Add hypervisor sysfs-like support
cover Add hypervisor sysfs-like support
On the 2019 Xen developer summit there was agreement that the Xen hypervisor should gain support for a hierarchical name-value store similar to the Linux kernel's sysfs.
This is a first implementation of that idea adding the basic functionality to hypervisor and tools side. The interface to any user program making use of that "xen-sysfs" is a new library "libxenfs" with a stable interface.
There are still some pending questions, those are:
- access rights:
+ should we allow access to dom0 only, or to all domains, or should that be possible to set per entry?
+ how to integrate with xsm?
- dynamical entries:
+ do we want support for e.g. per-domain and/or per-cpupool entries?
+ do we want support for debug aids (lock-profiling, debugtrace ..)?
- write access:
+ runtime parameters?
+ debugging aids?
I have added a simple example in the last patch of the series by supporting access to the .config file used for building the hypervisor.
Juergen Gross (5):
docs: add feature document for Xen hypervisor sysfs-like support
xen: add basic hypervisor filesystem support
libs: add libxenfs
tools: add xenfs tool
xen: add /buildinfo/config entry to hypervisor filesystem
.gitignore | 2 + docs/features/hypervisorfs.pandoc | 110 +++++++++++++++ tools/Rules.mk | 6 + tools/libs/Makefile | 1 + tools/libs/fs/Makefile | 14 ++ tools/libs/fs/core.c | 198 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/libs/fs/include/xenfs.h | 57 ++++++++ tools/libs/fs/libxenfs.map | 8 ++ tools/libs/fs/xenfs.pc.in | 10 ++ tools/misc/Makefile | 6 + tools/misc/xenfs.c | 102 ++++++++++++++ xen/arch/arm/traps.c | 1 + xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c | 1 + xen/arch/x86/hypercall.c | 1 + xen/arch/x86/pv/hypercall.c | 1 + xen/common/Makefile | 7 + xen/common/filesystem.c | 287 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ xen/include/public/errno.h | 1 + xen/include/public/filesystem.h | 98 +++++++++++++ xen/include/public/xen.h | 1 + xen/include/xen/filesystem.h | 34 +++++ xen/include/xen/hypercall.h | 8 ++ xen/include/xen/kernel.h | 2 + xen/tools/Makefile | 9 +- xen/tools/bin2c.c | 28 ++++ 25 files changed, 991 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 docs/features/hypervisorfs.pandoc create mode 100644 tools/libs/fs/Makefile create mode 100644 tools/libs/fs/core.c create mode 100644 tools/libs/fs/include/xenfs.h create mode 100644 tools/libs/fs/libxenfs.map create mode 100644 tools/libs/fs/xenfs.pc.in create mode 100644 tools/misc/xenfs.c create mode 100644 xen/common/filesystem.c create mode 100644 xen/include/public/filesystem.h create mode 100644 xen/include/xen/filesystem.h create mode 100644 xen/tools/bin2c.c
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2.16.4 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
RFC PATCH 1/5 docs: add feature document for Xen hypervisor sysfs-like support
On the 2019 Xen developer summit there was agreement that the Xen hypervisor should gain support for a hierarchical name-value store similar to the Linux kernel's sysfs.
In the beginning there should only be basic support: entries can be added from the hypervisor itself only, there is a simple hypercall interface to read the data.
Add a feature document for setting the base of a discussion regarding the desired functionality and the entries to add.
--- docs/features/hypervisorfs.pandoc | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 110 insertions(+) create mode 100644 docs/features/hypervisorfs.pandoc
docs/features/hypervisorfs.pandoc new file +110 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +% Hypervisor FS +% Revision 1 + +\clearpage + +# Basics +---------------- --------------------- + Status: e.g. **Supported** + + Architectures: all + + Components: Hypervisor, toolstack +---------------- --------------------- + +# Overview + +The Hypervisor FS is a hierarchical name-value store for reporting +information to guests, especially dom0. It is similar to the Linux +kernel's sysfs, but without the functionality to directly alter +entries values. Entries and directories are created by the hypervisor, +while the toolstack is able to use a hypercall to query the entry +values. + +# User details + +With: + + xenfs --ls <path> + +the user can list the entries of a specific path of the FS. Using: + + xenfs --cat <path> + +the content of an entry can be retrieved. + +The FS structure is: + + / + buildinfo/ directory containing build-time data + config contents of .config file used to build Xen + cpu-bugs/ x86: directory of cpu bug information + l1tf "Vulnerable" or "Not vulnerable" + mds "Vulnerable" or "Not vulnerable" + meltdown "Vulnerable" or "Not vulnerable" + spec-store-bypass "Vulnerable" or "Not vulnerable" + spectre-v1 "Vulnerable" or "Not vulnerable" + spectre-v2 "Vulnerable" or "Not vulnerable" + mitigations/ directory of mitigation settings + bti-thunk "N/A", "RETPOLINE", "LFENCE" or "JMP" + spec-ctrl "No", "IBRS+" or IBRS-" + ibpb "No" or "Yes" + l1d-flush "No" or "Yes" + md-clear "No" or "VERW" + l1tf-barrier "No" or "Yes" + active-hvm/ directory for mitigations active in hvm doamins + msr-spec-ctrl "No" or "Yes" + rsb "No" or "Yes" + eager-fpu "No" or "Yes" + md-clear "No" or "Yes" + active-pv/ directory for mitigations active in pv doamins + msr-spec-ctrl "No" or "Yes" + rsb "No" or "Yes" + eager-fpu "No" or "Yes" + md-clear "No" or "Yes" + xpti "No" or list of "dom0", "domU", "PCID on" + l1tf-shadow "No" or list of "dom0", "domU" + parameters/ directory with hypervisor parameter values + (boot/runtime parameters) + +# Technical details + +Access to the hypervisor filesystem is done via the stable new hypercall +__HYPERVISOR_filesystem_op. + +* hypercall interface specification + * `xen/include/public/filesystem.h` +* hypervisor internal files + * `xen/include/xen/filesystem.h` + * `xen/common/filesystem.c` +* `libxenfs` + * `tools/libs/libxenfs/*` +* `xenfs` + * `tools/misc/xenfs.c` + +# Testing + +Any new parameters or hardware mitigations should be verified to show up +correctly in the filesystem. + +# Areas for improvement + +* More detailed access rights +* Entries per domain and/or per cpupool +* Possibility to modify values via filesystem access + +# Known issues + +* None + +# References + +* None + +# History + +------------------------------------------------------------------------ +Date Revision Version Notes +---------- -------- -------- ------------------------------------------- +2019-08-29 1 Xen 4.13 Document written +---------- -------- -------- -------------------------------------------
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2.16.4 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
RFC PATCH 3/5 libs: add libxenfs
In reply to Juergen GrossAdd the new library libxenfs for access to the hypervisor filesystem.
--- tools/Rules.mk | 6 ++ tools/libs/Makefile | 1 + tools/libs/fs/Makefile | 14 +++ tools/libs/fs/core.c | 198 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/libs/fs/include/xenfs.h | 57 ++++++++++++ tools/libs/fs/libxenfs.map | 8 ++ tools/libs/fs/xenfs.pc.in | 10 +++ 7 files changed, 294 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/libs/fs/Makefile create mode 100644 tools/libs/fs/core.c create mode 100644 tools/libs/fs/include/xenfs.h create mode 100644 tools/libs/fs/libxenfs.map create mode 100644 tools/libs/fs/xenfs.pc.in
tools/Rules.mk +6 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ XEN_LIBXENGNTTAB = $(XEN_ROOT)/tools/libs/gnttab XEN_LIBXENCALL = $(XEN_ROOT)/tools/libs/call XEN_LIBXENFOREIGNMEMORY = $(XEN_ROOT)/tools/libs/foreignmemory XEN_LIBXENDEVICEMODEL = $(XEN_ROOT)/tools/libs/devicemodel +XEN_LIBXENFS = $(XEN_ROOT)/tools/libs/fs XEN_LIBXC = $(XEN_ROOT)/tools/libxc XEN_XENLIGHT = $(XEN_ROOT)/tools/libxl # Currently libxlutil lives in the same directory as libxenlight
@@ -134,6 +135,11 @@ SHDEPS_libxendevicemodel = $(SHLIB_libxentoollog) $(SHLIB_libxentoolcore) $(SHLI LDLIBS_libxendevicemodel = $(SHDEPS_libxendevicemodel) $(XEN_LIBXENDEVICEMODEL)/libxendevicemodel$(libextension) SHLIB_libxendevicemodel = $(SHDEPS_libxendevicemodel) -Wl,-rpath-link=$(XEN_LIBXENDEVICEMODEL) +CFLAGS_libxenfs = -I$(XEN_LIBXENFS)/include $(CFLAGS_xeninclude) +SHDEPS_libxenfs = $(SHLIB_libxentoollog) $(SHLIB_libxentoolcore) $(SHLIB_xencall) +LDLIBS_libxenfs = $(SHDEPS_libxenfs) $(XEN_LIBXENFS)/libxenfs$(libextension) +SHLIB_libxenfs = $(SHDEPS_libxenfs) -Wl,-rpath-link=$(XEN_LIBXENFS) + # code which compiles against libxenctrl get __XEN_TOOLS__ and # therefore sees the unstable hypercall interfaces. CFLAGS_libxenctrl = -I$(XEN_LIBXC)/include $(CFLAGS_libxentoollog) $(CFLAGS_libxenforeignmemory) $(CFLAGS_libxendevicemodel) $(CFLAGS_xeninclude) -D__XEN_TOOLS__
tools/libs/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ SUBDIRS-y += gnttab SUBDIRS-y += call SUBDIRS-y += foreignmemory SUBDIRS-y += devicemodel +SUBDIRS-y += fs ifeq ($(CONFIG_RUMP),y) SUBDIRS-y := toolcore
tools/libs/fs/Makefile new file +14 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +XEN_ROOT = $(CURDIR)/../../.. +include $(XEN_ROOT)/tools/Rules.mk + +MAJOR = 1 +MINOR = 0 +LIBNAME := fs +USELIBS := toollog toolcore call + +SRCS-y += core.c + +include ../libs.mk + +$(PKG_CONFIG_LOCAL): PKG_CONFIG_INCDIR = $(XEN_LIBXENFS)/include +$(PKG_CONFIG_LOCAL): PKG_CONFIG_CFLAGS_LOCAL = $(CFLAGS_xeninclude)
tools/libs/fs/core.c new file +198 -0
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tools/libs/fs/include/xenfs.h new file +57 -0
57 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/libs/fs/libxenfs.map new file +8 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +VERS_1.0 { + global: + xenfs_open; + xenfs_close; + xenfs_read; + xenfs_readdir; + local: *; /* Do not expose anything by default */ +};
tools/libs/fs/xenfs.pc.in new file +10 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +prefix=@@prefix@@ +includedir=@@incdir@@ +libdir=@@libdir@@ + +Name: Xenfs +Description: The Xenfs library for Xen hypervisor +Version: @@version@@ +Cflags: -I${includedir} @@cflagslocal@@ +Libs: @@libsflag@@${libdir} -lxenfs +Requires.private: xentoolcore,xentoollog,xencall
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2.16.4 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
RFC PATCH 4/5 tools: add xenfs tool
In reply to Juergen GrossAdd the xenfs tool for accessing the hypervisor filesystem.
--- tools/misc/Makefile | 6 ++++ tools/misc/xenfs.c | 102 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 108 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/misc/xenfs.c
tools/misc/Makefile +6 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-lowmemd INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-mfndump INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-ucode INSTALL_SBIN += xencov +INSTALL_SBIN += xenfs INSTALL_SBIN += xenlockprof INSTALL_SBIN += xenperf INSTALL_SBIN += xenpm
@@ -86,6 +87,9 @@ xenperf: xenperf.o xenpm: xenpm.o $(CC) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $< $(LDLIBS_libxenctrl) $(APPEND_LDFLAGS) +xenfs: xenfs.o + $(CC) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $< $(LDLIBS_libxenfs) $(APPEND_LDFLAGS) + xenlockprof: xenlockprof.o $(CC) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $< $(LDLIBS_libxenctrl) $(APPEND_LDFLAGS)
@@ -94,6 +98,8 @@ xen-hptool.o: CFLAGS += -I$(XEN_ROOT)/tools/libxc $(CFLAGS_libxencall) xen-hptool: xen-hptool.o $(CC) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $< $(LDLIBS_libxenevtchn) $(LDLIBS_libxenctrl) $(LDLIBS_libxenguest) $(LDLIBS_libxenstore) $(APPEND_LDFLAGS) +xenfs.o: CFLAGS += $(CFLAGS_libxenfs) + # xen-mfndump incorrectly uses libxc internals xen-mfndump.o: CFLAGS += -I$(XEN_ROOT)/tools/libxc $(CFLAGS_libxencall) xen-mfndump: xen-mfndump.o
tools/misc/xenfs.c new file +102 -0
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2.16.4 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
RFC PATCH 5/5 xen: add /buildinfo/config entry to hypervisor filesystem
In reply to Juergen GrossAdd the /buildinfo/config entry to the hypervisor filesystem. This entry contains the .config file used to build the hypervisor.
--- .gitignore | 2 ++ xen/common/Makefile | 6 ++++++ xen/common/filesystem.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ xen/include/xen/kernel.h | 2 ++ xen/tools/Makefile | 9 +++++++-- xen/tools/bin2c.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 xen/tools/bin2c.c
.gitignore +2 -0
@@ -295,6 +295,7 @@ xen/arch/*/efi/boot.c xen/arch/*/efi/compat.c xen/arch/*/efi/efi.h xen/arch/*/efi/runtime.c +xen/common/config_data.c xen/include/headers*.chk xen/include/asm xen/include/asm-*/asm-offsets.h
@@ -312,6 +313,7 @@ xen/test/livepatch/xen_bye_world.livepatch xen/test/livepatch/xen_hello_world.livepatch xen/test/livepatch/xen_nop.livepatch xen/test/livepatch/xen_replace_world.livepatch +xen/tools/bin2c xen/tools/kconfig/.tmp_gtkcheck xen/tools/kconfig/.tmp_qtcheck xen/tools/symbols
xen/common/Makefile +6 -0
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_ARGO) += argo.o obj-y += bitmap.o obj-y += bsearch.o +obj-y += config_data.o obj-$(CONFIG_CORE_PARKING) += core_parking.o obj-y += cpu.o obj-y += cpupool.o
@@ -79,3 +80,8 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_UBSAN) += ubsan subdir-$(CONFIG_NEEDS_LIBELF) += libelf subdir-$(CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE) += libfdt + +config_data.c: ../.config + ( echo "const char xen_config_data[] ="; \ + ../tools/bin2c <$<; \ + echo ";" ) > $@
xen/common/filesystem.c +17 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,10 @@ static struct fs_entry fs_root_entry = { .dir = &fs_root, }; +static struct fs_dir fs_buildinfo = { + .list =LIST_HEAD_INIT (fs_buildinfo.list), +}; +static int fs_add_entry (struct fs_dir *parent,struct fs_entry *new) {int ret = -ENOENT ;
@@ -268,3 +272,16 @@ long do_filesystem_op(unsigned int cmd,return ret; } + +static int __init fs_init (void ) +{ +int ret; + + ret =fs_new_dir (&fs_root,"buildinfo" , &fs_buildinfo); +BUG_ON (ret); + ret =fs_new_entry (&fs_buildinfo,"config" , xen_config_data); +BUG_ON (ret); + +return 0 ; +} +__initcall (fs_init);
xen/include/xen/kernel.h +2 -0
@@ -100,5 +100,7 @@ extern enum system_state {bool_t is_active_kernel_text (unsigned long addr); +extern const char xen_config_data[]; +#endif /* _LINUX_KERNEL_H */
xen/tools/Makefile +7 -2
@@ -1,13 +1,18 @@ include $(XEN_ROOT)/Config.mk +PROGS = symbols bin2c + .PHONY: default default: - $(MAKE) symbols + $(MAKE) $(PROGS) .PHONY: clean clean: - rm -f *.o symbols + rm -f *.o $(PROGS) symbols: symbols.c $(HOSTCC) $(HOSTCFLAGS) -o $@ $< + +bin2c: bin2c.c + $(HOSTCC) $(HOSTCFLAGS) -o $@ $<
xen/tools/bin2c.c new file +28 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +/* +* Unloved program to convert a binary on stdin to a C include on stdout +* +* Jan 1999 Matt Mackall <[email protected]> +* +* This software may be used and distributed according to the terms +* of the GNU General Public License, incorporated herein by reference. +*/ + +#include <stdio.h> + +int main (int argc,char *argv[]) +{ +int ch, total =0 ; + +do { +printf ("\t\"" ); +while ((ch =getchar ()) !=EOF ) { + total++; +printf ("\\x%02x" , ch); +if (total %16 ==0 ) +break ; + } +printf ("\"\n" ); + }while (ch !=EOF ); + +return 0 ; +}
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2.16.4 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
RFC PATCH 2/5 xen: add basic hypervisor filesystem support
In reply to Juergen GrossAdd the infrastructure for the hypervisor filesystem.
This includes the hypercall interface and the base functions for entry creation, deletion and modification.
--- xen/arch/arm/traps.c | 1 + xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c | 1 + xen/arch/x86/hypercall.c | 1 + xen/arch/x86/pv/hypercall.c | 1 + xen/common/Makefile | 1 + xen/common/filesystem.c | 270 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ xen/include/public/errno.h | 1 + xen/include/public/filesystem.h | 98 +++++++++++++++ xen/include/public/xen.h | 1 + xen/include/xen/filesystem.h | 34 +++++ xen/include/xen/hypercall.h | 8 ++ 11 files changed, 417 insertions(+) create mode 100644 xen/common/filesystem.c create mode 100644 xen/include/public/filesystem.h create mode 100644 xen/include/xen/filesystem.h
xen/arch/arm/traps.c +1 -0
@@ -1401,6 +1401,7 @@ static arm_hypercall_t arm_hypercall_table[] = {#ifdef CONFIG_ARGO HYPERCALL (argo_op,5 ), #endif + HYPERCALL(filesystem_op, 5), };#ifndef NDEBUG
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c +1 -0
@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ static const hypercall_table_t hvm_hypercall_table[] = {#endif HYPERCALL (xenpmu_op),COMPAT_CALL (dm_op), +HYPERCALL (filesystem_op), HYPERCALL(arch_1) };
xen/arch/x86/hypercall.c +1 -0
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ const hypercall_args_t hypercall_args_table[NR_hypercalls] =ARGS (hvm_op,2 ),ARGS (dm_op,3 ), #endif +ARGS (filesystem_op,5 ),ARGS (mca,1 ), ARGS(arch_1, 1), };
xen/arch/x86/pv/hypercall.c +1 -0
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ const hypercall_table_t pv_hypercall_table[] = {HYPERCALL (hvm_op),COMPAT_CALL (dm_op), #endif +HYPERCALL (filesystem_op),HYPERCALL (mca), HYPERCALL(arch_1), };
xen/common/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ obj-y += domain.o obj-y += event_2l.o obj-y += event_channel.o obj-y += event_fifo.o +obj-y += filesystem.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_DEBUG) += gdbstub.o obj-$(CONFIG_GRANT_TABLE) += grant_table.o obj-y += guestcopy.o
xen/common/filesystem.c new file +270 -0
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xen/include/public/errno.h +1 -0
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ XEN_ERRNO(EBUSY, 16) /* Device or resource busy */ XEN_ERRNO(EEXIST, 17) /* File exists */ XEN_ERRNO(EXDEV, 18) /* Cross-device link */ XEN_ERRNO(ENODEV, 19) /* No such device */ +XEN_ERRNO(ENOTDIR, 20) /* Not a directory */ XEN_ERRNO(EISDIR, 21) /* Is a directory */ XEN_ERRNO(EINVAL, 22) /* Invalid argument */XEN_ERRNO (ENFILE ,23 )/* File table overflow */
xen/include/public/filesystem.h new file +98 -0
98 lines not on this page · raw message
xen/include/public/xen.h +1 -0
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_ulong_t);#define __HYPERVISOR_argo_op 39#define __HYPERVISOR_xenpmu_op 40#define __HYPERVISOR_dm_op 41 +#define __HYPERVISOR_filesystem_op 42/* Architecture-specific hypercall definitions. */ #define __HYPERVISOR_arch_0 48
xen/include/xen/filesystem.h new file +34 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +#ifndef __XEN_FILESYSTEM_H__ +#define __XEN_FILESYSTEM_H__ + +#include <xen/list.h> + +struct fs_dir { +unsigned int content_size; +struct list_head list; +}; + +enum fs_entry_type { + fs_type_dir, + fs_type_string +}; + +struct fs_entry { +enum fs_entry_type type; +const char *name; +struct list_head list; +struct fs_dir *parent; +union { +void *content; +struct fs_dir *dir; +const char *val; + }; +}; + +extern struct fs_dir fs_root; + +int fs_new_dir (struct fs_dir *parent,const char *name,struct fs_dir *dir); +int fs_new_entry (struct fs_dir *parent,const char *name,const char *val); +struct fs_entry *fs_get_entry (char *path); + +#endif /* __XEN_FILESYSTEM_H__ */
xen/include/xen/hypercall.h +8 -0
@@ -150,6 +150,14 @@ do_dm_op( unsigned int nr_bufs, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_dm_op_buf_t) bufs); +extern long +do_filesystem_op ( +unsigned int cmd, +XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM (void ) arg1, +unsigned long arg2, +XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM (void ) arg3, +unsigned long arg4); +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT extern int
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2.16.4 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
Quoted 9 lines · Juergen Gross
On the 2019 Xen developer summit there was agreement that the Xen hypervisor should gain support for a hierarchical name-value store similar to the Linux kernel's sysfs.
This is a first implementation of that idea adding the basic functionality to hypervisor and tools side. The interface to any user program making use of that "xen-sysfs" is a new library "libxenfs" with a stable interface.
Quoted 5 lines
There are still some pending questions, those are:
- access rights:
+ should we allow access to dom0 only, or to all domains, or should that be possible to set per entry?
Dom0 only for now, I'd say. But if possible don't put in road blocks making relaxing this more difficult.
Quoted 1 line
+ how to integrate with xsm?
When Dom0 only, perhaps not needed more than wiring this through the same hook as e.g. the sysctl-s use?
Quoted 2 lines
- dynamical entries:
+ do we want support for e.g. per-domain and/or per-cpupool entries?
Down the road - perhaps.
Quoted 1 line
+ do we want support for debug aids (lock-profiling, debugtrace ..)?
Seeing you introduce a file system abstraction, have such go through a debugfs-like one?
Quoted 3 lines
- write access:
+ runtime parameters?
+ debugging aids?
For both - down the road, perhaps.
Jan
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Re: [Xen-devel] [RFC PATCH 1/5] docs: add feature document for Xen hypervisor sysfs-like support
In reply to Juergen GrossQuoted 10 lines · Juergen Gross
docs/features/hypervisorfs.pandoc new file +10
-0+# Overview + +The Hypervisor FS is a hierarchical name-value store for reporting +information to guests, especially dom0. It is similar to the Linux +kernel's sysfs, but without the functionality to directly alter +entries values. Entries and directories are created by the hypervisor, +while the toolstack is able to use a hypercall to query the entry +values. + +# User details
docs/features/hypervisorfs.pandoc line 34
Quoted 10 lines
docs/features/hypervisorfs.pandoc new file +10
-0+ +With: + + xenfs --ls <path> + +the user can list the entries of a specific path of the FS. Using: + + xenfs --cat <path> + +the content of an entry can be retrieved.
Just one initial remark: I think the -- prefix to the commands should be omitted; they should be used for option-like arguments only.
Jan
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Re: [Xen-devel] [RFC PATCH 1/5] docs: add feature document for Xen hypervisor sysfs-like support
Quoted 17 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 16 lines · Juergen Gross
docs/features/hypervisorfs.pandoc new file +16
-0+# Overview + +The Hypervisor FS is a hierarchical name-value store for reporting +information to guests, especially dom0. It is similar to the Linux +kernel's sysfs, but without the functionality to directly alter +entries values. Entries and directories are created by the hypervisor, +while the toolstack is able to use a hypercall to query the entry +values. + +# User details + +With: + + xenfs --ls <path> + +the user can list the entries of a specific path of the FS. Using:
Quoted 8 lines
docs/features/hypervisorfs.pandoc line 34
Quoted 4 lines
docs/features/hypervisorfs.pandoc new file +4
-0+ + xenfs --cat <path> + +the content of an entry can be retrieved.Just one initial remark: I think the -- prefix to the commands should be omitted; they should be used for option-like arguments only.
Fine with me.
Juergen
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Re: [Xen-devel] [RFC PATCH 4/5] tools: add xenfs tool
In reply to Juergen Grosstools/misc/Makefile INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-lowmemd · line 27
Quoted 7 lines · Juergen Gross
tools/misc/Makefile +1
-0@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-lowmemd INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-mfndump INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-ucode INSTALL_SBIN += xencov +INSTALL_SBIN += xenfs
Why SBIN? Is there anything wrong with allowing unprivileged users r/o access? Or is this because in order to access the hypercall interface one needs to be root? If so, we may want to consider relaxing/avoiding/bypassing this in some sensible way.
Jan
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Re: [Xen-devel] [RFC PATCH 4/5] tools: add xenfs tool
Quoted 14 lines · Jan Beulich
tools/misc/Makefile INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-lowmemd · line 27
Quoted 7 lines · Juergen Gross
tools/misc/Makefile +1
-0@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-lowmemd INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-mfndump INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-ucode INSTALL_SBIN += xencov +INSTALL_SBIN += xenfsWhy SBIN? Is there anything wrong with allowing unprivileged users r/o access? Or is this because in order to access the hypercall interface one needs to be root? If so, we may want to consider relaxing/avoiding/bypassing this in some sensible way.
Installing to bin is fine with me, but relaxing the root restriction might be more difficult and/or questionable.
I was thinking of "mounting" the xen-sysfs to either Xenstore or the kernel's sysfs (probably the latter, as Xenstore in a stubdom would need to enable access to xen-sysfs for that stubdom ,too).
This would then enable accessing some or all entries from non-root.
Juergen
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Quoted 10 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 9 lines · Juergen Gross
On the 2019 Xen developer summit there was agreement that the Xen hypervisor should gain support for a hierarchical name-value store similar to the Linux kernel's sysfs.
This is a first implementation of that idea adding the basic functionality to hypervisor and tools side. The interface to any user program making use of that "xen-sysfs" is a new library "libxenfs" with a stable interface.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
There are still some pending questions, those are:
- access rights:
+ should we allow access to dom0 only, or to all domains, or should that be possible to set per entry?Dom0 only for now, I'd say. But if possible don't put in road blocks making relaxing this more difficult.
Sure.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
+ how to integrate with xsm?
When Dom0 only, perhaps not needed more than wiring this through the same hook as e.g. the sysctl-s use?
Yes, or adding another hook for that purpose.
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 3 lines
- dynamical entries:
+ do we want support for e.g. per-domain and/or per-cpupool entries?Down the road - perhaps.
Quoted 1 line
+ do we want support for debug aids (lock-profiling, debugtrace ..)?
Seeing you introduce a file system abstraction, have such go through a debugfs-like one?
Well, I was more thinking of a "debug" directory for that purpose.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
- write access:
+ runtime parameters?
+ debugging aids?For both - down the road, perhaps.
Okay.
Thanks for the feedback,
Juergen
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Re: [Xen-devel] [RFC PATCH 4/5] tools: add xenfs tool
In reply to Juergen GrossQuoted 16 lines · Juergen Gross
Quoted 14 lines · Jan Beulich
tools/misc/Makefile INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-lowmemd · line 27
Quoted 7 lines · Juergen Gross
tools/misc/Makefile +1
-0@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-lowmemd INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-mfndump INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-ucode INSTALL_SBIN += xencov +INSTALL_SBIN += xenfsWhy SBIN? Is there anything wrong with allowing unprivileged users r/o access? Or is this because in order to access the hypercall interface one needs to be root? If so, we may want to consider relaxing/avoiding/bypassing this in some sensible way.
Quoted 8 lines
Installing to bin is fine with me, but relaxing the root restriction might be more difficult and/or questionable.
I was thinking of "mounting" the xen-sysfs to either Xenstore or the kernel's sysfs (probably the latter, as Xenstore in a stubdom would need to enable access to xen-sysfs for that stubdom ,too).
This would then enable accessing some or all entries from non-root.
Right, going through the kernel's sysfs is what I too was considering (I don't think xenstore is appropriate for this). The main issue I'd see with this is the split brain permissions handling. I'd prefer for there to be just one party determining who is allowed to see what, but even if the hypervisor told the kernel, there would still be a dependency upon the kernel also respecting the request. While not much of a problem as long as all of this is Dom0-only, with DomU-s in mind this would need taking care of.
Jan
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Quoted 8 lines · Juergen Gross
On the 2019 Xen developer summit there was agreement that the Xen hypervisor should gain support for a hierarchical name-value store similar to the Linux kernel's sysfs.
This is a first implementation of that idea adding the basic functionality to hypervisor and tools side. The interface to any user program making use of that "xen-sysfs" is a new library "libxenfs" with a stable interface.
Thankyou for looking into this. It is a good step forwards.
First of all, I'd suggest that we have a document along the lines of xenstored-paths as the point of authority describing the path/file ABI.
Second, is xenfs really the best name here? It is ambiguous with the still-essential (even though it really needs to disappear) Linux filesystem by the name xenfs.
Quoted 13 lines
There are still some pending questions, those are:
- access rights:
+ should we allow access to dom0 only, or to all domains, or should that be possible to set per entry?
+ how to integrate with xsm?
- dynamical entries:
+ do we want support for e.g. per-domain and/or per-cpupool entries?
+ do we want support for debug aids (lock-profiling, debugtrace ..)?
- write access:
+ runtime parameters?
+ debugging aids?
To answer some of these, we could really do with setting expectations on the scope of the work. For reading configuration, I think is great. Even for modification of configuration, it looks to be a good interface which won't require every option to gain a new ad-hoc hypercall.
However, for anything which is expected to operate periodically (outside of debugging circumstances), I'm not sure its the best interface.
Stats collection in particular would be better using shared memory pages than constantly polling /domain/$domid/stats. (Currently, its a slew of DOMCTL/etc hypercalls. On systems with more than a dozen guests or so, stats collection is the primary source of domctl lock contention.)
~Andrew
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Quoted 10 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 8 lines · Juergen Gross
On the 2019 Xen developer summit there was agreement that the Xen hypervisor should gain support for a hierarchical name-value store similar to the Linux kernel's sysfs.
This is a first implementation of that idea adding the basic functionality to hypervisor and tools side. The interface to any user program making use of that "xen-sysfs" is a new library "libxenfs" with a stable interface.
Quoted 4 lines
Thankyou for looking into this. It is a good step forwards.
First of all, I'd suggest that we have a document along the lines of xenstored-paths as the point of authority describing the path/file ABI.
Fine with me.
Quoted 4 lines
Second, is xenfs really the best name here? It is ambiguous with the still-essential (even though it really needs to disappear) Linux filesystem by the name xenfs.
Yes, I'm aware of that ambiguity. I'm absolutely in favor of finding a better name.
Maybe xensysfs?
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 4 lines
There are still some pending questions, those are:
Quoted 10 lines
- access rights:
+ should we allow access to dom0 only, or to all domains, or should that be possible to set per entry?
+ how to integrate with xsm?
- dynamical entries:
+ do we want support for e.g. per-domain and/or per-cpupool entries?
+ do we want support for debug aids (lock-profiling, debugtrace ..)?
- write access:
+ runtime parameters?
+ debugging aids?
Quoted 4 lines
To answer some of these, we could really do with setting expectations on the scope of the work. For reading configuration, I think is great. Even for modification of configuration, it looks to be a good interface which won't require every option to gain a new ad-hoc hypercall.
Yes, that was the idea.
Quoted 2 lines
However, for anything which is expected to operate periodically (outside of debugging circumstances), I'm not sure its the best interface.
I completely agree.
Quoted 4 lines
Stats collection in particular would be better using shared memory pages than constantly polling /domain/$domid/stats. (Currently, its a slew of DOMCTL/etc hypercalls. On systems with more than a dozen guests or so, stats collection is the primary source of domctl lock contention.)
Sounds like another nice project. Maybe something for outreachy or some student looking for a larger project (wasn't there one recently?)
This could result in something like debugfs in the end.
Juergen
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Re: [Xen-devel] [RFC PATCH 4/5] tools: add xenfs tool
In reply to Jan BeulichQuoted 26 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 16 lines · Juergen Gross
Quoted 14 lines · Jan Beulich
tools/misc/Makefile INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-lowmemd · line 27
Quoted 7 lines · Juergen Gross
tools/misc/Makefile +1
-0@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-lowmemd INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-mfndump INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-ucode INSTALL_SBIN += xencov +INSTALL_SBIN += xenfsWhy SBIN? Is there anything wrong with allowing unprivileged users r/o access? Or is this because in order to access the hypercall interface one needs to be root? If so, we may want to consider relaxing/avoiding/bypassing this in some sensible way.
Quoted 8 lines
Installing to bin is fine with me, but relaxing the root restriction might be more difficult and/or questionable.
I was thinking of "mounting" the xen-sysfs to either Xenstore or the kernel's sysfs (probably the latter, as Xenstore in a stubdom would need to enable access to xen-sysfs for that stubdom ,too).
This would then enable accessing some or all entries from non-root.
Quoted 9 lines
Right, going through the kernel's sysfs is what I too was considering (I don't think xenstore is appropriate for this). The main issue I'd see with this is the split brain permissions handling. I'd prefer for there to be just one party determining who is allowed to see what, but even if the hypervisor told the kernel, there would still be a dependency upon the kernel also respecting the request. While not much of a problem as long as all of this is Dom0-only, with DomU-s in mind this would need taking care of.
Hmm, why? I think we agree that DomUs should get access only to either global data (read-only) which doesn't do any harm, or to data related only to them (so per-domain data). Maybe driver-domains or device model stubdoms would need access to data related to the domains they are serving.
Whether a domU lets a user access that data or not should only be decided by the domU (applies to dom0, too).
Juergen
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Re: [Xen-devel] [RFC PATCH 4/5] tools: add xenfs tool
Quoted 37 lines · Juergen Gross
Quoted 26 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 16 lines · Juergen Gross
Quoted 14 lines · Jan Beulich
tools/misc/Makefile INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-lowmemd · line 27
Quoted 7 lines · Juergen Gross
tools/misc/Makefile +1
-0@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-lowmemd INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-mfndump INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-ucode INSTALL_SBIN += xencov +INSTALL_SBIN += xenfsWhy SBIN? Is there anything wrong with allowing unprivileged users r/o access? Or is this because in order to access the hypercall interface one needs to be root? If so, we may want to consider relaxing/avoiding/bypassing this in some sensible way.
Quoted 8 lines
Installing to bin is fine with me, but relaxing the root restriction might be more difficult and/or questionable.
I was thinking of "mounting" the xen-sysfs to either Xenstore or the kernel's sysfs (probably the latter, as Xenstore in a stubdom would need to enable access to xen-sysfs for that stubdom ,too).
This would then enable accessing some or all entries from non-root.
Quoted 9 lines
Right, going through the kernel's sysfs is what I too was considering (I don't think xenstore is appropriate for this). The main issue I'd see with this is the split brain permissions handling. I'd prefer for there to be just one party determining who is allowed to see what, but even if the hypervisor told the kernel, there would still be a dependency upon the kernel also respecting the request. While not much of a problem as long as all of this is Dom0-only, with DomU-s in mind this would need taking care of.
Quoted 2 lines
Hmm, why? I think we agree that DomUs should get access only to either global data (read-only) which doesn't do any harm,
I guess opinions tend to differ here: There may well be people thinking that certain things shouldn't be seen by everyone.
Quoted 7 lines
or to data related
only to them (so per-domain data). Maybe driver-domains or device model stubdoms would need access to data related to the domains they are serving.Whether a domU lets a user access that data or not should only be decided by the domU (applies to dom0, too).
Like above, there may be different views here as well.
Jan
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Quoted 9 lines · Juergen Gross
Quoted 3 lines · Andrew Cooper
Second, is xenfs really the best name here? It is ambiguous with the still-essential (even though it really needs to disappear) Linux filesystem by the name xenfs.
Yes, I'm aware of that ambiguity. I'm absolutely in favor of finding a better name.
Maybe xensysfs?
Or just xensys (albeit that's likely getting ambiguous)? I'm not fully convinced calling this a file system is a good idea. Windows' name-value pair store is called registry, for example, despite it also resembling a file system to a certain degree.
Jan
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Re: [Xen-devel] [RFC PATCH 4/5] tools: add xenfs tool
In reply to Jan BeulichQuoted 38 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 37 lines · Juergen Gross
Quoted 35 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 16 lines · Juergen Gross
Quoted 14 lines · Jan Beulich
tools/misc/Makefile INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-lowmemd · line 27
Quoted 7 lines · Juergen Gross
tools/misc/Makefile +1
-0@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-lowmemd INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-mfndump INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-ucode INSTALL_SBIN += xencov +INSTALL_SBIN += xenfsWhy SBIN? Is there anything wrong with allowing unprivileged users r/o access? Or is this because in order to access the hypercall interface one needs to be root? If so, we may want to consider relaxing/avoiding/bypassing this in some sensible way.
Quoted 8 lines
Installing to bin is fine with me, but relaxing the root restriction might be more difficult and/or questionable.
I was thinking of "mounting" the xen-sysfs to either Xenstore or the kernel's sysfs (probably the latter, as Xenstore in a stubdom would need to enable access to xen-sysfs for that stubdom ,too).
This would then enable accessing some or all entries from non-root.
Right, going through the kernel's sysfs is what I too was considering (I don't think xenstore is appropriate for this). The main issue I'd see with this is the split brain permissions handling. I'd prefer for there to be just one party determining who is allowed to see what, but even if the hypervisor told the kernel, there would still be a dependency upon the kernel also respecting the request. While not much of a problem as long as all of this is Dom0-only, with DomU-s in mind this would need taking care of.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Hmm, why? I think we agree that DomUs should get access only to either global data (read-only) which doesn't do any harm,
I guess opinions tend to differ here: There may well be people thinking that certain things shouldn't be seen by everyone.
I didn't mean to give them access to all global data, but to selected items only. This would be controlled by the hypervisor.
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 8 lines
or to data related
only to them (so per-domain data). Maybe driver-domains or device model stubdoms would need access to data related to the domains they are serving.Whether a domU lets a user access that data or not should only be decided by the domU (applies to dom0, too).
Like above, there may be different views here as well.
But how should Xen make a choice for the guest here? The guest is free to not give its users access to the data, but like data returned via a hypercall Xen has absolutely no way to control whether the data is accessible by a guest's user process or not.
Juergen
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Quoted 9 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 8 lines · Juergen Gross
Quoted 3 lines · Andrew Cooper
Second, is xenfs really the best name here? It is ambiguous with the still-essential (even though it really needs to disappear) Linux filesystem by the name xenfs.
Yes, I'm aware of that ambiguity. I'm absolutely in favor of finding a better name.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Maybe xensysfs?
Or just xensys (albeit that's likely getting ambiguous)? I'm not fully convinced calling this a file system is a good idea. Windows' name-value pair store is called registry, for example, despite it also resembling a file system to a certain degree.
"Registry" doesn't seem correct regarding the potential dynamically generated entries.
And with the idea to "mount" it in the dom0 kernel's sysfs I think xensysfs (or xenhypfs?) seems appropriate.
Juergen
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Quoted 12 lines · Juergen Gross
Quoted 11 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 9 lines · Juergen Gross
Quoted 3 lines · Andrew Cooper
Second, is xenfs really the best name here? It is ambiguous with the still-essential (even though it really needs to disappear) Linux filesystem by the name xenfs.
Yes, I'm aware of that ambiguity. I'm absolutely in favor of finding a better name.
Maybe xensysfs?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Or just xensys (albeit that's likely getting ambiguous)? I'm not fully convinced calling this a file system is a good idea. Windows' name-value pair store is called registry, for example, despite it also resembling a file system to a certain degree.
"Registry" doesn't seem correct regarding the potential dynamically generated entries.
I also didn't mean to suggest "registry" as a name. The Windows registry does, however (and despite its name), contain dynamic data afaik (certain performance counters for example).
Quoted 2 lines
And with the idea to "mount" it in the dom0 kernel's sysfs I think xensysfs (or xenhypfs?) seems appropriate.
Well, such "mounting" is going to be indirect, I would assume? I.e. not directly forward filesystem like requests as such to Xen?
Jan
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Quoted 26 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 12 lines · Juergen Gross
Quoted 11 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 9 lines · Juergen Gross
Quoted 3 lines · Andrew Cooper
Second, is xenfs really the best name here? It is ambiguous with the still-essential (even though it really needs to disappear) Linux filesystem by the name xenfs.
Yes, I'm aware of that ambiguity. I'm absolutely in favor of finding a better name.
Maybe xensysfs?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Or just xensys (albeit that's likely getting ambiguous)? I'm not fully convinced calling this a file system is a good idea. Windows' name-value pair store is called registry, for example, despite it also resembling a file system to a certain degree.
"Registry" doesn't seem correct regarding the potential dynamically generated entries.
I also didn't mean to suggest "registry" as a name. The Windows registry does, however (and despite its name), contain dynamic data afaik (certain performance counters for example).
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
And with the idea to "mount" it in the dom0 kernel's sysfs I think xensysfs (or xenhypfs?) seems appropriate.
Well, such "mounting" is going to be indirect, I would assume? I.e. not directly forward filesystem like requests as such to Xen?
For plain entries (reads and eventually writes) I surely would just forward them. In case this is possible for directories, too, I'd rather do no caching in the kernel, so forwarding them would seem to be appropriate (rejecting anything but reading a directory, of course).
Juergen
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Quoted 5 lines · Juergen Gross
Quoted 4 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 2 lines · Juergen Gross
And with the idea to "mount" it in the dom0 kernel's sysfs I think xensysfs (or xenhypfs?) seems appropriate.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Well, such "mounting" is going to be indirect, I would assume? I.e. not directly forward filesystem like requests as such to Xen?
For plain entries (reads and eventually writes) I surely would just forward them. In case this is possible for directories, too, I'd rather do no caching in the kernel, so forwarding them would seem to be appropriate (rejecting anything but reading a directory, of course).
But that's still a kernel based file system, simply taking its data from Xen. It's not like file system requests as such would be forwarded.
Jan
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Quoted 10 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 9 lines · Juergen Gross
Quoted 7 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 2 lines · Juergen Gross
And with the idea to "mount" it in the dom0 kernel's sysfs I think xensysfs (or xenhypfs?) seems appropriate.
Well, such "mounting" is going to be indirect, I would assume? I.e. not directly forward filesystem like requests as such to Xen?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
For plain entries (reads and eventually writes) I surely would just forward them. In case this is possible for directories, too, I'd rather do no caching in the kernel, so forwarding them would seem to be appropriate (rejecting anything but reading a directory, of course).
But that's still a kernel based file system, simply taking its data from Xen. It's not like file system requests as such would be forwarded.
True.
Juergen
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