4.4.217-rc1 review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.217 release. There are 93 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 21 Mar 2020 12:37:04 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.4.217-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 4.4.217-rc1

Matteo Croce <[email protected]>
ipv4: ensure rcu_read_lock() in cipso_v4_error()

Jann Horn <[email protected]>
mm: slub: add missing TID bump in kmem_cache_alloc_bulk()

Kees Cook <[email protected]>
ARM: 8958/1: rename missed uaccess .fixup section

Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>
ARM: 8957/1: VDSO: Match ARMv8 timer in cntvct_functional()

Qian Cai <[email protected]>
jbd2: fix data races at struct journal_head

Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
signal: avoid double atomic counter increments for user accounting

Marek Vasut <[email protected]>
net: ks8851-ml: Fix IRQ handling and locking

Kim Phillips <[email protected]>
perf/amd/uncore: Replace manual sampling check with CAP_NO_INTERRUPT flag

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Don't schedule OGM for disabled interface

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Avoid free/alloc race when handling OGM buffer

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Only read OGM tvlv_len after buffer len check

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Reduce tt_global hash refcnt only for removed entry

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Reduce tt_local hash refcnt only for removed entry

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Reduce claim hash refcnt only for removed entry

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Prevent duplicated tvlv handler

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Prevent duplicated global TT entry

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Prevent duplicated nc_node entry

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Prevent duplicated gateway_node entry

Linus Lüssing <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Avoid storing non-TT-sync flags on singular entries too

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Fix debugfs path for renamed softif

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Fix debugfs path for renamed hardif

Marek Lindner <[email protected]>
batman-adv: prevent TT request storms by not sending inconsistent TT TLVLs

Linus Lüssing <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Fix TT sync flags for intermediate TT responses

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Avoid race in TT TVLV allocator helper

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Fix skbuff rcsum on packet reroute

Matthias Schiffer <[email protected]>
batman-adv: update data pointers after skb_cow()

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Fix internal interface indices types

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Fix lock for ogm cnt access in batadv_iv_ogm_calc_tq

Linus Lüssing <[email protected]>
batman-adv: fix TT sync flag inconsistencies

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Fix rx packet/bytes stats on local ARP reply

Linus Lüssing <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Fix transmission of final, 16th fragment

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Fix double free during fragment merge error

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Add missing refcnt for last_candidate

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Fix speedy join in gateway client mode

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Free last_bonding_candidate on release of orig_node

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Fix reference leak in batadv_find_router

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Fix non-atomic bla_claim::backbone_gw access

Simon Wunderlich <[email protected]>
batman-adv: lock crc access in bridge loop avoidance

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Fix orig_node_vlan leak on orig_node_release

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Avoid nullptr dereference in dat after vlan_insert_tag

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Avoid nullptr dereference in bla after vlan_insert_tag

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Clean up untagged vlan when destroying via rtnl-link

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Fix ICMP RR ethernet access after skb_linearize

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Fix use-after-free/double-free of tt_req_node

Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
batman-adv: fix skb deref after free

Linus Lüssing <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Avoid duplicate neigh_node additions

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Fix reference counting of vlan object for tt_local_entry

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Drop reference to netdevice on last reference

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Deactivate TO_BE_ACTIVATED hardif on shutdown

Marek Lindner <[email protected]>
batman-adv: init neigh node last seen field

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Fix integer overflow in batadv_iv_ogm_calc_tq

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Fix unexpected free of bcast_own on add_if error

Andrew Lunn <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Avoid endless loop in bat-on-bat netdevice check

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Only put orig_node_vlan list reference when removed

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Only put gw_node list reference when removed

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Fix invalid read while copying bat_iv.bcast_own

Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
efi: Add a sanity check to efivar_store_raw()

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
ipv6: restrict IPV6_ADDRFORM operation

qize wang <[email protected]>
mwifiex: Fix heap overflow in mmwifiex_process_tdls_action_frame()

Daniel Drake <[email protected]>
iommu/vt-d: Ignore devices with out-of-spec domain number

Zhenzhong Duan <[email protected]>
iommu/vt-d: Fix the wrong printing in RHSA parsing

Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
netfilter: cthelper: add missing attribute validation for cthelper

Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
nl80211: add missing attribute validation for channel switch

Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
nl80211: add missing attribute validation for critical protocol indication

Yonghyun Hwang <[email protected]>
iommu/vt-d: Fix a bug in intel_iommu_iova_to_phys() for huge page

Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
iommu/vt-d: dmar: replace WARN_TAINT with pr_warn + add_taint

Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
efi: Fix a race and a buffer overflow while reading efivars via sysfs

Eugeniy Paltsev <[email protected]>
ARC: define __ALIGN_STR and __ALIGN symbols for ARC

Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]>

    KVM: x86: clear stale x86_emulate_ctxt->intercept value

Al Viro <[email protected]>
gfs2_atomic_open(): fix O_EXCL|O_CREAT handling on cold dcache

Colin Ian King <[email protected]>
drm/amd/display: remove duplicated assignment to grph_obj_type

Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
iommu/vt-d: quirk_ioat_snb_local_iommu: replace WARN_TAINT with pr_warn + add_taint

Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
net: fq: add missing attribute validation for orphan mask

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
bonding/alb: make sure arp header is pulled before accessing it

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
slip: make slhc_compress() more robust against malicious packets

Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
net: fec: validate the new settings in fec_enet_set_coalesce()

Mahesh Bandewar <[email protected]>
macvlan: add cond_resched() during multicast processing

Mahesh Bandewar <[email protected]>
ipvlan: don't deref eth hdr before checking it's set

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
ipvlan: do not use cond_resched_rcu() in ipvlan_process_multicast()

Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
ipvlan: egress mcast packets are not exceptional

Jiri Wiesner <[email protected]>
ipvlan: do not add hardware address of master to its unicast filter list

Mahesh Bandewar <[email protected]>
ipvlan: add cond_resched_rcu() while processing muticast backlog

Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
nfc: add missing attribute validation for vendor subcommand

Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
nfc: add missing attribute validation for SE API

Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
team: add missing attribute validation for array index

Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
team: add missing attribute validation for port ifindex

Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
nl802154: add missing attribute validation for dev_type

Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
nl802154: add missing attribute validation

Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
fib: add missing attribute validation for tun_id

Vasundhara Volam <[email protected]>
bnxt_en: reinitialize IRQs when MTU is modified

Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
net: nfc: fix bounds checking bugs on "pipe"

You-Sheng Yang <[email protected]>
r8152: check disconnect status after long sleep

Petr Malat <[email protected]>
NFS: Remove superfluous kmap in nfs_readdir_xdr_to_array

-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                     |   4 +-
 arch/arc/include/asm/linkage.h               |   2 +
 arch/arm/kernel/vdso.c                       |   2 +
 arch/arm/lib/copy_from_user.S                |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_amd_uncore.c  |  16 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c                       |   1 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c               |  32 +++-
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atombios.c |   3 +-
 drivers/iommu/dmar.c                         |  21 ++-
 drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c                  |  13 +-
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c               |  20 +--
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c    |   4 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c    |   6 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_mll.c     |  14 +-
 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c             |  19 +-
 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c             |   5 +-
 drivers/net/macvlan.c                        |   2 +
 drivers/net/slip/slhc.c                      |  14 +-
 drivers/net/team/team.c                      |   2 +
 drivers/net/usb/r8152.c                      |   6 +
 drivers/net/wireless/mwifiex/tdls.c          |  70 +++++++-
 fs/gfs2/inode.c                              |   2 +-
 fs/jbd2/transaction.c                        |   8 +-
 fs/nfs/dir.c                                 |   2 -
 include/net/fib_rules.h                      |   1 +
 kernel/signal.c                              |  23 ++-
 mm/slub.c                                    |   9 +
 net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c                  | 115 +++++++++----
 net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c       | 152 +++++++++++++---
 net/batman-adv/debugfs.c                     |  40 +++++
 net/batman-adv/debugfs.h                     |  11 ++
 net/batman-adv/distributed-arp-table.c       |  15 +-
 net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c               |  14 +-
 net/batman-adv/gateway_client.c              |  18 +-
 net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c              |  89 ++++++++--
 net/batman-adv/hard-interface.h              |   6 +-
 net/batman-adv/main.c                        |   8 +-
 net/batman-adv/network-coding.c              |  33 ++--
 net/batman-adv/originator.c                  |  26 ++-
 net/batman-adv/originator.h                  |   4 +-
 net/batman-adv/routing.c                     | 111 +++++++++---
 net/batman-adv/send.c                        |   4 +-
 net/batman-adv/soft-interface.c              |   9 +
 net/batman-adv/translation-table.c           | 249 ++++++++++++++++++---------
 net/batman-adv/types.h                       |  23 ++-
 net/ieee802154/nl_policy.c                   |   6 +
 net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c                        |   7 +-
 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c                     |  10 +-
 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c           |   2 +
 net/nfc/hci/core.c                           |  19 +-
 net/nfc/netlink.c                            |   3 +
 net/sched/sch_fq.c                           |   1 +
 net/wireless/nl80211.c                       |   3 +
 53 files changed, 963 insertions(+), 318 deletions(-)

From: Petr Malat <[email protected]>

Array is mapped by nfs_readdir_get_array(), the further kmap is a result of a bad merge and should be removed.

This resource leakage can be exploited for DoS by receptively reading a content of a directory on NFS (e.g. by running ls).

---
 fs/nfs/dir.c |    2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

@@ -657,8 +657,6 @@ int nfs_readdir_xdr_to_array(nfs_readdir
 		goto out_label_free;
 	}
 
-	array = kmap(page);
-
 	status = nfs_readdir_alloc_pages(pages, array_size);
 	if (status < 0)
 		goto out_release_array;

From: You-Sheng Yang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d64c7a08034b32c285e576208ae44fc3ba3fa7df ]

Dell USB Type C docking WD19/WD19DC attaches additional peripherals as:

/: Bus 02.Port 1: Dev 1, Class=root_hub, Driver=xhci_hcd/6p, 5000M

      |__ Port 1: Dev 11, If 0, Class=Hub, Driver=hub/4p, 5000M
          |__ Port 3: Dev 12, If 0, Class=Hub, Driver=hub/4p, 5000M
          |__ Port 4: Dev 13, If 0, Class=Vendor Specific Class,
              Driver=r8152, 5000M

where usb 2-1-3 is a hub connecting all USB Type-A/C ports on the dock.

When hotplugging such dock with additional usb devices already attached on it, the probing process may reset usb 2.1 port, therefore r8152 ethernet device is also reset. However, during r8152 device init there are several for-loops that, when it's unable to retrieve hardware registers due to being disconnected from USB, may take up to 14 seconds each in practice, and that has to be completed before USB may re-enumerate devices on the bus. As a result, devices attached to the dock will only be available after nearly 1 minute after the dock was plugged in:

  [ 216.388290] [250] r8152 2-1.4:1.0: usb_probe_interface
  [ 216.388292] [250] r8152 2-1.4:1.0: usb_probe_interface - got id
  [ 258.830410] r8152 2-1.4:1.0 (unnamed net_device) (uninitialized): PHY not ready
  [ 258.830460] r8152 2-1.4:1.0 (unnamed net_device) (uninitialized): Invalid header when reading pass-thru MAC addr
  [ 258.830464] r8152 2-1.4:1.0 (unnamed net_device) (uninitialized): Get ether addr fail

This happens in, for example, r8153_init:

static int generic_ocp_read(struct r8152 *tp, u16 index, u16 size,
void *data, u16 type)

  {
    if (test_bit(RTL8152_UNPLUG, &tp->flags))
      return -ENODEV;
    ...

}

  static u16 ocp_read_word(struct r8152 *tp, u16 type, u16 index)
  {
    u32 data;
    ...
    generic_ocp_read(tp, index, sizeof(tmp), &tmp, type | byen);

    data = __le32_to_cpu(tmp);
    ...
    return (u16)data;

}

  static void r8153_init(struct r8152 *tp)
  {
    ...
    if (test_bit(RTL8152_UNPLUG, &tp->flags))
      return;

    for (i = 0; i < 500; i++) {
      if (ocp_read_word(tp, MCU_TYPE_PLA, PLA_BOOT_CTRL) &
          AUTOLOAD_DONE)
        break;
      msleep(20);
    }
    ...

}

Since ocp_read_word() doesn't check the return status of generic_ocp_read(), and the only exit condition for the loop is to have a match in the returned value, such loops will only ends after exceeding its maximum runs when the device has been marked as disconnected, which takes 500 * 20ms = 10 seconds in theory, 14 in practice.

To solve this long latency another test to RTL8152_UNPLUG flag should be added after those 20ms sleep to skip unnecessary loops, so that the device probe can complete early and proceed to parent port reset/reprobe process.

This can be reproduced on all kernel versions up to latest v5.6-rc2, but after v5.5-rc7 the reproduce rate is dramatically lowered to 1/30 or less while it was around 1/2.

---
 drivers/net/usb/r8152.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

@@ -3328,14 +3328,20 @@ static void r8153_init(struct r8152 *tp)
 		if (ocp_read_word(tp, MCU_TYPE_PLA, PLA_BOOT_CTRL) &
 		    AUTOLOAD_DONE)
 			break;
+
 		msleep(20);
+		if (test_bit(RTL8152_UNPLUG, &tp->flags))
+			break;
 	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < 500; i++) {
 		ocp_data = ocp_reg_read(tp, OCP_PHY_STATUS) & PHY_STAT_MASK;
 		if (ocp_data == PHY_STAT_LAN_ON || ocp_data == PHY_STAT_PWRDN)
 			break;
+
 		msleep(20);
+		if (test_bit(RTL8152_UNPLUG, &tp->flags))
+			break;
 	}
 
 	usb_disable_lpm(tp->udev);

From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a3aefbfe45751bf7b338c181b97608e276b5bb73 ]

This is similar to commit 674d9de02aa7 ("NFC: Fix possible memory corruption when handling SHDLC I-Frame commands") and commit d7ee81ad09f0 ("NFC: nci: Add some bounds checking in nci_hci_cmd_received()") which added range checks on "pipe".

The "pipe" variable comes skb->data[0] in nfc_hci_msg_rx_work(). It's in the 0-255 range. We're using it as the array index into the hdev->pipes[] array which has NFC_HCI_MAX_PIPES (128) members.

---
 net/nfc/hci/core.c |   19 ++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -193,13 +193,20 @@ exit:
 void nfc_hci_cmd_received(struct nfc_hci_dev *hdev, u8 pipe, u8 cmd,
 			  struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	u8 gate = hdev->pipes[pipe].gate;
 	u8 status = NFC_HCI_ANY_OK;
 	struct hci_create_pipe_resp *create_info;
 	struct hci_delete_pipe_noti *delete_info;
 	struct hci_all_pipe_cleared_noti *cleared_info;
+	u8 gate;
 
-	pr_debug("from gate %x pipe %x cmd %x\n", gate, pipe, cmd);
+	pr_debug("from pipe %x cmd %x\n", pipe, cmd);
+
+	if (pipe >= NFC_HCI_MAX_PIPES) {
+		status = NFC_HCI_ANY_E_NOK;
+		goto exit;
+	}
+
+	gate = hdev->pipes[pipe].gate;
 
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case NFC_HCI_ADM_NOTIFY_PIPE_CREATED:

@@ -387,8 +394,14 @@ void nfc_hci_event_received(struct nfc_h
 			    struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	int r = 0;
-	u8 gate = hdev->pipes[pipe].gate;
+	u8 gate;
+
+	if (pipe >= NFC_HCI_MAX_PIPES) {
+		pr_err("Discarded event %x to invalid pipe %x\n", event, pipe);
+		goto exit;
+	}
 
+	gate = hdev->pipes[pipe].gate;
 	if (gate == NFC_HCI_INVALID_GATE) {
 		pr_err("Discarded event %x to unopened pipe %x\n", event, pipe);
 		goto exit;

From: Vasundhara Volam <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a9b952d267e59a3b405e644930f46d252cea7122 ]

MTU changes may affect the number of IRQs so we must call bnxt_close_nic()/bnxt_open_nic() with the irq_re_init parameter set to true. The reason is that a larger MTU may require aggregation rings not needed with smaller MTU. We may not be able to allocate the required number of aggregation rings and so we reduce the number of channels which will change the number of IRQs. Without this patch, it may crash eventually in pci_disable_msix() when the IRQs are not properly unwound.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -5310,13 +5310,13 @@ static int bnxt_change_mtu(struct net_de
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (netif_running(dev))
-		bnxt_close_nic(bp, false, false);
+		bnxt_close_nic(bp, true, false);
 
 	dev->mtu = new_mtu;
 	bnxt_set_ring_params(bp);
 
 	if (netif_running(dev))
-		return bnxt_open_nic(bp, false, false);
+		return bnxt_open_nic(bp, true, false);
 
 	return 0;
 }

From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4c16d64ea04056f1b1b324ab6916019f6a064114 ]

Add missing netlink policy entry for FRA_TUN_ID.

---
 include/net/fib_rules.h |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ struct fib_rules_ops {
 	[FRA_OIFNAME]	= { .type = NLA_STRING, .len = IFNAMSIZ - 1 }, \
 	[FRA_PRIORITY]	= { .type = NLA_U32 }, \
 	[FRA_FWMARK]	= { .type = NLA_U32 }, \
+	[FRA_TUN_ID]	= { .type = NLA_U64 }, \
 	[FRA_FWMASK]	= { .type = NLA_U32 }, \
 	[FRA_TABLE]     = { .type = NLA_U32 }, \
 	[FRA_SUPPRESS_PREFIXLEN] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, \

From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9322cd7c4af2ccc7fe7c5f01adb53f4f77949e92 ]

Add missing attribute validation for several u8 types.

---
 net/ieee802154/nl_policy.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

@@ -30,6 +30,11 @@ const struct nla_policy ieee802154_polic
 	[IEEE802154_ATTR_HW_ADDR] = { .type = NLA_HW_ADDR, },
 	[IEEE802154_ATTR_PAN_ID] = { .type = NLA_U16, },
 	[IEEE802154_ATTR_CHANNEL] = { .type = NLA_U8, },
+	[IEEE802154_ATTR_BCN_ORD] = { .type = NLA_U8, },
+	[IEEE802154_ATTR_SF_ORD] = { .type = NLA_U8, },
+	[IEEE802154_ATTR_PAN_COORD] = { .type = NLA_U8, },
+	[IEEE802154_ATTR_BAT_EXT] = { .type = NLA_U8, },
+	[IEEE802154_ATTR_COORD_REALIGN] = { .type = NLA_U8, },
 	[IEEE802154_ATTR_PAGE] = { .type = NLA_U8, },
 	[IEEE802154_ATTR_COORD_SHORT_ADDR] = { .type = NLA_U16, },
 	[IEEE802154_ATTR_COORD_HW_ADDR] = { .type = NLA_HW_ADDR, },

From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b60673c4c418bef7550d02faf53c34fbfeb366bf ]

Add missing attribute type validation for IEEE802154_ATTR_DEV_TYPE to the netlink policy.

---
 net/ieee802154/nl_policy.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ const struct nla_policy ieee802154_polic
 	[IEEE802154_ATTR_BAT_EXT] = { .type = NLA_U8, },
 	[IEEE802154_ATTR_COORD_REALIGN] = { .type = NLA_U8, },
 	[IEEE802154_ATTR_PAGE] = { .type = NLA_U8, },
+	[IEEE802154_ATTR_DEV_TYPE] = { .type = NLA_U8, },
 	[IEEE802154_ATTR_COORD_SHORT_ADDR] = { .type = NLA_U16, },
 	[IEEE802154_ATTR_COORD_HW_ADDR] = { .type = NLA_HW_ADDR, },
 	[IEEE802154_ATTR_COORD_PAN_ID] = { .type = NLA_U16, },

From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dd25cb272ccce4db67dc8509278229099e4f5e99 ]

Add missing attribute validation for TEAM_ATTR_OPTION_PORT_IFINDEX to the netlink policy.

---
 drivers/net/team/team.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -2169,6 +2169,7 @@ team_nl_option_policy[TEAM_ATTR_OPTION_M
 	[TEAM_ATTR_OPTION_CHANGED]		= { .type = NLA_FLAG },
 	[TEAM_ATTR_OPTION_TYPE]			= { .type = NLA_U8 },
 	[TEAM_ATTR_OPTION_DATA]			= { .type = NLA_BINARY },
+	[TEAM_ATTR_OPTION_PORT_IFINDEX]		= { .type = NLA_U32 },
 };
 
 static int team_nl_cmd_noop(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)

From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 669fcd7795900cd1880237cbbb57a7db66cb9ac8 ]

Add missing attribute validation for TEAM_ATTR_OPTION_ARRAY_INDEX to the netlink policy.

---
 drivers/net/team/team.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -2170,6 +2170,7 @@ team_nl_option_policy[TEAM_ATTR_OPTION_M
 	[TEAM_ATTR_OPTION_TYPE]			= { .type = NLA_U8 },
 	[TEAM_ATTR_OPTION_DATA]			= { .type = NLA_BINARY },
 	[TEAM_ATTR_OPTION_PORT_IFINDEX]		= { .type = NLA_U32 },
+	[TEAM_ATTR_OPTION_ARRAY_INDEX]		= { .type = NLA_U32 },
 };
 
 static int team_nl_cmd_noop(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)

From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 361d23e41ca6e504033f7e66a03b95788377caae ]

Add missing attribute validation for NFC_ATTR_SE_INDEX to the netlink policy.

---
 net/nfc/netlink.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy nfc_genl_
 	[NFC_ATTR_LLC_SDP] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },
 	[NFC_ATTR_FIRMWARE_NAME] = { .type = NLA_STRING,
 				     .len = NFC_FIRMWARE_NAME_MAXSIZE },
+	[NFC_ATTR_SE_INDEX] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
 	[NFC_ATTR_SE_APDU] = { .type = NLA_BINARY },
 	[NFC_ATTR_VENDOR_DATA] = { .type = NLA_BINARY },
 

From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6ba3da446551f2150fadbf8c7788edcb977683d3 ]

Add missing attribute validation for vendor subcommand attributes to the netlink policy.

---
 net/nfc/netlink.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ static const struct nla_policy nfc_genl_
 				     .len = NFC_FIRMWARE_NAME_MAXSIZE },
 	[NFC_ATTR_SE_INDEX] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
 	[NFC_ATTR_SE_APDU] = { .type = NLA_BINARY },
+	[NFC_ATTR_VENDOR_ID] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
+	[NFC_ATTR_VENDOR_SUBCMD] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
 	[NFC_ATTR_VENDOR_DATA] = { .type = NLA_BINARY },
 
 };

From: Mahesh Bandewar <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e18b353f102e371580f3f01dd47567a25acc3c1d ]

If there are substantial number of slaves created as simulated by Syzbot, the backlog processing could take much longer and result into the issue found in the Syzbot report.

INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
        (detected by 1, t=10502 jiffies, g=5049, c=5048, q=752)
All QSes seen, last rcu_sched kthread activity 10502 (4294965563-4294955061), jiffies_till_next_fqs=1, root ->qsmask 0x0
syz-executor.1  R  running task on cpu   1  10984 11210   3866 0x30020008 179034491270
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 [<ffffffff81497163>] _sched_show_task kernel/sched/core.c:8063 [inline]
 [<ffffffff81497163>] _sched_show_task.cold+0x2fd/0x392 kernel/sched/core.c:8030
 [<ffffffff8146a91b>] sched_show_task+0xb/0x10 kernel/sched/core.c:8073
 [<ffffffff815c931b>] print_other_cpu_stall kernel/rcu/tree.c:1577 [inline]
 [<ffffffff815c931b>] check_cpu_stall kernel/rcu/tree.c:1695 [inline]
 [<ffffffff815c931b>] __rcu_pending kernel/rcu/tree.c:3478 [inline]
 [<ffffffff815c931b>] rcu_pending kernel/rcu/tree.c:3540 [inline]
 [<ffffffff815c931b>] rcu_check_callbacks.cold+0xbb4/0xc29 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2876
 [<ffffffff815e3962>] update_process_times+0x32/0x80 kernel/time/timer.c:1635
 [<ffffffff816164f0>] tick_sched_handle+0xa0/0x180 kernel/time/tick-sched.c:161
 [<ffffffff81616ae4>] tick_sched_timer+0x44/0x130 kernel/time/tick-sched.c:1193
 [<ffffffff815e75f7>] __run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1393 [inline]
 [<ffffffff815e75f7>] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x307/0xd90 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1455
 [<ffffffff815e90ea>] hrtimer_interrupt+0x2ea/0x730 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1513
 [<ffffffff844050f4>] local_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1031 [inline]
 [<ffffffff844050f4>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x144/0x5e0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1056
 [<ffffffff84401cbe>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x8e/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:778
RIP: 0010:do_raw_read_lock+0x22/0x80 kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:153
RSP: 0018:ffff8801dad07ab8 EFLAGS: 00000a02 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff12
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8801c4135680 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 1ffff10038826afe RSI: ffff88019d816bb8 RDI: ffff8801c41357f0
RBP: ffff8801dad07ac0 R08: 0000000000004b15 R09: 0000000000310273
R10: ffff88019d816bb8 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8801c41357e8
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8801cfb19850 R15: ffff8801cfb198b0
 [<ffffffff8101460e>] __raw_read_lock_bh include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:177 [inline]
 [<ffffffff8101460e>] _raw_read_lock_bh+0x3e/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:240
 [<ffffffff840d78ca>] ipv6_chk_mcast_addr+0x11a/0x6f0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1006
 [<ffffffff84023439>] ip6_mc_input+0x319/0x8e0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:482
 [<ffffffff840211c8>] dst_input include/net/dst.h:449 [inline]
 [<ffffffff840211c8>] ip6_rcv_finish+0x408/0x610 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:78
 [<ffffffff840214de>] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:292 [inline]
 [<ffffffff840214de>] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:286 [inline]
 [<ffffffff840214de>] ipv6_rcv+0x10e/0x420 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:278
 [<ffffffff83a29efa>] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x12a/0x1f0 net/core/dev.c:5303
 [<ffffffff83a2a15c>] __netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1b0 net/core/dev.c:5417
 [<ffffffff83a2f536>] process_backlog+0x216/0x6c0 net/core/dev.c:6243
 [<ffffffff83a30d1b>] napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6680 [inline]
 [<ffffffff83a30d1b>] net_rx_action+0x47b/0xfb0 net/core/dev.c:6748
 [<ffffffff846002c8>] __do_softirq+0x2c8/0x99a kernel/softirq.c:317
 [<ffffffff813e656a>] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:399 [inline]
 [<ffffffff813e656a>] irq_exit+0x16a/0x1a0 kernel/softirq.c:439
 [<ffffffff84405115>] exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:561 [inline]
 [<ffffffff84405115>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x165/0x5e0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1058
 [<ffffffff84401cbe>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x8e/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:778
 </IRQ>
RIP: 0010:__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x26/0x50 kernel/kcov.c:102
RSP: 0018:ffff880196033bd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff12
RAX: ffff88019d8161c0 RBX: 00000000ffffffff RCX: ffffc90003501000
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffffff816236d1 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: ffff880196033bd8 R08: ffff88019d8161c0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 1ffff10032c067f0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 [<ffffffff816236d1>] do_futex+0x151/0x1d50 kernel/futex.c:3548
 [<ffffffff816260f0>] C_SYSC_futex kernel/futex_compat.c:201 [inline]
 [<ffffffff816260f0>] compat_SyS_futex+0x270/0x3b0 kernel/futex_compat.c:175
 [<ffffffff8101da17>] do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:353 [inline]
 [<ffffffff8101da17>] do_fast_syscall_32+0x357/0xe1c arch/x86/entry/common.c:415
 [<ffffffff84401a9b>] entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x8b/0x9d arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:139
RIP: 0023:0xf7f23c69
RSP: 002b:00000000f5d1f12c EFLAGS: 00000282 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000f0
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000816af88 RCX: 0000000000000080
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000000816af8c
RBP: 00000000f5d1f228 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
rcu_sched kthread starved for 10502 jiffies! g5049 c5048 f0x2 RCU_GP_WAIT_FQS(3) ->state=0x0 ->cpu=1
rcu_sched       R  running task on cpu   1  13048     8      2 0x90000000 179099587640
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff8147321f>] context_switch+0x60f/0xa60 kernel/sched/core.c:3209
 [<ffffffff8100095a>] __schedule+0x5aa/0x1da0 kernel/sched/core.c:3934
 [<ffffffff810021df>] schedule+0x8f/0x1b0 kernel/sched/core.c:4011
 [<ffffffff8101116d>] schedule_timeout+0x50d/0xee0 kernel/time/timer.c:1803
 [<ffffffff815c13f1>] rcu_gp_kthread+0xda1/0x3b50 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2327
 [<ffffffff8144b318>] kthread+0x348/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:246
 [<ffffffff84400266>] ret_from_fork+0x56/0x70 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:393

---
 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -240,6 +240,7 @@ void ipvlan_process_multicast(struct wor
 				ret = netif_rx(nskb);
 acct:
 			ipvlan_count_rx(ipvlan, len, ret == NET_RX_SUCCESS, true);
+			cond_resched_rcu();
 		}
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 

From: Jiri Wiesner <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 63aae7b17344d4b08a7d05cb07044de4c0f9dcc6 ]

There is a problem when ipvlan slaves are created on a master device that is a vmxnet3 device (ipvlan in VMware guests). The vmxnet3 driver does not support unicast address filtering. When an ipvlan device is brought up in ipvlan_open(), the ipvlan driver calls dev_uc_add() to add the hardware address of the vmxnet3 master device to the unicast address list of the master device, phy_dev->uc. This inevitably leads to the vmxnet3 master device being forced into promiscuous mode by __dev_set_rx_mode().

Promiscuous mode is switched on the master despite the fact that there is still only one hardware address that the master device should use for filtering in order for the ipvlan device to be able to receive packets. The comment above struct net_device describes the uc_promisc member as a "counter, that indicates, that promiscuous mode has been enabled due to the need to listen to additional unicast addresses in a device that does not implement ndo_set_rx_mode()". Moreover, the design of ipvlan guarantees that only the hardware address of a master device, phy_dev->dev_addr, will be used to transmit and receive all packets from its ipvlan slaves. Thus, the unicast address list of the master device should not be modified by ipvlan_open() and ipvlan_stop() in order to make ipvlan a workable option on masters that do not support unicast address filtering.

---
 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c |    5 +----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -145,7 +145,6 @@ static void ipvlan_uninit(struct net_dev
 static int ipvlan_open(struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	struct ipvl_dev *ipvlan = netdev_priv(dev);
-	struct net_device *phy_dev = ipvlan->phy_dev;
 	struct ipvl_addr *addr;
 
 	if (ipvlan->port->mode == IPVLAN_MODE_L3)

@@ -156,7 +155,7 @@ static int ipvlan_open(struct net_device
 	list_for_each_entry(addr, &ipvlan->addrs, anode)
 		ipvlan_ht_addr_add(ipvlan, addr);
 
-	return dev_uc_add(phy_dev, phy_dev->dev_addr);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int ipvlan_stop(struct net_device *dev)

@@ -168,8 +167,6 @@ static int ipvlan_stop(struct net_device
 	dev_uc_unsync(phy_dev, dev);
 	dev_mc_unsync(phy_dev, dev);
 
-	dev_uc_del(phy_dev, phy_dev->dev_addr);
-
 	list_for_each_entry(addr, &ipvlan->addrs, anode)
 		ipvlan_ht_addr_del(addr);
 

From: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

commit cccc200fcaf04cff4342036a72e51d6adf6c98c1 upstream.

Currently, if IPv6 is enabled on top of an ipvlan device in l3 mode, the following warning message:

Dropped {multi|broad}cast of type= [86dd]

is emitted every time that a RS is generated and dmseg is soon filled with irrelevant messages. Replace pr_warn with pr_debug, to preserve debuggability, without scaring the sysadmin.

---
 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -432,8 +432,8 @@ static int ipvlan_process_outbound(struc
 
 	/* In this mode we dont care about multicast and broadcast traffic */
 	if (is_multicast_ether_addr(ethh->h_dest)) {
-		pr_warn_ratelimited("Dropped {multi|broad}cast of type= [%x]\n",
-				    ntohs(skb->protocol));
+		pr_debug_ratelimited("Dropped {multi|broad}cast of type=[%x]\n",
+				     ntohs(skb->protocol));
 		kfree_skb(skb);
 		goto out;
 	}

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit afe207d80a61e4d6e7cfa0611a4af46d0ba95628 ]

Commit e18b353f102e ("ipvlan: add cond_resched_rcu() while processing muticast backlog") added a cond_resched_rcu() in a loop using rcu protection to iterate over slaves.

This is breaking rcu rules, so lets instead use cond_resched() at a point we can reschedule

---
 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -240,7 +240,6 @@ void ipvlan_process_multicast(struct wor
 				ret = netif_rx(nskb);
 acct:
 			ipvlan_count_rx(ipvlan, len, ret == NET_RX_SUCCESS, true);
-			cond_resched_rcu();
 		}
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 

@@ -252,6 +251,7 @@ acct:
 		} else {
 			kfree_skb(skb);
 		}
+		cond_resched();
 	}
 }
 

From: Mahesh Bandewar <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ad8192767c9f9cf97da57b9ffcea70fb100febef ]

IPvlan in L3 mode discards outbound multicast packets but performs the check before ensuring the ether-header is set or not. This is an error that Eric found through code browsing.

---
 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c |   18 ++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

@@ -430,19 +430,21 @@ static int ipvlan_process_outbound(struc
 	struct ethhdr *ethh = eth_hdr(skb);
 	int ret = NET_XMIT_DROP;
 
-	/* In this mode we dont care about multicast and broadcast traffic */
-	if (is_multicast_ether_addr(ethh->h_dest)) {
-		pr_debug_ratelimited("Dropped {multi|broad}cast of type=[%x]\n",
-				     ntohs(skb->protocol));
-		kfree_skb(skb);
-		goto out;
-	}
-
 	/* The ipvlan is a pseudo-L2 device, so the packets that we receive
 	 * will have L2; which need to discarded and processed further
 	 * in the net-ns of the main-device.
 	 */
 	if (skb_mac_header_was_set(skb)) {
+		/* In this mode we dont care about
+		 * multicast and broadcast traffic */
+		if (is_multicast_ether_addr(ethh->h_dest)) {
+			pr_debug_ratelimited(
+				"Dropped {multi|broad}cast of type=[%x]\n",
+				ntohs(skb->protocol));
+			kfree_skb(skb);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
 		skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*ethh));
 		skb->mac_header = (typeof(skb->mac_header))~0U;
 		skb_reset_network_header(skb);

From: Mahesh Bandewar <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ce9a4186f9ac475c415ffd20348176a4ea366670 ]

The Rx bound multicast packets are deferred to a workqueue and macvlan can also suffer from the same attack that was discovered by Syzbot for IPvlan. This solution is not as effective as in IPvlan. IPvlan defers all (Tx and Rx) multicast packet processing to a workqueue while macvlan does this way only for the Rx. This fix should address the Rx codition to certain extent.

Tx is still suseptible. Tx multicast processing happens when .ndo_start_xmit is called, hence we cannot add cond_resched(). However, it's not that severe since the user which is generating
/ flooding will be affected the most.

---
 drivers/net/macvlan.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -306,6 +306,8 @@ static void macvlan_process_broadcast(st
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 
 		kfree_skb(skb);
+
+		cond_resched();
 	}
 }
 

From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ab14961d10d02d20767612c78ce148f6eb85bd58 ]

fec_enet_set_coalesce() validates the previously set params and if they are within range proceeds to apply the new ones. The new ones, however, are not validated. This seems backwards, probably a copy-paste error?

Compile tested only.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -2510,15 +2510,15 @@ fec_enet_set_coalesce(struct net_device
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	cycle = fec_enet_us_to_itr_clock(ndev, fep->rx_time_itr);
+	cycle = fec_enet_us_to_itr_clock(ndev, ec->rx_coalesce_usecs);
 	if (cycle > 0xFFFF) {
 		pr_err("Rx coalesed usec exceeed hardware limiation");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	cycle = fec_enet_us_to_itr_clock(ndev, fep->tx_time_itr);
+	cycle = fec_enet_us_to_itr_clock(ndev, ec->tx_coalesce_usecs);
 	if (cycle > 0xFFFF) {
-		pr_err("Rx coalesed usec exceeed hardware limiation");
+		pr_err("Tx coalesed usec exceeed hardware limiation");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 110a40dfb708fe940a3f3704d470e431c368d256 ]

Before accessing various fields in IPV4 network header and TCP header, make sure the packet :

- Has IP version 4 (ip->version == 4)
- Has not a silly network length (ip->ihl >= 5)
- Is big enough to hold network and transport headers
- Has not a silly TCP header size (th->doff >= sizeof(struct tcphdr) / 4)

syzbot reported :

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in slhc_compress+0x5b9/0x2e60 drivers/net/slip/slhc.c:270
CPU: 0 PID: 11728 Comm: syz-executor231 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1c9/0x220 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 kmsan_report+0xf7/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_report.c:118
 __msan_warning+0x58/0xa0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:215
 slhc_compress+0x5b9/0x2e60 drivers/net/slip/slhc.c:270
 ppp_send_frame drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:1637 [inline]
 __ppp_xmit_process+0x1902/0x2970 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:1495
 ppp_xmit_process+0x147/0x2f0 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:1516
 ppp_write+0x6bb/0x790 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:512
 do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:717 [inline]
 do_iter_write+0x812/0xdc0 fs/read_write.c:1000
 compat_writev+0x2df/0x5a0 fs/read_write.c:1351
 do_compat_pwritev64 fs/read_write.c:1400 [inline]
 __do_compat_sys_pwritev fs/read_write.c:1420 [inline]
 __se_compat_sys_pwritev fs/read_write.c:1414 [inline]
 __ia32_compat_sys_pwritev+0x349/0x3f0 fs/read_write.c:1414
 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:339 [inline]
 do_fast_syscall_32+0x3c7/0x6e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:410
 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x68/0x77 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:139
RIP: 0023:0xf7f7cd99
Code: 90 e8 0b 00 00 00 f3 90 0f ae e8 eb f9 8d 74 26 00 89 3c 24 c3 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 51 52 55 89 e5 0f 34 cd 80 <5d> 5a 59 c3 90 90 90 90 eb 0d 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
RSP: 002b:00000000ffdb84ac EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000014e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00000000200001c0
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000040047459 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

Uninit was created at:

 kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:144 [inline]
 kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x66/0xd0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:127
 kmsan_slab_alloc+0x8a/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:82
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2793 [inline]
 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb40/0x1200 mm/slub.c:4401
 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:142 [inline]
 __alloc_skb+0x2fd/0xac0 net/core/skbuff.c:210
 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1051 [inline]
 ppp_write+0x115/0x790 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:500
 do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:717 [inline]
 do_iter_write+0x812/0xdc0 fs/read_write.c:1000
 compat_writev+0x2df/0x5a0 fs/read_write.c:1351
 do_compat_pwritev64 fs/read_write.c:1400 [inline]
 __do_compat_sys_pwritev fs/read_write.c:1420 [inline]
 __se_compat_sys_pwritev fs/read_write.c:1414 [inline]
 __ia32_compat_sys_pwritev+0x349/0x3f0 fs/read_write.c:1414
 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:339 [inline]
 do_fast_syscall_32+0x3c7/0x6e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:410
 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x68/0x77 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:139

---
 drivers/net/slip/slhc.c |   14 ++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ slhc_compress(struct slcompress *comp, u
 	register struct cstate *cs = lcs->next;
 	register unsigned long deltaS, deltaA;
 	register short changes = 0;
-	int hlen;
+	int nlen, hlen;
 	unsigned char new_seq[16];
 	register unsigned char *cp = new_seq;
 	struct iphdr *ip;

@@ -248,6 +248,8 @@ slhc_compress(struct slcompress *comp, u
 		return isize;
 
 	ip = (struct iphdr *) icp;
+	if (ip->version != 4 || ip->ihl < 5)
+		return isize;
 
 	/* Bail if this packet isn't TCP, or is an IP fragment */
 	if (ip->protocol != IPPROTO_TCP || (ntohs(ip->frag_off) & 0x3fff)) {

@@ -258,10 +260,14 @@ slhc_compress(struct slcompress *comp, u
 			comp->sls_o_tcp++;
 		return isize;
 	}
-	/* Extract TCP header */
+	nlen = ip->ihl * 4;
+	if (isize < nlen + sizeof(*th))
+		return isize;
 
-	th = (struct tcphdr *)(((unsigned char *)ip) + ip->ihl*4);
-	hlen = ip->ihl*4 + th->doff*4;
+	th = (struct tcphdr *)(icp + nlen);
+	if (th->doff < sizeof(struct tcphdr) / 4)
+		return isize;
+	hlen = nlen + th->doff * 4;
 
 	/*  Bail if the TCP packet isn't `compressible' (i.e., ACK isn't set or
 	 *  some other control bit is set). Also uncompressible if

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

commit b7469e83d2add567e4e0b063963db185f3167cea upstream.

Similar to commit 38f88c454042 ("bonding/alb: properly access headers in bond_alb_xmit()"), we need to make sure arp header was pulled in skb->head before blindly accessing it in rlb_arp_xmit().

Remove arp_pkt() private helper, since it is more readable/obvious to have the following construct back to back :

	if (!pskb_network_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*arp)))
		return NULL;
	arp = (struct arp_pkt *)skb_network_header(skb);

syzbot reported :

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in bond_slave_has_mac_rx include/net/bonding.h:704 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in rlb_arp_xmit drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:662 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in bond_alb_xmit+0x575/0x25e0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:1477
CPU: 0 PID: 12743 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1c9/0x220 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 kmsan_report+0xf7/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_report.c:118
 __msan_warning+0x58/0xa0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:215
 bond_slave_has_mac_rx include/net/bonding.h:704 [inline]
 rlb_arp_xmit drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:662 [inline]
 bond_alb_xmit+0x575/0x25e0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:1477
 __bond_start_xmit drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:4257 [inline]
 bond_start_xmit+0x85d/0x2f70 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:4282
 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4524 [inline]
 netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4538 [inline]
 xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3470 [inline]
 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x531/0xab0 net/core/dev.c:3486
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x37de/0x4220 net/core/dev.c:4063
 dev_queue_xmit+0x4b/0x60 net/core/dev.c:4096
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2967 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x8347/0x93b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:2992
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:672 [inline]
 __sys_sendto+0xc1b/0xc50 net/socket.c:1998
 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2010 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendto+0x107/0x130 net/socket.c:2006
 __x64_sys_sendto+0x6e/0x90 net/socket.c:2006
 do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x160 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x45c479
Code: ad b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fc77ffbbc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fc77ffbc6d4 RCX: 000000000045c479
RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: 00000000200004c0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000076bf20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 0000000000000a04 R14: 00000000004cc7b0 R15: 000000000076bf2c

Uninit was created at:

 kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:144 [inline]
 kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x66/0xd0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:127
 kmsan_slab_alloc+0x8a/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:82
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2793 [inline]
 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb40/0x1200 mm/slub.c:4401
 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:142 [inline]
 __alloc_skb+0x2fd/0xac0 net/core/skbuff.c:210
 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1051 [inline]
 alloc_skb_with_frags+0x18c/0xa70 net/core/skbuff.c:5766
 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xada/0xc60 net/core/sock.c:2242
 packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2815 [inline]
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2910 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x66a0/0x93b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:2992
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:672 [inline]
 __sys_sendto+0xc1b/0xc50 net/socket.c:1998
 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2010 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendto+0x107/0x130 net/socket.c:2006
 __x64_sys_sendto+0x6e/0x90 net/socket.c:2006
 do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x160 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

---
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c |   20 ++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

@@ -74,11 +74,6 @@ struct arp_pkt {
 };
 #pragma pack()
 
-static inline struct arp_pkt *arp_pkt(const struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
-	return (struct arp_pkt *)skb_network_header(skb);
-}
-
 /* Forward declaration */
 static void alb_send_learning_packets(struct slave *slave, u8 mac_addr[],
 				      bool strict_match);

@@ -577,10 +572,11 @@ static void rlb_req_update_subnet_client
 	spin_unlock(&bond->mode_lock);
 }
 
-static struct slave *rlb_choose_channel(struct sk_buff *skb, struct bonding *bond)
+static struct slave *rlb_choose_channel(struct sk_buff *skb,
+					struct bonding *bond,
+					const struct arp_pkt *arp)
 {
 	struct alb_bond_info *bond_info = &(BOND_ALB_INFO(bond));
-	struct arp_pkt *arp = arp_pkt(skb);
 	struct slave *assigned_slave, *curr_active_slave;
 	struct rlb_client_info *client_info;
 	u32 hash_index = 0;

@@ -677,8 +673,12 @@ static struct slave *rlb_choose_channel(
  */
 static struct slave *rlb_arp_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct bonding *bond)
 {
-	struct arp_pkt *arp = arp_pkt(skb);
 	struct slave *tx_slave = NULL;
+	struct arp_pkt *arp;
+
+	if (!pskb_network_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*arp)))
+		return NULL;
+	arp = (struct arp_pkt *)skb_network_header(skb);
 
 	/* Don't modify or load balance ARPs that do not originate locally
 	 * (e.g.,arrive via a bridge).

@@ -688,7 +688,7 @@ static struct slave *rlb_arp_xmit(struct
 
 	if (arp->op_code == htons(ARPOP_REPLY)) {
 		/* the arp must be sent on the selected rx channel */
-		tx_slave = rlb_choose_channel(skb, bond);
+		tx_slave = rlb_choose_channel(skb, bond, arp);
 		if (tx_slave)
 			ether_addr_copy(arp->mac_src, tx_slave->dev->dev_addr);
 		netdev_dbg(bond->dev, "Server sent ARP Reply packet\n");

@@ -698,7 +698,7 @@ static struct slave *rlb_arp_xmit(struct
 		 * When the arp reply is received the entry will be updated
 		 * with the correct unicast address of the client.
 		 */
-		rlb_choose_channel(skb, bond);
+		rlb_choose_channel(skb, bond, arp);
 
 		/* The ARP reply packets must be delayed so that
 		 * they can cancel out the influence of the ARP request.

From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7e6dc03eeb023e18427a373522f1d247b916a641 ]

Add missing attribute validation for TCA_FQ_ORPHAN_MASK to the netlink policy.

---
 net/sched/sch_fq.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -668,6 +668,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy fq_policy
 	[TCA_FQ_FLOW_MAX_RATE]		= { .type = NLA_U32 },
 	[TCA_FQ_BUCKETS_LOG]		= { .type = NLA_U32 },
 	[TCA_FQ_FLOW_REFILL_DELAY]	= { .type = NLA_U32 },
+	[TCA_FQ_ORPHAN_MASK]		= { .type = NLA_U32 },
 };
 
 static int fq_change(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt)

From: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>

commit 81ee85d0462410de8eeeec1b9761941fd6ed8c7b upstream.

Quoting from the comment describing the WARN functions in include/asm-generic/bug.h:

* WARN(), WARN_ON(), WARN_ON_ONCE, and so on can be used to report
* significant kernel issues that need prompt attention if they should ever
* appear at runtime.
*
* Do not use these macros when checking for invalid external inputs

The (buggy) firmware tables which the dmar code was calling WARN_TAINT for really are invalid external inputs. They are not under the kernel's control and the issues in them cannot be fixed by a kernel update. So logging a backtrace, which invites bug reports to be filed about this, is not helpful.

---
 drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c |    7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -3949,10 +3949,11 @@ static void quirk_ioat_snb_local_iommu(s
 
 	/* we know that the this iommu should be at offset 0xa000 from vtbar */
 	drhd = dmar_find_matched_drhd_unit(pdev);
-	if (WARN_TAINT_ONCE(!drhd || drhd->reg_base_addr - vtbar != 0xa000,
-			    TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND,
-			    "BIOS assigned incorrect VT-d unit for Intel(R) QuickData Technology device\n"))
+	if (!drhd || drhd->reg_base_addr - vtbar != 0xa000) {
+		pr_warn_once(FW_BUG "BIOS assigned incorrect VT-d unit for Intel(R) QuickData Technology device\n");
+		add_taint(TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
 		pdev->dev.archdata.iommu = DUMMY_DEVICE_DOMAIN_INFO;
+	}
 }
 DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_ENABLE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_IOAT_SNB, quirk_ioat_snb_local_iommu);
 

From: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>

commit d785476c608c621b345dd9396e8b21e90375cb0e upstream.

Variable grph_obj_type is being assigned twice, one of these is redundant so remove it.

Addresses-Coverity: ("Evaluation order violation")

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atombios.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -346,8 +346,7 @@ bool amdgpu_atombios_get_connector_info_
 			router.ddc_valid = false;
 			router.cd_valid = false;
 			for (j = 0; j < ((le16_to_cpu(path->usSize) - 8) / 2); j++) {
-				uint8_t grph_obj_type=
-				grph_obj_type =
+				uint8_t grph_obj_type =
 				    (le16_to_cpu(path->usGraphicObjIds[j]) &
 				     OBJECT_TYPE_MASK) >> OBJECT_TYPE_SHIFT;
 

From: Al Viro <[email protected]>

commit 21039132650281de06a169cbe8a0f7e5c578fd8b upstream.

with the way fs/namei.c:do_last() had been done, ->atomic_open() instances needed to recognize the case when existing file got found with O_EXCL|O_CREAT, either by falling back to finish_no_open() or failing themselves. gfs2 one didn't.

---
 fs/gfs2/inode.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1245,7 +1245,7 @@ static int gfs2_atomic_open(struct inode
 		if (!(*opened & FILE_OPENED))
 			return finish_no_open(file, d);
 		dput(d);
-		return 0;
+		return excl && (flags & O_CREAT) ? -EEXIST : 0;
 	}
 
 	BUG_ON(d != NULL);

From: Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]>

commit 342993f96ab24d5864ab1216f46c0b199c2baf8e upstream.

After commit 07721feee46b ("KVM: nVMX: Don't emulate instructions in guest mode") Hyper-V guests on KVM stopped booting with:

kvm_nested_vmexit: rip fffff802987d6169 reason EPT_VIOLATION info1 181
info2 0 int_info 0 int_info_err 0

 kvm_page_fault:       address febd0000 error_code 181
 kvm_emulate_insn:     0:fffff802987d6169: f3 a5
 kvm_emulate_insn:     0:fffff802987d6169: f3 a5 FAIL
 kvm_inj_exception:    #UD (0x0)

"f3 a5" is a "rep movsw" instruction, which should not be intercepted at all. Commit c44b4c6ab80e ("KVM: emulate: clean up initializations in init_decode_cache") reduced the number of fields cleared by init_decode_cache() claiming that they are being cleared elsewhere, 'intercept', however, is left uncleared if the instruction does not have any of the "slow path" flags (NotImpl, Stack, Op3264, Sse, Mmx, CheckPerm, NearBranch, No16 and of course Intercept itself).

---
 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -5010,6 +5010,7 @@ int x86_decode_insn(struct x86_emulate_c
 	ctxt->fetch.ptr = ctxt->fetch.data;
 	ctxt->fetch.end = ctxt->fetch.data + insn_len;
 	ctxt->opcode_len = 1;
+	ctxt->intercept = x86_intercept_none;
 	if (insn_len > 0)
 		memcpy(ctxt->fetch.data, insn, insn_len);
 	else {

From: Eugeniy Paltsev <[email protected]>

commit 8d92e992a785f35d23f845206cf8c6cafbc264e0 upstream.

The default defintions use fill pattern 0x90 for padding which for ARC generates unintended "ldh_s r12,[r0,0x20]" corresponding to opcode 0x9090

So use ".align 4" which insert a "nop_s" instruction instead.

---
 arch/arc/include/asm/linkage.h |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
 #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
 
 #define ASM_NL		 `	/* use '`' to mark new line in macro */
+#define __ALIGN		.align 4
+#define __ALIGN_STR	__stringify(__ALIGN)
 
 /* annotation for data we want in DCCM - if enabled in .config */
 .macro ARCFP_DATA nm

From: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>

commit 286d3250c9d6437340203fb64938bea344729a0e upstream.

There is a race and a buffer overflow corrupting a kernel memory while reading an EFI variable with a size more than 1024 bytes via the older sysfs method. This happens because accessing struct efi_variable in efivar_{attr,size,data}_read() and friends is not protected from a concurrent access leading to a kernel memory corruption and, at best, to a crash. The race scenario is the following:

CPU0: CPU1:
efivar_attr_read()
var->DataSize = 1024;
efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize)

    down_interruptible(&efivars_lock)
                                     efivar_attr_read() // same EFI var
                                       var->DataSize = 1024;
                                       efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize)
                                         down_interruptible(&efivars_lock)
    virt_efi_get_variable()
    // returns EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL but
    // var->DataSize is set to a real
    // var size more than 1024 bytes
    up(&efivars_lock)
                                         virt_efi_get_variable()
                                         // called with var->DataSize set
                                         // to a real var size, returns
                                         // successfully and overwrites
                                         // a 1024-bytes kernel buffer
                                         up(&efivars_lock)

This can be reproduced by concurrent reading of an EFI variable which size is more than 1024 bytes:

  ts# for cpu in $(seq 0 $(nproc --ignore=1)); do ( taskset -c $cpu \
  cat /sys/firmware/efi/vars/KEKDefault*/size & ) ; done

Fix this by using a local variable for a var's data buffer size so it does not get overwritten.

---
 drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c |   29 ++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

@@ -139,13 +139,16 @@ static ssize_t
 efivar_attr_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)
 {
 	struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var;
+	unsigned long size = sizeof(var->Data);
 	char *str = buf;
+	int ret;
 
 	if (!entry || !buf)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	var->DataSize = 1024;
-	if (efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data))
+	ret = efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data);
+	var->DataSize = size;
+	if (ret)
 		return -EIO;
 
 	if (var->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE)

@@ -172,13 +175,16 @@ static ssize_t
 efivar_size_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)
 {
 	struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var;
+	unsigned long size = sizeof(var->Data);
 	char *str = buf;
+	int ret;
 
 	if (!entry || !buf)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	var->DataSize = 1024;
-	if (efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data))
+	ret = efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data);
+	var->DataSize = size;
+	if (ret)
 		return -EIO;
 
 	str += sprintf(str, "0x%lx\n", var->DataSize);

@@ -189,12 +195,15 @@ static ssize_t
 efivar_data_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)
 {
 	struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var;
+	unsigned long size = sizeof(var->Data);
+	int ret;
 
 	if (!entry || !buf)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	var->DataSize = 1024;
-	if (efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data))
+	ret = efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data);
+	var->DataSize = size;
+	if (ret)
 		return -EIO;
 
 	memcpy(buf, var->Data, var->DataSize);

@@ -314,14 +323,16 @@ efivar_show_raw(struct efivar_entry *ent
 {
 	struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var;
 	struct compat_efi_variable *compat;
+	unsigned long datasize = sizeof(var->Data);
 	size_t size;
+	int ret;
 
 	if (!entry || !buf)
 		return 0;
 
-	var->DataSize = 1024;
-	if (efivar_entry_get(entry, &entry->var.Attributes,
-			     &entry->var.DataSize, entry->var.Data))
+	ret = efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &datasize, var->Data);
+	var->DataSize = datasize;
+	if (ret)
 		return -EIO;
 
 	if (is_compat()) {

From: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>

commit 59833696442c674acbbd297772ba89e7ad8c753d upstream.

Quoting from the comment describing the WARN functions in include/asm-generic/bug.h:

* WARN(), WARN_ON(), WARN_ON_ONCE, and so on can be used to report
* significant kernel issues that need prompt attention if they should ever
* appear at runtime.
*
* Do not use these macros when checking for invalid external inputs

The (buggy) firmware tables which the dmar code was calling WARN_TAINT for really are invalid external inputs. They are not under the kernel's control and the issues in them cannot be fixed by a kernel update. So logging a backtrace, which invites bug reports to be filed about this, is not helpful.

Some distros, e.g. Fedora, have tools watching for the kernel backtraces logged by the WARN macros and offer the user an option to file a bug for this when these are encountered. The WARN_TAINT in warn_invalid_dmar()
+ another iommu WARN_TAINT, addressed in another patch, have lead to over a 100 bugs being filed this way.

This commit replaces the WARN_TAINT("...") calls, with pr_warn(FW_BUG "...") + add_taint(TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND, ...) calls avoiding the backtrace and thus also avoiding bug-reports being filed about this against the kernel.

---
 drivers/iommu/dmar.c |   11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -438,12 +438,13 @@ static int __init dmar_parse_one_andd(st
 
 	/* Check for NUL termination within the designated length */
 	if (strnlen(andd->device_name, header->length - 8) == header->length - 8) {
-		WARN_TAINT(1, TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND,
+		pr_warn(FW_BUG
 			   "Your BIOS is broken; ANDD object name is not NUL-terminated\n"
 			   "BIOS vendor: %s; Ver: %s; Product Version: %s\n",
 			   dmi_get_system_info(DMI_BIOS_VENDOR),
 			   dmi_get_system_info(DMI_BIOS_VERSION),
 			   dmi_get_system_info(DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION));
+		add_taint(TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 	pr_info("ANDD device: %x name: %s\n", andd->device_number,

@@ -469,14 +470,14 @@ static int dmar_parse_one_rhsa(struct ac
 			return 0;
 		}
 	}
-	WARN_TAINT(
-		1, TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND,
+	pr_warn(FW_BUG
 		"Your BIOS is broken; RHSA refers to non-existent DMAR unit at %llx\n"
 		"BIOS vendor: %s; Ver: %s; Product Version: %s\n",
 		drhd->reg_base_addr,
 		dmi_get_system_info(DMI_BIOS_VENDOR),
 		dmi_get_system_info(DMI_BIOS_VERSION),
 		dmi_get_system_info(DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION));
+	add_taint(TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
 
 	return 0;
 }

@@ -822,14 +823,14 @@ int __init dmar_table_init(void)
 
 static void warn_invalid_dmar(u64 addr, const char *message)
 {
-	WARN_TAINT_ONCE(
-		1, TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND,
+	pr_warn_once(FW_BUG
 		"Your BIOS is broken; DMAR reported at address %llx%s!\n"
 		"BIOS vendor: %s; Ver: %s; Product Version: %s\n",
 		addr, message,
 		dmi_get_system_info(DMI_BIOS_VENDOR),
 		dmi_get_system_info(DMI_BIOS_VERSION),
 		dmi_get_system_info(DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION));
+	add_taint(TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
 }
 
 static int __ref

From: Yonghyun Hwang <[email protected]>

commit 77a1bce84bba01f3f143d77127b72e872b573795 upstream.

intel_iommu_iova_to_phys() has a bug when it translates an IOVA for a huge page onto its corresponding physical address. This commit fixes the bug by accomodating the level of page entry for the IOVA and adds IOVA's lower address to the physical address.

---
 drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -5017,8 +5017,10 @@ static phys_addr_t intel_iommu_iova_to_p
 	u64 phys = 0;
 
 	pte = pfn_to_dma_pte(dmar_domain, iova >> VTD_PAGE_SHIFT, &level);
-	if (pte)
-		phys = dma_pte_addr(pte);
+	if (pte && dma_pte_present(pte))
+		phys = dma_pte_addr(pte) +
+			(iova & (BIT_MASK(level_to_offset_bits(level) +
+						VTD_PAGE_SHIFT) - 1));
 
 	return phys;
 }

From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

commit 0e1a1d853ecedc99da9d27f9f5c376935547a0e2 upstream.

Add missing attribute validation for critical protocol fields to the netlink policy.

---
 net/wireless/nl80211.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -404,6 +404,8 @@ static const struct nla_policy nl80211_p
 	[NL80211_ATTR_MDID] = { .type = NLA_U16 },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_IE_RIC] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
 				  .len = IEEE80211_MAX_DATA_LEN },
+	[NL80211_ATTR_CRIT_PROT_ID] = { .type = NLA_U16 },
+	[NL80211_ATTR_MAX_CRIT_PROT_DURATION] = { .type = NLA_U16 },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_PEER_AID] = { .type = NLA_U16 },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_CH_SWITCH_COUNT] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_CH_SWITCH_BLOCK_TX] = { .type = NLA_FLAG },

From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

commit 5cde05c61cbe13cbb3fa66d52b9ae84f7975e5e6 upstream.

Add missing attribute validation for NL80211_ATTR_OPER_CLASS to the netlink policy.

---
 net/wireless/nl80211.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -431,6 +431,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy nl80211_p
 	[NL80211_ATTR_USER_PRIO] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_ADMITTED_TIME] = { .type = NLA_U16 },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_SMPS_MODE] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
+	[NL80211_ATTR_OPER_CLASS] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_MAC_MASK] = { .len = ETH_ALEN },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_WIPHY_SELF_MANAGED_REG] = { .type = NLA_FLAG },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_NETNS_FD] = { .type = NLA_U32 },

From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

commit c049b3450072b8e3998053490e025839fecfef31 upstream.

Add missing attribute validation for cthelper
to the netlink policy.

---
 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -711,6 +711,8 @@ static const struct nla_policy nfnl_cthe
 	[NFCTH_NAME] = { .type = NLA_NUL_STRING,
 			 .len = NF_CT_HELPER_NAME_LEN-1 },
 	[NFCTH_QUEUE_NUM] = { .type = NLA_U32, },
+	[NFCTH_PRIV_DATA_LEN] = { .type = NLA_U32, },
+	[NFCTH_STATUS] = { .type = NLA_U32, },
 };
 
 static const struct nfnl_callback nfnl_cthelper_cb[NFNL_MSG_CTHELPER_MAX] = {

From: Zhenzhong Duan <[email protected]>

commit b0bb0c22c4db623f2e7b1a471596fbf1c22c6dc5 upstream.

When base address in RHSA structure doesn't match base address in each DRHD structure, the base address in last DRHD is printed out.

This doesn't make sense when there are multiple DRHD units, fix it by printing the buggy RHSA's base address.

---
 drivers/iommu/dmar.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ static int dmar_parse_one_rhsa(struct ac
 	pr_warn(FW_BUG
 		"Your BIOS is broken; RHSA refers to non-existent DMAR unit at %llx\n"
 		"BIOS vendor: %s; Ver: %s; Product Version: %s\n",
-		drhd->reg_base_addr,
+		rhsa->base_address,
 		dmi_get_system_info(DMI_BIOS_VENDOR),
 		dmi_get_system_info(DMI_BIOS_VERSION),
 		dmi_get_system_info(DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION));

From: Daniel Drake <[email protected]>

commit da72a379b2ec0bad3eb265787f7008bead0b040c upstream.

VMD subdevices are created with a PCI domain ID of 0x10000 or higher.

These subdevices are also handled like all other PCI devices by dmar_pci_bus_notifier().

However, when dmar_alloc_pci_notify_info() take records of such devices, it will truncate the domain ID to a u16 value (in info->seg). The device at (e.g.) 10000:00:02.0 is then treated by the DMAR code as if it is 0000:00:02.0.

In the unlucky event that a real device also exists at 0000:00:02.0 and also has a device-specific entry in the DMAR table, dmar_insert_dev_scope() will crash on:
  BUG_ON(i >= devices_cnt);

That's basically a sanity check that only one PCI device matches a single DMAR entry; in this case we seem to have two matching devices.

Fix this by ignoring devices that have a domain number higher than what can be looked up in the DMAR table.

This problem was carefully diagnosed by Jian-Hong Pan.

---
 drivers/iommu/dmar.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include <linux/dmi.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/iommu.h>
+#include <linux/limits.h>
 #include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
 #include <asm/iommu_table.h>
 

@@ -138,6 +139,13 @@ dmar_alloc_pci_notify_info(struct pci_de
 
 	BUG_ON(dev->is_virtfn);
 
+	/*
+	 * Ignore devices that have a domain number higher than what can
+	 * be looked up in DMAR, e.g. VMD subdevices with domain 0x10000
+	 */
+	if (pci_domain_nr(dev->bus) > U16_MAX)
+		return NULL;
+
 	/* Only generate path[] for device addition event */
 	if (event == BUS_NOTIFY_ADD_DEVICE)
 		for (tmp = dev; tmp; tmp = tmp->bus->self)

From: qize wang <[email protected]>

commit 1e58252e334dc3f3756f424a157d1b7484464c40 upstream.

mwifiex_process_tdls_action_frame() without checking the incoming tdls infomation element's vality before use it, this may cause multi heap buffer overflows.

Fix them by putting vality check before use it.

IE is TLV struct, but ht_cap and ht_oper aren’t TLV struct. the origin marvell driver code is wrong:

memcpy(&sta_ptr->tdls_cap.ht_oper, pos,.... memcpy((u8 *)&sta_ptr->tdls_cap.ht_capb, pos,...

Fix the bug by changing pos(the address of IE) to pos+2 ( the address of IE value ).

---
 drivers/net/wireless/mwifiex/tdls.c |   70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 64 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

@@ -910,59 +910,117 @@ void mwifiex_process_tdls_action_frame(s
 
 		switch (*pos) {
 		case WLAN_EID_SUPP_RATES:
+			if (pos[1] > 32)
+				return;
 			sta_ptr->tdls_cap.rates_len = pos[1];
 			for (i = 0; i < pos[1]; i++)
 				sta_ptr->tdls_cap.rates[i] = pos[i + 2];
 			break;
 
 		case WLAN_EID_EXT_SUPP_RATES:
+			if (pos[1] > 32)
+				return;
 			basic = sta_ptr->tdls_cap.rates_len;
+			if (pos[1] > 32 - basic)
+				return;
 			for (i = 0; i < pos[1]; i++)
 				sta_ptr->tdls_cap.rates[basic + i] = pos[i + 2];
 			sta_ptr->tdls_cap.rates_len += pos[1];
 			break;
 		case WLAN_EID_HT_CAPABILITY:
-			memcpy((u8 *)&sta_ptr->tdls_cap.ht_capb, pos,
+			if (pos > end - sizeof(struct ieee80211_ht_cap) - 2)
+				return;
+			if (pos[1] != sizeof(struct ieee80211_ht_cap))
+				return;
+			/* copy the ie's value into ht_capb*/
+			memcpy((u8 *)&sta_ptr->tdls_cap.ht_capb, pos + 2,
 			       sizeof(struct ieee80211_ht_cap));
 			sta_ptr->is_11n_enabled = 1;
 			break;
 		case WLAN_EID_HT_OPERATION:
-			memcpy(&sta_ptr->tdls_cap.ht_oper, pos,
+			if (pos > end -
+			    sizeof(struct ieee80211_ht_operation) - 2)
+				return;
+			if (pos[1] != sizeof(struct ieee80211_ht_operation))
+				return;
+			/* copy the ie's value into ht_oper*/
+			memcpy(&sta_ptr->tdls_cap.ht_oper, pos + 2,
 			       sizeof(struct ieee80211_ht_operation));
 			break;
 		case WLAN_EID_BSS_COEX_2040:
+			if (pos > end - 3)
+				return;
+			if (pos[1] != 1)
+				return;
 			sta_ptr->tdls_cap.coex_2040 = pos[2];
 			break;
 		case WLAN_EID_EXT_CAPABILITY:
+			if (pos > end - sizeof(struct ieee_types_header))
+				return;
+			if (pos[1] < sizeof(struct ieee_types_header))
+				return;
+			if (pos[1] > 8)
+				return;
 			memcpy((u8 *)&sta_ptr->tdls_cap.extcap, pos,
 			       sizeof(struct ieee_types_header) +
 			       min_t(u8, pos[1], 8));
 			break;
 		case WLAN_EID_RSN:
+			if (pos > end - sizeof(struct ieee_types_header))
+				return;
+			if (pos[1] < sizeof(struct ieee_types_header))
+				return;
+			if (pos[1] > IEEE_MAX_IE_SIZE -
+			    sizeof(struct ieee_types_header))
+				return;
 			memcpy((u8 *)&sta_ptr->tdls_cap.rsn_ie, pos,
 			       sizeof(struct ieee_types_header) +
 			       min_t(u8, pos[1], IEEE_MAX_IE_SIZE -
 				     sizeof(struct ieee_types_header)));
 			break;
 		case WLAN_EID_QOS_CAPA:
+			if (pos > end - 3)
+				return;
+			if (pos[1] != 1)
+				return;
 			sta_ptr->tdls_cap.qos_info = pos[2];
 			break;
 		case WLAN_EID_VHT_OPERATION:
-			if (priv->adapter->is_hw_11ac_capable)
-				memcpy(&sta_ptr->tdls_cap.vhtoper, pos,
+			if (priv->adapter->is_hw_11ac_capable) {
+				if (pos > end -
+				    sizeof(struct ieee80211_vht_operation) - 2)
+					return;
+				if (pos[1] !=
+				    sizeof(struct ieee80211_vht_operation))
+					return;
+				/* copy the ie's value into vhtoper*/
+				memcpy(&sta_ptr->tdls_cap.vhtoper, pos + 2,
 				       sizeof(struct ieee80211_vht_operation));
+			}
 			break;
 		case WLAN_EID_VHT_CAPABILITY:
 			if (priv->adapter->is_hw_11ac_capable) {
-				memcpy((u8 *)&sta_ptr->tdls_cap.vhtcap, pos,
+				if (pos > end -
+				    sizeof(struct ieee80211_vht_cap) - 2)
+					return;
+				if (pos[1] != sizeof(struct ieee80211_vht_cap))
+					return;
+				/* copy the ie's value into vhtcap*/
+				memcpy((u8 *)&sta_ptr->tdls_cap.vhtcap, pos + 2,
 				       sizeof(struct ieee80211_vht_cap));
 				sta_ptr->is_11ac_enabled = 1;
 			}
 			break;
 		case WLAN_EID_AID:
-			if (priv->adapter->is_hw_11ac_capable)
+			if (priv->adapter->is_hw_11ac_capable) {
+				if (pos > end - 4)
+					return;
+				if (pos[1] != 2)
+					return;
 				sta_ptr->tdls_cap.aid =
 					      le16_to_cpu(*(__le16 *)(pos + 2));
+			}
+			break;
 		default:
 			break;
 		}

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

commit b6f6118901d1e867ac9177bbff3b00b185bd4fdc upstream.

IPV6_ADDRFORM is able to transform IPv6 socket to IPv4 one. While this operation sounds illogical, we have to support it.

One of the things it does for TCP socket is to switch sk->sk_prot to tcp_prot.

We now have other layers playing with sk->sk_prot, so we should make sure to not interfere with them.

This patch makes sure sk_prot is the default pointer for TCP IPv6 socket.

syzbot reported :

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
PGD a0113067 P4D a0113067 PUD a8771067 PMD 0
Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 10686 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:0x0
Code: Bad RIP value.
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000281fce0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 1ffffffff15f48ac RBX: ffffffff8afa4560 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8880a69a8f40
RBP: ffffc9000281fd10 R08: ffffffff86ed9b0c R09: ffffed1014d351f5
R10: ffffed1014d351f5 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8880920d3098
R13: 1ffff1101241a613 R14: ffff8880a69a8f40 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00007f2ae75db700(0000) GS:ffff8880aea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 00000000a3b85000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 inet_release+0x165/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:427
 __sock_release net/socket.c:605 [inline]
 sock_close+0xe1/0x260 net/socket.c:1283
 __fput+0x2e4/0x740 fs/file_table.c:280
 ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:313
 task_work_run+0x176/0x1b0 kernel/task_work.c:113
 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:188 [inline]
 exit_to_usermode_loop arch/x86/entry/common.c:164 [inline]
 prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x480/0x5b0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:195
 syscall_return_slowpath+0x113/0x4a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:278
 do_syscall_64+0x11f/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:304
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x45c429
Code: ad b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f2ae75dac78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f2ae75db6d4 RCX: 000000000045c429
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 000000000000011a RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 000000000076bf20 R08: 0000000000000038 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000020000180 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 0000000000000a9d R14: 00000000004ccfb4 R15: 000000000076bf2c
Modules linked in:
CR2: 0000000000000000
---[ end trace 82567b5207e87bae ]---
RIP: 0010:0x0
Code: Bad RIP value.
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000281fce0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 1ffffffff15f48ac RBX: ffffffff8afa4560 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8880a69a8f40
RBP: ffffc9000281fd10 R08: ffffffff86ed9b0c R09: ffffed1014d351f5
R10: ffffed1014d351f5 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8880920d3098
R13: 1ffff1101241a613 R14: ffff8880a69a8f40 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00007f2ae75db700(0000) GS:ffff8880aea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 00000000a3b85000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400

---
 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c |   10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -185,9 +185,15 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct soc
 					retv = -EBUSY;
 					break;
 				}
-			} else if (sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP)
+			} else if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP) {
+				if (sk->sk_prot != &tcpv6_prot) {
+					retv = -EBUSY;
+					break;
+				}
+				break;
+			} else {
 				break;
-
+			}
 			if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
 				retv = -ENOTCONN;
 				break;

From: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>

commit d6c066fda90d578aacdf19771a027ed484a79825 upstream.

Add a sanity check to efivar_store_raw() the same way efivar_{attr,size,data}_read() and efivar_show_raw() have it.

---
 drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -272,6 +272,9 @@ efivar_store_raw(struct efivar_entry *en
 	u8 *data;
 	int err;
 
+	if (!entry || !buf)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (is_compat()) {
 		struct compat_efi_variable *compat;
 

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit 13bbdd370f67aef3351ad7bbc2fb624e3c23f905 upstream.

batadv_iv_ogm_orig_del_if removes a part of the bcast_own which previously belonged to the now removed interface. This is done by copying all data which comes before the removed interface and then appending all the data which comes after the removed interface.

The address calculation for the position of the data which comes after the removed interface assumed that the bat_iv.bcast_own is a pointer to a single byte datatype. But it is a pointer to unsigned long and thus the calculated position was wrong off factor sizeof(unsigned long).

---
 net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -185,7 +185,8 @@ unlock:
 static int batadv_iv_ogm_orig_del_if(struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node,
 				     int max_if_num, int del_if_num)
 {
-	int chunk_size,  ret = -ENOMEM, if_offset;
+	int ret = -ENOMEM;
+	size_t chunk_size, if_offset;
 	void *data_ptr = NULL;
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&orig_node->bat_iv.ogm_cnt_lock);

@@ -203,8 +204,9 @@ static int batadv_iv_ogm_orig_del_if(str
 	memcpy(data_ptr, orig_node->bat_iv.bcast_own, del_if_num * chunk_size);
 
 	/* copy second part */
+	if_offset = (del_if_num + 1) * chunk_size;
 	memcpy((char *)data_ptr + del_if_num * chunk_size,
-	       orig_node->bat_iv.bcast_own + ((del_if_num + 1) * chunk_size),
+	       (uint8_t *)orig_node->bat_iv.bcast_own + if_offset,
 	       (max_if_num - del_if_num) * chunk_size);
 
 free_bcast_own:

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit c18bdd018e8912ca73ad6c12120b7283b5038875 upstream.

The batadv_gw_node reference counter in batadv_gw_node_update can only be reduced when the list entry was actually removed. Otherwise the reference counter may reach zero when batadv_gw_node_update is called from two different contexts for the same gw_node but only one context is actually removing the entry from the list.

The release function for this gw_node is not called inside the list_lock spinlock protected region because the function batadv_gw_node_update still holds a gw_node reference for the object pointer on the stack. Thus the actual release function (when required) will be called only at the end of the function.

---
 net/batman-adv/gateway_client.c |    7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -527,11 +527,12 @@ void batadv_gw_node_update(struct batadv
 		 * gets dereferenced.
 		 */
 		spin_lock_bh(&bat_priv->gw.list_lock);
-		hlist_del_init_rcu(&gw_node->list);
+		if (!hlist_unhashed(&gw_node->list)) {
+			hlist_del_init_rcu(&gw_node->list);
+			batadv_gw_node_free_ref(gw_node);
+		}
 		spin_unlock_bh(&bat_priv->gw.list_lock);
 
-		batadv_gw_node_free_ref(gw_node);
-
 		curr_gw = batadv_gw_get_selected_gw_node(bat_priv);
 		if (gw_node == curr_gw)
 			batadv_gw_reselect(bat_priv);

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit 3db152093efb750bc47fd4d69355b90b18113105 upstream.

The batadv_orig_node_vlan reference counter in batadv_tt_global_size_mod can only be reduced when the list entry was actually removed. Otherwise the reference counter may reach zero when batadv_tt_global_size_mod is called from two different contexts for the same orig_node_vlan but only one context is actually removing the entry from the list.

The release function for this orig_node_vlan is not called inside the vlan_list_lock spinlock protected region because the function batadv_tt_global_size_mod still holds a orig_node_vlan reference for the object pointer on the stack. Thus the actual release function (when required) will be called only at the end of the function.

---
 net/batman-adv/translation-table.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -303,9 +303,11 @@ static void batadv_tt_global_size_mod(st
 
 	if (atomic_add_return(v, &vlan->tt.num_entries) == 0) {
 		spin_lock_bh(&orig_node->vlan_list_lock);
-		hlist_del_init_rcu(&vlan->list);
+		if (!hlist_unhashed(&vlan->list)) {
+			hlist_del_init_rcu(&vlan->list);
+			batadv_orig_node_vlan_free_ref(vlan);
+		}
 		spin_unlock_bh(&orig_node->vlan_list_lock);
-		batadv_orig_node_vlan_free_ref(vlan);
 	}
 
 	batadv_orig_node_vlan_free_ref(vlan);

From: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]>

commit 1bc4e2b000e7fa9773d6623bc8850561ce10a4fb upstream.

batman-adv checks in different situation if a new device is already on top of a different batman-adv device. This is done by getting the iflink of a device and all its parent. It assumes that this iflink is always a parent device in an acyclic graph. But this assumption is broken by devices like veth which are actually a pair of two devices linked to each other. The recursive check would therefore get veth0 when calling dev_get_iflink on veth1. And it gets veth0 when calling dev_get_iflink with veth1.

Creating a veth pair and loading batman-adv freezes parts of the system

ip link add veth0 type veth peer name veth1
modprobe batman-adv

An RCU stall will be detected on the system which cannot be fixed.

    INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU
            1: (5264 ticks this GP) idle=3e9/140000000000001/0
    softirq=144683/144686 fqs=5249
             (t=5250 jiffies g=46 c=45 q=43)
    Task dump for CPU 1:
    insmod          R  running task        0   247    245 0x00000008
     ffffffff8151f140 ffffffff8107888e ffff88000fd141c0 ffffffff8151f140
     0000000000000000 ffffffff81552df0 ffffffff8107b420 0000000000000001
     ffff88000e3fa700 ffffffff81540b00 ffffffff8107d667 0000000000000001
    Call Trace:
     <IRQ>  [<ffffffff8107888e>] ? rcu_dump_cpu_stacks+0x7e/0xd0
     [<ffffffff8107b420>] ? rcu_check_callbacks+0x3f0/0x6b0
     [<ffffffff8107d667>] ? hrtimer_run_queues+0x47/0x180
     [<ffffffff8107cf9d>] ? update_process_times+0x2d/0x50
     [<ffffffff810873fb>] ? tick_handle_periodic+0x1b/0x60
     [<ffffffff810290ae>] ? smp_trace_apic_timer_interrupt+0x5e/0x90
     [<ffffffff813bbae2>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x82/0x90
     <EOI>  [<ffffffff812c3fd7>] ? __dev_get_by_index+0x37/0x40
     [<ffffffffa0031f3e>] ? batadv_hard_if_event+0xee/0x3a0 [batman_adv]
     [<ffffffff812c5801>] ? register_netdevice_notifier+0x81/0x1a0
    [...]

This can be avoided by checking if two devices are each others parent and stopping the check in this situation.

---
 net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c |   25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+)

@@ -74,6 +74,28 @@ out:
 }
 
 /**
+ * batadv_mutual_parents - check if two devices are each others parent
+ * @dev1: 1st net_device
+ * @dev2: 2nd net_device
+ *
+ * veth devices come in pairs and each is the parent of the other!
+ *
+ * Return: true if the devices are each others parent, otherwise false
+ */
+static bool batadv_mutual_parents(const struct net_device *dev1,
+				  const struct net_device *dev2)
+{
+	int dev1_parent_iflink = dev_get_iflink(dev1);
+	int dev2_parent_iflink = dev_get_iflink(dev2);
+
+	if (!dev1_parent_iflink || !dev2_parent_iflink)
+		return false;
+
+	return (dev1_parent_iflink == dev2->ifindex) &&
+	       (dev2_parent_iflink == dev1->ifindex);
+}
+
+/**
  * batadv_is_on_batman_iface - check if a device is a batman iface descendant
  * @net_dev: the device to check
  *

@@ -108,6 +130,9 @@ static bool batadv_is_on_batman_iface(co
 		return false;
 	}
 
+	if (batadv_mutual_parents(net_dev, parent_dev))
+		return false;
+
 	ret = batadv_is_on_batman_iface(parent_dev);
 
 	return ret;

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit f7dcdf5fdbe8fec7670d8f65a5db595c98e0ecab upstream.

The function batadv_iv_ogm_orig_add_if allocates new buffers for bcast_own and bcast_own_sum. It is expected that these buffers are unchanged in case either bcast_own or bcast_own_sum couldn't be resized.

But the error handling of this function frees the already resized buffer for bcast_own when the allocation of the new bcast_own_sum buffer failed. This will lead to an invalid memory access when some code will try to access bcast_own.

Instead the resized new bcast_own buffer has to be kept. This will not lead to problems because the size of the buffer was only increased and therefore no user of the buffer will try to access bytes outside of the new buffer.

---
 net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c |    4 +---
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -155,10 +155,8 @@ static int batadv_iv_ogm_orig_add_if(str
 	orig_node->bat_iv.bcast_own = data_ptr;
 
 	data_ptr = kmalloc_array(max_if_num, sizeof(u8), GFP_ATOMIC);
-	if (!data_ptr) {
-		kfree(orig_node->bat_iv.bcast_own);
+	if (!data_ptr)
 		goto unlock;
-	}
 
 	memcpy(data_ptr, orig_node->bat_iv.bcast_own_sum,
 	       (max_if_num - 1) * sizeof(u8));

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit d285f52cc0f23564fd61976d43fd5b991b4828f6 upstream.

The undefined behavior sanatizer detected an signed integer overflow in a setup with near perfect link quality

    UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c:1246:25
    signed integer overflow:
    8713350 * 255 cannot be represented in type 'int'

The problems happens because the calculation of mixed unsigned and signed integers resulted in an integer multiplication.

batadv_ogm_packet::tq (u8 255)
* tq_own (u8 255)
* tq_asym_penalty (int 134; max 255)
* tq_iface_penalty (int 255; max 255)

The tq_iface_penalty, tq_asym_penalty and inv_asym_penalty can just be changed to unsigned int because they are not expected to become negative.

---
 net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1140,9 +1140,10 @@ static int batadv_iv_ogm_calc_tq(struct
 	u8 total_count;
 	u8 orig_eq_count, neigh_rq_count, neigh_rq_inv, tq_own;
 	unsigned int neigh_rq_inv_cube, neigh_rq_max_cube;
-	int tq_asym_penalty, inv_asym_penalty, if_num, ret = 0;
+	int if_num, ret = 0;
+	unsigned int tq_asym_penalty, inv_asym_penalty;
 	unsigned int combined_tq;
-	int tq_iface_penalty;
+	unsigned int tq_iface_penalty;
 
 	/* find corresponding one hop neighbor */
 	rcu_read_lock();

From: Marek Lindner <[email protected]>

commit e48474ed8a217b7f80f2a42bc05352406a06cb67 upstream.

---
 net/batman-adv/originator.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -483,6 +483,7 @@ batadv_neigh_node_new(struct batadv_orig
 	ether_addr_copy(neigh_node->addr, neigh_addr);
 	neigh_node->if_incoming = hard_iface;
 	neigh_node->orig_node = orig_node;
+	neigh_node->last_seen = jiffies;
 
 	/* extra reference for return */
 	atomic_set(&neigh_node->refcount, 2);

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit f2d23861b818d08bcd15cc1612ae94aa33b3931c upstream.

The shutdown of an batman-adv interface can happen with one of its slave interfaces still being in the BATADV_IF_TO_BE_ACTIVATED state. A possible reason for it is that the routing algorithm BATMAN_V was selected and batadv_schedule_bat_ogm was not yet called for this interface. This slave interface still has to be set to BATADV_IF_INACTIVE or the batman-adv interface will never reduce its usage counter and thus never gets shutdown.

This problem can be simulated via:

    $ modprobe dummy
    $ modprobe batman-adv routing_algo=BATMAN_V
    $ ip link add bat0 type batadv
    $ ip link set dummy0 master bat0
    $ ip link set dummy0 up
    $ ip link del bat0
    unregister_netdevice: waiting for bat0 to become free. Usage count = 3

---
 net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -562,8 +562,7 @@ void batadv_hardif_disable_interface(str
 	struct batadv_priv *bat_priv = netdev_priv(hard_iface->soft_iface);
 	struct batadv_hard_iface *primary_if = NULL;
 
-	if (hard_iface->if_status == BATADV_IF_ACTIVE)
-		batadv_hardif_deactivate_interface(hard_iface);
+	batadv_hardif_deactivate_interface(hard_iface);
 
 	if (hard_iface->if_status != BATADV_IF_INACTIVE)
 		goto out;

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit 140ed8e87ca8f4875c2b146cdb2cdbf0c9ac6080 upstream.

The references to the network device should be dropped inside the release function for batadv_hard_iface similar to what is done with the batman-adv internal datastructures.

---
 net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c |   13 ++++++++-----
 net/batman-adv/hard-interface.h |    6 +++---
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

@@ -45,13 +45,16 @@
 #include "sysfs.h"
 #include "translation-table.h"
 
-void batadv_hardif_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+/**
+ * batadv_hardif_release - release hard interface from lists and queue for
+ *  free after rcu grace period
+ * @hard_iface: the hard interface to free
+ */
+void batadv_hardif_release(struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface)
 {
-	struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface;
-
-	hard_iface = container_of(rcu, struct batadv_hard_iface, rcu);
 	dev_put(hard_iface->net_dev);
-	kfree(hard_iface);
+
+	kfree_rcu(hard_iface, rcu);
 }
 
 struct batadv_hard_iface *

@@ -61,18 +61,18 @@ void batadv_hardif_disable_interface(str
 void batadv_hardif_remove_interfaces(void);
 int batadv_hardif_min_mtu(struct net_device *soft_iface);
 void batadv_update_min_mtu(struct net_device *soft_iface);
-void batadv_hardif_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu);
+void batadv_hardif_release(struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface);
 
 /**
  * batadv_hardif_free_ref - decrement the hard interface refcounter and
- *  possibly free it
+ *  possibly release it
  * @hard_iface: the hard interface to free
  */
 static inline void
 batadv_hardif_free_ref(struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface)
 {
 	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&hard_iface->refcount))
-		call_rcu(&hard_iface->rcu, batadv_hardif_free_rcu);
+		batadv_hardif_release(hard_iface);
 }
 
 static inline struct batadv_hard_iface *

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit a33d970d0b54b09746d5540af8271fad4eb10229 upstream.

The batadv_tt_local_entry was specific to a batadv_softif_vlan and held an implicit reference to it. But this reference was never stored in form of a pointer in the tt_local_entry itself. Instead batadv_tt_local_remove, batadv_tt_local_table_free and batadv_tt_local_purge_pending_clients depend on a consistent state of bat_priv->softif_vlan_list and that batadv_softif_vlan_get always returns the batadv_softif_vlan object which it has a reference for. But batadv_softif_vlan_get cannot guarantee that because it is working only with rcu_read_lock on this list. It can therefore happen that an vid is in this list twice or that batadv_softif_vlan_get cannot find the batadv_softif_vlan for an vid due to some other list operations taking place at the same time.

Instead add a batadv_softif_vlan pointer directly in batadv_tt_local_entry which will be used for the reference counter decremented on release of batadv_tt_local_entry.

---
 net/batman-adv/translation-table.c |   44 ++++---------------------------------
 net/batman-adv/types.h             |    2 +
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)

@@ -197,8 +197,11 @@ batadv_tt_global_hash_find(struct batadv
 static void
 batadv_tt_local_entry_free_ref(struct batadv_tt_local_entry *tt_local_entry)
 {
-	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&tt_local_entry->common.refcount))
+	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&tt_local_entry->common.refcount)) {
+		batadv_softif_vlan_free_ref(tt_local_entry->vlan);
+
 		kfree_rcu(tt_local_entry, common.rcu);
+	}
 }
 
 /**

@@ -638,7 +641,6 @@ bool batadv_tt_local_add(struct net_devi
 	if (unlikely(hash_added != 0)) {
 		/* remove the reference for the hash */
 		batadv_tt_local_entry_free_ref(tt_local);
-		batadv_softif_vlan_free_ref(vlan);
 		goto out;
 	}
 

@@ -942,7 +944,6 @@ int batadv_tt_local_seq_print_text(struc
 	struct batadv_tt_common_entry *tt_common_entry;
 	struct batadv_tt_local_entry *tt_local;
 	struct batadv_hard_iface *primary_if;
-	struct batadv_softif_vlan *vlan;
 	struct hlist_head *head;
 	unsigned short vid;
 	u32 i;

@@ -979,13 +980,6 @@ int batadv_tt_local_seq_print_text(struc
 
 			no_purge = tt_common_entry->flags & np_flag;
 
-			vlan = batadv_softif_vlan_get(bat_priv, vid);
-			if (!vlan) {
-				seq_printf(seq, "Cannot retrieve VLAN %d\n",
-					   BATADV_PRINT_VID(vid));
-				continue;
-			}
-
 			seq_printf(seq,
 				   " * %pM %4i [%c%c%c%c%c%c] %3u.%03u   (%#.8x)\n",
 				   tt_common_entry->addr,

@@ -1003,9 +997,7 @@ int batadv_tt_local_seq_print_text(struc
 				     BATADV_TT_CLIENT_ISOLA) ? 'I' : '.'),
 				   no_purge ? 0 : last_seen_secs,
 				   no_purge ? 0 : last_seen_msecs,
-				   vlan->tt.crc);
-
-			batadv_softif_vlan_free_ref(vlan);
+				   tt_local->vlan->tt.crc);
 		}
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 	}

@@ -1050,7 +1042,6 @@ u16 batadv_tt_local_remove(struct batadv
 {
 	struct batadv_tt_local_entry *tt_local_entry;
 	u16 flags, curr_flags = BATADV_NO_FLAGS;
-	struct batadv_softif_vlan *vlan;
 	void *tt_entry_exists;
 
 	tt_local_entry = batadv_tt_local_hash_find(bat_priv, addr, vid);

@@ -1090,14 +1081,6 @@ u16 batadv_tt_local_remove(struct batadv
 	/* extra call to free the local tt entry */
 	batadv_tt_local_entry_free_ref(tt_local_entry);
 
-	/* decrease the reference held for this vlan */
-	vlan = batadv_softif_vlan_get(bat_priv, vid);
-	if (!vlan)
-		goto out;
-
-	batadv_softif_vlan_free_ref(vlan);
-	batadv_softif_vlan_free_ref(vlan);
-
 out:
 	if (tt_local_entry)
 		batadv_tt_local_entry_free_ref(tt_local_entry);

@@ -1170,7 +1153,6 @@ static void batadv_tt_local_table_free(s
 	spinlock_t *list_lock; /* protects write access to the hash lists */
 	struct batadv_tt_common_entry *tt_common_entry;
 	struct batadv_tt_local_entry *tt_local;
-	struct batadv_softif_vlan *vlan;
 	struct hlist_node *node_tmp;
 	struct hlist_head *head;
 	u32 i;

@@ -1192,14 +1174,6 @@ static void batadv_tt_local_table_free(s
 						struct batadv_tt_local_entry,
 						common);
 
-			/* decrease the reference held for this vlan */
-			vlan = batadv_softif_vlan_get(bat_priv,
-						      tt_common_entry->vid);
-			if (vlan) {
-				batadv_softif_vlan_free_ref(vlan);
-				batadv_softif_vlan_free_ref(vlan);
-			}
-
 			batadv_tt_local_entry_free_ref(tt_local);
 		}
 		spin_unlock_bh(list_lock);

@@ -3229,7 +3203,6 @@ static void batadv_tt_local_purge_pendin
 	struct batadv_hashtable *hash = bat_priv->tt.local_hash;
 	struct batadv_tt_common_entry *tt_common;
 	struct batadv_tt_local_entry *tt_local;
-	struct batadv_softif_vlan *vlan;
 	struct hlist_node *node_tmp;
 	struct hlist_head *head;
 	spinlock_t *list_lock; /* protects write access to the hash lists */

@@ -3259,13 +3232,6 @@ static void batadv_tt_local_purge_pendin
 						struct batadv_tt_local_entry,
 						common);
 
-			/* decrease the reference held for this vlan */
-			vlan = batadv_softif_vlan_get(bat_priv, tt_common->vid);
-			if (vlan) {
-				batadv_softif_vlan_free_ref(vlan);
-				batadv_softif_vlan_free_ref(vlan);
-			}
-
 			batadv_tt_local_entry_free_ref(tt_local);
 		}
 		spin_unlock_bh(list_lock);

@@ -947,10 +947,12 @@ struct batadv_tt_common_entry {
  * struct batadv_tt_local_entry - translation table local entry data
  * @common: general translation table data
  * @last_seen: timestamp used for purging stale tt local entries
+ * @vlan: soft-interface vlan of the entry
  */
 struct batadv_tt_local_entry {
 	struct batadv_tt_common_entry common;
 	unsigned long last_seen;
+	struct batadv_softif_vlan *vlan;
 };
 
 /**

From: Linus L�ssing <[email protected]>

commit e123705e58bf171be8c6eb0902ebfb5d6ed255ad upstream.

Two parallel calls to batadv_neigh_node_new() might race for creating and adding the same neig_node. Fix this by including the check for any already existing, identical neigh_node within the spin-lock.

This fixes splats like the following:

[  739.535069] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  739.535079] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at /usr/src/batman-adv/git/batman-adv/net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c:1004 batadv_iv_ogm_process_per_outif+0xe3f/0xe60 [batman_adv]()
[  739.535092] too many matching neigh_nodes
[  739.535094] Modules linked in: dm_mod tun ip6table_filter ip6table_mangle ip6table_nat nf_nat_ipv6 ip6_tables xt_nat iptable_nat nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat xt_TCPMSS xt_mark iptable_mangle xt_tcpudp xt_conntrack iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables ip_gre ip_tunnel gre bridge stp llc thermal_sys kvm_intel kvm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul sha256_ssse3 sha256_generic hmac drbg ansi_cprng aesni_intel aes_x86_64 lrw gf128mul glue_helper ablk_helper cryptd evdev pcspkr ip6_gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 batman_adv(O) libcrc32c nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_conntrack autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 xen_netfront xen_blkfront crc32c_intel
[  739.535177] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G        W  O    4.2.0-0.bpo.1-amd64 #1 Debian 4.2.6-3~bpo8+2
[  739.535186]  0000000000000000 ffffffffa013b050 ffffffff81554521 ffff88007d003c18
[  739.535201]  ffffffff8106fa01 0000000000000000 ffff8800047a087a ffff880079c3a000
[  739.735602]  ffff88007b82bf40 ffff88007bc2d1c0 ffffffff8106fa7a ffffffffa013aa8e
[  739.735624] Call Trace:
[  739.735639]  <IRQ>  [<ffffffff81554521>] ? dump_stack+0x40/0x50
[  739.735677]  [<ffffffff8106fa01>] ? warn_slowpath_common+0x81/0xb0
[  739.735692]  [<ffffffff8106fa7a>] ? warn_slowpath_fmt+0x4a/0x50
[  739.735715]  [<ffffffffa012448f>] ? batadv_iv_ogm_process_per_outif+0xe3f/0xe60 [batman_adv]
[  739.735740]  [<ffffffffa0124813>] ? batadv_iv_ogm_receive+0x363/0x380 [batman_adv]
[  739.735762]  [<ffffffffa0124813>] ? batadv_iv_ogm_receive+0x363/0x380 [batman_adv]
[  739.735783]  [<ffffffff810b0841>] ? __raw_callee_save___pv_queued_spin_unlock+0x11/0x20
[  739.735804]  [<ffffffffa012cb39>] ? batadv_batman_skb_recv+0xc9/0x110 [batman_adv]
[  739.735825]  [<ffffffff81464891>] ? __netif_receive_skb_core+0x841/0x9a0
[  739.735838]  [<ffffffff810b0841>] ? __raw_callee_save___pv_queued_spin_unlock+0x11/0x20
[  739.735853]  [<ffffffff81465681>] ? process_backlog+0xa1/0x140
[  739.735864]  [<ffffffff81464f1a>] ? net_rx_action+0x20a/0x320
[  739.735878]  [<ffffffff81073aa7>] ? __do_softirq+0x107/0x270
[  739.735891]  [<ffffffff81073d82>] ? irq_exit+0x92/0xa0
[  739.735905]  [<ffffffff8137e0d1>] ? xen_evtchn_do_upcall+0x31/0x40
[  739.735924]  [<ffffffff8155b8fe>] ? xen_do_hypervisor_callback+0x1e/0x40
[  739.735939]  <EOI>  [<ffffffff810013aa>] ? xen_hypercall_sched_op+0xa/0x20
[  739.735965]  [<ffffffff810013aa>] ? xen_hypercall_sched_op+0xa/0x20
[  739.735979]  [<ffffffff8100a39c>] ? xen_safe_halt+0xc/0x20
[  739.735991]  [<ffffffff8101da6c>] ? default_idle+0x1c/0xa0
[  739.736004]  [<ffffffff810abf6b>] ? cpu_startup_entry+0x2eb/0x350
[  739.736019]  [<ffffffff81b2af5e>] ? start_kernel+0x480/0x48b
[  739.736032]  [<ffffffff81b2d116>] ? xen_start_kernel+0x507/0x511
[  739.736048] ---[ end trace c106bb901244bc8c ]---

---
 net/batman-adv/originator.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -462,6 +462,8 @@ batadv_neigh_node_new(struct batadv_orig
 {
 	struct batadv_neigh_node *neigh_node;
 
+	spin_lock_bh(&orig_node->neigh_list_lock);
+
 	neigh_node = batadv_neigh_node_get(orig_node, hard_iface, neigh_addr);
 	if (neigh_node)
 		goto out;

@@ -488,15 +490,15 @@ batadv_neigh_node_new(struct batadv_orig
 	/* extra reference for return */
 	atomic_set(&neigh_node->refcount, 2);
 
-	spin_lock_bh(&orig_node->neigh_list_lock);
 	hlist_add_head_rcu(&neigh_node->list, &orig_node->neigh_list);
-	spin_unlock_bh(&orig_node->neigh_list_lock);
 
 	batadv_dbg(BATADV_DBG_BATMAN, orig_node->bat_priv,
 		   "Creating new neighbor %pM for orig_node %pM on interface %s\n",
 		   neigh_addr, orig_node->orig, hard_iface->net_dev->name);
 
 out:
+	spin_unlock_bh(&orig_node->neigh_list_lock);
+
 	return neigh_node;
 }
 

From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>

commit 63d443efe8be2c1d02b30d7e4edeb9aa085352b3 upstream.

batadv_send_skb_to_orig() calls dev_queue_xmit() so we can't use skb->len.

---
 net/batman-adv/routing.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -585,6 +585,7 @@ static int batadv_route_unicast_packet(s
 	struct batadv_unicast_packet *unicast_packet;
 	struct ethhdr *ethhdr = eth_hdr(skb);
 	int res, hdr_len, ret = NET_RX_DROP;
+	unsigned int len;
 
 	unicast_packet = (struct batadv_unicast_packet *)skb->data;
 

@@ -625,6 +626,7 @@ static int batadv_route_unicast_packet(s
 	if (hdr_len > 0)
 		batadv_skb_set_priority(skb, hdr_len);
 
+	len = skb->len;
 	res = batadv_send_skb_to_orig(skb, orig_node, recv_if);
 
 	/* translate transmit result into receive result */

@@ -632,7 +634,7 @@ static int batadv_route_unicast_packet(s
 		/* skb was transmitted and consumed */
 		batadv_inc_counter(bat_priv, BATADV_CNT_FORWARD);
 		batadv_add_counter(bat_priv, BATADV_CNT_FORWARD_BYTES,
-				   skb->len + ETH_HLEN);
+				   len + ETH_HLEN);
 
 		ret = NET_RX_SUCCESS;
 	} else if (res == NET_XMIT_POLICED) {

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit 9c4604a298e0a9807eaf2cd912d1ebf24d98fbeb upstream.

The tt_req_node is added and removed from a list inside a spinlock. But the locking is sometimes removed even when the object is still referenced and will be used later via this reference. For example batadv_send_tt_request can create a new tt_req_node (including add to a list) and later re-acquires the lock to remove it from the list and to free it. But at this time another context could have already removed this tt_req_node from the list and freed it.

CPU#0

    batadv_batman_skb_recv from net_device 0
    -> batadv_iv_ogm_receive
      -> batadv_iv_ogm_process
        -> batadv_iv_ogm_process_per_outif
          -> batadv_tvlv_ogm_receive
            -> batadv_tvlv_ogm_receive
              -> batadv_tvlv_containers_process
                -> batadv_tvlv_call_handler
                  -> batadv_tt_tvlv_ogm_handler_v1
                    -> batadv_tt_update_orig
                      -> batadv_send_tt_request
                        -> batadv_tt_req_node_new
                           spin_lock(...)
                           allocates new tt_req_node and adds it to list
                           spin_unlock(...)
                           return tt_req_node

CPU#1

    batadv_batman_skb_recv from net_device 1
    -> batadv_recv_unicast_tvlv
      -> batadv_tvlv_containers_process
        -> batadv_tvlv_call_handler
          -> batadv_tt_tvlv_unicast_handler_v1
            -> batadv_handle_tt_response
               spin_lock(...)
               tt_req_node gets removed from list and is freed
               spin_unlock(...)

CPU#0

<- returned to batadv_send_tt_request
spin_lock(...)
tt_req_node gets removed from list and is freed MEMORY CORRUPTION/SEGFAULT/... spin_unlock(...)

This can only be solved via reference counting to allow multiple contexts to handle the list manipulation while making sure that only the last context holding a reference will free the object.

---
 net/batman-adv/translation-table.c |   43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 net/batman-adv/types.h             |    2 +
 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

@@ -2206,6 +2206,29 @@ static u32 batadv_tt_local_crc(struct ba
 	return crc;
 }
 
+/**
+ * batadv_tt_req_node_release - free tt_req node entry
+ * @ref: kref pointer of the tt req_node entry
+ */
+static void batadv_tt_req_node_release(struct kref *ref)
+{
+	struct batadv_tt_req_node *tt_req_node;
+
+	tt_req_node = container_of(ref, struct batadv_tt_req_node, refcount);
+
+	kfree(tt_req_node);
+}
+
+/**
+ * batadv_tt_req_node_put - decrement the tt_req_node refcounter and
+ *  possibly release it
+ * @tt_req_node: tt_req_node to be free'd
+ */
+static void batadv_tt_req_node_put(struct batadv_tt_req_node *tt_req_node)
+{
+	kref_put(&tt_req_node->refcount, batadv_tt_req_node_release);
+}
+
 static void batadv_tt_req_list_free(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv)
 {
 	struct batadv_tt_req_node *node;

@@ -2215,7 +2238,7 @@ static void batadv_tt_req_list_free(stru
 
 	hlist_for_each_entry_safe(node, safe, &bat_priv->tt.req_list, list) {
 		hlist_del_init(&node->list);
-		kfree(node);
+		batadv_tt_req_node_put(node);
 	}
 
 	spin_unlock_bh(&bat_priv->tt.req_list_lock);

@@ -2252,7 +2275,7 @@ static void batadv_tt_req_purge(struct b
 		if (batadv_has_timed_out(node->issued_at,
 					 BATADV_TT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT)) {
 			hlist_del_init(&node->list);
-			kfree(node);
+			batadv_tt_req_node_put(node);
 		}
 	}
 	spin_unlock_bh(&bat_priv->tt.req_list_lock);

@@ -2284,9 +2307,11 @@ batadv_tt_req_node_new(struct batadv_pri
 	if (!tt_req_node)
 		goto unlock;
 
+	kref_init(&tt_req_node->refcount);
 	ether_addr_copy(tt_req_node->addr, orig_node->orig);
 	tt_req_node->issued_at = jiffies;
 
+	kref_get(&tt_req_node->refcount);
 	hlist_add_head(&tt_req_node->list, &bat_priv->tt.req_list);
 unlock:
 	spin_unlock_bh(&bat_priv->tt.req_list_lock);

@@ -2536,13 +2561,19 @@ static int batadv_send_tt_request(struct
 out:
 	if (primary_if)
 		batadv_hardif_free_ref(primary_if);
+
 	if (ret && tt_req_node) {
 		spin_lock_bh(&bat_priv->tt.req_list_lock);
-		/* hlist_del_init() verifies tt_req_node still is in the list */
-		hlist_del_init(&tt_req_node->list);
+		if (!hlist_unhashed(&tt_req_node->list)) {
+			hlist_del_init(&tt_req_node->list);
+			batadv_tt_req_node_put(tt_req_node);
+		}
 		spin_unlock_bh(&bat_priv->tt.req_list_lock);
-		kfree(tt_req_node);
 	}
+
+	if (tt_req_node)
+		batadv_tt_req_node_put(tt_req_node);
+
 	kfree(tvlv_tt_data);
 	return ret;
 }

@@ -2978,7 +3009,7 @@ static void batadv_handle_tt_response(st
 		if (!batadv_compare_eth(node->addr, resp_src))
 			continue;
 		hlist_del_init(&node->list);
-		kfree(node);
+		batadv_tt_req_node_put(node);
 	}
 
 	spin_unlock_bh(&bat_priv->tt.req_list_lock);

@@ -1001,11 +1001,13 @@ struct batadv_tt_change_node {
  * struct batadv_tt_req_node - data to keep track of the tt requests in flight
  * @addr: mac address address of the originator this request was sent to
  * @issued_at: timestamp used for purging stale tt requests
+ * @refcount: number of contexts the object is used by
  * @list: list node for batadv_priv_tt::req_list
  */
 struct batadv_tt_req_node {
 	u8 addr[ETH_ALEN];
 	unsigned long issued_at;
+	struct kref refcount;
 	struct hlist_node list;
 };
 

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit 3b55e4422087f9f7b241031d758a0c65584e4297 upstream.

The skb_linearize may reallocate the skb. This makes the calculated pointer for ethhdr invalid. But it the pointer is used later to fill in the RR field of the batadv_icmp_packet_rr packet.

Instead re-evaluate eth_hdr after the skb_linearize+skb_cow to fix the pointer and avoid the invalid read.

---
 net/batman-adv/routing.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -359,6 +359,7 @@ int batadv_recv_icmp_packet(struct sk_bu
 		if (skb_cow(skb, ETH_HLEN) < 0)
 			goto out;
 
+		ethhdr = eth_hdr(skb);
 		icmph = (struct batadv_icmp_header *)skb->data;
 		icmp_packet_rr = (struct batadv_icmp_packet_rr *)icmph;
 		if (icmp_packet_rr->rr_cur >= BATADV_RR_LEN)

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit 420cb1b764f9169c5d2601b4af90e4a1702345ee upstream.

The untagged vlan object is only destroyed when the interface is removed via the legacy sysfs interface. But it also has to be destroyed when the standard rtnl-link interface is used.

---
 net/batman-adv/soft-interface.c |    9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

@@ -1000,7 +1000,9 @@ void batadv_softif_destroy_sysfs(struct
 static void batadv_softif_destroy_netlink(struct net_device *soft_iface,
 					  struct list_head *head)
 {
+	struct batadv_priv *bat_priv = netdev_priv(soft_iface);
 	struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface;
+	struct batadv_softif_vlan *vlan;
 
 	list_for_each_entry(hard_iface, &batadv_hardif_list, list) {
 		if (hard_iface->soft_iface == soft_iface)

@@ -1008,6 +1010,13 @@ static void batadv_softif_destroy_netlin
 							BATADV_IF_CLEANUP_KEEP);
 	}
 
+	/* destroy the "untagged" VLAN */
+	vlan = batadv_softif_vlan_get(bat_priv, BATADV_NO_FLAGS);
+	if (vlan) {
+		batadv_softif_destroy_vlan(bat_priv, vlan);
+		batadv_softif_vlan_free_ref(vlan);
+	}
+
 	batadv_sysfs_del_meshif(soft_iface);
 	unregister_netdevice_queue(soft_iface, head);
 }

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit 10c78f5854d361ded4736c1831948e0a5f67b932 upstream.

vlan_insert_tag can return NULL on errors. The bridge loop avoidance code therefore has to check the return value of vlan_insert_tag for NULL before it can safely operate on this pointer.

---
 net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -352,9 +352,12 @@ static void batadv_bla_send_claim(struct
 		break;
 	}
 
-	if (vid & BATADV_VLAN_HAS_TAG)
+	if (vid & BATADV_VLAN_HAS_TAG) {
 		skb = vlan_insert_tag(skb, htons(ETH_P_8021Q),
 				      vid & VLAN_VID_MASK);
+		if (!skb)
+			goto out;
+	}
 
 	skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
 	skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, soft_iface);

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit 60154a1e0495ffb8343a95cefe1e874634572fa8 upstream.

vlan_insert_tag can return NULL on errors. The distributed arp table code therefore has to check the return value of vlan_insert_tag for NULL before it can safely operate on this pointer.

---
 net/batman-adv/distributed-arp-table.c |   10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -993,9 +993,12 @@ bool batadv_dat_snoop_outgoing_arp_reque
 		if (!skb_new)
 			goto out;
 
-		if (vid & BATADV_VLAN_HAS_TAG)
+		if (vid & BATADV_VLAN_HAS_TAG) {
 			skb_new = vlan_insert_tag(skb_new, htons(ETH_P_8021Q),
 						  vid & VLAN_VID_MASK);
+			if (!skb_new)
+				goto out;
+		}
 
 		skb_reset_mac_header(skb_new);
 		skb_new->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb_new,

@@ -1073,9 +1076,12 @@ bool batadv_dat_snoop_incoming_arp_reque
 	 */
 	skb_reset_mac_header(skb_new);
 
-	if (vid & BATADV_VLAN_HAS_TAG)
+	if (vid & BATADV_VLAN_HAS_TAG) {
 		skb_new = vlan_insert_tag(skb_new, htons(ETH_P_8021Q),
 					  vid & VLAN_VID_MASK);
+		if (!skb_new)
+			goto out;
+	}
 
 	/* To preserve backwards compatibility, the node has choose the outgoing
 	 * format based on the incoming request packet type. The assumption is

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit 33fbb1f3db87ce53da925b3e034b4dd446d483f8 upstream.

batadv_orig_node_new uses batadv_orig_node_vlan_new to allocate a new batadv_orig_node_vlan and add it to batadv_orig_node::vlan_list. References to this list have also to be cleaned when the batadv_orig_node is removed.

---
 net/batman-adv/originator.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

@@ -564,6 +564,7 @@ static void batadv_orig_node_release(str
 	struct hlist_node *node_tmp;
 	struct batadv_neigh_node *neigh_node;
 	struct batadv_orig_ifinfo *orig_ifinfo;
+	struct batadv_orig_node_vlan *vlan;
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&orig_node->neigh_list_lock);
 

@@ -581,6 +582,13 @@ static void batadv_orig_node_release(str
 	}
 	spin_unlock_bh(&orig_node->neigh_list_lock);
 
+	spin_lock_bh(&orig_node->vlan_list_lock);
+	hlist_for_each_entry_safe(vlan, node_tmp, &orig_node->vlan_list, list) {
+		hlist_del_rcu(&vlan->list);
+		batadv_orig_node_vlan_free_ref(vlan);
+	}
+	spin_unlock_bh(&orig_node->vlan_list_lock);
+
 	/* Free nc_nodes */
 	batadv_nc_purge_orig(orig_node->bat_priv, orig_node, NULL);
 

From: Simon Wunderlich <[email protected]>

commit 5a1dd8a4773d4c24e925cc6154826d555a85c370 upstream.

We have found some networks in which nodes were constantly requesting other nodes BLA claim tables to synchronize, just to ask for that again once completed. The reason was that the crc checksum of the asked nodes were out of sync due to missing locking and multiple writes to the same crc checksum when adding/removing entries. Therefore the asked nodes constantly reported the wrong crc, which caused repeating requests.

To avoid multiple functions changing a backbone gateways crc entry at the same time, lock it using a spinlock.

---
 net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c |   35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 net/batman-adv/types.h                 |    2 +
 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -256,7 +256,9 @@ batadv_bla_del_backbone_claims(struct ba
 	}
 
 	/* all claims gone, initialize CRC */
+	spin_lock_bh(&backbone_gw->crc_lock);
 	backbone_gw->crc = BATADV_BLA_CRC_INIT;
+	spin_unlock_bh(&backbone_gw->crc_lock);
 }
 
 /**

@@ -407,6 +409,7 @@ batadv_bla_get_backbone_gw(struct batadv
 	entry->lasttime = jiffies;
 	entry->crc = BATADV_BLA_CRC_INIT;
 	entry->bat_priv = bat_priv;
+	spin_lock_init(&entry->crc_lock);
 	atomic_set(&entry->request_sent, 0);
 	atomic_set(&entry->wait_periods, 0);
 	ether_addr_copy(entry->orig, orig);

@@ -556,7 +559,9 @@ static void batadv_bla_send_announce(str
 	__be16 crc;
 
 	memcpy(mac, batadv_announce_mac, 4);
+	spin_lock_bh(&backbone_gw->crc_lock);
 	crc = htons(backbone_gw->crc);
+	spin_unlock_bh(&backbone_gw->crc_lock);
 	memcpy(&mac[4], &crc, 2);
 
 	batadv_bla_send_claim(bat_priv, mac, backbone_gw->vid,

@@ -617,14 +622,18 @@ static void batadv_bla_add_claim(struct
 			   "bla_add_claim(): changing ownership for %pM, vid %d\n",
 			   mac, BATADV_PRINT_VID(vid));
 
+		spin_lock_bh(&claim->backbone_gw->crc_lock);
 		claim->backbone_gw->crc ^= crc16(0, claim->addr, ETH_ALEN);
+		spin_unlock_bh(&claim->backbone_gw->crc_lock);
 		batadv_backbone_gw_free_ref(claim->backbone_gw);
 	}
 	/* set (new) backbone gw */
 	atomic_inc(&backbone_gw->refcount);
 	claim->backbone_gw = backbone_gw;
 
+	spin_lock_bh(&backbone_gw->crc_lock);
 	backbone_gw->crc ^= crc16(0, claim->addr, ETH_ALEN);
+	spin_unlock_bh(&backbone_gw->crc_lock);
 	backbone_gw->lasttime = jiffies;
 
 claim_free_ref:

@@ -652,7 +661,9 @@ static void batadv_bla_del_claim(struct
 			   batadv_choose_claim, claim);
 	batadv_claim_free_ref(claim); /* reference from the hash is gone */
 
+	spin_lock_bh(&claim->backbone_gw->crc_lock);
 	claim->backbone_gw->crc ^= crc16(0, claim->addr, ETH_ALEN);
+	spin_unlock_bh(&claim->backbone_gw->crc_lock);
 
 	/* don't need the reference from hash_find() anymore */
 	batadv_claim_free_ref(claim);

@@ -663,7 +674,7 @@ static int batadv_handle_announce(struct
 				  u8 *backbone_addr, unsigned short vid)
 {
 	struct batadv_bla_backbone_gw *backbone_gw;
-	u16 crc;
+	u16 backbone_crc, crc;
 
 	if (memcmp(an_addr, batadv_announce_mac, 4) != 0)
 		return 0;

@@ -682,12 +693,16 @@ static int batadv_handle_announce(struct
 		   "handle_announce(): ANNOUNCE vid %d (sent by %pM)... CRC = %#.4x\n",
 		   BATADV_PRINT_VID(vid), backbone_gw->orig, crc);
 
-	if (backbone_gw->crc != crc) {
+	spin_lock_bh(&backbone_gw->crc_lock);
+	backbone_crc = backbone_gw->crc;
+	spin_unlock_bh(&backbone_gw->crc_lock);
+
+	if (backbone_crc != crc) {
 		batadv_dbg(BATADV_DBG_BLA, backbone_gw->bat_priv,
 			   "handle_announce(): CRC FAILED for %pM/%d (my = %#.4x, sent = %#.4x)\n",
 			   backbone_gw->orig,
 			   BATADV_PRINT_VID(backbone_gw->vid),
-			   backbone_gw->crc, crc);
+			   backbone_crc, crc);
 
 		batadv_bla_send_request(backbone_gw);
 	} else {

@@ -1658,6 +1673,7 @@ int batadv_bla_claim_table_seq_print_tex
 	struct batadv_bla_claim *claim;
 	struct batadv_hard_iface *primary_if;
 	struct hlist_head *head;
+	u16 backbone_crc;
 	u32 i;
 	bool is_own;
 	u8 *primary_addr;

@@ -1680,11 +1696,15 @@ int batadv_bla_claim_table_seq_print_tex
 		hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(claim, head, hash_entry) {
 			is_own = batadv_compare_eth(claim->backbone_gw->orig,
 						    primary_addr);
+
+			spin_lock_bh(&claim->backbone_gw->crc_lock);
+			backbone_crc = claim->backbone_gw->crc;
+			spin_unlock_bh(&claim->backbone_gw->crc_lock);
 			seq_printf(seq, " * %pM on %5d by %pM [%c] (%#.4x)\n",
 				   claim->addr, BATADV_PRINT_VID(claim->vid),
 				   claim->backbone_gw->orig,
 				   (is_own ? 'x' : ' '),
-				   claim->backbone_gw->crc);
+				   backbone_crc);
 		}
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 	}

@@ -1703,6 +1723,7 @@ int batadv_bla_backbone_table_seq_print_
 	struct batadv_hard_iface *primary_if;
 	struct hlist_head *head;
 	int secs, msecs;
+	u16 backbone_crc;
 	u32 i;
 	bool is_own;
 	u8 *primary_addr;

@@ -1733,10 +1754,14 @@ int batadv_bla_backbone_table_seq_print_
 			if (is_own)
 				continue;
 
+			spin_lock_bh(&backbone_gw->crc_lock);
+			backbone_crc = backbone_gw->crc;
+			spin_unlock_bh(&backbone_gw->crc_lock);
+
 			seq_printf(seq, " * %pM on %5d %4i.%03is (%#.4x)\n",
 				   backbone_gw->orig,
 				   BATADV_PRINT_VID(backbone_gw->vid), secs,
-				   msecs, backbone_gw->crc);
+				   msecs, backbone_crc);
 		}
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 	}

@@ -884,6 +884,7 @@ struct batadv_socket_packet {
  *  backbone gateway - no bcast traffic is formwared until the situation was
  *  resolved
  * @crc: crc16 checksum over all claims
+ * @crc_lock: lock protecting crc
  * @refcount: number of contexts the object is used
  * @rcu: struct used for freeing in an RCU-safe manner
  */

@@ -897,6 +898,7 @@ struct batadv_bla_backbone_gw {
 	atomic_t wait_periods;
 	atomic_t request_sent;
 	u16 crc;
+	spinlock_t crc_lock; /* protects crc */
 	atomic_t refcount;
 	struct rcu_head rcu;
 };

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit 3db0decf1185357d6ab2256d0dede1ca9efda03d upstream.

The pointer batadv_bla_claim::backbone_gw can be changed at any time. Therefore, access to it must be protected to ensure that two function accessing the same backbone_gw are actually accessing the same. This is especially important when the crc_lock is used or when the backbone_gw of a claim is exchanged.

Not doing so leads to invalid memory access and/or reference leaks.

---
 net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c |  112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 net/batman-adv/types.h                 |    1 
 2 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

@@ -129,7 +129,19 @@ batadv_backbone_gw_free_ref(struct batad
 /* finally deinitialize the claim */
 static void batadv_claim_release(struct batadv_bla_claim *claim)
 {
-	batadv_backbone_gw_free_ref(claim->backbone_gw);
+	struct batadv_bla_backbone_gw *old_backbone_gw;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&claim->backbone_lock);
+	old_backbone_gw = claim->backbone_gw;
+	claim->backbone_gw = NULL;
+	spin_unlock_bh(&claim->backbone_lock);
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&old_backbone_gw->crc_lock);
+	old_backbone_gw->crc ^= crc16(0, claim->addr, ETH_ALEN);
+	spin_unlock_bh(&old_backbone_gw->crc_lock);
+
+	batadv_backbone_gw_free_ref(old_backbone_gw);
+
 	kfree_rcu(claim, rcu);
 }
 

@@ -579,8 +591,10 @@ static void batadv_bla_add_claim(struct
 				 const u8 *mac, const unsigned short vid,
 				 struct batadv_bla_backbone_gw *backbone_gw)
 {
+	struct batadv_bla_backbone_gw *old_backbone_gw;
 	struct batadv_bla_claim *claim;
 	struct batadv_bla_claim search_claim;
+	bool remove_crc = false;
 	int hash_added;
 
 	ether_addr_copy(search_claim.addr, mac);

@@ -594,8 +608,10 @@ static void batadv_bla_add_claim(struct
 			return;
 
 		ether_addr_copy(claim->addr, mac);
+		spin_lock_init(&claim->backbone_lock);
 		claim->vid = vid;
 		claim->lasttime = jiffies;
+		atomic_inc(&backbone_gw->refcount);
 		claim->backbone_gw = backbone_gw;
 
 		atomic_set(&claim->refcount, 2);

@@ -622,15 +638,26 @@ static void batadv_bla_add_claim(struct
 			   "bla_add_claim(): changing ownership for %pM, vid %d\n",
 			   mac, BATADV_PRINT_VID(vid));
 
-		spin_lock_bh(&claim->backbone_gw->crc_lock);
-		claim->backbone_gw->crc ^= crc16(0, claim->addr, ETH_ALEN);
-		spin_unlock_bh(&claim->backbone_gw->crc_lock);
-		batadv_backbone_gw_free_ref(claim->backbone_gw);
+		remove_crc = true;
 	}
-	/* set (new) backbone gw */
+
+	/* replace backbone_gw atomically and adjust reference counters */
+	spin_lock_bh(&claim->backbone_lock);
+	old_backbone_gw = claim->backbone_gw;
 	atomic_inc(&backbone_gw->refcount);
 	claim->backbone_gw = backbone_gw;
+	spin_unlock_bh(&claim->backbone_lock);
 
+	if (remove_crc) {
+		/* remove claim address from old backbone_gw */
+		spin_lock_bh(&old_backbone_gw->crc_lock);
+		old_backbone_gw->crc ^= crc16(0, claim->addr, ETH_ALEN);
+		spin_unlock_bh(&old_backbone_gw->crc_lock);
+	}
+
+	batadv_backbone_gw_free_ref(old_backbone_gw);
+
+	/* add claim address to new backbone_gw */
 	spin_lock_bh(&backbone_gw->crc_lock);
 	backbone_gw->crc ^= crc16(0, claim->addr, ETH_ALEN);
 	spin_unlock_bh(&backbone_gw->crc_lock);

@@ -640,6 +667,26 @@ claim_free_ref:
 	batadv_claim_free_ref(claim);
 }
 
+/**
+ * batadv_bla_claim_get_backbone_gw - Get valid reference for backbone_gw of
+ *  claim
+ * @claim: claim whose backbone_gw should be returned
+ *
+ * Return: valid reference to claim::backbone_gw
+ */
+static struct batadv_bla_backbone_gw *
+batadv_bla_claim_get_backbone_gw(struct batadv_bla_claim *claim)
+{
+	struct batadv_bla_backbone_gw *backbone_gw;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&claim->backbone_lock);
+	backbone_gw = claim->backbone_gw;
+	atomic_inc(&backbone_gw->refcount);
+	spin_unlock_bh(&claim->backbone_lock);
+
+	return backbone_gw;
+}
+
 /* Delete a claim from the claim hash which has the
  * given mac address and vid.
  */

@@ -661,10 +708,6 @@ static void batadv_bla_del_claim(struct
 			   batadv_choose_claim, claim);
 	batadv_claim_free_ref(claim); /* reference from the hash is gone */
 
-	spin_lock_bh(&claim->backbone_gw->crc_lock);
-	claim->backbone_gw->crc ^= crc16(0, claim->addr, ETH_ALEN);
-	spin_unlock_bh(&claim->backbone_gw->crc_lock);
-
 	/* don't need the reference from hash_find() anymore */
 	batadv_claim_free_ref(claim);
 }

@@ -1074,6 +1117,7 @@ static void batadv_bla_purge_claims(stru
 				    struct batadv_hard_iface *primary_if,
 				    int now)
 {
+	struct batadv_bla_backbone_gw *backbone_gw;
 	struct batadv_bla_claim *claim;
 	struct hlist_head *head;
 	struct batadv_hashtable *hash;

@@ -1088,14 +1132,17 @@ static void batadv_bla_purge_claims(stru
 
 		rcu_read_lock();
 		hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(claim, head, hash_entry) {
+			backbone_gw = batadv_bla_claim_get_backbone_gw(claim);
 			if (now)
 				goto purge_now;
-			if (!batadv_compare_eth(claim->backbone_gw->orig,
+
+			if (!batadv_compare_eth(backbone_gw->orig,
 						primary_if->net_dev->dev_addr))
-				continue;
+				goto skip;
+
 			if (!batadv_has_timed_out(claim->lasttime,
 						  BATADV_BLA_CLAIM_TIMEOUT))
-				continue;
+				goto skip;
 
 			batadv_dbg(BATADV_DBG_BLA, bat_priv,
 				   "bla_purge_claims(): %pM, vid %d, time out\n",

@@ -1103,8 +1150,10 @@ static void batadv_bla_purge_claims(stru
 
 purge_now:
 			batadv_handle_unclaim(bat_priv, primary_if,
-					      claim->backbone_gw->orig,
+					      backbone_gw->orig,
 					      claim->addr, claim->vid);
+skip:
+			batadv_backbone_gw_free_ref(backbone_gw);
 		}
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 	}

@@ -1488,9 +1537,11 @@ void batadv_bla_free(struct batadv_priv
 int batadv_bla_rx(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		  unsigned short vid, bool is_bcast)
 {
+	struct batadv_bla_backbone_gw *backbone_gw;
 	struct ethhdr *ethhdr;
 	struct batadv_bla_claim search_claim, *claim = NULL;
 	struct batadv_hard_iface *primary_if;
+	bool own_claim;
 	int ret;
 
 	ethhdr = eth_hdr(skb);

@@ -1522,8 +1573,12 @@ int batadv_bla_rx(struct batadv_priv *ba
 	}
 
 	/* if it is our own claim ... */
-	if (batadv_compare_eth(claim->backbone_gw->orig,
-			       primary_if->net_dev->dev_addr)) {
+	backbone_gw = batadv_bla_claim_get_backbone_gw(claim);
+	own_claim = batadv_compare_eth(backbone_gw->orig,
+				       primary_if->net_dev->dev_addr);
+	batadv_backbone_gw_free_ref(backbone_gw);
+
+	if (own_claim) {
 		/* ... allow it in any case */
 		claim->lasttime = jiffies;
 		goto allow;

@@ -1586,7 +1641,9 @@ int batadv_bla_tx(struct batadv_priv *ba
 {
 	struct ethhdr *ethhdr;
 	struct batadv_bla_claim search_claim, *claim = NULL;
+	struct batadv_bla_backbone_gw *backbone_gw;
 	struct batadv_hard_iface *primary_if;
+	bool client_roamed;
 	int ret = 0;
 
 	primary_if = batadv_primary_if_get_selected(bat_priv);

@@ -1616,8 +1673,12 @@ int batadv_bla_tx(struct batadv_priv *ba
 		goto allow;
 
 	/* check if we are responsible. */
-	if (batadv_compare_eth(claim->backbone_gw->orig,
-			       primary_if->net_dev->dev_addr)) {
+	backbone_gw = batadv_bla_claim_get_backbone_gw(claim);
+	client_roamed = batadv_compare_eth(backbone_gw->orig,
+					   primary_if->net_dev->dev_addr);
+	batadv_backbone_gw_free_ref(backbone_gw);
+
+	if (client_roamed) {
 		/* if yes, the client has roamed and we have
 		 * to unclaim it.
 		 */

@@ -1670,6 +1731,7 @@ int batadv_bla_claim_table_seq_print_tex
 	struct net_device *net_dev = (struct net_device *)seq->private;
 	struct batadv_priv *bat_priv = netdev_priv(net_dev);
 	struct batadv_hashtable *hash = bat_priv->bla.claim_hash;
+	struct batadv_bla_backbone_gw *backbone_gw;
 	struct batadv_bla_claim *claim;
 	struct batadv_hard_iface *primary_if;
 	struct hlist_head *head;

@@ -1694,17 +1756,21 @@ int batadv_bla_claim_table_seq_print_tex
 
 		rcu_read_lock();
 		hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(claim, head, hash_entry) {
-			is_own = batadv_compare_eth(claim->backbone_gw->orig,
+			backbone_gw = batadv_bla_claim_get_backbone_gw(claim);
+
+			is_own = batadv_compare_eth(backbone_gw->orig,
 						    primary_addr);
 
-			spin_lock_bh(&claim->backbone_gw->crc_lock);
-			backbone_crc = claim->backbone_gw->crc;
-			spin_unlock_bh(&claim->backbone_gw->crc_lock);
+			spin_lock_bh(&backbone_gw->crc_lock);
+			backbone_crc = backbone_gw->crc;
+			spin_unlock_bh(&backbone_gw->crc_lock);
 			seq_printf(seq, " * %pM on %5d by %pM [%c] (%#.4x)\n",
 				   claim->addr, BATADV_PRINT_VID(claim->vid),
-				   claim->backbone_gw->orig,
+				   backbone_gw->orig,
 				   (is_own ? 'x' : ' '),
 				   backbone_crc);
+
+			batadv_backbone_gw_free_ref(backbone_gw);
 		}
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 	}

@@ -917,6 +917,7 @@ struct batadv_bla_claim {
 	u8 addr[ETH_ALEN];
 	unsigned short vid;
 	struct batadv_bla_backbone_gw *backbone_gw;
+	spinlock_t backbone_lock; /* protects backbone_gw */
 	unsigned long lasttime;
 	struct hlist_node hash_entry;
 	struct rcu_head rcu;

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit 15c2ed753cd9e3e746472deab8151337a5b6da56 upstream.

The replacement of last_bonding_candidate in batadv_orig_node has to be an atomic operation. Otherwise it is possible that the reference counter of a batadv_orig_ifinfo is reduced which was no longer the last_bonding_candidate when the new candidate is added. This can either lead to an invalid memory access or to reference leaks which make it impossible to an interface which was added to batman-adv.

---
 net/batman-adv/routing.c |   52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 net/batman-adv/types.h   |    4 ++-
 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

@@ -440,6 +440,29 @@ static int batadv_check_unicast_packet(s
 }
 
 /**
+ * batadv_last_bonding_replace - Replace last_bonding_candidate of orig_node
+ * @orig_node: originator node whose bonding candidates should be replaced
+ * @new_candidate: new bonding candidate or NULL
+ */
+static void
+batadv_last_bonding_replace(struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node,
+			    struct batadv_orig_ifinfo *new_candidate)
+{
+	struct batadv_orig_ifinfo *old_candidate;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&orig_node->neigh_list_lock);
+	old_candidate = orig_node->last_bonding_candidate;
+
+	if (new_candidate)
+		atomic_inc(&new_candidate->refcount);
+	orig_node->last_bonding_candidate = new_candidate;
+	spin_unlock_bh(&orig_node->neigh_list_lock);
+
+	if (old_candidate)
+		batadv_orig_ifinfo_free_ref(old_candidate);
+}
+
+/**
  * batadv_find_router - find a suitable router for this originator
  * @bat_priv: the bat priv with all the soft interface information
  * @orig_node: the destination node

@@ -546,10 +569,6 @@ next:
 	}
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
-	/* last_bonding_candidate is reset below, remove the old reference. */
-	if (orig_node->last_bonding_candidate)
-		batadv_orig_ifinfo_free_ref(orig_node->last_bonding_candidate);
-
 	/* After finding candidates, handle the three cases:
 	 * 1) there is a next candidate, use that
 	 * 2) there is no next candidate, use the first of the list

@@ -558,21 +577,28 @@ next:
 	if (next_candidate) {
 		batadv_neigh_node_free_ref(router);
 
-		/* remove references to first candidate, we don't need it. */
-		if (first_candidate) {
-			batadv_neigh_node_free_ref(first_candidate_router);
-			batadv_orig_ifinfo_free_ref(first_candidate);
-		}
+		atomic_inc(&next_candidate_router->refcount);
 		router = next_candidate_router;
-		orig_node->last_bonding_candidate = next_candidate;
+		batadv_last_bonding_replace(orig_node, next_candidate);
 	} else if (first_candidate) {
 		batadv_neigh_node_free_ref(router);
 
-		/* refcounting has already been done in the loop above. */
+		atomic_inc(&first_candidate_router->refcount);
 		router = first_candidate_router;
-		orig_node->last_bonding_candidate = first_candidate;
+		batadv_last_bonding_replace(orig_node, first_candidate);
 	} else {
-		orig_node->last_bonding_candidate = NULL;
+		batadv_last_bonding_replace(orig_node, NULL);
+	}
+
+	/* cleanup of candidates */
+	if (first_candidate) {
+		batadv_neigh_node_free_ref(first_candidate_router);
+		batadv_orig_ifinfo_free_ref(first_candidate);
+	}
+
+	if (next_candidate) {
+		batadv_neigh_node_free_ref(next_candidate_router);
+		batadv_orig_ifinfo_free_ref(next_candidate);
 	}
 
 	return router;

@@ -287,7 +287,9 @@ struct batadv_orig_node {
 	DECLARE_BITMAP(bcast_bits, BATADV_TQ_LOCAL_WINDOW_SIZE);
 	u32 last_bcast_seqno;
 	struct hlist_head neigh_list;
-	/* neigh_list_lock protects: neigh_list and router */
+	/* neigh_list_lock protects: neigh_list, ifinfo_list,
+	 * last_bonding_candidate and router
+	 */
 	spinlock_t neigh_list_lock;
 	struct hlist_node hash_entry;
 	struct batadv_priv *bat_priv;

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit cbef1e102003edb236c6b2319ab269ccef963731 upstream.

The orig_ifinfo reference counter for last_bonding_candidate in batadv_orig_node has to be reduced when an originator node is released. Otherwise the orig_ifinfo is leaked and the reference counter the netdevice is not reduced correctly.

---
 net/batman-adv/originator.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

@@ -565,6 +565,7 @@ static void batadv_orig_node_release(str
 	struct batadv_neigh_node *neigh_node;
 	struct batadv_orig_ifinfo *orig_ifinfo;
 	struct batadv_orig_node_vlan *vlan;
+	struct batadv_orig_ifinfo *last_candidate;
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&orig_node->neigh_list_lock);
 

@@ -580,8 +581,14 @@ static void batadv_orig_node_release(str
 		hlist_del_rcu(&orig_ifinfo->list);
 		batadv_orig_ifinfo_free_ref(orig_ifinfo);
 	}
+
+	last_candidate = orig_node->last_bonding_candidate;
+	orig_node->last_bonding_candidate = NULL;
 	spin_unlock_bh(&orig_node->neigh_list_lock);
 
+	if (last_candidate)
+		batadv_orig_ifinfo_free_ref(last_candidate);
+
 	spin_lock_bh(&orig_node->vlan_list_lock);
 	hlist_for_each_entry_safe(vlan, node_tmp, &orig_node->vlan_list, list) {
 		hlist_del_rcu(&vlan->list);

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit d1fe176ca51fa3cb35f70c1d876d9a090e9befce upstream.

Speedy join only works when the received packet is either broadcast or an 4addr unicast packet. Thus packets converted from broadcast to unicast via the gateway handling code have to be converted to 4addr packets to allow the receiving gateway server to add the sender address as temporary entry to the translation table.

Not doing it will make the batman-adv gateway server drop the DHCP response in many situations because it doesn't yet have the TT entry for the destination of the DHCP response.

---
 net/batman-adv/send.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -381,8 +381,8 @@ int batadv_send_skb_via_gw(struct batadv
 	struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node;
 
 	orig_node = batadv_gw_get_selected_orig(bat_priv);
-	return batadv_send_skb_unicast(bat_priv, skb, BATADV_UNICAST, 0,
-				       orig_node, vid);
+	return batadv_send_skb_unicast(bat_priv, skb, BATADV_UNICAST_4ADDR,
+				       BATADV_P_DATA, orig_node, vid);
 }
 
 void batadv_schedule_bat_ogm(struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface)