Coverity: ext4_iomap_alloc(): Integer handling issues
Hello!
This is an experimental automated report about issues detected by Coverity from a scan of next-20191108 as part of the linux-next weekly scan project:
https://scan.coverity.com/projects/linux-next-weekly-scan
You're getting this email because you were associated with the identified lines of code (noted below) that were touched by recent commits:
378f32bab371 ("ext4: introduce direct I/O write using iomap infrastructure")
Coverity reported the following:
*** CID 1487841: Integer handling issues (OVERFLOW_BEFORE_WIDEN) /fs/ext4/inode.c: 3388 in ext4_iomap_alloc()
3382 /* 3383 * We use i_size instead of i_disksize here because delalloc writeback 3384 * can complete at any point during the I/O and subsequently push the 3385 * i_disksize out to i_size. This could be beyond where direct I/O is 3386 * happening and thus expose allocated blocks to direct I/O reads. 3387 */ vvv CID 1487841: Integer handling issues (OVERFLOW_BEFORE_WIDEN) vvv Potentially overflowing expression "1 << blkbits" with type "int" (32 bits, signed) is evaluated using 32-bit arithmetic, and then used in a context that expects an expression of type "loff_t" (64 bits, signed). 3388 else if ((map->m_lblk * (1 << blkbits)) >= i_size_read(inode)) 3389 m_flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE; 3390 else if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)) 3391 m_flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_IO_CREATE_EXT;
3392
3393 ret = ext4_map_blocks(handle, inode, map, m_flags);
If this is a false positive, please let us know so we can mark it as such, or teach the Coverity rules to be smarter. If not, please make sure fixes get into linux-next. :) For patches fixing this, please include these lines (but double-check the "Fixes" first):
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1487841 ("Integer handling issues")
Thanks for your attention!
Signature · 1 line
Coverity-bot
Quoted 13 lines · coverity-bot
This is an experimental automated report about issues detected by Coverity from a scan of next-20191108 as part of the linux-next weekly scan project:
https://scan.coverity.com/projects/linux-next-weekly-scanYou're getting this email because you were associated with the identified lines of code (noted below) that were touched by recent commits:
378f32bab371("ext4: introduce direct I/O write using iomap infrastructure")Coverity reported the following:
*** CID 1487841: Integer handling issues (
OVERFLOW_BEFORE_WIDEN) /fs/ext4/inode.c: 3388 inext4_iomap_alloc()
Quoted 12 lines
3382 /* 3383 * We use i_size instead of i_disksize here because delalloc writeback 3384 * can complete at any point during the I/O and subsequently push the 3385 * i_disksize out to i_size. This could be beyond where direct I/O is 3386 * happening and thus expose allocated blocks to direct I/O reads. 3387 */ vvv CID 1487841: Integer handling issues (OVERFLOW_BEFORE_WIDEN) vvv Potentially overflowing expression "1 << blkbits" with type "int" (32 bits, signed) is evaluated using 32-bit arithmetic, and then used in a context that expects an expression of type "loff_t" (64 bits, signed). 3388 else if ((map->m_lblk * (1 << blkbits)) >= i_size_read(inode)) 3389 m_flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE; 3390 else if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)) 3391 m_flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_IO_CREATE_EXT;
In the event of an overflow in this specific context, I don't think it would matter too much to be perfectly honest. If 'blkbits' were to actually ever push out the signed integer to a value that couldn't be represented by this data type, I would expect the resulting wrapping behaviour to _only_ affect how filesystem blocks are allocated. In that case, I/O workloads would behave alot differently, and at that point I would hope that our filesystem related testing infrastructure would pick this up before allowing anything to leak out into the wild...
Unless my trail of thought is wrong? Happy to be corrected here and educated on this.
/M
Quoted 37 lines · Matthew Bobrowski
Quoted 13 lines · coverity-bot
This is an experimental automated report about issues detected by Coverity from a scan of next-20191108 as part of the linux-next weekly scan project:
https://scan.coverity.com/projects/linux-next-weekly-scanYou're getting this email because you were associated with the identified lines of code (noted below) that were touched by recent commits:
378f32bab371("ext4: introduce direct I/O write using iomap infrastructure")Coverity reported the following:
*** CID 1487841: Integer handling issues (
OVERFLOW_BEFORE_WIDEN) /fs/ext4/inode.c: 3388 inext4_iomap_alloc()Quoted 12 lines
3382 /* 3383 * We use i_size instead of i_disksize here because delalloc writeback 3384 * can complete at any point during the I/O and subsequently push the 3385 * i_disksize out to i_size. This could be beyond where direct I/O is 3386 * happening and thus expose allocated blocks to direct I/O reads. 3387 */ vvv CID 1487841: Integer handling issues (OVERFLOW_BEFORE_WIDEN) vvv Potentially overflowing expression "1 << blkbits" with type "int" (32 bits, signed) is evaluated using 32-bit arithmetic, and then used in a context that expects an expression of type "loff_t" (64 bits, signed). 3388 else if ((map->m_lblk * (1 << blkbits)) >= i_size_read(inode)) 3389 m_flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE; 3390 else if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)) 3391 m_flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_IO_CREATE_EXT;In the event of an overflow in this specific context, I don't think it would matter too much to be perfectly honest. If 'blkbits' were to actually ever push out the signed integer to a value that couldn't be represented by this data type, I would expect the resulting wrapping behaviour to _only_ affect how filesystem blocks are allocated. In that case, I/O workloads would behave alot differently, and at that point I would hope that our filesystem related testing infrastructure would pick this up before allowing anything to leak out into the wild...
Quoted 2 lines
Unless my trail of thought is wrong? Happy to be corrected here and educated on this.
Fully agreed. blkbits is never expected to be larger than 16 in this code. So this is false positive.
Honza
Signature · 2 lines
Jan Kara <[email protected]> SUSE Labs, CR
Quoted 38 lines · Jan Kara
Quoted 37 lines · Matthew Bobrowski
Quoted 13 lines · coverity-bot
This is an experimental automated report about issues detected by Coverity from a scan of next-20191108 as part of the linux-next weekly scan project:
https://scan.coverity.com/projects/linux-next-weekly-scanYou're getting this email because you were associated with the identified lines of code (noted below) that were touched by recent commits:
378f32bab371("ext4: introduce direct I/O write using iomap infrastructure")Coverity reported the following:
*** CID 1487841: Integer handling issues (
OVERFLOW_BEFORE_WIDEN) /fs/ext4/inode.c: 3388 inext4_iomap_alloc()Quoted 12 lines
3382 /* 3383 * We use i_size instead of i_disksize here because delalloc writeback 3384 * can complete at any point during the I/O and subsequently push the 3385 * i_disksize out to i_size. This could be beyond where direct I/O is 3386 * happening and thus expose allocated blocks to direct I/O reads. 3387 */ vvv CID 1487841: Integer handling issues (OVERFLOW_BEFORE_WIDEN) vvv Potentially overflowing expression "1 << blkbits" with type "int" (32 bits, signed) is evaluated using 32-bit arithmetic, and then used in a context that expects an expression of type "loff_t" (64 bits, signed). 3388 else if ((map->m_lblk * (1 << blkbits)) >= i_size_read(inode)) 3389 m_flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE; 3390 else if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)) 3391 m_flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_IO_CREATE_EXT;In the event of an overflow in this specific context, I don't think it would matter too much to be perfectly honest. If 'blkbits' were to actually ever push out the signed integer to a value that couldn't be represented by this data type, I would expect the resulting wrapping behaviour to _only_ affect how filesystem blocks are allocated. In that case, I/O workloads would behave alot differently, and at that point I would hope that our filesystem related testing infrastructure would pick this up before allowing anything to leak out into the wild...
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Unless my trail of thought is wrong? Happy to be corrected here and educated on this.
Fully agreed. blkbits is never expected to be larger than 16 in this code. So this is false positive.
Thanks for looking into this!
Is it worth changing the type to u8 or something?
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
Quoted 39 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 38 lines · Jan Kara
Quoted 37 lines · Matthew Bobrowski
Quoted 13 lines · coverity-bot
This is an experimental automated report about issues detected by Coverity from a scan of next-20191108 as part of the linux-next weekly scan project:
https://scan.coverity.com/projects/linux-next-weekly-scanYou're getting this email because you were associated with the identified lines of code (noted below) that were touched by recent commits:
378f32bab371("ext4: introduce direct I/O write using iomap infrastructure")Coverity reported the following:
*** CID 1487841: Integer handling issues (
OVERFLOW_BEFORE_WIDEN) /fs/ext4/inode.c: 3388 inext4_iomap_alloc()Quoted 12 lines
3382 /* 3383 * We use i_size instead of i_disksize here because delalloc writeback 3384 * can complete at any point during the I/O and subsequently push the 3385 * i_disksize out to i_size. This could be beyond where direct I/O is 3386 * happening and thus expose allocated blocks to direct I/O reads. 3387 */ vvv CID 1487841: Integer handling issues (OVERFLOW_BEFORE_WIDEN) vvv Potentially overflowing expression "1 << blkbits" with type "int" (32 bits, signed) is evaluated using 32-bit arithmetic, and then used in a context that expects an expression of type "loff_t" (64 bits, signed). 3388 else if ((map->m_lblk * (1 << blkbits)) >= i_size_read(inode)) 3389 m_flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE; 3390 else if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)) 3391 m_flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_IO_CREATE_EXT;In the event of an overflow in this specific context, I don't think it would matter too much to be perfectly honest. If 'blkbits' were to actually ever push out the signed integer to a value that couldn't be represented by this data type, I would expect the resulting wrapping behaviour to _only_ affect how filesystem blocks are allocated. In that case, I/O workloads would behave alot differently, and at that point I would hope that our filesystem related testing infrastructure would pick this up before allowing anything to leak out into the wild...
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Unless my trail of thought is wrong? Happy to be corrected here and educated on this.
Fully agreed. blkbits is never expected to be larger than 16 in this code. So this is false positive.
Thanks for looking into this!
No problem!
Quoted 1 line
Is it worth changing the type to u8 or something?
'blkbits' in this case is already of data type u8, so this would effectively be a no-op. :)
/M
Quoted 46 lines · Matthew Bobrowski
Quoted 45 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 43 lines · Jan Kara
Quoted 37 lines · Matthew Bobrowski
Quoted 13 lines · coverity-bot
This is an experimental automated report about issues detected by Coverity from a scan of next-20191108 as part of the linux-next weekly scan project:
https://scan.coverity.com/projects/linux-next-weekly-scanYou're getting this email because you were associated with the identified lines of code (noted below) that were touched by recent commits:
378f32bab371("ext4: introduce direct I/O write using iomap infrastructure")Coverity reported the following:
*** CID 1487841: Integer handling issues (
OVERFLOW_BEFORE_WIDEN) /fs/ext4/inode.c: 3388 inext4_iomap_alloc()Quoted 12 lines
3382 /* 3383 * We use i_size instead of i_disksize here because delalloc writeback 3384 * can complete at any point during the I/O and subsequently push the 3385 * i_disksize out to i_size. This could be beyond where direct I/O is 3386 * happening and thus expose allocated blocks to direct I/O reads. 3387 */ vvv CID 1487841: Integer handling issues (OVERFLOW_BEFORE_WIDEN) vvv Potentially overflowing expression "1 << blkbits" with type "int" (32 bits, signed) is evaluated using 32-bit arithmetic, and then used in a context that expects an expression of type "loff_t" (64 bits, signed). 3388 else if ((map->m_lblk * (1 << blkbits)) >= i_size_read(inode)) 3389 m_flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE; 3390 else if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)) 3391 m_flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_IO_CREATE_EXT;In the event of an overflow in this specific context, I don't think it would matter too much to be perfectly honest. If 'blkbits' were to actually ever push out the signed integer to a value that couldn't be represented by this data type, I would expect the resulting wrapping behaviour to _only_ affect how filesystem blocks are allocated. In that case, I/O workloads would behave alot differently, and at that point I would hope that our filesystem related testing infrastructure would pick this up before allowing anything to leak out into the wild...
Quoted 2 lines
Unless my trail of thought is wrong? Happy to be corrected here and educated on this.
Fully agreed. blkbits is never expected to be larger than 16 in this code. So this is false positive.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Thanks for looking into this!
No problem!
Quoted 1 line
Is it worth changing the type to u8 or something?
'blkbits' in this case is already of data type u8, so this would effectively be a no-op. :)
Hm, yeah. I guess Coverity doesn't see anything bounding it or i_blkbits to 16. Would add something like this make sense just to validate assumptions?
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(blkbits > 16))
return -ENOSPC;
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
Quoted 56 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 46 lines · Matthew Bobrowski
Quoted 45 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 43 lines · Jan Kara
Quoted 37 lines · Matthew Bobrowski
Quoted 13 lines · coverity-bot
This is an experimental automated report about issues detected by Coverity from a scan of next-20191108 as part of the linux-next weekly scan project:
https://scan.coverity.com/projects/linux-next-weekly-scanYou're getting this email because you were associated with the identified lines of code (noted below) that were touched by recent commits:
378f32bab371("ext4: introduce direct I/O write using iomap infrastructure")Coverity reported the following:
*** CID 1487841: Integer handling issues (
OVERFLOW_BEFORE_WIDEN) /fs/ext4/inode.c: 3388 inext4_iomap_alloc()Quoted 12 lines
3382 /* 3383 * We use i_size instead of i_disksize here because delalloc writeback 3384 * can complete at any point during the I/O and subsequently push the 3385 * i_disksize out to i_size. This could be beyond where direct I/O is 3386 * happening and thus expose allocated blocks to direct I/O reads. 3387 */ vvv CID 1487841: Integer handling issues (OVERFLOW_BEFORE_WIDEN) vvv Potentially overflowing expression "1 << blkbits" with type "int" (32 bits, signed) is evaluated using 32-bit arithmetic, and then used in a context that expects an expression of type "loff_t" (64 bits, signed). 3388 else if ((map->m_lblk * (1 << blkbits)) >= i_size_read(inode)) 3389 m_flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE; 3390 else if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)) 3391 m_flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_IO_CREATE_EXT;In the event of an overflow in this specific context, I don't think it would matter too much to be perfectly honest. If 'blkbits' were to actually ever push out the signed integer to a value that couldn't be represented by this data type, I would expect the resulting wrapping behaviour to _only_ affect how filesystem blocks are allocated. In that case, I/O workloads would behave alot differently, and at that point I would hope that our filesystem related testing infrastructure would pick this up before allowing anything to leak out into the wild...
Quoted 2 lines
Unless my trail of thought is wrong? Happy to be corrected here and educated on this.
Fully agreed. blkbits is never expected to be larger than 16 in this code. So this is false positive.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Thanks for looking into this!
No problem!
Quoted 1 line
Is it worth changing the type to u8 or something?
'blkbits' in this case is already of data type u8, so this would effectively be a no-op. :)
Quoted 6 lines
Hm, yeah. I guess Coverity doesn't see anything bounding it or
i_blkbitsto 16. Would add something like this make sense just to validate assumptions?if (
WARN_ON_ONCE(blkbits > 16))return -ENOSPC;
In the realm of filesystem code, we'd lean towards using a different error code if we went down the route of adding such a check i.e. -EIO rather than -ENOSPC, where -ENOSPC is typically used to signify that there's no space left on an underlying device.
That said, I still don't think this would be necessary here though...
/M
Quoted 56 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 46 lines · Matthew Bobrowski
Quoted 45 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 43 lines · Jan Kara
Quoted 37 lines · Matthew Bobrowski
Quoted 13 lines · coverity-bot
This is an experimental automated report about issues detected by Coverity from a scan of next-20191108 as part of the linux-next weekly scan project:
https://scan.coverity.com/projects/linux-next-weekly-scanYou're getting this email because you were associated with the identified lines of code (noted below) that were touched by recent commits:
378f32bab371("ext4: introduce direct I/O write using iomap infrastructure")Coverity reported the following:
*** CID 1487841: Integer handling issues (
OVERFLOW_BEFORE_WIDEN) /fs/ext4/inode.c: 3388 inext4_iomap_alloc()Quoted 12 lines
3382 /* 3383 * We use i_size instead of i_disksize here because delalloc writeback 3384 * can complete at any point during the I/O and subsequently push the 3385 * i_disksize out to i_size. This could be beyond where direct I/O is 3386 * happening and thus expose allocated blocks to direct I/O reads. 3387 */ vvv CID 1487841: Integer handling issues (OVERFLOW_BEFORE_WIDEN) vvv Potentially overflowing expression "1 << blkbits" with type "int" (32 bits, signed) is evaluated using 32-bit arithmetic, and then used in a context that expects an expression of type "loff_t" (64 bits, signed). 3388 else if ((map->m_lblk * (1 << blkbits)) >= i_size_read(inode)) 3389 m_flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE; 3390 else if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)) 3391 m_flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_IO_CREATE_EXT;In the event of an overflow in this specific context, I don't think it would matter too much to be perfectly honest. If 'blkbits' were to actually ever push out the signed integer to a value that couldn't be represented by this data type, I would expect the resulting wrapping behaviour to _only_ affect how filesystem blocks are allocated. In that case, I/O workloads would behave alot differently, and at that point I would hope that our filesystem related testing infrastructure would pick this up before allowing anything to leak out into the wild...
Quoted 2 lines
Unless my trail of thought is wrong? Happy to be corrected here and educated on this.
Fully agreed. blkbits is never expected to be larger than 16 in this code. So this is false positive.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Thanks for looking into this!
No problem!
Quoted 1 line
Is it worth changing the type to u8 or something?
'blkbits' in this case is already of data type u8, so this would effectively be a no-op. :)
Quoted 6 lines
Hm, yeah. I guess Coverity doesn't see anything bounding it or
i_blkbitsto 16. Would add something like this make sense just to validate assumptions?if (
WARN_ON_ONCE(blkbits > 16))return -ENOSPC;
Well, I don't think we want to clutter various places in the code with checks that inode->i_blkbits (which is what blkbits actually is) is what we expect. inode->i_blkbits is initialized in fs/inode.c:inode_init_always() from sb->s_blocksize_bits and never changed. sb->s_blocksize_bits gets set through sb_set_blocksize(). Now it would make sense to assert in sb_set_blocksize() that block size is in the range we expect it (currently there's just a comment there). But then I suspect that Coverity won't be able to carry over the limits as far as into ext4_iomap_alloc() code... Kees?
Honza
Signature · 2 lines
Jan Kara <[email protected]> SUSE Labs, CR
Quoted 9 lines · Jan Kara
Well, I don't think we want to clutter various places in the code with checks that
inode->i_blkbits(which is what blkbits actually is) is what we expect.inode->i_blkbitsis initialized in fs/inode.c:inode_init_always() fromsb->s_blocksize_bitsand never changed.sb->s_blocksize_bitsgets set throughsb_set_blocksize(). Now it would make sense to assert insb_set_blocksize()that block size is in the range we expect it (currently there's just a comment there). But then I suspect that Coverity won't be able to carry over the limits as far as intoext4_iomap_alloc()code... Kees?
Yeah, I'm not sure it's capabilities in this regard. It's still a bit of a black box. :) I just tend to lean toward adding asserts to code-document value range expectations. Perhaps add the check in sb_set_blocksize() just because it's a decent thing to test, and if Coverity doesn't notice, that's okay -- my goal is to improve the kernel which may not always reduce the static checker noise. :)
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
Quoted 11 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 9 lines · Jan Kara
Well, I don't think we want to clutter various places in the code with checks that
inode->i_blkbits(which is what blkbits actually is) is what we expect.inode->i_blkbitsis initialized in fs/inode.c:inode_init_always() fromsb->s_blocksize_bitsand never changed.sb->s_blocksize_bitsgets set throughsb_set_blocksize(). Now it would make sense to assert insb_set_blocksize()that block size is in the range we expect it (currently there's just a comment there). But then I suspect that Coverity won't be able to carry over the limits as far as intoext4_iomap_alloc()code... Kees?
Quoted 6 lines
Yeah, I'm not sure it's capabilities in this regard. It's still a bit of a black box. :) I just tend to lean toward adding asserts to code-document value range expectations. Perhaps add the check in
sb_set_blocksize()just because it's a decent thing to test, and if Coverity doesn't notice, that's okay -- my goal is to improve the kernel which may not always reduce the static checker noise. :)
Now I've noticed that set_blocksize() called from sb_set_blocksize() already has these checks. So there's nothing to add. Just Coverity is not able to carry over those limits that far...
Honza
Signature · 2 lines
Jan Kara <[email protected]> SUSE Labs, CR
Quoted 19 lines · Jan Kara
Quoted 11 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 9 lines · Jan Kara
Well, I don't think we want to clutter various places in the code with checks that
inode->i_blkbits(which is what blkbits actually is) is what we expect.inode->i_blkbitsis initialized in fs/inode.c:inode_init_always() fromsb->s_blocksize_bitsand never changed.sb->s_blocksize_bitsgets set throughsb_set_blocksize(). Now it would make sense to assert insb_set_blocksize()that block size is in the range we expect it (currently there's just a comment there). But then I suspect that Coverity won't be able to carry over the limits as far as intoext4_iomap_alloc()code... Kees?Quoted 6 lines
Yeah, I'm not sure it's capabilities in this regard. It's still a bit of a black box. :) I just tend to lean toward adding asserts to code-document value range expectations. Perhaps add the check in
sb_set_blocksize()just because it's a decent thing to test, and if Coverity doesn't notice, that's okay -- my goal is to improve the kernel which may not always reduce the static checker noise. :)
Quoted 3 lines
Now I've noticed that
set_blocksize()called fromsb_set_blocksize()already has these checks. So there's nothing to add. Just Coverity is not able to carry over those limits that far...
Okay, cool. I'll mark it as such. Thanks!
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook