksum_complete(skb)). Prior to the fix the outcomes differed but after they produce the same result.

Fixes 25cd9ba0abc0 ("openvswitch: Add basic MPLS support to kernel")
Fixes bc7cc5999fd3 ("openvswitch: update checksum in {push,pop}_mpls")
---
 net/openvswitch/actions.c |    6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/openvswitch/actions.c +2 -4
@@ -175,8 +175,7 @@ static void update_ethertype(struct sk_b
 	if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE) {
 		__be16 diff[] = { ~(hdr->h_proto), ethertype };
 
-		skb->csum = ~csum_partial((char *)diff, sizeof(diff),
-					~skb->csum);
+		skb->csum = csum_partial((char *)diff, sizeof(diff), skb->csum);
 	}
 
 	hdr->h_proto = ethertype;
@@ -268,8 +267,7 @@ static int set_mpls(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE) {
 		__be32 diff[] = { ~(stack->label_stack_entry), lse };
 
-		skb->csum = ~csum_partial((char *)diff, sizeof(diff),
-					  ~skb->csum);
+		skb->csum = csum_partial((char *)diff, sizeof(diff), skb->csum);
 	}
 
 	stack->label_stack_entry = lse;
author maintainer
#50 lore raw

PATCH 50/62 perf/core: Fix race between close() and fork()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>

commit 1cf8dfe8a661f0462925df943140e9f6d1ea5233 upstream.

Syzcaller reported the following Use-after-Free bug:

	close()						clone()

							  copy_process()
							    perf_event_init_task()
							      perf_event_init_context()
							        mutex_lock(parent_ctx->mutex)
								inherit_task_group()
								  inherit_group()
								    inherit_event()
								      mutex_lock(event->child_mutex)
								      // expose event on child list
								      list_add_tail()
								      mutex_unlock(event->child_mutex)
							        mutex_unlock(parent_ctx->mutex)

							    ...
							    goto bad_fork_*

							  bad_fork_cleanup_perf:
							    perf_event_free_task()

	  perf_release()
	    perf_event_release_kernel()
	      list_for_each_entry()
		mutex_lock(ctx->mutex)
		mutex_lock(event->child_mutex)
		// event is from the failing inherit
		// on the other CPU
		perf_remove_from_context()
		list_move()
		mutex_unlock(event->child_mutex)
		mutex_unlock(ctx->mutex)

							      mutex_lock(ctx->mutex)
							      list_for_each_entry_safe()
							        // event already stolen
							      mutex_unlock(ctx->mutex)

							    delayed_free_task()
							      free_task()

	     list_for_each_entry_safe()
	       list_del()
	       free_event()
	         _free_event()
		   // and so event->hw.target
		   // is the already freed failed clone()
		   if (event->hw.target)
		     put_task_struct(event->hw.target)
		       // WHOOPSIE, already quite dead

Which puts the lie to the the comment on perf_event_free_task():
'unexposed, unused context' not so much.

Which is a 'fun' confluence of fail; copy_process() doing an unconditional free_task() and not respecting refcounts, and perf having creative locking. In particular:

82d94856fa22 ("perf/core: Fix lock inversion between perf,trace,cpuhp")

seems to have overlooked this 'fun' parade.

Solve it by using the fact that detached events still have a reference count on their (previous) context. With this perf_event_free_task() can detect when events have escaped and wait for their destruction.

Reported-by [email protected]
Cc Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Fixes 82d94856fa22 ("perf/core: Fix lock inversion between perf,trace,cpuhp")
---
 kernel/events/core.c |   49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel/events/core.c +41 -8
@@ -4459,12 +4459,20 @@ static void _free_event(struct perf_even
 	if (event->destroy)
 		event->destroy(event);
 
-	if (event->ctx)
-		put_ctx(event->ctx);
-
+	/*
+	 * Must be after ->destroy(), due to uprobe_perf_close() using
+	 * hw.target.
+	 */
 	if (event->hw.target)
 		put_task_struct(event->hw.target);
 
+	/*
+	 * perf_event_free_task() relies on put_ctx() being 'last', in particular
+	 * all task references must be cleaned up.
+	 */
+	if (event->ctx)
+		put_ctx(event->ctx);
+
 	exclusive_event_destroy(event);
 	module_put(event->pmu->module);
 
@@ -4644,8 +4652,17 @@ again:
 	mutex_unlock(&event->child_mutex);
 
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(child, tmp, &free_list, child_list) {
+		void *var = &child->ctx->refcount;
+
 		list_del(&child->child_list);
 		free_event(child);
+
+		/*
+		 * Wake any perf_event_free_task() waiting for this event to be
+		 * freed.
+		 */
+		smp_mb(); /* pairs with wait_var_event() */
+		wake_up_var(var);
 	}
 
 no_ctx:
@@ -11506,11 +11523,11 @@ static void perf_free_event(struct perf_
 }
 
 /*
- * Free an unexposed, unused context as created by inheritance by
- * perf_event_init_task below, used by fork() in case of fail.
+ * Free a context as created by inheritance by perf_event_init_task() below,
+ * used by fork() in case of fail.
  *
- * Not all locks are strictly required, but take them anyway to be nice and
- * help out with the lockdep assertions.
+ * Even though the task has never lived, the context and events have been
+ * exposed through the child_list, so we must take care tearing it all down.
  */
 void perf_event_free_task(struct task_struct *task)
 {
@@ -11540,7 +11557,23 @@ void perf_event_free_task(struct task_st
 			perf_free_event(event, ctx);
 
 		mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
-		put_ctx(ctx);
+
+		/*
+		 * perf_event_release_kernel() could've stolen some of our
+		 * child events and still have them on its free_list. In that
+		 * case we must wait for these events to have been freed (in
+		 * particular all their references to this task must've been
+		 * dropped).
+		 *
+		 * Without this copy_process() will unconditionally free this
+		 * task (irrespective of its reference count) and
+		 * _free_event()'s put_task_struct(event->hw.target) will be a
+		 * use-after-free.
+		 *
+		 * Wait for all events to drop their context reference.
+		 */
+		wait_var_event(&ctx->refcount, refcount_read(&ctx->refcount) == 1);
+		put_ctx(ctx); /* must be last */
 	}
 }
 
author maintainer
#59 lore raw

PATCH 59/62 Revert "kvm: x86: Use task structs fpu field for user"

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>

commit ec269475cba7bcdd1eb8fdf8e87f4c6c81a376fe upstream.

This reverts commit 240c35a3783ab9b3a0afaba0dde7291295680a6b ("kvm: x86: Use task structs fpu field for user", 2018-11-06). The commit is broken and causes QEMU's FPU state to be destroyed when KVM_RUN is preempted.

Fixes 240c35a3783a ("kvm: x86: Use task structs fpu field for user")
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |    7 ++++---
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              |    4 ++--
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +4 -3
@@ -609,15 +609,16 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
 
 	/*
 	 * QEMU userspace and the guest each have their own FPU state.
-	 * In vcpu_run, we switch between the user, maintained in the
-	 * task_struct struct, and guest FPU contexts. While running a VCPU,
-	 * the VCPU thread will have the guest FPU context.
+	 * In vcpu_run, we switch between the user and guest FPU contexts.
+	 * While running a VCPU, the VCPU thread will have the guest FPU
+	 * context.
 	 *
 	 * Note that while the PKRU state lives inside the fpu registers,
 	 * it is switched out separately at VMENTER and VMEXIT time. The
 	 * "guest_fpu" state here contains the guest FPU context, with the
 	 * host PRKU bits.
 	 */
+	struct fpu user_fpu;
 	struct fpu *guest_fpu;
 
 	u64 xcr0;
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +2 -2
@@ -8172,7 +8172,7 @@ static int complete_emulated_mmio(struct
 static void kvm_load_guest_fpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	preempt_disable();
-	copy_fpregs_to_fpstate(&current->thread.fpu);
+	copy_fpregs_to_fpstate(&vcpu->arch.user_fpu);
 	/* PKRU is separately restored in kvm_x86_ops->run.  */
 	__copy_kernel_to_fpregs(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu->state,
 				~XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU);
@@ -8185,7 +8185,7 @@ static void kvm_put_guest_fpu(struct kvm
 {
 	preempt_disable();
 	copy_fpregs_to_fpstate(vcpu->arch.guest_fpu);
-	copy_kernel_to_fpregs(&current->thread.fpu.state);
+	copy_kernel_to_fpregs(&vcpu->arch.user_fpu.state);
 	preempt_enable();
 	++vcpu->stat.fpu_reload;
 	trace_kvm_fpu(0);
author maintainer
#60 lore raw

PATCH 60/62 sd_zbc: Fix report zones buffer allocation

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>

commit b091ac616846a1da75b1f2566b41255ce7f0e0a6 upstream.

During disk scan and revalidation done with sd_revalidate(), the zones of a zoned disk are checked using the helper function blk_revalidate_disk_zones() if a configuration change is detected (change in the number of zones or zone size). The function blk_revalidate_disk_zones() issues report_zones calls that are very large, that is, to obtain zone information for all zones of the disk with a single command. The size of the report zones command buffer necessary for such large request generally is lower than the disk max_hw_sectors and KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE (4MB) and succeeds on boot (no memory fragmentation), but often fail at run time (e.g. hot-plug event). This causes the disk revalidation to fail and the disk capacity to be changed to 0.

This problem can be avoided by using vmalloc() instead of kmalloc() for the buffer allocation. To limit the amount of memory to be allocated, this patch also introduces the arbitrary SD_ZBC_REPORT_MAX_ZONES maximum number of zones to report with a single report zones command. This limit may be lowered further to satisfy the disk max_hw_sectors limit. Finally, to ensure that the vmalloc-ed buffer can always be mapped in a request, the buffer size is further limited to at most queue_max_segments() pages, allowing successful mapping of the buffer even in the worst case scenario where none of the buffer pages are contiguous.

Fixes 515ce6061312 ("scsi: sd_zbc: Fix sd_zbc_report_zones() buffer allocation")
Fixes e76239a3748c ("block: add a report_zones method")
---
 drivers/scsi/sd_zbc.c |  104 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 75 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/sd_zbc.c +75 -29
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/blkdev.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
 
 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
 
@@ -64,7 +66,7 @@ static void sd_zbc_parse_report(struct s
 /**
  * sd_zbc_do_report_zones - Issue a REPORT ZONES scsi command.
  * @sdkp: The target disk
- * @buf: Buffer to use for the reply
+ * @buf: vmalloc-ed buffer to use for the reply
  * @buflen: the buffer size
  * @lba: Start LBA of the report
  * @partial: Do partial report
@@ -93,7 +95,6 @@ static int sd_zbc_do_report_zones(struct
 	put_unaligned_be32(buflen, &cmd[10]);
 	if (partial)
 		cmd[14] = ZBC_REPORT_ZONE_PARTIAL;
-	memset(buf, 0, buflen);
 
 	result = scsi_execute_req(sdp, cmd, DMA_FROM_DEVICE,
 				  buf, buflen, &sshdr,
@@ -117,6 +118,53 @@ static int sd_zbc_do_report_zones(struct
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Maximum number of zones to get with one report zones command.
+ */
+#define SD_ZBC_REPORT_MAX_ZONES		8192U
+
+/**
+ * Allocate a buffer for report zones reply.
+ * @sdkp: The target disk
+ * @nr_zones: Maximum number of zones to report
+ * @buflen: Size of the buffer allocated
+ *
+ * Try to allocate a reply buffer for the number of requested zones.
+ * The size of the buffer allocated may be smaller than requested to
+ * satify the device constraint (max_hw_sectors, max_segments, etc).
+ *
+ * Return the address of the allocated buffer and update @buflen with
+ * the size of the allocated buffer.
+ */
+static void *sd_zbc_alloc_report_buffer(struct scsi_disk *sdkp,
+					unsigned int nr_zones, size_t *buflen)
+{
+	struct request_queue *q = sdkp->disk->queue;
+	size_t bufsize;
+	void *buf;
+
+	/*
+	 * Report zone buffer size should be at most 64B times the number of
+	 * zones requested plus the 64B reply header, but should be at least
+	 * SECTOR_SIZE for ATA devices.
+	 * Make sure that this size does not exceed the hardware capabilities.
+	 * Furthermore, since the report zone command cannot be split, make
+	 * sure that the allocated buffer can always be mapped by limiting the
+	 * number of pages allocated to the HBA max segments limit.
+	 */
+	nr_zones = min(nr_zones, SD_ZBC_REPORT_MAX_ZONES);
+	bufsize = roundup((nr_zones + 1) * 64, 512);
+	bufsize = min_t(size_t, bufsize,
+			queue_max_hw_sectors(q) << SECTOR_SHIFT);
+	bufsize = min_t(size_t, bufsize, queue_max_segments(q) << PAGE_SHIFT);
+
+	buf = vzalloc(bufsize);
+	if (buf)
+		*buflen = bufsize;
+
+	return buf;
+}
+
 /**
  * sd_zbc_report_zones - Disk report zones operation.
  * @disk: The target disk
@@ -132,30 +180,23 @@ int sd_zbc_report_zones(struct gendisk *
 			gfp_t gfp_mask)
 {
 	struct scsi_disk *sdkp = scsi_disk(disk);
-	unsigned int i, buflen, nrz = *nr_zones;
+	unsigned int i, nrz = *nr_zones;
 	unsigned char *buf;
-	size_t offset = 0;
+	size_t buflen = 0, offset = 0;
 	int ret = 0;
 
 	if (!sd_is_zoned(sdkp))
 		/* Not a zoned device */
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-	/*
-	 * Get a reply buffer for the number of requested zones plus a header,
-	 * without exceeding the device maximum command size. For ATA disks,
-	 * buffers must be aligned to 512B.
-	 */
-	buflen = min(queue_max_hw_sectors(disk->queue) << 9,
-		     roundup((nrz + 1) * 64, 512));
-	buf = kmalloc(buflen, gfp_mask);
+	buf = sd_zbc_alloc_report_buffer(sdkp, nrz, &buflen);
 	if (!buf)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	ret = sd_zbc_do_report_zones(sdkp, buf, buflen,
 			sectors_to_logical(sdkp->device, sector), true);
 	if (ret)
-		goto out_free_buf;
+		goto out;
 
 	nrz = min(nrz, get_unaligned_be32(&buf[0]) / 64);
 	for (i = 0; i < nrz; i++) {
@@ -166,8 +207,8 @@ int sd_zbc_report_zones(struct gendisk *
 
 	*nr_zones = nrz;
 
-out_free_buf:
-	kfree(buf);
+out:
+	kvfree(buf);
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -301,8 +342,6 @@ static int sd_zbc_check_zoned_characteri
 	return 0;
 }
 
-#define SD_ZBC_BUF_SIZE 131072U
-
 /**
  * sd_zbc_check_zones - Check the device capacity and zone sizes
  * @sdkp: Target disk
@@ -318,22 +357,28 @@ static int sd_zbc_check_zoned_characteri
  */
 static int sd_zbc_check_zones(struct scsi_disk *sdkp, u32 *zblocks)
 {
+	size_t bufsize, buflen;
+	unsigned int noio_flag;
 	u64 zone_blocks = 0;
 	sector_t max_lba, block = 0;
 	unsigned char *buf;
 	unsigned char *rec;
-	unsigned int buf_len;
-	unsigned int list_length;
 	int ret;
 	u8 same;
 
+	/* Do all memory allocations as if GFP_NOIO was specified */
+	noio_flag = memalloc_noio_save();
+
 	/* Get a buffer */
-	buf = kmalloc(SD_ZBC_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!buf)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	buf = sd_zbc_alloc_report_buffer(sdkp, SD_ZBC_REPORT_MAX_ZONES,
+					 &bufsize);
+	if (!buf) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	/* Do a report zone to get max_lba and the same field */
-	ret = sd_zbc_do_report_zones(sdkp, buf, SD_ZBC_BUF_SIZE, 0, false);
+	ret = sd_zbc_do_report_zones(sdkp, buf, bufsize, 0, false);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out_free;
 
@@ -369,12 +414,12 @@ static int sd_zbc_check_zones(struct scs
 	do {
 
 		/* Parse REPORT ZONES header */
-		list_length = get_unaligned_be32(&buf[0]) + 64;
+		buflen = min_t(size_t, get_unaligned_be32(&buf[0]) + 64,
+			       bufsize);
 		rec = buf + 64;
-		buf_len = min(list_length, SD_ZBC_BUF_SIZE);
 
 		/* Parse zone descriptors */
-		while (rec < buf + buf_len) {
+		while (rec < buf + buflen) {
 			u64 this_zone_blocks = get_unaligned_be64(&rec[8]);
 
 			if (zone_blocks == 0) {
@@ -390,8 +435,8 @@ static int sd_zbc_check_zones(struct scs
 		}
 
 		if (block < sdkp->capacity) {
-			ret = sd_zbc_do_report_zones(sdkp, buf, SD_ZBC_BUF_SIZE,
-						     block, true);
+			ret = sd_zbc_do_report_zones(sdkp, buf, bufsize, block,
+						     true);
 			if (ret)
 				goto out_free;
 		}
@@ -422,7 +467,8 @@ out:
 	}
 
 out_free:
-	kfree(buf);
+	memalloc_noio_restore(noio_flag);
+	kvfree(buf);
 
 	return ret;
 }
author maintainer
#61 lore raw

PATCH 61/62 block: Limit zone array allocation size

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>

commit 26202928fafad8bda8b478edb7e62c885be623d7 upstream.

Limit the size of the struct blk_zone array used in blk_revalidate_disk_zones() to avoid memory allocation failures leading to disk revalidation failure. Also further reduce the likelyhood of such failures by using kvcalloc() (that is vmalloc()) instead of allocating contiguous pages with alloc_pages().

Fixes 515ce6061312 ("scsi: sd_zbc: Fix sd_zbc_report_zones() buffer allocation")
Fixes e76239a3748c ("block: add a report_zones method")
---
 block/blk-zoned.c      |   46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 include/linux/blkdev.h |    5 +++++
 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
block/blk-zoned.c +30 -16
@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@
 #include <linux/rbtree.h>
 #include <linux/blkdev.h>
 #include <linux/blk-mq.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
 
 #include "blk.h"
 
@@ -372,22 +375,25 @@ static inline unsigned long *blk_alloc_z
  * Allocate an array of struct blk_zone to get nr_zones zone information.
  * The allocated array may be smaller than nr_zones.
  */
-static struct blk_zone *blk_alloc_zones(int node, unsigned int *nr_zones)
+static struct blk_zone *blk_alloc_zones(unsigned int *nr_zones)
 {
-	size_t size = *nr_zones * sizeof(struct blk_zone);
-	struct page *page;
-	int order;
-
-	for (order = get_order(size); order >= 0; order--) {
-		page = alloc_pages_node(node, GFP_NOIO | __GFP_ZERO, order);
-		if (page) {
-			*nr_zones = min_t(unsigned int, *nr_zones,
-				(PAGE_SIZE << order) / sizeof(struct blk_zone));
-			return page_address(page);
-		}
+	struct blk_zone *zones;
+	size_t nrz = min(*nr_zones, BLK_ZONED_REPORT_MAX_ZONES);
+
+	/*
+	 * GFP_KERNEL here is meaningless as the caller task context has
+	 * the PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO flag set in blk_revalidate_disk_zones()
+	 * with memalloc_noio_save().
+	 */
+	zones = kvcalloc(nrz, sizeof(struct blk_zone), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!zones) {
+		*nr_zones = 0;
+		return NULL;
 	}
 
-	return NULL;
+	*nr_zones = nrz;
+
+	return zones;
 }
 
 void blk_queue_free_zone_bitmaps(struct request_queue *q)
@@ -414,6 +420,7 @@ int blk_revalidate_disk_zones(struct gen
 	unsigned long *seq_zones_wlock = NULL, *seq_zones_bitmap = NULL;
 	unsigned int i, rep_nr_zones = 0, z = 0, nrz;
 	struct blk_zone *zones = NULL;
+	unsigned int noio_flag;
 	sector_t sector = 0;
 	int ret = 0;
 
@@ -426,6 +433,12 @@ int blk_revalidate_disk_zones(struct gen
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Ensure that all memory allocations in this context are done as
+	 * if GFP_NOIO was specified.
+	 */
+	noio_flag = memalloc_noio_save();
+
 	if (!blk_queue_is_zoned(q) || !nr_zones) {
 		nr_zones = 0;
 		goto update;
@@ -442,7 +455,7 @@ int blk_revalidate_disk_zones(struct gen
 
 	/* Get zone information and initialize seq_zones_bitmap */
 	rep_nr_zones = nr_zones;
-	zones = blk_alloc_zones(q->node, &rep_nr_zones);
+	zones = blk_alloc_zones(&rep_nr_zones);
 	if (!zones)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -479,8 +492,9 @@ update:
 	blk_mq_unfreeze_queue(q);
 
 out:
-	free_pages((unsigned long)zones,
-		   get_order(rep_nr_zones * sizeof(struct blk_zone)));
+	memalloc_noio_restore(noio_flag);
+
+	kvfree(zones);
 	kfree(seq_zones_wlock);
 	kfree(seq_zones_bitmap);
 
include/linux/blkdev.h +5 -0
@@ -344,6 +344,11 @@ struct queue_limits {
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_ZONED
 
+/*
+ * Maximum number of zones to report with a single report zones command.
+ */
+#define BLK_ZONED_REPORT_MAX_ZONES	8192U
+
 extern unsigned int blkdev_nr_zones(struct block_device *bdev);
 extern int blkdev_report_zones(struct block_device *bdev,
 			       sector_t sector, struct blk_zone *zones,
author maintainer
#51 lore raw

PATCH 51/62 ext4: dont allow any modifications to an immutable file

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>

commit 2e53840362771c73eb0a5ff71611507e64e8eecd upstream.

Don't allow any modifications to a file that's marked immutable, which means that we have to flush all the writable pages to make the readonly and we have to check the setattr/setflags parameters more closely.

---
 fs/ext4/ioctl.c |   46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/ioctl.c +45 -1
@@ -269,6 +269,29 @@ static int uuid_is_zero(__u8 u[16])
 }
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * If immutable is set and we are not clearing it, we're not allowed to change
+ * anything else in the inode.  Don't error out if we're only trying to set
+ * immutable on an immutable file.
+ */
+static int ext4_ioctl_check_immutable(struct inode *inode, __u32 new_projid,
+				      unsigned int flags)
+{
+	struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
+	unsigned int oldflags = ei->i_flags;
+
+	if (!(oldflags & EXT4_IMMUTABLE_FL) || !(flags & EXT4_IMMUTABLE_FL))
+		return 0;
+
+	if ((oldflags & ~EXT4_IMMUTABLE_FL) != (flags & ~EXT4_IMMUTABLE_FL))
+		return -EPERM;
+	if (ext4_has_feature_project(inode->i_sb) &&
+	    __kprojid_val(ei->i_projid) != new_projid)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int ext4_ioctl_setflags(struct inode *inode,
 			       unsigned int flags)
 {
@@ -322,6 +345,20 @@ static int ext4_ioctl_setflags(struct in
 			goto flags_out;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Wait for all pending directio and then flush all the dirty pages
+	 * for this file.  The flush marks all the pages readonly, so any
+	 * subsequent attempt to write to the file (particularly mmap pages)
+	 * will come through the filesystem and fail.
+	 */
+	if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && !IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) &&
+	    (flags & EXT4_IMMUTABLE_FL)) {
+		inode_dio_wait(inode);
+		err = filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping);
+		if (err)
+			goto flags_out;
+	}
+
 	handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_INODE, 1);
 	if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
 		err = PTR_ERR(handle);
@@ -751,7 +788,11 @@ long ext4_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsig
 			return err;
 
 		inode_lock(inode);
-		err = ext4_ioctl_setflags(inode, flags);
+		err = ext4_ioctl_check_immutable(inode,
+				from_kprojid(&init_user_ns, ei->i_projid),
+				flags);
+		if (!err)
+			err = ext4_ioctl_setflags(inode, flags);
 		inode_unlock(inode);
 		mnt_drop_write_file(filp);
 		return err;
@@ -1121,6 +1162,9 @@ resizefs_out:
 			goto out;
 		flags = (ei->i_flags & ~EXT4_FL_XFLAG_VISIBLE) |
 			 (flags & EXT4_FL_XFLAG_VISIBLE);
+		err = ext4_ioctl_check_immutable(inode, fa.fsx_projid, flags);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
 		err = ext4_ioctl_setflags(inode, flags);
 		if (err)
 			goto out;
author maintainer
#53 lore raw

PATCH 53/62 mm: add filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ross Zwisler <[email protected]>

commit aa0bfcd939c30617385ffa28682c062d78050eba upstream.

In the spirit of filemap_fdatawait_range() and filemap_fdatawait_keep_errors(), introduce filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors() which both takes a range upon which to wait and does not clear errors from the address space.

---
 include/linux/fs.h |    2 ++
 mm/filemap.c       |   22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
include/linux/fs.h +2 -0
@@ -2703,6 +2703,8 @@ extern int filemap_flush(struct address_
 extern int filemap_fdatawait_keep_errors(struct address_space *mapping);
 extern int filemap_fdatawait_range(struct address_space *, loff_t lstart,
 				   loff_t lend);
+extern int filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors(struct address_space *mapping,
+		loff_t start_byte, loff_t end_byte);
 
 static inline int filemap_fdatawait(struct address_space *mapping)
 {
mm/filemap.c +22 -0
@@ -548,6 +548,28 @@ int filemap_fdatawait_range(struct addre
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(filemap_fdatawait_range);
 
 /**
+ * filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors - wait for writeback to complete
+ * @mapping:		address space structure to wait for
+ * @start_byte:		offset in bytes where the range starts
+ * @end_byte:		offset in bytes where the range ends (inclusive)
+ *
+ * Walk the list of under-writeback pages of the given address space in the
+ * given range and wait for all of them.  Unlike filemap_fdatawait_range(),
+ * this function does not clear error status of the address space.
+ *
+ * Use this function if callers don't handle errors themselves.  Expected
+ * call sites are system-wide / filesystem-wide data flushers: e.g. sync(2),
+ * fsfreeze(8)
+ */
+int filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors(struct address_space *mapping,
+		loff_t start_byte, loff_t end_byte)
+{
+	__filemap_fdatawait_range(mapping, start_byte, end_byte);
+	return filemap_check_and_keep_errors(mapping);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors);
+
+/**
  * file_fdatawait_range - wait for writeback to complete
  * @file:		file pointing to address space structure to wait for
  * @start_byte:		offset in bytes where the range starts
author maintainer
#54 lore raw

PATCH 54/62 jbd2: introduce jbd2_inode dirty range scoping

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ross Zwisler <[email protected]>

commit 6ba0e7dc64a5adcda2fbe65adc466891795d639e upstream.

Currently both journal_submit_inode_data_buffers() and journal_finish_inode_data_buffers() operate on the entire address space of each of the inodes associated with a given journal entry. The consequence of this is that if we have an inode where we are constantly appending dirty pages we can end up waiting for an indefinite amount of time in journal_finish_inode_data_buffers() while we wait for all the pages under writeback to be written out.

The easiest way to cause this type of workload is do just dd from /dev/zero to a file until it fills the entire filesystem. This can cause journal_finish_inode_data_buffers() to wait for the duration of the entire dd operation.

We can improve this situation by scoping each of the inode dirty ranges associated with a given transaction. We do this via the jbd2_inode structure so that the scoping is contained within jbd2 and so that it follows the lifetime and locking rules for that structure.

This allows us to limit the writeback & wait in journal_submit_inode_data_buffers() and journal_finish_inode_data_buffers() respectively to the dirty range for a given struct jdb2_inode, keeping us from waiting forever if the inode in question is still being appended to.

---
 fs/jbd2/commit.c      |   23 +++++++++++++++++------
 fs/jbd2/journal.c     |    4 ++++
 fs/jbd2/transaction.c |   49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 include/linux/jbd2.h  |   22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
fs/jbd2/commit.c +17 -6
@@ -187,14 +187,15 @@ static int journal_wait_on_commit_record
  * use writepages() because with dealyed allocation we may be doing
  * block allocation in writepages().
  */
-static int journal_submit_inode_data_buffers(struct address_space *mapping)
+static int journal_submit_inode_data_buffers(struct address_space *mapping,
+		loff_t dirty_start, loff_t dirty_end)
 {
 	int ret;
 	struct writeback_control wbc = {
 		.sync_mode =  WB_SYNC_ALL,
 		.nr_to_write = mapping->nrpages * 2,
-		.range_start = 0,
-		.range_end = i_size_read(mapping->host),
+		.range_start = dirty_start,
+		.range_end = dirty_end,
 	};
 
 	ret = generic_writepages(mapping, &wbc);
@@ -218,6 +219,9 @@ static int journal_submit_data_buffers(j
 
 	spin_lock(&journal->j_list_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry(jinode, &commit_transaction->t_inode_list, i_list) {
+		loff_t dirty_start = jinode->i_dirty_start;
+		loff_t dirty_end = jinode->i_dirty_end;
+
 		if (!(jinode->i_flags & JI_WRITE_DATA))
 			continue;
 		mapping = jinode->i_vfs_inode->i_mapping;
@@ -230,7 +234,8 @@ static int journal_submit_data_buffers(j
 		 * only allocated blocks here.
 		 */
 		trace_jbd2_submit_inode_data(jinode->i_vfs_inode);
-		err = journal_submit_inode_data_buffers(mapping);
+		err = journal_submit_inode_data_buffers(mapping, dirty_start,
+				dirty_end);
 		if (!ret)
 			ret = err;
 		spin_lock(&journal->j_list_lock);
@@ -257,12 +262,16 @@ static int journal_finish_inode_data_buf
 	/* For locking, see the comment in journal_submit_data_buffers() */
 	spin_lock(&journal->j_list_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry(jinode, &commit_transaction->t_inode_list, i_list) {
+		loff_t dirty_start = jinode->i_dirty_start;
+		loff_t dirty_end = jinode->i_dirty_end;
+
 		if (!(jinode->i_flags & JI_WAIT_DATA))
 			continue;
 		jinode->i_flags |= JI_COMMIT_RUNNING;
 		spin_unlock(&journal->j_list_lock);
-		err = filemap_fdatawait_keep_errors(
-				jinode->i_vfs_inode->i_mapping);
+		err = filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors(
+				jinode->i_vfs_inode->i_mapping, dirty_start,
+				dirty_end);
 		if (!ret)
 			ret = err;
 		spin_lock(&journal->j_list_lock);
@@ -282,6 +291,8 @@ static int journal_finish_inode_data_buf
 				&jinode->i_transaction->t_inode_list);
 		} else {
 			jinode->i_transaction = NULL;
+			jinode->i_dirty_start = 0;
+			jinode->i_dirty_end = 0;
 		}
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&journal->j_list_lock);
fs/jbd2/journal.c +4 -0
@@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(jbd2_journal_try_to_free_b
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(jbd2_journal_force_commit);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(jbd2_journal_inode_add_write);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(jbd2_journal_inode_add_wait);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(jbd2_journal_inode_ranged_write);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(jbd2_journal_inode_ranged_wait);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(jbd2_journal_init_jbd_inode);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(jbd2_journal_release_jbd_inode);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(jbd2_journal_begin_ordered_truncate);
@@ -2574,6 +2576,8 @@ void jbd2_journal_init_jbd_inode(struct
 	jinode->i_next_transaction = NULL;
 	jinode->i_vfs_inode = inode;
 	jinode->i_flags = 0;
+	jinode->i_dirty_start = 0;
+	jinode->i_dirty_end = 0;
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&jinode->i_list);
 }
 
fs/jbd2/transaction.c +28 -21

73 lines not on this page · raw message

include/linux/jbd2.h +22 -0
@@ -454,6 +454,22 @@ struct jbd2_inode {
 	 * @i_flags: Flags of inode [j_list_lock]
 	 */
 	unsigned long i_flags;
+
+	/**
+	 * @i_dirty_start:
+	 *
+	 * Offset in bytes where the dirty range for this inode starts.
+	 * [j_list_lock]
+	 */
+	loff_t i_dirty_start;
+
+	/**
+	 * @i_dirty_end:
+	 *
+	 * Inclusive offset in bytes where the dirty range for this inode
+	 * ends. [j_list_lock]
+	 */
+	loff_t i_dirty_end;
 };
 
 struct jbd2_revoke_table_s;
@@ -1400,6 +1416,12 @@ extern int	   jbd2_journal_force_commit(
 extern int	   jbd2_journal_force_commit_nested(journal_t *);
 extern int	   jbd2_journal_inode_add_write(handle_t *handle, struct jbd2_inode *inode);
 extern int	   jbd2_journal_inode_add_wait(handle_t *handle, struct jbd2_inode *inode);
+extern int	   jbd2_journal_inode_ranged_write(handle_t *handle,
+			struct jbd2_inode *inode, loff_t start_byte,
+			loff_t length);
+extern int	   jbd2_journal_inode_ranged_wait(handle_t *handle,
+			struct jbd2_inode *inode, loff_t start_byte,
+			loff_t length);
 extern int	   jbd2_journal_begin_ordered_truncate(journal_t *journal,
 				struct jbd2_inode *inode, loff_t new_size);
 extern void	   jbd2_journal_init_jbd_inode(struct jbd2_inode *jinode, struct inode *inode);
author maintainer
#55 lore raw

PATCH 55/62 ext4: use jbd2_inode dirty range scoping

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ross Zwisler <[email protected]>

commit 73131fbb003b3691cfcf9656f234b00da497fcd6 upstream.

Use the newly introduced jbd2_inode dirty range scoping to prevent us from waiting forever when trying to complete a journal transaction.

---
 fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.h   |   12 ++++++------
 fs/ext4/inode.c       |   13 ++++++++++---
 fs/ext4/move_extent.c |    3 ++-
 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.h +6 -6
@@ -361,20 +361,20 @@ static inline int ext4_journal_force_com
 }
 
 static inline int ext4_jbd2_inode_add_write(handle_t *handle,
-					    struct inode *inode)
+		struct inode *inode, loff_t start_byte, loff_t length)
 {
 	if (ext4_handle_valid(handle))
-		return jbd2_journal_inode_add_write(handle,
-						    EXT4_I(inode)->jinode);
+		return jbd2_journal_inode_ranged_write(handle,
+				EXT4_I(inode)->jinode, start_byte, length);
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static inline int ext4_jbd2_inode_add_wait(handle_t *handle,
-					   struct inode *inode)
+		struct inode *inode, loff_t start_byte, loff_t length)
 {
 	if (ext4_handle_valid(handle))
-		return jbd2_journal_inode_add_wait(handle,
-						   EXT4_I(inode)->jinode);
+		return jbd2_journal_inode_ranged_wait(handle,
+				EXT4_I(inode)->jinode, start_byte, length);
 	return 0;
 }
 
fs/ext4/inode.c +10 -3
@@ -727,10 +727,16 @@ out_sem:
 		    !(flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_ZERO) &&
 		    !ext4_is_quota_file(inode) &&
 		    ext4_should_order_data(inode)) {
+			loff_t start_byte =
+				(loff_t)map->m_lblk << inode->i_blkbits;
+			loff_t length = (loff_t)map->m_len << inode->i_blkbits;
+
 			if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_IO_SUBMIT)
-				ret = ext4_jbd2_inode_add_wait(handle, inode);
+				ret = ext4_jbd2_inode_add_wait(handle, inode,
+						start_byte, length);
 			else
-				ret = ext4_jbd2_inode_add_write(handle, inode);
+				ret = ext4_jbd2_inode_add_write(handle, inode,
+						start_byte, length);
 			if (ret)
 				return ret;
 		}
@@ -4081,7 +4087,8 @@ static int __ext4_block_zero_page_range(
 		err = 0;
 		mark_buffer_dirty(bh);
 		if (ext4_should_order_data(inode))
-			err = ext4_jbd2_inode_add_write(handle, inode);
+			err = ext4_jbd2_inode_add_write(handle, inode, from,
+					length);
 	}
 
 unlock:
fs/ext4/move_extent.c +2 -1
@@ -390,7 +390,8 @@ data_copy:
 
 	/* Even in case of data=writeback it is reasonable to pin
 	 * inode to transaction, to prevent unexpected data loss */
-	*err = ext4_jbd2_inode_add_write(handle, orig_inode);
+	*err = ext4_jbd2_inode_add_write(handle, orig_inode,
+			(loff_t)orig_page_offset << PAGE_SHIFT, replaced_size);
 
 unlock_pages:
 	unlock_page(pagep[0]);
author maintainer
#56 lore raw

PATCH 56/62 ext4: allow directory holes

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>

commit 4e19d6b65fb4fc42e352ce9883649e049da14743 upstream.

The largedir feature was intended to allow ext4 directories to have unmapped directory blocks (e.g., directory holes). And so the released e2fsprogs no longer enforces this for largedir file systems; however, the corresponding change to the kernel-side code was not made.

This commit fixes this oversight.

---
 fs/ext4/dir.c   |   19 +++++++++----------
 fs/ext4/namei.c |   45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 2 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/dir.c +9 -10
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *fil
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
 	struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
-	int dir_has_error = 0;
 	struct fscrypt_str fstr = FSTR_INIT(NULL, 0);
 
 	if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) {
@@ -144,8 +143,6 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *fil
 			return err;
 	}
 
-	offset = ctx->pos & (sb->s_blocksize - 1);
-
 	while (ctx->pos < inode->i_size) {
 		struct ext4_map_blocks map;
 
@@ -154,9 +151,18 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *fil
 			goto errout;
 		}
 		cond_resched();
+		offset = ctx->pos & (sb->s_blocksize - 1);
 		map.m_lblk = ctx->pos >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
 		map.m_len = 1;
 		err = ext4_map_blocks(NULL, inode, &map, 0);
+		if (err == 0) {
+			/* m_len should never be zero but let's avoid
+			 * an infinite loop if it somehow is */
+			if (map.m_len == 0)
+				map.m_len = 1;
+			ctx->pos += map.m_len * sb->s_blocksize;
+			continue;
+		}
 		if (err > 0) {
 			pgoff_t index = map.m_pblk >>
 					(PAGE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits);
@@ -175,13 +181,6 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *fil
 		}
 
 		if (!bh) {
-			if (!dir_has_error) {
-				EXT4_ERROR_FILE(file, 0,
-						"directory contains a "
-						"hole at offset %llu",
-					   (unsigned long long) ctx->pos);
-				dir_has_error = 1;
-			}
 			/* corrupt size?  Maybe no more blocks to read */
 			if (ctx->pos > inode->i_blocks << 9)
 				break;
fs/ext4/namei.c +37 -8

109 lines not on this page · raw message

author maintainer
#57 lore raw

PATCH 57/62 KVM: nVMX: do not use dangling shadow VMCS after guest reset

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>

commit 88dddc11a8d6b09201b4db9d255b3394d9bc9e57 upstream.

If a KVM guest is reset while running a nested guest, free_nested will disable the shadow VMCS execution control in the vmcs01. However, on the next KVM_RUN vmx_vcpu_run would nevertheless try to sync the VMCS12 to the shadow VMCS which has since been freed.

This causes a vmptrld of a NULL pointer on my machime, but Jan reports the host to hang altogether. Let's see how much this trivial patch fixes.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c |    8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +7 -1
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ static void vmx_disable_shadow_vmcs(stru
 {
 	vmcs_clear_bits(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS);
 	vmcs_write64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, -1ull);
+	vmx->nested.need_vmcs12_sync = false;
 }
 
 static inline void nested_release_evmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -1328,6 +1329,9 @@ static void copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(struct
 	u64 field_value;
 	struct vmcs *shadow_vmcs = vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs;
 
+	if (WARN_ON(!shadow_vmcs))
+		return;
+
 	preempt_disable();
 
 	vmcs_load(shadow_vmcs);
@@ -1366,6 +1370,9 @@ static void copy_vmcs12_to_shadow(struct
 	u64 field_value = 0;
 	struct vmcs *shadow_vmcs = vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs;
 
+	if (WARN_ON(!shadow_vmcs))
+		return;
+
 	vmcs_load(shadow_vmcs);
 
 	for (q = 0; q < ARRAY_SIZE(fields); q++) {
@@ -4336,7 +4343,6 @@ static inline void nested_release_vmcs12
 		/* copy to memory all shadowed fields in case
 		   they were modified */
 		copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(vmx);
-		vmx->nested.need_vmcs12_sync = false;
 		vmx_disable_shadow_vmcs(vmx);
 	}
 	vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv = -1;
author maintainer
#49 lore raw

PATCH 49/62 perf/core: Fix exclusive events grouping

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>

commit 8a58ddae23796c733c5dfbd717538d89d036c5bd upstream.

So far, we tried to disallow grouping exclusive events for the fear of complications they would cause with moving between contexts. Specifically, moving a software group to a hardware context would violate the exclusivity rules if both groups contain matching exclusive events.

This attempt was, however, unsuccessful: the check that we have in the perf_event_open() syscall is both wrong (looks at wrong PMU) and insufficient (group leader may still be exclusive), as can be illustrated by running:

  $ perf record -e '{intel_pt//,cycles}' uname
  $ perf record -e '{cycles,intel_pt//}' uname

ultimately successfully.

Furthermore, we are completely free to trigger the exclusivity violation by:

perf -e '{cycles,intel_pt//}' -e '{intel_pt//,instructions}'

even though the helpful perf record will not allow that, the ABI will.

The warning later in the perf_event_open() path will also not trigger, because it's also wrong.

Fix all this by validating the original group before moving, getting rid of broken safeguards and placing a useful one to perf_install_in_context().

Cc Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Fixes bed5b25ad9c8a ("perf: Add a pmu capability for "exclusive" events")
---
 include/linux/perf_event.h |    5 +++++
 kernel/events/core.c       |   34 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
include/linux/perf_event.h +5 -0
@@ -1044,6 +1044,11 @@ static inline int in_software_context(st
 	return event->ctx->pmu->task_ctx_nr == perf_sw_context;
 }
 
+static inline int is_exclusive_pmu(struct pmu *pmu)
+{
+	return pmu->capabilities & PERF_PMU_CAP_EXCLUSIVE;
+}
+
 extern struct static_key perf_swevent_enabled[PERF_COUNT_SW_MAX];
 
 extern void ___perf_sw_event(u32, u64, struct pt_regs *, u64);
kernel/events/core.c +22 -12
@@ -2543,6 +2543,9 @@ unlock:
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static bool exclusive_event_installable(struct perf_event *event,
+					struct perf_event_context *ctx);
+
 /*
  * Attach a performance event to a context.
  *
@@ -2557,6 +2560,8 @@ perf_install_in_context(struct perf_even
 
 	lockdep_assert_held(&ctx->mutex);
 
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!exclusive_event_installable(event, ctx));
+
 	if (event->cpu != -1)
 		event->cpu = cpu;
 
@@ -4348,7 +4353,7 @@ static int exclusive_event_init(struct p
 {
 	struct pmu *pmu = event->pmu;
 
-	if (!(pmu->capabilities & PERF_PMU_CAP_EXCLUSIVE))
+	if (!is_exclusive_pmu(pmu))
 		return 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -4379,7 +4384,7 @@ static void exclusive_event_destroy(stru
 {
 	struct pmu *pmu = event->pmu;
 
-	if (!(pmu->capabilities & PERF_PMU_CAP_EXCLUSIVE))
+	if (!is_exclusive_pmu(pmu))
 		return;
 
 	/* see comment in exclusive_event_init() */
@@ -4399,14 +4404,15 @@ static bool exclusive_event_match(struct
 	return false;
 }
 
-/* Called under the same ctx::mutex as perf_install_in_context() */
 static bool exclusive_event_installable(struct perf_event *event,
 					struct perf_event_context *ctx)
 {
 	struct perf_event *iter_event;
 	struct pmu *pmu = event->pmu;
 
-	if (!(pmu->capabilities & PERF_PMU_CAP_EXCLUSIVE))
+	lockdep_assert_held(&ctx->mutex);
+
+	if (!is_exclusive_pmu(pmu))
 		return true;
 
 	list_for_each_entry(iter_event, &ctx->event_list, event_entry) {
@@ -10899,11 +10905,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 		goto err_alloc;
 	}
 
-	if ((pmu->capabilities & PERF_PMU_CAP_EXCLUSIVE) && group_leader) {
-		err = -EBUSY;
-		goto err_context;
-	}
-
 	/*
 	 * Look up the group leader (we will attach this event to it):
 	 */
@@ -10991,6 +10992,18 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 				move_group = 0;
 			}
 		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Failure to create exclusive events returns -EBUSY.
+		 */
+		err = -EBUSY;
+		if (!exclusive_event_installable(group_leader, ctx))
+			goto err_locked;
+
+		for_each_sibling_event(sibling, group_leader) {
+			if (!exclusive_event_installable(sibling, ctx))
+				goto err_locked;
+		}
 	} else {
 		mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
 	}
@@ -11027,9 +11040,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 	 * because we need to serialize with concurrent event creation.
 	 */
 	if (!exclusive_event_installable(event, ctx)) {
-		/* exclusive and group stuff are assumed mutually exclusive */
-		WARN_ON_ONCE(move_group);
-
 		err = -EBUSY;
 		goto err_locked;
 	}
author maintainer
#58 lore raw

PATCH 58/62 KVM: nVMX: Clear pending KVM_REQ_GET_VMCS12_PAGES when leaving nested

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jan Kiszka <[email protected]>

commit cf64527bb33f6cec2ed50f89182fc4688d0056b6 upstream.

Letting this pend may cause nested_get_vmcs12_pages to run against an invalid state, corrupting the effective vmcs of L1.

This was triggerable in QEMU after a guest corruption in L2, followed by a L1 reset.

Fixes 7f7f1ba33cf2 ("KVM: x86: do not load vmcs12 pages while still in SMM")
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +2 -0
@@ -212,6 +212,8 @@ static void free_nested(struct kvm_vcpu
 	if (!vmx->nested.vmxon && !vmx->nested.smm.vmxon)
 		return;
 
+	kvm_clear_request(KVM_REQ_GET_VMCS12_PAGES, vcpu);
+
 	vmx->nested.vmxon = false;
 	vmx->nested.smm.vmxon = false;
 	free_vpid(vmx->nested.vpid02);
author maintainer
#52 lore raw

PATCH 52/62 ext4: enforce the immutable flag on open files

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>

commit 02b016ca7f99229ae6227e7b2fc950c4e140d74a upstream.

According to the chattr man page, "a file with the 'i' attribute cannot be modified..." Historically, this was only enforced when the file was opened, per the rest of the description, "... and the file can not be opened in write mode".

There is general agreement that we should standardize all file systems to prevent modifications even for files that were opened at the time the immutable flag is set. Eventually, a change to enforce this at the VFS layer should be landing in mainline. Until then, enforce this at the ext4 level to prevent xfstests generic/553 from failing.

---
 fs/ext4/file.c  |    4 ++++
 fs/ext4/inode.c |   11 +++++++++++
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
fs/ext4/file.c +4 -0
@@ -165,6 +165,10 @@ static ssize_t ext4_write_checks(struct
 	ret = generic_write_checks(iocb, from);
 	if (ret <= 0)
 		return ret;
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_IMMUTABLE(inode)))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	/*
 	 * If we have encountered a bitmap-format file, the size limit
 	 * is smaller than s_maxbytes, which is for extent-mapped files.
fs/ext4/inode.c +11 -0
@@ -5514,6 +5514,14 @@ int ext4_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 	if (unlikely(ext4_forced_shutdown(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb))))
 		return -EIO;
 
+	if (unlikely(IS_IMMUTABLE(inode)))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_APPEND(inode) &&
+		     (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID |
+				  ATTR_GID | ATTR_TIMES_SET))))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	error = setattr_prepare(dentry, attr);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
@@ -6184,6 +6192,9 @@ vm_fault_t ext4_page_mkwrite(struct vm_f
 	get_block_t *get_block;
 	int retries = 0;
 
+	if (unlikely(IS_IMMUTABLE(inode)))
+		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+
 	sb_start_pagefault(inode->i_sb);
 	file_update_time(vma->vm_file);
 
author maintainer
#62 lore raw

PATCH 62/62 mm: vmscan: scan anonymous pages on file refaults

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Kuo-Hsin Yang <[email protected]>

commit 2c012a4ad1a2cd3fb5a0f9307b9d219f84eda1fa upstream.

When file refaults are detected and there are many inactive file pages, the system never reclaim anonymous pages, the file pages are dropped aggressively when there are still a lot of cold anonymous pages and system thrashes. This issue impacts the performance of applications with large executable, e.g. chrome.

With this patch, when file refault is detected, inactive_list_is_low() always returns true for file pages in get_scan_count() to enable scanning anonymous pages.

The problem can be reproduced by the following test program.

---8<---
void fallocate_file(const char *filename, off_t size)

{
	struct stat st;
	int fd;

	if (!stat(filename, &st) && st.st_size >= size)
		return;

	fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600);
	if (fd < 0) {
		perror("create file");
		exit(1);
	}
	if (posix_fallocate(fd, 0, size)) {
		perror("fallocate");
		exit(1);
	}
	close(fd);
}

long *alloc_anon(long size)

{
	long *start = malloc(size);
	memset(start, 1, size);
	return start;
}

long access_file(const char *filename, long size, long rounds)

{
	int fd, i;
	volatile char *start1, *end1, *start2;
	const int page_size = getpagesize();
	long sum = 0;

	fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
	if (fd == -1) {
		perror("open");
		exit(1);
	}

	/*
	 * Some applications, e.g. chrome, use a lot of executable file
	 * pages, map some of the pages with PROT_EXEC flag to simulate
	 * the behavior.
	 */
	start1 = mmap(NULL, size / 2, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, MAP_SHARED,
		      fd, 0);
	if (start1 == MAP_FAILED) {
		perror("mmap");
		exit(1);
	}
	end1 = start1 + size / 2;

	start2 = mmap(NULL, size / 2, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd, size / 2);
	if (start2 == MAP_FAILED) {
		perror("mmap");
		exit(1);
	}

	for (i = 0; i < rounds; ++i) {
		struct timeval before, after;
		volatile char *ptr1 = start1, *ptr2 = start2;
		gettimeofday(&before, NULL);
		for (; ptr1 < end1; ptr1 += page_size, ptr2 += page_size)
			sum += *ptr1 + *ptr2;
		gettimeofday(&after, NULL);
		printf("File access time, round %d: %f (sec)
", i,
		       (after.tv_sec - before.tv_sec) +
		       (after.tv_usec - before.tv_usec) / 1000000.0);
	}
	return sum;
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])

{
	const long MB = 1024 * 1024;
	long anon_mb, file_mb, file_rounds;
	const char filename[] = "large";
	long *ret1;
	long ret2;

	if (argc != 4) {
		printf("usage: thrash ANON_MB FILE_MB FILE_ROUNDS
");
		exit(0);
	}
	anon_mb = atoi(argv[1]);
	file_mb = atoi(argv[2]);
	file_rounds = atoi(argv[3]);

	fallocate_file(filename, file_mb * MB);
	printf("Allocate %ld MB anonymous pages
", anon_mb);
	ret1 = alloc_anon(anon_mb * MB);
	printf("Access %ld MB file pages
", file_mb);
	ret2 = access_file(filename, file_mb * MB, file_rounds);
	printf("Print result to prevent optimization: %ld
",
	       *ret1 + ret2);
	return 0;
}

---8<---

Running the test program on 2GB RAM VM with kernel 5.2.0-rc5, the program fills ram with 2048 MB memory, access a 200 MB file for 10 times. Without this patch, the file cache is dropped aggresively and every access to the file is from disk.

  $ ./thrash 2048 200 10
  Allocate 2048 MB anonymous pages
  Access 200 MB file pages
  File access time, round 0: 2.489316 (sec)
  File access time, round 1: 2.581277 (sec)
  File access time, round 2: 2.487624 (sec)
  File access time, round 3: 2.449100 (sec)
  File access time, round 4: 2.420423 (sec)
  File access time, round 5: 2.343411 (sec)
  File access time, round 6: 2.454833 (sec)
  File access time, round 7: 2.483398 (sec)
  File access time, round 8: 2.572701 (sec)
  File access time, round 9: 2.493014 (sec)

With this patch, these file pages can be cached.

  $ ./thrash 2048 200 10
  Allocate 2048 MB anonymous pages
  Access 200 MB file pages
  File access time, round 0: 2.475189 (sec)
  File access time, round 1: 2.440777 (sec)
  File access time, round 2: 2.411671 (sec)
  File access time, round 3: 1.955267 (sec)
  File access time, round 4: 0.029924 (sec)
  File access time, round 5: 0.000808 (sec)
  File access time, round 6: 0.000771 (sec)
  File access time, round 7: 0.000746 (sec)
  File access time, round 8: 0.000738 (sec)
  File access time, round 9: 0.000747 (sec)

Checked the swap out stats during the test [1], 19006 pages swapped out with this patch, 3418 pages swapped out without this patch. There are more swap out, but I think it's within reasonable range when file backed data set doesn't fit into the memory.

$ ./thrash 2000 100 2100 5 1 # ANON_MB FILE_EXEC FILE_NOEXEC ROUNDS
PROCESSES Allocate 2000 MB anonymous pages active_anon: 1613644,
inactive_anon: 348656, active_file: 892, inactive_file: 1384 (kB)
pswpout: 7972443, pgpgin: 478615246 Access 100 MB executable file pages
Access 2100 MB regular file pages File access time, round 0: 12.165,
(sec) active_anon: 1433788, inactive_anon: 478116, active_file: 17896,
inactive_file: 24328 (kB) File access time, round 1: 11.493, (sec)
active_anon: 1430576, inactive_anon: 477144, active_file: 25440,
inactive_file: 26172 (kB) File access time, round 2: 11.455, (sec)
active_anon: 1427436, inactive_anon: 476060, active_file: 21112,
inactive_file: 28808 (kB) File access time, round 3: 11.454, (sec)
active_anon: 1420444, inactive_anon: 473632, active_file: 23216,
inactive_file: 35036 (kB) File access time, round 4: 11.479, (sec)
active_anon: 1413964, inactive_anon: 471460, active_file: 31728,
inactive_file: 32224 (kB) pswpout: 7991449 (+ 19006), pgpgin: 489924366
(+ 11309120)

With 4 processes accessing non-overlapping parts of a large file, 30316 pages swapped out with this patch, 5152 pages swapped out without this patch. The swapout number is small comparing to pgpgin.

[1]: https://github.com/vovo/testing/blob/master/mem_thrash.c

Fixes e9868505987a ("mm,vmscan: only evict file pages when we have plenty")
Fixes 7c5bd705d8f9 ("mm: memcg: only evict file pages when we have plenty")
Cc Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc Sonny Rao <[email protected]>
Cc Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc Vladimir Davydov <[email protected]>
Cc Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc <[email protected]> [4.12+]
[backported to 4.14.y, 4.19.y, 5.1.y: adjust context]
---
 mm/vmscan.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
mm/vmscan.c +3 -3
@@ -2176,7 +2176,7 @@ static void shrink_active_list(unsigned
  *   10TB     320        32GB
  */
 static bool inactive_list_is_low(struct lruvec *lruvec, bool file,
-				 struct scan_control *sc, bool actual_reclaim)
+				 struct scan_control *sc, bool trace)
 {
 	enum lru_list active_lru = file * LRU_FILE + LRU_ACTIVE;
 	struct pglist_data *pgdat = lruvec_pgdat(lruvec);
@@ -2202,7 +2202,7 @@ static bool inactive_list_is_low(struct
 	 * rid of the stale workingset quickly.
 	 */
 	refaults = lruvec_page_state(lruvec, WORKINGSET_ACTIVATE);
-	if (file && actual_reclaim && lruvec->refaults != refaults) {
+	if (file && lruvec->refaults != refaults) {
 		inactive_ratio = 0;
 	} else {
 		gb = (inactive + active) >> (30 - PAGE_SHIFT);
@@ -2212,7 +2212,7 @@ static bool inactive_list_is_low(struct
 			inactive_ratio = 1;
 	}
 
-	if (actual_reclaim)
+	if (trace)
 		trace_mm_vmscan_inactive_list_is_low(pgdat->node_id, sc->reclaim_idx,
 			lruvec_lru_size(lruvec, inactive_lru, MAX_NR_ZONES), inactive,
 			lruvec_lru_size(lruvec, active_lru, MAX_NR_ZONES), active,
author maintainer
#18 lore raw

PATCH 18/62 r8169: fix issue with confused RX unit after PHY power-down on RTL8411b

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Heiner Kallweit <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fe4e8db0392a6c2e795eb89ef5fcd86522e66248 ]

On RTL8411b the RX unit gets confused if the PHY is powered-down. This was reported in [0] and confirmed by Realtek. Realtek provided a sequence to fix the RX unit after PHY wakeup.

The issue itself seems to have been there longer, the Fixes tag refers to where the fix applies properly.

[0] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1692075

Fixes a99790bf5c7f ("r8169: Reinstate ASPM Support")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c |  137 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 137 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c +137 -0
@@ -5241,6 +5241,143 @@ static void rtl_hw_start_8411_2(struct r
 	/* disable aspm and clock request before access ephy */
 	rtl_hw_aspm_clkreq_enable(tp, false);
 	rtl_ephy_init(tp, e_info_8411_2, ARRAY_SIZE(e_info_8411_2));
+
+	/* The following Realtek-provided magic fixes an issue with the RX unit
+	 * getting confused after the PHY having been powered-down.
+	 */
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC28, 0x0000);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2A, 0x0000);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2C, 0x0000);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2E, 0x0000);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC30, 0x0000);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC32, 0x0000);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC34, 0x0000);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC36, 0x0000);
+	mdelay(3);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC26, 0x0000);
+
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF800, 0xE008);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF802, 0xE00A);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF804, 0xE00C);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF806, 0xE00E);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF808, 0xE027);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF80A, 0xE04F);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF80C, 0xE05E);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF80E, 0xE065);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF810, 0xC602);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF812, 0xBE00);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF814, 0x0000);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF816, 0xC502);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF818, 0xBD00);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF81A, 0x074C);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF81C, 0xC302);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF81E, 0xBB00);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF820, 0x080A);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF822, 0x6420);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF824, 0x48C2);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF826, 0x8C20);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF828, 0xC516);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF82A, 0x64A4);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF82C, 0x49C0);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF82E, 0xF009);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF830, 0x74A2);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF832, 0x8CA5);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF834, 0x74A0);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF836, 0xC50E);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF838, 0x9CA2);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF83A, 0x1C11);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF83C, 0x9CA0);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF83E, 0xE006);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF840, 0x74F8);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF842, 0x48C4);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF844, 0x8CF8);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF846, 0xC404);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF848, 0xBC00);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF84A, 0xC403);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF84C, 0xBC00);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF84E, 0x0BF2);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF850, 0x0C0A);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF852, 0xE434);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF854, 0xD3C0);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF856, 0x49D9);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF858, 0xF01F);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF85A, 0xC526);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF85C, 0x64A5);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF85E, 0x1400);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF860, 0xF007);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF862, 0x0C01);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF864, 0x8CA5);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF866, 0x1C15);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF868, 0xC51B);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF86A, 0x9CA0);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF86C, 0xE013);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF86E, 0xC519);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF870, 0x74A0);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF872, 0x48C4);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF874, 0x8CA0);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF876, 0xC516);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF878, 0x74A4);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF87A, 0x48C8);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF87C, 0x48CA);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF87E, 0x9CA4);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF880, 0xC512);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF882, 0x1B00);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF884, 0x9BA0);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF886, 0x1B1C);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF888, 0x483F);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF88A, 0x9BA2);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF88C, 0x1B04);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF88E, 0xC508);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF890, 0x9BA0);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF892, 0xC505);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF894, 0xBD00);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF896, 0xC502);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF898, 0xBD00);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF89A, 0x0300);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF89C, 0x051E);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF89E, 0xE434);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8A0, 0xE018);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8A2, 0xE092);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8A4, 0xDE20);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8A6, 0xD3C0);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8A8, 0xC50F);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8AA, 0x76A4);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8AC, 0x49E3);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8AE, 0xF007);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8B0, 0x49C0);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8B2, 0xF103);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8B4, 0xC607);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8B6, 0xBE00);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8B8, 0xC606);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8BA, 0xBE00);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8BC, 0xC602);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8BE, 0xBE00);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8C0, 0x0C4C);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8C2, 0x0C28);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8C4, 0x0C2C);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8C6, 0xDC00);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8C8, 0xC707);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8CA, 0x1D00);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8CC, 0x8DE2);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8CE, 0x48C1);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8D0, 0xC502);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8D2, 0xBD00);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8D4, 0x00AA);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8D6, 0xE0C0);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8D8, 0xC502);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8DA, 0xBD00);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8DC, 0x0132);
+
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC26, 0x8000);
+
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2A, 0x0743);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2C, 0x0801);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2E, 0x0BE9);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC30, 0x02FD);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC32, 0x0C25);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC34, 0x00A9);
+	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC36, 0x012D);
+
 	rtl_hw_aspm_clkreq_enable(tp, true);
 }
 
author maintainer
#17 lore raw

PATCH 17/62 nfc: fix potential illegal memory access

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yang Wei <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dd006fc434e107ef90f7de0db9907cbc1c521645 ]

The frags_q is not properly initialized, it may result in illegal memory access when conn_info is NULL.
The "goto free_exit" should be replaced by "goto exit".

---
 net/nfc/nci/data.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/nfc/nci/data.c +1 -1
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ static int nci_queue_tx_data_frags(struc
 	conn_info = nci_get_conn_info_by_conn_id(ndev, conn_id);
 	if (!conn_info) {
 		rc = -EPROTO;
-		goto free_exit;
+		goto exit;
 	}
 
 	__skb_queue_head_init(&frags_q);
author maintainer
#46 lore raw

PATCH 46/62 gpio: davinci: silence error prints in case of EPROBE_DEFER

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Keerthy <[email protected]>

commit 541e4095f388c196685685633c950cb9b97f8039 upstream.

Silence error prints in case of EPROBE_DEFER. This avoids multiple/duplicate defer prints during boot.

---
 drivers/gpio/gpio-davinci.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpio/gpio-davinci.c +3 -2
@@ -242,8 +242,9 @@ static int davinci_gpio_probe(struct pla
 	for (i = 0; i < nirq; i++) {
 		chips->irqs[i] = platform_get_irq(pdev, i);
 		if (chips->irqs[i] < 0) {
-			dev_info(dev, "IRQ not populated, err = %d\n",
-				 chips->irqs[i]);
+			if (chips->irqs[i] != -EPROBE_DEFER)
+				dev_info(dev, "IRQ not populated, err = %d\n",
+					 chips->irqs[i]);
 			return chips->irqs[i];
 		}
 	}
author maintainer
#15 lore raw

PATCH 15/62 net: stmmac: Re-work the queue selection for TSO packets

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jose Abreu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4993e5b37e8bcb55ac90f76eb6d2432647273747 ]

Ben Hutchings says:
"This is the wrong place to change the queue mapping. stmmac_xmit() is called with a specific TX queue locked, and accessing a different TX queue results in a data race for all of that queue's state.

I think this commit should be reverted upstream and in all stable branches. Instead, the driver should implement the ndo_select_queue operation and override the queue mapping there."

Fixes c5acdbee22a1 ("net: stmmac: Send TSO packets always from Queue 0")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c |   29 ++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c +19 -10
@@ -3058,17 +3058,8 @@ static netdev_tx_t stmmac_xmit(struct sk
 
 	/* Manage oversized TCP frames for GMAC4 device */
 	if (skb_is_gso(skb) && priv->tso) {
-		if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & (SKB_GSO_TCPV4 | SKB_GSO_TCPV6)) {
-			/*
-			 * There is no way to determine the number of TSO
-			 * capable Queues. Let's use always the Queue 0
-			 * because if TSO is supported then at least this
-			 * one will be capable.
-			 */
-			skb_set_queue_mapping(skb, 0);
-
+		if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & (SKB_GSO_TCPV4 | SKB_GSO_TCPV6))
 			return stmmac_tso_xmit(skb, dev);
-		}
 	}
 
 	if (unlikely(stmmac_tx_avail(priv, queue) < nfrags + 1)) {
@@ -3885,6 +3876,23 @@ static int stmmac_setup_tc(struct net_de
 	}
 }
 
+static u16 stmmac_select_queue(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb,
+			       struct net_device *sb_dev,
+			       select_queue_fallback_t fallback)
+{
+	if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & (SKB_GSO_TCPV4 | SKB_GSO_TCPV6)) {
+		/*
+		 * There is no way to determine the number of TSO
+		 * capable Queues. Let's use always the Queue 0
+		 * because if TSO is supported then at least this
+		 * one will be capable.
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return fallback(dev, skb, NULL) % dev->real_num_tx_queues;
+}
+
 static int stmmac_set_mac_address(struct net_device *ndev, void *addr)
 {
 	struct stmmac_priv *priv = netdev_priv(ndev);
@@ -4101,6 +4109,7 @@ static const struct net_device_ops stmma
 	.ndo_tx_timeout = stmmac_tx_timeout,
 	.ndo_do_ioctl = stmmac_ioctl,
 	.ndo_setup_tc = stmmac_setup_tc,
+	.ndo_select_queue = stmmac_select_queue,
 #ifdef CONFIG_NET_POLL_CONTROLLER
 	.ndo_poll_controller = stmmac_poll_controller,
 #endif
author maintainer
#40 lore raw

PATCH 40/62 net/mlx5e: Rx, Fix checksum calculation for new hardware

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit db849faa9bef993a1379dc510623f750a72fa7ce ]

CQE checksum full mode in new HW, provides a full checksum of rx frame. Covering bytes starting from eth protocol up to last byte in the received frame (frame_size - ETH_HLEN), as expected by the stack.

Fixing up skb->csum by the driver is not required in such case. This fix is to avoid wrong checksum calculation in drivers which already support the new hardware with the new checksum mode.

Fixes 85327a9c4150 ("net/mlx5: Update the list of the PCI supported devices")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en.h      |    1 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c |    3 +++
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rx.c   |    7 ++++++-
 include/linux/mlx5/mlx5_ifc.h                     |    3 ++-
 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en.h +1 -0
@@ -294,6 +294,7 @@ enum {
 	MLX5E_RQ_STATE_ENABLED,
 	MLX5E_RQ_STATE_AM,
 	MLX5E_RQ_STATE_NO_CSUM_COMPLETE,
+	MLX5E_RQ_STATE_CSUM_FULL, /* cqe_csum_full hw bit is set */
 };
 
 struct mlx5e_cq {
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c +3 -0
@@ -948,6 +948,9 @@ static int mlx5e_open_rq(struct mlx5e_ch
 	if (err)
 		goto err_destroy_rq;
 
+	if (MLX5_CAP_ETH(c->mdev, cqe_checksum_full))
+		__set_bit(MLX5E_RQ_STATE_CSUM_FULL, &c->rq.state);
+
 	if (params->rx_dim_enabled)
 		__set_bit(MLX5E_RQ_STATE_AM, &c->rq.state);
 
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rx.c +6 -1
@@ -829,8 +829,14 @@ static inline void mlx5e_handle_csum(str
 		if (unlikely(get_ip_proto(skb, network_depth, proto) == IPPROTO_SCTP))
 			goto csum_unnecessary;
 
+		stats->csum_complete++;
 		skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_COMPLETE;
 		skb->csum = csum_unfold((__force __sum16)cqe->check_sum);
+
+		if (test_bit(MLX5E_RQ_STATE_CSUM_FULL, &rq->state))
+			return; /* CQE csum covers all received bytes */
+
+		/* csum might need some fixups ...*/
 		if (network_depth > ETH_HLEN)
 			/* CQE csum is calculated from the IP header and does
 			 * not cover VLAN headers (if present). This will add
@@ -841,7 +847,6 @@ static inline void mlx5e_handle_csum(str
 						 skb->csum);
 
 		mlx5e_skb_padding_csum(skb, network_depth, proto, stats);
-		stats->csum_complete++;
 		return;
 	}
 
include/linux/mlx5/mlx5_ifc.h +2 -1
@@ -716,7 +716,8 @@ struct mlx5_ifc_per_protocol_networking_
 	u8         swp[0x1];
 	u8         swp_csum[0x1];
 	u8         swp_lso[0x1];
-	u8         reserved_at_23[0xd];
+	u8         cqe_checksum_full[0x1];
+	u8         reserved_at_24[0xc];
 	u8         max_vxlan_udp_ports[0x8];
 	u8         reserved_at_38[0x6];
 	u8         max_geneve_opt_len[0x1];
author maintainer
#32 lore raw

PATCH 32/62 macsec: fix use-after-free of skb during RX

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Andreas Steinmetz <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 095c02da80a41cf6d311c504d8955d6d1c2add10 ]

Fix use-after-free of skb when rx_handler returns RX_HANDLER_PASS.

---
 drivers/net/macsec.c |    5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/macsec.c +2 -3
@@ -1103,10 +1103,9 @@ static rx_handler_result_t macsec_handle
 	}
 
 	skb = skb_unshare(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
-	if (!skb) {
-		*pskb = NULL;
+	*pskb = skb;
+	if (!skb)
 		return RX_HANDLER_CONSUMED;
-	}
 
 	pulled_sci = pskb_may_pull(skb, macsec_extra_len(true));
 	if (!pulled_sci) {
author maintainer
#26 lore raw

PATCH 26/62 vrf: make sure skb->data contains ip header to make routing

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Peter Kosyh <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 107e47cc80ec37cb332bd41b22b1c7779e22e018 ]

vrf_process_v4_outbound() and vrf_process_v6_outbound() do routing using ip/ipv6 addresses, but don't make sure the header is available in skb->data[] (skb_headlen() is less then header size).

Case:

1) igb driver from intel.
2) Packet size is greater then 255.
3) MPLS forwards to VRF device.

So, patch adds pskb_may_pull() calls in vrf_process_v4/v6_outbound() functions.

---
 drivers/net/vrf.c |   58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
drivers/net/vrf.c +35 -23
@@ -169,23 +169,29 @@ static int vrf_ip6_local_out(struct net
 static netdev_tx_t vrf_process_v6_outbound(struct sk_buff *skb,
 					   struct net_device *dev)
 {
-	const struct ipv6hdr *iph = ipv6_hdr(skb);
+	const struct ipv6hdr *iph;
 	struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
-	struct flowi6 fl6 = {
-		/* needed to match OIF rule */
-		.flowi6_oif = dev->ifindex,
-		.flowi6_iif = LOOPBACK_IFINDEX,
-		.daddr = iph->daddr,
-		.saddr = iph->saddr,
-		.flowlabel = ip6_flowinfo(iph),
-		.flowi6_mark = skb->mark,
-		.flowi6_proto = iph->nexthdr,
-		.flowi6_flags = FLOWI_FLAG_SKIP_NH_OIF,
-	};
+	struct flowi6 fl6;
 	int ret = NET_XMIT_DROP;
 	struct dst_entry *dst;
 	struct dst_entry *dst_null = &net->ipv6.ip6_null_entry->dst;
 
+	if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, ETH_HLEN + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)))
+		goto err;
+
+	iph = ipv6_hdr(skb);
+
+	memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
+	/* needed to match OIF rule */
+	fl6.flowi6_oif = dev->ifindex;
+	fl6.flowi6_iif = LOOPBACK_IFINDEX;
+	fl6.daddr = iph->daddr;
+	fl6.saddr = iph->saddr;
+	fl6.flowlabel = ip6_flowinfo(iph);
+	fl6.flowi6_mark = skb->mark;
+	fl6.flowi6_proto = iph->nexthdr;
+	fl6.flowi6_flags = FLOWI_FLAG_SKIP_NH_OIF;
+
 	dst = ip6_route_output(net, NULL, &fl6);
 	if (dst == dst_null)
 		goto err;
@@ -241,21 +247,27 @@ static int vrf_ip_local_out(struct net *
 static netdev_tx_t vrf_process_v4_outbound(struct sk_buff *skb,
 					   struct net_device *vrf_dev)
 {
-	struct iphdr *ip4h = ip_hdr(skb);
+	struct iphdr *ip4h;
 	int ret = NET_XMIT_DROP;
-	struct flowi4 fl4 = {
-		/* needed to match OIF rule */
-		.flowi4_oif = vrf_dev->ifindex,
-		.flowi4_iif = LOOPBACK_IFINDEX,
-		.flowi4_tos = RT_TOS(ip4h->tos),
-		.flowi4_flags = FLOWI_FLAG_ANYSRC | FLOWI_FLAG_SKIP_NH_OIF,
-		.flowi4_proto = ip4h->protocol,
-		.daddr = ip4h->daddr,
-		.saddr = ip4h->saddr,
-	};
+	struct flowi4 fl4;
 	struct net *net = dev_net(vrf_dev);
 	struct rtable *rt;
 
+	if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, ETH_HLEN + sizeof(struct iphdr)))
+		goto err;
+
+	ip4h = ip_hdr(skb);
+
+	memset(&fl4, 0, sizeof(fl4));
+	/* needed to match OIF rule */
+	fl4.flowi4_oif = vrf_dev->ifindex;
+	fl4.flowi4_iif = LOOPBACK_IFINDEX;
+	fl4.flowi4_tos = RT_TOS(ip4h->tos);
+	fl4.flowi4_flags = FLOWI_FLAG_ANYSRC | FLOWI_FLAG_SKIP_NH_OIF;
+	fl4.flowi4_proto = ip4h->protocol;
+	fl4.daddr = ip4h->daddr;
+	fl4.saddr = ip4h->saddr;
+
 	rt = ip_route_output_flow(net, &fl4, NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(rt))
 		goto err;
author maintainer
#13 lore raw

PATCH 13/62 net: phy: sfp: hwmon: Fix scaling of RX power

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0cea0e1148fe134a4a3aaf0b1496f09241fb943a ]

The RX power read from the SFP uses units of 0.1uW. This must be scaled to units of uW for HWMON. This requires a divide by 10, not the current 100.

With this change in place, sensors(1) and ethtool -m agree:

sff2-isa-0000

Adapter: ISA adapter
in0:          +3.23 V
temp1:        +33.1 C
power1:      270.00 uW
power2:      200.00 uW
curr1:        +0.01 A

Laser output power : 0.2743 mW / -5.62 dBm
Receiver signal average optical power : 0.2014 mW / -6.96 dBm

Reported-by [email protected]
Fixes 1323061a018a ("net: phy: sfp: Add HWMON support for module sensors")
---
 drivers/net/phy/sfp.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/phy/sfp.c +1 -1
@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ static int sfp_hwmon_read_sensor(struct
 
 static void sfp_hwmon_to_rx_power(long *value)
 {
-	*value = DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(*value, 100);
+	*value = DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(*value, 10);
 }
 
 static void sfp_hwmon_calibrate(struct sfp *sfp, unsigned int slope, int offset,
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/62 net: bcmgenet: use promisc for unsupported filters

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Justin Chen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 35cbef9863640f06107144687bd13151bc2e8ce3 ]

Currently we silently ignore filters if we cannot meet the filter requirements. This will lead to the MAC dropping packets that are expected to pass. A better solution would be to set the NIC to promisc mode when the required filters cannot be met.

Also correct the number of MDF filters supported. It should be 17, not 16.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmgenet.c |   57 +++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmgenet.c +26 -31
@@ -3086,39 +3086,42 @@ static void bcmgenet_timeout(struct net_
 	netif_tx_wake_all_queues(dev);
 }
 
-#define MAX_MC_COUNT	16
+#define MAX_MDF_FILTER	17
 
 static inline void bcmgenet_set_mdf_addr(struct bcmgenet_priv *priv,
 					 unsigned char *addr,
-					 int *i,
-					 int *mc)
+					 int *i)
 {
-	u32 reg;
-
 	bcmgenet_umac_writel(priv, addr[0] << 8 | addr[1],
 			     UMAC_MDF_ADDR + (*i * 4));
 	bcmgenet_umac_writel(priv, addr[2] << 24 | addr[3] << 16 |
 			     addr[4] << 8 | addr[5],
 			     UMAC_MDF_ADDR + ((*i + 1) * 4));
-	reg = bcmgenet_umac_readl(priv, UMAC_MDF_CTRL);
-	reg |= (1 << (MAX_MC_COUNT - *mc));
-	bcmgenet_umac_writel(priv, reg, UMAC_MDF_CTRL);
 	*i += 2;
-	(*mc)++;
 }
 
 static void bcmgenet_set_rx_mode(struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	struct bcmgenet_priv *priv = netdev_priv(dev);
 	struct netdev_hw_addr *ha;
-	int i, mc;
+	int i, nfilter;
 	u32 reg;
 
 	netif_dbg(priv, hw, dev, "%s: %08X\n", __func__, dev->flags);
 
-	/* Promiscuous mode */
+	/* Number of filters needed */
+	nfilter = netdev_uc_count(dev) + netdev_mc_count(dev) + 2;
+
+	/*
+	 * Turn on promicuous mode for three scenarios
+	 * 1. IFF_PROMISC flag is set
+	 * 2. IFF_ALLMULTI flag is set
+	 * 3. The number of filters needed exceeds the number filters
+	 *    supported by the hardware.
+	*/
 	reg = bcmgenet_umac_readl(priv, UMAC_CMD);
-	if (dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC) {
+	if ((dev->flags & (IFF_PROMISC | IFF_ALLMULTI)) ||
+	    (nfilter > MAX_MDF_FILTER)) {
 		reg |= CMD_PROMISC;
 		bcmgenet_umac_writel(priv, reg, UMAC_CMD);
 		bcmgenet_umac_writel(priv, 0, UMAC_MDF_CTRL);
@@ -3128,32 +3131,24 @@ static void bcmgenet_set_rx_mode(struct
 		bcmgenet_umac_writel(priv, reg, UMAC_CMD);
 	}
 
-	/* UniMac doesn't support ALLMULTI */
-	if (dev->flags & IFF_ALLMULTI) {
-		netdev_warn(dev, "ALLMULTI is not supported\n");
-		return;
-	}
-
 	/* update MDF filter */
 	i = 0;
-	mc = 0;
 	/* Broadcast */
-	bcmgenet_set_mdf_addr(priv, dev->broadcast, &i, &mc);
+	bcmgenet_set_mdf_addr(priv, dev->broadcast, &i);
 	/* my own address.*/
-	bcmgenet_set_mdf_addr(priv, dev->dev_addr, &i, &mc);
-	/* Unicast list*/
-	if (netdev_uc_count(dev) > (MAX_MC_COUNT - mc))
-		return;
+	bcmgenet_set_mdf_addr(priv, dev->dev_addr, &i);
 
-	if (!netdev_uc_empty(dev))
-		netdev_for_each_uc_addr(ha, dev)
-			bcmgenet_set_mdf_addr(priv, ha->addr, &i, &mc);
-	/* Multicast */
-	if (netdev_mc_empty(dev) || netdev_mc_count(dev) >= (MAX_MC_COUNT - mc))
-		return;
+	/* Unicast */
+	netdev_for_each_uc_addr(ha, dev)
+		bcmgenet_set_mdf_addr(priv, ha->addr, &i);
 
+	/* Multicast */
 	netdev_for_each_mc_addr(ha, dev)
-		bcmgenet_set_mdf_addr(priv, ha->addr, &i, &mc);
+		bcmgenet_set_mdf_addr(priv, ha->addr, &i);
+
+	/* Enable filters */
+	reg = GENMASK(MAX_MDF_FILTER - 1, MAX_MDF_FILTER - nfilter);
+	bcmgenet_umac_writel(priv, reg, UMAC_MDF_CTRL);
 }
 
 /* Set the hardware MAC address. */
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/62 hv_netvsc: Fix extra rcu_read_unlock in netvsc_recv_callback()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Haiyang Zhang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit be4363bdf0ce9530f15aa0a03d1060304d116b15 ]

There is an extra rcu_read_unlock left in netvsc_recv_callback(), after a previous patch that removes RCU from this function. This patch removes the extra RCU unlock.

Fixes 345ac08990b8 ("hv_netvsc: pass netvsc_device to receive callback")
---
 drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c |    1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c +0 -1
@@ -849,7 +849,6 @@ int netvsc_recv_callback(struct net_devi
 
 	if (unlikely(!skb)) {
 		++net_device_ctx->eth_stats.rx_no_memory;
-		rcu_read_unlock();
 		return NVSP_STAT_FAIL;
 	}
 
#63 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 12 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

Note, this will be the LAST 5.1.y kernel release. Everyone should move to the 5.2.y series at this point in time.

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.1.21 release. There are 62 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun 28 Jul 2019 03:21:13 PM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 9 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.1.21-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.1.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah

#64 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
stable-rc/linux-5.1.y boot: 127 boots: 2 failed, 81 passed with 44 offline (v5.1.20-63-gf878628d8f1e)

stable-rc/linux-5.1.y boot: 127 boots: 2 failed, 81 passed with 44 offline (v5.1.20-63-gf878628d8f1e)

Full Boot Summary: https://kernelci.org/boot/all/job/stable-rc/branch/linux-5.1.y/kernel/v5.1.20-63-gf878628d8f1e/
Full Build Summary: https://kernelci.org/build/stable-rc/branch/linux-5.1.y/kernel/v5.1.20-63-gf878628d8f1e/

Tree: stable-rc
Branch: linux-5.1.y
Git Describe: v5.1.20-63-gf878628d8f1e
Git Commit: f878628d8f1efc883e9bd6f9f81173194b4a01dd
Git URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
Tested: 74 unique boards, 27 SoC families, 17 builds out of 209

Boot Failures Detected:

arm64:

    defconfig:
        gcc-8:
            meson-g12a-x96-max: 1 failed lab

arm:

    multi_v7_defconfig:
        gcc-8:
            bcm4708-smartrg-sr400ac: 1 failed lab

Offline Platforms:

arm64:

    defconfig:
        gcc-8
            meson-axg-s400: 1 offline lab
            meson-g12a-u200: 1 offline lab
            meson-g12a-x96-max: 1 offline lab
            meson-gxbb-odroidc2: 1 offline lab
            meson-gxl-s905d-p230: 1 offline lab
            meson-gxl-s905x-libretech-cc: 1 offline lab
            meson-gxl-s905x-nexbox-a95x: 1 offline lab
            meson-gxl-s905x-p212: 1 offline lab
            meson-gxm-nexbox-a1: 1 offline lab
            rk3399-firefly: 1 offline lab
            sun50i-a64-pine64-plus: 1 offline lab

mips:

pistachio_defconfig:
gcc-8
pistachio_marduk: 1 offline lab

arm:

exynos_defconfig:
gcc-8
exynos5250-arndale: 1 offline lab
exynos5420-arndale-octa: 1 offline lab
exynos5800-peach-pi: 1 offline lab

multi_v7_defconfig:
gcc-8
bcm72521-bcm97252sffe: 1 offline lab
bcm7445-bcm97445c: 1 offline lab
exynos5250-arndale: 1 offline lab
exynos5420-arndale-octa: 1 offline lab
exynos5800-peach-pi: 1 offline lab
imx6dl-wandboard_dual: 1 offline lab
imx6dl-wandboard_solo: 1 offline lab
imx6q-wandboard: 1 offline lab
imx7s-warp: 1 offline lab
meson8b-odroidc1: 1 offline lab
omap3-beagle: 1 offline lab
omap4-panda: 1 offline lab
qcom-apq8064-ifc6410: 1 offline lab
stih410-b2120: 1 offline lab
sun4i-a10-cubieboard: 1 offline lab
sun7i-a20-bananapi: 1 offline lab
vf610-colibri-eval-v3: 1 offline lab

omap2plus_defconfig:
gcc-8
omap3-beagle: 1 offline lab
omap4-panda: 1 offline lab

qcom_defconfig:
gcc-8
qcom-apq8064-ifc6410: 1 offline lab

davinci_all_defconfig:
gcc-8
da850-evm: 1 offline lab
dm365evm,legacy: 1 offline lab

imx_v6_v7_defconfig:
gcc-8
imx6dl-wandboard_dual: 1 offline lab
imx6dl-wandboard_solo: 1 offline lab
imx6q-wandboard: 1 offline lab
imx7s-warp: 1 offline lab
vf610-colibri-eval-v3: 1 offline lab

sunxi_defconfig:
gcc-8
sun4i-a10-cubieboard: 1 offline lab
sun7i-a20-bananapi: 1 offline lab

---
For more info write to <[email protected]>

#65 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 13 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

Note, this will be the LAST 5.1.y kernel release. Everyone should move to the 5.2.y series at this point in time.

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.1.21 release. There are 62 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun 28 Jul 2019 03:21:13 PM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
        https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.1.21-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.1.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------

kernel: 5.1.21-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-5.1.y
git commit: f878628d8f1efc883e9bd6f9f81173194b4a01dd
git describe: v5.1.20-63-gf878628d8f1e
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-5.1-oe/build/v5.1.20-63-gf878628d8f1e

No regressions (compared to build v5.1.20)

No fixes (compared to build v5.1.20)

Ran 21561 total tests in the following environments and test suites.

Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c
- hi6220-hikey
- i386
- juno-r2
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15
- x86

Test Suites
-----------
* build
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest
* libgpiod
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-timers-tests
* network-basic-tests
* perf
* spectre-meltdown-checker-test
* v4l2-compliance
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* kvm-unit-tests
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none

Signature · 2 lines
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
#66 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 11 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

Note, this will be the LAST 5.1.y kernel release. Everyone should move to the 5.2.y series at this point in time.

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.1.21 release. There are 62 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun 28 Jul 2019 03:21:13 PM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Build results:

	total: 159 pass: 159 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 364 pass: 364 fail: 0

Guenter

maintainer
#67 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 12 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

Note, this will be the LAST 5.1.y kernel release. Everyone should move to the 5.2.y series at this point in time.

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.1.21 release. There are 62 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun 28 Jul 2019 03:21:13 PM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.1.21-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.1.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

All tests are passing for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v5.1:

    12 builds:	12 pass, 0 fail
    22 boots:	22 pass, 0 fail
    32 tests:	32 pass, 0 fail

Linux version: 5.1.21-g4a9b1eb8bc3b
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,

                tegra194-p2972-0000, tegra20-ventana,
                tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04

Cheers
Jon

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