unzip: fix CVE-2019-13232
PATCH v3 1/1 unzip: fix CVE-2019-13232
From: Dan Tran <[email protected]>
--- .../unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch | 33 ++ .../unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch | 356 ++++++++++++++++++ .../unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch | 121 ++++++ meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb | 3 + 4 files changed, 513 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch
meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch new file +33 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From 080d52c3c9416c731f637f9c6e003961ef43f079 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mark Adler <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 27 May 2019 08:20:32 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Fix bug in undefer_input() that misplaced the input + state. + +CVE: CVE-2019-13232 +Upstream-Status: Backport +[https://github.com/madler/unzip/commit/41beb477c5744bc396fa1162ee0c14218ec12213] + +Signed-off-by: Dan Tran <[email protected]> +--- + fileio.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/fileio.c b/fileio.c +index 7605a29..14460f3 100644 +--- a/fileio.c ++++ b/fileio.c +@@ -532,8 +532,10 @@ void undefer_input(__G) + * This condition was checked when G.incnt_leftover was set > 0 in + * defer_leftover_input(), and it is NOT allowed to touch G.csize + * before calling undefer_input() when (G.incnt_leftover > 0) +- * (single exception: see read_byte()'s "G.csize <= 0" handling) !! ++ * (single exception: see readbyte()'s "G.csize <= 0" handling) !! + */ ++ if (G.csize < 0L) ++ G.csize = 0L; + G.incnt = G.incnt_leftover + (int)G.csize; + G.inptr = G.inptr_leftover - (int)G.csize; + G.incnt_leftover = 0; +-- +2.22.0.vfs.1.1.57.gbaf16c8
meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch new file +356 -0
356 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch new file +121 -0
121 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb +3 -0
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/infozip/UnZip%206.x%20%28latest%29/UnZip%206.0/ file://symlink.patch \ file://0001-unzip-fix-CVE-2018-1000035.patch \ file://CVE-2018-18384.patch \ + file://CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch \ + file://CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch \ + file://CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch \ " UPSTREAM_VERSION_UNKNOWN = "1"
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
This applies as-is to master and warrior too since the versions there are same. Can this be merged there too please since those branches are also affected?
Thanks,
Anuj
Quoted 673 lines · On Wed, 2019-09-25 at 23:30 +0000, [email protected] wrote:
From: Dan Tran <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Dan Tran <[email protected]>--- .../unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch | 33 ++ .../unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch | 356 ++++++++++++++++++ .../unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch | 121 ++++++ meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb | 3 + 4 files changed, 513 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019- 13232_p1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019- 13232_p2.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch
(quoted diff) +0
-013232_p1.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019- 13232_p1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d485a1bd6emeta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch new file +1
-0@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From 080d52c3c9416c731f637f9c6e003961ef43f079 Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch new file +3
-0+From: Mark Adler <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 27 May 2019 08:20:32 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Fix bug in undefer_input() that misplaced theinput
+ state.meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch new file +4
-0+ +CVE: CVE-2019-13232 +Upstream-Status: Backport +[https://github.com/madler/unzip/commit/41beb477c5744bc396fa1162ee0c14218ec12213
]meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch new file +12
-0+ +Signed-off-by: Dan Tran <[email protected]> +--- + fileio.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/fileio.c b/fileio.c +index 7605a29..14460f3 100644 +--- a/fileio.c ++++ b/fileio.c +@@ -532,8 +532,10 @@ void undefer_input(__G) + * This condition was checked when G.incnt_leftover was setQuoted 1 line
0 in
+ *
defer_leftover_input(), and it is NOT allowed to touch
G.csize
+ * before callingundefer_input()when (G.incnt_leftover >
0)
+- * (single exception: see read_byte()'s "G.csize <= 0"
handling) !!
++ * (single exception: see readbyte()'s "G.csize <= 0"
handling) !!meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch new file +8
-0+ */ ++ if (G.csize < 0L) ++ G.csize = 0L; + G.incnt = G.incnt_leftover + (int)G.csize; + G.inptr = G.inptr_leftover - (int)G.csize; + G.incnt_leftover = 0; +-- +2.22.0.vfs.1.1.57.gbaf16c8(quoted diff) +0
-013232_p2.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019- 13232_p2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..41037a8e24meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch new file +1
-0@@ -0,0 +1,356 @@ +From 1aae47fa8935654a84403768f32c03ecbb1be470 Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch new file +3
-0+From: Mark Adler <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 22:01:18 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Detect and reject a zip bomb using overlappedentries.
meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch new file +25
-0+ +This detects an invalid zip file that has at least one entry that +overlaps with another entry or with the central directory to the +end of the file. A Fifield zip bomb uses overlapped local entries +to vastly increase the potential inflation ratio. Such an invalid +zip file is rejected. + +See https://www.bamsoftware.com/hacks/zipbomb/ for David Fifield's +analysis, construction, and examples of such zip bombs. + +The detection maintains a list of covered spans of the zip files +so far, where the central directory to the end of the file and any +bytes preceding the first entry at zip file offset zero are +considered covered initially. Then as each entry is decompressed +or tested, it is considered covered. When a new entry is about to +be processed, its initial offset is checked to see if it is +contained by a covered span. If so, the zip file is rejected as +invalid. + +This commit depends on a preceding commit: "Fix bug in +undefer_input() that misplaced the input state." + +CVE: CVE-2019-13232 +Upstream-Status: Backport +[https://github.com/madler/unzip/commit/47b3ceae397d21bf822bc2ac73052a4b1daf8e1c
]meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch new file +16
-0+ +Signed-off-by: Dan Tran <[email protected]> +--- + extract.c | 190 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + globals.c | 1 + + globals.h | 3 + + process.c | 10 +++ + unzip.h | 1 + + 5 files changed, 204 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c +index 24db2a8..2bb72ba 100644 +--- a/extract.c ++++ b/extract.c +@@ -321,6 +321,125 @@ static ZCONST char Far UnsupportedExtraField[]=
meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch new file +7
-1+ "\nerror: unsupported extra-field compression type (%u) --skipping\n"; + static ZCONST char Far BadExtraFieldCRC[] = + "error [%s]: bad extra-field CRC %08lx (should be %08lx)\n"; ++static ZCONST char Far NotEnoughMemCover[] = ++ "error: not enough memory for bomb detection\n"; ++static ZCONST char Far OverlappedComponents[] = ++ "error: invalid zip file with overlapped components (possible zipbomb)\n";
++
++
++
++
++
++/* A growable list of spans. */
++typedefzoff_tbound_t;
++typedef struct {++ bound_t beg; /* start of the span */ ++ bound_t end; /* one past the end of the span */++}
span_t;
++typedef struct {
++span_t*span; /* allocated, distinct, and sorted list of
spans */++ size_t num; /* number of spans in the list */ ++ size_t max; /* allocated number of spans (num <= max)*/
++}cover_t;
++
++/*
++ * Return the index of the first span in cover whose beg is greater than val.
++ * If there is no such span, thencover->numis returned. ++ */
++staticsize_tcover_find(cover, val)
++cover_t*cover;
++bound_tval;
++{
++size_tlo = 0, hi =cover->num;
++ while (lo < hi) {
++size_tmid = (lo + hi) >> 1;
++ if (val < cover->span[mid].beg)
++ hi = mid;
++ else
++ lo = mid + 1;
++ }
++ return hi;
++}
++
++/* Return true if val lies within any one of the spans in cover. */ ++static intcover_within(cover, val)
++cover_t*cover;
++bound_tval;
++{
++size_tpos =cover_find(cover, val);
++ return pos > 0 && val < cover->span[pos - 1].end;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Add a new span to the list, but only if the new span does not overlap any
++ * spans already in the list. The new span covers the values beg..end-1. beg
++ * must be less than end.
++ *
++ * Keep the list sorted and merge adjacent spans. Grow the allocated space for
++ * the list as needed. On success, 0 is returned. If the new span overlaps any
++ * existing spans, then 1 is returned and the new span is not added to the
++ * list. If the new span is invalid because beg is greater than or equal to
++ * end, then -1 is returned. If the list needs to be grown but the memory
++ * allocation fails, then -2 is returned.
++ */
++static intcover_add(cover, beg, end)++ cover_t *cover; ++ bound_t beg; ++ bound_t end;++{
++size_tpos;
++ int prec, foll;
++
++ if (beg >= end)
++ /* The new span is invalid. */
++ return -1;
++
++ /* Find where the new span should go, and make sure that it
does not
++ overlap with any existing spans. */
++ pos =cover_find(cover, beg);
++ if ((pos > 0 && beg < cover->span[pos - 1].end) ||
++ (pos <cover->num&& end > cover->span[pos].beg))
++ return 1;
++++ /* Check for adjacencies. */ ++ prec = pos > 0 && beg == cover->span[pos - 1].end; ++ foll = pos < cover->num && end == cover->span[pos].beg; ++ if (prec && foll) {++ /* The new span connects the preceding and following spans.
Merge the
++ following span into the preceding span, and delete the
following
++ span. */++ cover->span[pos - 1].end = cover->span[pos].end; ++ cover->num--; ++ memmove(cover->span + pos, cover->span + pos + 1,++ (
cover->num- pos) *sizeof(span_t));
++ }
++ else if (prec)
++ /* The new span is adjacent only to the preceding span.
Extend the end
++ of the preceding span. */
++ cover->span[pos - 1].end = end;
++ else if (foll)
++ /* The new span is adjacent only to the following span.
Extend the
++ beginning of the following span. */
++ cover->span[pos].beg = beg;
++ else {
++ /* The new span has gaps between both the preceding and the
following
++ spans. Assure that there is room and insert the
span. */
++ if (cover->num==cover->max) {
++size_tmax =cover->max== 0 ? 16 :cover->max<< 1;
++span_t*span = realloc(cover->span, max *sizeof(span_t));
++ if (span == NULL)
++ return -2;
++cover->span= span;
++cover->max= max;
++ }
++ memmove(cover->span + pos + 1,cover->span+ pos,
++ (cover->num- pos) *sizeof(span_t));++ cover->num++; ++ cover->span[pos].beg = beg; ++ cover->span[pos].end = end;++ }
++ return 0;
++}
+
+
+
+@@ -376,6 +495,29 @@ intextract_or_test_files(__G)/* return PK-
type error code */
+ }
+ #endif /* !SFX ||SFX_EXDIR*/
+
++ /* One more: initialize cover structure for bomb detection.
Start with a
++ span that covers the central directory though the end of the
file. */
++ if (G.cover == NULL) {
++ G.cover = malloc(sizeof(cover_t));
++ if (G.cover == NULL) {
++ Info(slide,0x401, ((char *)slide,
++ LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
++ returnPK_MEM;++ } ++ ((cover_t *)G.cover)->span = NULL; ++ ((cover_t *)G.cover)->max = 0; ++ } ++ ((cover_t *)G.cover)->num = 0; ++ if ((G.extra_bytes != 0 &&++
cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, 0, G.extra_bytes)!= 0) ||
++ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover,
++ G.extra_bytes +
G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory,
++ G.ziplen) != 0) {
++ Info(slide,0x401, ((char *)slide,
++ LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
++ returnPK_MEM;
++ }
++
+ /*-----------------------------------------------------------------
----------
+ The basic idea of this function is as follows. Since the
central di-
+ rectory lies at the end of the zipfile and the member files lie
at the
+@@ -593,7 +735,8 @@ intextract_or_test_files(__G)/* return PK-
type error code */meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch new file +3
-0+ if (error > error_in_archive) + error_in_archive = error; + /* ...and keep going (unless disk full or user break)*/
+- if (G.disk_full > 1 || error_in_archive == IZ_CTRLC) { ++ if (G.disk_full > 1 || error_in_archive == IZ_CTRLC || ++ error == PK_BOMB) { + /* clear reached_end to signal premature stop ...*/
meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch new file +3
-0+ reached_end = FALSE; + /* ... and cancel scanning the central directory */ +@@ -1062,6 +1205,11 @@ static int extract_or_test_entrylist(__G__numchunk,
+meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch new file +12
-0+ /* seek_zipf(__G__ pInfo->offset); */ + request = G.pInfo->offset + G.extra_bytes; ++ if (cover_within((cover_t *)G.cover, request)) { ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents))); ++ return PK_BOMB; ++ } + inbuf_offset = request % INBUFSIZ; + bufstart = request - inbuf_offset; + +@@ -1593,6 +1741,18 @@ reprompt: + return IZ_CTRLC; /* cancel operation by userrequest */
+ }
+ #endif
++ error = cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, request,
++ G.cur_zipfile_bufstart + (G.inptr -
G.inbuf));
++ if (error < 0) {
++ Info(slide,0x401, ((char *)slide,
++ LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
++ returnPK_MEM;
++ }
++ if (error != 0) {
++ Info(slide,0x401, ((char *)slide,
++ LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents)));
++ returnPK_BOMB;
++ }
+ #ifdef MACOS /* MacOS is no preemptive OS, thus call event- handling by hand */
+UserStop();
+ #endif
+@@ -1994,6 +2154,34 @@ static intextract_or_test_member(__G)/*
return PK-type error code */meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch new file +6
-0+ } + + undefer_input(__G); ++ ++ if ((G.lrec.general_purpose_bit_flag & 8) != 0) { ++ /* skip over data descriptor (harder than it sounds, due tosignature
++ * ambiguity)
++ */++# define SIG 0x08074b50 ++# define LOW 0xffffffff ++ uch buf[12]; ++ unsigned shy = 12 - readbuf((char *)buf, 12); ++ ulg crc = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf); ++ ulg clen = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf + 4); ++ ulg ulen = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf + 8); /* or high clen ifZIP64 */
++ if (crc == SIG && /* if not SIG, no
signature */
++ (G.lrec.crc32 != SIG || /* if not SIG, have
signature */
++ (clen == SIG && /* if not SIG, no
signature */
++ ((G.lrec.csize & LOW) != SIG || /* if not SIG, have
signature */
++ (ulen == SIG && /* if not SIG, no
signature */
++ (G.zip64 ? G.lrec.csize >> 32 : G.lrec.ucsize) !=
SIG
++ /* if not SIG, have
signature */
++ )))))
++ /* skip four more bytes to account for signature
*/
++ shy += 4 -readbuf((char *)buf, 4);
++ if (G.zip64)
++ shy += 8 -readbuf((char *)buf, 8); /* skip eight more
for ZIP64 */
++ if (shy)
++ error =PK_ERR;
++ }
++meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch new file +10
-0+ return error; + + } /* end function extract_or_test_member() */ +diff --git a/globals.c b/globals.c +index fa8cca5..1e0f608 100644 +--- a/globals.c ++++ b/globals.c +@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ Uz_Globs *globalsCtor() + # if (!defined(NO_TIMESTAMPS)) + uO.D_flag=1; /* default to '-D', no restoration of dirtimestamps */
+ # endif
++ G.cover = NULL; /* not allocated yet */
+ #endif
+meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch new file +8
-0+ uO.lflag=(-1); +diff --git a/globals.h b/globals.h +index 11b7215..2bdcdeb 100644 +--- a/globals.h ++++ b/globals.h +@@ -260,12 +260,15 @@ typedef struct Globals { + ecdir_rec ecrec; /* used in unzip.c, extract.c */ + z_stat statbuf; /* used by main, mapname,
check_for_newer*/
+
++ int zip64; /* true if Zip64 info in extra
field */
++meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch new file +7
-0+ int mem_mode; + uch *outbufptr; /* extract.c static */ + ulg outsize; /* extract.c static */ + int reported_backslash; /* extract.c static */ + int disk_full; + int newfile; ++ void **cover; /* used in extract.c for bombdetection */
+meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch new file +2
-0+ int didCRlast; /* fileio static */ + ulg numlines; /* fileio static: number oflines printed */
meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch new file +5
-0+diff --git a/process.c b/process.c +index a3c1a4d..208619c 100644 +--- a/process.c ++++ b/process.c +@@ -637,6 +637,13 @@ void free_G_buffers(__G) /* releases allmemory allocated in global vars */
meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch new file +23
-0+ } + #endif + ++ /* Free the cover span list and the cover structure. */ ++ if (G.cover != NULL) { ++ free(*(G.cover)); ++ free(G.cover); ++ G.cover = NULL; ++ } ++ + } /* end function free_G_buffers() */ + + +@@ -1905,6 +1912,7 @@ int getZip64Data(__G__ ef_buf, ef_len) + + #define Z64FLGS 0xffff + #define Z64FLGL 0xffffffff ++ G.zip64 = FALSE; + + if (ef_len == 0 || ef_buf == NULL) + return PK_COOL; +@@ -1964,6 +1972,8 @@ int getZip64Data(__G__ ef_buf, ef_len) + G.crec.disk_number_start = (zuvl_t)makelong(offset +
ef_buf);meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch new file +6
-0+ offset += 4; + } ++ ++ G.zip64 = TRUE; + #if 0 + break; /* Expect only one EF_PKSZ64 block.*/
+ #endif /* 0 */meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch new file +7
-0+diff --git a/unzip.h b/unzip.h +index 5b2a326..ed24a5b 100644 +--- a/unzip.h ++++ b/unzip.h +@@ -645,6 +645,7 @@ typedef struct _Uzp_cdir_Rec { + #define PK_NOZIP 9 /* zipfile not found */ + #define PK_PARAM 10 /* bad or illegal parametersspecified */
+ #define PK_FIND 11 /* no files found */ ++#define PK_BOMB 12 /* likely zip bomb */ + #define PK_DISK 50 /* disk full */ + #define PK_EOF 51 /* unexpected EOF */+
+--
+2.22.0.vfs.1.1.57.gbaf16c8(quoted diff) +0
-013232_p3.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019- 13232_p3.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fd26fdd833meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch new file +1
-0@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +From be88aa4811af47ca06d8b7dcda294f899eba70ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch new file +3
-0+From: Mark Adler <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2019 20:43:17 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Do not raise a zip bomb alert for a misplacedcentral
+ directory.meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch new file +12
-0+ +There is a zip-like file in the Firefox distribution, omni.ja, +which is a zip container with the central directory placed at the +start of the file instead of after the local entries as required +by the zip standard. This commit marks the actual location of the +central directory, as well as the end of central directory records, +as disallowed locations. This now permits such containers to not +raise a zip bomb alert, where in fact there are no overlaps. + +CVE: CVE-2019-13232 +Upstream-Status: Backport +[https://github.com/madler/unzip/commit/6d351831be705cc26d897db44f878a978f4138fc
]meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch new file +13
-0+ +Signed-off-by: Dan Tran <[email protected]> +--- + extract.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------ + process.c | 6 ++++++ + unzpriv.h | 10 ++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c +index 2bb72ba..a9dcca8 100644 +--- a/extract.c ++++ b/extract.c +@@ -495,8 +495,11 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
+ }
+ #endif /* !SFX ||SFX_EXDIR*/
+
+- /* One more: initialize cover structure for bomb detection.
Start with a
+- span that covers the central directory though the end of the
file. */
++ /* One more: initialize cover structure for bomb detection.
Start with
++ spans that cover any extra bytes at the start, the central
directory,
++ the end of central directory record (including the Zip64 end
of central
++ directory locator, if present), and the Zip64 end of central
directory
++ record, if present. */meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch new file +4
-0+ if (G.cover == NULL) { + G.cover = malloc(sizeof(cover_t)); + if (G.cover == NULL) { +@@ -508,15 +511,25 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G) /* returnPK-type error code */
meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch new file +8
-0+ ((cover_t *)G.cover)->max = 0; + } + ((cover_t *)G.cover)->num = 0; +- if ((G.extra_bytes != 0 && +- cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, 0, G.extra_bytes) != 0) || +- cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, ++ if (cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, + G.extra_bytes +G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory,
+- G.ziplen) != 0) { ++ G.extra_bytes +G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory +
++ G.ecrec.size_central_directory) != 0) {meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch new file +18
-1+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, + LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover))); + return PK_MEM; + } ++ if ((G.extra_bytes != 0 && ++ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, 0, G.extra_bytes) != 0) || ++ (G.ecrec.have_ecr64 && ++ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, G.ecrec.ec64_start, ++ G.ecrec.ec64_end) != 0) || ++ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, G.ecrec.ec_start, ++ G.ecrec.ec_end) != 0) { ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents))); ++ return PK_BOMB; ++ } + + /*----------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- + The basic idea of this function is as follows. Since thecentral di-
meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch new file +5
-0+diff --git a/process.c b/process.c +index 208619c..5f8f6c6 100644 +--- a/process.c ++++ b/process.c +@@ -1408,6 +1408,10 @@ static int find_ecrec64(__G__searchlen) /* return PK-class error */
+meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch new file +10
-0+ /* Now, we are (almost) sure that we have a Zip64 archive. */ + G.ecrec.have_ecr64 = 1; ++ G.ecrec.ec_start -= ECLOC64_SIZE+4; ++ G.ecrec.ec64_start = ecrec64_start_offset; ++ G.ecrec.ec64_end = ecrec64_start_offset + ++ 12 + makeint64(&byterec[ECREC64_LENGTH]); + + /* Update the "end-of-central-dir offset" for later checks. */ + G.real_ecrec_offset = ecrec64_start_offset; +@@ -1542,6 +1546,8 @@ static int find_ecrec(__G__searchlen) /* return PK-class error */
meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch new file +5
-0+ makelong(&byterec[OFFSET_START_CENTRAL_DIRECTORY]); + G.ecrec.zipfile_comment_length = + makeword(&byterec[ZIPFILE_COMMENT_LENGTH]); ++ G.ecrec.ec_start = G.real_ecrec_offset; ++ G.ecrec.ec_end = G.ecrec.ec_start + 22 +G.ecrec.zipfile_comment_length;
+
+ /* Now, we have to read the archive comment, BEFORE the file
pointer
+ is moved away backwards to seek for a Zip64 ECLOC64
structure.meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch new file +6
-0+diff --git a/unzpriv.h b/unzpriv.h +index c8d3eab..5e177c7 100644 +--- a/unzpriv.h ++++ b/unzpriv.h +@@ -2185,6 +2185,16 @@ typedef struct VMStimbuf { + int have_ecr64; /* valid Zip64 ecdir-recordexists */
+ intis_zip64_archive; /* Zip64 ecdir-record is
mandatory */
+ ushzipfile_comment_length;
++zusz_tec_start,ec_end; /* offsets of start and end
of the
++ end of central directory
record,
++ including if present the
Zip64
++ end of central directory
locator,
++ which immediately
precedes the
++ end of central directory
record */
++zusz_tec64_start,ec64_end; /* ifhave_ecr64is true,
then these
++ are the offsets of the
start and
++ end of the Zip64 end of
central
++ directory record */meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch new file +6
-0+ } ecdir_rec; + + +-- +2.22.0.vfs.1.1.57.gbaf16c8 +meta/recipes- renamed from meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb +0
-0extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb
indexdaba722722..464d73d0f3100644meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb +0
-0@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ SRC_URI ="${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/infozip/UnZip%206.x%20%28latest%29/UnZip%206.0 /
meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb +3
-0file://symlink.patch \ file://0001-unzip-fix-CVE-2018-1000035.patch \ file://CVE-2018-18384.patch \ + file://CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch \ + file://CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch \ + file://CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch \ " UPSTREAM_VERSION_UNKNOWN = "1"Signature · 2 lines
-- 2.17.1