KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Add a capability for enabling secure guests
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 1/1 KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Add a capability for enabling secure guests
At present, on Power systems with Protected Execution Facility hardware and an ultravisor, a KVM guest can transition to being a secure guest at will. Userspace (QEMU) has no way of knowing whether a host system is capable of running secure guests. This will present a problem in future when the ultravisor is capable of migrating secure guests from one host to another, because virtualization management software will have no way to ensure that secure guests only run in domains where all of the hosts can support secure guests.
This adds a VM capability which has two functions: (a) userspace can query it to find out whether the host can support secure guests, and (b) userspace can enable it for a guest, which allows that guest to become a secure guest. If userspace does not enable it, KVM will return an error when the ultravisor does the hypercall that indicates that the guest is starting to transition to a secure guest. The ultravisor will then abort the transition and the guest will terminate.
---
Note, only compile-tested. Ram, please test.
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 17 +++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_ppc.h | 1 + arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c | 4 ++++ arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c | 13 +++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 50 insertions(+)
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst +17 -0
@@ -5779,6 +5779,23 @@ it hard or impossible to use it correctly. The availability of KVM_CAP_MANUAL_DIRTY_LOG_PROTECT2 signals that those bugs are fixed. Userspace should not try to use KVM_CAP_MANUAL_DIRTY_LOG_PROTECT. +7.19 KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST +------------------------------ + +:Architectures: ppc + +This capability indicates that KVM is running on a host that has +ultravisor firmware and thus can support a secure guest. On such a +system, a guest can ask the ultravisor to make it a secure guest, +one whose memory is inaccessible to the host except for pages which +are explicitly requested to be shared with the host. The ultravisor +notifies KVM when a guest requests to become a secure guest, and KVM +has the opportunity to veto the transition. + +If present, this capability can be enabled for a VM, meaning that KVM +will allow the transition to secure guest mode. Otherwise KVM will +veto the transition. + 8. Other capabilities. ===========
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -0
@@ -303,6 +303,7 @@ struct kvm_arch {u8 radix;u8 fwnmi_enabled;u8 secure_guest; +u8 svm_enabled;bool threads_indep;bool nested_enable;pgd_t *pgtable;
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_ppc.h +1 -0
@@ -316,6 +316,7 @@ struct kvmppc_ops { int size);int (*store_to_eaddr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,ulong *eaddr,void *ptr,int size); +int (*enable_svm)(struct kvm *kvm);int (*svm_off)(struct kvm *kvm); };
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c +13 -0
@@ -5423,6 +5423,18 @@ static void unpin_vpa_reset(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvmppc_vpa *vpa) }/* +* Enable a guest to become a secure VM. +* Called when the KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST capability is enabled. +*/ +static int kvmhv_enable_svm (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +if (!firmware_has_feature (FW_FEATURE_ULTRAVISOR )) +return -EINVAL ; + kvm->arch.svm_enabled =1 ; +return 0 ; +} + +/* * IOCTL handler to turn off secure mode of guest * * - Release all device pages
@@ -5543,6 +5555,7 @@ static struct kvmppc_ops kvm_ops_hv = { .enable_nested = kvmhv_enable_nested, .load_from_eaddr = kvmhv_load_from_eaddr, .store_to_eaddr = kvmhv_store_to_eaddr, + .enable_svm = kvmhv_enable_svm, .svm_off = kvmhv_svm_off, };
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c +4 -0
@@ -216,6 +216,10 @@ unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_start(struct kvm *kvm)if (!kvm_is_radix (kvm))return H_UNSUPPORTED ; +/* NAK the transition to secure if not enabled */ +if (!kvm->arch.svm_enabled) +return H_AUTHORITY ; + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&kvm->srcu); slots =kvm_memslots (kvm);kvm_for_each_memslot (memslot, slots) {
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c +13 -0
@@ -670,6 +670,11 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext) (hv_enabled &&cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_P9_TM_HV_ASSIST ));break ;#endif +#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE ) && defined(CONFIG_PPC_UV ) +case KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST : + r = hv_enabled && !!firmware_has_feature (FW_FEATURE_ULTRAVISOR ); +break ; +#endif default : r =0 ;break ;
@@ -2170,6 +2175,14 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, r = kvm->arch.kvm_ops->enable_nested (kvm);break ;#endif +#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE ) && defined(CONFIG_PPC_UV ) +case KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST : + r = -EINVAL ; +if (!is_kvmppc_hv_enabled (kvm) || !kvm->arch.kvm_ops->enable_svm) +break ; + r = kvm->arch.kvm_ops->enable_svm (kvm); +break ; +#endif default : r = -EINVAL ;break ;
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +1 -0
@@ -1016,6 +1016,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt {#define KVM_CAP_ARM_INJECT_EXT_DABT 178#define KVM_CAP_S390_VCPU_RESETS 179#define KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED 180 +#define KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST 181#ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
Quoted 19 lines · On Thu, 19 Mar 2020 15:33:01 +1100 Paul Mackerras <[email protected]> wrote:
At present, on Power systems with Protected Execution Facility hardware and an ultravisor, a KVM guest can transition to being a secure guest at will. Userspace (QEMU) has no way of knowing whether a host system is capable of running secure guests. This will present a problem in future when the ultravisor is capable of migrating secure guests from one host to another, because virtualization management software will have no way to ensure that secure guests only run in domains where all of the hosts can support secure guests.
This adds a VM capability which has two functions: (a) userspace can query it to find out whether the host can support secure guests, and (b) userspace can enable it for a guest, which allows that guest to become a secure guest. If userspace does not enable it, KVM will return an error when the ultravisor does the hypercall that indicates that the guest is starting to transition to a secure guest. The ultravisor will then abort the transition and the guest will terminate.
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>---
Is someone working on wiring this up in QEMU ?
Quoted 152 lines
Note, only compile-tested. Ram, please test.
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 17 +++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_ppc.h | 1 + arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c | 4 ++++ arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c | 13 +++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 50 insertions(+)Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst +17
-0@@ -5779,6 +5779,23 @@ it hard or impossible to use it correctly. The availability of KVM_CAP_MANUAL_DIRTY_LOG_PROTECT2 signals that those bugs are fixed. Userspace should not try to use KVM_CAP_MANUAL_DIRTY_LOG_PROTECT. +7.19 KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST +------------------------------ + +:Architectures: ppc + +This capability indicates that KVM is running on a host that has +ultravisor firmware and thus can support a secure guest. On such a +system, a guest can ask the ultravisor to make it a secure guest, +one whose memory is inaccessible to the host except for pages which +are explicitly requested to be shared with the host. The ultravisor +notifies KVM when a guest requests to become a secure guest, and KVM +has the opportunity to veto the transition. + +If present, this capability can be enabled for a VM, meaning that KVM +will allow the transition to secure guest mode. Otherwise KVM will +veto the transition. + 8. Other capabilities. ===========arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1
-0@@ -303,6 +303,7 @@ struct kvm_arch {u8 radix;u8 fwnmi_enabled;u8 secure_guest; +u8 svm_enabled;bool threads_indep;bool nested_enable;pgd_t *pgtable;arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_ppc.h +1
-0@@ -316,6 +316,7 @@ struct kvmppc_ops { int size);int (*store_to_eaddr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,ulong *eaddr,void *ptr,int size); +int (*enable_svm)(struct kvm *kvm);int (*svm_off)(struct kvm *kvm); };arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c +13
-0@@ -5423,6 +5423,18 @@ static void unpin_vpa_reset(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvmppc_vpa *vpa) }/* +* Enable a guest to become a secure VM. +* Called when the KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST capability is enabled. +*/ +static int kvmhv_enable_svm (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +if (!firmware_has_feature (FW_FEATURE_ULTRAVISOR )) +return -EINVAL ; + kvm->arch.svm_enabled =1 ; +return 0 ; +} + +/* * IOCTL handler to turn off secure mode of guest * * - Release all device pages @@ -5543,6 +5555,7 @@ static struct kvmppc_ops kvm_ops_hv = { .enable_nested = kvmhv_enable_nested, .load_from_eaddr = kvmhv_load_from_eaddr, .store_to_eaddr = kvmhv_store_to_eaddr, + .enable_svm = kvmhv_enable_svm, .svm_off = kvmhv_svm_off, };arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c +4
-0@@ -216,6 +216,10 @@ unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_start(struct kvm *kvm)if (!kvm_is_radix (kvm))return H_UNSUPPORTED ; +/* NAK the transition to secure if not enabled */ +if (!kvm->arch.svm_enabled) +return H_AUTHORITY ; + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&kvm->srcu); slots =kvm_memslots (kvm);kvm_for_each_memslot (memslot, slots) {arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c +13
-0@@ -670,6 +670,11 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext) (hv_enabled &&cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_P9_TM_HV_ASSIST ));break ;#endif +#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE ) && defined(CONFIG_PPC_UV ) +case KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST : + r = hv_enabled && !!firmware_has_feature (FW_FEATURE_ULTRAVISOR ); +break ; +#endif default : r =0 ;break ;@@ -2170,6 +2175,14 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, r = kvm->arch.kvm_ops->enable_nested (kvm);break ;#endif +#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE ) && defined(CONFIG_PPC_UV ) +case KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST : + r = -EINVAL ; +if (!is_kvmppc_hv_enabled (kvm) || !kvm->arch.kvm_ops->enable_svm) +break ; + r = kvm->arch.kvm_ops->enable_svm (kvm); +break ; +#endif default : r = -EINVAL ;break ;include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +1
-0@@ -1016,6 +1016,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt {#define KVM_CAP_ARM_INJECT_EXT_DABT 178#define KVM_CAP_S390_VCPU_RESETS 179#define KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED 180 +#define KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST 181#ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING
Quoted 5 lines · Greg Kurz
Reviewed-by Greg Kurz <[email protected]>Is someone working on wiring this up in QEMU ?
I just did so I could test it. =)
If no one else is doing it I could send my patch as an RFC and we iterate from that.
Quoted 19 lines · Paul Mackerras
At present, on Power systems with Protected Execution Facility hardware and an ultravisor, a KVM guest can transition to being a secure guest at will. Userspace (QEMU) has no way of knowing whether a host system is capable of running secure guests. This will present a problem in future when the ultravisor is capable of migrating secure guests from one host to another, because virtualization management software will have no way to ensure that secure guests only run in domains where all of the hosts can support secure guests.
This adds a VM capability which has two functions: (a) userspace can query it to find out whether the host can support secure guests, and (b) userspace can enable it for a guest, which allows that guest to become a secure guest. If userspace does not enable it, KVM will return an error when the ultravisor does the hypercall that indicates that the guest is starting to transition to a secure guest. The ultravisor will then abort the transition and the guest will terminate.
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Quoted 154 lines
---
Note, only compile-tested. Ram, please test.Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 17 +++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_ppc.h | 1 + arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c | 4 ++++ arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c | 13 +++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 50 insertions(+)Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst +17
-0@@ -5779,6 +5779,23 @@ it hard or impossible to use it correctly. The availability of KVM_CAP_MANUAL_DIRTY_LOG_PROTECT2 signals that those bugs are fixed. Userspace should not try to use KVM_CAP_MANUAL_DIRTY_LOG_PROTECT. +7.19 KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST +------------------------------ + +:Architectures: ppc + +This capability indicates that KVM is running on a host that has +ultravisor firmware and thus can support a secure guest. On such a +system, a guest can ask the ultravisor to make it a secure guest, +one whose memory is inaccessible to the host except for pages which +are explicitly requested to be shared with the host. The ultravisor +notifies KVM when a guest requests to become a secure guest, and KVM +has the opportunity to veto the transition. + +If present, this capability can be enabled for a VM, meaning that KVM +will allow the transition to secure guest mode. Otherwise KVM will +veto the transition. + 8. Other capabilities. ===========arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1
-0@@ -303,6 +303,7 @@ struct kvm_arch {u8 radix;u8 fwnmi_enabled;u8 secure_guest; +u8 svm_enabled;bool threads_indep;bool nested_enable;pgd_t *pgtable;arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_ppc.h +1
-0@@ -316,6 +316,7 @@ struct kvmppc_ops { int size);int (*store_to_eaddr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,ulong *eaddr,void *ptr,int size); +int (*enable_svm)(struct kvm *kvm);int (*svm_off)(struct kvm *kvm); };arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c +13
-0@@ -5423,6 +5423,18 @@ static void unpin_vpa_reset(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvmppc_vpa *vpa) }/* +* Enable a guest to become a secure VM. +* Called when the KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST capability is enabled. +*/ +static int kvmhv_enable_svm (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +if (!firmware_has_feature (FW_FEATURE_ULTRAVISOR )) +return -EINVAL ; + kvm->arch.svm_enabled =1 ; +return 0 ; +} + +/* * IOCTL handler to turn off secure mode of guest * * - Release all device pages @@ -5543,6 +5555,7 @@ static struct kvmppc_ops kvm_ops_hv = { .enable_nested = kvmhv_enable_nested, .load_from_eaddr = kvmhv_load_from_eaddr, .store_to_eaddr = kvmhv_store_to_eaddr, + .enable_svm = kvmhv_enable_svm, .svm_off = kvmhv_svm_off, };arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c +4
-0@@ -216,6 +216,10 @@ unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_start(struct kvm *kvm)if (!kvm_is_radix (kvm))return H_UNSUPPORTED ; +/* NAK the transition to secure if not enabled */ +if (!kvm->arch.svm_enabled) +return H_AUTHORITY ; + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&kvm->srcu); slots =kvm_memslots (kvm);kvm_for_each_memslot (memslot, slots) {arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c +13
-0@@ -670,6 +670,11 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext) (hv_enabled &&cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_P9_TM_HV_ASSIST ));break ;#endif +#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE ) && defined(CONFIG_PPC_UV ) +case KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST : + r = hv_enabled && !!firmware_has_feature (FW_FEATURE_ULTRAVISOR ); +break ; +#endif default : r =0 ;break ;@@ -2170,6 +2175,14 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, r = kvm->arch.kvm_ops->enable_nested (kvm);break ;#endif +#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE ) && defined(CONFIG_PPC_UV ) +case KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST : + r = -EINVAL ; +if (!is_kvmppc_hv_enabled (kvm) || !kvm->arch.kvm_ops->enable_svm) +break ; + r = kvm->arch.kvm_ops->enable_svm (kvm); +break ; +#endif default : r = -EINVAL ;break ;include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +1
-0@@ -1016,6 +1016,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt {#define KVM_CAP_ARM_INJECT_EXT_DABT 178#define KVM_CAP_S390_VCPU_RESETS 179#define KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED 180 +#define KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST 181#ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING
Quoted 135 lines · Paul Mackerras
At present, on Power systems with Protected Execution Facility hardware and an ultravisor, a KVM guest can transition to being a secure guest at will. Userspace (QEMU) has no way of knowing whether a host system is capable of running secure guests. This will present a problem in future when the ultravisor is capable of migrating secure guests from one host to another, because virtualization management software will have no way to ensure that secure guests only run in domains where all of the hosts can support secure guests.
This adds a VM capability which has two functions: (a) userspace can query it to find out whether the host can support secure guests, and (b) userspace can enable it for a guest, which allows that guest to become a secure guest. If userspace does not enable it, KVM will return an error when the ultravisor does the hypercall that indicates that the guest is starting to transition to a secure guest. The ultravisor will then abort the transition and the guest will terminate.
Signed-off-by Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>---
Note, only compile-tested. Ram, please test.Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 17 +++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_ppc.h | 1 + arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c | 4 ++++ arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c | 13 +++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 50 insertions(+)Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst +17
-0@@ -5779,6 +5779,23 @@ it hard or impossible to use it correctly. The availability of KVM_CAP_MANUAL_DIRTY_LOG_PROTECT2 signals that those bugs are fixed. Userspace should not try to use KVM_CAP_MANUAL_DIRTY_LOG_PROTECT. +7.19 KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST +------------------------------ + +:Architectures: ppc + +This capability indicates that KVM is running on a host that has +ultravisor firmware and thus can support a secure guest. On such a +system, a guest can ask the ultravisor to make it a secure guest, +one whose memory is inaccessible to the host except for pages which +are explicitly requested to be shared with the host. The ultravisor +notifies KVM when a guest requests to become a secure guest, and KVM +has the opportunity to veto the transition. + +If present, this capability can be enabled for a VM, meaning that KVM +will allow the transition to secure guest mode. Otherwise KVM will +veto the transition. + 8. Other capabilities. ===========arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1
-0@@ -303,6 +303,7 @@ struct kvm_arch {u8 radix;u8 fwnmi_enabled;u8 secure_guest; +u8 svm_enabled;bool threads_indep;bool nested_enable;pgd_t *pgtable;arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_ppc.h +1
-0@@ -316,6 +316,7 @@ struct kvmppc_ops { int size);int (*store_to_eaddr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,ulong *eaddr,void *ptr,int size); +int (*enable_svm)(struct kvm *kvm);int (*svm_off)(struct kvm *kvm); };arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c +13
-0@@ -5423,6 +5423,18 @@ static void unpin_vpa_reset(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvmppc_vpa *vpa) }/* +* Enable a guest to become a secure VM. +* Called when the KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST capability is enabled. +*/ +static int kvmhv_enable_svm (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +if (!firmware_has_feature (FW_FEATURE_ULTRAVISOR )) +return -EINVAL ; + kvm->arch.svm_enabled =1 ; +return 0 ; +} + +/* * IOCTL handler to turn off secure mode of guest * * - Release all device pages @@ -5543,6 +5555,7 @@ static struct kvmppc_ops kvm_ops_hv = { .enable_nested = kvmhv_enable_nested, .load_from_eaddr = kvmhv_load_from_eaddr, .store_to_eaddr = kvmhv_store_to_eaddr, + .enable_svm = kvmhv_enable_svm, .svm_off = kvmhv_svm_off, };arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c +4
-0@@ -216,6 +216,10 @@ unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_start(struct kvm *kvm)if (!kvm_is_radix (kvm))return H_UNSUPPORTED ; +/* NAK the transition to secure if not enabled */ +if (!kvm->arch.svm_enabled) +return H_AUTHORITY ; + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&kvm->srcu); slots =kvm_memslots (kvm);kvm_for_each_memslot (memslot, slots) {arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c +0
-0
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext) · line 675
Quoted 6 lines
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c +3
-0@@ -670,6 +670,11 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext) (hv_enabled &&cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_P9_TM_HV_ASSIST ));break ;#endif +#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE ) && defined(CONFIG_PPC_UV ) +case KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST : + r = hv_enabled && !!firmware_has_feature (FW_FEATURE_ULTRAVISOR );
We also need to check if the kvmppc_uvmem_init() has been successfully called and initialized.
r = hv_enabled && !!firmware_has_feature(FW_FEATURE_ULTRAVISOR) && kvmppc_uvmem_bitmap;
RP
Quoted 1 line · Ram Pai
On Thu, Mar 19, 2020 at 03:33:01PM +1100, Paul Mackerras wrote:
[snip]
Quoted 13 lines
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext) · line 675
Quoted 9 lines
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c +3
-0@@ -670,6 +670,11 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext) (hv_enabled &&cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_P9_TM_HV_ASSIST ));break ;#endif +#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE ) && defined(CONFIG_PPC_UV ) +case KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST : + r = hv_enabled && !!firmware_has_feature (FW_FEATURE_ULTRAVISOR );We also need to check if the
kvmppc_uvmem_init()has been successfully called and initialized.
Quoted 2 lines
r = hv_enabled && !!firmware_has_feature(FW_FEATURE_ULTRAVISOR) && kvmppc_uvmem_bitmap;
Well I can't do that exactly because kvmppc_uvmem_bitmap is in a different module (the kvm_hv module, whereas this code is in the kvm module), and I wouldn't want to depend on kvmppc_uvmem_bitmap, since that's an internal implementation detail.
The firmware_has_feature(FW_FEATURE_ULTRAVISOR) test ultimately depends on there being a device tree node with "ibm,ultravisor" in its compatible property (see early_init_dt_scan_ultravisor()). So that means there is an ultravisor there. The cases where that test would pass but kvmppc_uvmem_bitmap = NULL would be those where the device tree nodes are present but not right, or where the host is so short of memory that it couldn't allocate the kvmppc_uvmem_bitmap. If you think those cases are worth worrying about then I will have to devise a way to do the test without depending on any symbols from the kvm-hv module.
Paul.
Quoted 16 lines · Paul Mackerras
Quoted 1 line · Ram Pai
On Thu, Mar 19, 2020 at 03:33:01PM +1100, Paul Mackerras wrote:
[snip]
Quoted 13 lines
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext) · line 675
Quoted 9 lines
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c +3
-0@@ -670,6 +670,11 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext) (hv_enabled &&cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_P9_TM_HV_ASSIST ));break ;#endif +#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE ) && defined(CONFIG_PPC_UV ) +case KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST : + r = hv_enabled && !!firmware_has_feature (FW_FEATURE_ULTRAVISOR );We also need to check if the
kvmppc_uvmem_init()has been successfully called and initialized.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
r = hv_enabled && !!firmware_has_feature(FW_FEATURE_ULTRAVISOR) && kvmppc_uvmem_bitmap;Well I can't do that exactly because
kvmppc_uvmem_bitmapis in a different module (thekvm_hvmodule, whereas this code is in the kvm module), and I wouldn't want to depend onkvmppc_uvmem_bitmap, since that's an internal implementation detail.
yes. checking for kvmppc_uvmem_bitmap depends on internal implementation detail. Its also a loose approximation. There has to be something better which can tell, if everything needed to support secure guests, is available and initialized.
Quoted 11 lines
The
firmware_has_feature(FW_FEATURE_ULTRAVISOR)test ultimately depends on there being a device tree node with "ibm,ultravisor" in its compatible property (seeearly_init_dt_scan_ultravisor()). So that means there is an ultravisor there. The cases where that test would pass butkvmppc_uvmem_bitmap= NULL would be those where the device tree nodes are present but not right, or where the host is so short of memory that it couldn't allocate thekvmppc_uvmem_bitmap. If you think those cases are worth worrying about then I will have to devise a way to do the test without depending on any symbols from the kvm-hv module.
the cases, where incorrect behavior can happen; if we do not have this additional check, are --
a) zero secure memory in the system.
b) "kvmppc_uvmem" memory region is not defined.
c) the memory region fails to map.
d) kvmppc_uvmem_bitmap allocation failed.
All these are possible to varying level of certainity.
I do not know we should be concerned about these possibilities. But if we do, than will a patch like this help? compile tested.
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arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_uvmem.h +6 -0
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_UV int kvmppc_uvmem_init (void ); +int kvmppc_uv_enabled (void );void kvmppc_uvmem_free (void );int kvmppc_uvmem_slot_init (struct kvm *kvm,const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot); void kvmppc_uvmem_slot_free(struct kvm *kvm,
@@ -28,6 +29,11 @@ static inline int kvmppc_uvmem_init(void)return 0 ; } +static inline int kvmppc_uv_enabled (void ) +{ +return 0 ; +} +static inline void kvmppc_uvmem_free (void ) { } static inline int
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c +5 -0
@@ -804,6 +804,11 @@ int kvmppc_uvmem_init(void)return ret; } +int kvmppc_uv_enabled (void ) +{ +return !kvmppc_uvmem_bitmap; +} +void kvmppc_uvmem_free (void ) {memunmap_pages (&kvmppc_uvmem_pgmap);
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Quoted 2 lines
Paul.
Signature · 1 line
Ram Pai
Quoted 19 lines · Paul Mackerras
At present, on Power systems with Protected Execution Facility hardware and an ultravisor, a KVM guest can transition to being a secure guest at will. Userspace (QEMU) has no way of knowing whether a host system is capable of running secure guests. This will present a problem in future when the ultravisor is capable of migrating secure guests from one host to another, because virtualization management software will have no way to ensure that secure guests only run in domains where all of the hosts can support secure guests.
This adds a VM capability which has two functions: (a) userspace can query it to find out whether the host can support secure guests, and (b) userspace can enable it for a guest, which allows that guest to become a secure guest. If userspace does not enable it, KVM will return an error when the ultravisor does the hypercall that indicates that the guest is starting to transition to a secure guest. The ultravisor will then abort the transition and the guest will terminate.
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Quoted 153 lines
---
Note, only compile-tested. Ram, please test.Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 17 +++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_ppc.h | 1 + arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c | 4 ++++ arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c | 13 +++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 50 insertions(+)Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst +17
-0@@ -5779,6 +5779,23 @@ it hard or impossible to use it correctly. The availability of KVM_CAP_MANUAL_DIRTY_LOG_PROTECT2 signals that those bugs are fixed. Userspace should not try to use KVM_CAP_MANUAL_DIRTY_LOG_PROTECT. +7.19 KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST +------------------------------ + +:Architectures: ppc + +This capability indicates that KVM is running on a host that has +ultravisor firmware and thus can support a secure guest. On such a +system, a guest can ask the ultravisor to make it a secure guest, +one whose memory is inaccessible to the host except for pages which +are explicitly requested to be shared with the host. The ultravisor +notifies KVM when a guest requests to become a secure guest, and KVM +has the opportunity to veto the transition. + +If present, this capability can be enabled for a VM, meaning that KVM +will allow the transition to secure guest mode. Otherwise KVM will +veto the transition. + 8. Other capabilities. ======================arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1
-0@@ -303,6 +303,7 @@ struct kvm_arch {u8 radix;u8 fwnmi_enabled;u8 secure_guest; +u8 svm_enabled;bool threads_indep;bool nested_enable;pgd_t *pgtable;arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_ppc.h +1
-0@@ -316,6 +316,7 @@ struct kvmppc_ops { int size);int (*store_to_eaddr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,ulong *eaddr,void *ptr,int size); +int (*enable_svm)(struct kvm *kvm);int (*svm_off)(struct kvm *kvm); };arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c +13
-0@@ -5423,6 +5423,18 @@ static void unpin_vpa_reset(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvmppc_vpa *vpa) }/* +* Enable a guest to become a secure VM. +* Called when the KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST capability is enabled. +*/ +static int kvmhv_enable_svm (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +if (!firmware_has_feature (FW_FEATURE_ULTRAVISOR )) +return -EINVAL ; + kvm->arch.svm_enabled =1 ; +return 0 ; +} + +/* * IOCTL handler to turn off secure mode of guest * * - Release all device pages @@ -5543,6 +5555,7 @@ static struct kvmppc_ops kvm_ops_hv = { .enable_nested = kvmhv_enable_nested, .load_from_eaddr = kvmhv_load_from_eaddr, .store_to_eaddr = kvmhv_store_to_eaddr, + .enable_svm = kvmhv_enable_svm, .svm_off = kvmhv_svm_off, };arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c +4
-0@@ -216,6 +216,10 @@ unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_start(struct kvm *kvm)if (!kvm_is_radix (kvm))return H_UNSUPPORTED ; +/* NAK the transition to secure if not enabled */ +if (!kvm->arch.svm_enabled) +return H_AUTHORITY ; + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&kvm->srcu); slots =kvm_memslots (kvm);kvm_for_each_memslot (memslot, slots) {arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c +13
-0@@ -670,6 +670,11 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext) (hv_enabled &&cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_P9_TM_HV_ASSIST ));break ;#endif +#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE ) && defined(CONFIG_PPC_UV ) +case KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST : + r = hv_enabled && !!firmware_has_feature (FW_FEATURE_ULTRAVISOR ); +break ; +#endif default : r =0 ;break ;@@ -2170,6 +2175,14 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, r = kvm->arch.kvm_ops->enable_nested (kvm);break ;#endif +#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE ) && defined(CONFIG_PPC_UV ) +case KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST : + r = -EINVAL ; +if (!is_kvmppc_hv_enabled (kvm) || !kvm->arch.kvm_ops->enable_svm) +break ; + r = kvm->arch.kvm_ops->enable_svm (kvm); +break ; +#endif default : r = -EINVAL ;break ;include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +1
-0@@ -1016,6 +1016,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt {#define KVM_CAP_ARM_INJECT_EXT_DABT 178#define KVM_CAP_S390_VCPU_RESETS 179#define KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED 180 +#define KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST 181#ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING
Signature · 4 lines
David Gibson | I'll have my music baroque, and my code david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au | minimalist, thank you. NOT _the_ _other_ | _way_ _around_! http://www.ozlabs.org/~dgibson