iommu/vt-d: fixes for v5.8
Subsystems (2)
Lu Baolu
maintainerHi Joerg,
Below fix patches have been piled up for v5.8. Please consider them for your fix branch.
Best regards,
Lu Baolu
Lu Baolu (5):
iommu/vt-d: Make Intel SVM code 64-bit only iommu/vt-d: Set U/S bit in first level page table by default iommu/vt-d: Enable PCI ACS for platform opt in hint iommu/vt-d: Update scalable mode paging structure coherency iommu/vt-d: Fix misuse of iommu_domain_identity_map()
Rajat Jain (1):
iommu/vt-d: Don't apply gfx quirks to untrusted devices
drivers/iommu/Kconfig | 2 +- drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c | 3 +- drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- include/linux/intel-iommu.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
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2.17.1 _______________________________________________ iommu mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/iommu
Lu Baolu
maintainerPATCH 1/6 iommu/vt-d: Make Intel SVM code 64-bit only
Current Intel SVM is designed by setting the pgd_t of the processor page table to FLPTR field of the PASID entry. The first level translation only supports 4 and 5 level paging structures, hence it's infeasible for the IOMMU to share a processor's page table when it's running in 32-bit mode. Let's disable 32bit support for now and claim support only when all the missing pieces are ready in the future.
--- drivers/iommu/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iommu/Kconfig +1 -1
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ config INTEL_IOMMU_DEBUGFS config INTEL_IOMMU_SVM bool "Support for Shared Virtual Memory with Intel IOMMU" - depends on INTEL_IOMMU && X86 + depends on INTEL_IOMMU && X86_64 select PCI_PASID select PCI_PRI select MMU_NOTIFIER
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2.17.1 _______________________________________________ iommu mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/iommu
Lu Baolu
maintainerPATCH 3/6 iommu/vt-d: Don't apply gfx quirks to untrusted devices
In reply to Lu BaoluFrom: Rajat Jain <[email protected]>
Currently, an external malicious PCI device can masquerade the VID:PID of faulty gfx devices, and thus apply iommu quirks to effectively disable the IOMMU restrictions for itself.
Thus we need to ensure that the device we are applying quirks to, is indeed an internal trusted device.
--- drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+)
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +37 -0
@@ -6020,6 +6020,23 @@ intel_iommu_domain_set_attr(struct iommu_domain *domain,return ret; } +/* +* Check that the device does not live on an external facing PCI port that is +* marked as untrusted. Such devices should not be able to apply quirks and +* thus not be able to bypass the IOMMU restrictions. +*/ +static bool risky_device (struct pci_dev *pdev) +{ +if (pdev->untrusted) { +pci_info (pdev, +"Skipping IOMMU quirk for dev [%04X:%04X] on untrusted PCI link\n" , + pdev->vendor, pdev->device); +pci_info (pdev,"Please check with your BIOS/Platform vendor about this\n" ); +return true; + } +return false; +} +const struct iommu_ops intel_iommu_ops = { .capable = intel_iommu_capable, .domain_alloc = intel_iommu_domain_alloc,
@@ -6059,6 +6076,9 @@ const struct iommu_ops intel_iommu_ops = {static void quirk_iommu_igfx (struct pci_dev *dev) { +if (risky_device (dev)) +return ; +pci_info (dev,"Disabling IOMMU for graphics on this chipset\n" ); dmar_map_gfx =0 ; }
@@ -6100,6 +6120,9 @@ DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_HEADER(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x163D, quirk_iommu_igfx);static void quirk_iommu_rwbf (struct pci_dev *dev) { +if (risky_device (dev)) +return ; +/* * Mobile 4 Series Chipset neglects to set RWBF capability, * but needs it. Same seems to hold for the desktop versions.
@@ -6130,6 +6153,9 @@ static void quirk_calpella_no_shadow_gtt(struct pci_dev *dev) {unsigned short ggc; +if (risky_device (dev)) +return ; +if (pci_read_config_word (dev,GGC , &ggc))return ;
@@ -6163,6 +6189,12 @@ static void __init check_tylersburg_isoch(void) pdev =pci_get_device (PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL ,0x3a3e ,NULL );if (!pdev)return ; + +if (risky_device (pdev)) { +pci_dev_put (pdev); +return ; + } +pci_dev_put (pdev);/* System Management Registers. Might be hidden, in which case
@@ -6172,6 +6204,11 @@ static void __init check_tylersburg_isoch(void)if (!pdev)return ; +if (risky_device (pdev)) { +pci_dev_put (pdev); +return ; + } +if (pci_read_config_dword (pdev,0x188 , &vtisochctrl)) {pci_dev_put (pdev);return ;
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2.17.1 _______________________________________________ iommu mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/iommu
Lu Baolu
maintainerPATCH 4/6 iommu/vt-d: Enable PCI ACS for platform opt in hint
In reply to Lu BaoluPCI ACS is disabled if Intel IOMMU is off by default or intel_iommu=off is used in command line. Unfortunately, Intel IOMMU will be forced on if there're devices sitting on an external facing PCI port that is marked as untrusted (for example, thunderbolt peripherals). That means, PCI ACS is disabled while Intel IOMMU is forced on to isolate those devices. As the result, the devices of an MFD will be grouped by a single group even the ACS is supported on device.
[ 0.691263] pci 0000:00:07.1: Adding to iommu group 3 [ 0.691277] pci 0000:00:07.2: Adding to iommu group 3 [ 0.691292] pci 0000:00:07.3: Adding to iommu group 3
Fix it by requesting PCI ACS when Intel IOMMU is detected with platform opt in hint.
--- drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c +2 -1
@@ -898,7 +898,8 @@ int __init detect_intel_iommu(void)if (!ret) ret =dmar_walk_dmar_table ((struct acpi_table_dmar *)dmar_tbl, &validate_drhd_cb); -if (!ret && !no_iommu && !iommu_detected && !dmar_disabled) { +if (!ret && !no_iommu && !iommu_detected && + (!dmar_disabled ||dmar_platform_optin ())) { iommu_detected =1 ;/* Make sure ACS will be enabled */ pci_request_acs ();
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2.17.1 _______________________________________________ iommu mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/iommu
Lu Baolu
maintainerPATCH 2/6 iommu/vt-d: Set U/S bit in first level page table by default
In reply to Lu BaoluWhen using first-level translation for IOVA, currently the U/S bit in the page table is cleared which implies DMA requests with user privilege are blocked. As the result, following error messages might be observed when passing through a device to user level:
DMAR: DRHD: handling fault status reg 3
DMAR: [DMA Read] Request device [41:00.0] PASID 1 fault addr 7ecdcd000
[fault reason 129] SM: U/S set 0 for first-level translation with user privilege
This fixes it by setting U/S bit in the first level page table and makes IOVA over first level compatible with previous second-level translation.
--- drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 5 ++--- include/linux/intel-iommu.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +2 -3
@@ -921,7 +921,7 @@ static struct dma_pte *pfn_to_dma_pte(struct dmar_domain *domain,domain_flush_cache (domain, tmp_page,VTD_PAGE_SIZE ); pteval = ((uint64_t )virt_to_dma_pfn (tmp_page) <<VTD_PAGE_SHIFT ) |DMA_PTE_READ |DMA_PTE_WRITE ;if (domain_use_first_level (domain)) - pteval |=DMA_FL_PTE_XD ; + pteval |=DMA_FL_PTE_XD |DMA_FL_PTE_US ;if (cmpxchg64 (&pte->val,0ULL , pteval))/* Someone else set it while we were thinking; use theirs. */ free_pgtable_page (tmp_page);
@@ -1951,7 +1951,6 @@ static inline void context_set_sm_rid2pasid(struct context_entry *context, unsigned long pasid) { context->hi |= pasid & ((1 <<20 ) -1 ); - context->hi |= (1 <<20 ); }/*
@@ -2243,7 +2242,7 @@ static int __domain_mapping(struct dmar_domain *domain, unsigned long iov_pfn, attr = prot & (DMA_PTE_READ |DMA_PTE_WRITE |DMA_PTE_SNP );if (domain_use_first_level (domain)) - attr |=DMA_FL_PTE_PRESENT |DMA_FL_PTE_XD ; + attr |=DMA_FL_PTE_PRESENT |DMA_FL_PTE_XD |DMA_FL_PTE_US ;if (!sg) { sg_res = nr_pages;
include/linux/intel-iommu.h +1 -0
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@#define DMA_PTE_SNP BIT_ULL(11)#define DMA_FL_PTE_PRESENT BIT_ULL(0) +#define DMA_FL_PTE_US BIT_ULL(2)#define DMA_FL_PTE_XD BIT_ULL(63)#define ADDR_WIDTH_5LEVEL (57)
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Lu Baolu
maintainerPATCH 5/6 iommu/vt-d: Update scalable mode paging structure coherency
In reply to Lu BaoluThe Scalable-mode Page-walk Coherency (SMPWC) field in the VT-d extended capability register indicates the hardware coherency behavior on paging structures accessed through the pasid table entry. This is ignored in current code and using ECAP.C instead which is only valid in legacy mode. Fix this so that paging structure updates could be manually flushed from the cache line if hardware page walking is not snooped.
--- drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +10 -3
@@ -612,6 +612,12 @@ struct intel_iommu *domain_get_iommu(struct dmar_domain *domain)return g_iommus[iommu_id]; } +static inline bool iommu_paging_structure_coherency (struct intel_iommu *iommu) +{ +return sm_supported (iommu) ? +ecap_smpwc (iommu->ecap) :ecap_coherent (iommu->ecap); +} +static void domain_update_iommu_coherency (struct dmar_domain *domain) {struct dmar_drhd_unit *drhd;
@@ -623,7 +629,7 @@ static void domain_update_iommu_coherency(struct dmar_domain *domain)for_each_domain_iommu (i, domain) { found = true; -if (!ecap_coherent (g_iommus[i]->ecap)) { +if (!iommu_paging_structure_coherency (g_iommus[i])) { domain->iommu_coherency =0 ;break ; }
@@ -634,7 +640,7 @@ static void domain_update_iommu_coherency(struct dmar_domain *domain)/* No hardware attached; use lowest common denominator */ rcu_read_lock ();for_each_active_iommu (iommu, drhd) { -if (!ecap_coherent (iommu->ecap)) { +if (!iommu_paging_structure_coherency (iommu)) { domain->iommu_coherency =0 ;break ; }
@@ -2094,7 +2100,8 @@ static int domain_context_mapping_one(struct dmar_domain *domain,context_set_fault_enable (context);context_set_present (context); -domain_flush_cache (domain, context,sizeof (*context)); +if (!ecap_coherent (iommu->ecap)) +clflush_cache_range (context,sizeof (*context));/* * It's a non-present to present mapping. If hardware doesn't cache
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Lu Baolu
maintainerPATCH 6/6 iommu/vt-d: Fix misuse of iommu_domain_identity_map()
In reply to Lu BaoluThe iommu_domain_identity_map() helper takes start/end PFN as arguments. Fix a misuse case where the start and end addresses are passed.
--- drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +3 -1
@@ -2701,7 +2701,9 @@ static int __init si_domain_init(int hw) end >> agaw_to_width(si_domain->agaw)))continue ; - ret =iommu_domain_identity_map (si_domain, start, end); + ret =iommu_domain_identity_map (si_domain, +mm_to_dma_pfn (start >>PAGE_SHIFT ), +mm_to_dma_pfn (end >>PAGE_SHIFT ));if (ret)return ret; }
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Joerg Roedel
maintainerQuoted 15 lines · Lu Baolu
Hi Joerg,
Below fix patches have been piled up for v5.8. Please consider them for your fix branch.
Best regards,
Lu BaoluLu Baolu (5):
iommu/vt-d: Make Intel SVM code 64-bit only iommu/vt-d: Set U/S bit in first level page table by default iommu/vt-d: Enable PCI ACS for platform opt in hint iommu/vt-d: Update scalable mode paging structure coherency iommu/vt-d: Fix misuse ofiommu_domain_identity_map()
Quoted 8 lines
Rajat Jain (1):
iommu/vt-d: Don't apply gfx quirks to untrusted devicesdrivers/iommu/Kconfig | 2 +- drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c | 3 +- drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- include/linux/intel-iommu.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Applied to iommu/fixes, thanks Baolu.
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