powerpc/64s: remove support for kernel-mode syscalls
Nicholas Piggin
reviewerPATCH 1/2 powerpc/64s: remove support for kernel-mode syscalls
There is support for the kernel to execute the 'sc 0' instruction and make a system call to itself. This is a relic that is unused in the tree, therefore untested. It's also highly questionable for modules to be doing this.
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S | 21 ++++++--------------- arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S | 2 -- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S +6 -15
@@ -69,24 +69,20 @@ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION bne .Ltabort_syscall END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_TM) #endif - andi. r10,r12,MSR_PR mr r10,r1 - addi r1,r1,-INT_FRAME_SIZE - beq- 1f ld r1,PACAKSAVE(r13) -1: std r10,0(r1) + std r10,0(r1) std r11,_NIP(r1) std r12,_MSR(r1) std r0,GPR0(r1) std r10,GPR1(r1) - beq 2f /* if from kernel mode */ #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E START_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION BTB_FLUSH(r10) END_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION #endif ACCOUNT_CPU_USER_ENTRY(r13, r10, r11) -2: std r2,GPR2(r1) + std r2,GPR2(r1) std r3,GPR3(r1) mfcr r2 std r4,GPR4(r1)
@@ -122,14 +118,13 @@ END_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION #if defined(CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_NATIVE) && defined(CONFIG_PPC_SPLPAR) BEGIN_FW_FTR_SECTION - beq 33f - /* if from user, see if there are any DTL entries to process */ + /* see if there are any DTL entries to process */ ld r10,PACALPPACAPTR(r13) /* get ptr to VPA */ ld r11,PACA_DTL_RIDX(r13) /* get log read index */ addi r10,r10,LPPACA_DTLIDX LDX_BE r10,0,r10 /* get log write index */ - cmpd cr1,r11,r10 - beq+ cr1,33f + cmpd r11,r10 + beq+ 33f bl accumulate_stolen_time REST_GPR(0,r1) REST_4GPRS(3,r1)
@@ -203,6 +198,7 @@ system_call: /* label this so stack traces look sane */ mtctr r12 bctrl /* Call handler */ + /* syscall_exit can exit to kernel mode, via ret_from_kernel_thread */ .Lsyscall_exit: std r3,RESULT(r1)
@@ -216,11 +212,6 @@ system_call: /* label this so stack traces look sane */ ld r12, PACA_THREAD_INFO(r13) ld r8,_MSR(r1) -#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S - /* No MSR:RI on BookE */ - andi. r10,r8,MSR_RI - beq- .Lunrecov_restore -#endif /* * This is a few instructions into the actual syscall exit path (which actually
arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S +0 -2
@@ -1521,8 +1521,6 @@ EXC_COMMON(trap_0b_common, 0xb00, unknown_exception) * system call / hypercall (0xc00, 0x4c00) * * The system call exception is invoked with "sc 0" and does not alter HV bit. - * There is support for kernel code to invoke system calls but there are no - * in-tree users. * * The hypercall is invoked with "sc 1" and sets HV=1. *
Signature · 1 line
2.22.0
Nicholas Piggin
reviewerPATCH 2/2 powerpc/64s: interrupt entry use isel to prevent untrusted speculative r1 values used by the kernel
Interrupts may come from user or kernel, so the stack pointer needs to be set to either the base of the kernel stack, or a new frame on the existing kernel stack pointer, respectively.
Using a branch for this can lead to r1-indexed memory operations being speculatively executed using a value of r1 controlled by userspace. This is the first step to possible speculative execution vulnerability.
This does not appear to be a problem on its own, because loads from the stack with this rogue address should only come from memory the kernel previously stored to during the same speculative path, so they should always be satisfied by the store buffers rather than exposing the underlying memory contents.
There are some obscure cases where an r1-indexed load may be used in other ways (e.g., stack unwinding), however they are rare and difficult to control, and they still need to contain a sequence that subsequently changes microarchitectural state based on the result of such a rogue load, in a way that can be observed.
However it's safer to just close the concern at the first step, by preventing untrusted speculative r1 value leaking into the kernel. Do this by using isel to select the r1 value rather than a branch. isel output is not predicted on POWER CPUs which support the instruction, although this is not architecture.
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S +16 -2
@@ -393,15 +393,29 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_NESTED(CPU_FTR_CFAR, CPU_FTR_CFAR, 66); \ * On entry r13 points to the paca, r9-r13 are saved in the paca, * r9 contains the saved CR, r11 and r12 contain the saved SRR0 and * SRR1, and relocation is on. + * + * Using isel to select the r1 kernel stack depending on MSR_PR prevents + * speculative execution of memory ops with untrusted addresses (r1 from + * userspace) as a hardening measure, although there is no known vulnerability + * using a branch here instead. isel will not do value speculation on any POWER + * processor that implements it, although this is not currently documented. */ #define EXCEPTION_COMMON(area, trap) \ andi. r10,r12,MSR_PR; /* See if coming from user */ \ mr r10,r1; /* Save r1 */ \ +BEGIN_FTR_SECTION \ + ld r1,PACAKSAVE(r13); /* base stack if from user */ \ + addi r1,r1,INT_FRAME_SIZE; /* adjust for subi */ \ + iseleq r1,r10,r1; /* original r1 if from kernel */ \ + subi r1,r1,INT_FRAME_SIZE; /* alloc frame on kernel stack */ \ +FTR_SECTION_ELSE \ subi r1,r1,INT_FRAME_SIZE; /* alloc frame on kernel stack */ \ beq- 1f; \ ld r1,PACAKSAVE(r13); /* kernel stack to use */ \ -1: tdgei r1,-INT_FRAME_SIZE; /* trap if r1 is in userspace */ \ - EMIT_BUG_ENTRY 1b,__FILE__,__LINE__,0; \ +1: \ +ALT_FTR_SECTION_END_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S) \ +2: tdgei r1,-INT_FRAME_SIZE; /* trap if r1 is in userspace */ \ + EMIT_BUG_ENTRY 2b,__FILE__,__LINE__,0; \ 3: EXCEPTION_PROLOG_COMMON_1(); \ kuap_save_amr_and_lock r9, r10, cr1, cr0; \ beq 4f; /* if from kernel mode */ \
Signature · 1 line
2.22.0
Nicholas Piggin
reviewerNicholas Piggin's on August 20, 2019 3:11 pm:
Quoted 4 lines
There is support for the kernel to execute the 'sc 0' instruction and make a system call to itself. This is a relic that is unused in the tree, therefore untested. It's also highly questionable for modules to be doing this.
Oh I'm sorry this is not 64s, it's 64e as well, I just realised title is wrong. I actually haven't tested 64e either.
Thanks,
Nick