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Bluetooth: Disconnect if E0 is used for Level 4

PATCH In review Luiz Augusto von Dentz 3 participants 7 messages May 20, 2020 – Nov 30, 2023

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Luiz Augusto von Dentz

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/2 Bluetooth: Disconnect if E0 is used for Level 4

From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

E0 is not allowed with Level 4:

BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part C page 1319:

'128-bit equivalent strength for link and encryption keys
required using FIPS approved algorithms (E0 not allowed, SAFER+ not allowed, and P-192 not allowed; encryption key not shortened'

SC enabled:

Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13

        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 256
        Page: 1/2
        Features: 0x0b 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
          Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support)
          LE Supported (Host)
          Secure Connections (Host Support)
Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4

        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 256
        Encryption: Enabled with AES-CCM (0x02)

SC disabled:

Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13

        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 256
        Page: 1/2
        Features: 0x03 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
          Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support)
          LE Supported (Host)
Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4

        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 256
        Encryption: Enabled with E0 (0x01)
[May 8 20:23] Bluetooth: hci0: Invalid security: expect AES but E0 was used
< HCI Command: Disconnect (0x01|0x0006) plen 3
        Handle: 256
        Reason: Authentication Failure (0x05)
---
 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 10 ++++++----
 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c         | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c        | 20 ++++++++------------
 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h +6 -4
index cdd4f1db8670..c69309ffd40a 100644
@@ -1402,11 +1402,13 @@ static inline void hci_encrypt_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status)
 	else
 		encrypt = 0x01;
 
-	if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_SDP)
-		conn->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
+	if (!status) {
+		if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_SDP)
+			conn->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
 
-	if (conn->pending_sec_level > conn->sec_level)
-		conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level;
+		if (conn->pending_sec_level > conn->sec_level)
+			conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level;
+	}
 
 	mutex_lock(&hci_cb_list_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry(cb, &hci_cb_list, list) {
net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c +17 -0
index 307800fd18e6..b99b5c6de55a 100644
@@ -1323,6 +1323,23 @@ int hci_conn_check_link_mode(struct hci_conn *conn)
 			return 0;
 	}
 
+	 /* AES encryption is required for Level 4:
+	  *
+	  * BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part C
+	  * page 1319:
+	  *
+	  * 128-bit equivalent strength for link and encryption keys
+	  * required using FIPS approved algorithms (E0 not allowed,
+	  * SAFER+ not allowed, and P-192 not allowed; encryption key
+	  * not shortened)
+	  */
+	if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS &&
+	    !test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->flags)) {
+		bt_dev_err(conn->hdev,
+			   "Invalid security: Missing AES-CCM usage");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	if (hci_conn_ssp_enabled(conn) &&
 	    !test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags))
 		return 0;
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +8 -12
index cfeaee347db3..d6a1e2450696 100644
@@ -3065,27 +3065,23 @@ static void hci_encrypt_change_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	clear_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->flags);
 
+	/* Check link security requirements are met */
+	if (!hci_conn_check_link_mode(conn))
+		ev->status = HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE;
+
 	if (ev->status && conn->state == BT_CONNECTED) {
 		if (ev->status == HCI_ERROR_PIN_OR_KEY_MISSING)
 			set_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH_FAILURE, &conn->flags);
 
+		/* Notify upper layers so they can cleanup before
+		 * disconnecting.
+		 */
+		hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, ev->status);
 		hci_disconnect(conn, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
 		hci_conn_drop(conn);
 		goto unlock;
 	}
 
-	/* In Secure Connections Only mode, do not allow any connections
-	 * that are not encrypted with AES-CCM using a P-256 authenticated
-	 * combination key.
-	 */
-	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) &&
-	    (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->flags) ||
-	     conn->key_type != HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256)) {
-		hci_connect_cfm(conn, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
-		hci_conn_drop(conn);
-		goto unlock;
-	}
-
 	/* Try reading the encryption key size for encrypted ACL links */
 	if (!ev->status && ev->encrypt && conn->type == ACL_LINK) {
 		struct hci_cp_read_enc_key_size cp;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.3
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/2 Bluetooth: Fix bogus check for re-auth no supported with non-ssp

From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

This reverts 19f8def031bfa50c579149b200bfeeb919727b27 "Bluetooth: Fix auth_complete_evt for legacy units" which seems to be working around a bug on a broken controller rather then any limitation imposed by the Bluetooth spec, in fact if there ws not possible to re-auth the command shall fail not succeed.

---
 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h |  1 -
 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c         |  8 +++-----
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c        | 11 ++---------
 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h +0 -1
index c69309ffd40a..13b90b5fdd3b 100644
@@ -732,7 +732,6 @@ void hci_inquiry_cache_flush(struct hci_dev *hdev);
 /* ----- HCI Connections ----- */
 enum {
 	HCI_CONN_AUTH_PEND,
-	HCI_CONN_REAUTH_PEND,
 	HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND,
 	HCI_CONN_RSWITCH_PEND,
 	HCI_CONN_MODE_CHANGE_PEND,
net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c +3 -5
index b99b5c6de55a..f595acf0032b 100644
@@ -1372,12 +1372,10 @@ static int hci_conn_auth(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level, __u8 auth_type)
 		hci_send_cmd(conn->hdev, HCI_OP_AUTH_REQUESTED,
 			     sizeof(cp), &cp);
 
-		/* If we're already encrypted set the REAUTH_PEND flag,
-		 * otherwise set the ENCRYPT_PEND.
+		/* Set the ENCRYPT_PEND to trigger encryption after
+		 * authentication.
 		 */
-		if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags))
-			set_bit(HCI_CONN_REAUTH_PEND, &conn->flags);
-		else
+		if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags))
 			set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->flags);
 	}
 
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +2 -9
index d6a1e2450696..cfc7edcce3cd 100644
@@ -2884,14 +2884,8 @@ static void hci_auth_complete_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	if (!ev->status) {
 		clear_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH_FAILURE, &conn->flags);
-
-		if (!hci_conn_ssp_enabled(conn) &&
-		    test_bit(HCI_CONN_REAUTH_PEND, &conn->flags)) {
-			bt_dev_info(hdev, "re-auth of legacy device is not possible.");
-		} else {
-			set_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH, &conn->flags);
-			conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level;
-		}
+		set_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH, &conn->flags);
+		conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level;
 	} else {
 		if (ev->status == HCI_ERROR_PIN_OR_KEY_MISSING)
 			set_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH_FAILURE, &conn->flags);
@@ -2900,7 +2894,6 @@ static void hci_auth_complete_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	}
 
 	clear_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH_PEND, &conn->flags);
-	clear_bit(HCI_CONN_REAUTH_PEND, &conn->flags);
 
 	if (conn->state == BT_CONFIG) {
 		if (!ev->status && hci_conn_ssp_enabled(conn)) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.3
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] Bluetooth: Fix bogus check for re-auth no supported with non-ssp

Quoted 10 lines · Luiz Augusto von Dentz

From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

This reverts 19f8def031bfa50c579149b200bfeeb919727b27 "Bluetooth: Fix auth_complete_evt for legacy units" which seems to be working around a bug on a broken controller rather then any limitation
imposed by the Bluetooth spec, in fact if there ws not possible to re-auth the command shall fail not succeed.

Looks like this fell through the cracks, do you want me to rebase and re-send it?

author maintainer
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] Bluetooth: Fix bogus check for re-auth no supported with non-ssp

Hi Bastien,

Quoted 11 lines · Bastien Nocera
Quoted 9 lines · Luiz Augusto von Dentz

From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

This reverts 19f8def031bfa50c579149b200bfeeb919727b27 "Bluetooth: Fix auth_complete_evt for legacy units" which seems to be working around a bug on a broken controller rather then any limitation
imposed by the Bluetooth spec, in fact if there ws not possible to re-auth the command shall fail not succeed.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

Looks like this fell through the cracks, do you want me to rebase and re-send it?

Yeah, please resend so we get the CI to test it doesn't break anything.

Signature · 1 line
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] Bluetooth: Fix bogus check for re-auth no supported with non-ssp

Quoted 17 lines · Luiz Augusto von Dentz

Hi Bastien,

Quoted 13 lines · Bastien Nocera
Quoted 11 lines · Luiz Augusto von Dentz

From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

This reverts 19f8def031bfa50c579149b200bfeeb919727b27 "Bluetooth: Fix auth_complete_evt for legacy units" which seems to be
working around a bug on a broken controller rather then any limitation
imposed by the Bluetooth spec, in fact if there ws not possible to
re-auth the command shall fail not succeed.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line

Looks like this fell through the cracks, do you want me to rebase and
re-send it?

Yeah, please resend so we get the CI to test it doesn't break anything.

Done.

Cheers

author maintainer
#5 lore raw
In reply to Luiz Augusto von Dentz

Hi Marcel,

Quoted 143 lines · Luiz Augusto von Dentz

From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

E0 is not allowed with Level 4:

BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part C page 1319:

'128-bit equivalent strength for link and encryption keys
required using FIPS approved algorithms (E0 not allowed, SAFER+ not allowed, and P-192 not allowed; encryption key not shortened'

SC enabled:

Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13

        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 256
        Page: 1/2
        Features: 0x0b 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
          Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support)
          LE Supported (Host)
          Secure Connections (Host Support)
Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4

        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 256
        Encryption: Enabled with AES-CCM (0x02)

SC disabled:

Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13

        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 256
        Page: 1/2
        Features: 0x03 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
          Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support)
          LE Supported (Host)
Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4

        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 256
        Encryption: Enabled with E0 (0x01)
[May 8 20:23] Bluetooth: hci0: Invalid security: expect AES but E0 was used
< HCI Command: Disconnect (0x01|0x0006) plen 3
        Handle: 256
        Reason: Authentication Failure (0x05)
---
 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 10 ++++++----
 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c         | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c        | 20 ++++++++------------
 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h +6 -4
index cdd4f1db8670..c69309ffd40a 100644
@@ -1402,11 +1402,13 @@ static inline void hci_encrypt_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status)
        else
                encrypt = 0x01;
 
-       if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_SDP)
-               conn->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
+       if (!status) {
+               if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_SDP)
+                       conn->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
 
-       if (conn->pending_sec_level > conn->sec_level)
-               conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level;
+               if (conn->pending_sec_level > conn->sec_level)
+                       conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level;
+       }
 
        mutex_lock(&hci_cb_list_lock);
        list_for_each_entry(cb, &hci_cb_list, list) {
net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c +17 -0
index 307800fd18e6..b99b5c6de55a 100644
@@ -1323,6 +1323,23 @@ int hci_conn_check_link_mode(struct hci_conn *conn)
                        return 0;
        }
 
+        /* AES encryption is required for Level 4:
+         *
+         * BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part C
+         * page 1319:
+         *
+         * 128-bit equivalent strength for link and encryption keys
+         * required using FIPS approved algorithms (E0 not allowed,
+         * SAFER+ not allowed, and P-192 not allowed; encryption key
+         * not shortened)
+         */
+       if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS &&
+           !test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->flags)) {
+               bt_dev_err(conn->hdev,
+                          "Invalid security: Missing AES-CCM usage");
+               return 0;
+       }
+
        if (hci_conn_ssp_enabled(conn) &&
            !test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags))
                return 0;
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +8 -13
index cfeaee347db3..d6a1e2450696 100644
@@ -3065,27 +3065,23 @@ static void hci_encrypt_change_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
        clear_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->flags);
 
+       /* Check link security requirements are met */
+       if (!hci_conn_check_link_mode(conn))
+               ev->status = HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE;
+
        if (ev->status && conn->state == BT_CONNECTED) {
                if (ev->status == HCI_ERROR_PIN_OR_KEY_MISSING)
                        set_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH_FAILURE, &conn->flags);
 
+               /* Notify upper layers so they can cleanup before
+                * disconnecting.
+                */
+               hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, ev->status);
                hci_disconnect(conn, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
                hci_conn_drop(conn);
                goto unlock;
        }
 
-       /* In Secure Connections Only mode, do not allow any connections
-        * that are not encrypted with AES-CCM using a P-256 authenticated
-        * combination key.
-        */
-       if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) &&
-           (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->flags) ||
-            conn->key_type != HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256)) {
-               hci_connect_cfm(conn, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
-               hci_conn_drop(conn);
-               goto unlock;
-       }
-
        /* Try reading the encryption key size for encrypted ACL links */
        if (!ev->status && ev->encrypt && conn->type == ACL_LINK) {
                struct hci_cp_read_enc_key_size cp;
--
Quoted 1 line

2.25.3

Looks like we had left this behind.

Signature · 1 line
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
maintainer
#6 lore raw
In reply to Luiz Augusto von Dentz

Hi Luiz,

Quoted 42 lines

E0 is not allowed with Level 4:

BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part C page 1319:

'128-bit equivalent strength for link and encryption keys
required using FIPS approved algorithms (E0 not allowed, SAFER+ not allowed, and P-192 not allowed; encryption key not shortened'

SC enabled:

Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13

       Status: Success (0x00)
       Handle: 256
       Page: 1/2
       Features: 0x0b 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
         Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support)
         LE Supported (Host)
         Secure Connections (Host Support)
Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4

       Status: Success (0x00)
       Handle: 256
       Encryption: Enabled with AES-CCM (0x02)

SC disabled:

Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13

       Status: Success (0x00)
       Handle: 256
       Page: 1/2
       Features: 0x03 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
         Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support)
         LE Supported (Host)
Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4

       Status: Success (0x00)
       Handle: 256
       Encryption: Enabled with E0 (0x01)
[May 8 20:23] Bluetooth: hci0: Invalid security: expect AES but E0 was used
< HCI Command: Disconnect (0x01|0x0006) plen 3
       Handle: 256
       Reason: Authentication Failure (0x05)
Quoted 6 lines

---

include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 10 ++++++----
net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c         | 17 +++++++++++++++++
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c        | 20 ++++++++------------
3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

patch has been applied to bluetooth-next tree.

Regards

Marcel