EFI fixes for v5.4
Subsystems (5)
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerIngo, Thomas,
The v1 of this pull request/series was sent out last Wednesday, and appears to have slipped through the cracks. This is actually for the better, given that I had overlooked a patch that I had queued in the wrong place, so I have included it now for this v2.
Thanks,
Ard.
The following changes since commit 7d194c2100ad2a6dded545887d02754948ca5241:
Linux 5.4-rc4 (2019-10-20 15:56:22 -0400)
are available in the Git repository at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi.git tags/efi-urgent
for you to fetch changes up to 8a1022da89857a21556eb04f53d281eda94ef02d:
efi/efi_test: lock down /dev/efi_test and require CAP_SYS_ADMIN (2019-10-29 10:30:18 +0100)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Some more fixes for the EFI subsystem:
- Prevent boot problems on HyperV due to incorrect placement of the kernel
- Classify UEFI randomness as bootloader randomness
- Fix EFI boot for the Raspberry Pi2 running U-boot
- A capability/lockdown fix for the efi_test module.
- Some more odd fixes.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Ard Biesheuvel (1):
efi: libstub/arm: account for firmware reserved memory at the base of RAM
Dominik Brodowski (1):
efi/random: treat EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL output as bootloader randomness
Javier Martinez Canillas (1):
efi/efi_test: lock down /dev/efi_test and require CAP_SYS_ADMIN
Jerry Snitselaar (1):
efi/tpm: return -EINVAL when determining tpm final events log size fails
Kairui Song (1):
x86, efi: never relocate kernel below lowest acceptable address
Narendra K (1):
efi: Make CONFIG_EFI_RCI2_TABLE selectable on x86 only
arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 4 +++- drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig | 1 + drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 1 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm32-stub.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c | 24 ++++++++++-------------- drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.c | 8 ++++++++ drivers/firmware/efi/tpm.c | 1 + include/linux/efi.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 11 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerPATCH v2 1/6 efi: Make CONFIG_EFI_RCI2_TABLE selectable on x86 only
From: Narendra K <[email protected]>
For the EFI_RCI2_TABLE kconfig option, 'make oldconfig' asks the user for input on platforms where the option may not be applicable. This patch modifies the kconfig option to ask the user for input only when CONFIG_X86 or CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST is set to y.
--- drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -182,6 +182,7 @@ config RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION config EFI_RCI2_TABLE bool "EFI Runtime Configuration Interface Table Version 2 Support" + depends on X86 || COMPILE_TEST help Displays the content of the Runtime Configuration Interface Table version 2 on Dell EMC PowerEdge systems as a binary
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerPATCH v2 2/6 efi/tpm: return -EINVAL when determining tpm final events log size fails
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelFrom: Jerry Snitselaar <[email protected]>
Currently nothing checks the return value of efi_tpm_eventlog_init, but in case that changes in the future make sure an error is returned when it fails to determine the tpm final events log size.
--- drivers/firmware/efi/tpm.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/firmware/efi/tpm.c +1 -0
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ int __init efi_tpm_eventlog_init(void)if (tbl_size <0 ) {pr_err (FW_BUG "Failed to parse event in TPM Final Events Log\n" ); + ret = -EINVAL ; goto out_calc; }
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerPATCH v2 4/6 efi: libstub/arm: account for firmware reserved memory at the base of RAM
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelFrom: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
The EFI stubloader for ARM starts out by allocating a 32 MB window at the base of RAM, in order to ensure that the decompressor (which blindly copies the uncompressed kernel into that window) does not overwrite other allocations that are made while running in the context of the EFI firmware.
In some cases, (e.g., U-Boot running on the Raspberry Pi 2), this is causing boot failures because this initial allocation conflicts with a page of reserved memory at the base of RAM that contains the SMP spin tables and other pieces of firmware data and which was put there by the bootloader under the assumption that the TEXT_OFFSET window right below the kernel is only used partially during early boot, and will be left alone once the memory reservations are processed and taken into account.
So let's permit reserved memory regions to exist in the region starting at the base of RAM, and ending at TEXT_OFFSET - 5 * PAGE_SIZE, which is the window below the kernel that is not touched by the early boot code.
--- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 1 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm32-stub.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ lib-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) += arm-stub.o fdt.o string.o random.o \ lib-$(CONFIG_ARM) += arm32-stub.o lib-$(CONFIG_ARM64) += arm64-stub.o +CFLAGS_arm32-stub.o := -DTEXT_OFFSET=$(TEXT_OFFSET) CFLAGS_arm64-stub.o := -DTEXT_OFFSET=$(TEXT_OFFSET) #
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm32-stub.c +13 -3
@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ efi_status_t handle_kernel_image(efi_system_table_t *sys_table,unsigned long dram_base, efi_loaded_image_t *image) { + unsigned long kernel_base;efi_status_t status;/*
@@ -204,9 +205,18 @@ efi_status_t handle_kernel_image(efi_system_table_t *sys_table,* loaded. These assumptions are made by the decompressor, * before any memory map is available. */ - dram_base =round_up (dram_base,SZ_128M ); + kernel_base =round_up (dram_base,SZ_128M ); - status =reserve_kernel_base (sys_table, dram_base, reserve_addr, +/* +* Note that some platforms (notably, the Raspberry Pi 2) put +* spin-tables and other pieces of firmware at the base of RAM, +* abusing the fact that the window of TEXT_OFFSET bytes at the +* base of the kernel image is only partially used at the moment. +* (Up to 5 pages are used for the swapper page tables) +*/ + kernel_base +=TEXT_OFFSET -5 *PAGE_SIZE ; + + status =reserve_kernel_base (sys_table, kernel_base, reserve_addr, reserve_size);if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) {pr_efi_err (sys_table,"Unable to allocate memory for uncompressed kernel.\n" );
@@ -220,7 +230,7 @@ efi_status_t handle_kernel_image(efi_system_table_t *sys_table, *image_size = image->image_size; status =efi_relocate_kernel (sys_table, image_addr, *image_size, *image_size, - dram_base +MAX_UNCOMP_KERNEL_SIZE ,0 ); + kernel_base +MAX_UNCOMP_KERNEL_SIZE ,0 );if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) {pr_efi_err (sys_table,"Failed to relocate kernel.\n" );efi_free (sys_table, *reserve_size, *reserve_addr);
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerPATCH v2 5/6 x86, efi: never relocate kernel below lowest acceptable address
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelFrom: Kairui Song <[email protected]>
Currently, kernel fails to boot on some HyperV VMs when using EFI. And it's a potential issue on all x86 platforms.
It's caused by broken kernel relocation on EFI systems, when below three conditions are met:
1. Kernel image is not loaded to the default address (LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR) by the loader.
2. There isn't enough room to contain the kernel, starting from the default load address (eg. something else occupied part the region).
3. In the memmap provided by EFI firmware, there is a memory region starts below LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR, and suitable for containing the kernel.
EFI stub will perform a kernel relocation when condition 1 is met. But due to condition 2, EFI stub can't relocate kernel to the preferred address, so it fallback to ask EFI firmware to alloc lowest usable memory region, got the low region mentioned in condition 3, and relocated kernel there.
It's incorrect to relocate the kernel below LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR. This is the lowest acceptable kernel relocation address.
The first thing goes wrong is in arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S. Kernel decompression will force use LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR as the output address if kernel is located below it. Then the relocation before decompression, which move kernel to the end of the decompression buffer, will overwrite other memory region, as there is no enough memory there.
To fix it, just don't let EFI stub relocate the kernel to any address lower than lowest acceptable address.
--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 4 +++- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm32-stub.c | 2 +- .../firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c | 24 ++++++++----------- include/linux/efi.h | 18 ++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c +3 -1
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#include <asm/e820/types.h> #include <asm/setup.h> #include <asm/desc.h> +#include <asm/boot.h> #include "../string.h" #include "eboot.h"
@@ -813,7 +814,8 @@ efi_main(struct efi_config *c, struct boot_params *boot_params) status =efi_relocate_kernel (sys_table, &bzimage_addr, hdr->init_size, hdr->init_size, hdr->pref_address, - hdr->kernel_alignment); + hdr->kernel_alignment, +LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR );if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) {efi_printk (sys_table,"efi_relocate_kernel() failed!\n" ); goto fail;
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm32-stub.c +1 -1
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ efi_status_t handle_kernel_image(efi_system_table_t *sys_table, *image_size = image->image_size; status =efi_relocate_kernel (sys_table, image_addr, *image_size, *image_size, - kernel_base +MAX_UNCOMP_KERNEL_SIZE ,0 ); + kernel_base +MAX_UNCOMP_KERNEL_SIZE ,0 ,0 );if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) {pr_efi_err (sys_table,"Failed to relocate kernel.\n" );efi_free (sys_table, *reserve_size, *reserve_addr);
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c +10 -14
@@ -260,11 +260,11 @@ efi_status_t efi_high_alloc(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, }/* -* Allocate at the lowest possible address. +* Allocate at the lowest possible address that is not below 'min'. */ -efi_status_t efi_low_alloc (efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, -unsigned long size,unsigned long align, -unsigned long *addr) +efi_status_t efi_low_alloc_above (efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, +unsigned long size,unsigned long align, +unsigned long *addr,unsigned long min) {unsigned long map_size, desc_size, buff_size;efi_memory_desc_t *map;
@@ -311,13 +311,8 @@ efi_status_t efi_low_alloc(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, start = desc->phys_addr; end = start + desc->num_pages *EFI_PAGE_SIZE ; -/* -* Don't allocate at 0x0. It will confuse code that -* checks pointers against NULL. Skip the first 8 -* bytes so we start at a nice even number. -*/ -if (start ==0x0 ) - start +=8 ; +if (start < min) + start = min; start =round_up (start, align);if ((start + size) > end)
@@ -698,7 +693,8 @@ efi_status_t efi_relocate_kernel(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,unsigned long image_size, unsigned long alloc_size, unsigned long preferred_addr, - unsigned long alignment) + unsigned long alignment, + unsigned long min_addr) { unsigned long cur_image_addr;unsigned long new_addr =0 ;
@@ -731,8 +727,8 @@ efi_status_t efi_relocate_kernel(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,* possible. */ if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) { - status =efi_low_alloc (sys_table_arg, alloc_size, alignment, - &new_addr); + status =efi_low_alloc_above (sys_table_arg, alloc_size, + alignment, &new_addr, min_addr); }if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) {pr_efi_err (sys_table_arg,"Failed to allocate usable memory for kernel.\n" );
include/linux/efi.h +16 -2
@@ -1579,9 +1579,22 @@ char *efi_convert_cmdline(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,efi_status_t efi_get_memory_map (efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,struct efi_boot_memmap *map); +efi_status_t efi_low_alloc_above (efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, +unsigned long size,unsigned long align, +unsigned long *addr,unsigned long min); + +static inline efi_status_t efi_low_alloc (efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,unsigned long size,unsigned long align, -unsigned long *addr); +unsigned long *addr) +{ +/* +* Don't allocate at 0x0. It will confuse code that +* checks pointers against NULL. Skip the first 8 +* bytes so we start at a nice even number. +*/ +return efi_low_alloc_above (sys_table_arg, size, align, addr,0x8 ); +} efi_status_t efi_high_alloc(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, unsigned long size, unsigned long align,
@@ -1592,7 +1605,8 @@ efi_status_t efi_relocate_kernel(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,unsigned long image_size, unsigned long alloc_size, unsigned long preferred_addr, - unsigned long alignment); + unsigned long alignment, + unsigned long min_addr); efi_status_t handle_cmdline_files(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, efi_loaded_image_t *image,
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerPATCH v2 6/6 efi/efi_test: lock down /dev/efi_test and require CAP_SYS_ADMIN
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelFrom: Javier Martinez Canillas <[email protected]>
The driver exposes EFI runtime services to user-space through an IOCTL interface, calling the EFI services function pointers directly without using the efivar API.
Disallow access to the /dev/efi_test character device when the kernel is locked down to prevent arbitrary user-space to call EFI runtime services.
Also require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to open the chardev to prevent unprivileged users to call the EFI runtime services, instead of just relying on the chardev file mode bits for this.
The main user of this driver is the fwts [0] tool that already checks if the effective user ID is 0 and fails otherwise. So this change shouldn't cause any regression to this tool.
[0]: https://wiki.ubuntu.com/FirmwareTestSuite/Reference/uefivarinfo
--- drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.c | 8 ++++++++ include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.c +8 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/proc_fs.h> #include <linux/efi.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -717,6 +718,13 @@ static long efi_test_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,static int efi_test_open (struct inode *inode,struct file *file) { +int ret =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST ); + +if (ret) +return ret; + +if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EACCES ;/* * nothing special to do here * We do accept multiple open files at the same time as we
include/linux/security.h +1 -0
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {LOCKDOWN_NONE ,LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE ,LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM , +LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST ,LOCKDOWN_KEXEC ,LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION , LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS,
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +1 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ static const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none", [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading", [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port", + [LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access", [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images", [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation", [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access",
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerPATCH v2 3/6 efi/random: treat EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL output as bootloader randomness
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelFrom: Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>
Commit 428826f5358c ("fdt: add support for rng-seed") introduced add_bootloader_randomness(), permitting randomness provided by the bootloader or firmware to be credited as entropy. However, the fact that the UEFI support code was already wired into the RNG subsystem via a call to add_device_randomness() was overlooked, and so it was not converted at the same time.
Note that this UEFI (v2.4 or newer) feature is currently only implemented for EFI stub booting on ARM, and further note that CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER must be enabled, and this should be done only if there indeed is sufficient trust in the bootloader _and_ its source of randomness.
--- drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +1 -1
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(void *config_tables, int count, int sz, sizeof(*seed) + size);if (seed !=NULL ) {pr_notice ("seeding entropy pool\n" ); -add_device_randomness (seed->bits, seed->size); +add_bootloader_randomness (seed->bits, seed->size);early_memunmap (seed,sizeof (*seed) + size); }else {pr_err ("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n" );
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] efi/random: treat EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL output as bootloader randomness
Hi Ard,
Quoted 16 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
From: Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>
Commit
428826f5358c("fdt: add support for rng-seed") introducedadd_bootloader_randomness(), permitting randomness provided by the bootloader or firmware to be credited as entropy. However, the fact that the UEFI support code was already wired into the RNG subsystem via a call toadd_device_randomness()was overlooked, and so it was not converted at the same time.Note that this UEFI (v2.4 or newer) feature is currently only implemented for EFI stub booting on ARM, and further note that
CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADERmust be enabled, and this should be done only if there indeed is sufficient trust in the bootloader _and_ its source of randomness.
Quoted 3 lines
Signed-off-by Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>[ardb: update commit log]Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Seems my Tested-by was dropped which I provide for the RFC version of this patch.
See <https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg12281.html>
for details.
I can provide a similar Tested-by for this version as well.
Thanks,
Bhupesh
Quoted 20 lines
--- drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +1
-2@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(void *config_tables, int count, int sz, sizeof(*seed) + size);if (seed !=NULL ) {pr_notice ("seeding entropy pool\n" ); -add_device_randomness (seed->bits, seed->size); +add_bootloader_randomness (seed->bits, seed->size);early_memunmap (seed,sizeof (*seed) + size); }else {pr_err ("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n" ); --2.17.1
Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] efi/random: treat EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL output as bootloader randomness
Quoted 24 lines · Bhupesh Sharma
Hi Ard,
Quoted 16 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
From: Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>
Commit
428826f5358c("fdt: add support for rng-seed") introducedadd_bootloader_randomness(), permitting randomness provided by the bootloader or firmware to be credited as entropy. However, the fact that the UEFI support code was already wired into the RNG subsystem via a call toadd_device_randomness()was overlooked, and so it was not converted at the same time.Note that this UEFI (v2.4 or newer) feature is currently only implemented for EFI stub booting on ARM, and further note that
CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADERmust be enabled, and this should be done only if there indeed is sufficient trust in the bootloader _and_ its source of randomness.Quoted 3 lines
Signed-off-by Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>[ardb: update commit log]Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Quoted 7 lines
Seems my Tested-by was dropped which I provide for the RFC version of this patch.
See <https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg12281.html>
for details.I can provide a similar Tested-by for this version as well.
Thanks Bhupesh
Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] efi/random: treat EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL output as bootloader randomness
Quoted 30 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 29 lines · Bhupesh Sharma
Hi Ard,
Quoted 16 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
From: Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>
Commit
428826f5358c("fdt: add support for rng-seed") introducedadd_bootloader_randomness(), permitting randomness provided by the bootloader or firmware to be credited as entropy. However, the fact that the UEFI support code was already wired into the RNG subsystem via a call toadd_device_randomness()was overlooked, and so it was not converted at the same time.Note that this UEFI (v2.4 or newer) feature is currently only implemented for EFI stub booting on ARM, and further note that
CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADERmust be enabled, and this should be done only if there indeed is sufficient trust in the bootloader _and_ its source of randomness.Quoted 3 lines
Signed-off-by Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>[ardb: update commit log]Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>Seems my Tested-by was dropped which I provide for the RFC version of this patch.
See <https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg12281.html>
for details.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I can provide a similar Tested-by for this version as well.
Thanks Bhupesh
I've added Bhupesh's Tested-by to the commit - no need to resend.
I've picked up all 6 EFI fixes, will push them out after a bit of testing
- sorry about the delay!
Thanks,
Ingo
[tip: efi/urgent] efi: Make CONFIG_EFI_RCI2_TABLE selectable on x86 only
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelThe following commit has been merged into the efi/urgent branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the efi/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 0b6b30c65621fc11a799ca71241f52d8fd9e334c Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/0b6b30c65621fc11a799ca71241f52d8fd9e334c Author: Narendra K <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 29 Oct 2019 18:37:50 +01:00 Committer: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Thu, 31 Oct 2019 09:40:16 +01:00
efi: Make CONFIG_EFI_RCI2_TABLE selectable on x86 only
For the EFI_RCI2_TABLE Kconfig option, 'make oldconfig' asks the user for input on platforms where the option may not be applicable. This patch modifies the Kconfig option to ask the user for input only when CONFIG_X86 or CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST is set to y.
--- drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -182,6 +182,7 @@ config RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION config EFI_RCI2_TABLE bool "EFI Runtime Configuration Interface Table Version 2 Support" + depends on X86 || COMPILE_TEST help Displays the content of the Runtime Configuration Interface Table version 2 on Dell EMC PowerEdge systems as a binary
[tip: efi/urgent] efi/efi_test: Lock down /dev/efi_test and require CAP_SYS_ADMIN
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelThe following commit has been merged into the efi/urgent branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the efi/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 359efcc2c910117d2faf704ce154e91fc976d37f Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/359efcc2c910117d2faf704ce154e91fc976d37f Author: Javier Martinez Canillas <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 29 Oct 2019 18:37:55 +01:00 Committer: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Thu, 31 Oct 2019 09:40:21 +01:00
efi/efi_test: Lock down /dev/efi_test and require CAP_SYS_ADMIN
The driver exposes EFI runtime services to user-space through an IOCTL interface, calling the EFI services function pointers directly without using the efivar API.
Disallow access to the /dev/efi_test character device when the kernel is locked down to prevent arbitrary user-space to call EFI runtime services.
Also require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to open the chardev to prevent unprivileged users to call the EFI runtime services, instead of just relying on the chardev file mode bits for this.
The main user of this driver is the fwts [0] tool that already checks if the effective user ID is 0 and fails otherwise. So this change shouldn't cause any regression to this tool.
[0]: https://wiki.ubuntu.com/FirmwareTestSuite/Reference/uefivarinfo
--- drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.c | 8 ++++++++ include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.c +8 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/proc_fs.h> #include <linux/efi.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -717,6 +718,13 @@ static long efi_test_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,static int efi_test_open (struct inode *inode,struct file *file) { +int ret =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST ); + +if (ret) +return ret; + +if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EACCES ;/* * nothing special to do here * We do accept multiple open files at the same time as we
include/linux/security.h +1 -0
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {LOCKDOWN_NONE ,LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE ,LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM , +LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST ,LOCKDOWN_KEXEC ,LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION , LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS,
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +1 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ static const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none", [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading", [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port", + [LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access", [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images", [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation", [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access",
[tip: efi/urgent] efi/tpm: Return -EINVAL when determining tpm final events log size fails
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelThe following commit has been merged into the efi/urgent branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the efi/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 2bb6a81633cb47dcba4c9f75605cbe49e6b73d60 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/2bb6a81633cb47dcba4c9f75605cbe49e6b73d60 Author: Jerry Snitselaar <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 29 Oct 2019 18:37:51 +01:00 Committer: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Thu, 31 Oct 2019 09:40:17 +01:00
efi/tpm: Return -EINVAL when determining tpm final events log size fails
Currently nothing checks the return value of efi_tpm_eventlog_init(), but in case that changes in the future make sure an error is returned when it fails to determine the tpm final events log size.
--- drivers/firmware/efi/tpm.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/firmware/efi/tpm.c +1 -0
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ int __init efi_tpm_eventlog_init(void)if (tbl_size <0 ) {pr_err (FW_BUG "Failed to parse event in TPM Final Events Log\n" ); + ret = -EINVAL ; goto out_calc; }
[tip: efi/urgent] efi/random: Treat EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL output as bootloader randomness
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelThe following commit has been merged into the efi/urgent branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the efi/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 18b915ac6b0ac5ba7ded03156860f60a9f16df2b Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/18b915ac6b0ac5ba7ded03156860f60a9f16df2b Author: Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 29 Oct 2019 18:37:52 +01:00 Committer: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Thu, 31 Oct 2019 09:40:18 +01:00
efi/random: Treat EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL output as bootloader randomness
Commit 428826f5358c ("fdt: add support for rng-seed") introduced add_bootloader_randomness(), permitting randomness provided by the bootloader or firmware to be credited as entropy. However, the fact that the UEFI support code was already wired into the RNG subsystem via a call to add_device_randomness() was overlooked, and so it was not converted at the same time.
Note that this UEFI (v2.4 or newer) feature is currently only implemented for EFI stub booting on ARM, and further note that CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER must be enabled, and this should be done only if there indeed is sufficient trust in the bootloader _and_ its source of randomness.
[ ardb: update commit log ]
--- drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +1 -1
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(void *config_tables, int count, int sz, sizeof(*seed) + size);if (seed !=NULL ) {pr_notice ("seeding entropy pool\n" ); -add_device_randomness (seed->bits, seed->size); +add_bootloader_randomness (seed->bits, seed->size);early_memunmap (seed,sizeof (*seed) + size); }else {pr_err ("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n" );
[tip: efi/urgent] efi: libstub/arm: Account for firmware reserved memory at the base of RAM
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelThe following commit has been merged into the efi/urgent branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the efi/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 41cd96fa149b29684ebd38759fefb07f9c7d5276 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/41cd96fa149b29684ebd38759fefb07f9c7d5276 Author: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 29 Oct 2019 18:37:53 +01:00 Committer: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Thu, 31 Oct 2019 09:40:19 +01:00
efi: libstub/arm: Account for firmware reserved memory at the base of RAM
The EFI stubloader for ARM starts out by allocating a 32 MB window at the base of RAM, in order to ensure that the decompressor (which blindly copies the uncompressed kernel into that window) does not overwrite other allocations that are made while running in the context of the EFI firmware.
In some cases, (e.g., U-Boot running on the Raspberry Pi 2), this is causing boot failures because this initial allocation conflicts with a page of reserved memory at the base of RAM that contains the SMP spin tables and other pieces of firmware data and which was put there by the bootloader under the assumption that the TEXT_OFFSET window right below the kernel is only used partially during early boot, and will be left alone once the memory reservations are processed and taken into account.
So let's permit reserved memory regions to exist in the region starting at the base of RAM, and ending at TEXT_OFFSET - 5 * PAGE_SIZE, which is the window below the kernel that is not touched by the early boot code.
--- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 1 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm32-stub.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ lib-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) += arm-stub.o fdt.o string.o random.o \ lib-$(CONFIG_ARM) += arm32-stub.o lib-$(CONFIG_ARM64) += arm64-stub.o +CFLAGS_arm32-stub.o := -DTEXT_OFFSET=$(TEXT_OFFSET) CFLAGS_arm64-stub.o := -DTEXT_OFFSET=$(TEXT_OFFSET) #
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm32-stub.c +13 -3
@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ efi_status_t handle_kernel_image(efi_system_table_t *sys_table,unsigned long dram_base, efi_loaded_image_t *image) { + unsigned long kernel_base;efi_status_t status;/*
@@ -204,9 +205,18 @@ efi_status_t handle_kernel_image(efi_system_table_t *sys_table,* loaded. These assumptions are made by the decompressor, * before any memory map is available. */ - dram_base =round_up (dram_base,SZ_128M ); + kernel_base =round_up (dram_base,SZ_128M ); - status =reserve_kernel_base (sys_table, dram_base, reserve_addr, +/* +* Note that some platforms (notably, the Raspberry Pi 2) put +* spin-tables and other pieces of firmware at the base of RAM, +* abusing the fact that the window of TEXT_OFFSET bytes at the +* base of the kernel image is only partially used at the moment. +* (Up to 5 pages are used for the swapper page tables) +*/ + kernel_base +=TEXT_OFFSET -5 *PAGE_SIZE ; + + status =reserve_kernel_base (sys_table, kernel_base, reserve_addr, reserve_size);if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) {pr_efi_err (sys_table,"Unable to allocate memory for uncompressed kernel.\n" );
@@ -220,7 +230,7 @@ efi_status_t handle_kernel_image(efi_system_table_t *sys_table, *image_size = image->image_size; status =efi_relocate_kernel (sys_table, image_addr, *image_size, *image_size, - dram_base +MAX_UNCOMP_KERNEL_SIZE ,0 ); + kernel_base +MAX_UNCOMP_KERNEL_SIZE ,0 );if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) {pr_efi_err (sys_table,"Failed to relocate kernel.\n" );efi_free (sys_table, *reserve_size, *reserve_addr);
[tip: efi/urgent] x86, efi: Never relocate kernel below lowest acceptable address
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelThe following commit has been merged into the efi/urgent branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the efi/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 220dd7699c46d5940115bd797b01b2ab047c87b8 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/220dd7699c46d5940115bd797b01b2ab047c87b8 Author: Kairui Song <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 29 Oct 2019 18:37:54 +01:00 Committer: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Thu, 31 Oct 2019 09:40:19 +01:00
x86, efi: Never relocate kernel below lowest acceptable address
Currently, kernel fails to boot on some HyperV VMs when using EFI. And it's a potential issue on all x86 platforms.
It's caused by broken kernel relocation on EFI systems, when below three conditions are met:
1. Kernel image is not loaded to the default address (LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR) by the loader.
2. There isn't enough room to contain the kernel, starting from the default load address (eg. something else occupied part the region).
3. In the memmap provided by EFI firmware, there is a memory region starts below LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR, and suitable for containing the kernel.
EFI stub will perform a kernel relocation when condition 1 is met. But due to condition 2, EFI stub can't relocate kernel to the preferred address, so it fallback to ask EFI firmware to alloc lowest usable memory region, got the low region mentioned in condition 3, and relocated kernel there.
It's incorrect to relocate the kernel below LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR. This is the lowest acceptable kernel relocation address.
The first thing goes wrong is in arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S. Kernel decompression will force use LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR as the output address if kernel is located below it. Then the relocation before decompression, which move kernel to the end of the decompression buffer, will overwrite other memory region, as there is no enough memory there.
To fix it, just don't let EFI stub relocate the kernel to any address lower than lowest acceptable address.
[ ardb: introduce efi_low_alloc_above() to reduce the scope of the change ]
--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 4 ++- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm32-stub.c | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c | 24 +++++++---------- include/linux/efi.h | 18 +++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c +3 -1
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#include <asm/e820/types.h> #include <asm/setup.h> #include <asm/desc.h> +#include <asm/boot.h> #include "../string.h" #include "eboot.h"
@@ -813,7 +814,8 @@ efi_main(struct efi_config *c, struct boot_params *boot_params) status =efi_relocate_kernel (sys_table, &bzimage_addr, hdr->init_size, hdr->init_size, hdr->pref_address, - hdr->kernel_alignment); + hdr->kernel_alignment, +LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR );if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) {efi_printk (sys_table,"efi_relocate_kernel() failed!\n" ); goto fail;
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm32-stub.c +1 -1
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ efi_status_t handle_kernel_image(efi_system_table_t *sys_table, *image_size = image->image_size; status =efi_relocate_kernel (sys_table, image_addr, *image_size, *image_size, - kernel_base +MAX_UNCOMP_KERNEL_SIZE ,0 ); + kernel_base +MAX_UNCOMP_KERNEL_SIZE ,0 ,0 );if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) {pr_efi_err (sys_table,"Failed to relocate kernel.\n" );efi_free (sys_table, *reserve_size, *reserve_addr);
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c +10 -14
@@ -260,11 +260,11 @@ fail: }/* -* Allocate at the lowest possible address. +* Allocate at the lowest possible address that is not below 'min'. */ -efi_status_t efi_low_alloc (efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, -unsigned long size,unsigned long align, -unsigned long *addr) +efi_status_t efi_low_alloc_above (efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, +unsigned long size,unsigned long align, +unsigned long *addr,unsigned long min) {unsigned long map_size, desc_size, buff_size;efi_memory_desc_t *map;
@@ -311,13 +311,8 @@ efi_status_t efi_low_alloc(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, start = desc->phys_addr; end = start + desc->num_pages *EFI_PAGE_SIZE ; -/* -* Don't allocate at 0x0. It will confuse code that -* checks pointers against NULL. Skip the first 8 -* bytes so we start at a nice even number. -*/ -if (start ==0x0 ) - start +=8 ; +if (start < min) + start = min; start =round_up (start, align);if ((start + size) > end)
@@ -698,7 +693,8 @@ efi_status_t efi_relocate_kernel(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,unsigned long image_size, unsigned long alloc_size, unsigned long preferred_addr, - unsigned long alignment) + unsigned long alignment, + unsigned long min_addr) { unsigned long cur_image_addr;unsigned long new_addr =0 ;
@@ -731,8 +727,8 @@ efi_status_t efi_relocate_kernel(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,* possible. */ if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) { - status =efi_low_alloc (sys_table_arg, alloc_size, alignment, - &new_addr); + status =efi_low_alloc_above (sys_table_arg, alloc_size, + alignment, &new_addr, min_addr); }if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) {pr_efi_err (sys_table_arg,"Failed to allocate usable memory for kernel.\n" );
include/linux/efi.h +16 -2
@@ -1579,9 +1579,22 @@ char *efi_convert_cmdline(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,efi_status_t efi_get_memory_map (efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,struct efi_boot_memmap *map); +efi_status_t efi_low_alloc_above (efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, +unsigned long size,unsigned long align, +unsigned long *addr,unsigned long min); + +static inline efi_status_t efi_low_alloc (efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,unsigned long size,unsigned long align, -unsigned long *addr); +unsigned long *addr) +{ +/* +* Don't allocate at 0x0. It will confuse code that +* checks pointers against NULL. Skip the first 8 +* bytes so we start at a nice even number. +*/ +return efi_low_alloc_above (sys_table_arg, size, align, addr,0x8 ); +} efi_status_t efi_high_alloc(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, unsigned long size, unsigned long align,
@@ -1592,7 +1605,8 @@ efi_status_t efi_relocate_kernel(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,unsigned long image_size, unsigned long alloc_size, unsigned long preferred_addr, - unsigned long alignment); + unsigned long alignment, + unsigned long min_addr); efi_status_t handle_cmdline_files(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, efi_loaded_image_t *image,
Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] efi/random: treat EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL output as bootloader randomness
In reply to Ingo MolnarQuoted 37 lines · Ingo Molnar
Quoted 33 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 31 lines · Bhupesh Sharma
Hi Ard,
Quoted 16 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
From: Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>
Commit
428826f5358c("fdt: add support for rng-seed") introducedadd_bootloader_randomness(), permitting randomness provided by the bootloader or firmware to be credited as entropy. However, the fact that the UEFI support code was already wired into the RNG subsystem via a call toadd_device_randomness()was overlooked, and so it was not converted at the same time.Note that this UEFI (v2.4 or newer) feature is currently only implemented for EFI stub booting on ARM, and further note that
CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADERmust be enabled, and this should be done only if there indeed is sufficient trust in the bootloader _and_ its source of randomness.Quoted 3 lines
Signed-off-by Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>[ardb: update commit log]Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>Seems my Tested-by was dropped which I provide for the RFC version of this patch.
See <https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg12281.html>
for details.I can provide a similar Tested-by for this version as well.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Thanks Bhupesh
I've added Bhupesh's Tested-by to the commit - no need to resend.
I've picked up all 6 EFI fixes, will push them out after a bit of testing
- sorry about the delay!
No worries, thanks for picking them up.