Return ENXIO instead of EPERM when speculation control is unimplemented
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 Return ENXIO instead of EPERM when speculation control is unimplemented
According to the documentation, the PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL call should return ENXIO when the control of the selected speculation misfeature is not possible. EPERM should be returned only when the speculation was disabled with PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE and caller tried to enable it again.
Instead, the current implementation returns EPERM when the control of indirect branch speculation is not possible because it is unimplemented by the CPU. This behavior is obviously not compatible with the current documentation. ENXIO should be returned in this case.
This change is:
1) Explicitly document that the EPERM return value applies also to cases when the speculative behavior is forced from the boot command line and the caller tries to change it.
2) Distinguishing between the speculation control being unimplemented and being disabled, returning ENXIO in the first case and EPERM in the second case.
--- Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst | 6 +++-- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 29 +++++++++++++++-------- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst +4 -2
@@ -83,8 +83,10 @@ ERANGE arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's neither PR_SPEC_ENABLE nor ENXIO Control of the selected speculation misfeature is not possible. See PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL. -EPERM Speculation was disabled with PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE and caller - tried to enable it again. +EPERM Caller tried to enable speculation when it was disabled with + PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE or force-disabled on the boot command line. + Caller tried to disable speculation when it was force-enabled on + the boot command line. ======= ================================================================= Speculation misfeature controls
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +2 -1
@@ -220,7 +220,8 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {/* The indirect branch speculation control variants */ enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation { -SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE , +SPECTRE_V2_USER_UNAVAILABLE , +SPECTRE_V2_USER_DISABLED ,SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ,SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ,SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +19 -10
@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =SPECTRE_V2_NONE ;static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user__ro_after_init = -SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE ; +SPECTRE_V2_USER_UNAVAILABLE ;#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
@@ -540,7 +540,8 @@ enum spectre_v2_user_cmd { };static const char *const spectre_v2_user_strings[] = { - [SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE ] ="User space: Vulnerable" , + [SPECTRE_V2_USER_UNAVAILABLE ] ="User space: Vulnerable: STIBP unavailable" , + [SPECTRE_V2_USER_DISABLED ] ="User space: Vulnerable: STIBP disabled" , [SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ] ="User space: Mitigation: STIBP protection" , [SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ] ="User space: Mitigation: STIBP always-on protection" , [SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ] ="User space: Mitigation: STIBP via prctl" ,
@@ -602,7 +603,7 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation (enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) { -enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation mode =SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE ; +enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation mode =SPECTRE_V2_USER_UNAVAILABLE ;bool smt_possible =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_SMP );enum spectre_v2_user_cmd cmd;
@@ -616,6 +617,7 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) cmd =spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline (v2_cmd);switch (cmd) {case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE : + mode =SPECTRE_V2_USER_DISABLED ; goto set_mode;case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE : mode =SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ;
@@ -676,7 +678,7 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)* mode. */ if (!smt_possible || !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_STIBP )) - mode =SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE ; + mode =SPECTRE_V2_USER_UNAVAILABLE ; set_mode: spectre_v2_user = mode;/* Only print the STIBP mode when SMT possible */
@@ -915,7 +917,8 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)mutex_lock (&spec_ctrl_mutex);switch (spectre_v2_user) { -case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE : +case SPECTRE_V2_USER_DISABLED : +case SPECTRE_V2_USER_UNAVAILABLE :break ;case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT :case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED :
@@ -1157,7 +1160,8 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl) {switch (ctrl) {case PR_SPEC_ENABLE : -if (spectre_v2_user ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE ) +if (spectre_v2_user ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_UNAVAILABLE || + spectre_v2_user ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_DISABLED )return 0 ;/* * Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict
@@ -1173,9 +1177,11 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE :/* * Indirect branch speculation is always allowed when -* mitigation is force disabled. +* mitigation is unavailable or force disabled. */ -if (spectre_v2_user ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE ) +if (spectre_v2_user ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_UNAVAILABLE ) +return -ENXIO ; +if (spectre_v2_user ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_DISABLED )return -EPERM ;if (spectre_v2_user ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || spectre_v2_user ==SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED )
@@ -1241,7 +1247,8 @@ static int ib_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED ;switch (spectre_v2_user) { -case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE : +case SPECTRE_V2_USER_UNAVAILABLE : +case SPECTRE_V2_USER_DISABLED :return PR_SPEC_ENABLE ;case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL :case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP :
@@ -1495,7 +1502,9 @@ static char *stibp_state(void)return "" ;switch (spectre_v2_user) { -case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE : +case SPECTRE_V2_USER_UNAVAILABLE : +return ", STIBP: unavailable" ; +case SPECTRE_V2_USER_DISABLED :return ", STIBP: disabled" ;case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT :return ", STIBP: forced" ;
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1.735.g03f4e72817-goog
Anthony,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c static char *stibp_state(void) · line 1506
Quoted 6 lines · Anthony Steinhauser
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +2
-1return "" ;switch (spectre_v2_user) { -case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE : +case SPECTRE_V2_USER_UNAVAILABLE : +return ", STIBP: unavailable" ;
Shouldn't this for correctness differentiate between the case where the STIBP mitigation feature is not available and the case where STIBP is not used because SMT is not possible?
Thanks,
tglx
You're right, Thomas,
thanks for pointing that out. Please, see attached a corrected version.
Quoted 11 lines · Thomas Gleixner
Anthony,
Review
Quoted 6 lines · Anthony Steinhauser
return ""; switch (spectre_v2_user) {(quoted diff) +2
-1- case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE: + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_UNAVAILABLE: + return ", STIBP: unavailable";
Quoted 7 lines
Shouldn't this for correctness differentiate between the case where the STIBP mitigation feature is not available and the case where STIBP is not used because SMT is not possible?
Thanks,
tglx
From 561159a358e91ce4959f06836b0aa6147f8dd346 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Anthony Steinhauser <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2020 03:09:11 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] Return ENXIO instead of EPERM when speculation control is
unimplemented
According to the documentation, the PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL call should return ENXIO when the control of the selected speculation misfeature is not possible. EPERM should be returned only when the speculation was disabled with PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE and caller tried to enable it again.
Instead, the current implementation returns EPERM when the control of indirect branch speculation is not possible because it is unimplemented by the CPU. This behavior is obviously not compatible with the current documentation. ENXIO should be returned in this case.
This change is:
1) Explicitly document that the EPERM return value applies also to cases when the speculative behavior is forced from the boot command line and the caller tries to change it.
2) Distinguishing between the speculation control being unimplemented and being disabled, returning ENXIO in the first case and EPERM in the second case.
--- Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst | 6 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 4 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++------ 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst +4 -2
@@ -83,8 +83,10 @@ ERANGE arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's neither PR_SPEC_ENABLE nor ENXIO Control of the selected speculation misfeature is not possible. See PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL. -EPERM Speculation was disabled with PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE and caller - tried to enable it again. +EPERM Caller tried to enable speculation when it was disabled with + PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE or force-disabled on the boot command line. + Caller tried to disable speculation when it was force-enabled on + the boot command line. ======= ================================================================= Speculation misfeature controls
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +3 -1
@@ -220,7 +220,9 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {/* The indirect branch speculation control variants */ enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation { -SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE , +SPECTRE_V2_USER_UNAVAILABLE , +SPECTRE_V2_USER_DISABLED , +SPECTRE_V2_USER_SMT_IMPOSSIBLE ,SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ,SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ,SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +36 -13
122 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.0.341.g760bfbb309-goog
Borislav Petkov
maintainerReview spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) · line 608
Quoted 8 lines · Anthony Steinhauser
(quoted diff) +1
-1@@ -602,7 +603,7 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) { - enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE; + enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_UNAVAILABLE; bool smt_possible = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP); enum spectre_v2_user_cmd cmd;
So here in the code, right under this line we check IBPB and STIBP and whether SMT is force_disabled/possible and set smt_possible if not. We parse cmdline, pick apart selection, etc...
Quoted 9 lines
(quoted diff) +1
-0@@ -616,6 +617,7 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(v2_cmd); switch (cmd) { case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE: + mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_DISABLED; goto set_mode; case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE: mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT;
Review spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) · line 681
Quoted 5 lines
(quoted diff) +1
-1@@ -676,7 +678,7 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) * mode. */ if (!smt_possible || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) - mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE; + mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_UNAVAILABLE;
... but here we do that evaluation again. But I think that *if* the required hw support is not there - either SMT is not possible or STIBP not present - then there's no real need to parse the cmdline and do all that.
IOW, the filtering out of the cases where the user can't do any changes due to not present hw should be concentrated at the function entry and mode left at SPECTRE_V2_USER_UNAVAILABLE.
IOW 2, unless I'm not missing some of the gazillion use cases with this ;-\ I think that check needs to be moved up and integrated into the entry checks. I.e., this ontop or a separate patch...:
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +3 -8
@@ -618,8 +618,10 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)return ;if (cpu_smt_control ==CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED || - cpu_smt_control ==CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + cpu_smt_control ==CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED ) { smt_possible = false; +return ; + } cmd =spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline (v2_cmd);switch (cmd) {
@@ -679,13 +681,6 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)/* If enhanced IBRS is enabled no STIBP required */ if (spectre_v2_enabled ==SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED )return ; - -/* -* If SMT is not possible or STIBP is not available clear the STIBP -* mode. -*/ -if (!smt_possible || !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_STIBP )) - mode =SPECTRE_V2_USER_UNAVAILABLE ; set_mode: spectre_v2_user = mode;/* Only print the STIBP mode when SMT possible */
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteYour change seems to remove exactly the distinction which Thomas pointed out because SPECTRE_V2_USER_UNAVAILABLE would not differentiate between STIBP mitigation not available and STIBP not used because SMT is not possible. Otherwise your modification looks fine to me.
Quoted 80 lines · Borislav Petkov
Review spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) · line 608
Quoted 8 lines · Anthony Steinhauser
(quoted diff) +1
-1@@ -602,7 +603,7 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) { - enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE; + enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_UNAVAILABLE; bool smt_possible = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP); enum spectre_v2_user_cmd cmd;So here in the code, right under this line we check IBPB and STIBP and whether SMT is force_disabled/possible and set
smt_possibleif not. We parse cmdline, pick apart selection, etc...Quoted 9 lines
(quoted diff) +1
-0@@ -616,6 +617,7 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(v2_cmd); switch (cmd) { case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE: + mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_DISABLED; goto set_mode; case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE: mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT;Review spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) · line 681
Quoted 5 lines
(quoted diff) +1
-1@@ -676,7 +678,7 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) * mode. */ if (!smt_possible || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) - mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE; + mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_UNAVAILABLE;... but here we do that evaluation again. But I think that *if* the required hw support is not there - either SMT is not possible or STIBP not present - then there's no real need to parse the cmdline and do all that.
IOW, the filtering out of the cases where the user can't do any changes due to not present hw should be concentrated at the function entry and mode left at
SPECTRE_V2_USER_UNAVAILABLE.IOW 2, unless I'm not missing some of the gazillion use cases with this ;-\ I think that check needs to be moved up and integrated into the entry checks. I.e., this ontop or a separate patch...:
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +3
-9@@ -618,8 +618,10 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)return ;if (cpu_smt_control ==CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED || - cpu_smt_control ==CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + cpu_smt_control ==CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED ) { smt_possible = false; +return ; + } cmd =spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline (v2_cmd);switch (cmd) {@@ -679,13 +681,6 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)/* If enhanced IBRS is enabled no STIBP required */ if (spectre_v2_enabled ==SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED )return ; - -/* -* If SMT is not possible or STIBP is not available clear the STIBP -* mode. -*/ -if (!smt_possible || !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_STIBP )) - mode =SPECTRE_V2_USER_UNAVAILABLE ; set_mode: spectre_v2_user = mode;/* Only print the STIBP mode when SMT possible */ --Regards/Gruss,
Boris.