mptcp: Re-factor expand_ack
Subsystems (2)
Peter Krystad
PATCH 1/1 mptcp: Re-factor expand_ack
Modify this commit to handle separately-stored 32-bit data acks.
squashto: update per unacked sequence on pkt reception
--- net/mptcp/options.c | 22 +++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
net/mptcp/options.c +11 -11
@@ -674,15 +674,16 @@ static bool check_fourth_ack(struct mptcp_subflow_context *subflow,return true; } -static u64 expand_ack (u64 old_ack,u64 cur_ack,bool use_64bit) +static u64 expand_ack (u64 old_ack,u32 cur_ack32) { -u32 old_ack32, cur_ack32; - -if (use_64bit) -return cur_ack; +u32 old_ack32; +u64 cur_ack; +/* avoid ack expansion on update conflict, to reduce the risk of +* wrongly expanding to a future ack sequence number, which is way +* more dangerous than missing an ack +*/ old_ack32 = (u32 )old_ack; - cur_ack32 = (u32 )cur_ack; cur_ack = (old_ack &GENMASK_ULL (63 ,32 )) + cur_ack32;if (unlikely (before (cur_ack32, old_ack32)))return cur_ack + (1LL <<32 );
@@ -695,11 +696,10 @@ static void update_una(struct mptcp_sock *msk,u64 new_snd_una, snd_una, old_snd_una =atomic64_read (&msk->snd_una);u64 write_seq =READ_ONCE (msk->write_seq); -/* avoid ack expansion on update conflict, to reduce the risk of -* wrongly expanding to a future ack sequence number, which is way -* more dangerous than missing an ack -*/ - new_snd_una =expand_ack (old_snd_una, mp_opt->data_ack, mp_opt->ack64); +if (mp_opt->ack64) + new_snd_una = mp_opt->data_ack; +else + new_snd_una =expand_ack (old_snd_una, (u32 )mp_opt->data_ack);/* ACK for data not even sent yet? Ignore. */ if (after64 (new_snd_una, write_seq))
Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
Mat Martineau
Quoted 21 lines · Peter Krystad
Modify this commit to handle separately-stored 32-bit data acks.
squashto: update per unacked sequence on pkt reception
Signed-off-by Peter Krystad <peter.krystad(a)linux.intel.com>---
net/mptcp/options.c| 22 +++++++++++-----------1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)net/mptcp/options.c +1
-2@@ -674,15 +674,16 @@ static bool check_fourth_ack(struct mptcp_subflow_context *subflow,return true; } -static u64 expand_ack (u64 old_ack,u64 cur_ack,bool use_64bit) +static u64 expand_ack (u64 old_ack,u32 cur_ack32) { -u32 old_ack32, cur_ack32;
net/mptcp/options.c static bool check_fourth_ack(struct mptcp_subflow_context *subflow, · line 685
Quoted 10 lines
net/mptcp/options.c +6
-3- -if (use_64bit) -return cur_ack; +u32 old_ack32; +u64 cur_ack; +/* avoid ack expansion on update conflict, to reduce the risk of +* wrongly expanding to a future ack sequence number, which is way +* more dangerous than missing an ack +*/
I think this comment belongs in the original function - there's no conflict detection going on in this function.
net/mptcp/options.c static void update_una(struct mptcp_sock *msk, · line 701
Quoted 13 lines
net/mptcp/options.c +0
-5old_ack32 = (u32 )old_ack; - cur_ack32 = (u32 )cur_ack; cur_ack = (old_ack &GENMASK_ULL (63 ,32 )) + cur_ack32;if (unlikely (before (cur_ack32, old_ack32)))return cur_ack + (1LL <<32 );@@ -695,11 +696,10 @@ static void update_una(struct mptcp_sock *msk,u64 new_snd_una, snd_una, old_snd_una =atomic64_read (&msk->snd_una);u64 write_seq =READ_ONCE (msk->write_seq); -/* avoid ack expansion on update conflict, to reduce the risk of -* wrongly expanding to a future ack sequence number, which is way -* more dangerous than missing an ack -*/
I have to admit this comment does seem out of place here too. In an earlier version, the comment was closer to the while loop (see
https://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg602279.html )
Quoted 10 lines
net/mptcp/options.c +4
-1- new_snd_una =expand_ack (old_snd_una, mp_opt->data_ack, mp_opt->ack64); +if (mp_opt->ack64) + new_snd_una = mp_opt->data_ack; +else + new_snd_una =expand_ack (old_snd_una, (u32 )mp_opt->data_ack);/* ACK for data not even sent yet? Ignore. */ if (after64 (new_snd_una, write_seq))Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
--
Mat Martineau
Intel
Peter Krystad
Same here, drop this patch.
Peter.
Quoted 52 lines · Peter Krystad
Modify this commit to handle separately-stored 32-bit data acks.
squashto: update per unacked sequence on pkt reception
Signed-off-by Peter Krystad <peter.krystad(a)linux.intel.com>--- net/mptcp/options.c | 22 +++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)net/mptcp/options.c +11
-11@@ -674,15 +674,16 @@ static bool check_fourth_ack(struct mptcp_subflow_context *subflow,return true; } -static u64 expand_ack (u64 old_ack,u64 cur_ack,bool use_64bit) +static u64 expand_ack (u64 old_ack,u32 cur_ack32) { -u32 old_ack32, cur_ack32; - -if (use_64bit) -return cur_ack; +u32 old_ack32; +u64 cur_ack; +/* avoid ack expansion on update conflict, to reduce the risk of +* wrongly expanding to a future ack sequence number, which is way +* more dangerous than missing an ack +*/ old_ack32 = (u32 )old_ack; - cur_ack32 = (u32 )cur_ack; cur_ack = (old_ack &GENMASK_ULL (63 ,32 )) + cur_ack32;if (unlikely (before (cur_ack32, old_ack32)))return cur_ack + (1LL <<32 );@@ -695,11 +696,10 @@ static void update_una(struct mptcp_sock *msk,u64 new_snd_una, snd_una, old_snd_una =atomic64_read (&msk->snd_una);u64 write_seq =READ_ONCE (msk->write_seq); -/* avoid ack expansion on update conflict, to reduce the risk of -* wrongly expanding to a future ack sequence number, which is way -* more dangerous than missing an ack -*/ - new_snd_una =expand_ack (old_snd_una, mp_opt->data_ack, mp_opt->ack64); +if (mp_opt->ack64) + new_snd_una = mp_opt->data_ack; +else + new_snd_una =expand_ack (old_snd_una, (u32 )mp_opt->data_ack);/* ACK for data not even sent yet? Ignore. */ if (after64 (new_snd_una, write_seq))