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lib/refcount: Document interaction with PID_MAX_LIMIT

PATCH Superseded Jann Horn 2 participants 3 messages Mar 2, 2020 – Mar 3, 2020 Atomic infrastructure

v1 of 2 Superseded Latest is v2 →

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Jann Horn

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PATCH 1/1 lib/refcount: Document interaction with PID_MAX_LIMIT

Document the circumstances under which refcount_t's saturation mechanism works deterministically.

---
 include/linux/refcount.h | 19 ++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
include/linux/refcount.h +14 -5
index 0ac50cf62d062..cf14db393d89d 100644
@@ -38,11 +38,20 @@
  * atomic operations, then the count will continue to edge closer to 0. If it
  * reaches a value of 1 before /any/ of the threads reset it to the saturated
  * value, then a concurrent refcount_dec_and_test() may erroneously free the
- * underlying object. Given the precise timing details involved with the
- * round-robin scheduling of each thread manipulating the refcount and the need
- * to hit the race multiple times in succession, there doesn't appear to be a
- * practical avenue of attack even if using refcount_add() operations with
- * larger increments.
+ * underlying object.
+ * Linux limits the maximum number of tasks to PID_MAX_LIMIT, which is currently
+ * 0x400000 (and can't easily be raised in the future beyond FUTEX_TID_MASK).
+ * With the current PID limit, if no batched refcounting operations are used and
+ * the attacker can't repeatedly trigger kernel oopses in the middle of refcount
+ * operations, this makes it impossible for a saturated refcount to leave the
+ * saturation range, even if it is possible for multiple uses of the same
+ * refcount to nest in the context of a single task.
+ * If hundreds of references are added/removed with a single refcounting
+ * operation, it may potentially be possible to leave the saturation range; but
+ * given the precise timing details involved with the round-robin scheduling of
+ * each thread manipulating the refcount and the need to hit the race multiple
+ * times in succession, there doesn't appear to be a practical avenue of attack
+ * even if using refcount_add() operations with larger increments.
  *
  * Memory ordering
  * ===============

base-commit: 98d54f81e36ba3bf92172791eba5ca5bd813989b

Signature · 1 line
2.25.0.265.gbab2e86ba0-goog
Acked-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · Jann Horn

Document the circumstances under which refcount_t's saturation mechanism works deterministically.

With one note below...

Quoted 10 lines
---
 include/linux/refcount.h | 19 ++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
include/linux/refcount.h +0 -0
index 0ac50cf62d062..cf14db393d89d 100644
@@ -38,11 +38,20 @@
  * atomic operations, then the count will continue to edge closer to 0. If it

include/linux/refcount.h line 43

Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/refcount.h +3 -5
  * reaches a value of 1 before /any/ of the threads reset it to the saturated
  * value, then a concurrent refcount_dec_and_test() may erroneously free the
- * underlying object. Given the precise timing details involved with the
- * round-robin scheduling of each thread manipulating the refcount and the need
- * to hit the race multiple times in succession, there doesn't appear to be a
- * practical avenue of attack even if using refcount_add() operations with
- * larger increments.
+ * underlying object.
+ * Linux limits the maximum number of tasks to PID_MAX_LIMIT, which is currently
+ * 0x400000 (and can't easily be raised in the future beyond FUTEX_TID_MASK).

Maybe just to clarify and make readers not have to go search the source:

	"... beyond FUTEX_TID_MASK, which is UAPI defined as 0x3fffffff)."

and is it worth showing the math on this, just to have it clearly stated?

-Kees

Quoted 19 lines
include/linux/refcount.h +11 -0
+ * With the current PID limit, if no batched refcounting operations are used and
+ * the attacker can't repeatedly trigger kernel oopses in the middle of refcount
+ * operations, this makes it impossible for a saturated refcount to leave the
+ * saturation range, even if it is possible for multiple uses of the same
+ * refcount to nest in the context of a single task.
+ * If hundreds of references are added/removed with a single refcounting
+ * operation, it may potentially be possible to leave the saturation range; but
+ * given the precise timing details involved with the round-robin scheduling of
+ * each thread manipulating the refcount and the need to hit the race multiple
+ * times in succession, there doesn't appear to be a practical avenue of attack
+ * even if using refcount_add() operations with larger increments.
  *
  * Memory ordering
  * ===============

base-commit: 98d54f81e36ba3bf92172791eba5ca5bd813989b

Signature · 1 line
2.25.0.265.gbab2e86ba0-goog
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
author
#2 lore raw
Quoted 33 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 4 lines · Jann Horn

Document the circumstances under which refcount_t's saturation mechanism works deterministically.

With one note below...

Quoted 10 lines
---
 include/linux/refcount.h | 19 ++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
include/linux/refcount.h +0 -0
index 0ac50cf62d062..cf14db393d89d 100644
@@ -38,11 +38,20 @@
  * atomic operations, then the count will continue to edge closer to 0. If it

include/linux/refcount.h line 43

Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/refcount.h +3 -5
  * reaches a value of 1 before /any/ of the threads reset it to the saturated
  * value, then a concurrent refcount_dec_and_test() may erroneously free the
- * underlying object. Given the precise timing details involved with the
- * round-robin scheduling of each thread manipulating the refcount and the need
- * to hit the race multiple times in succession, there doesn't appear to be a
- * practical avenue of attack even if using refcount_add() operations with
- * larger increments.
+ * underlying object.
+ * Linux limits the maximum number of tasks to PID_MAX_LIMIT, which is currently
+ * 0x400000 (and can't easily be raised in the future beyond FUTEX_TID_MASK).

Maybe just to clarify and make readers not have to go search the source:

Quoted 1 line
        "... beyond FUTEX_TID_MASK, which is UAPI defined as 0x3fffffff)."

The value of that thing has changed three times in git history, and there is a comment in threads.h that refers to it as being 0x1fffffff; so I'm a bit hesitant to copy that around further.

Quoted 2 lines

and is it worth showing the math on this, just to have it clearly stated?

Hm, I suppose... I'll send a v2.

Quoted 13 lines

-Kees

Quoted 11 lines
include/linux/refcount.h +11 -0
+ * With the current PID limit, if no batched refcounting operations are used and
+ * the attacker can't repeatedly trigger kernel oopses in the middle of refcount
+ * operations, this makes it impossible for a saturated refcount to leave the
+ * saturation range, even if it is possible for multiple uses of the same
+ * refcount to nest in the context of a single task.
+ * If hundreds of references are added/removed with a single refcounting
+ * operation, it may potentially be possible to leave the saturation range; but
+ * given the precise timing details involved with the round-robin scheduling of
+ * each thread manipulating the refcount and the need to hit the race multiple
+ * times in succession, there doesn't appear to be a practical avenue of attack
+ * even if using refcount_add() operations with larger increments.