Skip to contentSkip to conversation

kernel: sysctl: ignore out-of-range taint bits introduced via kernel.tainted

PATCH Superseded Rafael Aquini 3 participants 4 messages May 12, 2020

Subsystems (2)

v1 of 2 Superseded Latest is v2 →

lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 kernel: sysctl: ignore out-of-range taint bits introduced via kernel.tainted

The sysctl knob allows users with SYS_ADMIN capability to taint the kernel with any arbitrary value, but this might produce an invalid flags bitset being committed to tainted_mask.

This patch introduces a simple way for proc_taint() to ignore any eventual invalid bit coming from the user input before committing those bits to the kernel tainted_mask.

---
 include/linux/kernel.h |  2 ++
 kernel/sysctl.c        | 14 +++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/kernel.h +2 -0
index 9b7a8d74a9d6..e8c22a9bbc95 100644
@@ -597,6 +597,8 @@ extern enum system_states {
 #define TAINT_RANDSTRUCT		17
 #define TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT		18
 
+#define TAINT_FLAGS_MAX			((1UL << TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT) - 1)
+
 struct taint_flag {
 	char c_true;	/* character printed when tainted */
 	char c_false;	/* character printed when not tainted */
kernel/sysctl.c +13 -1
index 8a176d8727a3..fb2d693fc08c 100644
@@ -2623,11 +2623,23 @@ static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 		return err;
 
 	if (write) {
+		int i;
+
+		/*
+		 * Ignore user input that would cause the loop below
+		 * to commit arbitrary and out of valid range TAINT flags.
+		 */
+		if (tmptaint > TAINT_FLAGS_MAX) {
+			tmptaint &= TAINT_FLAGS_MAX;
+			pr_warn_once("%s: out-of-range taint input ignored."
+				     " tainted_mask adjusted to 0x%lx\n",
+				     __func__, tmptaint);
+		}
+
 		/*
 		 * Poor man's atomic or. Not worth adding a primitive
 		 * to everyone's atomic.h for this
 		 */
-		int i;
 		for (i = 0; i < BITS_PER_LONG && tmptaint >> i; i++) {
 			if ((tmptaint >> i) & 1)
 				add_taint(i, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.4
#1 lore raw
Quoted 1 line · On Tue, 12 May 2020 13:46:53 -0400 Rafael Aquini <[email protected]> wrote:

The sysctl knob

/proc/sys/kernel/tainted, yes?

Quoted 38 lines

allows users with SYS_ADMIN capability to
taint the kernel with any arbitrary value, but this might produce an invalid flags bitset being committed to tainted_mask.

This patch introduces a simple way for proc_taint() to ignore any eventual invalid bit coming from the user input before committing those bits to the kernel tainted_mask.

...

include/linux/kernel.h +2 -0
@@ -597,6 +597,8 @@ extern enum system_states {
 #define TAINT_RANDSTRUCT		17
 #define TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT		18
 
+#define TAINT_FLAGS_MAX			((1UL << TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT) - 1)
+
 struct taint_flag {
 	char c_true;	/* character printed when tainted */
 	char c_false;	/* character printed when not tainted */
kernel/sysctl.c +9 -0
index 8a176d8727a3..fb2d693fc08c 100644
@@ -2623,11 +2623,23 @@ static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 		return err;
 
 	if (write) {
+		int i;
+
+		/*
+		 * Ignore user input that would cause the loop below
+		 * to commit arbitrary and out of valid range TAINT flags.
+		 */
+		if (tmptaint > TAINT_FLAGS_MAX) {
+			tmptaint &= TAINT_FLAGS_MAX;
+			pr_warn_once("%s: out-of-range taint input ignored."

kernel/sysctl.c static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write, · line 2643

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/sysctl.c +4 -1
+				     " tainted_mask adjusted to 0x%lx\n",
+				     __func__, tmptaint);
+		}
+
 		/*
 		 * Poor man's atomic or. Not worth adding a primitive
 		 * to everyone's atomic.h for this
 		 */
-		int i;
 		for (i = 0; i < BITS_PER_LONG && tmptaint >> i; i++) {

Could simply replace BITS_PER_LONG with TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT here?

(That "&& tmptaint >> i" seems a rather silly optimization?)

kernel/sysctl.c static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write, · line 2645

Quoted 2 lines
kernel/sysctl.c +0 -0
 			if ((tmptaint >> i) & 1)
 				add_taint(i, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);

In fact the whole thing could be simplified down to

	for (i = 1; i <= TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT; i <<= 1)
		if (i & tmptaint)
			add_taint(...)

and silently drop out-of-range bits?

#2 lore raw
Quoted 62 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 1 line · On Tue, 12 May 2020 13:46:53 -0400 Rafael Aquini <[email protected]> wrote:

The sysctl knob

/proc/sys/kernel/tainted, yes?

Quoted 38 lines

allows users with SYS_ADMIN capability to
taint the kernel with any arbitrary value, but this might produce an invalid flags bitset being committed to tainted_mask.

This patch introduces a simple way for proc_taint() to ignore any eventual invalid bit coming from the user input before committing those bits to the kernel tainted_mask.

...

include/linux/kernel.h +2 -0
@@ -597,6 +597,8 @@ extern enum system_states {
 #define TAINT_RANDSTRUCT		17
 #define TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT		18
 
+#define TAINT_FLAGS_MAX			((1UL << TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT) - 1)
+
 struct taint_flag {
 	char c_true;	/* character printed when tainted */
 	char c_false;	/* character printed when not tainted */
kernel/sysctl.c +9 -0
index 8a176d8727a3..fb2d693fc08c 100644
@@ -2623,11 +2623,23 @@ static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 		return err;
 
 	if (write) {
+		int i;
+
+		/*
+		 * Ignore user input that would cause the loop below
+		 * to commit arbitrary and out of valid range TAINT flags.
+		 */
+		if (tmptaint > TAINT_FLAGS_MAX) {
+			tmptaint &= TAINT_FLAGS_MAX;
+			pr_warn_once("%s: out-of-range taint input ignored."

kernel/sysctl.c static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write, · line 2643

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/sysctl.c +4 -1
+				     " tainted_mask adjusted to 0x%lx\n",
+				     __func__, tmptaint);
+		}
+
 		/*
 		 * Poor man's atomic or. Not worth adding a primitive
 		 * to everyone's atomic.h for this
 		 */
-		int i;
 		for (i = 0; i < BITS_PER_LONG && tmptaint >> i; i++) {

Could simply replace BITS_PER_LONG with TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT here?

(That "&& tmptaint >> i" seems a rather silly optimization?)

kernel/sysctl.c static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write, · line 2645

Quoted 2 lines
kernel/sysctl.c +0 -0
 			if ((tmptaint >> i) & 1)
 				add_taint(i, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
Quoted 8 lines

In fact the whole thing could be simplified down to

	for (i = 1; i <= TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT; i <<= 1)
		if (i & tmptaint)
			add_taint(...)

and silently drop out-of-range bits?

Sure!

-- Rafael

Acked-by on v1 1/1
#3 lore raw
In reply to Rafael Aquini
Quoted 9 lines · Rafael Aquini

The sysctl knob allows users with SYS_ADMIN capability to taint the kernel with any arbitrary value, but this might produce an invalid flags bitset being committed to tainted_mask.

This patch introduces a simple way for proc_taint() to ignore any eventual invalid bit coming from the user input before committing those bits to the kernel tainted_mask.

Luis