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introduce a uid/gid shifting bind mount

PATCH Superseded James Bottomley 5 participants 16 messages Jan 4, 2020 – Jan 17, 2020

Subsystems (10)
VFS NFS server Scheduler Driver core +6 more subsystems

v2 of 3 Superseded Latest is v3 →

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#0 lore raw

v2 cover introduce a uid/gid shifting bind mount

The object of this series is to replace shiftfs with a proper uid/gid shifting bind mount instead of the shiftfs hack of introducing something that looks similar to an overlay filesystem to do it.

The VFS still has the problem that in order to tell what vfsmount a dentry belongs to, struct path would have to be threaded everywhere struct dentry currently is. However, this patch is structured only to require a rethreading of notify_change. The rest of the knowledge that a shift is in operation is carried in the task structure by caching the unshifted credentials.

The only real change from v1 is that the notify_change patch is updated to fix the issues pointed out by Amir Goldstein. And I've combined the precursor patch to rethread notify_changes into the series.

James

---

James Bottomley (3):
fs: rethread notify_change to take a path instead of a dentry
fs: introduce uid/gid shifting bind mount
fs: expose shifting bind mount to userspace

 drivers/base/devtmpfs.c   |   8 +++-
 fs/attr.c                 |  91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 fs/bind.c                 |  35 +++++++++++++++
 fs/cachefiles/interface.c |   6 ++-
 fs/coredump.c             |   4 +-
 fs/ecryptfs/inode.c       |   9 ++--
 fs/exec.c                 |   7 ++-
 fs/inode.c                |  16 ++++---
 fs/internal.h             |   2 +
 fs/mount.h                |   2 +
 fs/namei.c                | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 fs/namespace.c            |   1 +
 fs/nfsd/vfs.c             |  13 +++---
 fs/open.c                 |  44 ++++++++++++++-----
 fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c    |  40 ++++++++++-------
 fs/overlayfs/dir.c        |  10 ++++-
 fs/overlayfs/inode.c      |   6 ++-
 fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h  |   2 +-
 fs/overlayfs/super.c      |   3 +-
 fs/posix_acl.c            |   4 +-
 fs/proc_namespace.c       |   4 ++
 fs/stat.c                 |  31 +++++++++++--
 fs/utimes.c               |   2 +-
 include/linux/cred.h      |  10 +++++
 include/linux/fs.h        |   6 +--
 include/linux/mount.h     |   4 +-
 include/linux/sched.h     |   5 +++
 kernel/capability.c       |  14 +++++-
 kernel/cred.c             |  20 +++++++++
 kernel/groups.c           |   7 +++
 30 files changed, 408 insertions(+), 108 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.16.4
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/3 fs: rethread notify_change to take a path instead of a dentry

In order to prepare for implementing shiftfs as a property changing bind mount, the path (which contains the vfsmount) must be threaded through everywhere we are going to do either a permission check or an attribute get/set so that we can arrange for the credentials for the operation to be based on the bind mount properties rather than those of current.

---

v2: fix issues found by Amir Goldstein

---
 drivers/base/devtmpfs.c   |  8 ++++++--
 fs/attr.c                 |  4 +++-
 fs/cachefiles/interface.c |  6 ++++--
 fs/coredump.c             |  4 ++--
 fs/ecryptfs/inode.c       |  9 ++++++---
 fs/inode.c                |  7 ++++---
 fs/namei.c                |  2 +-
 fs/nfsd/vfs.c             | 13 ++++++++-----
 fs/open.c                 | 19 ++++++++++---------
 fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c    | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 fs/overlayfs/dir.c        | 10 ++++++++--
 fs/overlayfs/inode.c      |  6 ++++--
 fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h  |  2 +-
 fs/overlayfs/super.c      |  3 ++-
 fs/utimes.c               |  2 +-
 include/linux/fs.h        |  6 +++---
 16 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
drivers/base/devtmpfs.c +6 -2
index 6cdbf1531238..eb9f072f5deb 100644
@@ -224,13 +224,17 @@ static int handle_create(const char *nodename, umode_t mode, kuid_t uid,
 	err = vfs_mknod(d_inode(path.dentry), dentry, mode, dev->devt);
 	if (!err) {
 		struct iattr newattrs;
+		struct path newpath = {
+			.mnt = path.mnt,
+			.dentry = dentry,
+		};
 
 		newattrs.ia_mode = mode;
 		newattrs.ia_uid = uid;
 		newattrs.ia_gid = gid;
 		newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE|ATTR_UID|ATTR_GID;
 		inode_lock(d_inode(dentry));
-		notify_change(dentry, &newattrs, NULL);
+		notify_change(&newpath, &newattrs, NULL);
 		inode_unlock(d_inode(dentry));
 
 		/* mark as kernel-created inode */
@@ -337,7 +341,7 @@ static int handle_remove(const char *nodename, struct device *dev)
 			newattrs.ia_valid =
 				ATTR_UID|ATTR_GID|ATTR_MODE;
 			inode_lock(d_inode(dentry));
-			notify_change(dentry, &newattrs, NULL);
+			notify_change(&p, &newattrs, NULL);
 			inode_unlock(d_inode(dentry));
 			err = vfs_unlink(d_inode(parent.dentry), dentry, NULL);
 			if (!err || err == -ENOENT)
fs/attr.c +3 -1
index df28035aa23e..370b18807f05 100644
@@ -226,8 +226,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(setattr_copy);
  * the file open for write, as there can be no conflicting delegation in
  * that case.
  */
-int notify_change(struct dentry * dentry, struct iattr * attr, struct inode **delegated_inode)
+int notify_change(const struct path *path, struct iattr * attr,
+		  struct inode **delegated_inode)
 {
+	struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
 	int error;
fs/cachefiles/interface.c +4 -2
index 4cea5fbf695e..f11216f59a56 100644
@@ -436,6 +436,7 @@ static int cachefiles_attr_changed(struct fscache_object *_object)
 	uint64_t ni_size;
 	loff_t oi_size;
 	int ret;
+	struct path path;
 
 	ni_size = _object->store_limit_l;
 
@@ -466,18 +467,19 @@ static int cachefiles_attr_changed(struct fscache_object *_object)
 	/* if there's an extension to a partial page at the end of the backing
 	 * file, we need to discard the partial page so that we pick up new
 	 * data after it */
+	path = (struct path){ .mnt = cache->mnt, .dentry = object->backer };
 	if (oi_size & ~PAGE_MASK && ni_size > oi_size) {
 		_debug("discard tail %llx", oi_size);
 		newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_SIZE;
 		newattrs.ia_size = oi_size & PAGE_MASK;
-		ret = notify_change(object->backer, &newattrs, NULL);
+		ret = notify_change(&path, &newattrs, NULL);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			goto truncate_failed;
 	}
 
 	newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_SIZE;
 	newattrs.ia_size = ni_size;
-	ret = notify_change(object->backer, &newattrs, NULL);
+	ret = notify_change(&path, &newattrs, NULL);
 
 truncate_failed:
 	inode_unlock(d_inode(object->backer));
fs/coredump.c +2 -2
index b1ea7dfbd149..69899bfb025a 100644
@@ -775,7 +775,7 @@ void do_coredump(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo)
 			goto close_fail;
 		if (!(cprm.file->f_mode & FMODE_CAN_WRITE))
 			goto close_fail;
-		if (do_truncate(cprm.file->f_path.dentry, 0, 0, cprm.file))
+		if (do_truncate(&cprm.file->f_path, 0, 0, cprm.file))
 			goto close_fail;
 	}
 
@@ -879,7 +879,7 @@ void dump_truncate(struct coredump_params *cprm)
 	if (file->f_op->llseek && file->f_op->llseek != no_llseek) {
 		offset = file->f_op->llseek(file, 0, SEEK_CUR);
 		if (i_size_read(file->f_mapping->host) < offset)
-			do_truncate(file->f_path.dentry, offset, 0, file);
+			do_truncate(&file->f_path, offset, 0, file);
 	}
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(dump_truncate);
fs/ecryptfs/inode.c +6 -3
index e23752d9a79f..3bc67c478163 100644
@@ -852,10 +852,11 @@ int ecryptfs_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t new_length)
 
 	rc = truncate_upper(dentry, &ia, &lower_ia);
 	if (!rc && lower_ia.ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
-		struct dentry *lower_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(dentry);
+		struct path *lower_path = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower_path(dentry);
+		struct dentry *lower_dentry = lower_path->dentry;
 
 		inode_lock(d_inode(lower_dentry));
-		rc = notify_change(lower_dentry, &lower_ia, NULL);
+		rc = notify_change(lower_path, &lower_ia, NULL);
 		inode_unlock(d_inode(lower_dentry));
 	}
 	return rc;
@@ -883,6 +884,7 @@ static int ecryptfs_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *ia)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct dentry *lower_dentry;
+	struct path *lower_path;
 	struct iattr lower_ia;
 	struct inode *inode;
 	struct inode *lower_inode;
@@ -897,6 +899,7 @@ static int ecryptfs_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *ia)
 	inode = d_inode(dentry);
 	lower_inode = ecryptfs_inode_to_lower(inode);
 	lower_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(dentry);
+	lower_path = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower_path(dentry);
 	mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->cs_mutex);
 	if (d_is_dir(dentry))
 		crypt_stat->flags &= ~(ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED);
@@ -959,7 +962,7 @@ static int ecryptfs_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *ia)
 		lower_ia.ia_valid &= ~ATTR_MODE;
 
 	inode_lock(d_inode(lower_dentry));
-	rc = notify_change(lower_dentry, &lower_ia, NULL);
+	rc = notify_change(lower_path, &lower_ia, NULL);
 	inode_unlock(d_inode(lower_dentry));
 out:
 	fsstack_copy_attr_all(inode, lower_inode);
fs/inode.c +4 -3
index 96d62d97694e..18ff3081bda0 100644
@@ -1817,7 +1817,7 @@ int dentry_needs_remove_privs(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return mask;
 }
 
-static int __remove_privs(struct dentry *dentry, int kill)
+static int __remove_privs(struct path *path, int kill)
 {
 	struct iattr newattrs;
 
@@ -1826,7 +1826,7 @@ static int __remove_privs(struct dentry *dentry, int kill)
 	 * Note we call this on write, so notify_change will not
 	 * encounter any conflicting delegations:
 	 */
-	return notify_change(dentry, &newattrs, NULL);
+	return notify_change(path, &newattrs, NULL);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1835,6 +1835,7 @@ static int __remove_privs(struct dentry *dentry, int kill)
  */
 int file_remove_privs(struct file *file)
 {
+	struct path *path = &file->f_path;
 	struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	int kill;
@@ -1853,7 +1854,7 @@ int file_remove_privs(struct file *file)
 	if (kill < 0)
 		return kill;
 	if (kill)
-		error = __remove_privs(dentry, kill);
+		error = __remove_privs(path, kill);
 	if (!error)
 		inode_has_no_xattr(inode);
 
fs/namei.c +1 -1
index d6c91d1e88cb..7bb4b1dcf3cc 100644
@@ -3012,7 +3012,7 @@ static int handle_truncate(struct file *filp)
 	if (!error)
 		error = security_path_truncate(path);
 	if (!error) {
-		error = do_truncate(path->dentry, 0,
+		error = do_truncate(path, 0,
 				    ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME|ATTR_OPEN,
 				    filp);
 	}
fs/nfsd/vfs.c +8 -5
index c0dc491537a6..dc990cc8f549 100644
@@ -360,8 +360,8 @@ __be32
 nfsd_setattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, struct iattr *iap,
 	     int check_guard, time_t guardtime)
 {
-	struct dentry	*dentry;
 	struct inode	*inode;
+	struct path	path;
 	int		accmode = NFSD_MAY_SATTR;
 	umode_t		ftype = 0;
 	__be32		err;
@@ -400,8 +400,11 @@ nfsd_setattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, struct iattr *iap,
 			goto out;
 	}
 
-	dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
-	inode = d_inode(dentry);
+	path = (struct path) {
+		.mnt = fhp->fh_export->ex_path.mnt,
+		.dentry = fhp->fh_dentry,
+	};
+	inode = d_inode(path.dentry);
 
 	/* Ignore any mode updates on symlinks */
 	if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
@@ -442,7 +445,7 @@ nfsd_setattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, struct iattr *iap,
 			.ia_size	= iap->ia_size,
 		};
 
-		host_err = notify_change(dentry, &size_attr, NULL);
+		host_err = notify_change(&path, &size_attr, NULL);
 		if (host_err)
 			goto out_unlock;
 		iap->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_SIZE;
@@ -457,7 +460,7 @@ nfsd_setattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, struct iattr *iap,
 	}
 
 	iap->ia_valid |= ATTR_CTIME;
-	host_err = notify_change(dentry, iap, NULL);
+	host_err = notify_change(&path, iap, NULL);
 
 out_unlock:
 	fh_unlock(fhp);
fs/open.c +10 -9
index b62f5c0923a8..033e2112fbda 100644
@@ -35,11 +35,12 @@
 
 #include "internal.h"
 
-int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length, unsigned int time_attrs,
+int do_truncate(const struct path *path, loff_t length, unsigned int time_attrs,
 	struct file *filp)
 {
 	int ret;
 	struct iattr newattrs;
+	struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
 
 	/* Not pretty: "inode->i_size" shouldn't really be signed. But it is. */
 	if (length < 0)
@@ -61,7 +62,7 @@ int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length, unsigned int time_attrs,
 
 	inode_lock(dentry->d_inode);
 	/* Note any delegations or leases have already been broken: */
-	ret = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs, NULL);
+	ret = notify_change(path, &newattrs, NULL);
 	inode_unlock(dentry->d_inode);
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -107,7 +108,7 @@ long vfs_truncate(const struct path *path, loff_t length)
 	if (!error)
 		error = security_path_truncate(path);
 	if (!error)
-		error = do_truncate(path->dentry, length, 0, NULL);
+		error = do_truncate(path, length, 0, NULL);
 
 put_write_and_out:
 	put_write_access(inode);
@@ -155,7 +156,7 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(truncate, const char __user *, path, compat_off_t, length
 long do_sys_ftruncate(unsigned int fd, loff_t length, int small)
 {
 	struct inode *inode;
-	struct dentry *dentry;
+	struct path *path;
 	struct fd f;
 	int error;
 
@@ -171,8 +172,8 @@ long do_sys_ftruncate(unsigned int fd, loff_t length, int small)
 	if (f.file->f_flags & O_LARGEFILE)
 		small = 0;
 
-	dentry = f.file->f_path.dentry;
-	inode = dentry->d_inode;
+	path = &f.file->f_path;
+	inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
 	error = -EINVAL;
 	if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !(f.file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
 		goto out_putf;
@@ -192,7 +193,7 @@ long do_sys_ftruncate(unsigned int fd, loff_t length, int small)
 	if (!error)
 		error = security_path_truncate(&f.file->f_path);
 	if (!error)
-		error = do_truncate(dentry, length, ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME, f.file);
+		error = do_truncate(path, length, ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME, f.file);
 	sb_end_write(inode->i_sb);
 out_putf:
 	fdput(f);
@@ -558,7 +559,7 @@ static int chmod_common(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
 		goto out_unlock;
 	newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO);
 	newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
-	error = notify_change(path->dentry, &newattrs, &delegated_inode);
+	error = notify_change(path, &newattrs, &delegated_inode);
 out_unlock:
 	inode_unlock(inode);
 	if (delegated_inode) {
@@ -649,7 +650,7 @@ static int chown_common(const struct path *path, uid_t user, gid_t group)
 	inode_lock(inode);
 	error = security_path_chown(path, uid, gid);
 	if (!error)
-		error = notify_change(path->dentry, &newattrs, &delegated_inode);
+		error = notify_change(path, &newattrs, &delegated_inode);
 	inode_unlock(inode);
 	if (delegated_inode) {
 		error = break_deleg_wait(&delegated_inode);
fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c +24 -16
index 6220642fe113..b16231c9dd11 100644
@@ -177,17 +177,17 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_data(struct path *old, struct path *new, loff_t len)
 	return error;
 }
 
-static int ovl_set_size(struct dentry *upperdentry, struct kstat *stat)
+static int ovl_set_size(struct path *upperpath, struct kstat *stat)
 {
 	struct iattr attr = {
 		.ia_valid = ATTR_SIZE,
 		.ia_size = stat->size,
 	};
 
-	return notify_change(upperdentry, &attr, NULL);
+	return notify_change(upperpath, &attr, NULL);
 }
 
-static int ovl_set_timestamps(struct dentry *upperdentry, struct kstat *stat)
+static int ovl_set_timestamps(struct path *upperpath, struct kstat *stat)
 {
 	struct iattr attr = {
 		.ia_valid =
@@ -196,10 +196,10 @@ static int ovl_set_timestamps(struct dentry *upperdentry, struct kstat *stat)
 		.ia_mtime = stat->mtime,
 	};
 
-	return notify_change(upperdentry, &attr, NULL);
+	return notify_change(upperpath, &attr, NULL);
 }
 
-int ovl_set_attr(struct dentry *upperdentry, struct kstat *stat)
+int ovl_set_attr(struct path *upperpath, struct kstat *stat)
 {
 	int err = 0;
 
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ int ovl_set_attr(struct dentry *upperdentry, struct kstat *stat)
 			.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE,
 			.ia_mode = stat->mode,
 		};
-		err = notify_change(upperdentry, &attr, NULL);
+		err = notify_change(upperpath, &attr, NULL);
 	}
 	if (!err) {
 		struct iattr attr = {
@@ -216,10 +216,10 @@ int ovl_set_attr(struct dentry *upperdentry, struct kstat *stat)
 			.ia_uid = stat->uid,
 			.ia_gid = stat->gid,
 		};
-		err = notify_change(upperdentry, &attr, NULL);
+		err = notify_change(upperpath, &attr, NULL);
 	}
 	if (!err)
-		ovl_set_timestamps(upperdentry, stat);
+		ovl_set_timestamps(upperpath, stat);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -398,8 +398,13 @@ static int ovl_link_up(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c)
 {
 	int err;
 	struct dentry *upper;
-	struct dentry *upperdir = ovl_dentry_upper(c->parent);
-	struct inode *udir = d_inode(upperdir);
+	struct dentry *upperdir;
+	struct path upperdirpath;
+	struct inode *udir;
+
+	ovl_path_upper(c->parent, &upperdirpath);
+	upperdir = upperdirpath.dentry;
+	udir = d_inode(upperdir);
 
 	/* Mark parent "impure" because it may now contain non-pure upper */
 	err = ovl_set_impure(c->parent, upperdir);
@@ -420,7 +425,7 @@ static int ovl_link_up(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c)
 
 		if (!err) {
 			/* Restore timestamps on parent (best effort) */
-			ovl_set_timestamps(upperdir, &c->pstat);
+			ovl_set_timestamps(&upperdirpath, &c->pstat);
 			ovl_dentry_set_upper_alias(c->dentry);
 		}
 	}
@@ -436,15 +441,16 @@ static int ovl_link_up(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c)
 static int ovl_copy_up_inode(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c, struct dentry *temp)
 {
 	int err;
+	struct path upperpath, temppath;
 
+	ovl_path_upper(c->dentry, &upperpath);
 	/*
 	 * Copy up data first and then xattrs. Writing data after
 	 * xattrs will remove security.capability xattr automatically.
 	 */
 	if (S_ISREG(c->stat.mode) && !c->metacopy) {
-		struct path upperpath, datapath;
+		struct path datapath;
 
-		ovl_path_upper(c->dentry, &upperpath);
 		if (WARN_ON(upperpath.dentry != NULL))
 			return -EIO;
 		upperpath.dentry = temp;
@@ -478,12 +484,13 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_inode(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c, struct dentry *temp)
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 	}
+	temppath = (struct path){ .mnt = upperpath.mnt, .dentry = temp };
 
 	inode_lock(temp->d_inode);
 	if (c->metacopy)
-		err = ovl_set_size(temp, &c->stat);
+		err = ovl_set_size(&temppath, &c->stat);
 	if (!err)
-		err = ovl_set_attr(temp, &c->stat);
+		err = ovl_set_attr(&temppath, &c->stat);
 	inode_unlock(temp->d_inode);
 
 	return err;
@@ -699,10 +706,11 @@ static int ovl_do_copy_up(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c)
 		err = ovl_set_nlink_upper(c->dentry);
 	} else {
 		struct inode *udir = d_inode(c->destdir);
+		struct path destpath = { .mnt = ofs->upper_mnt, .dentry = c->destdir };
 
 		/* Restore timestamps on parent (best effort) */
 		inode_lock(udir);
-		ovl_set_timestamps(c->destdir, &c->pstat);
+		ovl_set_timestamps(&destpath, &c->pstat);
 		inode_unlock(udir);
 
 		ovl_dentry_set_upper_alias(c->dentry);
fs/overlayfs/dir.c +8 -2
index 29abdb1d3b5c..6729fb6e15a9 100644
@@ -374,7 +374,8 @@ static struct dentry *ovl_clear_empty(struct dentry *dentry,
 		goto out_cleanup;
 
 	inode_lock(opaquedir->d_inode);
-	err = ovl_set_attr(opaquedir, &stat);
+	err = ovl_set_attr(&(struct path) { .mnt = upperpath.mnt,
+					    .dentry = opaquedir }, &stat);
 	inode_unlock(opaquedir->d_inode);
 	if (err)
 		goto out_cleanup;
@@ -435,10 +436,13 @@ static int ovl_create_over_whiteout(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 	struct inode *udir = upperdir->d_inode;
 	struct dentry *upper;
 	struct dentry *newdentry;
+	struct path newpath;
 	int err;
 	struct posix_acl *acl, *default_acl;
 	bool hardlink = !!cattr->hardlink;
 
+	ovl_path_upper(dentry, &newpath);
+
 	if (WARN_ON(!workdir))
 		return -EROFS;
 
@@ -478,8 +482,10 @@ static int ovl_create_over_whiteout(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 			.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE,
 			.ia_mode = cattr->mode,
 		};
+
+		newpath.dentry = newdentry;
 		inode_lock(newdentry->d_inode);
-		err = notify_change(newdentry, &attr, NULL);
+		err = notify_change(&newpath, &attr, NULL);
 		inode_unlock(newdentry->d_inode);
 		if (err)
 			goto out_cleanup;
fs/overlayfs/inode.c +4 -2
index b045cf1826fc..da39c3b40669 100644
@@ -45,8 +45,10 @@ int ovl_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 		err = ovl_copy_up_with_data(dentry);
 	if (!err) {
 		struct inode *winode = NULL;
+		struct path upperpath;
 
-		upperdentry = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry);
+		ovl_path_upper(dentry, &upperpath);
+		upperdentry = upperpath.dentry;
 
 		if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
 			winode = d_inode(upperdentry);
@@ -60,7 +62,7 @@ int ovl_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 
 		inode_lock(upperdentry->d_inode);
 		old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
-		err = notify_change(upperdentry, attr, NULL);
+		err = notify_change(&upperpath, attr, NULL);
 		revert_creds(old_cred);
 		if (!err)
 			ovl_copyattr(upperdentry->d_inode, dentry->d_inode);
fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h +1 -1
index f283b1d69a9e..24537d13076d 100644
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ int ovl_copy_up_with_data(struct dentry *dentry);
 int ovl_copy_up_flags(struct dentry *dentry, int flags);
 int ovl_maybe_copy_up(struct dentry *dentry, int flags);
 int ovl_copy_xattr(struct dentry *old, struct dentry *new);
-int ovl_set_attr(struct dentry *upper, struct kstat *stat);
+int ovl_set_attr(struct path *upperpath, struct kstat *stat);
 struct ovl_fh *ovl_encode_real_fh(struct dentry *real, bool is_upper);
 int ovl_set_origin(struct dentry *dentry, struct dentry *lower,
 		   struct dentry *upper);
fs/overlayfs/super.c +2 -1
index 7621ff176d15..82c1da52831b 100644
@@ -632,6 +632,7 @@ static struct dentry *ovl_workdir_create(struct ovl_fs *ofs,
 			.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE,
 			.ia_mode = S_IFDIR | 0,
 		};
+		const struct path workpath = { .mnt = mnt, .dentry = work };
 
 		if (work->d_inode) {
 			err = -EEXIST;
@@ -675,7 +676,7 @@ static struct dentry *ovl_workdir_create(struct ovl_fs *ofs,
 
 		/* Clear any inherited mode bits */
 		inode_lock(work->d_inode);
-		err = notify_change(work, &attr, NULL);
+		err = notify_change(&workpath, &attr, NULL);
 		inode_unlock(work->d_inode);
 		if (err)
 			goto out_dput;
fs/utimes.c +1 -1
index c952b6b3d8a0..9b9e78c914af 100644
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ static int utimes_common(const struct path *path, struct timespec64 *times)
 	}
 retry_deleg:
 	inode_lock(inode);
-	error = notify_change(path->dentry, &newattrs, &delegated_inode);
+	error = notify_change(path, &newattrs, &delegated_inode);
 	inode_unlock(inode);
 	if (delegated_inode) {
 		error = break_deleg_wait(&delegated_inode);
include/linux/fs.h +3 -3
index 70eb6255680d..3b3a1a25e244 100644
@@ -2526,8 +2526,8 @@ struct filename {
 static_assert(offsetof(struct filename, iname) % sizeof(long) == 0);
 
 extern long vfs_truncate(const struct path *, loff_t);
-extern int do_truncate(struct dentry *, loff_t start, unsigned int time_attrs,
-		       struct file *filp);
+extern int do_truncate(const struct path *p, loff_t start,
+		       unsigned int time_attrs, struct file *filp);
 extern int vfs_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset,
 			loff_t len);
 extern long do_sys_open(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int flags,
@@ -2870,7 +2870,7 @@ extern void emergency_remount(void);
 #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
 extern sector_t bmap(struct inode *, sector_t);
 #endif
-extern int notify_change(struct dentry *, struct iattr *, struct inode **);
+extern int notify_change(const struct path *, struct iattr *, struct inode **);
 extern int inode_permission(struct inode *, int);
 extern int generic_permission(struct inode *, int);
 extern int __check_sticky(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode);
Signature · 1 line
2.16.4
maintainer Reviewed-by on v2 1/3
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] fs: rethread notify_change to take a path instead of a dentry

Quoted 11 lines · James Bottomley

In order to prepare for implementing shiftfs as a property changing bind mount, the path (which contains the vfsmount) must be threaded through everywhere we are going to do either a permission check or an attribute get/set so that we can arrange for the credentials for the operation to be based on the bind mount properties rather than those of current.

---

v2: fix issues found by Amir Goldstein

Looks fine to me.

Quoted 621 lines
---
 drivers/base/devtmpfs.c   |  8 ++++++--
 fs/attr.c                 |  4 +++-
 fs/cachefiles/interface.c |  6 ++++--
 fs/coredump.c             |  4 ++--
 fs/ecryptfs/inode.c       |  9 ++++++---
 fs/inode.c                |  7 ++++---
 fs/namei.c                |  2 +-
 fs/nfsd/vfs.c             | 13 ++++++++-----
 fs/open.c                 | 19 ++++++++++---------
 fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c    | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 fs/overlayfs/dir.c        | 10 ++++++++--
 fs/overlayfs/inode.c      |  6 ++++--
 fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h  |  2 +-
 fs/overlayfs/super.c      |  3 ++-
 fs/utimes.c               |  2 +-
 include/linux/fs.h        |  6 +++---
 16 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
drivers/base/devtmpfs.c +6 -2
index 6cdbf1531238..eb9f072f5deb 100644
@@ -224,13 +224,17 @@ static int handle_create(const char *nodename, umode_t mode, kuid_t uid,
        err = vfs_mknod(d_inode(path.dentry), dentry, mode, dev->devt);
        if (!err) {
                struct iattr newattrs;
+               struct path newpath = {
+                       .mnt = path.mnt,
+                       .dentry = dentry,
+               };
 
                newattrs.ia_mode = mode;
                newattrs.ia_uid = uid;
                newattrs.ia_gid = gid;
                newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE|ATTR_UID|ATTR_GID;
                inode_lock(d_inode(dentry));
-               notify_change(dentry, &newattrs, NULL);
+               notify_change(&newpath, &newattrs, NULL);
                inode_unlock(d_inode(dentry));
 
                /* mark as kernel-created inode */
@@ -337,7 +341,7 @@ static int handle_remove(const char *nodename, struct device *dev)
                        newattrs.ia_valid =
                                ATTR_UID|ATTR_GID|ATTR_MODE;
                        inode_lock(d_inode(dentry));
-                       notify_change(dentry, &newattrs, NULL);
+                       notify_change(&p, &newattrs, NULL);
                        inode_unlock(d_inode(dentry));
                        err = vfs_unlink(d_inode(parent.dentry), dentry, NULL);
                        if (!err || err == -ENOENT)
fs/attr.c +3 -1
index df28035aa23e..370b18807f05 100644
@@ -226,8 +226,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(setattr_copy);
  * the file open for write, as there can be no conflicting delegation in
  * that case.
  */
-int notify_change(struct dentry * dentry, struct iattr * attr, struct inode **delegated_inode)
+int notify_change(const struct path *path, struct iattr * attr,
+                 struct inode **delegated_inode)
 {
+       struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
        struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
        umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
        int error;
fs/cachefiles/interface.c +4 -2
index 4cea5fbf695e..f11216f59a56 100644
@@ -436,6 +436,7 @@ static int cachefiles_attr_changed(struct fscache_object *_object)
        uint64_t ni_size;
        loff_t oi_size;
        int ret;
+       struct path path;
 
        ni_size = _object->store_limit_l;
 
@@ -466,18 +467,19 @@ static int cachefiles_attr_changed(struct fscache_object *_object)
        /* if there's an extension to a partial page at the end of the backing
         * file, we need to discard the partial page so that we pick up new
         * data after it */
+       path = (struct path){ .mnt = cache->mnt, .dentry = object->backer };
        if (oi_size & ~PAGE_MASK && ni_size > oi_size) {
                _debug("discard tail %llx", oi_size);
                newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_SIZE;
                newattrs.ia_size = oi_size & PAGE_MASK;
-               ret = notify_change(object->backer, &newattrs, NULL);
+               ret = notify_change(&path, &newattrs, NULL);
                if (ret < 0)
                        goto truncate_failed;
        }
 
        newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_SIZE;
        newattrs.ia_size = ni_size;
-       ret = notify_change(object->backer, &newattrs, NULL);
+       ret = notify_change(&path, &newattrs, NULL);
 
 truncate_failed:
        inode_unlock(d_inode(object->backer));
fs/coredump.c +2 -2
index b1ea7dfbd149..69899bfb025a 100644
@@ -775,7 +775,7 @@ void do_coredump(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo)
                        goto close_fail;
                if (!(cprm.file->f_mode & FMODE_CAN_WRITE))
                        goto close_fail;
-               if (do_truncate(cprm.file->f_path.dentry, 0, 0, cprm.file))
+               if (do_truncate(&cprm.file->f_path, 0, 0, cprm.file))
                        goto close_fail;
        }
 
@@ -879,7 +879,7 @@ void dump_truncate(struct coredump_params *cprm)
        if (file->f_op->llseek && file->f_op->llseek != no_llseek) {
                offset = file->f_op->llseek(file, 0, SEEK_CUR);
                if (i_size_read(file->f_mapping->host) < offset)
-                       do_truncate(file->f_path.dentry, offset, 0, file);
+                       do_truncate(&file->f_path, offset, 0, file);
        }
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(dump_truncate);
fs/ecryptfs/inode.c +6 -3
index e23752d9a79f..3bc67c478163 100644
@@ -852,10 +852,11 @@ int ecryptfs_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t new_length)
 
        rc = truncate_upper(dentry, &ia, &lower_ia);
        if (!rc && lower_ia.ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
-               struct dentry *lower_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(dentry);
+               struct path *lower_path = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower_path(dentry);
+               struct dentry *lower_dentry = lower_path->dentry;
 
                inode_lock(d_inode(lower_dentry));
-               rc = notify_change(lower_dentry, &lower_ia, NULL);
+               rc = notify_change(lower_path, &lower_ia, NULL);
                inode_unlock(d_inode(lower_dentry));
        }
        return rc;
@@ -883,6 +884,7 @@ static int ecryptfs_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *ia)
 {
        int rc = 0;
        struct dentry *lower_dentry;
+       struct path *lower_path;
        struct iattr lower_ia;
        struct inode *inode;
        struct inode *lower_inode;
@@ -897,6 +899,7 @@ static int ecryptfs_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *ia)
        inode = d_inode(dentry);
        lower_inode = ecryptfs_inode_to_lower(inode);
        lower_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(dentry);
+       lower_path = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower_path(dentry);
        mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->cs_mutex);
        if (d_is_dir(dentry))
                crypt_stat->flags &= ~(ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED);
@@ -959,7 +962,7 @@ static int ecryptfs_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *ia)
                lower_ia.ia_valid &= ~ATTR_MODE;
 
        inode_lock(d_inode(lower_dentry));
-       rc = notify_change(lower_dentry, &lower_ia, NULL);
+       rc = notify_change(lower_path, &lower_ia, NULL);
        inode_unlock(d_inode(lower_dentry));
 out:
        fsstack_copy_attr_all(inode, lower_inode);
fs/inode.c +4 -3
index 96d62d97694e..18ff3081bda0 100644
@@ -1817,7 +1817,7 @@ int dentry_needs_remove_privs(struct dentry *dentry)
        return mask;
 }
 
-static int __remove_privs(struct dentry *dentry, int kill)
+static int __remove_privs(struct path *path, int kill)
 {
        struct iattr newattrs;
 
@@ -1826,7 +1826,7 @@ static int __remove_privs(struct dentry *dentry, int kill)
         * Note we call this on write, so notify_change will not
         * encounter any conflicting delegations:
         */
-       return notify_change(dentry, &newattrs, NULL);
+       return notify_change(path, &newattrs, NULL);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1835,6 +1835,7 @@ static int __remove_privs(struct dentry *dentry, int kill)
  */
 int file_remove_privs(struct file *file)
 {
+       struct path *path = &file->f_path;
        struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
        struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
        int kill;
@@ -1853,7 +1854,7 @@ int file_remove_privs(struct file *file)
        if (kill < 0)
                return kill;
        if (kill)
-               error = __remove_privs(dentry, kill);
+               error = __remove_privs(path, kill);
        if (!error)
                inode_has_no_xattr(inode);
 
fs/namei.c +1 -1
index d6c91d1e88cb..7bb4b1dcf3cc 100644
@@ -3012,7 +3012,7 @@ static int handle_truncate(struct file *filp)
        if (!error)
                error = security_path_truncate(path);
        if (!error) {
-               error = do_truncate(path->dentry, 0,
+               error = do_truncate(path, 0,
                                    ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME|ATTR_OPEN,
                                    filp);
        }
fs/nfsd/vfs.c +8 -5
index c0dc491537a6..dc990cc8f549 100644
@@ -360,8 +360,8 @@ __be32
 nfsd_setattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, struct iattr *iap,
             int check_guard, time_t guardtime)
 {
-       struct dentry   *dentry;
        struct inode    *inode;
+       struct path     path;
        int             accmode = NFSD_MAY_SATTR;
        umode_t         ftype = 0;
        __be32          err;
@@ -400,8 +400,11 @@ nfsd_setattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, struct iattr *iap,
                        goto out;
        }
 
-       dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
-       inode = d_inode(dentry);
+       path = (struct path) {
+               .mnt = fhp->fh_export->ex_path.mnt,
+               .dentry = fhp->fh_dentry,
+       };
+       inode = d_inode(path.dentry);
 
        /* Ignore any mode updates on symlinks */
        if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
@@ -442,7 +445,7 @@ nfsd_setattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, struct iattr *iap,
                        .ia_size        = iap->ia_size,
                };
 
-               host_err = notify_change(dentry, &size_attr, NULL);
+               host_err = notify_change(&path, &size_attr, NULL);
                if (host_err)
                        goto out_unlock;
                iap->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_SIZE;
@@ -457,7 +460,7 @@ nfsd_setattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, struct iattr *iap,
        }
 
        iap->ia_valid |= ATTR_CTIME;
-       host_err = notify_change(dentry, iap, NULL);
+       host_err = notify_change(&path, iap, NULL);
 
 out_unlock:
        fh_unlock(fhp);
fs/open.c +10 -9
index b62f5c0923a8..033e2112fbda 100644
@@ -35,11 +35,12 @@
 
 #include "internal.h"
 
-int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length, unsigned int time_attrs,
+int do_truncate(const struct path *path, loff_t length, unsigned int time_attrs,
        struct file *filp)
 {
        int ret;
        struct iattr newattrs;
+       struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
 
        /* Not pretty: "inode->i_size" shouldn't really be signed. But it is. */
        if (length < 0)
@@ -61,7 +62,7 @@ int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length, unsigned int time_attrs,
 
        inode_lock(dentry->d_inode);
        /* Note any delegations or leases have already been broken: */
-       ret = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs, NULL);
+       ret = notify_change(path, &newattrs, NULL);
        inode_unlock(dentry->d_inode);
        return ret;
 }
@@ -107,7 +108,7 @@ long vfs_truncate(const struct path *path, loff_t length)
        if (!error)
                error = security_path_truncate(path);
        if (!error)
-               error = do_truncate(path->dentry, length, 0, NULL);
+               error = do_truncate(path, length, 0, NULL);
 
 put_write_and_out:
        put_write_access(inode);
@@ -155,7 +156,7 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(truncate, const char __user *, path, compat_off_t, length
 long do_sys_ftruncate(unsigned int fd, loff_t length, int small)
 {
        struct inode *inode;
-       struct dentry *dentry;
+       struct path *path;
        struct fd f;
        int error;
 
@@ -171,8 +172,8 @@ long do_sys_ftruncate(unsigned int fd, loff_t length, int small)
        if (f.file->f_flags & O_LARGEFILE)
                small = 0;
 
-       dentry = f.file->f_path.dentry;
-       inode = dentry->d_inode;
+       path = &f.file->f_path;
+       inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
        error = -EINVAL;
        if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !(f.file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
                goto out_putf;
@@ -192,7 +193,7 @@ long do_sys_ftruncate(unsigned int fd, loff_t length, int small)
        if (!error)
                error = security_path_truncate(&f.file->f_path);
        if (!error)
-               error = do_truncate(dentry, length, ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME, f.file);
+               error = do_truncate(path, length, ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME, f.file);
        sb_end_write(inode->i_sb);
 out_putf:
        fdput(f);
@@ -558,7 +559,7 @@ static int chmod_common(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
                goto out_unlock;
        newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO);
        newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
-       error = notify_change(path->dentry, &newattrs, &delegated_inode);
+       error = notify_change(path, &newattrs, &delegated_inode);
 out_unlock:
        inode_unlock(inode);
        if (delegated_inode) {
@@ -649,7 +650,7 @@ static int chown_common(const struct path *path, uid_t user, gid_t group)
        inode_lock(inode);
        error = security_path_chown(path, uid, gid);
        if (!error)
-               error = notify_change(path->dentry, &newattrs, &delegated_inode);
+               error = notify_change(path, &newattrs, &delegated_inode);
        inode_unlock(inode);
        if (delegated_inode) {
                error = break_deleg_wait(&delegated_inode);
fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c +24 -16
index 6220642fe113..b16231c9dd11 100644
@@ -177,17 +177,17 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_data(struct path *old, struct path *new, loff_t len)
        return error;
 }
 
-static int ovl_set_size(struct dentry *upperdentry, struct kstat *stat)
+static int ovl_set_size(struct path *upperpath, struct kstat *stat)
 {
        struct iattr attr = {
                .ia_valid = ATTR_SIZE,
                .ia_size = stat->size,
        };
 
-       return notify_change(upperdentry, &attr, NULL);
+       return notify_change(upperpath, &attr, NULL);
 }
 
-static int ovl_set_timestamps(struct dentry *upperdentry, struct kstat *stat)
+static int ovl_set_timestamps(struct path *upperpath, struct kstat *stat)
 {
        struct iattr attr = {
                .ia_valid =
@@ -196,10 +196,10 @@ static int ovl_set_timestamps(struct dentry *upperdentry, struct kstat *stat)
                .ia_mtime = stat->mtime,
        };
 
-       return notify_change(upperdentry, &attr, NULL);
+       return notify_change(upperpath, &attr, NULL);
 }
 
-int ovl_set_attr(struct dentry *upperdentry, struct kstat *stat)
+int ovl_set_attr(struct path *upperpath, struct kstat *stat)
 {
        int err = 0;
 
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ int ovl_set_attr(struct dentry *upperdentry, struct kstat *stat)
                        .ia_valid = ATTR_MODE,
                        .ia_mode = stat->mode,
                };
-               err = notify_change(upperdentry, &attr, NULL);
+               err = notify_change(upperpath, &attr, NULL);
        }
        if (!err) {
                struct iattr attr = {
@@ -216,10 +216,10 @@ int ovl_set_attr(struct dentry *upperdentry, struct kstat *stat)
                        .ia_uid = stat->uid,
                        .ia_gid = stat->gid,
                };
-               err = notify_change(upperdentry, &attr, NULL);
+               err = notify_change(upperpath, &attr, NULL);
        }
        if (!err)
-               ovl_set_timestamps(upperdentry, stat);
+               ovl_set_timestamps(upperpath, stat);
 
        return err;
 }
@@ -398,8 +398,13 @@ static int ovl_link_up(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c)
 {
        int err;
        struct dentry *upper;
-       struct dentry *upperdir = ovl_dentry_upper(c->parent);
-       struct inode *udir = d_inode(upperdir);
+       struct dentry *upperdir;
+       struct path upperdirpath;
+       struct inode *udir;
+
+       ovl_path_upper(c->parent, &upperdirpath);
+       upperdir = upperdirpath.dentry;
+       udir = d_inode(upperdir);
 
        /* Mark parent "impure" because it may now contain non-pure upper */
        err = ovl_set_impure(c->parent, upperdir);
@@ -420,7 +425,7 @@ static int ovl_link_up(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c)
 
                if (!err) {
                        /* Restore timestamps on parent (best effort) */
-                       ovl_set_timestamps(upperdir, &c->pstat);
+                       ovl_set_timestamps(&upperdirpath, &c->pstat);
                        ovl_dentry_set_upper_alias(c->dentry);
                }
        }
@@ -436,15 +441,16 @@ static int ovl_link_up(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c)
 static int ovl_copy_up_inode(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c, struct dentry *temp)
 {
        int err;
+       struct path upperpath, temppath;
 
+       ovl_path_upper(c->dentry, &upperpath);
        /*
         * Copy up data first and then xattrs. Writing data after
         * xattrs will remove security.capability xattr automatically.
         */
        if (S_ISREG(c->stat.mode) && !c->metacopy) {
-               struct path upperpath, datapath;
+               struct path datapath;
 
-               ovl_path_upper(c->dentry, &upperpath);
                if (WARN_ON(upperpath.dentry != NULL))
                        return -EIO;
                upperpath.dentry = temp;
@@ -478,12 +484,13 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_inode(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c, struct dentry *temp)
                if (err)
                        return err;
        }
+       temppath = (struct path){ .mnt = upperpath.mnt, .dentry = temp };
 
        inode_lock(temp->d_inode);
        if (c->metacopy)
-               err = ovl_set_size(temp, &c->stat);
+               err = ovl_set_size(&temppath, &c->stat);
        if (!err)
-               err = ovl_set_attr(temp, &c->stat);
+               err = ovl_set_attr(&temppath, &c->stat);
        inode_unlock(temp->d_inode);
 
        return err;
@@ -699,10 +706,11 @@ static int ovl_do_copy_up(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c)
                err = ovl_set_nlink_upper(c->dentry);
        } else {
                struct inode *udir = d_inode(c->destdir);
+               struct path destpath = { .mnt = ofs->upper_mnt, .dentry = c->destdir };
 
                /* Restore timestamps on parent (best effort) */
                inode_lock(udir);
-               ovl_set_timestamps(c->destdir, &c->pstat);
+               ovl_set_timestamps(&destpath, &c->pstat);
                inode_unlock(udir);
 
                ovl_dentry_set_upper_alias(c->dentry);
fs/overlayfs/dir.c +8 -2
index 29abdb1d3b5c..6729fb6e15a9 100644
@@ -374,7 +374,8 @@ static struct dentry *ovl_clear_empty(struct dentry *dentry,
                goto out_cleanup;
 
        inode_lock(opaquedir->d_inode);
-       err = ovl_set_attr(opaquedir, &stat);
+       err = ovl_set_attr(&(struct path) { .mnt = upperpath.mnt,
+                                           .dentry = opaquedir }, &stat);
        inode_unlock(opaquedir->d_inode);
        if (err)
                goto out_cleanup;
@@ -435,10 +436,13 @@ static int ovl_create_over_whiteout(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
        struct inode *udir = upperdir->d_inode;
        struct dentry *upper;
        struct dentry *newdentry;
+       struct path newpath;
        int err;
        struct posix_acl *acl, *default_acl;
        bool hardlink = !!cattr->hardlink;
 
+       ovl_path_upper(dentry, &newpath);
+
        if (WARN_ON(!workdir))
                return -EROFS;
 
@@ -478,8 +482,10 @@ static int ovl_create_over_whiteout(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
                        .ia_valid = ATTR_MODE,
                        .ia_mode = cattr->mode,
                };
+
+               newpath.dentry = newdentry;
                inode_lock(newdentry->d_inode);
-               err = notify_change(newdentry, &attr, NULL);
+               err = notify_change(&newpath, &attr, NULL);
                inode_unlock(newdentry->d_inode);
                if (err)
                        goto out_cleanup;
fs/overlayfs/inode.c +4 -2
index b045cf1826fc..da39c3b40669 100644
@@ -45,8 +45,10 @@ int ovl_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
                err = ovl_copy_up_with_data(dentry);
        if (!err) {
                struct inode *winode = NULL;
+               struct path upperpath;
 
-               upperdentry = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry);
+               ovl_path_upper(dentry, &upperpath);
+               upperdentry = upperpath.dentry;
 
                if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
                        winode = d_inode(upperdentry);
@@ -60,7 +62,7 @@ int ovl_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 
                inode_lock(upperdentry->d_inode);
                old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
-               err = notify_change(upperdentry, attr, NULL);
+               err = notify_change(&upperpath, attr, NULL);
                revert_creds(old_cred);
                if (!err)
                        ovl_copyattr(upperdentry->d_inode, dentry->d_inode);
fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h +1 -1
index f283b1d69a9e..24537d13076d 100644
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ int ovl_copy_up_with_data(struct dentry *dentry);
 int ovl_copy_up_flags(struct dentry *dentry, int flags);
 int ovl_maybe_copy_up(struct dentry *dentry, int flags);
 int ovl_copy_xattr(struct dentry *old, struct dentry *new);
-int ovl_set_attr(struct dentry *upper, struct kstat *stat);
+int ovl_set_attr(struct path *upperpath, struct kstat *stat);
 struct ovl_fh *ovl_encode_real_fh(struct dentry *real, bool is_upper);
 int ovl_set_origin(struct dentry *dentry, struct dentry *lower,
                   struct dentry *upper);
fs/overlayfs/super.c +2 -1
index 7621ff176d15..82c1da52831b 100644
@@ -632,6 +632,7 @@ static struct dentry *ovl_workdir_create(struct ovl_fs *ofs,
                        .ia_valid = ATTR_MODE,
                        .ia_mode = S_IFDIR | 0,
                };
+               const struct path workpath = { .mnt = mnt, .dentry = work };
 
                if (work->d_inode) {
                        err = -EEXIST;
@@ -675,7 +676,7 @@ static struct dentry *ovl_workdir_create(struct ovl_fs *ofs,
 
                /* Clear any inherited mode bits */
                inode_lock(work->d_inode);
-               err = notify_change(work, &attr, NULL);
+               err = notify_change(&workpath, &attr, NULL);
                inode_unlock(work->d_inode);
                if (err)
                        goto out_dput;
fs/utimes.c +1 -1
index c952b6b3d8a0..9b9e78c914af 100644
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ static int utimes_common(const struct path *path, struct timespec64 *times)
        }
 retry_deleg:
        inode_lock(inode);
-       error = notify_change(path->dentry, &newattrs, &delegated_inode);
+       error = notify_change(path, &newattrs, &delegated_inode);
        inode_unlock(inode);
        if (delegated_inode) {
                error = break_deleg_wait(&delegated_inode);
include/linux/fs.h +3 -4
index 70eb6255680d..3b3a1a25e244 100644
@@ -2526,8 +2526,8 @@ struct filename {
 static_assert(offsetof(struct filename, iname) % sizeof(long) == 0);
 
 extern long vfs_truncate(const struct path *, loff_t);
-extern int do_truncate(struct dentry *, loff_t start, unsigned int time_attrs,
-                      struct file *filp);
+extern int do_truncate(const struct path *p, loff_t start,
+                      unsigned int time_attrs, struct file *filp);
 extern int vfs_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset,
                        loff_t len);
 extern long do_sys_open(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int flags,
@@ -2870,7 +2870,7 @@ extern void emergency_remount(void);
 #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
 extern sector_t bmap(struct inode *, sector_t);
 #endif
-extern int notify_change(struct dentry *, struct iattr *, struct inode **);
+extern int notify_change(const struct path *, struct iattr *, struct inode **);
 extern int inode_permission(struct inode *, int);
 extern int generic_permission(struct inode *, int);
 extern int __check_sticky(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode);
--

2.16.4

#3 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/3 fs: introduce uid/gid shifting bind mount

In reply to James Bottomley

This implementation reverse shifts according to the user_ns belonging to the mnt_ns. So if the vfsmount has the newly introduced flag MNT_SHIFT and the current user_ns is the same as the mount_ns->user_ns then we shift back using the user_ns before committing to the underlying filesystem.

For example, if a user_ns is created where interior (fake root, uid 0) is mapped to kernel uid 100000 then writes from interior root normally go to the filesystem at the kernel uid. However, if MNT_SHIFT is set, they will be shifted back to write at uid 0, meaning we can bind mount real image filesystems to user_ns protected faker root.

In essence there are several things which have to be done for this to occur safely. Firstly for all operations on the filesystem, new credentials have to be installed where fsuid and fsgid are set to the *interior* values. Next all inodes used from the filesystem have to have i_uid and i_gid shifted back to the kernel values and attributes set from user space have to have ia_uid and ia_gid shifted from the kernel values to the interior values. The capability checks have to be done using ns_capable against the kernel values, but the inode capability checks have to be done against the shifted ids.

Since creating a new credential is a reasonably expensive proposition and we have to shift and unshift many times during path walking, a cached copy of the shifted credential is saved to a newly created place in the task structure. This serves the dual purpose of allowing us to use a pre-prepared copy of the shifted credentials and also allows us to recognise whenever the shift is actually in effect (the cached shifted credential pointer being equal to the current_cred() pointer).

To get this all to work, we have a check for the vfsmount flag and the user_ns gating a shifting of the credentials over all user space entries to filesystem functions. In theory the path has to be present everywhere we do this, so we can check the vfsmount flags. However, for lower level functions we can cheat this path check of vfsmount simply to check whether a shifted credential is in effect or not to gate things like the inode permission check, which means the path doesn't have to be threaded all the way through the permission checking functions. if the credential is shifted check passes, we can also be sure that the current user_ns is the same as the mnt->user_ns, so we can use it and thus have no need of the struct mount at the point of the shift.

Although the shift can be effected simply by executing do_reconfigure_mnt with MNT_SHIFT in the flags, this patch only contains the shifting mechanisms. The follow on patch wires up the user visible API for turning the flag on.

---

Note this patch depends on the rethreading notify_change to use a path instead of a dentry patch

---
 fs/attr.c             |  87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 fs/exec.c             |   7 +++-
 fs/inode.c            |   9 +++--
 fs/internal.h         |   2 +
 fs/namei.c            | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 fs/open.c             |  25 +++++++++++-
 fs/posix_acl.c        |   4 +-
 fs/stat.c             |  31 +++++++++++++--
 include/linux/cred.h  |  10 +++++
 include/linux/mount.h |   4 +-
 include/linux/sched.h |   5 +++
 kernel/capability.c   |  14 ++++++-
 kernel/cred.c         |  20 ++++++++++
 kernel/groups.c       |   7 ++++
 14 files changed, 279 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
fs/attr.c +66 -21
index 370b18807f05..3efb2dc67896 100644
@@ -18,14 +18,22 @@
 #include <linux/evm.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
 
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "mount.h"
+
 static bool chown_ok(const struct inode *inode, kuid_t uid)
 {
+	kuid_t i_uid = inode->i_uid;
+
+	if (cred_is_shifted())
+		i_uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), __kuid_val(i_uid));
+
 	if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) &&
-	    uid_eq(uid, inode->i_uid))
+	    uid_eq(uid, i_uid))
 		return true;
 	if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
 		return true;
-	if (uid_eq(inode->i_uid, INVALID_UID) &&
+	if (uid_eq(i_uid, INVALID_UID) &&
 	    ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_CHOWN))
 		return true;
 	return false;
@@ -33,12 +41,21 @@ static bool chown_ok(const struct inode *inode, kuid_t uid)
 
 static bool chgrp_ok(const struct inode *inode, kgid_t gid)
 {
+	kgid_t i_gid = inode->i_gid;
+	kuid_t i_uid = inode->i_uid;
+
+	if (cred_is_shifted()) {
+		struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
+
+		i_uid = make_kuid(ns, __kuid_val(i_uid));
+		i_gid = make_kgid(ns, __kgid_val(i_gid));
+	}
 	if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) &&
-	    (in_group_p(gid) || gid_eq(gid, inode->i_gid)))
+	    (in_group_p(gid) || gid_eq(gid, i_gid)))
 		return true;
 	if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
 		return true;
-	if (gid_eq(inode->i_gid, INVALID_GID) &&
+	if (gid_eq(i_gid, INVALID_GID) &&
 	    ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_CHOWN))
 		return true;
 	return false;
@@ -89,9 +106,10 @@ int setattr_prepare(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 	if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
 		if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
 			return -EPERM;
+
 		/* Also check the setgid bit! */
-		if (!in_group_p((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) ? attr->ia_gid :
-				inode->i_gid) &&
+		if (!in_group_p_shifted((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) ? attr->ia_gid :
+					inode->i_gid) &&
 		    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
 			attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISGID;
 	}
@@ -198,7 +216,7 @@ void setattr_copy(struct inode *inode, const struct iattr *attr)
 	if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
 		umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode;
 
-		if (!in_group_p(inode->i_gid) &&
+		if (!in_group_p_shifted(inode->i_gid) &&
 		    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
 			mode &= ~S_ISGID;
 		inode->i_mode = mode;
@@ -235,6 +253,9 @@ int notify_change(const struct path *path, struct iattr * attr,
 	int error;
 	struct timespec64 now;
 	unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
+	const struct cred *cred;
+	kuid_t i_uid = inode->i_uid;
+	kgid_t i_gid = inode->i_gid;
 
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(!inode_is_locked(inode));
 
@@ -243,18 +264,28 @@ int notify_change(const struct path *path, struct iattr * attr,
 			return -EPERM;
 	}
 
+	cred = change_userns_creds(path);
+	if (cred) {
+		struct mount *m = real_mount(path->mnt);
+
+		attr->ia_uid = KUIDT_INIT(from_kuid(m->mnt_ns->user_ns, attr->ia_uid));
+		attr->ia_gid = KGIDT_INIT(from_kgid(m->mnt_ns->user_ns, attr->ia_gid));
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * If utimes(2) and friends are called with times == NULL (or both
 	 * times are UTIME_NOW), then we need to check for write permission
 	 */
 	if (ia_valid & ATTR_TOUCH) {
-		if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode))
-			return -EPERM;
+		if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode)) {
+			error = -EPERM;
+			goto err;
+		}
 
 		if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode)) {
 			error = inode_permission(inode, MAY_WRITE);
 			if (error)
-				return error;
+				goto err;
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -275,7 +306,7 @@ int notify_change(const struct path *path, struct iattr * attr,
 	if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_PRIV) {
 		error = security_inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
 		if (error < 0)
-			return error;
+			goto err;
 		if (error == 0)
 			ia_valid = attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
 	}
@@ -306,34 +337,46 @@ int notify_change(const struct path *path, struct iattr * attr,
 			attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISGID;
 		}
 	}
-	if (!(attr->ia_valid & ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID)))
-		return 0;
+	if (!(attr->ia_valid & ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID))) {
+		error = 0;
+		goto err;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Verify that uid/gid changes are valid in the target
 	 * namespace of the superblock.
 	 */
+	error = -EOVERFLOW;
 	if (ia_valid & ATTR_UID &&
 	    !kuid_has_mapping(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, attr->ia_uid))
-		return -EOVERFLOW;
+		goto err;
+
 	if (ia_valid & ATTR_GID &&
 	    !kgid_has_mapping(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, attr->ia_gid))
-		return -EOVERFLOW;
+		goto err;
 
 	/* Don't allow modifications of files with invalid uids or
 	 * gids unless those uids & gids are being made valid.
 	 */
-	if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_UID) && !uid_valid(inode->i_uid))
-		return -EOVERFLOW;
-	if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_GID) && !gid_valid(inode->i_gid))
-		return -EOVERFLOW;
+	if (cred_is_shifted()) {
+		struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
+
+		i_uid = make_kuid(ns, __kuid_val(i_uid));
+		i_gid = make_kgid(ns, __kgid_val(i_gid));
+	}
+
+	if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_UID) && !uid_valid(i_uid))
+		goto err;
+
+	if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_GID) && !gid_valid(i_gid))
+		goto err;
 
 	error = security_inode_setattr(dentry, attr);
 	if (error)
-		return error;
+		goto err;
 	error = try_break_deleg(inode, delegated_inode);
 	if (error)
-		return error;
+		goto err;
 
 	if (inode->i_op->setattr)
 		error = inode->i_op->setattr(dentry, attr);
@@ -346,6 +389,8 @@ int notify_change(const struct path *path, struct iattr * attr,
 		evm_inode_post_setattr(dentry, ia_valid);
 	}
 
+ err:
+	revert_userns_creds(cred);
 	return error;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(notify_change);
fs/exec.c +6 -1
index 74d88dab98dd..4baf91391689 100644
@@ -1539,13 +1539,18 @@ static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 	/* Be careful if suid/sgid is set */
 	inode_lock(inode);
-
 	/* reload atomically mode/uid/gid now that lock held */
 	mode = inode->i_mode;
 	uid = inode->i_uid;
 	gid = inode->i_gid;
 	inode_unlock(inode);
 
+	if (cred_is_shifted()) {
+		struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
+
+		uid = make_kuid(ns, __kuid_val(uid));
+		gid = make_kgid(ns, __kgid_val(gid));
+	}
 	/* We ignore suid/sgid if there are no mappings for them in the ns */
 	if (!kuid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, uid) ||
 		 !kgid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, gid))
fs/inode.c +6 -3
index 18ff3081bda0..f5f7f7cbd374 100644
@@ -2060,7 +2060,7 @@ void inode_init_owner(struct inode *inode, const struct inode *dir,
 		if (S_ISDIR(mode))
 			mode |= S_ISGID;
 		else if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP) &&
-			 !in_group_p(inode->i_gid) &&
+			 !in_group_p_shifted(inode->i_gid) &&
 			 !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(dir, CAP_FSETID))
 			mode &= ~S_ISGID;
 	} else
@@ -2079,12 +2079,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_init_owner);
 bool inode_owner_or_capable(const struct inode *inode)
 {
 	struct user_namespace *ns;
+	kuid_t uid = inode->i_uid;
 
-	if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid))
+	if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), uid))
 		return true;
 
 	ns = current_user_ns();
-	if (kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) && ns_capable(ns, CAP_FOWNER))
+	if (cred_is_shifted())
+		uid = make_kuid(ns, __kuid_val(uid));
+	if (kuid_has_mapping(ns, uid) && ns_capable(ns, CAP_FOWNER))
 		return true;
 	return false;
 }
fs/internal.h +2 -0
index 9cbf6097c77f..47ac2f295f70 100644
@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ long do_symlinkat(const char __user *oldname, int newdfd,
 		  const char __user *newname);
 int do_linkat(int olddfd, const char __user *oldname, int newdfd,
 	      const char __user *newname, int flags);
+const struct cred *change_userns_creds(const struct path *p);
+void revert_userns_creds(const struct cred *cred);
 
 /*
  * namespace.c
fs/namei.c +90 -18

350 lines not on this page · raw message

fs/open.c +23 -2
index 033e2112fbda..7cad2b723925 100644
@@ -456,11 +456,13 @@ int ksys_chdir(const char __user *filename)
 	struct path path;
 	int error;
 	unsigned int lookup_flags = LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY;
+	const struct cred *cred;
 retry:
 	error = user_path_at(AT_FDCWD, filename, lookup_flags, &path);
 	if (error)
 		goto out;
 
+	cred = change_userns_creds(&path);
 	error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
 	if (error)
 		goto dput_and_out;
@@ -468,6 +470,7 @@ int ksys_chdir(const char __user *filename)
 	set_fs_pwd(current->fs, &path);
 
 dput_and_out:
+	revert_userns_creds(cred);
 	path_put(&path);
 	if (retry_estale(error, lookup_flags)) {
 		lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_REVAL;
@@ -486,11 +489,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(fchdir, unsigned int, fd)
 {
 	struct fd f = fdget_raw(fd);
 	int error;
+	const struct cred *cred;
 
 	error = -EBADF;
 	if (!f.file)
 		goto out;
 
+	cred = change_userns_creds(&f.file->f_path);
 	error = -ENOTDIR;
 	if (!d_can_lookup(f.file->f_path.dentry))
 		goto out_putf;
@@ -499,6 +504,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(fchdir, unsigned int, fd)
 	if (!error)
 		set_fs_pwd(current->fs, &f.file->f_path);
 out_putf:
+	revert_userns_creds(cred);
 	fdput(f);
 out:
 	return error;
@@ -547,11 +553,13 @@ static int chmod_common(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
 	struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
 	struct inode *delegated_inode = NULL;
 	struct iattr newattrs;
+	const struct cred *cred;
 	int error;
 
+	cred = change_userns_creds(path);
 	error = mnt_want_write(path->mnt);
 	if (error)
-		return error;
+		goto out;
 retry_deleg:
 	inode_lock(inode);
 	error = security_path_chmod(path, mode);
@@ -568,6 +576,8 @@ static int chmod_common(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
 			goto retry_deleg;
 	}
 	mnt_drop_write(path->mnt);
+ out:
+	revert_userns_creds(cred);
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -666,6 +676,7 @@ int do_fchownat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, uid_t user, gid_t group,
 	struct path path;
 	int error = -EINVAL;
 	int lookup_flags;
+	const struct cred *cred;
 
 	if ((flag & ~(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH)) != 0)
 		goto out;
@@ -677,12 +688,14 @@ int do_fchownat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, uid_t user, gid_t group,
 	error = user_path_at(dfd, filename, lookup_flags, &path);
 	if (error)
 		goto out;
+	cred = change_userns_creds(&path);
 	error = mnt_want_write(path.mnt);
 	if (error)
 		goto out_release;
 	error = chown_common(&path, user, group);
 	mnt_drop_write(path.mnt);
 out_release:
+	revert_userns_creds(cred);
 	path_put(&path);
 	if (retry_estale(error, lookup_flags)) {
 		lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_REVAL;
@@ -713,10 +726,12 @@ int ksys_fchown(unsigned int fd, uid_t user, gid_t group)
 {
 	struct fd f = fdget(fd);
 	int error = -EBADF;
+	const struct cred *cred;
 
 	if (!f.file)
 		goto out;
 
+	cred = change_userns_creds(&f.file->f_path);
 	error = mnt_want_write_file(f.file);
 	if (error)
 		goto out_fput;
@@ -724,6 +739,7 @@ int ksys_fchown(unsigned int fd, uid_t user, gid_t group)
 	error = chown_common(&f.file->f_path, user, group);
 	mnt_drop_write_file(f.file);
 out_fput:
+	revert_userns_creds(cred);
 	fdput(f);
 out:
 	return error;
@@ -911,8 +927,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(file_path);
  */
 int vfs_open(const struct path *path, struct file *file)
 {
+	int ret;
+	const struct cred *cred = change_userns_creds(path);
+
 	file->f_path = *path;
-	return do_dentry_open(file, d_backing_inode(path->dentry), NULL);
+	ret = do_dentry_open(file, d_backing_inode(path->dentry), NULL);
+	revert_userns_creds(cred);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 struct file *dentry_open(const struct path *path, int flags,
fs/posix_acl.c +2 -2
index 84ad1c90d535..b5aa36261964 100644
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ posix_acl_permission(struct inode *inode, const struct posix_acl *acl, int want)
                                         goto mask;
 				break;
                         case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
-                                if (in_group_p(inode->i_gid)) {
+				if (in_group_p_shifted(inode->i_gid)) {
 					found = 1;
 					if ((pa->e_perm & want) == want)
 						goto mask;
@@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ int posix_acl_update_mode(struct inode *inode, umode_t *mode_p,
 		return error;
 	if (error == 0)
 		*acl = NULL;
-	if (!in_group_p(inode->i_gid) &&
+	if (!in_group_p_shifted(inode->i_gid) &&
 	    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
 		mode &= ~S_ISGID;
 	*mode_p = mode;
fs/stat.c +27 -4
index c38e4c2e1221..0018b168d7a7 100644
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
 
+#include "mount.h"
+
 /**
  * generic_fillattr - Fill in the basic attributes from the inode struct
  * @inode: Inode to use as the source
@@ -48,6 +50,21 @@ void generic_fillattr(struct inode *inode, struct kstat *stat)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(generic_fillattr);
 
+static void shift_check(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct kstat *stat)
+{
+	struct mount *m = real_mount(mnt);
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns = m->mnt_ns->user_ns;
+
+	if ((mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_SHIFT) == 0)
+		return;
+
+	if (current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->user_ns != m->mnt_ns->user_ns)
+		return;
+
+	stat->uid = make_kuid(user_ns, __kuid_val(stat->uid));
+	stat->gid = make_kgid(user_ns, __kgid_val(stat->gid));
+}
+
 /**
  * vfs_getattr_nosec - getattr without security checks
  * @path: file to get attributes from
@@ -65,6 +82,7 @@ int vfs_getattr_nosec(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
 		      u32 request_mask, unsigned int query_flags)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
+	int ret;
 
 	memset(stat, 0, sizeof(*stat));
 	stat->result_mask |= STATX_BASIC_STATS;
@@ -77,12 +95,17 @@ int vfs_getattr_nosec(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
 	if (IS_AUTOMOUNT(inode))
 		stat->attributes |= STATX_ATTR_AUTOMOUNT;
 
+	ret = 0;
 	if (inode->i_op->getattr)
-		return inode->i_op->getattr(path, stat, request_mask,
-					    query_flags);
+		ret = inode->i_op->getattr(path, stat, request_mask,
+					   query_flags);
+	else
+		generic_fillattr(inode, stat);
 
-	generic_fillattr(inode, stat);
-	return 0;
+	if (!ret)
+		shift_check(path->mnt, stat);
+
+	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_getattr_nosec);
 
include/linux/cred.h +10 -0
index 18639c069263..8a5f2c9b613a 100644
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ extern struct group_info *groups_alloc(int);
 extern void groups_free(struct group_info *);
 
 extern int in_group_p(kgid_t);
+extern int in_group_p_shifted(kgid_t);
 extern int in_egroup_p(kgid_t);
 extern int groups_search(const struct group_info *, kgid_t);
 
@@ -75,6 +76,10 @@ static inline int in_group_p(kgid_t grp)
 {
         return 1;
 }
+static inline int in_group_p_shifted(kgid_t grp)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
 static inline int in_egroup_p(kgid_t grp)
 {
         return 1;
@@ -422,4 +427,9 @@ do {						\
 	*(_fsgid) = __cred->fsgid;		\
 } while(0)
 
+static inline bool cred_is_shifted(void)
+{
+	return current_cred() == current->mnt_cred;
+}
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_CRED_H */
include/linux/mount.h +3 -1
index bf8cc4108b8f..cdc5d981d594 100644
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ struct fs_context;
 #define MNT_SHARED_MASK	(MNT_UNBINDABLE)
 #define MNT_USER_SETTABLE_MASK  (MNT_NOSUID | MNT_NODEV | MNT_NOEXEC \
 				 | MNT_NOATIME | MNT_NODIRATIME | MNT_RELATIME \
-				 | MNT_READONLY)
+				 | MNT_READONLY | MNT_SHIFT)
 #define MNT_ATIME_MASK (MNT_NOATIME | MNT_NODIRATIME | MNT_RELATIME )
 
 #define MNT_INTERNAL_FLAGS (MNT_SHARED | MNT_WRITE_HOLD | MNT_INTERNAL | \
@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ struct fs_context;
 #define MNT_MARKED		0x4000000
 #define MNT_UMOUNT		0x8000000
 
+#define MNT_SHIFT		0x10000000
+
 struct vfsmount {
 	struct dentry *mnt_root;	/* root of the mounted tree */
 	struct super_block *mnt_sb;	/* pointer to superblock */
include/linux/sched.h +5 -0
index 467d26046416..d376dc7bcf76 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/plist.h>
 #include <linux/hrtimer.h>
 #include <linux/seccomp.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/nodemask.h>
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
 #include <linux/refcount.h>
@@ -882,6 +883,10 @@ struct task_struct {
 	/* Effective (overridable) subjective task credentials (COW): */
 	const struct cred __rcu		*cred;
 
+	/* cache for uid/gid shifted cred tied to mnt */
+	struct cred			*mnt_cred;
+	struct vfsmount			*mnt;
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
 	/* Cached requested key. */
 	struct key			*cached_requested_key;
kernel/capability.c +12 -2
index 1444f3954d75..3273e85a644c 100644
@@ -486,8 +486,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(file_ns_capable);
  */
 bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct inode *inode)
 {
-	return kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) &&
-		kgid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_gid);
+	kuid_t i_uid = inode->i_uid;
+	kgid_t i_gid = inode->i_gid;
+
+	if (cred_is_shifted()) {
+		struct user_namespace *cns = current_user_ns();
+
+		i_uid = make_kuid(cns, __kuid_val(i_uid));
+		i_gid = make_kgid(cns, __kgid_val(i_gid));
+	}
+
+	return kuid_has_mapping(ns, i_uid) &&
+		kgid_has_mapping(ns, i_gid);
 }
 
 /**
kernel/cred.c +20 -0
index c0a4c12d38b2..bbe0e2e64081 100644
@@ -167,6 +167,8 @@ void exit_creds(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	validate_creds(cred);
 	alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1);
 	put_cred(cred);
+	if (tsk->mnt_cred)
+		put_cred(tsk->mnt_cred);
 
 	cred = (struct cred *) tsk->cred;
 	tsk->cred = NULL;
@@ -318,6 +320,17 @@ struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void)
 	return new;
 }
 
+static void flush_mnt_cred(struct task_struct *t)
+{
+	if (t->mnt_cred == t->cred)
+		return;
+	if (t->mnt_cred)
+		put_cred(t->mnt_cred);
+	t->mnt_cred = NULL;
+	/* mnt is only used for comparison, so it has no reference */
+	t->mnt = NULL;
+}
+
 /*
  * Copy credentials for the new process created by fork()
  *
@@ -344,6 +357,8 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
 	    ) {
 		p->real_cred = get_cred(p->cred);
 		get_cred(p->cred);
+		p->mnt = NULL;
+		p->mnt_cred = NULL;
 		alter_cred_subscribers(p->cred, 2);
 		kdebug("share_creds(%p{%d,%d})",
 		       p->cred, atomic_read(&p->cred->usage),
@@ -383,6 +398,8 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
 
 	atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
 	p->cred = p->real_cred = get_cred(new);
+	p->mnt = NULL;
+	p->mnt_cred = NULL;
 	alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
 	validate_creds(new);
 	return 0;
@@ -506,6 +523,7 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
 	/* release the old obj and subj refs both */
 	put_cred(old);
 	put_cred(old);
+	flush_mnt_cred(task);
 	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(commit_creds);
@@ -564,6 +582,7 @@ const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *new)
 	alter_cred_subscribers(new, 1);
 	rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, new);
 	alter_cred_subscribers(old, -1);
+	flush_mnt_cred(current);
 
 	kdebug("override_creds() = %p{%d,%d}", old,
 	       atomic_read(&old->usage),
@@ -589,6 +608,7 @@ void revert_creds(const struct cred *old)
 
 	validate_creds(old);
 	validate_creds(override);
+	flush_mnt_cred(current);
 	alter_cred_subscribers(old, 1);
 	rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, old);
 	alter_cred_subscribers(override, -1);
kernel/groups.c +7 -0
index daae2f2dc6d4..772b49a367b0 100644
@@ -228,6 +228,13 @@ int in_group_p(kgid_t grp)
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(in_group_p);
 
+int in_group_p_shifted(kgid_t grp)
+{
+	if (cred_is_shifted())
+		grp = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), __kgid_val(grp));
+	return in_group_p(grp);
+}
+
 int in_egroup_p(kgid_t grp)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
Signature · 1 line
2.16.4
maintainer
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] fs: introduce uid/gid shifting bind mount

Quoted 13 lines · James Bottomley

This implementation reverse shifts according to the user_ns belonging to the mnt_ns. So if the vfsmount has the newly introduced flag MNT_SHIFT and the current user_ns is the same as the mount_ns->user_ns then we shift back using the user_ns before committing to the underlying filesystem.

For example, if a user_ns is created where interior (fake root, uid 0) is mapped to kernel uid 100000 then writes from interior root normally go to the filesystem at the kernel uid. However, if MNT_SHIFT is set, they will be shifted back to write at uid 0, meaning we can bind mount real image filesystems to user_ns protected faker root.

Quoted 4 lines

In essence there are several things which have to be done for this to occur safely. Firstly for all operations on the filesystem, new credentials have to be installed where fsuid and fsgid are set to the *interior* values.

Must we really install new creds?
Maybe we just need to set/clear a SHIFTED flag on current creds?

i.e. instead of change_userns_creds(path)/revert_userns_creds() how about start_shifted_creds(mnt)/end_shifted_creds().

and then cred_is_shifted() only checks the flag and no need for all the cached creds mechanism.

current_fsuid()/current_fsgid() will take care of the shifting based on the creds flag.

Also, you should consider placing a call to start_shifted/end_shifted inside __mnt_want_write()/__mnt_drop_write().
This should automatically cover all writable fs ops - including some that you missed (setxattr).

Taking this a step further, perhaps it would make sense to wrap all readonly fs ops with mnt_want_read()/mnt_drop_read() flavors.
Note that inode level already has a similar i_readcount access counter.

This could be used, for example, to provide a facility that is stronger than MNT_DETACH, and weaker than filesystem "shutdown" ioctl, for blocking new file opens (with openat()) on a mounted filesystem.

The point is, you add gating to vfs that is generic and not for single use case (i.e. cred shifting).

Apologies in advance if some of these ideas are ill advised.

Thanks,
Amir.

#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] fs: introduce uid/gid shifting bind mount

Quoted 16 lines · Amir Goldstein
Quoted 14 lines · James Bottomley

This implementation reverse shifts according to the user_ns belonging to the mnt_ns. So if the vfsmount has the newly introduced flag MNT_SHIFT and the current user_ns is the same as the mount_ns->user_ns then we shift back using the user_ns before committing to the underlying filesystem.

For example, if a user_ns is created where interior (fake root, uid
0) is mapped to kernel uid 100000 then writes from interior root normally go to the filesystem at the kernel uid. However, if MNT_SHIFT is set, they will be shifted back to write at uid 0, meaning we can bind mount real image filesystems to user_ns protected faker root.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines

In essence there are several things which have to be done for this to occur safely. Firstly for all operations on the filesystem, new credentials have to be installed where fsuid and fsgid are set to the *interior* values.

Must we really install new creds?

Well, the reason for doing it is that for uid/gid changes that's the way everything else does it, so principle of least surprise.

However, there are two other cases where this doesn't work:

1. inode uid/gid changes, which are compared against the real uid/gid
2. execution, where we need to bring the filesystem uid/gid to the exterior representation of the interior values for unprivileged execution to work.
3. the capable_wrt_inode checks where we're usually checking if the inode uid/gid has an interior mapping, but since for shiftfs we're assuming inode uid/gid are interior we need to see if anything maps to them.
4. the in_group_p checks to see whether we're in a group that's capable.

1. could be fixed by shifting uid/gid ... I just didn't think this was a good idea. 2,3. can't be fixed because the direction of the check needs to be reversed and 4 has to be done separately because group_info is a pointer to something that lives outside the credential. Taking
the pointer, creating a new one and shifting every group is possible, I just also wasn't sure if it was a wise thing to do.

Quoted 10 lines

Maybe we just need to set/clear a SHIFTED flag on current creds?

i.e. instead of change_userns_creds(path)/revert_userns_creds() how about start_shifted_creds(mnt)/end_shifted_creds().

and then cred_is_shifted() only checks the flag and no need for all the cached creds mechanism.

current_fsuid()/current_fsgid() will take care of the shifting based on the creds flag.

So it is true, if current_fsuid/fsgid did the mapping, it would be a fifth case above, but we'd have to be sure no-one ever used the bare current_cred()->fsuid. Auditing filesystems, it looks like there's only one current case of this in namei.c:may_follow_link(), so I think it could work ... but it's still a danger for other places, like security module checks and things.

Quoted 4 lines

Also, you should consider placing a call to start_shifted/end_shifted inside __mnt_want_write()/__mnt_drop_write().
This should automatically cover all writable fs ops - including some that you missed (setxattr).

xattr handling wasn't really missed, I left it out because it was the controversial case last time. Should the interior root be able to set xattrs? I think the argument was tending towards the yes except security. prefix ones last time so perhaps it is safe to reintroduce.

Quoted 4 lines

Taking this a step further, perhaps it would make sense to wrap all readonly fs ops with mnt_want_read()/mnt_drop_read() flavors. Note that inode level already has a similar i_readcount access counter.

Unfortunately, read and write aren't the only operations where we need a shift, there's also lookup (which doesn't require read or write). Now we could also go with mnt_want_lookup/mnt_drop_lookup or simply keep the existing shift coding on the lookup path.

Quoted 9 lines

This could be used, for example, to provide a facility that is stronger than MNT_DETACH, and weaker than filesystem "shutdown" ioctl, for blocking new file opens (with openat()) on a mounted filesystem.

The point is, you add gating to vfs that is generic and not for single use case (i.e. cred shifting).

Apologies in advance if some of these ideas are ill advised.

Of the two ideas, I think using a generic gate point, if we can find it, is a definite winner because it programmatically identifies the shift points. I'm less enthused about moving the shift into current_fsuid/fsgid because of the potential for stuff to go wrong and because it's counter to how everything else is currently done, but I'll let the filesystem experts weigh in on this one. The good news is that the two ideas aren't dependent on each other so either can be implemented without the other.

James

maintainer
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] fs: introduce uid/gid shifting bind mount

In reply to James Bottomley
Quoted 11 lines · James Bottomley

This implementation reverse shifts according to the user_ns belonging to the mnt_ns. So if the vfsmount has the newly introduced flag MNT_SHIFT and the current user_ns is the same as the mount_ns->user_ns then we shift back using the user_ns before committing to the underlying filesystem.

For example, if a user_ns is created where interior (fake root, uid 0) is mapped to kernel uid 100000 then writes from interior root normally go to the filesystem at the kernel uid. However, if MNT_SHIFT is set, they will be shifted back to write at uid 0, meaning we can bind mount real image filesystems to user_ns protected faker root.

Thanks, James, I definately would like to see shifting in the VFS api.

I have a few practical concerns about this implementation, but my biggest concern is more fundemental: this again by design leaves littered about the filesystem uid-0 owned files which were written by an untrusted user.

I would feel much better if you institutionalized having the origin shifted. For instance, take a squashfs for a container fs, shift it so that fsuid 0 == hostuid 100000. Mount that, with a marker saying how it is shifted, then set 'shiftable'. Now use that as a base for allowing an unpriv user to shift. If that user has subuid 200000 as container uid 0, then its root will write files as uid 100000 in the fs. This isn't perfect, but I think something along these lines would be far safer.

Two namespaces with different uid maps can share the filesystem as though they both had the same uidmap. (This currently is to me the most interesting use case for shifing bind mounts)

If the user wants to tar up the result, they can do do in their own namespace, resulting in uid 0 shown as uid 0. If host root wants to do so, they can umount it everywhere and use something like fuidshift. Or, they can also create a namespace to do the shifting to uid 0 in tar.

My more practical concerns include: (1) once a userns has set a shiftable bind mount to shift, if it then creates a new child userns, that ns will not see (iiuc) see the fs as shifted. (2) there seems to be no good reason to stick to caching the cred for only one mnt, versus having a per-userns hashtable of creds for shifted mnts. Was that just a temporary shortcut or did you intend it to stay that way?

#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] fs: introduce uid/gid shifting bind mount

Quoted 14 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 6 lines · James Bottomley

This implementation reverse shifts according to the user_ns belonging to the mnt_ns. So if the vfsmount has the newly introduced flag MNT_SHIFT and the current user_ns is the same as the mount_ns->user_ns then we shift back using the user_ns before committing to the underlying filesystem.

Quoted 6 lines

For example, if a user_ns is created where interior (fake root, uid
0) is mapped to kernel uid 100000 then writes from interior root normally go to the filesystem at the kernel uid. However, if MNT_SHIFT is set, they will be shifted back to write at uid 0, meaning we can bind mount real image filesystems to user_ns protected faker root.

Quoted 7 lines

Thanks, James, I definately would like to see shifting in the VFS api.

I have a few practical concerns about this implementation, but my biggest concern is more fundemental: this again by design leaves littered about the filesystem uid-0 owned files which were written by an untrusted user.

Well, I think that's a consequence of my use case: using unmodified container images with the user namespace. We're starting to do IMA/EVM signatures in our images, so shifted UID images aren't an option for us . Therefore I have to figure out a way of allowing an untrusted user to write safely at UID zero. For me that safety comes from strictly corralling where they can write and making sure the container orchestration system sets it up correctly.

Quoted 8 lines

I would feel much better if you institutionalized having the origin shifted. For instance, take a squashfs for a container fs, shift it so that fsuid 0 == hostuid 100000. Mount that, with a marker saying how it is shifted, then set 'shiftable'. Now use that as a base for allowing an unpriv user to shift. If that user has subuid 200000 as container uid 0, then its root will write files as uid 100000 in the fs. This isn't perfect, but I think something along these lines would be far safer.

OK, so I fully agree that if you're not doing integrity in the container, then this is an option for you and whatever API gets upstreamed should cope with that case.

So to push on the API a bit, what do you want? The reverse along the user_ns one I implemented is easy: a single flag tells you to map back or not. However, the implementation is phrased in terms of shifted credentials, so as long as we know how to map, it can work for both our use cases. I think in plumbers you expressed interest in simply passing the map to the mount rather than doing it via a user_ns; is that still the case?

Quoted 10 lines

Two namespaces with different uid maps can share the filesystem as though they both had the same uidmap. (This currently is to me the most interesting use case for shifing bind mounts)

If the user wants to tar up the result, they can do do in their own namespace, resulting in uid 0 shown as uid 0. If host root wants to do so, they can umount it everywhere and use something like fuidshift. Or, they can also create a namespace to do the shifting to uid 0 in tar.

Quoted 3 lines

My more practical concerns include: (1) once a userns has set a shiftable bind mount to shift, if it then creates a new child userns, that ns will not see (iiuc) see the fs as shifted.

Actually, it will. The shift is a property of the vfsmount (or underlying struct mount), so if you create a new user_ns then a mount_ns, the new mount_ns inherits the shift flag and you go back along your new user_ns. If you don't create a new mount_ns, you still get the shift flag, but you're still being shifted along the parent user_ns, not your new one.

Quoted 4 lines

(2) there seems to be no good reason to stick to caching the cred
for only one mnt, versus having a per-userns hashtable of creds for shifted mnts. Was that just a temporary shortcut or did you intend it to stay that way?

Well, it was a demo of mechanism, but remember this cache is per thread of execution. Is there really going to be a use case where one thread of execution traverses multiple user_ns's and so would need multiple shifted credentials? The current implementation could be backed by a hashtable, but I really think it would only make sense if the creds could be global, but they're not they're strictly thread specific entities.

James

maintainer
#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] fs: introduce uid/gid shifting bind mount

Quoted 23 lines · James Bottomley
Quoted 14 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 6 lines · James Bottomley

This implementation reverse shifts according to the user_ns belonging to the mnt_ns. So if the vfsmount has the newly introduced flag MNT_SHIFT and the current user_ns is the same as the mount_ns->user_ns then we shift back using the user_ns before committing to the underlying filesystem.

Quoted 6 lines

For example, if a user_ns is created where interior (fake root, uid
0) is mapped to kernel uid 100000 then writes from interior root normally go to the filesystem at the kernel uid. However, if MNT_SHIFT is set, they will be shifted back to write at uid 0, meaning we can bind mount real image filesystems to user_ns protected faker root.

Quoted 7 lines

Thanks, James, I definately would like to see shifting in the VFS api.

I have a few practical concerns about this implementation, but my biggest concern is more fundemental: this again by design leaves littered about the filesystem uid-0 owned files which were written by an untrusted user.

Quoted 7 lines

Well, I think that's a consequence of my use case: using unmodified container images with the user namespace. We're starting to do IMA/EVM signatures in our images, so shifted UID images aren't an option for us . Therefore I have to figure out a way of allowing an untrusted user to write safely at UID zero. For me that safety comes from strictly corralling where they can write and making sure the container orchestration system sets it up correctly.

Isn't that a matter of convention? You could ship, store, and measure the files already shifted. An OCI annotation could show the offset, say 100000.

Now if any admin runs across this device noone will be tricked by the root owned files.

Mount could conceivably look like:

	mount --bind --origin-uid 100000 --shift /proc/50/ns/user /src /dest

(the --shift idea coming from Tycho). I'd prefer --origin to be another user namespace fd, which I suppose some tool could easily set up, for instance:

	pid1=`setup-userns-fd -m b:0:100000:65536`
	pid2=$(prepare a container userns)
	mount --bind --shift-origin=/proc/$pid1/ns/user \
		--shift-target=/proc/$pid2/ns/user /src /dest

You could presumably always skip the shift-origin to achieve what you're doing now.

Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 8 lines

I would feel much better if you institutionalized having the origin shifted. For instance, take a squashfs for a container fs, shift it so that fsuid 0 == hostuid 100000. Mount that, with a marker saying how it is shifted, then set 'shiftable'. Now use that as a base for allowing an unpriv user to shift. If that user has subuid 200000 as container uid 0, then its root will write files as uid 100000 in the fs. This isn't perfect, but I think something along these lines would be far safer.

OK, so I fully agree that if you're not doing integrity in the container, then this is an option for you and whatever API gets upstreamed should cope with that case.

Quoted 7 lines

So to push on the API a bit, what do you want? The reverse along the user_ns one I implemented is easy: a single flag tells you to map back or not. However, the implementation is phrased in terms of shifted credentials, so as long as we know how to map, it can work for both our use cases. I think in plumbers you expressed interest in simply passing the map to the mount rather than doing it via a user_ns; is that still the case?

Oh I think I'm fine either way - I can always create a user_ns to match the map I want.

-serge

#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] fs: introduce uid/gid shifting bind mount

Quoted 32 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 23 lines · James Bottomley
Quoted 14 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 6 lines · James Bottomley

This implementation reverse shifts according to the user_ns belonging to the mnt_ns. So if the vfsmount has the newly introduced flag MNT_SHIFT and the current user_ns is the same as the mount_ns->user_ns then we shift back using the user_ns before committing to the underlying filesystem.

Quoted 6 lines

For example, if a user_ns is created where interior (fake root, uid 0) is mapped to kernel uid 100000 then writes from interior root normally go to the filesystem at the kernel uid. However, if MNT_SHIFT is set, they will be shifted back to write at uid 0, meaning we can bind mount real image filesystems to user_ns protected faker root.

Quoted 7 lines

Thanks, James, I definately would like to see shifting in the VFS api.

I have a few practical concerns about this implementation, but my biggest concern is more fundemental: this again by design leaves littered about the filesystem uid-0 owned files which were written by an untrusted user.

Quoted 7 lines

Well, I think that's a consequence of my use case: using unmodified container images with the user namespace. We're starting to do IMA/EVM signatures in our images, so shifted UID images aren't an option for us. Therefore I have to figure out a way of allowing an untrusted user to write safely at UID zero. For me that safety comes from strictly corralling where they can write and making sure the container orchestration system sets it up correctly.

Quoted 3 lines

Isn't that a matter of convention? You could ship, store, and measure the files already shifted. An OCI annotation could show the offset, say 100000.

We could, but it's the wrong way to look at it to tell a customer that if they want us to run the image safely they have to modify it at the build stage. As a cloud service provider I want to make the statement that I can run any customer image safely as long as it was built to whatever standards the registry supports. That has to include integrity protected images. And I have to be able to attest to a customer that I'm running their image as part of the customer integrity verification.

Quoted 2 lines

Now if any admin runs across this device noone will be tricked by the root owned files.

Perhaps you could go into what tricks you think will happen? This is clearly the thread model of using unmodified images you have which might be different from the one I have. My mitigation is basically that as long as no tenant or unprivileged user can get at the unshifted image, we're fine.

Quoted 6 lines

Mount could conceivably look like:

	mount --bind --origin-uid 100000 --shift /proc/50/ns/user /src

/dest

(the --shift idea coming from Tycho).

Just so we're clear --origin-uid <uid> means map back along the --shift user_ns but add this <uid> to whatever interior id the shift produces? I think that's fairly easy to parametrise and store in the bind mount, yes.

Quoted 10 lines

I'd prefer --origin to be another user namespace fd, which I
suppose some tool could easily set up, for instance:

	pid1=`setup-userns-fd -m b:0:100000:65536`
	pid2=$(prepare a container userns)
	mount --bind --shift-origin=/proc/$pid1/ns/user \
		--shift-target=/proc/$pid2/ns/user /src /dest

You could presumably always skip the shift-origin to achieve what you're doing now.

Yes, if you're happy to have --shift-origin <uid> default to 0

I have to ask in the above, what is the point of the pid1 user_ns? Do you ever use pid1 for anything else? It looks like you were merely creating it for the object of having it passed into the bind. If there's never any use for the --shift-origin <ns_fd> then I think I agree that a bare number is a better abstraction. Or are you thinking we'll have use cases where a simple numeric addition won't serve and our only user mechanism for complex parametrisation of the shift map is a user_ns?

The other slight problem is that now the bind mount does need to understand complex arguments, which it definitely doesn't today. I'm happy with extending fsconfig to bind, so it can do complex arguments like this, but it sounds like others are dubious so doing the above also depends on agreeing whatever extension we do to bind.

I suppose bind reconfigure could be yet another system call in the open_tree/move_mount pantheon, which would also solve the remount with different bind parameters problem with the new API.

The other thing I worry about is that is separating the shift_user_ns from the mount_ns->user_ns a potential security hole? For the unprivileged operation of this, I like the idea of enforcing them to be the same so the tenant can only shift back along a user_ns they're operating in. The problem being that the kernel has no way of validating that the passed in <ns_fd> is within the subuid/subgid range of the unprivileged user, so we're trusting that the user can't get access to the ns_fd of a user_ns outside that range.

Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 8 lines

I would feel much better if you institutionalized having the origin shifted. For instance, take a squashfs for a container fs, shift it so that fsuid 0 == hostuid 100000. Mount that, with a marker saying how it is shifted, then set 'shiftable'. Now use that as a base for allowing an unpriv user to shift. If that user has subuid 200000 as container uid 0, then its root will write files as uid 100000 in the fs. This isn't perfect, but I think something along these lines would be far safer.

OK, so I fully agree that if you're not doing integrity in the container, then this is an option for you and whatever API gets upstreamed should cope with that case.

Quoted 7 lines

So to push on the API a bit, what do you want? The reverse along the user_ns one I implemented is easy: a single flag tells you to map back or not. However, the implementation is phrased in terms of shifted credentials, so as long as we know how to map, it can work for both our use cases. I think in plumbers you expressed interest in simply passing the map to the mount rather than doing it via a user_ns; is that still the case?

Quoted 2 lines

Oh I think I'm fine either way - I can always create a user_ns to match the map I want.

I think it comes down to whether there's an actual use for the user_ns you create. It seems a bit wasteful merely to create a user_ns for the purpose of passing something that can also be simply parametrised if there's no further use for that user_ns.

James

maintainer
#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] fs: introduce uid/gid shifting bind mount

Quoted 37 lines · James Bottomley
Quoted 32 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 23 lines · James Bottomley
Quoted 14 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 6 lines · James Bottomley

This implementation reverse shifts according to the user_ns belonging to the mnt_ns. So if the vfsmount has the newly introduced flag MNT_SHIFT and the current user_ns is the same as the mount_ns->user_ns then we shift back using the user_ns before committing to the underlying filesystem.

Quoted 6 lines

For example, if a user_ns is created where interior (fake root, uid 0) is mapped to kernel uid 100000 then writes from interior root normally go to the filesystem at the kernel uid. However, if MNT_SHIFT is set, they will be shifted back to write at uid 0, meaning we can bind mount real image filesystems to user_ns protected faker root.

Quoted 7 lines

Thanks, James, I definately would like to see shifting in the VFS api.

I have a few practical concerns about this implementation, but my biggest concern is more fundemental: this again by design leaves littered about the filesystem uid-0 owned files which were written by an untrusted user.

Quoted 7 lines

Well, I think that's a consequence of my use case: using unmodified container images with the user namespace. We're starting to do IMA/EVM signatures in our images, so shifted UID images aren't an option for us. Therefore I have to figure out a way of allowing an untrusted user to write safely at UID zero. For me that safety comes from strictly corralling where they can write and making sure the container orchestration system sets it up correctly.

Quoted 3 lines

Isn't that a matter of convention? You could ship, store, and measure the files already shifted. An OCI annotation could show the offset, say 100000.

Quoted 6 lines

We could, but it's the wrong way to look at it to tell a customer that if they want us to run the image safely they have to modify it at the build stage. As a cloud service provider I want to make the statement that I can run any customer image safely as long as it was built to whatever standards the registry supports. That has to include integrity protected images. And I have to be able to attest to a

And does the customer measure the files, or do you?

Quoted 2 lines

customer that I'm running their image as part of the customer integrity verification.

Makes sense. And in your environment, you can easily partition off a place (or an otherwise unused namespace) in which to mount these images. So using a null mapping for the 'origin' would make sense there.

But in cases where what you want is a single directory shared by several containers with disjoint uid mappings, where this is the only directory they share - be it for logs, or data, etc, and be it by infrastructure containers in the course of running a cluster or a set of students manipulating shared data with their otherwise completely unprivileged containers - we can make the shared directory a lot less of a minefield.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Now if any admin runs across this device noone will be tricked by the root owned files.

Perhaps you could go into what tricks you think will happen? This is

I don't like to use my own underactive imagination to decide what an attacker - or accidental fool - might be likely to do. But simply writing a setuid-root shell script called 'ls' will probably hit *someone* who against all advice has . at the front of their path.

(Don't look at me like that - it's 2020 and we still have flashy respectable-looking websites encouraging people to wget | sudo /bin/sh)

Quoted 4 lines

clearly the thread model of using unmodified images you have which might be different from the one I have. My mitigation is basically that as long as no tenant or unprivileged user can get at the unshifted image, we're fine.

Are you sure? What if $package accidentally ships a broken cronjob that tries to run ./bin/sh -c "logger $(date)" ?

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines

Mount could conceivably look like:

	mount --bind --origin-uid 100000 --shift /proc/50/ns/user /src

/dest

(the --shift idea coming from Tycho).

Just so we're clear --origin-uid <uid> means map back along the --shift user_ns but add this <uid> to whatever interior id the shift produces?

If by interior id you mean the kuid, then yes :)

Quoted 11 lines

I think that's fairly easy to parametrise and store in the bind mount, yes.

Quoted 8 lines

I'd prefer --origin to be another user namespace fd, which I
suppose some tool could easily set up, for instance:

	pid1=`setup-userns-fd -m b:0:100000:65536`
	pid2=$(prepare a container userns)
	mount --bind --shift-origin=/proc/$pid1/ns/user \
		--shift-target=/proc/$pid2/ns/user /src /dest
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

You could presumably always skip the shift-origin to achieve what you're doing now.

Yes, if you're happy to have --shift-origin <uid> default to 0

Yeah I think that's fine. I'd expect any distro which tries to configure this for easy consumption to allocate a 65k subuid range for 'images', and set a default shift-origin under /etc which 'mount' would consult, or something like that. The kernel almost certainly would default to 0.

Quoted 2 lines

I have to ask in the above, what is the point of the pid1 user_ns? Do you ever use pid1 for anything else?

Probably not.

Quoted 7 lines

It looks like you were merely
creating it for the object of having it passed into the bind. If there's never any use for the --shift-origin <ns_fd> then I think I agree that a bare number is a better abstraction. Or are you thinking we'll have use cases where a simple numeric addition won't serve and our only user mechanism for complex parametrisation of the shift map is a user_ns?

I don't think so. People can have some pretty convoluted uid mappings right now, but presumably the images we are talking about would be the result of an rsync or tar *in* such a namespace. Though again, limited imagination and all that. There *may* be very good use cases for a more complicated mapping.

Quoted 10 lines

The other slight problem is that now the bind mount does need to understand complex arguments, which it definitely doesn't today. I'm happy with extending fsconfig to bind, so it can do complex arguments like this, but it sounds like others are dubious so doing the above also depends on agreeing whatever extension we do to bind.

I suppose bind reconfigure could be yet another system call in the open_tree/move_mount pantheon, which would also solve the remount with different bind parameters problem with the new API.

Quoted 8 lines

The other thing I worry about is that is separating the shift_user_ns from the mount_ns->user_ns a potential security hole? For the unprivileged operation of this, I like the idea of enforcing them to be the same so the tenant can only shift back along a user_ns they're operating in. The problem being that the kernel has no way of validating that the passed in <ns_fd> is within the subuid/subgid range of the unprivileged user, so we're trusting that the user can't get access to the ns_fd of a user_ns outside that range.

I guess I figured we would have privileged task in the owning namespace (presumably init_user_ns) mark a bind mount as shiftable (maybe specifying who is allowed to bind mount it using the mapped root uid, analogous to how the namespaced file capabilities are identified) and then the ns_fd of the task doing the "mount --bind --shift" (which is privileged inside the ns_fd userns) would be used, unmodified (or even modified, since whatever uid args the task would pass would have to be valid inside the mounting userns)

So something like:

1. On the host:

   mount --bind --mark-shiftable-by 200000 --origin-uid 100000 /data/group1

2. In the container which has its root mapped to host uid 200000

   mount --bind --shift /data/group1 /data/group1
Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 8 lines

I would feel much better if you institutionalized having the origin shifted. For instance, take a squashfs for a container fs, shift it so that fsuid 0 == hostuid 100000. Mount that, with a marker saying how it is shifted, then set 'shiftable'. Now use that as a base for allowing an unpriv user to shift. If that user has subuid 200000 as container uid 0, then its root will write files as uid 100000 in the fs. This isn't perfect, but I think something along these lines would be far safer.

OK, so I fully agree that if you're not doing integrity in the container, then this is an option for you and whatever API gets upstreamed should cope with that case.

So to push on the API a bit, what do you want? The reverse along the user_ns one I implemented is easy: a single flag tells you to map back or not. However, the implementation is phrased in terms of shifted credentials, so as long as we know how to map, it can work for both our use cases. I think in plumbers you expressed interest in simply passing the map to the mount rather than doing it via a user_ns; is that still the case?

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Oh I think I'm fine either way - I can always create a user_ns to match the map I want.

I think it comes down to whether there's an actual use for the user_ns you create. It seems a bit wasteful merely to create a user_ns for the purpose of passing something that can also be simply parametrised if there's no further use for that user_ns.

Oh - I consider the detail of whether we pass a userid or userns nsfd as more of an implementation detail which we can hash out after the more general shift-mount api is decided upon. Anyway, passing nsfds just has a cool factor :)

-serge

#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] fs: introduce uid/gid shifting bind mount

Quoted 48 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 39 lines · James Bottomley
Quoted 34 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 24 lines · James Bottomley
Quoted 15 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 6 lines · James Bottomley

This implementation reverse shifts according to the user_ns belonging to the mnt_ns. So if the vfsmount has the newly introduced flag MNT_SHIFT and the current user_ns is the same as the mount_ns->user_ns then we shift back using the user_ns before committing to the underlying filesystem.

Quoted 6 lines

For example, if a user_ns is created where interior (fake root,uid 0) is mapped to kernel uid 100000 then writes from interior root normally go to the filesystem at the kernel uid. However, if MNT_SHIFT is set, they will be shifted back to write at uid 0, meaning we can bind mount real image filesystems to user_ns protected faker root.

Quoted 7 lines

Thanks, James, I definately would like to see shifting in the VFS api.

I have a few practical concerns about this implementation, but my biggest concern is more fundemental: this again by design leaves littered about the filesystem uid-0 owned files which were written by an untrusted user.

Quoted 8 lines

Well, I think that's a consequence of my use case: using unmodified container images with the user namespace. We're starting to do IMA/EVM signatures in our images, so shifted UID images aren't an option for us. Therefore I have to figure out a way of allowing an untrusted user to write safely at UID zero. For me that safety comes from strictly corralling where they can write and making sure the container orchestration system sets it up correctly.

Quoted 3 lines

Isn't that a matter of convention? You could ship, store, and measure the files already shifted. An OCI annotation could show the offset, say 100000.

Quoted 7 lines

We could, but it's the wrong way to look at it to tell a customer that if they want us to run the image safely they have to modify it at the build stage. As a cloud service provider I want to make the statement that I can run any customer image safely as long as it was built to whatever standards the registry supports. That has to include integrity protected images. And I have to be able to attest to a

Quoted 1 line

And does the customer measure the files, or do you?

Well, the customer signs the image, which is why we can't alter it. The idea would be that the CSP does the measurement and the provision of the running dashboard but that the customer could also do it themselves if they didn't trust the CSP ... or just wanted to verify the CSP integrity tool was working correctly.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines

customer that I'm running their image as part of the customer integrity verification.

Makes sense. And in your environment, you can easily partition off a place (or an otherwise unused namespace) in which to mount these images. So using a null mapping for the 'origin' would make sense there.

Quoted 7 lines

But in cases where what you want is a single directory shared by several containers with disjoint uid mappings, where this is the only directory they share - be it for logs, or data, etc, and be it by infrastructure containers in the course of running a cluster or a set of students manipulating shared data with their otherwise completely unprivileged containers - we can make the shared directory a lot less of a minefield.

Sure ... I didn't say you didn't have a use case. I was just pointing
out that I have a write at uid 0 one. I'm happy to implement a scheme that covers both.

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Now if any admin runs across this device noone will be tricked by the root owned files.

Perhaps you could go into what tricks you think will happen? This is

I don't like to use my own underactive imagination to decide what an attacker - or accidental fool - might be likely to do. But simply writing a setuid-root shell script called 'ls' will probably hit *someone* who against all advice has . at the front of their path.

The suid/sgid is already on my list of potential threats. It's mitigated by never letting the tenant get access to where the unshifted image is unpacked.

Quoted 3 lines

(Don't look at me like that - it's 2020 and we still have flashy respectable-looking websites encouraging people to wget | sudo /bin/sh)

Person with root access being stupid is definitely a problem, but it's not really in my threat model.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

clearly the thread model of using unmodified images you have which might be different from the one I have. My mitigation is basically that as long as no tenant or unprivileged user can get at the unshifted image, we're fine.

Are you sure? What if $package accidentally ships a broken cronjob that tries to run ./bin/sh -c "logger $(date)" ?

You mean sends a message to the systemd log socket? That's usually intercepted to go into the per-container Kafka receiver (or whatever else the CSP uses for logging).

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines

Mount could conceivably look like:

	mount --bind --origin-uid 100000 --shift /proc/50/ns/user /src

/dest

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line

(the --shift idea coming from Tycho).

Just so we're clear --origin-uid <uid> means map back along the -- shift user_ns but add this <uid> to whatever interior id the shift produces?

If by interior id you mean the kuid, then yes :)

Oh, no ... we need to get the terminogy straight. The kuid, as in the uid the kernel sees, is what I think of as the exterior uid. The uid the container tenant thinks they see is the interior one.

So let's say the user_ns maps interior 0 to exterior 20,000 but that the image begins at 100,000. You have an --origin-uid of 100000 in the above, I believe. How we get there is the user as sudo root writes a file "f". "f" has interior owner 0. However, the exterior owner, which is what usually gets written, as 20,000. Doing the shift I'd take the 20,000; shift back along the tenant user_ns to get 0 and then add the 100,000 offset to end up writing to the image at 100,000

That would mean a bunch of different user_ns could be set up all shifting back to the same 100,000 and thus share the image.

Quoted 34 lines
Quoted 11 lines

I think that's fairly easy to parametrise and store in the bind mount, yes.

Quoted 8 lines

I'd prefer --origin to be another user namespace fd, which I
suppose some tool could easily set up, for instance:

	pid1=`setup-userns-fd -m b:0:100000:65536`
	pid2=$(prepare a container userns)
	mount --bind --shift-origin=/proc/$pid1/ns/user \
		--shift-target=/proc/$pid2/ns/user /src /dest
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

You could presumably always skip the shift-origin to achieve what you're doing now.

Yes, if you're happy to have --shift-origin <uid> default to 0

Yeah I think that's fine. I'd expect any distro which tries to configure this for easy consumption to allocate a 65k subuid range for 'images', and set a default shift-origin under /etc which 'mount' would consult, or something like that. The kernel almost certainly would default to 0.

Quoted 2 lines

I have to ask in the above, what is the point of the pid1 user_ns? Do you ever use pid1 for anything else?

Probably not.

Quoted 6 lines

It looks like you were merely creating it for the object of having it passed into the bind. If there's never any use for the --shift- origin <ns_fd> then I think I agree that a bare number is a better abstraction. Or are you thinking we'll have use cases where a simple numeric addition won't serve and our only user mechanism for complex parametrisation of the shift map is a user_ns?

Quoted 5 lines

I don't think so. People can have some pretty convoluted uid mappings right now, but presumably the images we are talking about would be the result of an rsync or tar *in* such a namespace. Though again, limited imagination and all that. There *may* be very good use cases for a more complicated mapping.

Would it be OK to implement the simple now and add the complex later if it ever materializes. Provided we can agree on a way of passing extra arguments to bind, we have the freedom to add stuff later.

Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 11 lines

The other slight problem is that now the bind mount does need to understand complex arguments, which it definitely doesn't today. I'm happy with extending fsconfig to bind, so it can do complex arguments like this, but it sounds like others are dubious so doing the above also depends on agreeing whatever extension we do to bind.

I suppose bind reconfigure could be yet another system call in the open_tree/move_mount pantheon, which would also solve the remount with different bind parameters problem with the new API.

Quoted 9 lines

The other thing I worry about is that is separating the shift_user_ns from the mount_ns->user_ns a potential security hole? For the unprivileged operation of this, I like the idea of enforcing them to be the same so the tenant can only shift back along a user_ns they're operating in. The problem being that the kernel has no way of validating that the passed in <ns_fd> is within the subuid/subgid range of the unprivileged user, so we're trusting that the user can't get access to the ns_fd of a user_ns outside that range.

Quoted 2 lines

I guess I figured we would have privileged task in the owning namespace (presumably init_user_ns) mark a bind mount as shiftable

Yes, that's what I've got today in the prototype. It mirrors the original shiftfs mechanism. However, I have also heard people say they want a permanent mark, like an xattr for this.

Quoted 9 lines

(maybe specifying who is allowed to bind mount it using the mapped root uid, analogous to how the namespaced file capabilities are identified) and then the ns_fd of the task doing the "mount --bind -- shift" (which is privileged inside the ns_fd userns) would be used, unmodified (or even modified, since whatever uid args the task would pass would have to be valid inside the mounting userns)

So something like:

Quoted 8 lines

1. On the host:

   mount --bind --mark-shiftable-by 200000 --origin-uid 100000

/data/group1

2. In the container which has its root mapped to host uid 200000

   mount --bind --shift /data/group1 /data/group1

We can certainly do that, but it does mean one mark (i.e. one mount point, so /data/group<n>) per user_ns at different uids. A simpler alternative may be to do the mark as

mount --bind --mark-shiftable --origin-uid 100000 /data/group

And regulate access to /data/group by the usual filesystem ACL. Then anyone who can get at /data/group can do

mount --bind --shift /data/group1 /my/place/for/the/image

I tend to think that ACL security is sufficient, since it's what everyone is used to but I don't object to having the additional origin check as well.

Quoted 31 lines
Quoted 23 lines
Quoted 23 lines
Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 9 lines

I would feel much better if you institutionalized having the origin shifted. For instance, take a squashfs for a container fs, shift it so that fsuid 0 == hostuid 100000. Mount that, with a marker saying how it is shifted, then set 'shiftable'. Now use that as a base for allowing an unpriv user to shift. If that user has subuid 200000 as container uid 0, then its root will write files as uid 100000 in the fs. This isn't perfect, but I think something along these lines would be far safer.

OK, so I fully agree that if you're not doing integrity in the container, then this is an option for you and whatever API gets upstreamed should cope with that case.

So to push on the API a bit, what do you want? The reverse along the user_ns one I implemented is easy: a single flag tells you to map back or not. However, the implementation is phrased in terms of shifted credentials, so as long as we know how to map, it can work for both our use cases. I think in plumbers you expressed interest in simply passing the map to the mount rather than doing it via a user_ns; is that still the case?

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Oh I think I'm fine either way - I can always create a user_ns to match the map I want.

I think it comes down to whether there's an actual use for the user_ns you create. It seems a bit wasteful merely to create a user_ns for the purpose of passing something that can also be simply parametrised if there's no further use for that user_ns.

Quoted 4 lines

Oh - I consider the detail of whether we pass a userid or userns nsfd as more of an implementation detail which we can hash out after the more general shift-mount api is decided upon. Anyway, passing nsfds just has a cool factor :)

Well, yes, won't aruge on the cool factor-ness.

James

Quoted 2 lines

-serge

#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] fs: introduce uid/gid shifting bind mount

Quoted 8 lines · James Bottomley
Quoted 3 lines · Serge E. Hallyn

On Thu, Jan 16, 2020 at 08:29:33AM -0800, James Bottomley wrote:
I guess I figured we would have privileged task in the owning namespace (presumably init_user_ns) mark a bind mount as shiftable

Yes, that's what I've got today in the prototype. It mirrors the original shiftfs mechanism. However, I have also heard people say they want a permanent mark, like an xattr for this.

Please, no. mount() failures are already hard to reason about, I would rather not add another temporary (or worse, permanent) non-obvious failure mode.

What if we make shifted bind mounts always readonly? That will force people to use an overlay (or something else) on top, but they probably want to do that anyway so they can avoid tainting the original container image with writes.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Oh - I consider the detail of whether we pass a userid or userns nsfd as more of an implementation detail which we can hash out after the more general shift-mount api is decided upon. Anyway, passing nsfds just has a cool factor :)

Well, yes, won't aruge on the cool factor-ness.

It's not just the cool factor: if you're doing this, it's presumably because you want to use it with a container in a user namespace. Specifying the same parameters twice leaves room for error, causing CVEs and more work.

Tycho

#13 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] fs: introduce uid/gid shifting bind mount

There are also cases where you’d want to bind-mount a host dir into a shifted container and have that be writeable, not just to an overlay.

—

Quoted 23 lines · Tycho Andersen

Please, no. mount() failures are already hard to reason about, I would rather not add another temporary (or worse, permanent) non-obvious failure mode.

What if we make shifted bind mounts always readonly? That will force people to use an overlay (or something else) on top, but they probably want to do that anyway so they can avoid tainting the original container image with writes.

It's not just the cool factor: if you're doing this, it's presumably because you want to use it with a container in a user namespace. Specifying the same parameters twice leaves room for error, causing CVEs and more work.

Tycho
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#14 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] fs: introduce uid/gid shifting bind mount

In reply to Tycho Andersen
Quoted 7 lines · Tycho Andersen
Quoted 6 lines · James Bottomley
Quoted 4 lines · Serge E. Hallyn

On Thu, Jan 16, 2020 at 08:29:33AM -0800, James Bottomley wrote:
I guess I figured we would have privileged task in the owning namespace (presumably init_user_ns) mark a bind mount as shiftable

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Yes, that's what I've got today in the prototype. It mirrors the original shiftfs mechanism. However, I have also heard people say they want a permanent mark, like an xattr for this.

Please, no. mount() failures are already hard to reason about, I would rather not add another temporary (or worse, permanent) non- obvious failure mode.

I'm not particularly bothered either way ... although using xattrs always seems to end up biting us for nesting, so I wasn't wildly enthusiastic about it.

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What if we make shifted bind mounts always readonly? That will force people to use an overlay (or something else) on top, but they probably want to do that anyway so they can avoid tainting the original container image with writes.

That really causes problems for the mutable (non-docker) container use case which is pretty much the way I always use containers. Who wants to bother with overlayfs when their image is expected to mutate: it's just a huge hassle.

Quoted 11 lines
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Oh - I consider the detail of whether we pass a userid or userns nsfd as more of an implementation detail which we can hash out after the more general shift-mount api is decided upon. Anyway, passing nsfds just has a cool factor :)

Well, yes, won't aruge on the cool factor-ness.

It's not just the cool factor: if you're doing this, it's presumably because you want to use it with a container in a user namespace. Specifying the same parameters twice leaves room for error, causing CVEs and more work.

It depends. For the offset, we agreed there's no extant user_ns, so you have to create one specifically. That leads to a more error prone setup with no actual checking benefit.

For the shift_ns, it depends whether you want one mount point per tenant, in which case the tenant user_ns might be a useful check, or one mount point with an ACL in which case you just backshift along the binding tenant user_ns.

James

#15 lore raw

PATCH v2 3/3 fs: expose shifting bind mount to userspace

In reply to James Bottomley

This capability is exposed currently through the proposed new bind API. To mark a mount for shifting, you add the allow-shift flag to the properties, either by a reconfigure or a rebind. Only real root on the system can do this. Once this is done, admin in a user namespace (i.e. an unprivileged user) can take that mount point and bind it with a shift in effect.

The way an admin marks a mount is:

pathfd = open("/path/to/shift", O_PATH);
fd = configfd_open("bind", O_CLOEXEC); configfd_action(fd, CONFIGFD_SET_FD, "pathfd", NULL, pathfd); configfd_action(fd, CONFIGFD_SET_FLAG, "allow-shift", NULL, 0); configfd_action(fd, CONFIGFD_SET_FLAG, "detached", NULL, 0); configfd_action(fd, CONFIGFD_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 0); configfd_action(fd, CONFIGFD_GET_FD, "bindfd", &bindfd, O_CLOEXEC);

move_mount(bindfd, "", AT_FDCWD, "/path/to/allow", MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH);

Technically /path/to/shift and /path/to/allow can be the same, which basically installs a mnt at the path that allows onward traversal.

Then any mount namespace in a user namespace can do:

pathfd = open("/path/to/allow", O_PATH);
fd = configfd_open("bind", O_CLOEXEC); configfd_action(fd, CONFIGFD_SET_FD, "pathfd", NULL, pathfd); configfd_action(fd, CONFIGFD_SET_FLAG, "shift", NULL, 0); configfd_action(fd, CONFIGFD_SET_FLAG, "detached", NULL, 0); configfd_action(fd, CONFIGFD_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 0); configfd_action(fd, CONFIGFD_GET_FD, "bindfd", &bindfd, O_CLOEXEC);

move_mount(bindfd, "", AT_FDCWD, "/path/to/mount", MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH);

And /path/to/mount will have the uid/gid shifting bind mount installed.

---
 fs/bind.c           | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/mount.h          |  2 ++
 fs/namespace.c      |  1 +
 fs/proc_namespace.c |  4 ++++
 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+)
fs/bind.c +35 -0
index eea4e6cd5108..6b4668041248 100644
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ struct bind_data {
 	bool		nodev:1;
 	bool		detached:1;
 	bool		recursive:1;
+	bool		shift:1;
+	bool		allow_shift:1;
 	struct file	*file;
 	struct file	*retfile;
 };
@@ -66,6 +68,25 @@ static int bind_set_flag(const struct configfd_context *cfc,
 		bd->nodev = true;
 	} else if (strcmp(p->key, "noexec") == 0) {
 		bd->noexec = true;
+	} else if (strcmp(p->key, "shift") == 0) {
+		struct mount *m;
+
+		if (!bd->file) {
+			logger_err(cfc->log, "can't shift without setting pathfd");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		m = real_mount(bd->file->f_path.mnt);
+		if (!m->allow_shift) {
+			logger_err(cfc->log, "pathfd doesn't allow shifting");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		bd->shift = true;
+	} else if (strcmp(p->key, "allow-shift") == 0) {
+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+			logger_err(cfc->log, "must be root to set allow-shift");
+			return -EPERM;
+		}
+		bd->allow_shift = true;
 	} else if (strcmp(p->key, "recursive") == 0 &&
 		   cfc->op == CONFIGFD_CMD_CREATE) {
 		bd->recursive = true;
@@ -126,6 +147,8 @@ static int bind_get_mnt_flags(struct bind_data *bd, int mnt_flags)
 		mnt_flags |= MNT_NODEV;
 	if (bd->noexec)
 		mnt_flags |= MNT_NOEXEC;
+	if (bd->shift)
+		mnt_flags |= MNT_SHIFT;
 
 	return mnt_flags;
 }
@@ -143,6 +166,13 @@ static int bind_reconfigure(const struct configfd_context *cfc)
 	mnt_flags = bd->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_ATIME_MASK;
 	mnt_flags = bind_get_mnt_flags(bd, mnt_flags);
 
+	if (bd->allow_shift) {
+		struct mount *m = real_mount(bd->file->f_path.mnt);
+
+		/* FIXME: this should be set with the reconfigure locking */
+		m->allow_shift = true;
+	}
+
 	return do_reconfigure_mnt(&bd->file->f_path, mnt_flags);
 }
 
@@ -183,6 +213,11 @@ static int bind_create(const struct configfd_context *cfc)
 
 		/* since this is a detached copy, we can do without locking */
 		f->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags |= mnt_flags;
+		if (bd->allow_shift) {
+			struct mount *m = real_mount(f->f_path.mnt);
+
+			m->allow_shift = true;
+		}
 	}
 
 	bd->retfile = f;
fs/mount.h +2 -0
index 711a4093e475..1da13decf93b 100644
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ struct mount {
 	int mnt_expiry_mark;		/* true if marked for expiry */
 	struct hlist_head mnt_pins;
 	struct hlist_head mnt_stuck_children;
+	/* shifting bind mount parameters */
+	bool allow_shift:1;
 } __randomize_layout;
 
 #define MNT_NS_INTERNAL ERR_PTR(-EINVAL) /* distinct from any mnt_namespace */
fs/namespace.c +1 -0
index 3ae0124e9783..8266e9540595 100644
@@ -1038,6 +1038,7 @@ static struct mount *clone_mnt(struct mount *old, struct dentry *root,
 
 	mnt->mnt.mnt_flags = old->mnt.mnt_flags;
 	mnt->mnt.mnt_flags &= ~(MNT_WRITE_HOLD|MNT_MARKED|MNT_INTERNAL);
+	mnt->allow_shift = old->allow_shift;
 
 	atomic_inc(&sb->s_active);
 	mnt->mnt.mnt_sb = sb;
fs/proc_namespace.c +4 -0
index 273ee82d8aa9..bdf8d23cf42e 100644
@@ -70,14 +70,18 @@ static void show_mnt_opts(struct seq_file *m, struct vfsmount *mnt)
 		{ MNT_NOATIME, ",noatime" },
 		{ MNT_NODIRATIME, ",nodiratime" },
 		{ MNT_RELATIME, ",relatime" },
+		{ MNT_SHIFT, ",shift" },
 		{ 0, NULL }
 	};
 	const struct proc_fs_info *fs_infop;
+	struct mount *rm = real_mount(mnt);
 
 	for (fs_infop = mnt_info; fs_infop->flag; fs_infop++) {
 		if (mnt->mnt_flags & fs_infop->flag)
 			seq_puts(m, fs_infop->str);
 	}
+	if (rm->allow_shift)
+		seq_puts(m, ",allow-shift");
 }
 
 static inline void mangle(struct seq_file *m, const char *s)
Signature · 1 line
2.16.4