fscrypt: don't evict dirty inodes after removing key
Eric Biggers
maintainerPATCH 1/1 fscrypt: don't evict dirty inodes after removing key
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
After FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY removes a key, it syncs the filesystem and tries to get and put all inodes that were unlocked by the key so that unused inodes get evicted via fscrypt_drop_inode(). Normally, the inodes are all clean due to the sync.
However, after the filesystem is sync'ed, userspace can modify and close one of the files. (Userspace is *supposed* to close the files before removing the key. But it doesn't always happen, and the kernel can't assume it.) This causes the inode to be dirtied and have i_count == 0. Then, fscrypt_drop_inode() failed to consider this case and indicated that the inode can be dropped, causing the write to be lost.
On f2fs, other problems such as a filesystem freeze could occur due to the inode being freed while still on f2fs's dirty inode list.
Fix this bug by making fscrypt_drop_inode() only drop clean inodes.
I've written an xfstest which detects this bug on ext4, f2fs, and ubifs.
--- fs/crypto/keysetup.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
fs/crypto/keysetup.c +9 -0
@@ -538,6 +538,15 @@ int fscrypt_drop_inode(struct inode *inode)return 0 ; mk = ci->ci_master_key->payload.data[0 ]; +/* +* With proper, non-racy use of FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, all inodes +* protected by the key were cleaned by sync_filesystem(). But if +* userspace is still using the files, inodes can be dirtied between +* then and now. We mustn't lose any writes, so skip dirty inodes here. +*/ +if (inode->i_state &I_DIRTY_ALL ) +return 0 ; +/* * Note: since we aren't holding ->mk_secret_sem, the result here can * immediately become outdated. But there's no correctness problem with
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Quoted 39 lines · Eric Biggers
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
After
FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEYremoves a key, it syncs the filesystem and tries to get and put all inodes that were unlocked by the key so that unused inodes get evicted viafscrypt_drop_inode(). Normally, the inodes are all clean due to the sync.However, after the filesystem is sync'ed, userspace can modify and close one of the files. (Userspace is *supposed* to close the files before removing the key. But it doesn't always happen, and the kernel can't assume it.) This causes the inode to be dirtied and have
i_count== 0. Then,fscrypt_drop_inode()failed to consider this case and indicated that the inode can be dropped, causing the write to be lost.On f2fs, other problems such as a filesystem freeze could occur due to the inode being freed while still on f2fs's dirty inode list.
Fix this bug by making
fscrypt_drop_inode()only drop clean inodes.I've written an xfstest which detects this bug on ext4, f2fs, and ubifs.
Fixes b1c0ec3599f4 ("fscrypt: add FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl")Cc <[email protected]> # v5.4+Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>--- fs/crypto/keysetup.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)fs/crypto/keysetup.c +2
-0@@ -538,6 +538,15 @@ int fscrypt_drop_inode(struct inode *inode)return 0 ; mk = ci->ci_master_key->payload.data[0 ]; +/* +* With proper, non-racy use of FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, all inodes
fs/crypto/keysetup.c int fscrypt_drop_inode(struct inode *inode) · line 552
Quoted 10 lines
fs/crypto/keysetup.c +7
-0+* protected by the key were cleaned by sync_filesystem(). But if +* userspace is still using the files, inodes can be dirtied between +* then and now. We mustn't lose any writes, so skip dirty inodes here. +*/ +if (inode->i_state &I_DIRTY_ALL ) +return 0 ; +/* * Note: since we aren't holding ->mk_secret_sem, the result here can * immediately become outdated. But there's no correctness problem with
Applied to fscrypt.git#for-stable for 5.6.
- Eric