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ima: Fix rule parsing bugs and extend KEXEC_CMDLINE rule support

PATCH In review Tyler Hicks 4 participants 28 messages Jul 9, 2020 – Jul 20, 2020 1 message not in the archive

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#0 lore raw

v3 cover ima: Fix rule parsing bugs and extend KEXEC_CMDLINE rule support

This series ultimately extends the supported IMA rule conditionals for the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function. As of today, there's an imbalance in IMA language conditional support for KEXEC_CMDLINE rules in comparison to KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK and KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK rules. The KEXEC_CMDLINE rules do not support *any* conditionals so you cannot have a sequence of rules like this:

dont_measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK obj_type=foo_t dont_measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK obj_type=foo_t dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE obj_type=foo_t measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK
measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE

Instead, KEXEC_CMDLINE rules can only be measured or not measured and there's no additional flexibility in today's implementation of the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function.

With this series, the above sequence of rules becomes valid and any calls to kexec_file_load() with a kernel and initramfs inode type of foo_t will not be measured (that includes the kernel cmdline buffer) while all other objects given to a kexec_file_load() syscall will be measured. There's obviously not an inode directly associated with the kernel cmdline buffer but this patch series ties the inode based decision making for KEXEC_CMDLINE to the kernel's inode. I think this will be intuitive to policy authors.

While reading IMA code and preparing to make this change, I realized that the buffer based hook functions (KEXEC_CMDLINE and KEY_CHECK) are quite special in comparison to longer standing hook functions. These buffer based hook functions can only support measure actions and there are some restrictions on the conditionals that they support. However, the rule parser isn't enforcing any of those restrictions and IMA policy authors wouldn't have any immediate way of knowing that the policy that they wrote is invalid. For example, the sequence of rules above parses successfully in today's kernel but the
"dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE ..." rule is incorrectly handled in ima_match_rules(). The dont_measure rule is *always* considered to be a match so, surprisingly, no KEXEC_CMDLINE measurements are made.

While making the rule parser more strict, I realized that the parser does not correctly free all of the allocated memory associated with an ima_rule_entry when going down some error paths. Invalid policy loaded by the policy administrator could result in small memory leaks.

I envision patches 1-7 going to stable. The series is ordered in a way that has all the fixes up front, followed by cleanups, followed by the feature patch. The breakdown of patches looks like so:

Memory leak fixes: 1-3
Parser strictness fixes: 4-7
Code cleanups made possible by the fixes: 8-11
Extend KEXEC_CMDLINE rule support: 12

Perhaps the most logical ordering for code review is:

1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12

If you'd like me to re-order or split up the series, just let me know. Thanks for considering these patches!

* Series-wide v3 changes
- Indentation changes in patch #4 which caused some churn
- Added patch #7
- Significant changes to patch #10 to address Mimi's requests
* Series-wide v2 changes
- Rebased onto next-integrity-testing
- Squashed patches 2 and 3 from v1
+ Updated this cover letter to account for changes to patch index changes
+ See patch 2 for specific code changes

Tyler

Tyler Hicks (12):
ima: Have the LSM free its audit rule
ima: Free the entire rule when deleting a list of rules
ima: Free the entire rule if it fails to parse
ima: Fail rule parsing when buffer hook functions have an invalid
action
ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook is combined with an
invalid cond
ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEY_CHECK hook is combined with an
invalid cond
ima: Fail rule parsing when appraise_flag=blacklist is unsupportable
ima: Shallow copy the args_p member of ima_rule_entry.lsm elements
ima: Use correct type for the args_p member of ima_rule_entry.lsm
elements
ima: Move comprehensive rule validation checks out of the token parser
ima: Use the common function to detect LSM conditionals in a rule
ima: Support additional conditionals in the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook
function

 include/linux/ima.h                          |   4 +-
 kernel/kexec_file.c                          |   2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h                 |  13 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c             |   2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c        |   2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c |   2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c            |  23 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c          |  20 --
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c          | 206 ++++++++++++++-----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c      |   2 +-
 10 files changed, 182 insertions(+), 94 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/12 ima: Have the LSM free its audit rule

Ask the LSM to free its audit rule rather than directly calling kfree(). Both AppArmor and SELinux do additional work in their audit_rule_free() hooks. Fix memory leaks by allowing the LSMs to perform necessary work.

Fixes b16942455193 ("ima: use the lsm policy update notifier")
Cc Janne Karhunen <[email protected]>
Cc Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>

---

* v3
- No change
* v2
- Fixed build warning by dropping the 'return -EINVAL' from the stubbed out security_filter_rule_free() since it has a void return type
- Added Mimi's Reviewed-by
- Developed a follow-on patch to rename security_filter_rule_*() functions, to address Casey's request, but I'll submit it independently of this patch series since it is somewhat unrelated

 security/integrity/ima/ima.h        | 5 +++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +5 -0
index 4515975cc540..59ec28f5c117 100644
@@ -420,6 +420,7 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
 
 #define security_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
+#define security_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free
 #define security_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
 
 #else
@@ -430,6 +431,10 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
+static inline void security_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{
+}
+
 static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
 					     void *lsmrule)
 {
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1 -1
index 66aa3e17a888..d7c268c2b0ce 100644
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 	int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
-		kfree(entry->lsm[i].rule);
+		security_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
 		kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
 	}
 	kfree(entry);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#5 lore raw

PATCH v3 2/12 ima: Free the entire rule when deleting a list of rules

In reply to Tyler Hicks

Create a function, ima_free_rule(), to free all memory associated with an ima_rule_entry. Use the new function to fix memory leaks of allocated ima_rule_entry members, such as .fsname and .keyrings, when deleting a list of rules.

Make the existing ima_lsm_free_rule() function specific to the LSM audit rule array of an ima_rule_entry and require that callers make an additional call to kfree to free the ima_rule_entry itself.

This fixes a memory leak seen when loading by a valid rule that contains an additional piece of allocated memory, such as an fsname, followed by an invalid rule that triggers a policy load failure:

 # echo -e "dont_measure fsname=securityfs\nbad syntax" > \
    /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
 -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
 # echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
 # cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
 unreferenced object 0xffff9bab67ca12c0 (size 16):
   comm "bash", pid 684, jiffies 4295212803 (age 252.344s)
   hex dump (first 16 bytes):
     73 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 66 73 00 6b 6b 6b 6b a5  securityfs.kkkk.
   backtrace:
     [<00000000adc80b1b>] kstrdup+0x2e/0x60
     [<00000000d504cb0d>] ima_parse_add_rule+0x7d4/0x1020
     [<00000000444825ac>] ima_write_policy+0xab/0x1d0
     [<000000002b7f0d6c>] vfs_write+0xde/0x1d0
     [<0000000096feedcf>] ksys_write+0x68/0xe0
     [<0000000052b544a2>] do_syscall_64+0x56/0xa0
     [<000000007ead1ba7>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fixes f1b08bbcbdaf ("ima: define a new policy condition based on the filesystem name")
Fixes 2b60c0ecedf8 ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy")

---

* v3
- No change
* v2
- Collapsed patch #2 from v1 of this series, into this patch. This patch now introduces ima_free_rule().
- Existing callers of ima_lsm_free_rule() are doing so to free rules after a successful or failed ima_lsm_copy_rule() and those callers continue to directly call ima_lsm_copy_rule() rather than doing explicit reference ownership and calling ima_free_rule().
- The kfree(entry) of ima_lsm_free_rule() was removed from that function to make it focused on freeing the LSM references. Direct callers of ima_lsm_free_rule() must now call kfree(entry) after ima_lsm_free_rule().
- A comment was added in ima_lsm_update_rule() to clarify why ima_free_rule() isn't being used.

 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +24 -5
index d7c268c2b0ce..bf00b966e87f 100644
@@ -261,6 +261,21 @@ static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 		security_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
 		kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
 	}
+}
+
+static void ima_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+{
+	if (!entry)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * entry->template->fields may be allocated in ima_parse_rule() but that
+	 * reference is owned by the corresponding ima_template_desc element in
+	 * the defined_templates list and cannot be freed here
+	 */
+	kfree(entry->fsname);
+	kfree(entry->keyrings);
+	ima_lsm_free_rule(entry);
 	kfree(entry);
 }
 
@@ -302,6 +317,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 
 out_err:
 	ima_lsm_free_rule(nentry);
+	kfree(nentry);
 	return NULL;
 }
 
@@ -315,7 +331,14 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 
 	list_replace_rcu(&entry->list, &nentry->list);
 	synchronize_rcu();
+	/*
+	 * ima_lsm_copy_rule() shallow copied all references, except for the
+	 * LSM references, from entry to nentry so we only want to free the LSM
+	 * references and the entry itself. All other memory refrences will now
+	 * be owned by nentry.
+	 */
 	ima_lsm_free_rule(entry);
+	kfree(entry);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -1402,15 +1425,11 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 void ima_delete_rules(void)
 {
 	struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
-	int i;
 
 	temp_ima_appraise = 0;
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_temp_rules, list) {
-		for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
-			kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
-
 		list_del(&entry->list);
-		kfree(entry);
+		ima_free_rule(entry);
 	}
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#6 lore raw

PATCH v3 3/12 ima: Free the entire rule if it fails to parse

In reply to Tyler Hicks

Use ima_free_rule() to fix memory leaks of allocated ima_rule_entry members, such as .fsname and .keyrings, when an error is encountered during rule parsing.

Set the args_p pointer to NULL after freeing it in the error path of ima_lsm_rule_init() so that it isn't freed twice.

This fixes a memory leak seen when loading an rule that contains an additional piece of allocated memory, such as an fsname, followed by an invalid conditional:

 # echo "measure fsname=tmpfs bad=cond" > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
 -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
 # echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
 # cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
 unreferenced object 0xffff98e7e4ece6c0 (size 8):
   comm "bash", pid 672, jiffies 4294791843 (age 21.855s)
   hex dump (first 8 bytes):
     74 6d 70 66 73 00 6b a5                          tmpfs.k.
   backtrace:
     [<00000000abab7413>] kstrdup+0x2e/0x60
     [<00000000f11ede32>] ima_parse_add_rule+0x7d4/0x1020
     [<00000000f883dd7a>] ima_write_policy+0xab/0x1d0
     [<00000000b17cf753>] vfs_write+0xde/0x1d0
     [<00000000b8ddfdea>] ksys_write+0x68/0xe0
     [<00000000b8e21e87>] do_syscall_64+0x56/0xa0
     [<0000000089ea7b98>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fixes f1b08bbcbdaf ("ima: define a new policy condition based on the filesystem name")
Fixes 2b60c0ecedf8 ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy")

---

* v3
- No change
* v2
- No change

 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +2 -1
index bf00b966e87f..e458cd47c099 100644
@@ -913,6 +913,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
 
 		if (ima_rules == &ima_default_rules) {
 			kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
+			entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = NULL;
 			result = -EINVAL;
 		} else
 			result = 0;
@@ -1404,7 +1405,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 
 	result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
 	if (result) {
-		kfree(entry);
+		ima_free_rule(entry);
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
 				    NULL, op, "invalid-policy", result,
 				    audit_info);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#7 lore raw

PATCH v3 4/12 ima: Fail rule parsing when buffer hook functions have an invalid action

In reply to Tyler Hicks

Buffer based hook functions, such as KEXEC_CMDLINE and KEY_CHECK, can only measure. The process_buffer_measurement() function quietly ignores all actions except measure so make this behavior clear at the time of policy load.

The parsing of the keyrings conditional had a check to ensure that it was only specified with measure actions but the check should be on the hook function and not the keyrings conditional since "appraise func=KEY_CHECK" is not a valid rule.

Fixes b0935123a183 ("IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments")
Fixes 5808611cccb2 ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys")

---

* v3
- Add comments to ima_validate_rule() to separate/explain the types of validation checks (section for action checks, section for hook function checks, soon to be a section for combination of options checks, etc.)
- Removed the "if (entry->flags & IMA_FUNC)" conditional around the switch statement in ima_validate_rule() which reduced the overall indention by a tab. This could be removed because entry->func is NONE when the IMA_FUNC flag is not set. We'll explicitly enforce and then leverage that property in a later patch when we start validating all hook functions in ima_validate_rule().
- Add comment explicitly stating that all hook functions except KEXEC_CMDLINE and KEY_CHECK are still being validated in ima_parse_rule().
* v2
- No change

 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +38 -2
index e458cd47c099..40c28f1a6a5a 100644
@@ -973,6 +973,43 @@ static void check_template_modsig(const struct ima_template_desc *template)
 #undef MSG
 }
 
+static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+{
+	/* Ensure that the action is set */
+	if (entry->action == UNKNOWN)
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure that the hook function is compatible with the other
+	 * components of the rule
+	 */
+	switch (entry->func) {
+	case NONE:
+	case FILE_CHECK:
+	case MMAP_CHECK:
+	case BPRM_CHECK:
+	case CREDS_CHECK:
+	case POST_SETATTR:
+	case MODULE_CHECK:
+	case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
+	case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK:
+	case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK:
+	case POLICY_CHECK:
+		/* Validation of these hook functions is in ima_parse_rule() */
+		break;
+	case KEXEC_CMDLINE:
+	case KEY_CHECK:
+		if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
+			return false;
+
+		break;
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -1150,7 +1187,6 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			keyrings_len = strlen(args[0].from) + 1;
 
 			if ((entry->keyrings) ||
-			    (entry->action != MEASURE) ||
 			    (entry->func != KEY_CHECK) ||
 			    (keyrings_len < 2)) {
 				result = -EINVAL;
@@ -1356,7 +1392,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			break;
 		}
 	}
-	if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN))
+	if (!result && !ima_validate_rule(entry))
 		result = -EINVAL;
 	else if (entry->action == APPRAISE)
 		temp_ima_appraise |= ima_appraise_flag(entry->func);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#13 lore raw

PATCH v3 7/12 ima: Fail rule parsing when appraise_flag=blacklist is unsupportable

In reply to Tyler Hicks

The "appraise_flag" option is only appropriate for appraise actions and its "blacklist" value is only appropriate when CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG is enabled and "appraise_flag=blacklist" is only appropriate when "appraise_type=imasig|modsig" is also present. Make this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that other uses of "appraise_flag=blacklist" are supported.

Fixes 273df864cf74 ("ima: Check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig")
Cc Nayna Jain <[email protected]>

---

* v3
- New patch

 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +12 -1
index 81da02071d41..9842e2e0bc6d 100644
@@ -1035,6 +1035,11 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 		return false;
 	}
 
+	/* Ensure that combinations of flags are compatible with each other */
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST &&
+	    !(entry->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED))
+		return false;
+
 	return true;
 }
 
@@ -1371,8 +1376,14 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 				result = -EINVAL;
 			break;
 		case Opt_appraise_flag:
+			if (entry->action != APPRAISE) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
 			ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_flag", args[0].from);
-			if (strstr(args[0].from, "blacklist"))
+			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
+			    strstr(args[0].from, "blacklist"))
 				entry->flags |= IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST;
 			break;
 		case Opt_permit_directio:
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#9 lore raw

PATCH v3 6/12 ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEY_CHECK hook is combined with an invalid cond

In reply to Tyler Hicks

The KEY_CHECK function only supports the uid, pcr, and keyrings conditionals. Make this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that other conditionals are supported.

Fixes 5808611cccb2 ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys")

---

* v3
- Added Lakshmi's Reviewed-by
- Adjust for the indentation change introduced in patch #4
* v2
- No change

 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +7 -0
index 1c64bd6f1728..81da02071d41 100644
@@ -1023,6 +1023,13 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 		if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
 			return false;
 
+		if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR |
+				     IMA_KEYRINGS))
+			return false;
+
+		if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
+			return false;
+
 		break;
 	default:
 		return false;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#22 lore raw

PATCH v3 9/12 ima: Use correct type for the args_p member of ima_rule_entry.lsm elements

In reply to Tyler Hicks

Make args_p be of the char pointer type rather than have it be a void pointer that gets casted to char pointer when it is used. It is a simple NUL-terminated string as returned by match_strdup().

---

* v3
- No change
* v2
- No change

 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 18 +++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +9 -9
index b02e1ffd10c9..13a178c70b44 100644
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
 	int pcr;
 	struct {
 		void *rule;	/* LSM file metadata specific */
-		void *args_p;	/* audit value */
+		char *args_p;	/* audit value */
 		int type;	/* audit type */
 	} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
 	char *fsname;
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 					  &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
 		if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
 			pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
-				(char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+				entry->lsm[i].args_p);
 	}
 	return nentry;
 }
@@ -918,7 +918,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
 					   &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
 	if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
 		pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
-			(char *)entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
+			entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
 
 		if (ima_rules == &ima_default_rules) {
 			kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
@@ -1682,27 +1682,27 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 			switch (i) {
 			case LSM_OBJ_USER:
 				seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_user),
-					   (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+					   entry->lsm[i].args_p);
 				break;
 			case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
 				seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_role),
-					   (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+					   entry->lsm[i].args_p);
 				break;
 			case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
 				seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_type),
-					   (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+					   entry->lsm[i].args_p);
 				break;
 			case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
 				seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_user),
-					   (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+					   entry->lsm[i].args_p);
 				break;
 			case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
 				seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_role),
-					   (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+					   entry->lsm[i].args_p);
 				break;
 			case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
 				seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_type),
-					   (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+					   entry->lsm[i].args_p);
 				break;
 			}
 			seq_puts(m, " ");
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#25 lore raw

PATCH v3 12/12 ima: Support additional conditionals in the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function

In reply to Tyler Hicks

Take the properties of the kexec kernel's inode and the current task ownership into consideration when matching a KEXEC_CMDLINE operation to the rules in the IMA policy. This allows for some uniformity when writing IMA policy rules for KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK, and KEXEC_CMDLINE operations.

Prior to this patch, it was not possible to write a set of rules like this:

dont_measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK obj_type=foo_t dont_measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK obj_type=foo_t dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE obj_type=foo_t measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK
measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE

The inode information associated with the kernel being loaded by a kexec_kernel_load(2) syscall can now be included in the decision to measure or not

Additonally, the uid, euid, and subj_* conditionals can also now be used in KEXEC_CMDLINE rules. There was no technical reason as to why those conditionals weren't being considered previously other than ima_match_rules() didn't have a valid inode to use so it immediately bailed out for KEXEC_CMDLINE operations rather than going through the full list of conditional comparisons.

---

* v3
- Added Lakshmi's Reviewed-by
- Adjust for the indentation change introduced in patch #4
* v2
- Moved the inode parameter of process_buffer_measurement() to be the first parameter so that it more closely matches process_masurement()

 include/linux/ima.h                          |  4 ++--
 kernel/kexec_file.c                          |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h                 |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c             |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c        |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c            | 23 +++++++++++++++-----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c          | 17 +++++----------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c      |  2 +-
 9 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
include/linux/ima.h +2 -2
index 9164e1534ec9..d15100de6cdd 100644
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 			      enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
-extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size);
+extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
 extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image);
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
-static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size) {}
+static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) {}
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
 
 #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
kernel/kexec_file.c +1 -1
index bb05fd52de85..07df431c1f21 100644
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		ima_kexec_cmdline(image->cmdline_buf,
+		ima_kexec_cmdline(kernel_fd, image->cmdline_buf,
 				  image->cmdline_buf_len - 1);
 	}
 
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +1 -1
index ea7e77536f3c..576ae2c6d418 100644
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 			   int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
 			   struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
-void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
+void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
 				const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
 				int pcr, const char *keyring);
 void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +1 -1
index bf22de8b7ce0..4f39fb93f278 100644
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 
 /**
  * ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
- * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
+ * @inode: pointer to the inode associated with the object being validated
  * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
  * @secid: secid of the task being validated
  * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +1 -1
index a9649b04b9f1..6c52bf7ea7f0 100644
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 
 		rc = is_binary_blacklisted(digest, digestsize);
 		if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE))
-			process_buffer_measurement(digest, digestsize,
+			process_buffer_measurement(NULL, digest, digestsize,
 						   "blacklisted-hash", NONE,
 						   pcr, NULL);
 	}
security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c +1 -1
index aaae80c4e376..1c68c500c26f 100644
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
 	 * if the IMA policy is configured to measure a key linked
 	 * to the given keyring.
 	 */
-	process_buffer_measurement(payload, payload_len,
+	process_buffer_measurement(NULL, payload, payload_len,
 				   keyring->description, KEY_CHECK, 0,
 				   keyring->description);
 }
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +17 -6
index 8351b2fd48e0..8a91711ca79b 100644
@@ -726,6 +726,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
 
 /*
  * process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer to ima log.
+ * @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK)
  * @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log.
  * @size: size of buffer(in bytes).
  * @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry.
@@ -735,7 +736,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
  *
  * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log.
  */
-void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
+void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
 				const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
 				int pcr, const char *keyring)
 {
@@ -768,7 +769,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
 	 */
 	if (func) {
 		security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
-		action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), secid, 0, func,
+		action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, 0, func,
 					&pcr, &template, keyring);
 		if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
 			return;
@@ -823,16 +824,26 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
 
 /**
  * ima_kexec_cmdline - measure kexec cmdline boot args
+ * @kernel_fd: file descriptor of the kexec kernel being loaded
  * @buf: pointer to buffer
  * @size: size of buffer
  *
  * Buffers can only be measured, not appraised.
  */
-void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size)
+void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
 {
-	if (buf && size != 0)
-		process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, "kexec-cmdline",
-					   KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL);
+	struct fd f;
+
+	if (!buf || !size)
+		return;
+
+	f = fdget(kernel_fd);
+	if (!f.file)
+		return;
+
+	process_buffer_measurement(file_inode(f.file), buf, size,
+				   "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL);
+	fdput(f);
 }
 
 static int __init init_ima(void)
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +6 -11
index 81ee8fd1d83a..2e87154c9296 100644
@@ -443,13 +443,9 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 {
 	int i;
 
-	if ((func == KEXEC_CMDLINE) || (func == KEY_CHECK)) {
-		if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func)) {
-			if (func == KEY_CHECK)
-				return ima_match_keyring(rule, keyring, cred);
-			return true;
-		}
-		return false;
+	if (func == KEY_CHECK) {
+		return (rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func) &&
+		       ima_match_keyring(rule, keyring, cred);
 	}
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
 	    (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
@@ -1035,10 +1031,9 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 		if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
 			return false;
 
-		if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_PCR))
-			return false;
-
-		if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
+		if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_FSMAGIC | IMA_UID |
+				     IMA_FOWNER | IMA_FSUUID | IMA_EUID |
+				     IMA_PCR | IMA_FSNAME))
 			return false;
 
 		break;
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c +1 -1
index 56ce24a18b66..69a8626a35c0 100644
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ void ima_process_queued_keys(void)
 
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_keys, list) {
 		if (!timer_expired)
-			process_buffer_measurement(entry->payload,
+			process_buffer_measurement(NULL, entry->payload,
 						   entry->payload_len,
 						   entry->keyring_name,
 						   KEY_CHECK, 0,
Signature · 7 lines
2.25.1


_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
#23 lore raw

PATCH v3 10/12 ima: Move comprehensive rule validation checks out of the token parser

In reply to Tyler Hicks

Use ima_validate_rule(), at the end of the token parsing stage, to verify combinations of actions, hooks, and flags. This is useful to increase readability by consolidating such checks into a single function and also because rule conditionals can be specified in arbitrary order making it difficult to do comprehensive rule validation until the entire rule has been parsed.

This allows for the check that ties together the "keyrings" conditional with the KEY_CHECK function hook to be moved into the final rule validation.

The modsig check no longer needs to compiled conditionally because the token parser will ensure that modsig support is enabled before accepting "imasig|modsig" appraise type values. The final rule validation will ensure that appraise_type and appraise_flag options are only present in appraise rules.

Finally, this allows for the check that ties together the "pcr" conditional with the measure action to be moved into the final rule validation.

---

* v3
- Significant broadening of the patch's scope along with renaming and re-describing the patch. ima_validate_rule() is now the consolidated location for checking combinations of actions/functions/conditionals and the existing checks are now removed from the token parsing code.
+ Ensure that the IMA_FUNC flag is only set when a function hook is specified, and vice versa, which allows us to use the NONE case in the switch statement to enforce that "keyrings=", "appraise_type=imasig|modsig", and "appraise_flag=blacklist" cannot be specified on a rule without an appropriate hook function
- Adjust for the indentation change introduced in patch #4
- Adjust for new fixes introduced in patch #7
* v2
- Allowed IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED, IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO, IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED, and IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST conditionals to be present in the rule entry flags for non-buffer hook functions.

 security/integrity/ima/ima.h        |  6 ---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 20 ----------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++----------
 3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +0 -6
index 59ec28f5c117..ea7e77536f3c 100644
@@ -372,7 +372,6 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
-bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func);
 int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
 		    struct modsig **modsig);
 void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf, loff_t size);
@@ -382,11 +381,6 @@ int ima_get_raw_modsig(const struct modsig *modsig, const void **data,
 		       u32 *data_len);
 void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig);
 #else
-static inline bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func)
-{
-	return false;
-}
-
 static inline int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf,
 				  loff_t buf_len, struct modsig **modsig)
 {
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c +0 -20
index d106885cc495..fb25723c65bc 100644
@@ -32,26 +32,6 @@ struct modsig {
 	u8 raw_pkcs7[];
 };
 
-/**
- * ima_hook_supports_modsig - can the policy allow modsig for this hook?
- *
- * modsig is only supported by hooks using ima_post_read_file(), because only
- * they preload the contents of the file in a buffer. FILE_CHECK does that in
- * some cases, but not when reached from vfs_open(). POLICY_CHECK can support
- * it, but it's not useful in practice because it's a text file so deny.
- */
-bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func)
-{
-	switch (func) {
-	case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK:
-	case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK:
-	case MODULE_CHECK:
-		return true;
-	default:
-		return false;
-	}
-}
-
 /*
  * ima_read_modsig - Read modsig from buf.
  *
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +37 -20

102 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#24 lore raw

PATCH v3 11/12 ima: Use the common function to detect LSM conditionals in a rule

In reply to Tyler Hicks

Make broader use of ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond() to check if a given rule contains an LSM conditional. This is a code cleanup and has no user-facing change.

---

* v3
- No change
* v2
- No change

 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 11 ++---------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +2 -9
index c4d0a0c1f896..81ee8fd1d83a 100644
@@ -360,17 +360,10 @@ static bool ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
 {
 	struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *e;
-	int i, result, needs_update;
+	int result;
 
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, e, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
-		needs_update = 0;
-		for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
-			if (entry->lsm[i].args_p) {
-				needs_update = 1;
-				break;
-			}
-		}
-		if (!needs_update)
+		if (!ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
 			continue;
 
 		result = ima_lsm_update_rule(entry);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#19 lore raw

PATCH v3 8/12 ima: Shallow copy the args_p member of ima_rule_entry.lsm elements

In reply to Tyler Hicks

The args_p member is a simple string that is allocated by ima_rule_init(). Shallow copy it like other non-LSM references in ima_rule_entry structs.

There are no longer any necessary error path cleanups to do in ima_lsm_copy_rule().

---

* v3
- No change
* v2
- Adjusted context to account for ima_lsm_copy_rule() directly calling ima_lsm_free_rule() and the lack of explicit reference ownership transfers
- Added comment to ima_lsm_copy_rule() to document the args_p reference ownership transfer

 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 16 +++++++---------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +7 -9
index 9842e2e0bc6d..b02e1ffd10c9 100644
@@ -300,10 +300,13 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			continue;
 
 		nentry->lsm[i].type = entry->lsm[i].type;
-		nentry->lsm[i].args_p = kstrdup(entry->lsm[i].args_p,
-						GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!nentry->lsm[i].args_p)
-			goto out_err;
+		nentry->lsm[i].args_p = entry->lsm[i].args_p;
+		/*
+		 * Remove the reference from entry so that the associated
+		 * memory will not be freed during a later call to
+		 * ima_lsm_free_rule(entry).
+		 */
+		entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL;
 
 		security_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type,
 					  Audit_equal,
@@ -314,11 +317,6 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 				(char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
 	}
 	return nentry;
-
-out_err:
-	ima_lsm_free_rule(nentry);
-	kfree(nentry);
-	return NULL;
 }
 
 static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#8 lore raw

PATCH v3 5/12 ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook is combined with an invalid cond

In reply to Tyler Hicks

The KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function only supports the pcr conditional. Make this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that other conditionals are supported.

Since KEXEC_CMDLINE's inception, ima_match_rules() has always returned true on any loaded KEXEC_CMDLINE rule without any consideration for other conditionals present in the rule. Make it clear that pcr is the only supported KEXEC_CMDLINE conditional by returning an error during policy load.

An example of why this is a problem can be explained with the following rule:

dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE obj_type=foo_t

An IMA policy author would have assumed that rule is valid because the parser accepted it but the result was that measurements for all KEXEC_CMDLINE operations would be disabled.

Fixes b0935123a183 ("IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments")

---

* v3
- Adjust for the indentation change introduced in patch #4
- Added Lakshmi's Reviewed-by
* v2
- Added Mimi's Reviewed-by

 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +21 -0
index 40c28f1a6a5a..1c64bd6f1728 100644
@@ -343,6 +343,17 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static bool ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+		if (entry->lsm[i].args_p)
+			return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
 /*
  * The LSM policy can be reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring
  * to the old, stale LSM policy.  Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect
@@ -998,6 +1009,16 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 		/* Validation of these hook functions is in ima_parse_rule() */
 		break;
 	case KEXEC_CMDLINE:
+		if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
+			return false;
+
+		if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_PCR))
+			return false;
+
+		if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
+			return false;
+
+		break;
 	case KEY_CHECK:
 		if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
 			return false;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
maintainer
#14 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 07/12] ima: Fail rule parsing when appraise_flag=blacklist is unsupportable

In reply to Tyler Hicks
Quoted 6 lines · Tyler Hicks

The "appraise_flag" option is only appropriate for appraise actions and its "blacklist" value is only appropriate when CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG is enabled and "appraise_flag=blacklist" is only appropriate when "appraise_type=imasig|modsig" is also present. Make this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that other uses of "appraise_flag=blacklist" are supported.

The code looks correct, but this patch description could be written at a higher level.  Perhaps it just needs to be prefixed with something like this:

Verifying that a file hash is not blacklisted is currently only supported for files with appended signatures (modsig).  In the future, this might change.  For now, ...

Mimi

Quoted 45 lines
Fixes 273df864cf74 ("ima: Check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig")
Cc Nayna Jain <[email protected]>

---

* v3
- New patch

 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +12 -1
index 81da02071d41..9842e2e0bc6d 100644
@@ -1035,6 +1035,11 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 		return false;
 	}
 
+	/* Ensure that combinations of flags are compatible with each other */
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST &&
+	    !(entry->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED))
+		return false;
+
 	return true;
 }
 
@@ -1371,8 +1376,14 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 				result = -EINVAL;
 			break;
 		case Opt_appraise_flag:
+			if (entry->action != APPRAISE) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
 			ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_flag", args[0].from);
-			if (strstr(args[0].from, "blacklist"))
+			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
+			    strstr(args[0].from, "blacklist"))
 				entry->flags |= IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST;
 			break;
 		case Opt_permit_directio:
#15 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 07/12] ima: Fail rule parsing when appraise_flag=blacklist is unsupportable

Quoted 8 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 6 lines · Tyler Hicks

The "appraise_flag" option is only appropriate for appraise actions and its "blacklist" value is only appropriate when CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG is enabled and "appraise_flag=blacklist" is only appropriate when "appraise_type=imasig|modsig" is also present. Make this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that other uses of "appraise_flag=blacklist" are supported.

Quoted 7 lines

The code looks correct, but this patch description could be written at a higher level.  Perhaps it just needs to be prefixed with something like this:

Verifying that a file hash is not blacklisted is currently only supported for files with appended signatures (modsig).  In the future, this might change.  For now, ...

That makes sense. I'm not up to speed on the intent behind the blacklist feature or where it may go in the future so I didn't think to add anything along those lines.

If you are happy with the rest of the series, please feel free to append this to the commit message. Otherwise, I can add it if I need to submit a new revision of the series.

Tyler

Quoted 48 lines

Mimi

Quoted 45 lines
Fixes 273df864cf74 ("ima: Check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig")
Cc Nayna Jain <[email protected]>

---

* v3
- New patch

 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +12 -1
index 81da02071d41..9842e2e0bc6d 100644
@@ -1035,6 +1035,11 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 		return false;
 	}
 
+	/* Ensure that combinations of flags are compatible with each other */
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST &&
+	    !(entry->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED))
+		return false;
+
 	return true;
 }
 
@@ -1371,8 +1376,14 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 				result = -EINVAL;
 			break;
 		case Opt_appraise_flag:
+			if (entry->action != APPRAISE) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
 			ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_flag", args[0].from);
-			if (strstr(args[0].from, "blacklist"))
+			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
+			    strstr(args[0].from, "blacklist"))
 				entry->flags |= IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST;
 			break;
 		case Opt_permit_directio:
maintainer
#26 lore raw
In reply to Tyler Hicks
Quoted 45 lines · Tyler Hicks

This series ultimately extends the supported IMA rule conditionals for the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function. As of today, there's an imbalance in IMA language conditional support for KEXEC_CMDLINE rules in comparison to KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK and KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK rules. The KEXEC_CMDLINE rules do not support *any* conditionals so you cannot have a sequence of rules like this:

dont_measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK obj_type=foo_t dont_measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK obj_type=foo_t dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE obj_type=foo_t measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK
measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE

Instead, KEXEC_CMDLINE rules can only be measured or not measured and there's no additional flexibility in today's implementation of the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function.

With this series, the above sequence of rules becomes valid and any calls to kexec_file_load() with a kernel and initramfs inode type of foo_t will not be measured (that includes the kernel cmdline buffer) while all other objects given to a kexec_file_load() syscall will be measured. There's obviously not an inode directly associated with the kernel cmdline buffer but this patch series ties the inode based decision making for KEXEC_CMDLINE to the kernel's inode. I think this will be intuitive to policy authors.

While reading IMA code and preparing to make this change, I realized that the buffer based hook functions (KEXEC_CMDLINE and KEY_CHECK) are quite special in comparison to longer standing hook functions. These buffer based hook functions can only support measure actions and there are some restrictions on the conditionals that they support. However, the rule parser isn't enforcing any of those restrictions and IMA policy authors wouldn't have any immediate way of knowing that the policy that they wrote is invalid. For example, the sequence of rules above parses successfully in today's kernel but the
"dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE ..." rule is incorrectly handled in ima_match_rules(). The dont_measure rule is *always* considered to be a match so, surprisingly, no KEXEC_CMDLINE measurements are made.

While making the rule parser more strict, I realized that the parser does not correctly free all of the allocated memory associated with an ima_rule_entry when going down some error paths. Invalid policy loaded by the policy administrator could result in small memory leaks.

Quoted 8 lines

I envision patches 1-7 going to stable. The series is ordered in a way that has all the fixes up front, followed by cleanups, followed by the feature patch. The breakdown of patches looks like so:

Memory leak fixes: 1-3
Parser strictness fixes: 4-7
Code cleanups made possible by the fixes: 8-11
Extend KEXEC_CMDLINE rule support: 12

Thanks, Tyler.  This is a really nice patch set.  The patches are now in the "next-integrity-testing" branch.

Mimi

#27 lore raw
Quoted 50 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 49 lines · Tyler Hicks

This series ultimately extends the supported IMA rule conditionals for the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function. As of today, there's an imbalance in IMA language conditional support for KEXEC_CMDLINE rules in comparison to KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK and KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK rules. The KEXEC_CMDLINE rules do not support *any* conditionals so you cannot have a sequence of rules like this:

dont_measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK obj_type=foo_t dont_measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK obj_type=foo_t dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE obj_type=foo_t measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK
measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE

Instead, KEXEC_CMDLINE rules can only be measured or not measured and there's no additional flexibility in today's implementation of the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function.

With this series, the above sequence of rules becomes valid and any calls to kexec_file_load() with a kernel and initramfs inode type of foo_t will not be measured (that includes the kernel cmdline buffer) while all other objects given to a kexec_file_load() syscall will be measured. There's obviously not an inode directly associated with the kernel cmdline buffer but this patch series ties the inode based decision making for KEXEC_CMDLINE to the kernel's inode. I think this will be intuitive to policy authors.

While reading IMA code and preparing to make this change, I realized that the buffer based hook functions (KEXEC_CMDLINE and KEY_CHECK) are quite special in comparison to longer standing hook functions. These buffer based hook functions can only support measure actions and there are some restrictions on the conditionals that they support. However, the rule parser isn't enforcing any of those restrictions and IMA policy authors wouldn't have any immediate way of knowing that the policy that they wrote is invalid. For example, the sequence of rules above parses successfully in today's kernel but the
"dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE ..." rule is incorrectly handled in ima_match_rules(). The dont_measure rule is *always* considered to be a match so, surprisingly, no KEXEC_CMDLINE measurements are made.

While making the rule parser more strict, I realized that the parser does not correctly free all of the allocated memory associated with an ima_rule_entry when going down some error paths. Invalid policy loaded by the policy administrator could result in small memory leaks.

I envision patches 1-7 going to stable. The series is ordered in a way that has all the fixes up front, followed by cleanups, followed by the feature patch. The breakdown of patches looks like so:

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Memory leak fixes: 1-3
Parser strictness fixes: 4-7
Code cleanups made possible by the fixes: 8-11
Extend KEXEC_CMDLINE rule support: 12

Thanks, Tyler.  This is a really nice patch set.  The patches are now in the "next-integrity-testing" branch.

Thank you for all the helpful review comments. You know where to find me if any bugs pop up during testing. :)

Tyler

Quoted 2 lines

Mimi

Reviewed-by on v3 8/12
#20 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 08/12] ima: Shallow copy the args_p member of ima_rule_entry.lsm elements

In reply to Tyler Hicks

Hi,

Found one glitch with this change, see below:

Quoted 32 lines · Tyler Hicks

The args_p member is a simple string that is allocated by ima_rule_init(). Shallow copy it like other non-LSM references in ima_rule_entry structs.

There are no longer any necessary error path cleanups to do in ima_lsm_copy_rule().

---

* v3
- No change
* v2
- Adjusted context to account for ima_lsm_copy_rule() directly calling ima_lsm_free_rule() and the lack of explicit reference ownership transfers
- Added comment to ima_lsm_copy_rule() to document the args_p reference ownership transfer

 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 16 +++++++---------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0 -1
index 9842e2e0bc6d..b02e1ffd10c9 100644
@@ -300,10 +300,13 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
                        continue;
 
                nentry->lsm[i].type = entry->lsm[i].type;
-               nentry->lsm[i].args_p = kstrdup(entry->lsm[i].args_p,

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) · line 309

Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +7 -3
-                                               GFP_KERNEL);
-               if (!nentry->lsm[i].args_p)
-                       goto out_err;
+               nentry->lsm[i].args_p = entry->lsm[i].args_p;
+               /*
+                * Remove the reference from entry so that the associated
+                * memory will not be freed during a later call to
+                * ima_lsm_free_rule(entry).
+                */
+               entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL;

This assignment necessitates a change in the code below...

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) · line 317

Quoted 4 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0 -0
                security_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type,
                                          Audit_equal,
@@ -314,11 +317,6 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
                                (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);

... you should refer to nentry->lsm[i].args_p here!

Other than that,

Konsta

Quoted 13 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0 -6
        }
        return nentry;
-
-out_err:
-       ima_lsm_free_rule(nentry);
-       kfree(nentry);
-       return NULL;
 }
 
 static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
--

2.25.1

#21 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 08/12] ima: Shallow copy the args_p member of ima_rule_entry.lsm elements

Quoted 57 lines · Konsta Karsisto

Hi,

Found one glitch with this change, see below:

Quoted 32 lines · Tyler Hicks

The args_p member is a simple string that is allocated by ima_rule_init(). Shallow copy it like other non-LSM references in ima_rule_entry structs.

There are no longer any necessary error path cleanups to do in ima_lsm_copy_rule().

---

* v3
- No change
* v2
- Adjusted context to account for ima_lsm_copy_rule() directly calling ima_lsm_free_rule() and the lack of explicit reference ownership transfers
- Added comment to ima_lsm_copy_rule() to document the args_p reference ownership transfer

 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 16 +++++++---------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0 -1
index 9842e2e0bc6d..b02e1ffd10c9 100644
@@ -300,10 +300,13 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
                        continue;
 
                nentry->lsm[i].type = entry->lsm[i].type;
-               nentry->lsm[i].args_p = kstrdup(entry->lsm[i].args_p,

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) · line 309

Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +7 -3
-                                               GFP_KERNEL);
-               if (!nentry->lsm[i].args_p)
-                       goto out_err;
+               nentry->lsm[i].args_p = entry->lsm[i].args_p;
+               /*
+                * Remove the reference from entry so that the associated
+                * memory will not be freed during a later call to
+                * ima_lsm_free_rule(entry).
+                */
+               entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL;

This assignment necessitates a change in the code below...

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) · line 317

Quoted 4 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0 -0
                security_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type,
                                          Audit_equal,
@@ -314,11 +317,6 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
                                (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);

... you should refer to nentry->lsm[i].args_p here!

Quoted 3 lines

Other than that,

Thank you, Konsta. You're exactly right about the required change. Without it, the pr_warn() in the error path will always attempt to print a NULL pointer.

Mimi, the following change (along with adding Konsta's Reviewed-by) needs to be made to this patch in next-integrity-testing:

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1 -1
index b02e1ffd10c9..330a4e216349 100644
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 					  &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
 		if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
 			pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
-				(char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+				(char *)nentry->lsm[i].args_p);
 	}
 	return nentry;
 }

It will then cause the next patch in the series to not apply but the fixup is minor.

Let me know if you are alright with doing these changes yourself or if you'd like me to submit a new series revision.

If you do this rebase work in next-integrity-testing yourself, I've prepared a copy branch of next-integrity-testing with all of the necessary changes for you to compare against:

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tyhicks/linux.git/log/?h=next-integrity-testing-fixup

My apologies for the trouble.

Tyler

Quoted 17 lines

Konsta

Quoted 13 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0 -6
        }
        return nentry;
-
-out_err:
-       ima_lsm_free_rule(nentry);
-       kfree(nentry);
-       return NULL;
 }
 
 static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
--

2.25.1

#17 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 07/12] ima: Fail rule parsing when appraise_flag=blacklist is unsupportable

In reply to a message not in the archive
Quoted 52 lines · Nayna
Quoted 36 lines · Tyler Hicks

The "appraise_flag" option is only appropriate for appraise actions and its "blacklist" value is only appropriate when CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG is enabled and "appraise_flag=blacklist" is only appropriate when "appraise_type=imasig|modsig" is also present. Make this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that other uses of "appraise_flag=blacklist" are supported.

Fixes 273df864cf74 ("ima: Check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig")
Cc Nayna Jain <[email protected]>

---

* v3
- New patch

  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
  1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +5 -0
index 81da02071d41..9842e2e0bc6d 100644
@@ -1035,6 +1035,11 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
  		return false;
  	}
+	/* Ensure that combinations of flags are compatible with each other */
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST &&
+	    !(entry->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED))
+		return false;
+
  	return true;
  }
@@ -1371,8 +1376,14 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
  				result = -EINVAL;
  			break;
  		case Opt_appraise_flag:

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) · line 1387

Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +7 -1
+			if (entry->action != APPRAISE) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
  			ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_flag", args[0].from);
-			if (strstr(args[0].from, "blacklist"))
+			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
+			    strstr(args[0].from, "blacklist"))
  				entry->flags |= IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST;

If IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG is disabled, it will allow the following rule to load, which is not as expected.

Quoted 3 lines

"appraise func=xxx_CHECK appraise_flag=blacklist appraise_type=imasig"

Missing is the "else" condition to immediately reject the policy rule.

Thanks for the review. You're right. This change is needed:

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +2 -0
index 9842e2e0bc6d..cf3ddb38dfa8 100644
@@ -1385,6 +1385,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
 			    strstr(args[0].from, "blacklist"))
 				entry->flags |= IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST;
+			else
+				result = -EINVAL;
 			break;
 		case Opt_permit_directio:
 			entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO;

Making this change does not conflict with any later patches in the series.

Mimi, I've rebased and force pushed to my fixup branch with this change, for your comparison:

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tyhicks/linux.git/log/?h=next-integrity-testing-fixup

Tyler

Quoted 5 lines

Thanks & Regards,

     - Nayna

#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 06/12] ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEY_CHECK hook is combined with an invalid cond

In reply to Tyler Hicks
Quoted 26 lines · Tyler Hicks

The KEY_CHECK function only supports the uid, pcr, and keyrings conditionals. Make this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that other conditionals are supported.

Fixes 5808611cccb2 ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys")

---

* v3
- Added Lakshmi's Reviewed-by
- Adjust for the indentation change introduced in patch #4
* v2
- No change

  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++++
  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0 -0
index 1c64bd6f1728..81da02071d41 100644
@@ -1023,6 +1023,13 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
  		if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
  			return false;
 

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) · line 1035

Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +7 -0
+		if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR |
+				     IMA_KEYRINGS))
+			return false;
+
+		if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
+			return false;
+
  		break;
  	default:
  		return false;

Should there be a check for IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS in Opt_keyrings in ima_parse_rule() to return immediately if not enabled ?

Thanks & Regards,

     - Nayna

#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 06/12] ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEY_CHECK hook is combined with an invalid cond

Quoted 28 lines · Nayna
Quoted 26 lines · Tyler Hicks

The KEY_CHECK function only supports the uid, pcr, and keyrings conditionals. Make this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that other conditionals are supported.

Fixes 5808611cccb2 ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys")

---

* v3
- Added Lakshmi's Reviewed-by
- Adjust for the indentation change introduced in patch #4
* v2
- No change

  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++++
  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0 -0
index 1c64bd6f1728..81da02071d41 100644
@@ -1023,6 +1023,13 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
  		if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
  			return false;
 
Quoted 13 lines

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) · line 1035

Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +7 -0
+		if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR |
+				     IMA_KEYRINGS))
+			return false;
+
+		if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
+			return false;
+
  		break;
  	default:
  		return false;

Should there be a check for IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS in Opt_keyrings in ima_parse_rule() to return immediately if not enabled ?

I didn't notice that "keyrings=" could be disabled at build time. I think you're right that something like what I have below would be a good idea.

@Lakshmi, do you agree?

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +5 -0
index 81da02071d41..bd687560f88e 100644
@@ -1212,6 +1212,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 		case Opt_keyrings:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "keyrings", args[0].from);
 
+			if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS)) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
 			keyrings_len = strlen(args[0].from) + 1;
 
 			if ((entry->keyrings) ||

Tyler

Quoted 5 lines

Thanks & Regards,

     - Nayna

#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 01/12] ima: Have the LSM free its audit rule

In reply to Tyler Hicks
Quoted 1 line · Tyler Hicks

Ask the LSM to free its audit rule rather than directly calling kfree().

Is it to be called audit rule or filter rule ?  Likewise in subject line.

Thanks & Regards,

    - Nayna

#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 01/12] ima: Have the LSM free its audit rule

Quoted 5 lines · Nayna
Quoted 1 line · Tyler Hicks

Ask the LSM to free its audit rule rather than directly calling kfree().

Is it to be called audit rule or filter rule ?  Likewise in subject line.

The security hooks call this "audit rule" but Mimi explained the reasoning for IMA referring to this as an "audit filter" here:

https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

I would be fine with her renaming/rewording this patch, accordingly, in next-integrity-testing.

Tyler

Quoted 4 lines

Thanks & Regards,

    - Nayna

#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 06/12] ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEY_CHECK hook is combined with an invalid cond

In reply to Tyler Hicks
Quoted 55 lines · Tyler Hicks
Quoted 28 lines · Nayna
Quoted 26 lines · Tyler Hicks

The KEY_CHECK function only supports the uid, pcr, and keyrings conditionals. Make this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that other conditionals are supported.

Fixes 5808611cccb2 ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys")

---

* v3
- Added Lakshmi's Reviewed-by
- Adjust for the indentation change introduced in patch #4
* v2
- No change

  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++++
  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0 -0
index 1c64bd6f1728..81da02071d41 100644
@@ -1023,6 +1023,13 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
  		if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
  			return false;
 
Quoted 13 lines

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) · line 1035

Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +7 -0
+		if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR |
+				     IMA_KEYRINGS))
+			return false;
+
+		if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
+			return false;
+
  		break;
  	default:
  		return false;

Should there be a check for IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS in Opt_keyrings in ima_parse_rule() to return immediately if not enabled ?

I didn't notice that "keyrings=" could be disabled at build time. I think you're right that something like what I have below would be a good idea.

@Lakshmi, do you agree?

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0 -0
index 81da02071d41..bd687560f88e 100644
@@ -1212,6 +1212,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 		case Opt_keyrings:

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) · line 1222

Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +5 -0
 			ima_log_string(ab, "keyrings", args[0].from);
 
+			if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS)) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
 			keyrings_len = strlen(args[0].from) + 1;
 
 			if ((entry->keyrings) ||

Actually, this change introduces a new compiler warning in another part of the code that I need to think some more about. I'd like to leave this patch as-is for now and work on the !CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS case in a separate, later patch when I have some more time to think about it and test properly.

Tyler

Quoted 7 lines

Tyler

Quoted 5 lines

Thanks & Regards,

     - Nayna

maintainer
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 01/12] ima: Have the LSM free its audit rule

In reply to Tyler Hicks
Quoted 6 lines · Tyler Hicks
Quoted 5 lines · Nayna
Quoted 1 line · Tyler Hicks

Ask the LSM to free its audit rule rather than directly calling kfree().

Is it to be called audit rule or filter rule ?  Likewise in subject line.

Quoted 8 lines

gt
The security hooks call this "audit rule" but Mimi explained the reasoning for IMA referring to this as an "audit filter" here:

https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

I would be fine with her renaming/rewording this patch, accordingly, in next-integrity-testing.

Both here and "ima: AppArmor satisfies the audit rule requirements", the subject is AppArmor/LSM, which do refer to the rules as "audit" rules.  In the "ima: Rename internal audit rule functions" case, the rule rename is internal to IMA.  Here it makes sense to replace "audit" with "filter".  Tyler, I've gone ahead and made the change.

Mimi

Reviewed-by Nayna Jain Tested-by Nayna Jain
#18 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 07/12] ima: Fail rule parsing when appraise_flag=blacklist is unsupportable

In reply to Tyler Hicks
Quoted 62 lines · Tyler Hicks
Quoted 50 lines · Nayna
Quoted 36 lines · Tyler Hicks

The "appraise_flag" option is only appropriate for appraise actions and its "blacklist" value is only appropriate when CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG is enabled and "appraise_flag=blacklist" is only appropriate when "appraise_type=imasig|modsig" is also present. Make this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that other uses of "appraise_flag=blacklist" are supported.

Fixes 273df864cf74 ("ima: Check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig")
Cc Nayna Jain <[email protected]>

---

* v3
- New patch

   security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
   1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +5 -0
index 81da02071d41..9842e2e0bc6d 100644
@@ -1035,6 +1035,11 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
   		return false;
   	}
+	/* Ensure that combinations of flags are compatible with each other */
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST &&
+	    !(entry->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED))
+		return false;
+
   	return true;
   }
@@ -1371,8 +1376,14 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
   				result = -EINVAL;
   			break;
   		case Opt_appraise_flag:

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) · line 1387

Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +7 -1
+			if (entry->action != APPRAISE) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
   			ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_flag", args[0].from);
-			if (strstr(args[0].from, "blacklist"))
+			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
+			    strstr(args[0].from, "blacklist"))
   				entry->flags |= IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST;

If IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG is disabled, it will allow the following rule to load, which is not as expected.

Quoted 3 lines

"appraise func=xxx_CHECK appraise_flag=blacklist appraise_type=imasig"

Missing is the "else" condition to immediately reject the policy rule.

Thanks for the review. You're right. This change is needed:

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0 -0
index 9842e2e0bc6d..cf3ddb38dfa8 100644

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) · line 1392

Quoted 8 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +2 -0
@@ -1385,6 +1385,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
  			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
  			    strstr(args[0].from, "blacklist"))
  				entry->flags |= IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST;
+			else
+				result = -EINVAL;
  			break;
  		case Opt_permit_directio:
  			entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO;

Thanks & Regards,

      - Nayna

maintainer
#28 lore raw
In reply to Tyler Hicks

[Cc'ing Sasha]

Quoted 8 lines · Tyler Hicks

I envision patches 1-7 going to stable. The series is ordered in a way that has all the fixes up front, followed by cleanups, followed by the feature patch. The breakdown of patches looks like so:

Memory leak fixes: 1-3
Parser strictness fixes: 4-7
Code cleanups made possible by the fixes: 8-11
Extend KEXEC_CMDLINE rule support: 12

I agree they should be backported, but they don't apply cleanly before linux-5.6.  The changes aren't that major.  Some patch hunks apply cleanly, but won't compile, while others patch hunks need to be dropped based on when the feature was upstreamed.  For these reasons, I'm not Cc'ing stable.

Feature upstreamed:
- LSM policy update: linux 5.3
- key command line: linux 5.3
- blacklist: linux 5.5
- keyrings: linux 5.6

For Linux 5.3:
- Dependency on backporting commit 483ec26eed42 ("ima: ima/lsm policy rule loading logic bug fixes") to apply " ima: Free the entire rule if it fails to parse".

Mimi

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