slub: improve bit diffusion for freelist ptr obfuscation
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 slub: improve bit diffusion for freelist ptr obfuscation
commit 1ad53d9fa3f6168ebcf48a50e08b170432da2257 upstream.
Under CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y, the obfuscation was relatively weak in that the ptr and ptr address were usually so close that the first XOR would result in an almost entirely 0-byte value[1], leaving most of the "secret" number ultimately being stored after the third XOR. A single blind memory content exposure of the freelist was generally sufficient to learn the secret.
Add a swab() call to mix bits a little more. This is a cheap way (1 cycle) to make attacks need more than a single exposure to learn the secret (or to know _where_ the exposure is in memory).
kmalloc-32 freelist walk, before:
ptr ptr_addr stored value secret
ffff90c22e019020@ffff90c22e019000 is 86528eb656b3b5bd (86528eb656b3b59d) ffff90c22e019040@ffff90c22e019020 is 86528eb656b3b5fd (86528eb656b3b59d) ffff90c22e019060@ffff90c22e019040 is 86528eb656b3b5bd (86528eb656b3b59d) ffff90c22e019080@ffff90c22e019060 is 86528eb656b3b57d (86528eb656b3b59d) ffff90c22e0190a0@ffff90c22e019080 is 86528eb656b3b5bd (86528eb656b3b59d)
...
after:
ptr ptr_addr stored value secret
ffff9eed6e019020@ffff9eed6e019000 is 793d1135d52cda42 (86528eb656b3b59d) ffff9eed6e019040@ffff9eed6e019020 is 593d1135d52cda22 (86528eb656b3b59d) ffff9eed6e019060@ffff9eed6e019040 is 393d1135d52cda02 (86528eb656b3b59d) ffff9eed6e019080@ffff9eed6e019060 is 193d1135d52cdae2 (86528eb656b3b59d) ffff9eed6e0190a0@ffff9eed6e019080 is f93d1135d52cdac2 (86528eb656b3b59d)
[1] https://blog.infosectcbr.com.au/2020/03/weaknesses-in-linux-kernel-heap.html
---
This requires that commit d5767057c9a76a29f073dad66b7fa12a90e8c748 is also cherry-picked into -stable.
--- mm/slub.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/slub.c +1 -1
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ static inline void *freelist_ptr(const struct kmem_cache *s, void *ptr, unsigned long ptr_addr) {#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED -return (void *)((unsigned long )ptr ^ s->random ^ ptr_addr); +return (void *)((unsigned long )ptr ^ s->random ^swab (ptr_addr));#else return ptr;#endif
Signature · 5 lines
2.20.1 -- Kees Cook
Greg KH
maintainerQuoted 72 lines · Kees Cook
commit
1ad53d9fa3f6168ebcf48a50e08b170432da2257upstream.Under
CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y, the obfuscation was relatively weak in that the ptr and ptr address were usually so close that the first XOR would result in an almost entirely 0-byte value[1], leaving most of the "secret" number ultimately being stored after the third XOR. A single blind memory content exposure of the freelist was generally sufficient to learn the secret.Add a
swab()call to mix bits a little more. This is a cheap way (1 cycle) to make attacks need more than a single exposure to learn the secret (or to know _where_ the exposure is in memory).kmalloc-32 freelist walk, before:
ptr
ptr_addrstored value secret
ffff90c22e019020@ffff90c22e019000 is86528eb656b3b5bd(86528eb656b3b59d) ffff90c22e019040@ffff90c22e019020 is86528eb656b3b5fd(86528eb656b3b59d) ffff90c22e019060@ffff90c22e019040 is86528eb656b3b5bd(86528eb656b3b59d) ffff90c22e019080@ffff90c22e019060 is86528eb656b3b57d(86528eb656b3b59d) ffff90c22e0190a0@ffff90c22e019080 is86528eb656b3b5bd(86528eb656b3b59d)
...after:
ptr
ptr_addrstored value secret
ffff9eed6e019020@ffff9eed6e019000 is793d1135d52cda42(86528eb656b3b59d) ffff9eed6e019040@ffff9eed6e019020 is593d1135d52cda22(86528eb656b3b59d) ffff9eed6e019060@ffff9eed6e019040 is393d1135d52cda02(86528eb656b3b59d) ffff9eed6e019080@ffff9eed6e019060 is193d1135d52cdae2(86528eb656b3b59d) ffff9eed6e0190a0@ffff9eed6e019080 isf93d1135d52cdac2(86528eb656b3b59d)[1] https://blog.infosectcbr.com.au/2020/03/weaknesses-in-linux-kernel-heap.html
Fixes 2482ddec670f ("mm: add SLUB free list pointer obfuscation")Reported-by Silvio Cesare <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Andrew Morton <[email protected]>Cc Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>Cc Pekka Enberg <[email protected]>Cc David Rientjes <[email protected]>Cc Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>Cc <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>[kees: Backport to v4.19 which doesn't call kasan_reset_untag()]Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>---
This requires that commitd5767057c9a76a29f073dad66b7fa12a90e8c748is also cherry-picked into -stable.--- mm/slub.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)mm/slub.c +1
-1@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ static inline void *freelist_ptr(const struct kmem_cache *s, void *ptr, unsigned long ptr_addr) {#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED -return (void *)((unsigned long )ptr ^ s->random ^ ptr_addr); +return (void *)((unsigned long )ptr ^ s->random ^swab (ptr_addr));#else return ptr;#endif Signature · 4 lines
2.20.1 --
Now queued up, thanks.
greg k-h