selinux: cache the SID -> context string translation
Subsystems (2)
PATCH v4 1/1 selinux: cache the SID -> context string translation
Translating a context struct to string can be quite slow, especially if the context has a lot of category bits set. This can cause quite noticeable performance impact in situations where the translation needs to be done repeatedly. A common example is a UNIX datagram socket with the SO_PASSSEC option enabled, which is used e.g. by systemd-journald when receiving log messages via datagram socket. This scenario can be reproduced with:
cat /dev/urandom | base64 | logger &
timeout 30s perf record -p $(pidof systemd-journald) -a -g
kill %1
perf report -g none --pretty raw | grep security_secid_to_secctxBefore the caching introduced by this patch, computing the context string (security_secid_to_secctx() function) takes up ~65% of systemd-journald's CPU time (assuming a context with 1024 categories set and Fedora x86_64 release kernel configs). After this patch (assuming near-perfect cache hit ratio) this overhead is reduced to just ~2%.
This patch addresses the issue by caching a certain number (compile-time configurable) of recently used context strings to speed up repeated translations of the same context, while using only a small amount of memory.
The cache is integrated into the existing sidtab table by adding a field to each entry, which when not NULL contains an RCU-protected pointer to a cache entry containing the cached string. The cache entries are kept in a linked list sorted according to how recently they were used. On a cache miss when the cache is full, the least recently used entry is removed to make space for the new entry.
The patch migrates security_sid_to_context_core() to use the cache (also a few other functions where it was possible without too much fuss, but these mostly use the translation for logging in case of error, which is rare).
---
Changes in v4:
- use rcu_dereference_protected() instead of rcu_dereference_raw() in sidtab_sid2str_put()
- fix typo in comment
- remove unnecessary rcu_head_init() call
Changes in v3:
- add [email protected] and Paul McKenney to Cc for review of the RCU logic
- add __rcu annotation to the cache entry pointer (sidtab.c now passes sparse checks with C=1)
Changes in v2:
- skip sidtab_sid2str_put() when in non-task context to prevent deadlock while avoiding the need to lock the spinlock with irqsave/-restore (which is slower)
security/selinux/Kconfig | 11 ++ security/selinux/ss/services.c | 138 +++++++++++++++---------- security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 179 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h | 58 +++++++++-- 4 files changed, 294 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-)
security/selinux/Kconfig +11 -0
@@ -85,3 +85,14 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE via /selinux/checkreqprot if authorized by policy. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 0. + +config SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE + int "NSA SELinux SID to context string translation cache size" + depends on SECURITY_SELINUX + default 256 + help + This option defines the size of the internal SID -> context string + cache, which improves the performance of context to string + conversion. Setting this option to 0 disables the cache completely. + + If unsure, keep the default value.
security/selinux/ss/services.c +84 -54
299 lines not on this page · raw message
security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c +150 -29
309 lines not on this page · raw message
security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h +49 -9
103 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Quoted 32 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
Translating a context struct to string can be quite slow, especially if the context has a lot of category bits set. This can cause quite noticeable performance impact in situations where the translation needs to be done repeatedly. A common example is a UNIX datagram socket with the
SO_PASSSECoption enabled, which is used e.g. by systemd-journald when receiving log messages via datagram socket. This scenario can be reproduced with:cat /dev/urandom | base64 | logger & timeout 30s perf record -p $(pidof systemd-journald) -a -g kill %1 perf report -g none --pretty raw | grep security_secid_to_secctxBefore the caching introduced by this patch, computing the context string (
security_secid_to_secctx()function) takes up ~65% of systemd-journald's CPU time (assuming a context with 1024 categories set and Fedorax86_64release kernel configs). After this patch (assuming near-perfect cache hit ratio) this overhead is reduced to just ~2%.This patch addresses the issue by caching a certain number (compile-time configurable) of recently used context strings to speed up repeated translations of the same context, while using only a small amount of memory.
The cache is integrated into the existing sidtab table by adding a field to each entry, which when not NULL contains an RCU-protected pointer to a cache entry containing the cached string. The cache entries are kept in a linked list sorted according to how recently they were used. On a cache miss when the cache is full, the least recently used entry is removed to make space for the new entry.
Quoted 8 lines
The patch migrates
security_sid_to_context_core()to use the cache (also a few other functions where it was possible without too much fuss, but these mostly use the translation for logging in case of error, which is rare).Cc Michal Sekletar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ondrej Mosnacek <[email protected]>
Quoted 808 lines
---
Changes in v4:
- usercu_dereference_protected()instead ofrcu_dereference_raw()insidtab_sid2str_put()
- fix typo in comment
- remove unnecessaryrcu_head_init()callChanges in v3:
- add [email protected] and Paul McKenney to Cc for review of the RCU logic
- add__rcuannotation to the cache entry pointer (sidtab.cnow passes sparse checks with C=1)Changes in v2:
- skipsidtab_sid2str_put()when in non-task context to prevent deadlock while avoiding the need to lock the spinlock with irqsave/-restore (which is slower)security/selinux/Kconfig | 11 ++ security/selinux/ss/services.c | 138 +++++++++++++++---------- security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 179 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h | 58 +++++++++-- 4 files changed, 294 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-)security/selinux/Kconfig +11
-0@@ -85,3 +85,14 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE via /selinux/checkreqprot if authorized by policy. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 0. + +config SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE + int "NSA SELinux SID to context string translation cache size" + depends on SECURITY_SELINUX + default 256 + help + This option defines the size of the internal SID -> context string + cache, which improves the performance of context to string + conversion. Setting this option to 0 disables the cache completely. + + If unsure, keep the default value.security/selinux/ss/services.c +84
-54@@ -91,6 +91,12 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *policydb,char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len); +static int sidtab_entry_to_string (struct policydb *policydb, +struct sidtab *sidtab, +struct sidtab_entry *entry, +char **scontext, +u32 *scontext_len); + static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb, struct context *scontext, struct context *tcontext,@@ -716,20 +722,21 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb, }static int security_validtrans_handle_fail (struct selinux_state *state, -struct context *ocontext, -struct context *ncontext, -struct context *tcontext, +struct sidtab_entry *oentry, +struct sidtab_entry *nentry, +struct sidtab_entry *tentry,u16 tclass) {struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb; +struct sidtab *sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;char *o =NULL , *n =NULL , *t =NULL ;u32 olen, nlen, tlen; -if (context_struct_to_string (p, ocontext, &o, &olen)) +if (sidtab_entry_to_string (p, sidtab, oentry, &o, &olen)) goto out; -if (context_struct_to_string (p, ncontext, &n, &nlen)) +if (sidtab_entry_to_string (p, sidtab, nentry, &n, &nlen)) goto out; -if (context_struct_to_string (p, tcontext, &t, &tlen)) +if (sidtab_entry_to_string (p, sidtab, tentry, &t, &tlen)) goto out;audit_log (audit_context (),GFP_ATOMIC ,AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR , "op=security_validate_transition seresult=denied"@@ -751,9 +758,9 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(struct selinux_state *state, {struct policydb *policydb;struct sidtab *sidtab; -struct context *ocontext; -struct context *ncontext; -struct context *tcontext; +struct sidtab_entry *oentry; +struct sidtab_entry *nentry; +struct sidtab_entry *tentry;struct class_datum *tclass_datum;struct constraint_node *constraint;u16 tclass;@@ -779,24 +786,24 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(struct selinux_state *state, } tclass_datum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass -1 ]; - ocontext =sidtab_search (sidtab, oldsid); -if (!ocontext) { + oentry =sidtab_search_entry (sidtab, oldsid); +if (!oentry) {pr_err ("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n" , __func__, oldsid); rc = -EINVAL ; goto out; } - ncontext =sidtab_search (sidtab, newsid); -if (!ncontext) { + nentry =sidtab_search_entry (sidtab, newsid); +if (!nentry) {pr_err ("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n" , __func__, newsid); rc = -EINVAL ; goto out; } - tcontext =sidtab_search (sidtab, tasksid); -if (!tcontext) { + tentry =sidtab_search_entry (sidtab, tasksid); +if (!tentry) {pr_err ("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n" , __func__, tasksid); rc = -EINVAL ;@@ -805,15 +812,16 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(struct selinux_state *state, constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;while (constraint) { -if (!constraint_expr_eval (policydb, ocontext, ncontext, - tcontext, constraint->expr)) { +if (!constraint_expr_eval (policydb, &oentry->context, + &nentry->context, &tentry->context, + constraint->expr)) {if (user) rc = -EPERM ;else rc =security_validtrans_handle_fail (state, - ocontext, - ncontext, - tcontext, + oentry, + nentry, + tentry, tclass); goto out; }@@ -855,7 +863,7 @@ int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state, {struct policydb *policydb;struct sidtab *sidtab; -struct context *old_context, *new_context; +struct sidtab_entry *old_entry, *new_entry;struct type_datum *type;int index;int rc;@@ -869,16 +877,16 @@ int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state, sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; rc = -EINVAL ; - old_context =sidtab_search (sidtab, old_sid); -if (!old_context) { + old_entry =sidtab_search_entry (sidtab, old_sid); +if (!old_entry) {pr_err ("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n" , __func__, old_sid); goto out; } rc = -EINVAL ; - new_context =sidtab_search (sidtab, new_sid); -if (!new_context) { + new_entry =sidtab_search_entry (sidtab, new_sid); +if (!new_entry) {pr_err ("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n" , __func__, new_sid); goto out;@@ -886,10 +894,10 @@ int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state, rc =0 ;/* type/domain unchanged */ -if (old_context->type == new_context->type) +if (old_entry->context.type == new_entry->context.type) goto out; - index = new_context->type; + index = new_entry->context.type;while (true) { type = policydb->type_val_to_struct[index -1 ];BUG_ON (!type);@@ -901,7 +909,7 @@ int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state,/* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */ rc =0 ; -if (type->bounds == old_context->type) +if (type->bounds == old_entry->context.type)break ; index = type->bounds;@@ -912,10 +920,10 @@ int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state,char *new_name =NULL ;u32 length; -if (!context_struct_to_string (policydb, old_context, - &old_name, &length) && - !context_struct_to_string (policydb, new_context, - &new_name, &length)) { +if (!sidtab_entry_to_string (policydb, sidtab, old_entry, + &old_name, &length) && + !sidtab_entry_to_string (policydb, sidtab, new_entry, + &new_name, &length)) {audit_log (audit_context (),GFP_ATOMIC ,AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR , "op=security_bounded_transition "@@ -1255,6 +1263,23 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *p,return 0 ; } +static int sidtab_entry_to_string (struct policydb *p, +struct sidtab *sidtab, +struct sidtab_entry *entry, +char **scontext,u32 *scontext_len) +{ +int rc =sidtab_sid2str_get (sidtab, entry, scontext, scontext_len); + +if (rc != -ENOENT ) +return rc; + + rc =context_struct_to_string (p, &entry->context, scontext, + scontext_len); +if (!rc && scontext) +sidtab_sid2str_put (sidtab, entry, *scontext, *scontext_len); +return rc; +} +#include "initial_sid_to_string.h" const char *security_get_initial_sid_context (u32 sid)@@ -1271,7 +1296,7 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(struct selinux_state *state, {struct policydb *policydb;struct sidtab *sidtab; -struct context *context; +struct sidtab_entry *entry;int rc =0 ;if (scontext)@@ -1302,21 +1327,23 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(struct selinux_state *state,read_lock (&state->ss->policy_rwlock); policydb = &state->ss->policydb; sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; +if (force) - context =sidtab_search_force (sidtab, sid); + entry =sidtab_search_entry_force (sidtab, sid);else - context =sidtab_search (sidtab, sid); -if (!context) { + entry =sidtab_search_entry (sidtab, sid); +if (!entry) {pr_err ("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n" , __func__, sid); rc = -EINVAL ; goto out_unlock; } -if (only_invalid && !context->len) - rc =0 ; -else - rc =context_struct_to_string (policydb, context, scontext, - scontext_len); +if (only_invalid && !entry->context.len) + goto out_unlock; + + rc =sidtab_entry_to_string (policydb, sidtab, entry, scontext, + scontext_len); + out_unlock:read_unlock (&state->ss->policy_rwlock); out:@@ -1574,19 +1601,20 @@ int security_context_to_sid_force(struct selinux_state *state,static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context (struct selinux_state *state, -struct context *scontext, -struct context *tcontext, +struct sidtab_entry *sentry, +struct sidtab_entry *tentry,u16 tclass,struct context *newcontext) {struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; +struct sidtab *sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;char *s =NULL , *t =NULL , *n =NULL ;u32 slen, tlen, nlen;struct audit_buffer *ab; -if (context_struct_to_string (policydb, scontext, &s, &slen)) +if (sidtab_entry_to_string (policydb, sidtab, sentry, &s, &slen)) goto out; -if (context_struct_to_string (policydb, tcontext, &t, &tlen)) +if (sidtab_entry_to_string (policydb, sidtab, tentry, &t, &tlen)) goto out;if (context_struct_to_string (policydb, newcontext, &n, &nlen)) goto out;@@ -1645,7 +1673,8 @@ static int security_compute_sid(struct selinux_state *state,struct policydb *policydb;struct sidtab *sidtab;struct class_datum *cladatum =NULL ; -struct context *scontext =NULL , *tcontext =NULL , newcontext; +struct context *scontext, *tcontext, newcontext; +struct sidtab_entry *sentry, *tentry;struct role_trans *roletr =NULL ;struct avtab_key avkey;struct avtab_datum *avdatum;@@ -1682,21 +1711,24 @@ static int security_compute_sid(struct selinux_state *state, policydb = &state->ss->policydb; sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; - scontext =sidtab_search (sidtab, ssid); -if (!scontext) { + sentry =sidtab_search_entry (sidtab, ssid); +if (!sentry) {pr_err ("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n" , __func__, ssid); rc = -EINVAL ; goto out_unlock; } - tcontext =sidtab_search (sidtab, tsid); -if (!tcontext) { + tentry =sidtab_search_entry (sidtab, tsid); +if (!tentry) {pr_err ("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n" , __func__, tsid); rc = -EINVAL ; goto out_unlock; } + scontext = &sentry->context; + tcontext = &tentry->context; +if (tclass && tclass <= policydb->p_classes.nprim) cladatum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass -1 ];@@ -1797,10 +1829,8 @@ static int security_compute_sid(struct selinux_state *state,/* Check the validity of the context. */ if (!policydb_context_isvalid (policydb, &newcontext)) { - rc =compute_sid_handle_invalid_context (state, scontext, - tcontext, - tclass, - &newcontext); + rc =compute_sid_handle_invalid_context (state, sentry, tentry, + tclass, &newcontext);if (rc) goto out_unlock; }security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c +150
-29@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@*/ #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/list.h> +#include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> @@ -17,6 +19,14 @@#include "security.h" #include "sidtab.h" +struct sidtab_str_cache { +struct rcu_head rcu_member; +struct list_head lru_member; +struct sidtab_entry *parent; +u32 len; +char str[]; +}; +int sidtab_init (struct sidtab *s) {u32 i;@@ -34,24 +44,33 @@ int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s) s->convert =NULL ;spin_lock_init (&s->lock); + +#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE >0 + s->cache_free_slots =CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE ; +INIT_LIST_HEAD (&s->cache_lru_list); +spin_lock_init (&s->cache_lock); +#endif return 0 ; }int sidtab_set_initial (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid,struct context *context) { -struct sidtab_isid_entry *entry; +struct sidtab_isid_entry *isid;int rc;if (sid ==0 || sid >SECINITSID_NUM )return -EINVAL ; - entry = &s->isids[sid -1 ]; + isid = &s->isids[sid -1 ]; - rc =context_cpy (&entry->context, context); + rc =context_cpy (&isid->entry.context, context);if (rc)return rc; - entry->set =1 ; +#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE >0 + isid->entry.cache =NULL ; +#endif + isid->set =1 ;return 0 ; }@@ -88,7 +107,8 @@ static int sidtab_alloc_roots(struct sidtab *s, u32 level)return 0 ; } -static struct context *sidtab_do_lookup (struct sidtab *s,u32 index,int alloc) +static struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_do_lookup (struct sidtab *s,u32 index, +int alloc) {union sidtab_entry_inner *entry;u32 level, capacity_shift, leaf_index = index /SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES ;@@ -125,10 +145,16 @@ static struct context *sidtab_do_lookup(struct sidtab *s, u32 index, int alloc)if (!entry->ptr_leaf)return NULL ; } -return &entry->ptr_leaf->entries[index %SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES ].context; +return &entry->ptr_leaf->entries[index %SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES ]; +} + +/* use when you know that there is enough entries */ +static struct context *sidtab_lookup_unsafe (struct sidtab *s,u32 index) +{ +return &sidtab_do_lookup (s, index,0 )->context; } -static struct context *sidtab_lookup (struct sidtab *s,u32 index) +static struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_lookup (struct sidtab *s,u32 index) {/* read entries only after reading count */ u32 count =smp_load_acquire (&s->count);@@ -139,33 +165,34 @@ static struct context *sidtab_lookup(struct sidtab *s, u32 index)return sidtab_do_lookup (s, index,0 ); } -static struct context *sidtab_lookup_initial (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid) +static struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_lookup_initial (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid) { -return s->isids[sid -1 ].set ? &s->isids[sid -1 ].context :NULL ; +return s->isids[sid -1 ].set ? &s->isids[sid -1 ].entry :NULL ; } -static struct context *sidtab_search_core (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid,int force) +static struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_search_core (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid, +int force) { -struct context *context; -if (sid !=0 ) { +struct sidtab_entry *entry; +if (sid >SECINITSID_NUM ) - context =sidtab_lookup (s, sid - (SECINITSID_NUM +1 )); + entry =sidtab_lookup (s, sid - (SECINITSID_NUM +1 ));else - context =sidtab_lookup_initial (s, sid); -if (context && (!context->len || force)) -return context; + entry =sidtab_lookup_initial (s, sid); +if (entry && (!entry->context.len || force)) +return entry; }return sidtab_lookup_initial (s,SECINITSID_UNLABELED ); } -struct context *sidtab_search (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid) +struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_search_entry (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid) {return sidtab_search_core (s, sid,0 ); } -struct context *sidtab_search_force (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid) +struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_search_entry_force (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid) {return sidtab_search_core (s, sid,1 ); }@@ -230,7 +257,7 @@ static int sidtab_rcache_search(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,if (v >=SIDTAB_MAX )continue ; -if (context_cmp (sidtab_do_lookup (s, v,0 ), context)) { +if (context_cmp (sidtab_lookup_unsafe (s, v), context)) {sidtab_rcache_update (s, v, i); *index = v;return 0 ;@@ -245,7 +272,7 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,unsigned long flags;u32 count, count_locked, level, pos;struct sidtab_convert_params *convert; -struct context *dst, *dst_convert; +struct sidtab_entry *dst, *dst_convert;int rc; rc =sidtab_rcache_search (s, context, index);@@ -273,7 +300,7 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,/* if count has changed before we acquired the lock, then catch up */ while (count < count_locked) { -if (context_cmp (sidtab_do_lookup (s, count,0 ), context)) { +if (context_cmp (sidtab_lookup_unsafe (s, count), context)) {sidtab_rcache_push (s, count); *index = count; rc =0 ;@@ -293,7 +320,7 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,if (!dst) goto out_unlock; - rc =context_cpy (dst, context); + rc =context_cpy (&dst->context, context);if (rc) goto out_unlock;@@ -305,13 +332,14 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context, rc = -ENOMEM ; dst_convert =sidtab_do_lookup (convert->target, count,1 );if (!dst_convert) { -context_destroy (dst); +context_destroy (&dst->context); goto out_unlock; } - rc = convert->func (context, dst_convert, convert->args); + rc = convert->func (context, &dst_convert->context, + convert->args);if (rc) { -context_destroy (dst); +context_destroy (&dst->context); goto out_unlock; }@@ -341,9 +369,9 @@ int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context, u32 *sid)u32 i;for (i =0 ; i <SECINITSID_NUM ; i++) { -struct sidtab_isid_entry *entry = &s->isids[i]; +struct sidtab_isid_entry *isid = &s->isids[i]; -if (entry->set &&context_cmp (context, &entry->context)) { +if (isid->set &&context_cmp (context, &isid->entry.context)) { *sid = i +1 ;return 0 ; }@@ -453,6 +481,14 @@ int sidtab_convert(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_convert_params *params)return rc; } +static void sidtab_destroy_entry (struct sidtab_entry *entry) +{ +context_destroy (&entry->context); +#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE >0 +kfree (rcu_dereference_raw (entry->cache)); +#endif +} +static void sidtab_destroy_tree (union sidtab_entry_inner entry,u32 level) {u32 i;@@ -473,7 +509,7 @@ static void sidtab_destroy_tree(union sidtab_entry_inner entry, u32 level)return ;for (i =0 ; i <SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES ; i++) -context_destroy (&node->entries[i].context); +sidtab_destroy_entry (&node->entries[i]);kfree (node); } }@@ -484,7 +520,7 @@ void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s)for (i =0 ; i <SECINITSID_NUM ; i++)if (s->isids[i].set) -context_destroy (&s->isids[i].context); +sidtab_destroy_entry (&s->isids[i].entry); level =SIDTAB_MAX_LEVEL ;while (level && !s->roots[level].ptr_inner)@@ -492,3 +528,88 @@ void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s)sidtab_destroy_tree (s->roots[level], level); } + +#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE >0 + +void sidtab_sid2str_put (struct sidtab *s,struct sidtab_entry *entry, +const char *str,u32 str_len) +{ +struct sidtab_str_cache *cache, *victim; + +/* do not cache invalid contexts */ +if (entry->context.len) +return ; + +/* +* Skip the put operation when in non-task context to avoid the need +* to disable interrupts while holding s->cache_lock. +*/ +if (!in_task ()) +return ; + +spin_lock (&s->cache_lock); + + cache =rcu_dereference_protected (entry->cache, +lockdep_is_held (&s->cache_lock)); +if (cache) { +/* entry in cache - just bump to the head of LRU list */ +list_move (&cache->lru_member, &s->cache_lru_list); + goto out_unlock; + } + + cache =kmalloc (sizeof (struct sidtab_str_cache ) + str_len,GFP_ATOMIC ); +if (!cache) + goto out_unlock; + +if (s->cache_free_slots ==0 ) { +/* pop a cache entry from the tail and free it */ + victim =container_of (s->cache_lru_list.prev, + struct sidtab_str_cache, lru_member); +list_del (&victim->lru_member); +kfree_rcu (victim, rcu_member); +rcu_assign_pointer (victim->parent->cache,NULL ); + }else { + s->cache_free_slots--; + } + cache->parent = entry; + cache->len = str_len; +memcpy (cache->str, str, str_len); +list_add (&cache->lru_member, &s->cache_lru_list); + +rcu_assign_pointer (entry->cache, cache); + +out_unlock: +spin_unlock (&s->cache_lock); +} + +int sidtab_sid2str_get (struct sidtab *s,struct sidtab_entry *entry, +char **out,u32 *out_len) +{ +struct sidtab_str_cache *cache; +int rc =0 ; + +if (entry->context.len) +return -ENOENT ;/* do not cache invalid contexts */ + +rcu_read_lock (); + + cache =rcu_dereference (entry->cache); +if (!cache) { + rc = -ENOENT ; + }else { + *out_len = cache->len; +if (out) { + *out =kmemdup (cache->str, cache->len,GFP_ATOMIC ); +if (!*out) + rc = -ENOMEM ; + } + } + +rcu_read_unlock (); + +if (!rc && out) +sidtab_sid2str_put (s, entry, *out, *out_len); +return rc; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0 */ security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h +49
-9@@ -16,13 +16,13 @@#include "context.h" -struct sidtab_entry_leaf { +struct sidtab_entry {struct context context; +#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE >0 +struct sidtab_str_cache __rcu *cache; +#endif }; -struct sidtab_node_inner ; -struct sidtab_node_leaf ; -union sidtab_entry_inner {struct sidtab_node_inner *ptr_inner;struct sidtab_node_leaf *ptr_leaf;@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ union sidtab_entry_inner { (SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SHIFT - size_to_shift(sizeof(union sidtab_entry_inner)))#define SIDTAB_INNER_ENTRIES ((size_t)1 << SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT)#define SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES \ - (SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE / sizeof(struct sidtab_entry_leaf)) + (SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE / sizeof(struct sidtab_entry))#define SIDTAB_MAX_BITS 32#define SIDTAB_MAX U32_MAX@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ union sidtab_entry_inner { SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT)struct sidtab_node_leaf { -struct sidtab_entry_leaf entries[SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES ]; +struct sidtab_entry entries[SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES ]; };struct sidtab_node_inner {@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ struct sidtab_node_inner {struct sidtab_isid_entry {int set; -struct context context; +struct sidtab_entry entry; };struct sidtab_convert_params {@@ -83,6 +83,13 @@ struct sidtab {struct sidtab_convert_params *convert;spinlock_t lock; +#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE >0 +/* SID -> context string cache */ +u32 cache_free_slots; +struct list_head cache_lru_list; +spinlock_t cache_lock; +#endif +/* reverse lookup cache - access atomically via {READ|WRITE}_ONCE() */ u32 rcache[SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE ];@@ -92,8 +99,22 @@ struct sidtab {int sidtab_init (struct sidtab *s);int sidtab_set_initial (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid,struct context *context); -struct context *sidtab_search (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid); -struct context *sidtab_search_force (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid); +struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_search_entry (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid); +struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_search_entry_force (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid); + +static inline struct context *sidtab_search (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid) +{ +struct sidtab_entry *entry =sidtab_search_entry (s, sid); + +return entry ? &entry->context :NULL ; +} + +static inline struct context *sidtab_search_force (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid) +{ +struct sidtab_entry *entry =sidtab_search_entry_force (s, sid); + +return entry ? &entry->context :NULL ; +}int sidtab_convert (struct sidtab *s,struct sidtab_convert_params *params);@@ -101,6 +122,25 @@ int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context, u32 *sid);void sidtab_destroy (struct sidtab *s); +#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE >0 +void sidtab_sid2str_put (struct sidtab *s,struct sidtab_entry *entry, +const char *str,u32 str_len); +int sidtab_sid2str_get (struct sidtab *s,struct sidtab_entry *entry, +char **out,u32 *out_len); +#else +static inline void sidtab_sid2str_put (struct sidtab *s, +struct sidtab_entry *entry, +const char *str,u32 str_len) +{ +} +static inline int sidtab_sid2str_get (struct sidtab *s, +struct sidtab_entry *entry, +char **out,u32 *out_len) +{ +return -ENOENT ; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0 */ +#endif /* _SS_SIDTAB_H_ */
Quoted 32 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
Translating a context struct to string can be quite slow, especially if the context has a lot of category bits set. This can cause quite noticeable performance impact in situations where the translation needs to be done repeatedly. A common example is a UNIX datagram socket with the
SO_PASSSECoption enabled, which is used e.g. by systemd-journald when receiving log messages via datagram socket. This scenario can be reproduced with:cat /dev/urandom | base64 | logger & timeout 30s perf record -p $(pidof systemd-journald) -a -g kill %1 perf report -g none --pretty raw | grep security_secid_to_secctxBefore the caching introduced by this patch, computing the context string (
security_secid_to_secctx()function) takes up ~65% of systemd-journald's CPU time (assuming a context with 1024 categories set and Fedorax86_64release kernel configs). After this patch (assuming near-perfect cache hit ratio) this overhead is reduced to just ~2%.This patch addresses the issue by caching a certain number (compile-time configurable) of recently used context strings to speed up repeated translations of the same context, while using only a small amount of memory.
The cache is integrated into the existing sidtab table by adding a field to each entry, which when not NULL contains an RCU-protected pointer to a cache entry containing the cached string. The cache entries are kept in a linked list sorted according to how recently they were used. On a cache miss when the cache is full, the least recently used entry is removed to make space for the new entry.
Quoted 8 lines
The patch migrates
security_sid_to_context_core()to use the cache (also a few other functions where it was possible without too much fuss, but these mostly use the translation for logging in case of error, which is rare).Cc Michal Sekletar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ondrej Mosnacek <[email protected]>
Quoted 810 lines
---
Changes in v4:
- usercu_dereference_protected()instead ofrcu_dereference_raw()insidtab_sid2str_put()
- fix typo in comment
- remove unnecessaryrcu_head_init()callChanges in v3:
- add [email protected] and Paul McKenney to Cc for review of the RCU logic
- add__rcuannotation to the cache entry pointer (sidtab.cnow passes sparse checks with C=1)Changes in v2:
- skipsidtab_sid2str_put()when in non-task context to prevent deadlock while avoiding the need to lock the spinlock with irqsave/-restore (which is slower)security/selinux/Kconfig | 11 ++ security/selinux/ss/services.c | 138 +++++++++++++++---------- security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 179 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h | 58 +++++++++-- 4 files changed, 294 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-)security/selinux/Kconfig +11
-0@@ -85,3 +85,14 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE via /selinux/checkreqprot if authorized by policy. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 0. + +config SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE + int "NSA SELinux SID to context string translation cache size" + depends on SECURITY_SELINUX + default 256 + help + This option defines the size of the internal SID -> context string + cache, which improves the performance of context to string + conversion. Setting this option to 0 disables the cache completely. + + If unsure, keep the default value.security/selinux/ss/services.c +84
-54@@ -91,6 +91,12 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *policydb,char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len); +static int sidtab_entry_to_string (struct policydb *policydb, +struct sidtab *sidtab, +struct sidtab_entry *entry, +char **scontext, +u32 *scontext_len); + static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb, struct context *scontext, struct context *tcontext,@@ -716,20 +722,21 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb, }static int security_validtrans_handle_fail (struct selinux_state *state, -struct context *ocontext, -struct context *ncontext, -struct context *tcontext, +struct sidtab_entry *oentry, +struct sidtab_entry *nentry, +struct sidtab_entry *tentry,u16 tclass) {struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb; +struct sidtab *sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;char *o =NULL , *n =NULL , *t =NULL ;u32 olen, nlen, tlen; -if (context_struct_to_string (p, ocontext, &o, &olen)) +if (sidtab_entry_to_string (p, sidtab, oentry, &o, &olen)) goto out; -if (context_struct_to_string (p, ncontext, &n, &nlen)) +if (sidtab_entry_to_string (p, sidtab, nentry, &n, &nlen)) goto out; -if (context_struct_to_string (p, tcontext, &t, &tlen)) +if (sidtab_entry_to_string (p, sidtab, tentry, &t, &tlen)) goto out;audit_log (audit_context (),GFP_ATOMIC ,AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR , "op=security_validate_transition seresult=denied"@@ -751,9 +758,9 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(struct selinux_state *state, {struct policydb *policydb;struct sidtab *sidtab; -struct context *ocontext; -struct context *ncontext; -struct context *tcontext; +struct sidtab_entry *oentry; +struct sidtab_entry *nentry; +struct sidtab_entry *tentry;struct class_datum *tclass_datum;struct constraint_node *constraint;u16 tclass;@@ -779,24 +786,24 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(struct selinux_state *state, } tclass_datum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass -1 ]; - ocontext =sidtab_search (sidtab, oldsid); -if (!ocontext) { + oentry =sidtab_search_entry (sidtab, oldsid); +if (!oentry) {pr_err ("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n" , __func__, oldsid); rc = -EINVAL ; goto out; } - ncontext =sidtab_search (sidtab, newsid); -if (!ncontext) { + nentry =sidtab_search_entry (sidtab, newsid); +if (!nentry) {pr_err ("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n" , __func__, newsid); rc = -EINVAL ; goto out; } - tcontext =sidtab_search (sidtab, tasksid); -if (!tcontext) { + tentry =sidtab_search_entry (sidtab, tasksid); +if (!tentry) {pr_err ("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n" , __func__, tasksid); rc = -EINVAL ;@@ -805,15 +812,16 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(struct selinux_state *state, constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;while (constraint) { -if (!constraint_expr_eval (policydb, ocontext, ncontext, - tcontext, constraint->expr)) { +if (!constraint_expr_eval (policydb, &oentry->context, + &nentry->context, &tentry->context, + constraint->expr)) {if (user) rc = -EPERM ;else rc =security_validtrans_handle_fail (state, - ocontext, - ncontext, - tcontext, + oentry, + nentry, + tentry, tclass); goto out; }@@ -855,7 +863,7 @@ int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state, {struct policydb *policydb;struct sidtab *sidtab; -struct context *old_context, *new_context; +struct sidtab_entry *old_entry, *new_entry;struct type_datum *type;int index;int rc;@@ -869,16 +877,16 @@ int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state, sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; rc = -EINVAL ; - old_context =sidtab_search (sidtab, old_sid); -if (!old_context) { + old_entry =sidtab_search_entry (sidtab, old_sid); +if (!old_entry) {pr_err ("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n" , __func__, old_sid); goto out; } rc = -EINVAL ; - new_context =sidtab_search (sidtab, new_sid); -if (!new_context) { + new_entry =sidtab_search_entry (sidtab, new_sid); +if (!new_entry) {pr_err ("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n" , __func__, new_sid); goto out;@@ -886,10 +894,10 @@ int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state, rc =0 ;/* type/domain unchanged */ -if (old_context->type == new_context->type) +if (old_entry->context.type == new_entry->context.type) goto out; - index = new_context->type; + index = new_entry->context.type;while (true) { type = policydb->type_val_to_struct[index -1 ];BUG_ON (!type);@@ -901,7 +909,7 @@ int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state,/* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */ rc =0 ; -if (type->bounds == old_context->type) +if (type->bounds == old_entry->context.type)break ; index = type->bounds;@@ -912,10 +920,10 @@ int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state,char *new_name =NULL ;u32 length; -if (!context_struct_to_string (policydb, old_context, - &old_name, &length) && - !context_struct_to_string (policydb, new_context, - &new_name, &length)) { +if (!sidtab_entry_to_string (policydb, sidtab, old_entry, + &old_name, &length) && + !sidtab_entry_to_string (policydb, sidtab, new_entry, + &new_name, &length)) {audit_log (audit_context (),GFP_ATOMIC ,AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR , "op=security_bounded_transition "@@ -1255,6 +1263,23 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *p,return 0 ; } +static int sidtab_entry_to_string (struct policydb *p, +struct sidtab *sidtab, +struct sidtab_entry *entry, +char **scontext,u32 *scontext_len) +{ +int rc =sidtab_sid2str_get (sidtab, entry, scontext, scontext_len); + +if (rc != -ENOENT ) +return rc; + + rc =context_struct_to_string (p, &entry->context, scontext, + scontext_len); +if (!rc && scontext) +sidtab_sid2str_put (sidtab, entry, *scontext, *scontext_len); +return rc; +} +#include "initial_sid_to_string.h" const char *security_get_initial_sid_context (u32 sid)@@ -1271,7 +1296,7 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(struct selinux_state *state, {struct policydb *policydb;struct sidtab *sidtab; -struct context *context; +struct sidtab_entry *entry;int rc =0 ;if (scontext)@@ -1302,21 +1327,23 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(struct selinux_state *state,read_lock (&state->ss->policy_rwlock); policydb = &state->ss->policydb; sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; +if (force) - context =sidtab_search_force (sidtab, sid); + entry =sidtab_search_entry_force (sidtab, sid);else - context =sidtab_search (sidtab, sid); -if (!context) { + entry =sidtab_search_entry (sidtab, sid); +if (!entry) {pr_err ("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n" , __func__, sid); rc = -EINVAL ; goto out_unlock; } -if (only_invalid && !context->len) - rc =0 ; -else - rc =context_struct_to_string (policydb, context, scontext, - scontext_len); +if (only_invalid && !entry->context.len) + goto out_unlock; + + rc =sidtab_entry_to_string (policydb, sidtab, entry, scontext, + scontext_len); + out_unlock:read_unlock (&state->ss->policy_rwlock); out:@@ -1574,19 +1601,20 @@ int security_context_to_sid_force(struct selinux_state *state,static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context (struct selinux_state *state, -struct context *scontext, -struct context *tcontext, +struct sidtab_entry *sentry, +struct sidtab_entry *tentry,u16 tclass,struct context *newcontext) {struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; +struct sidtab *sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;char *s =NULL , *t =NULL , *n =NULL ;u32 slen, tlen, nlen;struct audit_buffer *ab; -if (context_struct_to_string (policydb, scontext, &s, &slen)) +if (sidtab_entry_to_string (policydb, sidtab, sentry, &s, &slen)) goto out; -if (context_struct_to_string (policydb, tcontext, &t, &tlen)) +if (sidtab_entry_to_string (policydb, sidtab, tentry, &t, &tlen)) goto out;if (context_struct_to_string (policydb, newcontext, &n, &nlen)) goto out;@@ -1645,7 +1673,8 @@ static int security_compute_sid(struct selinux_state *state,struct policydb *policydb;struct sidtab *sidtab;struct class_datum *cladatum =NULL ; -struct context *scontext =NULL , *tcontext =NULL , newcontext; +struct context *scontext, *tcontext, newcontext; +struct sidtab_entry *sentry, *tentry;struct role_trans *roletr =NULL ;struct avtab_key avkey;struct avtab_datum *avdatum;@@ -1682,21 +1711,24 @@ static int security_compute_sid(struct selinux_state *state, policydb = &state->ss->policydb; sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; - scontext =sidtab_search (sidtab, ssid); -if (!scontext) { + sentry =sidtab_search_entry (sidtab, ssid); +if (!sentry) {pr_err ("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n" , __func__, ssid); rc = -EINVAL ; goto out_unlock; } - tcontext =sidtab_search (sidtab, tsid); -if (!tcontext) { + tentry =sidtab_search_entry (sidtab, tsid); +if (!tentry) {pr_err ("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n" , __func__, tsid); rc = -EINVAL ; goto out_unlock; } + scontext = &sentry->context; + tcontext = &tentry->context; +if (tclass && tclass <= policydb->p_classes.nprim) cladatum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass -1 ];@@ -1797,10 +1829,8 @@ static int security_compute_sid(struct selinux_state *state,/* Check the validity of the context. */ if (!policydb_context_isvalid (policydb, &newcontext)) { - rc =compute_sid_handle_invalid_context (state, scontext, - tcontext, - tclass, - &newcontext); + rc =compute_sid_handle_invalid_context (state, sentry, tentry, + tclass, &newcontext);if (rc) goto out_unlock; }security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c +150
-29@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@*/ #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/list.h> +#include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> @@ -17,6 +19,14 @@#include "security.h" #include "sidtab.h" +struct sidtab_str_cache { +struct rcu_head rcu_member; +struct list_head lru_member; +struct sidtab_entry *parent; +u32 len; +char str[]; +}; +int sidtab_init (struct sidtab *s) {u32 i;@@ -34,24 +44,33 @@ int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s) s->convert =NULL ;spin_lock_init (&s->lock); + +#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE >0 + s->cache_free_slots =CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE ; +INIT_LIST_HEAD (&s->cache_lru_list); +spin_lock_init (&s->cache_lock); +#endif return 0 ; }int sidtab_set_initial (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid,struct context *context) { -struct sidtab_isid_entry *entry; +struct sidtab_isid_entry *isid;int rc;if (sid ==0 || sid >SECINITSID_NUM )return -EINVAL ; - entry = &s->isids[sid -1 ]; + isid = &s->isids[sid -1 ]; - rc =context_cpy (&entry->context, context); + rc =context_cpy (&isid->entry.context, context);if (rc)return rc; - entry->set =1 ; +#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE >0 + isid->entry.cache =NULL ; +#endif + isid->set =1 ;return 0 ; }@@ -88,7 +107,8 @@ static int sidtab_alloc_roots(struct sidtab *s, u32 level)return 0 ; } -static struct context *sidtab_do_lookup (struct sidtab *s,u32 index,int alloc) +static struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_do_lookup (struct sidtab *s,u32 index, +int alloc) {union sidtab_entry_inner *entry;u32 level, capacity_shift, leaf_index = index /SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES ;@@ -125,10 +145,16 @@ static struct context *sidtab_do_lookup(struct sidtab *s, u32 index, int alloc)if (!entry->ptr_leaf)return NULL ; } -return &entry->ptr_leaf->entries[index %SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES ].context; +return &entry->ptr_leaf->entries[index %SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES ]; +} + +/* use when you know that there is enough entries */ +static struct context *sidtab_lookup_unsafe (struct sidtab *s,u32 index) +{ +return &sidtab_do_lookup (s, index,0 )->context; } -static struct context *sidtab_lookup (struct sidtab *s,u32 index) +static struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_lookup (struct sidtab *s,u32 index) {/* read entries only after reading count */ u32 count =smp_load_acquire (&s->count);@@ -139,33 +165,34 @@ static struct context *sidtab_lookup(struct sidtab *s, u32 index)return sidtab_do_lookup (s, index,0 ); } -static struct context *sidtab_lookup_initial (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid) +static struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_lookup_initial (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid) { -return s->isids[sid -1 ].set ? &s->isids[sid -1 ].context :NULL ; +return s->isids[sid -1 ].set ? &s->isids[sid -1 ].entry :NULL ; } -static struct context *sidtab_search_core (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid,int force) +static struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_search_core (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid, +int force) { -struct context *context; -if (sid !=0 ) { +struct sidtab_entry *entry; +if (sid >SECINITSID_NUM ) - context =sidtab_lookup (s, sid - (SECINITSID_NUM +1 )); + entry =sidtab_lookup (s, sid - (SECINITSID_NUM +1 ));else - context =sidtab_lookup_initial (s, sid); -if (context && (!context->len || force)) -return context; + entry =sidtab_lookup_initial (s, sid); +if (entry && (!entry->context.len || force)) +return entry; }return sidtab_lookup_initial (s,SECINITSID_UNLABELED ); } -struct context *sidtab_search (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid) +struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_search_entry (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid) {return sidtab_search_core (s, sid,0 ); } -struct context *sidtab_search_force (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid) +struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_search_entry_force (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid) {return sidtab_search_core (s, sid,1 ); }@@ -230,7 +257,7 @@ static int sidtab_rcache_search(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,if (v >=SIDTAB_MAX )continue ; -if (context_cmp (sidtab_do_lookup (s, v,0 ), context)) { +if (context_cmp (sidtab_lookup_unsafe (s, v), context)) {sidtab_rcache_update (s, v, i); *index = v;return 0 ;@@ -245,7 +272,7 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,unsigned long flags;u32 count, count_locked, level, pos;struct sidtab_convert_params *convert; -struct context *dst, *dst_convert; +struct sidtab_entry *dst, *dst_convert;int rc; rc =sidtab_rcache_search (s, context, index);@@ -273,7 +300,7 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,/* if count has changed before we acquired the lock, then catch up */ while (count < count_locked) { -if (context_cmp (sidtab_do_lookup (s, count,0 ), context)) { +if (context_cmp (sidtab_lookup_unsafe (s, count), context)) {sidtab_rcache_push (s, count); *index = count; rc =0 ;@@ -293,7 +320,7 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,if (!dst) goto out_unlock; - rc =context_cpy (dst, context); + rc =context_cpy (&dst->context, context);if (rc) goto out_unlock;@@ -305,13 +332,14 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context, rc = -ENOMEM ; dst_convert =sidtab_do_lookup (convert->target, count,1 );if (!dst_convert) { -context_destroy (dst); +context_destroy (&dst->context); goto out_unlock; } - rc = convert->func (context, dst_convert, convert->args); + rc = convert->func (context, &dst_convert->context, + convert->args);if (rc) { -context_destroy (dst); +context_destroy (&dst->context); goto out_unlock; }@@ -341,9 +369,9 @@ int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context, u32 *sid)u32 i;for (i =0 ; i <SECINITSID_NUM ; i++) { -struct sidtab_isid_entry *entry = &s->isids[i]; +struct sidtab_isid_entry *isid = &s->isids[i]; -if (entry->set &&context_cmp (context, &entry->context)) { +if (isid->set &&context_cmp (context, &isid->entry.context)) { *sid = i +1 ;return 0 ; }@@ -453,6 +481,14 @@ int sidtab_convert(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_convert_params *params)return rc; } +static void sidtab_destroy_entry (struct sidtab_entry *entry) +{ +context_destroy (&entry->context); +#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE >0 +kfree (rcu_dereference_raw (entry->cache)); +#endif +} +static void sidtab_destroy_tree (union sidtab_entry_inner entry,u32 level) {u32 i;@@ -473,7 +509,7 @@ static void sidtab_destroy_tree(union sidtab_entry_inner entry, u32 level)return ;for (i =0 ; i <SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES ; i++) -context_destroy (&node->entries[i].context); +sidtab_destroy_entry (&node->entries[i]);kfree (node); } }@@ -484,7 +520,7 @@ void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s)for (i =0 ; i <SECINITSID_NUM ; i++)if (s->isids[i].set) -context_destroy (&s->isids[i].context); +sidtab_destroy_entry (&s->isids[i].entry); level =SIDTAB_MAX_LEVEL ;while (level && !s->roots[level].ptr_inner)@@ -492,3 +528,88 @@ void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s)sidtab_destroy_tree (s->roots[level], level); } + +#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE >0 + +void sidtab_sid2str_put (struct sidtab *s,struct sidtab_entry *entry, +const char *str,u32 str_len) +{ +struct sidtab_str_cache *cache, *victim; + +/* do not cache invalid contexts */ +if (entry->context.len) +return ; + +/* +* Skip the put operation when in non-task context to avoid the need +* to disable interrupts while holding s->cache_lock. +*/ +if (!in_task ()) +return ; + +spin_lock (&s->cache_lock); + + cache =rcu_dereference_protected (entry->cache, +lockdep_is_held (&s->cache_lock)); +if (cache) { +/* entry in cache - just bump to the head of LRU list */ +list_move (&cache->lru_member, &s->cache_lru_list); + goto out_unlock; + } + + cache =kmalloc (sizeof (struct sidtab_str_cache ) + str_len,GFP_ATOMIC ); +if (!cache) + goto out_unlock; + +if (s->cache_free_slots ==0 ) { +/* pop a cache entry from the tail and free it */ + victim =container_of (s->cache_lru_list.prev, + struct sidtab_str_cache, lru_member); +list_del (&victim->lru_member); +kfree_rcu (victim, rcu_member); +rcu_assign_pointer (victim->parent->cache,NULL ); + }else { + s->cache_free_slots--; + } + cache->parent = entry; + cache->len = str_len; +memcpy (cache->str, str, str_len); +list_add (&cache->lru_member, &s->cache_lru_list); + +rcu_assign_pointer (entry->cache, cache); + +out_unlock: +spin_unlock (&s->cache_lock); +} + +int sidtab_sid2str_get (struct sidtab *s,struct sidtab_entry *entry, +char **out,u32 *out_len) +{ +struct sidtab_str_cache *cache; +int rc =0 ; + +if (entry->context.len) +return -ENOENT ;/* do not cache invalid contexts */ + +rcu_read_lock (); + + cache =rcu_dereference (entry->cache); +if (!cache) { + rc = -ENOENT ; + }else { + *out_len = cache->len; +if (out) { + *out =kmemdup (cache->str, cache->len,GFP_ATOMIC ); +if (!*out) + rc = -ENOMEM ; + } + } + +rcu_read_unlock (); + +if (!rc && out) +sidtab_sid2str_put (s, entry, *out, *out_len); +return rc; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0 */ security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h +49
-9@@ -16,13 +16,13 @@#include "context.h" -struct sidtab_entry_leaf { +struct sidtab_entry {struct context context; +#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE >0 +struct sidtab_str_cache __rcu *cache; +#endif }; -struct sidtab_node_inner ; -struct sidtab_node_leaf ; -union sidtab_entry_inner {struct sidtab_node_inner *ptr_inner;struct sidtab_node_leaf *ptr_leaf;@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ union sidtab_entry_inner { (SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SHIFT - size_to_shift(sizeof(union sidtab_entry_inner)))#define SIDTAB_INNER_ENTRIES ((size_t)1 << SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT)#define SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES \ - (SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE / sizeof(struct sidtab_entry_leaf)) + (SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE / sizeof(struct sidtab_entry))#define SIDTAB_MAX_BITS 32#define SIDTAB_MAX U32_MAX@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ union sidtab_entry_inner { SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT)struct sidtab_node_leaf { -struct sidtab_entry_leaf entries[SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES ]; +struct sidtab_entry entries[SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES ]; };struct sidtab_node_inner {@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ struct sidtab_node_inner {struct sidtab_isid_entry {int set; -struct context context; +struct sidtab_entry entry; };struct sidtab_convert_params {@@ -83,6 +83,13 @@ struct sidtab {struct sidtab_convert_params *convert;spinlock_t lock; +#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE >0 +/* SID -> context string cache */ +u32 cache_free_slots; +struct list_head cache_lru_list; +spinlock_t cache_lock; +#endif +/* reverse lookup cache - access atomically via {READ|WRITE}_ONCE() */ u32 rcache[SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE ];@@ -92,8 +99,22 @@ struct sidtab {int sidtab_init (struct sidtab *s);int sidtab_set_initial (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid,struct context *context); -struct context *sidtab_search (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid); -struct context *sidtab_search_force (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid); +struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_search_entry (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid); +struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_search_entry_force (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid); + +static inline struct context *sidtab_search (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid) +{ +struct sidtab_entry *entry =sidtab_search_entry (s, sid); + +return entry ? &entry->context :NULL ; +} + +static inline struct context *sidtab_search_force (struct sidtab *s,u32 sid) +{ +struct sidtab_entry *entry =sidtab_search_entry_force (s, sid); + +return entry ? &entry->context :NULL ; +}int sidtab_convert (struct sidtab *s,struct sidtab_convert_params *params);@@ -101,6 +122,25 @@ int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context, u32 *sid);void sidtab_destroy (struct sidtab *s); +#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE >0 +void sidtab_sid2str_put (struct sidtab *s,struct sidtab_entry *entry, +const char *str,u32 str_len); +int sidtab_sid2str_get (struct sidtab *s,struct sidtab_entry *entry, +char **out,u32 *out_len); +#else +static inline void sidtab_sid2str_put (struct sidtab *s, +struct sidtab_entry *entry, +const char *str,u32 str_len) +{ +} +static inline int sidtab_sid2str_get (struct sidtab *s, +struct sidtab_entry *entry, +char **out,u32 *out_len) +{ +return -ENOENT ; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0 */ +#endif /* _SS_SIDTAB_H_ */ Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Paul Moore
maintainerQuoted 64 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
Translating a context struct to string can be quite slow, especially if the context has a lot of category bits set. This can cause quite noticeable performance impact in situations where the translation needs to be done repeatedly. A common example is a UNIX datagram socket with the
SO_PASSSECoption enabled, which is used e.g. by systemd-journald when receiving log messages via datagram socket. This scenario can be reproduced with:cat /dev/urandom | base64 | logger & timeout 30s perf record -p $(pidof systemd-journald) -a -g kill %1 perf report -g none --pretty raw | grep security_secid_to_secctxBefore the caching introduced by this patch, computing the context string (
security_secid_to_secctx()function) takes up ~65% of systemd-journald's CPU time (assuming a context with 1024 categories set and Fedorax86_64release kernel configs). After this patch (assuming near-perfect cache hit ratio) this overhead is reduced to just ~2%.This patch addresses the issue by caching a certain number (compile-time configurable) of recently used context strings to speed up repeated translations of the same context, while using only a small amount of memory.
The cache is integrated into the existing sidtab table by adding a field to each entry, which when not NULL contains an RCU-protected pointer to a cache entry containing the cached string. The cache entries are kept in a linked list sorted according to how recently they were used. On a cache miss when the cache is full, the least recently used entry is removed to make space for the new entry.
The patch migrates
security_sid_to_context_core()to use the cache (also a few other functions where it was possible without too much fuss, but these mostly use the translation for logging in case of error, which is rare).Cc Michal Sekletar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ondrej Mosnacek <[email protected]>---
Changes in v4:
- usercu_dereference_protected()instead ofrcu_dereference_raw()insidtab_sid2str_put()
- fix typo in comment
- remove unnecessaryrcu_head_init()callChanges in v3:
- add [email protected] and Paul McKenney to Cc for review of the RCU logic
- add__rcuannotation to the cache entry pointer (sidtab.cnow passes sparse checks with C=1)Changes in v2:
- skipsidtab_sid2str_put()when in non-task context to prevent deadlock while avoiding the need to lock the spinlock with irqsave/-restore (which is slower)security/selinux/Kconfig | 11 ++ security/selinux/ss/services.c | 138 +++++++++++++++---------- security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 179 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h | 58 +++++++++-- 4 files changed, 294 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-)
...
Quoted 37 lines
security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c +29
-0@@ -492,3 +528,88 @@ void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s)sidtab_destroy_tree (s->roots[level], level); } + +#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE >0 + +void sidtab_sid2str_put (struct sidtab *s,struct sidtab_entry *entry, +const char *str,u32 str_len) +{ +struct sidtab_str_cache *cache, *victim; + +/* do not cache invalid contexts */ +if (entry->context.len) +return ; + +/* +* Skip the put operation when in non-task context to avoid the need +* to disable interrupts while holding s->cache_lock. +*/ +if (!in_task ()) +return ; + +spin_lock (&s->cache_lock); + + cache =rcu_dereference_protected (entry->cache, +lockdep_is_held (&s->cache_lock)); +if (cache) { +/* entry in cache - just bump to the head of LRU list */ +list_move (&cache->lru_member, &s->cache_lru_list); + goto out_unlock; + } +
security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s) · line 569
Quoted 10 lines
security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c +10
-0+ cache =kmalloc (sizeof (struct sidtab_str_cache ) + str_len,GFP_ATOMIC ); +if (!cache) + goto out_unlock; + +if (s->cache_free_slots ==0 ) { +/* pop a cache entry from the tail and free it */ + victim =container_of (s->cache_lru_list.prev, + struct sidtab_str_cache, lru_member); +list_del (&victim->lru_member); +kfree_rcu (victim, rcu_member);
We could move the kfree_rcu() down to after we drop the spinlock, right? It's likely not a big deal, but since the whole point of this patch is performance improvements it seems like it might be nice. ;)
Quoted 14 lines
security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c +14
-0+rcu_assign_pointer (victim->parent->cache,NULL ); + }else { + s->cache_free_slots--; + } + cache->parent = entry; + cache->len = str_len; +memcpy (cache->str, str, str_len); +list_add (&cache->lru_member, &s->cache_lru_list); + +rcu_assign_pointer (entry->cache, cache); + +out_unlock: +spin_unlock (&s->cache_lock); +}
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Quoted 111 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 64 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
Translating a context struct to string can be quite slow, especially if the context has a lot of category bits set. This can cause quite noticeable performance impact in situations where the translation needs to be done repeatedly. A common example is a UNIX datagram socket with the
SO_PASSSECoption enabled, which is used e.g. by systemd-journald when receiving log messages via datagram socket. This scenario can be reproduced with:cat /dev/urandom | base64 | logger & timeout 30s perf record -p $(pidof systemd-journald) -a -g kill %1 perf report -g none --pretty raw | grep security_secid_to_secctxBefore the caching introduced by this patch, computing the context string (
security_secid_to_secctx()function) takes up ~65% of systemd-journald's CPU time (assuming a context with 1024 categories set and Fedorax86_64release kernel configs). After this patch (assuming near-perfect cache hit ratio) this overhead is reduced to just ~2%.This patch addresses the issue by caching a certain number (compile-time configurable) of recently used context strings to speed up repeated translations of the same context, while using only a small amount of memory.
The cache is integrated into the existing sidtab table by adding a field to each entry, which when not NULL contains an RCU-protected pointer to a cache entry containing the cached string. The cache entries are kept in a linked list sorted according to how recently they were used. On a cache miss when the cache is full, the least recently used entry is removed to make space for the new entry.
The patch migrates
security_sid_to_context_core()to use the cache (also a few other functions where it was possible without too much fuss, but these mostly use the translation for logging in case of error, which is rare).Cc Michal Sekletar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ondrej Mosnacek <[email protected]>---
Changes in v4:
- usercu_dereference_protected()instead ofrcu_dereference_raw()insidtab_sid2str_put()
- fix typo in comment
- remove unnecessaryrcu_head_init()callChanges in v3:
- add [email protected] and Paul McKenney to Cc for review of the RCU logic
- add__rcuannotation to the cache entry pointer (sidtab.cnow passes sparse checks with C=1)Changes in v2:
- skipsidtab_sid2str_put()when in non-task context to prevent deadlock while avoiding the need to lock the spinlock with irqsave/-restore (which is slower)security/selinux/Kconfig | 11 ++ security/selinux/ss/services.c | 138 +++++++++++++++---------- security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 179 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h | 58 +++++++++-- 4 files changed, 294 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-)...
Quoted 43 lines
security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c +35
-0@@ -492,3 +528,88 @@ void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s)sidtab_destroy_tree (s->roots[level], level); } + +#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE >0 + +void sidtab_sid2str_put (struct sidtab *s,struct sidtab_entry *entry, +const char *str,u32 str_len) +{ +struct sidtab_str_cache *cache, *victim; + +/* do not cache invalid contexts */ +if (entry->context.len) +return ; + +/* +* Skip the put operation when in non-task context to avoid the need +* to disable interrupts while holding s->cache_lock. +*/ +if (!in_task ()) +return ; + +spin_lock (&s->cache_lock); + + cache =rcu_dereference_protected (entry->cache, +lockdep_is_held (&s->cache_lock)); +if (cache) { +/* entry in cache - just bump to the head of LRU list */ +list_move (&cache->lru_member, &s->cache_lru_list); + goto out_unlock; + } + + cache =kmalloc (sizeof (struct sidtab_str_cache ) + str_len,GFP_ATOMIC ); +if (!cache) + goto out_unlock; + +if (s->cache_free_slots ==0 ) { +/* pop a cache entry from the tail and free it */
Quoted 8 lines
security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s) · line 569
Quoted 4 lines
security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c +4
-0+ victim =container_of (s->cache_lru_list.prev, + struct sidtab_str_cache, lru_member); +list_del (&victim->lru_member); +kfree_rcu (victim, rcu_member);We could move the
kfree_rcu()down to after we drop the spinlock, right? It's likely not a big deal, but since the whole point of this patch is performance improvements it seems like it might be nice. ;)
I could be wrong, but I think kfree_rcu() just (always?) appends the object to the RCU list and defers the deallocation for later (and that should be pretty quick). But actually... since the kfree_rcu() is not called under RCU read lock here, I should at least move it below the next line, which still dereferences "victim". And at that point I could move it all the way after spin_unlock() as you suggest...
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 5 lines
security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c +4
-0+rcu_assign_pointer (victim->parent->cache,NULL ); + }else { + s->cache_free_slots--; + }security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s) · line 583
Quoted 10 lines
security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c +10
-0+ cache->parent = entry; + cache->len = str_len; +memcpy (cache->str, str, str_len); +list_add (&cache->lru_member, &s->cache_lru_list); + +rcu_assign_pointer (entry->cache, cache); + +out_unlock: +spin_unlock (&s->cache_lock); +}--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
Signature · 3 lines
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat dot com> Software Engineer, Security Technologies Red Hat, Inc.
Paul Moore
maintainerQuoted 121 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
Quoted 111 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 64 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
Translating a context struct to string can be quite slow, especially if the context has a lot of category bits set. This can cause quite noticeable performance impact in situations where the translation needs to be done repeatedly. A common example is a UNIX datagram socket with the
SO_PASSSECoption enabled, which is used e.g. by systemd-journald when receiving log messages via datagram socket. This scenario can be reproduced with:cat /dev/urandom | base64 | logger & timeout 30s perf record -p $(pidof systemd-journald) -a -g kill %1 perf report -g none --pretty raw | grep security_secid_to_secctxBefore the caching introduced by this patch, computing the context string (
security_secid_to_secctx()function) takes up ~65% of systemd-journald's CPU time (assuming a context with 1024 categories set and Fedorax86_64release kernel configs). After this patch (assuming near-perfect cache hit ratio) this overhead is reduced to just ~2%.This patch addresses the issue by caching a certain number (compile-time configurable) of recently used context strings to speed up repeated translations of the same context, while using only a small amount of memory.
The cache is integrated into the existing sidtab table by adding a field to each entry, which when not NULL contains an RCU-protected pointer to a cache entry containing the cached string. The cache entries are kept in a linked list sorted according to how recently they were used. On a cache miss when the cache is full, the least recently used entry is removed to make space for the new entry.
The patch migrates
security_sid_to_context_core()to use the cache (also a few other functions where it was possible without too much fuss, but these mostly use the translation for logging in case of error, which is rare).Cc Michal Sekletar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ondrej Mosnacek <[email protected]>---
Changes in v4:
- usercu_dereference_protected()instead ofrcu_dereference_raw()insidtab_sid2str_put()
- fix typo in comment
- remove unnecessaryrcu_head_init()callChanges in v3:
- add [email protected] and Paul McKenney to Cc for review of the RCU logic
- add__rcuannotation to the cache entry pointer (sidtab.cnow passes sparse checks with C=1)Changes in v2:
- skipsidtab_sid2str_put()when in non-task context to prevent deadlock while avoiding the need to lock the spinlock with irqsave/-restore (which is slower)security/selinux/Kconfig | 11 ++ security/selinux/ss/services.c | 138 +++++++++++++++---------- security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 179 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h | 58 +++++++++-- 4 files changed, 294 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-)...
Quoted 43 lines
security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c +35
-0@@ -492,3 +528,88 @@ void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s)sidtab_destroy_tree (s->roots[level], level); } + +#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE >0 + +void sidtab_sid2str_put (struct sidtab *s,struct sidtab_entry *entry, +const char *str,u32 str_len) +{ +struct sidtab_str_cache *cache, *victim; + +/* do not cache invalid contexts */ +if (entry->context.len) +return ; + +/* +* Skip the put operation when in non-task context to avoid the need +* to disable interrupts while holding s->cache_lock. +*/ +if (!in_task ()) +return ; + +spin_lock (&s->cache_lock); + + cache =rcu_dereference_protected (entry->cache, +lockdep_is_held (&s->cache_lock)); +if (cache) { +/* entry in cache - just bump to the head of LRU list */ +list_move (&cache->lru_member, &s->cache_lru_list); + goto out_unlock; + } + + cache =kmalloc (sizeof (struct sidtab_str_cache ) + str_len,GFP_ATOMIC ); +if (!cache) + goto out_unlock; + +if (s->cache_free_slots ==0 ) { +/* pop a cache entry from the tail and free it */ Quoted 8 lines
security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s) · line 569
Quoted 4 lines
security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c +4
-0+ victim =container_of (s->cache_lru_list.prev, + struct sidtab_str_cache, lru_member); +list_del (&victim->lru_member); +kfree_rcu (victim, rcu_member);We could move the
kfree_rcu()down to after we drop the spinlock, right? It's likely not a big deal, but since the whole point of this patch is performance improvements it seems like it might be nice. ;)
Quoted 6 lines
I could be wrong, but I think
kfree_rcu()just (always?) appends the object to the RCU list and defers the deallocation for later (and that should be pretty quick). But actually... since thekfree_rcu()is not called under RCU read lock here, I should at least move it below the next line, which still dereferences "victim". And at that point I could move it all the way afterspin_unlock()as you suggest...
Yes, the bulk of the work is handled later once it is safe to free the memory, but that doesn't mean work doesn't still happen :)
It's definitely a nitpicky thing, but since we are already at -rc7 and this isn't a bug-fix, this was always going to land in selinux/next after the upcoming merge window so we've got time for a respin.
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com