IB/hfi1: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 IB/hfi1: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
sl is controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
Fix this by sanitizing sl before using it to index ibp->sl_to_sc.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
--- drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/verbs.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/verbs.c +2 -0
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@#include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include <rdma/opa_addr.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include "hfi.h" #include "common.h"
@@ -1537,6 +1538,7 @@ static int hfi1_check_ah(struct ib_device *ibdev, struct rdma_ah_attr *ah_attr) sl =rdma_ah_get_sl (ah_attr);if (sl >=ARRAY_SIZE (ibp->sl_to_sc))return -EINVAL ; + sl =array_index_nospec (sl,ARRAY_SIZE (ibp->sl_to_sc)); sc5 = ibp->sl_to_sc[sl];if (sc_to_vlt (dd, sc5) > num_vls &&sc_to_vlt (dd, sc5) !=0xf )
Signature · 1 line
2.22.0
Doug Ledford
AppliedQuoted 9 lines · Gustavo A. R. Silva
sl is controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
Fix this by sanitizing sl before using it to index
ibp->sl_to_sc.Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Quoted 6 lines
[1]
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/Signed-off-by Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>---
Thanks, applied to for-rc.
Signature · 3 lines
Doug Ledford <[email protected]> GPG KeyID: B826A3330E572FDD Fingerprint = AE6B 1BDA 122B 23B4 265B 1274 B826 A333 0E57 2FDD