xfs: Use scnprintf() for avoiding potential buffer overflow
PATCH 1/1 xfs: Use scnprintf() for avoiding potential buffer overflow
Since snprintf() returns the would-be-output size instead of the actual output size, the succeeding calls may go beyond the given buffer limit. Fix it by replacing with scnprintf().
--- fs/xfs/xfs_stats.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_stats.c +5 -5
@@ -57,13 +57,13 @@ int xfs_stats_format(struct xfsstats __percpu *stats, char *buf)/* Loop over all stats groups */ for (i = j =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (xstats); i++) { - len +=snprintf (buf + len,PATH_MAX - len,"%s" , + len +=scnprintf (buf + len,PATH_MAX - len,"%s" , xstats[i].desc);/* inner loop does each group */ for (; j < xstats[i].endpoint; j++) - len +=snprintf (buf + len,PATH_MAX - len," %u" , + len +=scnprintf (buf + len,PATH_MAX - len," %u" ,counter_val (stats, j)); - len +=snprintf (buf + len,PATH_MAX - len,"\n" ); + len +=scnprintf (buf + len,PATH_MAX - len,"\n" ); }/* extra precision counters */ for_each_possible_cpu (i) {
@@ -72,9 +72,9 @@ int xfs_stats_format(struct xfsstats __percpu *stats, char *buf) xs_read_bytes +=per_cpu_ptr (stats, i)->s.xs_read_bytes; } - len +=snprintf (buf + len,PATH_MAX -len,"xpc %Lu %Lu %Lu\n" , + len +=scnprintf (buf + len,PATH_MAX -len,"xpc %Lu %Lu %Lu\n" , xs_xstrat_bytes, xs_write_bytes, xs_read_bytes); - len +=snprintf (buf + len,PATH_MAX -len,"debug %u\n" , + len +=scnprintf (buf + len,PATH_MAX -len,"debug %u\n" , #if defined(DEBUG) 1);#else
Signature · 1 line
2.16.4
Quoted 5 lines · Takashi Iwai
Since
snprintf()returns the would-be-output size instead of the actual output size, the succeeding calls may go beyond the given buffer limit. Fix it by replacing withscnprintf().Signed-off-by Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
The 'c' in 'scnprintf' means that it returns the number of bytes written into the buffer (not including the \0) instead of the number of bytes that /would/ have been written provided there was enough space, right?
If so,
--D
Quoted 40 lines
--- fs/xfs/xfs_stats.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)fs/xfs/xfs_stats.c +5
-5@@ -57,13 +57,13 @@ int xfs_stats_format(struct xfsstats __percpu *stats, char *buf)/* Loop over all stats groups */ for (i = j =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (xstats); i++) { - len +=snprintf (buf + len,PATH_MAX - len,"%s" , + len +=scnprintf (buf + len,PATH_MAX - len,"%s" , xstats[i].desc);/* inner loop does each group */ for (; j < xstats[i].endpoint; j++) - len +=snprintf (buf + len,PATH_MAX - len," %u" , + len +=scnprintf (buf + len,PATH_MAX - len," %u" ,counter_val (stats, j)); - len +=snprintf (buf + len,PATH_MAX - len,"\n" ); + len +=scnprintf (buf + len,PATH_MAX - len,"\n" ); }/* extra precision counters */ for_each_possible_cpu (i) {@@ -72,9 +72,9 @@ int xfs_stats_format(struct xfsstats __percpu *stats, char *buf) xs_read_bytes +=per_cpu_ptr (stats, i)->s.xs_read_bytes; } - len +=snprintf (buf + len,PATH_MAX -len,"xpc %Lu %Lu %Lu\n" , + len +=scnprintf (buf + len,PATH_MAX -len,"xpc %Lu %Lu %Lu\n" , xs_xstrat_bytes, xs_write_bytes, xs_read_bytes); - len +=snprintf (buf + len,PATH_MAX -len,"debug %u\n" , + len +=scnprintf (buf + len,PATH_MAX -len,"debug %u\n" , #if defined(DEBUG) 1);#else Signature · 1 line
2.16.4
Quoted 11 lines · Darrick J. Wong
Quoted 5 lines · Takashi Iwai
Since
snprintf()returns the would-be-output size instead of the actual output size, the succeeding calls may go beyond the given buffer limit. Fix it by replacing withscnprintf().Signed-off-by Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>The 'c' in 'scnprintf' means that it returns the number of bytes written into the buffer (not including the \0) instead of the number of bytes that /would/ have been written provided there was enough space, right?
Yes.
Takashi
Quoted 8 lines · Takashi Iwai
Since
snprintf()returns the would-be-output size instead of the actual output size, the succeeding calls may go beyond the given buffer limit. Fix it by replacing withscnprintf().Signed-off-by Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>--- fs/xfs/xfs_stats.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
what about all the other calls to snprintf() in fs/xfs/xfs_sysfs.c and fs/xfs/xfs_error.c that return the "would be written" length to their callers? i.e. we can return a length longer than the buffer provided to the callers...
Aren't they all broken, too?
A quick survey of random snprintf() calls shows there's an abundance of callers that do not check the return value of snprintf for overflow when outputting stuff to proc/sysfs files. This seems like a case of "snprintf() considered harmful, s/snprintf/scnprintf/ kernel wide, remove snprintf()"...
Cheers,
Dave,
Signature · 2 lines
Dave Chinner [email protected]
Quoted 11 lines · Dave Chinner
Quoted 8 lines · Takashi Iwai
Since
snprintf()returns the would-be-output size instead of the actual output size, the succeeding calls may go beyond the given buffer limit. Fix it by replacing withscnprintf().Signed-off-by Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>--- fs/xfs/xfs_stats.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Quoted 6 lines
what about all the other calls to
snprintf()infs/xfs/xfs_sysfs.candfs/xfs/xfs_error.cthat return the "would be written" length to their callers? i.e. we can return a length longer than the buffer provided to the callers...Aren't they all broken, too?
The one in xfs_error.c is a oneshot call for a sysfs output with PAGE_SIZE limit, so it's obviously safe. OTOH, using snprintf() makes no sense as it doesn't return the right value if it really exceeds, so it should be either simplified to sprintf() or use scnprintf() to align both the truncation and the return value.
Quoted 5 lines
A quick survey of random
snprintf()calls shows there's an abundance of callers that do not check the return value of snprintf for overflow when outputting stuff to proc/sysfs files. This seems like a case of "snprintf()considered harmful, s/snprintf/scnprintf/ kernel wide, removesnprintf()"...
Yeah, snprintf() is a hard-to-use function if you evaluate the return value. I've submitted many similar patches like this matching a pattern like
pos += snprintf(buf + pos, limit - pos, ...)
which is a higher risk of breakage than a single shot call.
We may consider flagging snprintf() to be harmful, but I guess it wasn't done at the time scnprintf() was introduced just because there are too many callers of snprintf(). And some code actually needs the size that would be output for catching the overflow explicitly (hence warning or resizing after that).
Practically seen, the recent kernel snprintf() already protects the negative length with WARN(). But it's error-prone and would hit other issue if you access to the buffer position by other than snprintf(), so please see my patch just as a precaution.
thanks,
Takashi
Quoted 18 lines · Takashi Iwai
Quoted 16 lines · Dave Chinner
Quoted 8 lines · Takashi Iwai
Since
snprintf()returns the would-be-output size instead of the actual output size, the succeeding calls may go beyond the given buffer limit. Fix it by replacing withscnprintf().Signed-off-by Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>--- fs/xfs/xfs_stats.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)what about all the other calls to
snprintf()infs/xfs/xfs_sysfs.candfs/xfs/xfs_error.cthat return the "would be written" length to their callers? i.e. we can return a length longer than the buffer provided to the callers...
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Aren't they all broken, too?
The one in
xfs_error.cis a oneshot call for a sysfs output withPAGE_SIZElimit, so it's obviously safe.
Until the sysfs code changes. Then it's a landmine that explodes.
Quoted 4 lines
OTOH, using
snprintf()makes
no sense as it doesn't return the right value if it really exceeds, so it should be either simplified tosprintf()or usescnprintf()to align both the truncation and the return value.
Right, we have technical debt here, and lots of it. scnprintf() is the right thing to use here.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 5 lines
A quick survey of random
snprintf()calls shows there's an abundance of callers that do not check the return value of snprintf for overflow when outputting stuff to proc/sysfs files. This seems like a case of "snprintf()considered harmful, s/snprintf/scnprintf/ kernel wide, removesnprintf()"...Yeah,
snprintf()is a hard-to-use function if you evaluate the return value. I've submitted many similar patches like this matching a pattern like
Quoted 8 lines
pos += snprintf(buf + pos, limit - pos, ...)which is a higher risk of breakage than a single shot call.
We may consider flagging
snprintf()to be harmful, but I guess it wasn't done at the timescnprintf()was introduced just because there are too many callers ofsnprintf(). And some code actually needs the size that would be output for catching the overflow explicitly (hence warning or resizing after that).
So, after seeing the technical debt the kernel has accumulated, it's been given a "somebody else's problem to solve" label, rather than putting in the effort to fix it.
Basically you are saying "we know our software sucks and we don't care enough to fix it", yes?
Quoted 2 lines
Practically seen, the recent kernel
snprintf()already protects the negative length withWARN().
That's a truly awful way of handling out of bounds accesses: not only are we saying we know our software sucks, we're telling the user and making it their problem. It's a cop-out.
Quoted 3 lines
But it's error-prone and would hit other
issue if you access to the buffer position by other thansnprintf(), so please see my patch just as a precaution.
Obviously, but slapping band-aids around like this not a fix for all the other existing (and future) buggy snprintf code.
I'm annoyed that every time a fundamental failing or technical debt is uncovered in the kernel, nobody takes responsibility to fix the problem completely, for everyone, for ever.
As Thomas said recently: correctness first.
https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/[email protected]/
This is not "good enough" - get rid of snprintf() altogether.
-Dave.
Signature · 2 lines
Dave Chinner [email protected]
Quoted 19 lines · Dave Chinner
Quoted 18 lines · Takashi Iwai
Quoted 16 lines · Dave Chinner
Quoted 8 lines · Takashi Iwai
Since
snprintf()returns the would-be-output size instead of the actual output size, the succeeding calls may go beyond the given buffer limit. Fix it by replacing withscnprintf().Signed-off-by Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>--- fs/xfs/xfs_stats.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)what about all the other calls to
snprintf()infs/xfs/xfs_sysfs.candfs/xfs/xfs_error.cthat return the "would be written" length to their callers? i.e. we can return a length longer than the buffer provided to the callers...
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Aren't they all broken, too?
The one in
xfs_error.cis a oneshot call for a sysfs output withPAGE_SIZElimit, so it's obviously safe.Until the sysfs code changes. Then it's a landmine that explodes.
It's a pity we didn't make cursor management automatic and required for sysfs/procfs/configfs/debugfs files...
...but in the meantime, Takashi-san, would you mind fixing the other snprintfs in xfs, so at least the problems get fixed for the whole subsystem?
Quoted 51 lines
Quoted 4 lines
OTOH, using
snprintf()makes
no sense as it doesn't return the right value if it really exceeds, so it should be either simplified tosprintf()or usescnprintf()to align both the truncation and the return value.Right, we have technical debt here, and lots of it.
scnprintf()is the right thing to use here.Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 5 lines
A quick survey of random
snprintf()calls shows there's an abundance of callers that do not check the return value of snprintf for overflow when outputting stuff to proc/sysfs files. This seems like a case of "snprintf()considered harmful, s/snprintf/scnprintf/ kernel wide, removesnprintf()"...Yeah,
snprintf()is a hard-to-use function if you evaluate the return value. I've submitted many similar patches like this matching a pattern likeQuoted 8 lines
pos += snprintf(buf + pos, limit - pos, ...)which is a higher risk of breakage than a single shot call.
We may consider flagging
snprintf()to be harmful, but I guess it wasn't done at the timescnprintf()was introduced just because there are too many callers ofsnprintf(). And some code actually needs the size that would be output for catching the overflow explicitly (hence warning or resizing after that).So, after seeing the technical debt the kernel has accumulated, it's been given a "somebody else's problem to solve" label, rather than putting in the effort to fix it.
Basically you are saying "we know our software sucks and we don't care enough to fix it", yes?
Quoted 2 lines
Practically seen, the recent kernel
snprintf()already protects the negative length withWARN().That's a truly awful way of handling out of bounds accesses: not only are we saying we know our software sucks, we're telling the user and making it their problem. It's a cop-out.
Quoted 3 lines
But it's error-prone and would hit other
issue if you access to the buffer position by other thansnprintf(), so please see my patch just as a precaution.Obviously, but slapping band-aids around like this not a fix for all the other existing (and future) buggy snprintf code.
I'm annoyed that every time a fundamental failing or technical debt is uncovered in the kernel, nobody takes responsibility to fix the problem completely, for everyone, for ever.
Quoted 5 lines
As Thomas said recently: correctness first.
https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/[email protected]/
This is not "good enough" - get rid of
snprintf()altogether.
$ git grep snprintf | wc -l 8534
That's somebody's 20 year project... :/
--D
Quoted 4 lines
-Dave.
Signature · 2 lines
Dave Chinner [email protected]
Quoted 8 lines · Darrick J. Wong
Quoted 7 lines · Dave Chinner
I'm annoyed that every time a fundamental failing or technical debt is uncovered in the kernel, nobody takes responsibility to fix the problem completely, for everyone, for ever.
As Thomas said recently: correctness first.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/[email protected]/
This is not "good enough" - get rid of
snprintf()altogether.$ git grep snprintf | wc -l 8534That's somebody's 20 year project... :/
Or half an hour with sed.
Indeed, not all of them are problematic:
$ git grep "= snprintf" |wc -l 1744 $ git grep "return snprintf"|wc -l 1306
Less than half of them use the return value.
Anything that calls snprintf() without checking the return value (just to prevent formatting overruning the buffer) can be converted by search and replace because the behaviour is the same for both functions in this case.
Further, code written properly to catch a snprintf overrun will also correctly pick up scnprintf filling the buffer. However, code that overruns with snprintf()s return value is much more likely to work correctly with scnprintf as the calculated buffer length won't overrun into memory beyond the buffer.
And that's likely all of the snprintf() calls dealt with in half an hour. Now snprintf can be removed.
What's more scary is this:
$ git grep "+= sprintf" |wc -l 1834
which is indicative of string formatting iterating over buffers with no protection against the formatting overwriting the end of the buffer. Those are much more dangerous (i.e. potential buffer overflows) than the snprintf problem being fixed here, and those will need to be checked and fixed manually to use scnprintf(). That's where the really nasty technical debt lies, not snprintf...
Cheers,
Dave.
Signature · 2 lines
Dave Chinner [email protected]
Quoted 49 lines · Dave Chinner
Quoted 8 lines · Darrick J. Wong
Quoted 7 lines · Dave Chinner
I'm annoyed that every time a fundamental failing or technical debt is uncovered in the kernel, nobody takes responsibility to fix the problem completely, for everyone, for ever.
As Thomas said recently: correctness first.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/[email protected]/
This is not "good enough" - get rid of
snprintf()altogether.$ git grep snprintf | wc -l 8534That's somebody's 20 year project... :/
Or half an hour with sed.
Indeed, not all of them are problematic:
$ git grep "= snprintf" |wc -l 1744 $ git grep "return snprintf"|wc -l 1306Less than half of them use the return value.
Anything that calls
snprintf()without checking the return value (just to prevent formatting overruning the buffer) can be converted by search and replace because the behaviour is the same for both functions in this case.Further, code written properly to catch a snprintf overrun will also correctly pick up scnprintf filling the buffer. However, code that overruns with snprintf()s return value is much more likely to work correctly with scnprintf as the calculated buffer length won't overrun into memory beyond the buffer.
And that's likely all of the
snprintf()calls dealt with in half an hour. Now snprintf can be removed.What's more scary is this:
$ git grep "+= sprintf" |wc -l 1834
Quoted 6 lines
which is indicative of string formatting iterating over buffers with no protection against the formatting overwriting the end of the buffer. Those are much more dangerous (i.e. potential buffer overflows) than the snprintf problem being fixed here, and those will need to be checked and fixed manually to use
scnprintf(). That's where the really nasty technical debt lies, not snprintf...
Right, that's how I started looking through the whole tree and submitting patches like this. I've submitted to per-subsystem patches and many of them have been already covered; after my tons of patches:
% git grep '+= snprintf' | wc -l
147
The remaining codes are either doing right or it's a user-space code that have no scnprintf() available. For other snprintf() usages can be converted to scnprintf() easily as you mentioned.
An open question is what we should do for the code that uses snprintf() in a right way. snprintf() is useful to predict the non-fitted formatted string. Some warns if such a situation happens. Replacing with scnprintf(), this would never hit, so you'll lose the way of message truncation there.
Maybe we may keep snprintf() but put a checkpatch warning for any new usage?
In anyway, if you prefer, I'll resubmit the patch to convert all snprintf() calls in xfs.
thanks,
Takashi
Quoted 75 lines · Takashi Iwai
Quoted 49 lines · Dave Chinner
Quoted 8 lines · Darrick J. Wong
Quoted 7 lines · Dave Chinner
I'm annoyed that every time a fundamental failing or technical debt is uncovered in the kernel, nobody takes responsibility to fix the problem completely, for everyone, for ever.
As Thomas said recently: correctness first.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/[email protected]/
This is not "good enough" - get rid of
snprintf()altogether.$ git grep snprintf | wc -l 8534That's somebody's 20 year project... :/
Or half an hour with sed.
Indeed, not all of them are problematic:
$ git grep "= snprintf" |wc -l 1744 $ git grep "return snprintf"|wc -l 1306Less than half of them use the return value.
Anything that calls
snprintf()without checking the return value (just to prevent formatting overruning the buffer) can be converted by search and replace because the behaviour is the same for both functions in this case.Further, code written properly to catch a snprintf overrun will also correctly pick up scnprintf filling the buffer. However, code that overruns with snprintf()s return value is much more likely to work correctly with scnprintf as the calculated buffer length won't overrun into memory beyond the buffer.
And that's likely all of the
snprintf()calls dealt with in half an hour. Now snprintf can be removed.What's more scary is this:
$ git grep "+= sprintf" |wc -l 1834Quoted 6 lines
which is indicative of string formatting iterating over buffers with no protection against the formatting overwriting the end of the buffer. Those are much more dangerous (i.e. potential buffer overflows) than the snprintf problem being fixed here, and those will need to be checked and fixed manually to use
scnprintf(). That's where the really nasty technical debt lies, not snprintf...Right, that's how I started looking through the whole tree and submitting patches like this. I've submitted to per-subsystem patches and many of them have been already covered; after my tons of patches:
% git grep '+= snprintf' | wc -l
147The remaining codes are either doing right or it's a user-space code that have no
scnprintf()available. For othersnprintf()usages can be converted toscnprintf()easily as you mentioned.An open question is what we should do for the code that uses
snprintf()in a right way.snprintf()is useful to predict the non-fitted formatted string. Some warns if such a situation happens. Replacing withscnprintf(), this would never hit, so you'll lose the way of message truncation there.
Quoted 5 lines
Maybe we may keep
snprintf()but put a checkpatch warning for any new usage?In anyway, if you prefer, I'll resubmit the patch to convert all
snprintf()calls in xfs.
I already put the first patch in -next, so send a second patch to convert the rest, please.
--D
Quoted 4 lines
thanks,
Takashi
Quoted 77 lines · Darrick J. Wong
Quoted 75 lines · Takashi Iwai
Quoted 49 lines · Dave Chinner
Quoted 8 lines · Darrick J. Wong
Quoted 7 lines · Dave Chinner
I'm annoyed that every time a fundamental failing or technical debt is uncovered in the kernel, nobody takes responsibility to fix the problem completely, for everyone, for ever.
As Thomas said recently: correctness first.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/[email protected]/
This is not "good enough" - get rid of
snprintf()altogether.$ git grep snprintf | wc -l 8534That's somebody's 20 year project... :/
Or half an hour with sed.
Indeed, not all of them are problematic:
$ git grep "= snprintf" |wc -l 1744 $ git grep "return snprintf"|wc -l 1306Less than half of them use the return value.
Anything that calls
snprintf()without checking the return value (just to prevent formatting overruning the buffer) can be converted by search and replace because the behaviour is the same for both functions in this case.Further, code written properly to catch a snprintf overrun will also correctly pick up scnprintf filling the buffer. However, code that overruns with snprintf()s return value is much more likely to work correctly with scnprintf as the calculated buffer length won't overrun into memory beyond the buffer.
And that's likely all of the
snprintf()calls dealt with in half an hour. Now snprintf can be removed.What's more scary is this:
$ git grep "+= sprintf" |wc -l 1834Quoted 6 lines
which is indicative of string formatting iterating over buffers with no protection against the formatting overwriting the end of the buffer. Those are much more dangerous (i.e. potential buffer overflows) than the snprintf problem being fixed here, and those will need to be checked and fixed manually to use
scnprintf(). That's where the really nasty technical debt lies, not snprintf...Right, that's how I started looking through the whole tree and submitting patches like this. I've submitted to per-subsystem patches and many of them have been already covered; after my tons of patches:
% git grep '+= snprintf' | wc -l
147The remaining codes are either doing right or it's a user-space code that have no
scnprintf()available. For othersnprintf()usages can be converted toscnprintf()easily as you mentioned.An open question is what we should do for the code that uses
snprintf()in a right way.snprintf()is useful to predict the non-fitted formatted string. Some warns if such a situation happens. Replacing withscnprintf(), this would never hit, so you'll lose the way of message truncation there.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Maybe we may keep
snprintf()but put a checkpatch warning for any new usage?In anyway, if you prefer, I'll resubmit the patch to convert all
snprintf()calls in xfs.I already put the first patch in -next, so send a second patch to convert the rest, please.
Well, if that's so, I'd rather leave the rest to you guys :) There are different opinions how to handle the code like
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, ...);
for a simple sysfs output. Some prefer sprintf() as it's obviously safe, while others prefer replacing with scnprintf() for a precaution. Which to take depends on maintainers, after all.
thanks,
Takashi
FYI, the right fix for sysfs would be to simply offer a new variant of ->show using the seq_file infrastructure. That will take care of all the bounds checking in a maintainable and well understood way.