LSM: Measure security module state
Subsystems (5)
v2 cover LSM: Measure security module state
Critical data structures of security modules are currently not measured. Therefore an attestation service, for instance, would not be able to attest whether the security modules are always operating with the policies and configuration that the system administrator had setup. The policies and configuration for the security modules could be tampered with by malware by exploiting Kernel vulnerabilities or modified through some inadvertent actions on the system. Measuring such critical data would enable an attestation service to better assess the state of the system.
IMA subsystem measures system files, command line arguments passed to kexec, boot aggregate, keys, etc. It can be used to measure critical data structures of security modules as well.
This change aims to address measuring critical data structures of security modules when they are initialized, when they are updated at runtime, and also periodically to detect any tampering.
This change set is based off of Linux Kernel version 5.8-rc5.
The following patch needs to be applied first before applying the patches in this patch set:
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11612989/
Change log:
v2:
=> Pass selinux_state struct as parameter to the function
that measures SELinux data.
=> Use strings from selinux_policycap_names array for SELinux
state measurement.
=> Refactored security_read_policy() to alloc kernel or user
virtual memory and then read the SELinux policy.
v1:
=> Per Stephen Smalley's suggestion added selinux_state booleans
and hash of SELinux policy in the measured data for SELinux.
=> Call IMA hook from the security module directly instead of
redirecting through the LSM.
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian (5):
IMA: Add LSM_STATE func to measure LSM data
IMA: Define an IMA hook to measure LSM data
LSM: Add security_measure_data in lsm_info struct
LSM: Define SELinux function to measure security state
LSM: Define workqueue for measuring security module state
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 6 +- include/linux/ima.h | 4 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 17 +++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 29 ++++- security/security.c | 74 ++++++++++++- security/selinux/Makefile | 2 + security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 26 +++++ security/selinux/measure.c | 158 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 1 + security/selinux/ss/services.c | 66 +++++++++-- 14 files changed, 376 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/selinux/measure.c
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
PATCH v2 1/5 IMA: Add LSM_STATE func to measure LSM data
Critical data structures of security modules need to be measured to enable an attestation service to verify if the policies and configuration have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered with at runtime. A new IMA policy is required for handling this measurement.
Define a new IMA policy func namely LSM_STATE to measure data provided by security modules. Update ima_match_rules() to check for LSM_STATE and ima_parse_rule() to handle LSM_STATE.
--- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 6 +++++- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++----- 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +5 -1
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Description: base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK] [FIRMWARE_CHECK] [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK] - [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] + [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] [LSM_STATE] mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND] [[^]MAY_EXEC] fsmagic:= hex value
@@ -125,3 +125,7 @@ Description: keys added to .builtin_trusted_keys or .ima keyring: measure func=KEY_CHECK keyrings=.builtin_trusted_keys|.ima + + Example of measure rule using LSM_STATE to measure LSM data: + + measure func=LSM_STATE
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +1 -0
@@ -200,6 +200,7 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy) \ hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \ hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \ + hook(LSM_STATE, lsm_state) \ hook(MAX_CHECK, none)#define __ima_hook_enumify (ENUM , str) ENUM,
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +1 -1
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK -* | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK +* | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK | LSM_STATE * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value *
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +24 -5
@@ -417,15 +417,31 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, const char *keyring) {int i; +int funcmatch =0 ; -if ((func ==KEXEC_CMDLINE ) || (func ==KEY_CHECK )) { +switch (func) { +case KEXEC_CMDLINE : +case KEY_CHECK : +case LSM_STATE :if ((rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func == func)) {if (func ==KEY_CHECK ) -return ima_match_keyring (rule, keyring, cred); -return true; - } -return false; + funcmatch =ima_match_keyring (rule, keyring, + cred) ?1 :-1 ; +else + funcmatch =1 ; + }else + funcmatch =-1 ; + +break ; + +default : + funcmatch =0 ; +break ; } + +if (funcmatch) +return (funcmatch ==1 ) ? true : false; +if ((rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func != func && func !=POST_SETATTR ))return false;
@@ -1068,6 +1084,9 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->func =KEXEC_CMDLINE ; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEY_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = KEY_CHECK; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_STATE") == 0) + entry->func = LSM_STATE; + else result = -EINVAL ;if (!result)
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
PATCH v2 4/5 LSM: Define SELinux function to measure security state
In reply to Lakshmi RamasubramanianSELinux configuration and policy are some of the critical data for this security module that needs to be measured. To enable this measurement SELinux needs to implement the interface function, security_measure_data(), that the LSM can call.
Define the security_state() function in SELinux to measure SELinux configuration and policy. Call this function to measure SELinux data when there is a change in the security module's state.
Sample measurement of SELinux state and hash of the policy:
10 e32e...5ac3 ima-buf sha256:86e8...4594 selinux-state 656e61626c65643d313b656e666f7263696e673d303b636865636b72657170726f743d313b6e6574706565723d313b6f70656e7065726d3d313b657874736f636b636c6173733d313b616c776179736e6574776f726b3d303b6367726f75707365636c6162656c3d313b6e6e706e6f737569647472616e736974696f6e3d313b67656e66737365636c6162656c73796d6c696e6b3d303b 10 f4a7...9408 ima-buf sha256:4941...68fc selinux-policy-hash 8d1d...1834
The data for selinux-state in the above measurement is:
enabled=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0;
The data for selinux-policy-hash in the above measurement is the SHA256 hash of the SELinux policy.
--- security/selinux/Makefile | 2 + security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 26 +++++ security/selinux/measure.c | 158 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 1 + security/selinux/ss/services.c | 66 ++++++++++-- 6 files changed, 248 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/selinux/measure.c
security/selinux/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND) += ibpkey.o +selinux-$(CONFIG_IMA) += measure.o + ccflags-y := -I$(srctree)/security/selinux -I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(selinux-y)): $(obj)/flask.h
security/selinux/hooks.c +4 -0
@@ -7259,6 +7259,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)fs_validate_description ("selinux" , selinux_fs_parameters); +selinux_init_measurement (); +return 0 ; }
@@ -7284,6 +7286,7 @@ DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = { .enabled = &selinux_enabled_boot, .blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes, .init = selinux_init, + .security_measure_data = selinux_measure_data, };#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER )
@@ -7394,6 +7397,7 @@ int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state) }selinux_mark_disabled (state); +selinux_measure_state (state);pr_info ("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n" );
security/selinux/include/security.h +26 -0
@@ -222,16 +222,42 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void)return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS ]; } +static inline bool selinux_checkreqprot (const struct selinux_state *state) +{ +return READ_ONCE (state->checkreqprot); +} +int security_mls_enabled (struct selinux_state *state);int security_load_policy (struct selinux_state *state,void *data,size_t len);int security_read_policy (struct selinux_state *state,void **data,size_t *len); +int security_read_policy_kernel (struct selinux_state *state, +void **data,size_t *len);size_t security_policydb_len (struct selinux_state *state);int security_policycap_supported (struct selinux_state *state,unsigned int req_cap); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA +extern void __init selinux_init_measurement (void ); +extern int selinux_measure_data (void ); +extern int selinux_measure_state (struct selinux_state *selinux_state); +#else +static inline void __init selinux_init_measurement (void ) {} + +static inline int selinux_measure_data (void ) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static inline int selinux_measure_state ( +struct selinux_state *selinux_state) +{ +return 0 ; +} +#endif +#define SEL_VEC_MAX 32struct av_decision {u32 allowed;
security/selinux/measure.c new file +158 -0
158 lines not on this page · raw message
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +1 -0
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,from_kuid (&init_user_ns,audit_get_loginuid (current)), audit_get_sessionid(current));enforcing_set (state, new_value); +selinux_measure_state (&selinux_state);if (new_value)avc_ss_reset (state->avc,0 );selnl_notify_setenforce (new_value);
security/selinux/ss/services.c +57 -9
88 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
PATCH v3 3/5 LSM: Add security_measure_data in lsm_info struct
In reply to Lakshmi RamasubramanianThe security modules that require their data to be measured using the IMA subsystem need to define a function that the LSM can call to trigger the measurement.
Add a function pointer field namely security_measure_data in lsm_info structure. Update LSM to call this security module function, if defined, to measure the security module's data using the IMA subsystem.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 +++ security/security.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +3 -0
@@ -1591,6 +1591,9 @@ struct lsm_info {int *enabled;/* Optional: controlled by CONFIG_LSM */ int (*init)(void );/* Required. */ struct lsm_blob_sizes *blobs;/* Optional: for blob sharing. */ +int (*security_measure_data)(void );/* Optional: for measuring +* security module data. +*/ };extern struct lsm_info __start_lsm_info[], __end_lsm_info[];
security/security.c +47 -1
67 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
PATCH v2 5/5 LSM: Define workqueue for measuring security module state
In reply to Lakshmi RamasubramanianData structures critical to the functioning of a security module could be tampered with by malware or changed inadvertently at runtime thereby disabling or reducing the security guarantees provided by the security module. Such critical data need to be periodically checked and measured, if there is any change. This would enable an attestation service, for instance, to verify that the security modules are operating with the configuration and policy setup by the system administrator.
Define a workqueue in the LSM and invoke the security modules in the workqueue handler to check their data and measure.
Note that the data given by the security module would be measured by the IMA subsystem only if it has changed since the last time it was measured.
--- security/security.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
security/security.c +26 -0
@@ -89,6 +89,11 @@ static __initdata struct lsm_info *exclusive;static struct lsm_info *security_state_lsms;static int security_state_lsms_count; +static long security_state_timeout =300000 ;/* 5 Minutes */ +static void security_state_handler (struct work_struct *work); +static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(security_state_delayed_work, + security_state_handler); +static __initdata bool debug;#define init_debug (...) \ do { \
@@ -277,6 +282,26 @@ static void __init initialize_security_state_lsms(void) security_state_lsms_count = count; } +static void initialize_security_state_monitor (void ) +{ +if (security_state_lsms_count ==0 ) +return ; + +schedule_delayed_work (&security_state_delayed_work, +msecs_to_jiffies (security_state_timeout)); +} + +static void security_state_handler (struct work_struct *work) +{ +int inx; + +for (inx =0 ; inx < security_state_lsms_count; inx++) +measure_security_state (&(security_state_lsms[inx])); + +schedule_delayed_work (&security_state_delayed_work, +msecs_to_jiffies (security_state_timeout)); +} +/* Populate ordered LSMs list from comma-separated LSM name list. */ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse (const char *order,const char *origin) {
@@ -400,6 +425,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void) }initialize_security_state_lsms (); +initialize_security_state_monitor ();kfree (ordered_lsms); }
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
PATCH v2 2/5 IMA: Define an IMA hook to measure LSM data
In reply to Lakshmi RamasubramanianIMA subsystem needs to define an IMA hook that the security modules can call to measure critical data of the security modules.
Define a new IMA hook, namely ima_lsm_state(), that the security modules can call to measure data.
--- include/linux/ima.h | 4 ++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
include/linux/ima.h +4 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,extern void ima_post_path_mknod (struct dentry *dentry);extern int ima_file_hash (struct file *file,char *buf,size_t buf_size);extern void ima_kexec_cmdline (const void *buf,int size); +extern void ima_lsm_state (const char *lsm_event_name,const void *buf,int size);#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer (struct kimage *image);
@@ -104,6 +105,9 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) }static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline (const void *buf,int size) {} + +static inline void ima_lsm_state (const char *lsm_event_name, +const void *buf,int size) {}#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +17 -0
@@ -835,6 +835,23 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size) KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL); } +/** +* ima_lsm_state - measure LSM specific state +* @lsm_event_name: LSM event +* @buf: pointer to buffer containing LSM specific state +* @size: Number of bytes in buf +* +* Buffers can only be measured, not appraised. +*/ +void ima_lsm_state (const char *lsm_event_name,const void *buf,int size) +{ +if (!lsm_event_name || !buf || !size) +return ; + +process_buffer_measurement (buf, size, lsm_event_name, +LSM_STATE ,0 ,NULL ); +} +static int __init init_ima (void ) {int error;
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Stephen Smalley
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 4/5] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure security state
In reply to Lakshmi RamasubramanianQuoted 12 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
SELinux configuration and policy are some of the critical data for this security module that needs to be measured. To enable this measurement SELinux needs to implement the interface function,
security_measure_data(), that the LSM can call.Define the
security_state()function in SELinux to measure SELinux configuration and policy. Call this function to measure SELinux data when there is a change in the security module's state.Sample measurement of SELinux state and hash of the policy:
Quoted 8 lines
10 e32e...5ac3 ima-buf sha256:86e8...4594 selinux-state 656e61626c65643d313b656e666f7263696e673d303b636865636b72657170726f743d313b6e6574706565723d313b6f70656e7065726d3d313b657874736f636b636c6173733d313b616c776179736e6574776f726b3d303b6367726f75707365636c6162656c3d313b6e6e706e6f737569647472616e736974696f6e3d313b67656e66737365636c6162656c73796d6c696e6b3d303b 10 f4a7...9408 ima-buf sha256:4941...68fc selinux-policy-hash 8d1d...1834
The data for selinux-state in the above measurement is:
enabled=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0;The data for selinux-policy-hash in the above measurement is the SHA256 hash of the SELinux policy.
Can you show an example of how to verify that the above measurement matches a given state and policy, e.g. the sha256sum commands and inputs to reproduce the same from an expected state and policy?
Quoted 29 lines
Signed-off-by Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <[email protected]>Suggested-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>---
security/selinux/measure.c new file +18
-0@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* +* Measure SELinux state using IMA subsystem. +*/ +#include <linux/ima.h> +#include "security.h" + +/* Pre-allocated buffer used for measuring state */ +static char *selinux_state_string; +static size_t selinux_state_string_len; +static char *selinux_state_string_fmt = +"%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;" ; + +void __init selinux_init_measurement (void ) +{ + selinux_state_string_len = + snprintf(NULL, 0, selinux_state_string_fmt, + "enabled", 0,
security/selinux/measure.c line 28
Quoted 10 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +10
-0+"enforcing" ,0 , +"checkreqprot" ,0 , + selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER ],0 , + selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM ],0 , + selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS ],0 , + selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK ],0 , + selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL ],0 , + selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION ],0 , + selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS ], + 0);
I was thinking you'd dynamically construct the format string with a for loop from 0 to POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX
and likewise for the values so that we wouldn't have to patch this code every time we add a new one.
security/selinux/measure.c line 31
Quoted 3 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +3
-0+ +if (selinux_state_string_len <0 ) +return ;
How can this happen legitimately (i.e. as a result of something other than a kernel bug)?
security/selinux/measure.c line 38
Quoted 7 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +7
-0+ + ++selinux_state_string_len; + + selinux_state_string =kzalloc (selinux_state_string_len,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!selinux_state_string) + selinux_state_string_len =0 ; +}
Not sure about this error handling approach (silent, proceeding as if the length was zero and then later failing with ENOMEM on every attempt?). I'd be more inclined to panic/BUG here but I know Linus doesn't like that.
security/selinux/measure.c line 87
Quoted 2 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +2
-0+if (ret) +pr_err ("%s: error %d\n" , __func__, ret);
This doesn't seem terribly useful as an error message; I'd be inclined to drop it.
Re: [PATCH v2 4/5] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure security state
Quoted 9 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 5 lines
The data for selinux-state in the above measurement is:
enabled=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0;The data for selinux-policy-hash in the above measurement is the SHA256 hash of the SELinux policy.
Can you show an example of how to verify that the above measurement matches a given state and policy, e.g. the sha256sum commands and inputs to reproduce the same from an expected state and policy?
Sure - I'll provide an example.
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 18 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +18
-0+/* Pre-allocated buffer used for measuring state */ +static char *selinux_state_string; +static size_t selinux_state_string_len; +static char *selinux_state_string_fmt = +"%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;" ; + +void __init selinux_init_measurement (void ) +{ + selinux_state_string_len = + snprintf(NULL, 0, selinux_state_string_fmt, + "enabled", 0, + "enforcing", 0, + "checkreqprot", 0, + selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER], 0, + selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM], 0, + selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS], 0, + selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK], 0, + selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL], 0,
Quoted 8 lines
security/selinux/measure.c line 28
Quoted 3 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +3
-0+ selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION ],0 , + selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS ], + 0);I was thinking you'd dynamically construct the format string with a for loop from 0 to
POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX
and likewise for the values so that we wouldn't have to patch this code every time we add a new one.
That's a good point - will do.
Quoted 7 lines
security/selinux/measure.c line 31
Quoted 4 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +3
-0+ +if (selinux_state_string_len <0 ) +return ;How can this happen legitimately (i.e. as a result of something other than a kernel bug)?
Since snprintf can return an error I wanted to handle that. But I agree this should not happen for the input data to snprintf used here.
Quoted 13 lines
security/selinux/measure.c line 38
Quoted 8 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +7
-0+ + ++selinux_state_string_len; + + selinux_state_string =kzalloc (selinux_state_string_len,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!selinux_state_string) + selinux_state_string_len =0 ; +}Not sure about this error handling approach (silent, proceeding as if the length was zero and then later failing with ENOMEM on every attempt?). I'd be more inclined to panic/BUG here but I know Linus doesn't like that.
I am not sure if failing (kernel panic/BUG) to "measure" LSM data under memory pressure conditions is the right thing. But I am open to treating this error as a fatal error. Please let me know.
Quoted 7 lines
security/selinux/measure.c line 87
Quoted 3 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +2
-0+if (ret) +pr_err ("%s: error %d\n" , __func__, ret);This doesn't seem terribly useful as an error message; I'd be inclined to drop it.
Will do.
thanks,
-lakshmi
Stephen Smalley
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 4/5] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure security state
Quoted 9 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 4 lines · Stephen Smalley
Not sure about this error handling approach (silent, proceeding as if the length was zero and then later failing with ENOMEM on every attempt?). I'd be more inclined to panic/BUG here but I know Linus doesn't like that.
I am not sure if failing (kernel panic/BUG) to "measure" LSM data under memory pressure conditions is the right thing. But I am open to treating this error as a fatal error. Please let me know.
Let's at least log an error message since it otherwise silently disables all measuring of security state.
Also not sure why we bother returning errors from selinux_measure_data() since nothing appears to check or use the result.
Don't know if integrity/IMA has any equivalent to the audit subsystem's concept of audit_failure settings to control whether errors that prevent auditing (measuring) are handled silently, with a log message, or via a panic. If not, I guess that can be explored separately.
Re: [PATCH v2 4/5] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure security state
Quoted 8 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 6 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 4 lines · Stephen Smalley
Not sure about this error handling approach (silent, proceeding as if the length was zero and then later failing with ENOMEM on every attempt?). I'd be more inclined to panic/BUG here but I know Linus doesn't like that.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I am not sure if failing (kernel panic/BUG) to "measure" LSM data under memory pressure conditions is the right thing. But I am open to treating this error as a fatal error. Please let me know.
Let's at least log an error message since it otherwise silently disables all measuring of security state.
Agree - will log error messages as appropriate.
Quoted 3 lines
Also not sure why we bother returning errors from
selinux_measure_data()since nothing appears to check or use the result.
Maybe SELinux can log audit messages on failures, but I guess it may be better to do that closer to where the error occurs.
Will change selinux_measure_data() to void function.
Quoted 6 lines
Don't know if integrity/IMA has any equivalent to the audit subsystem's concept of
audit_failuresettings to control whether errors that prevent auditing (measuring) are handled silently, with a log message, or via a panic. If not, I guess that can be explored separately.
Yes - integrity subsystem logs audit messages for errors\failures.
-lakshmi