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arch/x86: Optionally flush L1D on context switch

PATCH In review Balbir Singh 4 participants 11 messages Apr 2, 2020

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#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/3 arch/x86/kvm: Refactor l1d flush lifecycle management

In reply to Balbir Singh

Split out the allocation and free routines to be used in a follow up set of patches (to reuse for L1D flushing).

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/Makefile          |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/l1d_flush.c       | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c            | 25 +++------------------
 4 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/l1d_flush.c
arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h +3 -0
index 63feaf2a5f93..6419a4cef0e8 100644
@@ -6,6 +6,9 @@
 #include <asm-generic/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/special_insns.h>
 
+#define L1D_CACHE_ORDER 4
 void clflush_cache_range(void *addr, unsigned int size);
+void *alloc_l1d_flush_pages(void);
+void cleanup_l1d_flush_pages(void *l1d_flush_pages);
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CACHEFLUSH_H */
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +1 -0
index d6d61c4455fa..48f443e6c2de 100644
@@ -160,3 +160,4 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
 endif
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT)	+= ima_arch.o
+obj-y						+= l1d_flush.o
arch/x86/kernel/l1d_flush.c new file +36 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..05f375c33423
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
+
+void *alloc_l1d_flush_pages(void)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+	void *l1d_flush_pages = NULL;
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * This allocation for l1d_flush_pages is not tied to a VM/task's
+	 * lifetime and so should not be charged to a memcg.
+	 */
+	page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL, L1D_CACHE_ORDER);
+	if (!page)
+		return NULL;
+	l1d_flush_pages = page_address(page);
+
+	/*
+	 * Initialize each page with a different pattern in
+	 * order to protect against KSM in the nested
+	 * virtualization case.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < 1u << L1D_CACHE_ORDER; ++i) {
+		memset(l1d_flush_pages + i * PAGE_SIZE, i + 1,
+				PAGE_SIZE);
+	}
+	return l1d_flush_pages;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(alloc_l1d_flush_pages);
+
+void cleanup_l1d_flush_pages(void *l1d_flush_pages)
+{
+	free_pages((unsigned long)l1d_flush_pages, L1D_CACHE_ORDER);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cleanup_l1d_flush_pages);
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +3 -22
index 9eaccf92d616..209e63798435 100644
@@ -203,14 +203,10 @@ static const struct {
 	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED] = {"not required", false},
 };
 
-#define L1D_CACHE_ORDER 4
 static void *vmx_l1d_flush_pages;
 
 static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
 {
-	struct page *page;
-	unsigned int i;
-
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF)) {
 		l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED;
 		return 0;
@@ -253,24 +249,9 @@ static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
 
 	if (l1tf != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER && !vmx_l1d_flush_pages &&
 	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D)) {
-		/*
-		 * This allocation for vmx_l1d_flush_pages is not tied to a VM
-		 * lifetime and so should not be charged to a memcg.
-		 */
-		page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL, L1D_CACHE_ORDER);
-		if (!page)
+		vmx_l1d_flush_pages = alloc_l1d_flush_pages();
+		if (!vmx_l1d_flush_pages)
 			return -ENOMEM;
-		vmx_l1d_flush_pages = page_address(page);
-
-		/*
-		 * Initialize each page with a different pattern in
-		 * order to protect against KSM in the nested
-		 * virtualization case.
-		 */
-		for (i = 0; i < 1u << L1D_CACHE_ORDER; ++i) {
-			memset(vmx_l1d_flush_pages + i * PAGE_SIZE, i + 1,
-			       PAGE_SIZE);
-		}
 	}
 
 	l1tf_vmx_mitigation = l1tf;
@@ -7992,7 +7973,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
 static void vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush(void)
 {
 	if (vmx_l1d_flush_pages) {
-		free_pages((unsigned long)vmx_l1d_flush_pages, L1D_CACHE_ORDER);
+		cleanup_l1d_flush_pages(vmx_l1d_flush_pages);
 		vmx_l1d_flush_pages = NULL;
 	}
 	/* Restore state so sysfs ignores VMX */
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/3 arch/x86: Optionally flush L1D on context switch

In reply to Balbir Singh

Implement a mechanism to selectively flush the L1D cache. The goal is to allow tasks that are paranoid due to the recent snoop assisted data sampling vulnerabilites, to flush their L1D on being switched out. This protects their data from being snooped or leaked via side channels after the task has context switched out.

There are two scenarios we might want to protect against, a task leaving the CPU with data still in L1D (which is the main concern of this patch), the second scenario is a malicious task coming in (not so well trusted) for which we want to clean up the cache before it starts. Only the case for the former is addressed.

Add arch specific prctl()'s to opt-in to the L1D cache on context switch out, the existing mechanisms of tracking prev_mm via cpu_tlbstate is reused. cond_ibpb() is refactored and renamed into cond_mitigation().

A new thread_info flag TIF_SPEC_FLUSH_L1D is added to track tasks which opt-into L1D flushing. cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb is renamed to cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_spec, this is used to convert the TIF flags into mm state (per cpu via last_user_mm_spec) in cond_mitigation(), which then used to do decide when to call flush_l1d().

The current version benefited from discussions with Kees and Thomas. Thomas suggested and provided the code snippet for refactoring the existing cond_ibpb() code.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h |  6 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h    |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h  |  3 +
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c       | 10 +++-
 arch/x86/mm/tlb.c                  | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 5 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h +5 -1
index 8de8ceccb8bc..5cb250872643 100644
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ struct thread_info {
 #define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT	7	/* syscall auditing active */
 #define TIF_SECCOMP		8	/* secure computing */
 #define TIF_SPEC_IB		9	/* Indirect branch speculation mitigation */
-#define TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE	10	/* Force speculation MSR update in context switch */
+#define TIF_SPEC_FLUSH_L1D	10	/* Flush L1D on mm switches (processes) */
 #define TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY	11	/* notify kernel of userspace return */
 #define TIF_UPROBE		12	/* breakpointed or singlestepping */
 #define TIF_PATCH_PENDING	13	/* pending live patching update */
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ struct thread_info {
 #define TIF_MEMDIE		20	/* is terminating due to OOM killer */
 #define TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG	21	/* idle is polling for TIF_NEED_RESCHED */
 #define TIF_IO_BITMAP		22	/* uses I/O bitmap */
+#define TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE	23	/* Force speculation MSR update in context switch */
 #define TIF_FORCED_TF		24	/* true if TF in eflags artificially */
 #define TIF_BLOCKSTEP		25	/* set when we want DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF */
 #define TIF_LAZY_MMU_UPDATES	27	/* task is updating the mmu lazily */
@@ -132,6 +133,7 @@ struct thread_info {
 #define _TIF_ADDR32		(1 << TIF_ADDR32)
 #define _TIF_X32		(1 << TIF_X32)
 #define _TIF_FSCHECK		(1 << TIF_FSCHECK)
+#define _TIF_SPEC_FLUSH_L1D	(1 << TIF_SPEC_FLUSH_L1D)
 
 /* Work to do before invoking the actual syscall. */
 #define _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY	\
@@ -239,6 +241,8 @@ extern void arch_task_cache_init(void);
 extern int arch_dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *dst, struct task_struct *src);
 extern void arch_release_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk);
 extern void arch_setup_new_exec(void);
+extern int enable_l1d_flush_for_task(struct task_struct *tsk);
+extern int disable_l1d_flush_for_task(struct task_struct *tsk);
 #define arch_setup_new_exec arch_setup_new_exec
 #endif	/* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
 
arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h +1 -1
index 6f66d841262d..69e6ea20679c 100644
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ struct tlb_state {
 	/* Last user mm for optimizing IBPB */
 	union {
 		struct mm_struct	*last_user_mm;
-		unsigned long		last_user_mm_ibpb;
+		unsigned long		last_user_mm_spec;
 	};
 
 	u16 loaded_mm_asid;
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h +3 -0
index 5a6aac9fa41f..1361e5e25791 100644
@@ -14,4 +14,7 @@
 #define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_32	0x2002
 #define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_64	0x2003
 
+#define ARCH_SET_L1D_FLUSH	0x3001
+#define ARCH_GET_L1D_FLUSH	0x3002
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +9 -1
index 5ef9d8f25b0e..ecf542f13572 100644
@@ -699,7 +699,15 @@ long do_arch_prctl_64(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2)
 	case ARCH_MAP_VDSO_64:
 		return prctl_map_vdso(&vdso_image_64, arg2);
 #endif
-
+	case ARCH_GET_L1D_FLUSH:
+		return test_ti_thread_flag(&task->thread_info, TIF_SPEC_FLUSH_L1D);
+	case ARCH_SET_L1D_FLUSH: {
+		if (arg2 >= 1)
+			return enable_l1d_flush_for_task(task);
+		else
+			return disable_l1d_flush_for_task(task);
+		break;
+	}
 	default:
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		break;
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +71 -21

165 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#0 lore raw

cover arch/x86: Optionally flush L1D on context switch

Provide a mechanisn to flush the L1D cache on context switch. The goal is to allow tasks that are paranoid due to the recent snoop assisted data sampling vulnerabilites, to flush their L1D on being switched out. This protects their data from being snooped or leaked via side channels after the task has context switched out.

The core of the patches is patch 3, the first two refactor the code so that common bits can be reused.

Changelog:
- Refactor the code and reuse cond_ibpb() - code bits provided by tglx
- Merge mm state tracking for ibpb and l1d flush
- Rename TIF_L1D_FLUSH to TIF_SPEC_FLUSH_L1D

Changelog RFC:
- Reuse existing code for allocation and flush
- Simplify the goto logic in the actual l1d_flush function
- Optimize the code path with jump labels/static functions

The RFC patch was previously posted at

https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

Balbir Singh (3):
arch/x86/kvm: Refactor l1d flush lifecycle management arch/x86: Refactor tlbflush and l1d flush arch/x86: Optionally flush L1D on context switch

 arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h  |  6 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h |  6 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h    |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h  |  3 +
 arch/x86/kernel/Makefile           |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/l1d_flush.c        | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c       | 10 +++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c             | 56 +++---------------
 arch/x86/mm/tlb.c                  | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 9 files changed, 189 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/l1d_flush.c
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/3 arch/x86: Refactor tlbflush and l1d flush

Refactor the existing assembly bits into smaller helper functions and also abstract L1D_FLUSH into a helper function. Use these functions in kvm for L1D flushing.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h |  3 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/l1d_flush.c       | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c            | 31 ++++---------------
 3 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h +3 -0
index 6419a4cef0e8..66a46db7aadd 100644
@@ -10,5 +10,8 @@
 void clflush_cache_range(void *addr, unsigned int size);
 void *alloc_l1d_flush_pages(void);
 void cleanup_l1d_flush_pages(void *l1d_flush_pages);
+void populate_tlb_with_flush_pages(void *l1d_flush_pages);
+void flush_l1d_cache_sw(void *l1d_flush_pages);
+int flush_l1d_cache_hw(void);
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CACHEFLUSH_H */
arch/x86/kernel/l1d_flush.c +49 -0

52 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +5 -26
index 209e63798435..29dc5a5bb6ab 100644
@@ -5956,8 +5956,6 @@ static int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
  */
 static void vmx_l1d_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	int size = PAGE_SIZE << L1D_CACHE_ORDER;
-
 	/*
 	 * This code is only executed when the the flush mode is 'cond' or
 	 * 'always'
@@ -5986,32 +5984,13 @@ static void vmx_l1d_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	vcpu->stat.l1d_flush++;
 
-	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D)) {
-		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD, L1D_FLUSH);
+	if (flush_l1d_cache_hw())
 		return;
-	}
 
-	asm volatile(
-		/* First ensure the pages are in the TLB */
-		"xorl	%%eax, %%eax\n"
-		".Lpopulate_tlb:\n\t"
-		"movzbl	(%[flush_pages], %%" _ASM_AX "), %%ecx\n\t"
-		"addl	$4096, %%eax\n\t"
-		"cmpl	%%eax, %[size]\n\t"
-		"jne	.Lpopulate_tlb\n\t"
-		"xorl	%%eax, %%eax\n\t"
-		"cpuid\n\t"
-		/* Now fill the cache */
-		"xorl	%%eax, %%eax\n"
-		".Lfill_cache:\n"
-		"movzbl	(%[flush_pages], %%" _ASM_AX "), %%ecx\n\t"
-		"addl	$64, %%eax\n\t"
-		"cmpl	%%eax, %[size]\n\t"
-		"jne	.Lfill_cache\n\t"
-		"lfence\n"
-		:: [flush_pages] "r" (vmx_l1d_flush_pages),
-		    [size] "r" (size)
-		: "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx");
+	preempt_disable();
+	populate_tlb_with_flush_pages(vmx_l1d_flush_pages);
+	flush_l1d_cache_sw(vmx_l1d_flush_pages);
+	preempt_enable();
 }
 
 static void update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr, int irr)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#6 lore raw
In reply to Balbir Singh
Quoted 3 lines · Balbir Singh

Provide a mechanisn to flush the L1D cache on context switch. The goal is to allow tasks that are paranoid due to the recent snoop assisted data sampling vulnerabilites, to flush their L1D on being switched out.

Hi Balbir,

Just curious, is it really vulnerabilities, plural? I thought there was only one: CVE-2020-0550 (Snoop-assisted L1 Data Sampling).

(There was a similar one without the "snoop": L1D Eviction Sampling, but it's supposed to get fixed in microcode).

Signature · 1 line
Josh
#7 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you can confirm the sender and know the content is safe.

Quoted 3 lines · Balbir Singh

Provide a mechanisn to flush the L1D cache on context switch. The goal is to allow tasks that are paranoid due to the recent snoop assisted data sampling vulnerabilites, to flush their L1D on being switched out.

Quoted 8 lines

Hi Balbir,

Just curious, is it really vulnerabilities, plural? I thought there was only one: CVE-2020-0550 (Snoop-assisted L1 Data Sampling).

(There was a similar one without the "snoop": L1D Eviction Sampling, but it's supposed to get fixed in microcode).

Hi, Josh

Yes, that CVE the motivation, the mitigation for CVE-2020-0550 does suggest flushing the cache on context switch. But in general, as we begin to find more ways of evicting data or snopping data, a generic mechanism is more useful and that is why I am making it an opt-in.

Balbir Singh.

#8 lore raw
Quoted 21 lines · Balbir
Quoted 11 lines · Josh Poimboeuf

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you can confirm the sender and know the content is safe.

Quoted 3 lines · Balbir Singh

Provide a mechanisn to flush the L1D cache on context switch. The goal is to allow tasks that are paranoid due to the recent snoop assisted data sampling vulnerabilites, to flush their L1D on being switched out.

Quoted 8 lines

Hi Balbir,

Just curious, is it really vulnerabilities, plural? I thought there was only one: CVE-2020-0550 (Snoop-assisted L1 Data Sampling).

(There was a similar one without the "snoop": L1D Eviction Sampling, but it's supposed to get fixed in microcode).

Quoted 6 lines

Hi, Josh

Yes, that CVE the motivation, the mitigation for CVE-2020-0550 does suggest flushing the cache on context switch. But in general, as we begin to find more ways of evicting data or snopping data, a generic mechanism is more useful and that is why I am making it an opt-in.

Ok. I think it would be a good idea to expand on that justification more precisely in the commit message. That would help both reviewers of the code and users of the new option understand what level of paranoia they're opting in to :-)

Signature · 1 line
Josh
#9 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 4 lines · Balbir

Yes, that CVE the motivation, the mitigation for CVE-2020-0550 does suggest flushing the cache on context switch. But in general, as we begin to find more ways of evicting data or snopping data, a generic mechanism is more useful and that is why I am making it an opt-in.

Ok. I think it would be a good idea to expand on that justification more precisely in the commit message. That would help both reviewers of the code and users of the new option understand what level of paranoia they're opting in to :-)

The commit message is mostly useful for reviewers and people who have to do code archeaology.

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/ has plenty of space to host a document with explanations. paranoia.rst comes to my mind. :)

Thanks,

tglx

maintainer
#4 lore raw
In reply to Balbir Singh
Quoted 5 lines · Balbir Singh
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +5 -0
+int enable_l1d_flush_for_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+	int ret = 0;
+

arch/x86/mm/tlb.c void leave_mm(int cpu) · line 174

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +10 -0
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D))
+		goto done;
+
+	page = READ_ONCE(l1d_flush_pages);
+	if (unlikely(!page)) {
+		mutex_lock(&l1d_flush_mutex);
+		if (!l1d_flush_pages) {
+			l1d_flush_pages = alloc_l1d_flush_pages();
+			if (!l1d_flush_pages)
+				return -ENOMEM;

Do I see it correctly that you'll return here with l1d_flush_mutex still held?

arch/x86/mm/tlb.c void leave_mm(int cpu) · line 178

Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +4 -0
+		}
+		mutex_unlock(&l1d_flush_mutex);
+	}
+	/* I don't think we need to worry about KSM */

Pls use passive voice: no "we" or "I", etc.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#5 lore raw
Quoted 17 lines · Borislav Petkov

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you can confirm the sender and know the content is safe.

Quoted 10 lines · Balbir Singh
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +10 -0
+int enable_l1d_flush_for_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+     struct page *page;
+     int ret = 0;
+
+     if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D))
+             goto done;
+
+     page = READ_ONCE(l1d_flush_pages);
+     if (unlikely(!page)) {
Quoted 8 lines

arch/x86/mm/tlb.c void leave_mm(int cpu) · line 174

Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +5 -0
+             mutex_lock(&l1d_flush_mutex);
+             if (!l1d_flush_pages) {
+                     l1d_flush_pages = alloc_l1d_flush_pages();
+                     if (!l1d_flush_pages)
+                             return -ENOMEM;

Do I see it correctly that you'll return here with l1d_flush_mutex still held?

Darn.. :(

I had goto done to release the mutex earlier, let me fix that :)

Thanks,
Balbir Singh

Quoted 13 lines

arch/x86/mm/tlb.c void leave_mm(int cpu) · line 178

Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +4 -0
+             }
+             mutex_unlock(&l1d_flush_mutex);
+     }
+     /* I don't think we need to worry about KSM */

Pls use passive voice: no "we" or "I", etc.

--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

#10 lore raw
In reply to Thomas Gleixner
Quoted 21 lines · Thomas Gleixner

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you can confirm the sender and know the content is safe.

Quoted 9 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 7 lines · Balbir

Yes, that CVE the motivation, the mitigation for CVE-2020-0550 does suggest
flushing the cache on context switch. But in general, as we begin to find more
ways of evicting data or snopping data, a generic mechanism is more useful and
that is why I am making it an opt-in.

Quoted 4 lines

Ok. I think it would be a good idea to expand on that justification more precisely in the commit message. That would help both reviewers of the code and users of the new option understand what level of paranoia they're opting in to :-)

Quoted 5 lines

The commit message is mostly useful for reviewers and people who have to do code archeaology.

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/ has plenty of space to host a document with explanations. paranoia.rst comes to my mind. :)

I hope people don't go looking for aliens in there :) I'll write up some documentation if that helps, starting with something simple.

Balbir

Quoted 5 lines

Thanks,

tglx