orangefs: posix open permission checking
Subsystems (2)
PATCH v2 1/1 orangefs: posix open permission checking
From: Mike Marshall <[email protected]>
Here's another approach that might not be as broken...
Orangefs has no open. Orangefs does permission checking each time a file is accessed. The Posix model is for permission checks to be done at open.
This patch brings orangefs-through-the-kernel closer to Posix by marking inodes "opened" when they pass through file_operations->open and using a UID whose capabilities include PINT_CAP_WRITE and PINT_CAP_READ for IO associated with open files.
I have another proof-of-concept version of this patch which sends a message to the userspace server to add PINT_CAP_WRITE and PINT_CAP_READ to whatever arbitrary UID is doing IO, in case using the root UID for the entire IO is not conservative enough... this version also requires a patch to the userspace part of Orangefs.
"root has every possible capability - PINT_get_capabilities"
--- fs/orangefs/file.c | 4 ++++ fs/orangefs/inode.c | 1 + fs/orangefs/orangefs-kernel.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
fs/orangefs/file.c +4 -0
@@ -90,6 +90,8 @@ ssize_t wait_for_direct_io(enum ORANGEFS_io_type type, struct inode *inode, new_op->upcall.uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns, wr->uid); new_op->upcall.gid =from_kgid (&init_user_ns, wr->gid); } +if (new_op->upcall.uid && (ORANGEFS_I (inode)->opened)) + new_op->upcall.uid =0 ; gossip_debug(GOSSIP_FILE_DEBUG, "%s(%pU): offset: %llu total_size: %zd\n",
@@ -495,6 +497,7 @@ static int orangefs_file_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)"orangefs_file_release: called on %pD\n" , file); +ORANGEFS_I (inode)->opened =0 ;/* * remove all associated inode pages from the page cache and * readahead cache (if any); this forces an expensive refresh of
@@ -618,6 +621,7 @@ static int orangefs_lock(struct file *filp, int cmd, struct file_lock *fl)static int orangefs_file_open (struct inode * inode,struct file *file) { file->private_data =NULL ; +ORANGEFS_I (inode)->opened =1 ;return generic_file_open (inode, file); }
fs/orangefs/inode.c +1 -0
@@ -1060,6 +1060,7 @@ static int orangefs_set_inode(struct inode *inode, void *data)hash_init (ORANGEFS_I (inode)->xattr_cache);ORANGEFS_I (inode)->mapping_time = jiffies -1 ;ORANGEFS_I (inode)->bitlock =0 ; +ORANGEFS_I (inode)->opened =0 ;return 0 ; }
fs/orangefs/orangefs-kernel.h +1 -0
@@ -198,6 +198,7 @@ struct orangefs_inode_s {kuid_t attr_uid;kgid_t attr_gid;unsigned long bitlock; +int opened;DECLARE_HASHTABLE (xattr_cache,4 ); };
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
fs/orangefs/file.c ssize_t wait_for_direct_io(enum ORANGEFS_io_type type, struct inode *inode, · line 94
Quoted 7 lines · On Mon, Nov 25, 2019 at 7:12 AM <[email protected]> wrote:
fs/orangefs/file.c +2
-0@@ -90,6 +90,8 @@ ssize_t wait_for_direct_io(enum ORANGEFS_io_type type, struct inode *inode, new_op->upcall.uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns, wr->uid); new_op->upcall.gid =from_kgid (&init_user_ns, wr->gid); } +if (new_op->upcall.uid && (ORANGEFS_I (inode)->opened)) + new_op->upcall.uid =0 ;
You still can't do this.
You can't make it part of the inode state, because the inode is shared across different file descriptors. So you are giving a potentially different file descriptor (that really was opened just for reading) the magical override.
What you *should* do is to always use the credentials at open time, and the "can I read or write this" from open time.
And regardless of whether you have your own open routine or not, those are always available as "file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE" and "file->f_cred".
If you use those - and pretty much *ONLY* if you use those - you will get things right.
Linus