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arm64: ptr auth: Use get_random_u64 instead of _bytes

PATCH In review George Spelvin 3 participants 4 messages Mar 31, 2020 – May 4, 2020 arm64

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PATCH v2 1/1 arm64: ptr auth: Use get_random_u64 instead of _bytes

get_random_bytes() is approximately 4x the cost of two get_random_u64() calls, because the former implements anti-backtracking.

Because these are authentication keys, useless to an attacker as soon as the kernel stops using them, there is no security benefit from anti-backtracking.

Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>

---
v2: Took out all the clever bitmap-based stuff and made a simple
boring helper function to replace get_random_bytes(&key, 16).

 arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 16 +++++++++++-----
 arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c      | 10 +++++-----
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +11 -5
index 7a24bad1a58b8..1a4590d05785e 100644
@@ -30,17 +30,23 @@ struct ptrauth_keys {
 	struct ptrauth_key apga;
 };
 
+static inline void __ptrauth_key_init(struct ptrauth_key *key)
+{
+	key->lo = get_random_u64();
+	key->hi = get_random_u64();
+}
+
 static inline void ptrauth_keys_init(struct ptrauth_keys *keys)
 {
 	if (system_supports_address_auth()) {
-		get_random_bytes(&keys->apia, sizeof(keys->apia));
-		get_random_bytes(&keys->apib, sizeof(keys->apib));
-		get_random_bytes(&keys->apda, sizeof(keys->apda));
-		get_random_bytes(&keys->apdb, sizeof(keys->apdb));
+		__ptrauth_key_init(&keys->apia);
+		__ptrauth_key_init(&keys->apib);
+		__ptrauth_key_init(&keys->apda);
+		__ptrauth_key_init(&keys->apdb);
 	}
 
 	if (system_supports_generic_auth())
-		get_random_bytes(&keys->apga, sizeof(keys->apga));
+		__ptrauth_key_init(&keys->apga);
 }
 
 #define __ptrauth_key_install(k, v)				\
arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c +5 -5
index c507b584259d0..05e2e3d174010 100644
@@ -31,15 +31,15 @@ int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long arg)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (arg & PR_PAC_APIAKEY)
-		get_random_bytes(&keys->apia, sizeof(keys->apia));
+		__ptrauth_key_init(&keys->apia);
 	if (arg & PR_PAC_APIBKEY)
-		get_random_bytes(&keys->apib, sizeof(keys->apib));
+		__ptrauth_key_init(&keys->apib);
 	if (arg & PR_PAC_APDAKEY)
-		get_random_bytes(&keys->apda, sizeof(keys->apda));
+		__ptrauth_key_init(&keys->apda);
 	if (arg & PR_PAC_APDBKEY)
-		get_random_bytes(&keys->apdb, sizeof(keys->apdb));
+		__ptrauth_key_init(&keys->apdb);
 	if (arg & PR_PAC_APGAKEY)
-		get_random_bytes(&keys->apga, sizeof(keys->apga));
+		__ptrauth_key_init(&keys->apga);
 
 	ptrauth_keys_switch(keys);
 
Signature · 6 lines
2.26.0

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reviewer Acked-by on v2 1/1
#1 lore raw

This seems to have been sent twice, so I'm replying to the latest copy.

Quoted 8 lines · George Spelvin

get_random_bytes() is approximately 4x the cost of two get_random_u64() calls, because the former implements anti-backtracking.

Because these are authentication keys, useless to an attacker as soon as the kernel stops using them, there is no security benefit from anti-backtracking.

Quoted 5 lines
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>

Given my understanding from discussion on the prior version the conversion is sound, it doesn't matter that we expose the keys via ptrace, and the code looks nicer, so:

I assume Will or Catalin will pick this up when they next pick up patches.

Mark.

Quoted 68 lines

---
v2: Took out all the clever bitmap-based stuff and made a simple
boring helper function to replace get_random_bytes(&key, 16).

 arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 16 +++++++++++-----
 arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c      | 10 +++++-----
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +11 -5
index 7a24bad1a58b8..1a4590d05785e 100644
@@ -30,17 +30,23 @@ struct ptrauth_keys {
 	struct ptrauth_key apga;
 };
 
+static inline void __ptrauth_key_init(struct ptrauth_key *key)
+{
+	key->lo = get_random_u64();
+	key->hi = get_random_u64();
+}
+
 static inline void ptrauth_keys_init(struct ptrauth_keys *keys)
 {
 	if (system_supports_address_auth()) {
-		get_random_bytes(&keys->apia, sizeof(keys->apia));
-		get_random_bytes(&keys->apib, sizeof(keys->apib));
-		get_random_bytes(&keys->apda, sizeof(keys->apda));
-		get_random_bytes(&keys->apdb, sizeof(keys->apdb));
+		__ptrauth_key_init(&keys->apia);
+		__ptrauth_key_init(&keys->apib);
+		__ptrauth_key_init(&keys->apda);
+		__ptrauth_key_init(&keys->apdb);
 	}
 
 	if (system_supports_generic_auth())
-		get_random_bytes(&keys->apga, sizeof(keys->apga));
+		__ptrauth_key_init(&keys->apga);
 }
 
 #define __ptrauth_key_install(k, v)				\
arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c +5 -5
index c507b584259d0..05e2e3d174010 100644
@@ -31,15 +31,15 @@ int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long arg)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (arg & PR_PAC_APIAKEY)
-		get_random_bytes(&keys->apia, sizeof(keys->apia));
+		__ptrauth_key_init(&keys->apia);
 	if (arg & PR_PAC_APIBKEY)
-		get_random_bytes(&keys->apib, sizeof(keys->apib));
+		__ptrauth_key_init(&keys->apib);
 	if (arg & PR_PAC_APDAKEY)
-		get_random_bytes(&keys->apda, sizeof(keys->apda));
+		__ptrauth_key_init(&keys->apda);
 	if (arg & PR_PAC_APDBKEY)
-		get_random_bytes(&keys->apdb, sizeof(keys->apdb));
+		__ptrauth_key_init(&keys->apdb);
 	if (arg & PR_PAC_APGAKEY)
-		get_random_bytes(&keys->apga, sizeof(keys->apga));
+		__ptrauth_key_init(&keys->apga);
 
 	ptrauth_keys_switch(keys);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.26.0

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maintainer
#2 lore raw
In reply to George Spelvin

Hi George,

Quoted 13 lines · George Spelvin

get_random_bytes() is approximately 4x the cost of two get_random_u64() calls, because the former implements anti-backtracking.

Because these are authentication keys, useless to an attacker as soon as the kernel stops using them, there is no security benefit from anti-backtracking.

Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Quoted 7 lines

---
v2: Took out all the clever bitmap-based stuff and made a simple
boring helper function to replace get_random_bytes(&key, 16).

 arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 16 +++++++++++-----
 arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c      | 10 +++++-----
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

Please can you resend this against the arm64 for-next/ptr-auth branch [1]? I can't apply it as-is.

Thanks,

Will

[1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux.git/log/?h=for-next/ptr-auth

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maintainer
#3 lore raw
Quoted 18 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 17 lines · George Spelvin

get_random_bytes() is approximately 4x the cost of two get_random_u64() calls, because the former implements anti-backtracking.

Because these are authentication keys, useless to an attacker as soon as the kernel stops using them, there is no security benefit from anti-backtracking.

Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>

---
v2: Took out all the clever bitmap-based stuff and made a simple
boring helper function to replace get_random_bytes(&key, 16).

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
 arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 16 +++++++++++-----
 arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c      | 10 +++++-----
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

Please can you resend this against the arm64 for-next/ptr-auth branch [1]? I can't apply it as-is.

Any update on this one?

Cheers,

Will

Quoted 1 line

[1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux.git/log/?h=for-next/ptr-auth

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