how is the bpfilter sockopt processing supposed to work
Subsystems (3)
Hi Alexei,
I've just been auditing the sockopt code, and bpfilter looks really odd. Both getsockopts and setsockopt eventually end up in__bpfilter_process_sockopt, which then passes record to the userspace helper containing the address of the optval buffer. Which depending on bpf-cgroup might be in user or kernel space. But even if it is in userspace it would be in a different process than the bpfiler helper. What makes all this work?
Quoted 10 lines · Christoph Hellwig
Hi Alexei,
I've just been auditing the sockopt code, and bpfilter looks really odd. Both getsockopts and setsockopt eventually end up
in__bpfilter_process_sockopt, which then passes record to the userspace helper containing the address of the optval buffer. Which depending on bpf-cgroup might be in user or kernel space. But even if it is in userspace it would be in a different process than the bpfiler helper. What makes all this work?
Hmm. Good point. bpfilter assumes user addresses. It will break if bpf cgroup sockopt messes with it.
We had a different issue with bpf-cgroup-sockopt and iptables in the past. Probably the easiest way forward is to special case this particular one. With your new series is there a way to tell in bpfilter_ip_get_sockopt() whether addr is kernel or user? And if it's the kernel just return with error.
Quoted 12 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 10 lines · Christoph Hellwig
Hi Alexei,
I've just been auditing the sockopt code, and bpfilter looks really odd. Both getsockopts and setsockopt eventually end up
in__bpfilter_process_sockopt, which then passes record to the userspace helper containing the address of the optval buffer. Which depending on bpf-cgroup might be in user or kernel space. But even if it is in userspace it would be in a different process than the bpfiler helper. What makes all this work?
Quoted 6 lines
Hmm. Good point. bpfilter assumes user addresses. It will break if bpf cgroup sockopt messes with it.
We had a different issue with bpf-cgroup-sockopt and iptables in the past. Probably the easiest way forward is to special case this particular one. With your new series is there a way to tell inbpfilter_ip_get_sockopt()whether addr is kernel or user? And if it's the kernel just return with error.
Yes, I can send a fix. But how do even the user space addressed work? If some random process calls getsockopt or setsockopt, how does the bpfilter user mode helper attach to its address space?
Quoted 21 lines · Christoph Hellwig
Quoted 12 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 10 lines · Christoph Hellwig
Hi Alexei,
I've just been auditing the sockopt code, and bpfilter looks really odd. Both getsockopts and setsockopt eventually end up
in__bpfilter_process_sockopt, which then passes record to the userspace helper containing the address of the optval buffer. Which depending on bpf-cgroup might be in user or kernel space. But even if it is in userspace it would be in a different process than the bpfiler helper. What makes all this work?Quoted 6 lines
Hmm. Good point. bpfilter assumes user addresses. It will break if bpf cgroup sockopt messes with it.
We had a different issue with bpf-cgroup-sockopt and iptables in the past. Probably the easiest way forward is to special case this particular one. With your new series is there a way to tell inbpfilter_ip_get_sockopt()whether addr is kernel or user? And if it's the kernel just return with error.
Quoted 3 lines
Yes, I can send a fix. But how do even the user space addressed work? If some random process calls getsockopt or setsockopt, how does the bpfilter user mode helper attach to its address space?
The actual bpfilter processing is in two patches that we didn't land:
https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/902785/
https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/902783/
UMD is using process_vm_readv().
The target process is waiting for the sockopt syscall to return,
so from the toctou perspective it's the same as the kernel doing copy_from_user.
From: Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 27 lines
Sent: 17 July 2020 18:29
Quoted 21 lines · Christoph Hellwig
Quoted 12 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 10 lines · Christoph Hellwig
Hi Alexei,
I've just been auditing the sockopt code, and bpfilter looks really odd. Both getsockopts and setsockopt eventually end up
in__bpfilter_process_sockopt, which then passes record to the userspace helper containing the address of the optval buffer. Which depending on bpf-cgroup might be in user or kernel space. But even if it is in userspace it would be in a different process than the bpfiler helper. What makes all this work?Quoted 6 lines
Hmm. Good point. bpfilter assumes user addresses. It will break if bpf cgroup sockopt messes with it.
We had a different issue with bpf-cgroup-sockopt and iptables in the past. Probably the easiest way forward is to special case this particular one. With your new series is there a way to tell inbpfilter_ip_get_sockopt()whether addr is kernel or user? And if it's the kernel just return with error.Quoted 3 lines
Yes, I can send a fix. But how do even the user space addressed work? If some random process calls getsockopt or setsockopt, how does the bpfilter user mode helper attach to its address space?
Quoted 6 lines
The actual bpfilter processing is in two patches that we didn't land:
https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/902785/
https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/902783/
UMD is usingprocess_vm_readv().
The target process is waiting for the sockopt syscall to return,
so from the toctou perspective it's the same as the kernel doingcopy_from_user.
You need to be doing the user-spaces accesses from the target process's context.
If it is waiting for the syscall to return then you aren't running it its context.
There is also at least one sockopt that has an embedded pointer. So even if you've copied the sockopt buffer into kernel space you are doomed.
If the request has come from a kernel thread with kernel buffers then the embedded buffer will be kernel.
(This is probably more common for ioctl() requests.)
I'm not sure there is any sane was to handle this.
David
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