proc-handle-umounts-cleanly.patch removed from -mm tree
The patch titled
Subject: proc: handle umounts cleanly
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
proc-handle-umounts-cleanly.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree
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From: [email protected] (Eric W. Biederman)
Subject: proc: handle umounts cleanly
Quoted 29 lines · syzbot
KASAN: use-after-free Read in dput (2)
proc_fill_super: allocate dentry failed
==================================================================BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in fast_dput fs/dcache.c:727 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dput+0x53e/0xdf0 fs/dcache.c:846 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88808a618cf0 by task syz-executor.0/8426 CPU: 0 PID: 8426 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.6.0-next-20200412-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x188/0x20d lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd3/0x315 mm/kasan/report.c:382 __kasan_report.cold+0x35/0x4d mm/kasan/report.c:511 kasan_report+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:625 fast_dput fs/dcache.c:727 [inline] dput+0x53e/0xdf0 fs/dcache.c:846 proc_kill_sb+0x73/0xf0 fs/proc/root.c:195 deactivate_locked_super+0x8c/0xf0 fs/super.c:335 vfs_get_super+0x258/0x2d0 fs/super.c:1212 vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x2f0 fs/super.c:1547 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2813 [inline] do_mount+0x1306/0x1b30 fs/namespace.c:3138 __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3347 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3324 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x18f/0x230 fs/namespace.c:3324 do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3
Quoted 8 lines
RIP: 0033:0x45c889 Code: ad b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffc1930ec48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000001324914 RCX: 000000000045c889 RDX: 0000000020000140 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 000000000076bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003 R13: 0000000000000749 R14: 00000000004ca15a R15: 0000000000000013
Looking at the code now that it the internal mount of proc is no longer used it is possible to unmount proc. If proc is unmounted the fields of the pid namespace that were used for filesystem specific state are not reinitialized.
Which means that proc_self and proc_thread_self can be pointers to already freed dentries.
The reported user after free appears to be from mounting and unmounting proc followed by mounting proc again and using error injection to cause the new root dentry allocation to fail. This in turn results in proc_kill_sb running with proc_self and proc_thread_self still retaining their values from the previous mount of proc. Then calling dput on either proc_self of proc_thread_self will result in double put. Which KASAN sees as a use after free.
Solve this by always reinitializing the filesystem state stored in the struct pid_namespace, when proc is unmounted.
---
fs/proc/root.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
fs/proc/root.c renamed from fs/proc/root.c~proc-handle-umounts-cleanly +7 -0
@@ -196,6 +196,13 @@ static void proc_kill_sb(struct super_blif (ns->proc_thread_self)dput (ns->proc_thread_self);kill_anon_super (sb); + +/* Make the pid namespace safe for a new mount of proc */ + ns->proc_self =NULL ; + ns->proc_thread_self =NULL ; + ns->pid_gid =GLOBAL_ROOT_GID ; + ns->hide_pid =0 ; +put_pid_ns (ns); }
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Patches currently in -mm which might be from [email protected] are