AES GCM fixes for the CCP crypto driver
Subsystems (2)
cover AES GCM fixes for the CCP crypto driver
Additional testing features added to the crypto framework (including fuzzy probing and variations of the lengths of input parameters such as AAD and authsize) expose some gaps in robustness and function in the CCP driver. Address these gaps:
Input text is allowed to be zero bytes in length. In this case no encryption/decryption occurs, and certain data structures are not allocated. Don't clean up what doesn't exist.
Valid auth tag sizes are 4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15 or 16 bytes.
Note: since the CCP driver has been designed to be used directly, add
validation of the authsize parameter at this layer.
AES GCM defines the input text for decryption as the concatenation of the AAD, the ciphertext, and the tag. Only the cipher text needs to be decrypted; the tag is simple used for comparison.
Gary R Hook (3):
crypto: ccp - Fix oops by properly managing allocated structures
crypto: ccp - Add support for valid authsize values less than 16
crypto: ccp - Ignore tag length when decrypting GCM ciphertext
drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-aes-galois.c | 14 +++++++++ drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-ops.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++------ include/linux/ccp.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH 1/3 crypto: ccp - Fix oops by properly managing allocated structures
From: Gary R Hook <[email protected]>
A plaintext or ciphertext length of 0 is allowed in AES, in which case no encryption occurs. Ensure that we don't clean up data structures that were never allocated.
--- drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-ops.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-ops.c +2 -2
@@ -858,11 +858,11 @@ ccp_run_aes_gcm_cmd(struct ccp_cmd_queue *cmd_q, struct ccp_cmd *cmd)ccp_dm_free (&final_wa); e_dst: -if (aes->src_len && !in_place) +if (ilen >0 && !in_place)ccp_free_data (&dst, cmd_q); e_src: -if (aes->src_len) +if (ilen >0 )ccp_free_data (&src, cmd_q); e_aad:
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH 2/3 crypto: ccp - Add support for valid authsize values less than 16
In reply to Hook, GaryFrom: Gary R Hook <[email protected]>
AES GCM encryption allows for authsize values of 4, 8, and 12-16 bytes. Validate the requested authsize, and retain it to save in the request context.
--- drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-aes-galois.c | 14 ++++++++++++ drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-ops.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++----- include/linux/ccp.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-aes-galois.c +14 -0
@@ -58,6 +58,19 @@ static int ccp_aes_gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,static int ccp_aes_gcm_setauthsize (struct crypto_aead *tfm,unsigned int authsize) { +switch (authsize) { +case 16 : +case 15 : +case 14 : +case 13 : +case 12 : +case 8 : +case 4 : +break ; +default : +return -EINVAL ; + } +return 0 ; }
@@ -104,6 +117,7 @@ static int ccp_aes_gcm_crypt(struct aead_request *req, bool encrypt)memset (&rctx->cmd,0 ,sizeof (rctx->cmd));INIT_LIST_HEAD (&rctx->cmd.entry); rctx->cmd.engine =CCP_ENGINE_AES ; + rctx->cmd.u.aes.authsize =crypto_aead_authsize (tfm); rctx->cmd.u.aes.type = ctx->u.aes.type; rctx->cmd.u.aes.mode = ctx->u.aes.mode; rctx->cmd.u.aes.action = encrypt;
drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-ops.c +21 -5
@@ -621,6 +621,7 @@ ccp_run_aes_gcm_cmd(struct ccp_cmd_queue *cmd_q, struct ccp_cmd *cmd)unsigned long long *final;unsigned int dm_offset; +unsigned int authsize;unsigned int jobid;unsigned int ilen;bool in_place = true;/* Default value */
@@ -642,6 +643,21 @@ ccp_run_aes_gcm_cmd(struct ccp_cmd_queue *cmd_q, struct ccp_cmd *cmd)if (!aes->key)/* Gotta have a key SGL */ return -EINVAL ; +/* Zero defaults to 16 bytes, the maximum size */ + authsize = aes->authsize ? aes->authsize :AES_BLOCK_SIZE ; +switch (authsize) { +case 16 : +case 15 : +case 14 : +case 13 : +case 12 : +case 8 : +case 4 : +break ; +default : +return -EINVAL ; + } +/* First, decompose the source buffer into AAD & PT, * and the destination buffer into AAD, CT & tag, or * the input into CT & tag.
@@ -656,7 +672,7 @@ ccp_run_aes_gcm_cmd(struct ccp_cmd_queue *cmd_q, struct ccp_cmd *cmd) p_tag =scatterwalk_ffwd (sg_tag, p_outp, ilen); }else {/* Input length for decryption includes tag */ - ilen = aes->src_len -AES_BLOCK_SIZE ; + ilen = aes->src_len - authsize; p_tag =scatterwalk_ffwd (sg_tag, p_inp, ilen); }
@@ -838,19 +854,19 @@ ccp_run_aes_gcm_cmd(struct ccp_cmd_queue *cmd_q, struct ccp_cmd *cmd)if (aes->action ==CCP_AES_ACTION_ENCRYPT ) {/* Put the ciphered tag after the ciphertext. */ -ccp_get_dm_area (&final_wa,0 , p_tag,0 ,AES_BLOCK_SIZE ); +ccp_get_dm_area (&final_wa,0 , p_tag,0 , authsize); }else {/* Does this ciphered tag match the input? */ - ret =ccp_init_dm_workarea (&tag, cmd_q,AES_BLOCK_SIZE , + ret =ccp_init_dm_workarea (&tag, cmd_q, authsize,DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL );if (ret) goto e_tag; - ret =ccp_set_dm_area (&tag,0 , p_tag,0 ,AES_BLOCK_SIZE ); + ret =ccp_set_dm_area (&tag,0 , p_tag,0 , authsize);if (ret) goto e_tag; ret =crypto_memneq (tag.address, final_wa.address, -AES_BLOCK_SIZE ) ? -EBADMSG :0 ; + authsize) ? -EBADMSG :0 ;ccp_dm_free (&tag); }
include/linux/ccp.h +2 -0
@@ -170,6 +170,8 @@ struct ccp_aes_engine {enum ccp_aes_mode mode;enum ccp_aes_action action; +u32 authsize; +struct scatterlist *key;u32 key_len;/* In bytes */
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH 3/3 crypto: ccp - Ignore tag length when decrypting GCM ciphertext
In reply to Hook, GaryFrom: Gary R Hook <[email protected]>
AES GCM input buffers for decryption contain AAD+CTEXT+TAG. Only decrypt the ciphertext, and use the tag for comparison.
--- drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-ops.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-ops.c +1 -2
@@ -781,8 +781,7 @@ ccp_run_aes_gcm_cmd(struct ccp_cmd_queue *cmd_q, struct ccp_cmd *cmd)while (src.sg_wa.bytes_left) {ccp_prepare_data (&src, &dst, &op,AES_BLOCK_SIZE , true);if (!src.sg_wa.bytes_left) { -unsigned int nbytes = aes->src_len - %AES_BLOCK_SIZE ; +unsigned int nbytes = ilen %AES_BLOCK_SIZE ;if (nbytes) { op.eom =1 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Herbert Xu
maintainerQuoted 22 lines · Gary
Additional testing features added to the crypto framework (including fuzzy probing and variations of the lengths of input parameters such as AAD and authsize) expose some gaps in robustness and function in the CCP driver. Address these gaps:
Input text is allowed to be zero bytes in length. In this case no encryption/decryption occurs, and certain data structures are not allocated. Don't clean up what doesn't exist.
Valid auth tag sizes are 4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15 or 16 bytes.
Note: since the CCP driver has been designed to be used directly, add
validation of the authsize parameter at this layer.AES GCM defines the input text for decryption as the concatenation of the AAD, the ciphertext, and the tag. Only the cipher text needs to be decrypted; the tag is simple used for comparison.
Gary R Hook (3):
crypto: ccp - Fix oops by properly managing allocated structures
crypto: ccp - Add support for valid authsize values less than 16
crypto: ccp - Ignore tag length when decrypting GCM ciphertext
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-aes-galois.c | 14 +++++++++ drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-ops.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++------ include/linux/ccp.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
All applied. Thanks.
Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt