LSM: Measure security module data
Subsystems (5)
v5 cover LSM: Measure security module data
Critical data structures of security modules are currently not measured. Therefore an attestation service, for instance, would not be able to attest whether the security modules are always operating with the policies and configuration that the system administrator had setup. The policies and configuration for the security modules could be tampered with by malware by exploiting kernel vulnerabilities or modified through some inadvertent actions on the system. Measuring such critical data would enable an attestation service to better assess the state of the system.
IMA subsystem measures system files, command line arguments passed to kexec, boot aggregate, keys, etc. It can be used to measure critical data structures of security modules as well.
This change aims to address measuring critical data structures of security modules when they are initialized and when they are updated at runtime.
This series is based on commit 3db0d0c276a7 ("integrity: remove redundant initialization of variable ret") in next-integrity
Change log:
v5:
=> Append timestamp to "event name" string in the call to
the IMA hooks so that LSM data is always measured by IMA.
=> Removed workqueue patch that was handling periodic checking
of the LSM data. This change will be introduced as a separate patch set while keeping this patch set focussed on measuring the LSM data on initialization and on updates at runtime.
=> Handle early boot measurement of LSM data.
v4:
=> Added LSM_POLICY func and IMA hook to measure LSM policy. => Pass SELinux policy data, instead of the hash of the policy,
to the IMA hook to measure.
=> Include "initialized" flag in SELinux measurement.
Also, measure SELinux state even when initialization is not yet completed. But measure SELinux policy only after initialization.
v3:
=> Loop through policy_capabilities to build the state data
to measure instead of hardcoding to current set of policy capabilities.
=> Added error log messages for failure conditions.
v2:
=> Pass selinux_state struct as parameter to the function
that measures SELinux data.
=> Use strings from selinux_policycap_names array for SELinux
state measurement.
=> Refactored security_read_policy() to alloc kernel or user
virtual memory and then read the SELinux policy.
v1:
=> Per Stephen Smalley's suggestion added selinux_state booleans
and hash of SELinux policy in the measured data for SELinux.
=> Call IMA hook from the security module directly instead of
redirecting through the LSM.
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian (4):
IMA: Add func to measure LSM state and policy
IMA: Define IMA hooks to measure LSM state and policy
LSM: Define SELinux function to measure state and policy
IMA: Handle early boot data measurement
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 9 + include/linux/ima.h | 14 ++ security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 5 +- security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 45 +++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 6 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 64 ++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 33 +++- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_data.c | 175 +++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 174 ------------------ security/selinux/Makefile | 2 + security/selinux/hooks.c | 1 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 15 ++ security/selinux/measure.c | 150 ++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 3 + security/selinux/ss/services.c | 71 +++++++- 18 files changed, 551 insertions(+), 222 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_data.c delete mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c create mode 100644 security/selinux/measure.c
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
PATCH v5 1/4 IMA: Add func to measure LSM state and policy
Critical data structures of security modules need to be measured to enable an attestation service to verify if the configuration and policies for the security modules have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered with at runtime. A new IMA policy is required for handling this measurement.
Define two new IMA policy func namely LSM_STATE and LSM_POLICY to measure the state and the policy provided by the security modules. Update ima_match_rules() and ima_validate_rule() to check for the new func and ima_parse_rule() to handle the new func.
--- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 9 ++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +9 -0
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ Description: [FIRMWARE_CHECK] [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK] [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] + [LSM_STATE] [LSM_POLICY] mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND] [[^]MAY_EXEC] fsmagic:= hex value
@@ -125,3 +126,11 @@ Description: keys added to .builtin_trusted_keys or .ima keyring: measure func=KEY_CHECK keyrings=.builtin_trusted_keys|.ima + + Example of measure rule using LSM_STATE to measure LSM state: + + measure func=LSM_STATE template=ima-buf + + Example of measure rule using LSM_POLICY to measure LSM policy: + + measure func=LSM_POLICY template=ima-ng
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +2 -0
@@ -200,6 +200,8 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy) \ hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \ hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \ + hook(LSM_STATE, lsm_state) \ + hook(LSM_POLICY, lsm_policy) \ hook(MAX_CHECK, none)#define __ima_hook_enumify (ENUM , str) ENUM,
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +1 -1
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK -* | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK +* | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK | LSM_STATE | LSM_POLICY * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value *
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +27 -4
@@ -442,13 +442,20 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, {int i; -if (func ==KEY_CHECK ) { -return (rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func == func) && -ima_match_keyring (rule, keyring, cred); - }if ((rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func != func && func !=POST_SETATTR ))return false; + +switch (func) { +case KEY_CHECK : +return ima_match_keyring (rule, keyring, cred); +case LSM_STATE : +case LSM_POLICY : +return true; +default : +break ; + } +if ((rule->flags &IMA_MASK ) && (rule->mask != mask && func !=POST_SETATTR ))return false;
@@ -1044,6 +1051,18 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond (entry))return false; +break ; +case LSM_STATE : +case LSM_POLICY : +if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE |DONT_MEASURE )) +return false; + +if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC |IMA_PCR )) +return false; + +if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond (entry)) +return false; +break ;default :return false;
@@ -1176,6 +1195,10 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->func =KEXEC_CMDLINE ; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEY_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = KEY_CHECK; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_STATE") == 0) + entry->func = LSM_STATE; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_POLICY") == 0) + entry->func = LSM_POLICY; else result = -EINVAL ;if (!result)
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
PATCH v5 3/4 LSM: Define SELinux function to measure state and policy
In reply to Lakshmi RamasubramanianSELinux configuration and policy are some of the critical data for this security module that needs to be measured. This measurement can be used by an attestation service, for instance, to verify if the configuration and policies have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered with at runtime.
Measure SELinux configuration, policy capabilities settings, and the loaded policy by calling the IMA hooks ima_measure_lsm_state() and ima_measure_lsm_policy() respectively.
Sample measurement of SELinux state and hash of the policy:
10 e32e...5ac3 ima-buf sha256:86e8...4594 selinux-state-1595389364:287899386 696e697469616c697a65643d313b656e61626c65643d313b656e666f7263696e673d303b636865636b72657170726f743d313b6e6574776f726b5f706565725f636f6e74726f6c733d313b6f70656e5f7065726d733d313b657874656e6465645f736f636b65745f636c6173733d313b616c776179735f636865636b5f6e6574776f726b3d303b6367726f75705f7365636c6162656c3d313b6e6e705f6e6f737569645f7472616e736974696f6e3d313b67656e66735f7365636c6162656c5f73796d6c696e6b733d303 10 f4a7...9408 ima-ng sha256:8d1d...1834 selinux-policy-hash-1595389353:863934271
To verify the measurement check the following:
Execute the following command to extract the measured data from the IMA log for SELinux configuration (selinux-state).
grep -m 1 "selinux-state" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p
The output should be the list of key-value pairs. For example,
initialized=1;enabled=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0;
To verify the measured data with the current SELinux state:
=> enabled should be set to 1 if /sys/fs/selinux folder exists,
0 otherwise
For other entries, compare the integer value in the files
=> /sys/fs/selinux/enforce
=> /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot
And, each of the policy capabilities files under
=> /sys/fs/selinux/policy_capabilities
For selinux-policy-hash, the hash of SELinux policy is included in the IMA log entry.
To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run the following commands and verify the output hash values match.
sha256sum /sys/fs/selinux/policy | cut -d' ' -f 1
grep -m 1 "selinux-policy-hash" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | cut -d' ' -f 4
--- security/selinux/Makefile | 2 + security/selinux/hooks.c | 1 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 15 +++ security/selinux/measure.c | 150 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 3 + security/selinux/ss/services.c | 71 +++++++++++-- 6 files changed, 233 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/selinux/measure.c
security/selinux/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND) += ibpkey.o +selinux-$(CONFIG_IMA) += measure.o + ccflags-y := -I$(srctree)/security/selinux -I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(selinux-y)): $(obj)/flask.h
security/selinux/hooks.c +1 -0
@@ -7394,6 +7394,7 @@ int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state) }selinux_mark_disabled (state); +selinux_measure_state (state);pr_info ("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n" );
security/selinux/include/security.h +15 -0
@@ -222,16 +222,31 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void)return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS ]; } +static inline bool selinux_checkreqprot (const struct selinux_state *state) +{ +return READ_ONCE (state->checkreqprot); +} +int security_mls_enabled (struct selinux_state *state);int security_load_policy (struct selinux_state *state,void *data,size_t len);int security_read_policy (struct selinux_state *state,void **data,size_t *len); +int security_read_policy_kernel (struct selinux_state *state, +void **data,size_t *len);size_t security_policydb_len (struct selinux_state *state);int security_policycap_supported (struct selinux_state *state,unsigned int req_cap); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA +extern void selinux_measure_state (struct selinux_state *selinux_state); +#else +static inline void selinux_measure_state (struct selinux_state *selinux_state) +{ +} +#endif +#define SEL_VEC_MAX 32struct av_decision {u32 allowed;
security/selinux/measure.c new file +150 -0
150 lines not on this page · raw message
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +3 -0
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,from_kuid (&init_user_ns,audit_get_loginuid (current)), audit_get_sessionid(current));enforcing_set (state, new_value); +selinux_measure_state (state);if (new_value)avc_ss_reset (state->avc,0 );selnl_notify_setenforce (new_value);
@@ -678,6 +679,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, fsi->state->checkreqprot = new_value ?1 :0 ; length = count; + +selinux_measure_state (fsi->state); out:kfree (page);return length;
security/selinux/ss/services.c +62 -9
111 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
PATCH v5 4/4 IMA: Handle early boot data measurement
In reply to Lakshmi RamasubramanianThe current implementation of early boot measurement in the IMA subsystem is very specific to asymmetric keys. It does not handle measurement of other data such as Linux Security Module (LSM) data. Since most security modules are initialized very early in the boot cycle, data provided by those modules are not measured by IMA. Any other subsystem that initializes early in the boot cycle and needs IMA to measure their data would suffer from the same issue.
Update the early boot key measurement to handle any early boot data. Change the kernel configuration CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS to CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA so it can be used for enabling early boot data measurement. Change this new configuration to support SECURITY subsystem in addition to KEYS subsystem, which is currently supported. This can be extended to include more subsystems in the future by updating this kernel configuration.
Update LSM hooks namely ima_measure_lsm_state() and ima_measure_lsm_policy to utilize early boot measurement support.
--- security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 5 +- security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 37 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 6 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 22 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_data.c | 175 +++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 174 ------------------ 9 files changed, 223 insertions(+), 202 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_data.c delete mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +2 -3
@@ -322,10 +322,9 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS depends on ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE=y default y -config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS +config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA bool - depends on IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS - depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING + depends on SECURITY || (IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) default y config IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
security/integrity/ima/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -13,4 +13,4 @@ ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) += ima_modsig.o ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += ima_asymmetric_keys.o -ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS) += ima_queue_keys.o +ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA) += ima_queue_data.o
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +21 -16
@@ -229,29 +229,34 @@ extern const char *const func_tokens[];struct modsig ; -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA /* -* To track keys that need to be measured. +* To track data that needs to be measured. */ -struct ima_key_entry { +struct ima_data_entry {struct list_head list;void *payload;size_t payload_len; -char *keyring_name; +const char *event_name; +const char *event_data; +enum ima_hooks func; }; -void ima_init_key_queue (void ); -bool ima_should_queue_key (void ); -bool ima_queue_key (struct key *keyring,const void *payload, -size_t payload_len); -void ima_process_queued_keys (void ); +void ima_init_data_queue (void ); +bool ima_should_queue_data (void ); +bool ima_queue_data (const char *event_name,const void *payload, +size_t payload_len,const char *event_data, +enum ima_hooks func); +void ima_process_queued_data (void );#else -static inline void ima_init_key_queue (void ) {} -static inline bool ima_should_queue_key (void ) {return false; } -static inline bool ima_queue_key (struct key *keyring, -const void *payload, -size_t payload_len) {return false; } -static inline void ima_process_queued_keys (void ) {} -#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS */ +static inline void ima_init_data_queue (void ) {} +static inline bool ima_should_queue_data (void ) {return false; } +static inline bool ima_queue_data (const char *event_name, +const void *payload, +size_t payload_len, +const char *event_data, +enum ima_hooks func) {return false; } +static inline void ima_process_queued_data (void ) {} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA */ /* LIM API function definitions */ int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c +4 -2
@@ -37,8 +37,10 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,if (!payload || (payload_len ==0 ))return ; -if (ima_should_queue_key ()) - queued =ima_queue_key (keyring, payload, payload_len); +if (ima_should_queue_data ()) + queued =ima_queue_data (keyring->description, payload, + payload_len, keyring->description, +KEY_CHECK );if (queued)return ;
security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +1 -1
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ int __init ima_init(void)if (rc !=0 )return rc; -ima_init_key_queue (); +ima_init_data_queue ();return rc; }
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +18 -4
@@ -846,6 +846,22 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)fdput (f); } +static int ima_measure_lsm_data (const char *event_name, +const void *buf,int size, +enum ima_hooks func) +{ +bool queued = false; + +if (ima_should_queue_data ()) + queued =ima_queue_data (event_name, buf, size,NULL , func); + +if (queued) +return 0 ; + +return process_buffer_measurement (NULL , buf, size, event_name, func, +0 ,NULL ); +} +/** * ima_measure_lsm_state - measure LSM specific state * @lsm_event_name: LSM event
@@ -860,8 +876,7 @@ int ima_measure_lsm_state(const char *lsm_event_name, const void *buf,if (!lsm_event_name || !buf || !size)return -EINVAL ; -return process_buffer_measurement (NULL , buf, size, lsm_event_name, -LSM_STATE ,0 ,NULL ); +return ima_measure_lsm_data (lsm_event_name, buf, size,LSM_STATE ); }/**
@@ -878,8 +893,7 @@ int ima_measure_lsm_policy(const char *lsm_event_name, const void *buf,if (!lsm_event_name || !buf || !size)return -EINVAL ; -return process_buffer_measurement (NULL , buf, size, lsm_event_name, -LSM_POLICY ,0 ,NULL ); +return ima_measure_lsm_data (lsm_event_name, buf, size,LSM_POLICY ); }static int __init init_ima (void )
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1 -1
@@ -836,7 +836,7 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)ima_update_policy_flag ();/* Custom IMA policy has been loaded */ -ima_process_queued_keys (); +ima_process_queued_data (); }/* Keep the enumeration in sync with the policy_tokens! */
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_data.c new file +175 -0
175 lines not on this page · raw message
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c deleted +0 -174
174 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
PATCH v5 2/4 IMA: Define IMA hooks to measure LSM state and policy
In reply to Lakshmi RamasubramanianIMA subsystem needs to define IMA hooks that the security modules can call to measure state and policy data.
Define two new IMA hooks, namely ima_lsm_state() and ima_lsm_policy(), that the security modules can call to measure LSM state and LSM policy respectively. Return the status of the measurement operation from these two IMA hooks.
--- include/linux/ima.h | 14 +++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 6 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
include/linux/ima.h +14 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,extern void ima_post_path_mknod (struct dentry *dentry);extern int ima_file_hash (struct file *file,char *buf,size_t buf_size);extern void ima_kexec_cmdline (int kernel_fd,const void *buf,int size); +extern int ima_measure_lsm_state (const char *lsm_event_name,const void *buf, +int size); +extern int ima_measure_lsm_policy (const char *lsm_event_name,const void *buf, +int size);#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer (struct kimage *image);
@@ -104,6 +108,16 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) }static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline (int kernel_fd,const void *buf,int size) {} +static inline int ima_measure_lsm_state (const char *lsm_event_name, +const void *buf,int size) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +} +static inline int ima_measure_lsm_policy (const char *lsm_event_name, +const void *buf,int size) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +}#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +3 -3
@@ -267,9 +267,9 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc); -void process_buffer_measurement (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,int size, -const char *eventname,enum ima_hooks func, -int pcr,const char *keyring); +int process_buffer_measurement (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,int size, +const char *eventname,enum ima_hooks func, +int pcr,const char *keyring);void ima_audit_measurement (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,const unsigned char *filename); int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +43 -7
86 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] IMA: Add func to measure LSM state and policy
In reply to Lakshmi RamasubramanianQuoted 118 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Critical data structures of security modules need to be measured to enable an attestation service to verify if the configuration and policies for the security modules have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered with at runtime. A new IMA policy is required for handling this measurement.
Define two new IMA policy func namely
LSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYto measure the state and the policy provided by the security modules. Updateima_match_rules()andima_validate_rule()to check for the new func andima_parse_rule()to handle the new func.Signed-off-by Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <[email protected]>--- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 9 ++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +9
-0@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ Description: [FIRMWARE_CHECK] [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK] [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] + [LSM_STATE] [LSM_POLICY] mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND] [[^]MAY_EXEC] fsmagic:= hex value@@ -125,3 +126,11 @@ Description: keys added to .builtin_trusted_keys or .ima keyring: measure func=KEY_CHECK keyrings=.builtin_trusted_keys|.ima + + Example of measure rule using LSM_STATE to measure LSM state: + + measure func=LSM_STATE template=ima-buf + + Example of measure rule using LSM_POLICY to measure LSM policy: + + measure func=LSM_POLICY template=ima-ngsecurity/integrity/ima/ima.h +2
-0@@ -200,6 +200,8 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy) \ hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \ hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \ + hook(LSM_STATE, lsm_state) \ + hook(LSM_POLICY, lsm_policy) \ hook(MAX_CHECK, none)#define __ima_hook_enumify (ENUM , str) ENUM,security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +1
-1@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK -* | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK +* | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK | LSM_STATE | LSM_POLICY * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value * security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +23
-4@@ -442,13 +442,20 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, {int i; -if (func ==KEY_CHECK ) { -return (rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func == func) && -ima_match_keyring (rule, keyring, cred); - }if ((rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func != func && func !=POST_SETATTR ))return false; + +switch (func) { +case KEY_CHECK : +return ima_match_keyring (rule, keyring, cred); +case LSM_STATE : +case LSM_POLICY : +return true; +default : +break ; + } +if ((rule->flags &IMA_MASK ) && (rule->mask != mask && func !=POST_SETATTR ))return false;@@ -1044,6 +1051,18 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond (entry))return false; +break ; +case LSM_STATE : +case LSM_POLICY : +if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE |DONT_MEASURE )) +return false; + +if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC |IMA_PCR )) +return false; + +if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond (entry)) +return false; +break ;default :return false;
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) · line 1201
Quoted 7 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +4
-0@@ -1176,6 +1195,10 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->func =KEXEC_CMDLINE ; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEY_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = KEY_CHECK; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_STATE") == 0) + entry->func = LSM_STATE; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_POLICY") == 0) + entry->func = LSM_POLICY;
This patch generally looks really good to me with the exception of one thing...
We should only accept rules with these specified hook functions when an LSM that has measurement support is enabled. This messes up the ordering of your patch series but it could be as simple as doing this:
else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) && strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_STATE") == 0) entry->func = LSM_STATE;
Or you could do something a little more complex, like what's done with CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES. You could create a CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_LSM option that's default enabled but depends on CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX and then check for IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_LSM) in ima_parse_rule().
I'd personally opt for just placing the IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) check directly into ima_parse_rule().
Tyler
Quoted 5 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0
-0else result = -EINVAL ;if (!result)Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Re: [PATCH v5 2/4] IMA: Define IMA hooks to measure LSM state and policy
In reply to Lakshmi RamasubramanianQuoted 9 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
IMA subsystem needs to define IMA hooks that the security modules can call to measure state and policy data.
Define two new IMA hooks, namely
ima_lsm_state()andima_lsm_policy(), that the security modules can call to measure LSM state and LSM policy respectively. Return the status of the measurement operation from these two IMA hooks.Signed-off-by Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <[email protected]>
Tyler
Quoted 153 lines
--- include/linux/ima.h | 14 +++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 6 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)include/linux/ima.h +14
-0@@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,extern void ima_post_path_mknod (struct dentry *dentry);extern int ima_file_hash (struct file *file,char *buf,size_t buf_size);extern void ima_kexec_cmdline (int kernel_fd,const void *buf,int size); +extern int ima_measure_lsm_state (const char *lsm_event_name,const void *buf, +int size); +extern int ima_measure_lsm_policy (const char *lsm_event_name,const void *buf, +int size);#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer (struct kimage *image);@@ -104,6 +108,16 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) }static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline (int kernel_fd,const void *buf,int size) {} +static inline int ima_measure_lsm_state (const char *lsm_event_name, +const void *buf,int size) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +} +static inline int ima_measure_lsm_policy (const char *lsm_event_name, +const void *buf,int size) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +}#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC security/integrity/ima/ima.h +3
-3@@ -267,9 +267,9 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc); -void process_buffer_measurement (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,int size, -const char *eventname,enum ima_hooks func, -int pcr,const char *keyring); +int process_buffer_measurement (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,int size, +const char *eventname,enum ima_hooks func, +int pcr,const char *keyring);void ima_audit_measurement (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,const unsigned char *filename); int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +43
-7@@ -736,9 +736,9 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)* * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log. */ -void process_buffer_measurement (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,int size, -const char *eventname,enum ima_hooks func, -int pcr,const char *keyring) +int process_buffer_measurement (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,int size, +const char *eventname,enum ima_hooks func, +int pcr,const char *keyring) {int ret =0 ;const char *audit_cause ="ENOMEM" ;@@ -758,7 +758,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,u32 secid;if (!ima_policy_flag) -return ; +return 0 ;/* * Both LSM hooks and auxilary based buffer measurements are @@ -772,7 +772,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, action =ima_get_action (inode,current_cred (), secid,0 , func, &pcr, &template, keyring);if (!(action &IMA_MEASURE )) -return ; +return 0 ; }if (!pcr)@@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,pr_err ("template %s init failed, result: %d\n" , (strlen (template->name) ? template->name : template->fmt), ret); -return ; +return ret; } }@@ -819,7 +819,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,func_measure_str (func), audit_cause, ret, 0, ret); -return ; +return ret; }/** @@ -846,6 +846,42 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)fdput (f); } +/** +* ima_measure_lsm_state - measure LSM specific state +* @lsm_event_name: LSM event +* @buf: pointer to buffer containing LSM specific state +* @size: Number of bytes in buf +* +* Buffers can only be measured, not appraised. +*/ +int ima_measure_lsm_state (const char *lsm_event_name,const void *buf, +int size) +{ +if (!lsm_event_name || !buf || !size) +return -EINVAL ; + +return process_buffer_measurement (NULL , buf, size, lsm_event_name, +LSM_STATE ,0 ,NULL ); +} + +/** +* ima_measure_lsm_policy - measure LSM specific policy +* @lsm_event_name: LSM event +* @buf: pointer to buffer containing LSM specific policy +* @size: Number of bytes in buf +* +* Buffers can only be measured, not appraised. +*/ +int ima_measure_lsm_policy (const char *lsm_event_name,const void *buf, +int size) +{ +if (!lsm_event_name || !buf || !size) +return -EINVAL ; + +return process_buffer_measurement (NULL , buf, size, lsm_event_name, +LSM_POLICY ,0 ,NULL ); +} +static int __init init_ima (void ) {int error;Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] IMA: Add func to measure LSM state and policy
In reply to Tyler HicksQuoted 68 lines · Tyler Hicks
Quoted 49 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +23
-4@@ -442,13 +442,20 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, {int i; -if (func ==KEY_CHECK ) { -return (rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func == func) && -ima_match_keyring (rule, keyring, cred); - }if ((rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func != func && func !=POST_SETATTR ))return false; + +switch (func) { +case KEY_CHECK : +return ima_match_keyring (rule, keyring, cred); +case LSM_STATE : +case LSM_POLICY : +return true; +default : +break ; + } +if ((rule->flags &IMA_MASK ) && (rule->mask != mask && func !=POST_SETATTR ))return false;@@ -1044,6 +1051,18 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond (entry))return false; +break ; +case LSM_STATE : +case LSM_POLICY : +if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE |DONT_MEASURE )) +return false; + +if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC |IMA_PCR )) +return false; + +if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond (entry)) +return false; +break ;default :return false;security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) · line 1201
Quoted 7 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +4
-0@@ -1176,6 +1195,10 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->func =KEXEC_CMDLINE ; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEY_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = KEY_CHECK; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_STATE") == 0) + entry->func = LSM_STATE; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_POLICY") == 0) + entry->func = LSM_POLICY;This patch generally looks really good to me with the exception of one thing...
We should only accept rules with these specified hook functions when an LSM that has measurement support is enabled. This messes up the ordering of your patch series but it could be as simple as doing this:
else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) && strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_STATE") == 0) entry->func = LSM_STATE;
Quoted 9 lines
Or you could do something a little more complex, like what's done with
CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES. You could create aCONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_LSMoption that's default enabled but depends onCONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUXand then check forIS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_LSM)inima_parse_rule().I'd personally opt for just placing the
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)check directly intoima_parse_rule().
The LSM hook can be used by any security module (not just SELinux) to measure their data.
I have implemented measurement in SELinux to illustrate the usage. Maybe, I can add the check you have suggested for now and when more security modules start using this IMA policy additional checks can be added as appropriate.
thanks,
-lakshmi
Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] IMA: Add func to measure LSM state and policy
Quoted 78 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 66 lines · Tyler Hicks
Quoted 47 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +23
-4@@ -442,13 +442,20 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, {int i; -if (func ==KEY_CHECK ) { -return (rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func == func) && -ima_match_keyring (rule, keyring, cred); - }if ((rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func != func && func !=POST_SETATTR ))return false; + +switch (func) { +case KEY_CHECK : +return ima_match_keyring (rule, keyring, cred); +case LSM_STATE : +case LSM_POLICY : +return true; +default : +break ; + } +if ((rule->flags &IMA_MASK ) && (rule->mask != mask && func !=POST_SETATTR ))return false;@@ -1044,6 +1051,18 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond (entry))return false; +break ; +case LSM_STATE : +case LSM_POLICY : +if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE |DONT_MEASURE )) +return false; + +if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC |IMA_PCR )) +return false; + +if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond (entry)) +return false; +break ;default :return false;security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) · line 1201
Quoted 7 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +4
-0@@ -1176,6 +1195,10 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->func =KEXEC_CMDLINE ; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEY_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = KEY_CHECK; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_STATE") == 0) + entry->func = LSM_STATE; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_POLICY") == 0) + entry->func = LSM_POLICY;This patch generally looks really good to me with the exception of one thing...
We should only accept rules with these specified hook functions when an LSM that has measurement support is enabled. This messes up the ordering of your patch series but it could be as simple as doing this:
else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) && strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_STATE") == 0) entry->func = LSM_STATE;Quoted 9 lines
Or you could do something a little more complex, like what's done with
CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES. You could create aCONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_LSMoption that's default enabled but depends onCONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUXand then check forIS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_LSM)inima_parse_rule().I'd personally opt for just placing the
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)check directly intoima_parse_rule().
Quoted 6 lines
The LSM hook can be used by any security module (not just SELinux) to measure their data.
I have implemented measurement in SELinux to illustrate the usage. Maybe, I can add the check you have suggested for now and when more security modules start using this IMA policy additional checks can be added as appropriate.
Yes, that's what I envision.
The main idea is that there's negative feedback to userspace when IMA can't possibly do anything with an LSM_STATE/LSM_POLICY rule.
Tyler
Quoted 3 lines
thanks,
-lakshmi
Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] IMA: Add func to measure LSM state and policy
In reply to Tyler HicksQuoted 9 lines · Tyler Hicks
Quoted 8 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Critical data structures of security modules need to be measured to enable an attestation service to verify if the configuration and policies for the security modules have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered with at runtime. A new IMA policy is required for handling this measurement.
Define two new IMA policy func namely
LSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYto measure the state and the policy provided by the security modules.
If, as you suggest below, this is SELinux specific, these should be SELINUX_STATE and SELINUX_POLICY. It makes me very uncomfortable when I see LSM used in cases where SELinux is required. The LSM is supposed to be an agnostic interface, so if you need to throw
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) &&
into the IMA code you're clearly not thinking in terms of the LSM layer. I have no problem with seeing SELinux oriented and/or specific code in IMA if that's what you want. Just don't call it LSM.
Quoted 144 lines
Quoted 110 lines
Update
ima_match_rules()andima_validate_rule()to check for the new func andima_parse_rule()to handle the new func.Signed-off-by Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <[email protected]>--- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 9 ++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +9
-0@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ Description: [FIRMWARE_CHECK] [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK] [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] + [LSM_STATE] [LSM_POLICY] mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND] [[^]MAY_EXEC] fsmagic:= hex value@@ -125,3 +126,11 @@ Description: keys added to .builtin_trusted_keys or .ima keyring: measure func=KEY_CHECK keyrings=.builtin_trusted_keys|.ima + + Example of measure rule using LSM_STATE to measure LSM state: + + measure func=LSM_STATE template=ima-buf + + Example of measure rule using LSM_POLICY to measure LSM policy: + + measure func=LSM_POLICY template=ima-ngsecurity/integrity/ima/ima.h +2
-0@@ -200,6 +200,8 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy) \ hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \ hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \ + hook(LSM_STATE, lsm_state) \ + hook(LSM_POLICY, lsm_policy) \ hook(MAX_CHECK, none)#define __ima_hook_enumify (ENUM , str) ENUM,security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +1
-1@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK -* | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK +* | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK | LSM_STATE | LSM_POLICY * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value * security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +23
-4@@ -442,13 +442,20 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, {int i; -if (func ==KEY_CHECK ) { -return (rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func == func) && -ima_match_keyring (rule, keyring, cred); - }if ((rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func != func && func !=POST_SETATTR ))return false; + +switch (func) { +case KEY_CHECK : +return ima_match_keyring (rule, keyring, cred); +case LSM_STATE : +case LSM_POLICY : +return true; +default : +break ; + } +if ((rule->flags &IMA_MASK ) && (rule->mask != mask && func !=POST_SETATTR ))return false;@@ -1044,6 +1051,18 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond (entry))return false; +break ; +case LSM_STATE : +case LSM_POLICY : +if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE |DONT_MEASURE )) +return false; + +if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC |IMA_PCR )) +return false; + +if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond (entry)) +return false; +break ;default :return false;security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) · line 1201
Quoted 7 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +4
-0@@ -1176,6 +1195,10 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->func =KEXEC_CMDLINE ; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEY_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = KEY_CHECK; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_STATE") == 0) + entry->func = LSM_STATE; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_POLICY") == 0) + entry->func = LSM_POLICY;This patch generally looks really good to me with the exception of one thing...
We should only accept rules with these specified hook functions when an LSM that has measurement support is enabled. This messes up the ordering of your patch series but it could be as simple as doing this:
else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) && strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_STATE") == 0) entry->func = LSM_STATE;Or you could do something a little more complex, like what's done with
CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES. You could create aCONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_LSMoption that's default enabled but depends onCONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUXand then check forIS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_LSM)inima_parse_rule().I'd personally opt for just placing the
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)check directly intoima_parse_rule().Tyler
Quoted 5 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0
-0else result = -EINVAL ;if (!result)Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] IMA: Add func to measure LSM state and policy
Quoted 15 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Critical data structures of security modules need to be measured to enable an attestation service to verify if the configuration and policies for the security modules have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered with at runtime. A new IMA policy is required for handling this measurement.
Define two new IMA policy func namely
LSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYto measure the state and the policy provided by the security modules.If, as you suggest below, this is SELinux specific, these should be
SELINUX_STATEandSELINUX_POLICY. It makes me very uncomfortable when I see LSM used in cases where SELinux is required. The LSM is supposed to be an agnostic interface, so if you need to throw
Quoted 6 lines
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) &&into the IMA code you're clearly not thinking in terms of the LSM layer. I have no problem with seeing SELinux oriented and/or specific code in IMA if that's what you want. Just don't call it LSM.
The hook defined in IMA is not SELinux specific - it is generic enough to be used by any security module to measure their STATE and POLICY.
I have implemented the measurement for SELinux to illustrate the usage.
Tyler's suggestion was to allow this IMA policy only when component(s) that are using it are also enabled.
-lakshmi
Re: [PATCH v5 4/4] IMA: Handle early boot data measurement
In reply to Lakshmi RamasubramanianOn 7/29/20 8:47 PM, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote:
Hi Tyler,
Quoted 6 lines
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +0
-0@@ -322,10 +322,9 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS depends on ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE=y
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig config IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS · line 329
Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +2
-3default y -config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS +config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA bool - depends on IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS - depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING + depends on SECURITY || (IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) default y
Similar to the change you'd suggested for validating LSM_STATE and LSM_POLICY func, I think IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA config should be enabled for SECURITY_SELINUX.
depends on SECURITY_SELINUX ||
(IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
And, when more security modules are added update this CONFIG as appropriate.
Does that sound okay?
-lakshmi
Re: [PATCH v5 4/4] IMA: Handle early boot data measurement
Quoted 22 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
On 7/29/20 8:47 PM, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote:
Hi Tyler,
Quoted 5 lines
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +0
-0security/integrity/ima/Kconfig config IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS · line 327
Quoted 9 lines
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +2
-3@@ -322,10 +322,9 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS depends on ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE=y default y -config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS +config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA bool - depends on IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS - depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING + depends on SECURITY || (IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) default ySimilar to the change you'd suggested for validating
LSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYfunc, I thinkIMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATAconfig should be enabled forSECURITY_SELINUX.
Quoted 6 lines
depends on
SECURITY_SELINUX||(IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING)And, when more security modules are added update this CONFIG as appropriate.
Does that sound okay?
Yes, I think so.
Tyler
Quoted 2 lines
-lakshmi
Stephen Smalley
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 3/4] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure state and policy
In reply to Lakshmi RamasubramanianQuoted 44 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
SELinux configuration and policy are some of the critical data for this security module that needs to be measured. This measurement can be used by an attestation service, for instance, to verify if the configuration and policies have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered with at runtime.
Measure SELinux configuration, policy capabilities settings, and the loaded policy by calling the IMA hooks
ima_measure_lsm_state()andima_measure_lsm_policy()respectively.Sample measurement of SELinux state and hash of the policy:
10 e32e...5ac3 ima-buf sha256:86e8...4594 selinux-state-1595389364:287899386 696e697469616c697a65643d313b656e61626c65643d313b656e666f7263696e673d303b636865636b72657170726f743d313b6e6574776f726b5f706565725f636f6e74726f6c733d313b6f70656e5f7065726d733d313b657874656e6465645f736f636b65745f636c6173733d313b616c776179735f636865636b5f6e6574776f726b3d303b6367726f75705f7365636c6162656c3d313b6e6e705f6e6f737569645f7472616e736974696f6e3d313b67656e66735f7365636c6162656c5f73796d6c696e6b733d303 10 f4a7...9408 ima-ng sha256:8d1d...1834 selinux-policy-hash-1595389353:863934271
To verify the measurement check the following:
Execute the following command to extract the measured data from the IMA log for SELinux configuration (selinux-state).
grep -m 1 "selinux-state"
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements| cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -pThe output should be the list of key-value pairs. For example,
initialized=1;enabled=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0;To verify the measured data with the current SELinux state:
=> enabled should be set to 1 if
/sys/fs/selinuxfolder exists,
0 otherwiseFor other entries, compare the integer value in the files
=>/sys/fs/selinux/enforce
=>/sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot
And, each of the policy capabilities files under
=>/sys/fs/selinux/policy_capabilitiesFor selinux-policy-hash, the hash of SELinux policy is included in the IMA log entry.
To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run the following commands and verify the output hash values match.
sha256sum
/sys/fs/selinux/policy| cut -d' ' -f 1
Quoted 7 lines
grep -m 1 "selinux-policy-hash"
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements| cut -d' ' -f 4
Possibly I'm missing something but with these patches applied on top of next-integrity, and the following lines added to /etc/ima/ima-policy:
measure func=LSM_STATE template=ima-buf
measure func=LSM_POLICY
I still don't get the selinux-state or selinux-policy-hash entries in the ascii_runtime_measurements file. No errors during loading of the ima policy as far as I can see.
Re: [PATCH v5 3/4] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure state and policy
Quoted 8 lines · Stephen Smalley
Possibly I'm missing something but with these patches applied on top of next-integrity, and the following lines added to
/etc/ima/ima-policy:measure func=LSM_STATE template=ima-buf
measure func=LSM_POLICYI still don't get the selinux-state or selinux-policy-hash entries in the
ascii_runtime_measurementsfile. No errors during loading of the ima policy as far as I can see.
Could you please check if the following config is set? CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA=y
Try changing /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot and check ascii_runtime_measurements file again?
Also, could you please check if /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy contains LSM_STATE and LSM_POLICY entries?
-lakshmi
Stephen Smalley
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 3/4] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure state and policy
Quoted 9 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 7 lines · Stephen Smalley
Possibly I'm missing something but with these patches applied on top of next-integrity, and the following lines added to
/etc/ima/ima-policy:measure func=LSM_STATE template=ima-buf
measure func=LSM_POLICY
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I still don't get the selinux-state or selinux-policy-hash entries in the
ascii_runtime_measurementsfile. No errors during loading of the ima policy as far as I can see.Could you please check if the following config is set?
CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA=y
Yes, I have that set.
Quoted 2 lines
Try changing
/sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprotand checkascii_runtime_measurementsfile again?
No change. Likewise for changing enforce or running load_policy again.
Quoted 3 lines
Also, could you please check if
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policycontainsLSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYentries?
Yes, it does. However, I noticed that if I reduce the policy to only contain those entries and no others and reboot, then I get measurements. Whereas if I append them to an existing policy like the one below, they seem to be ignored:dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720dont_measure fsmagic=0x1021994dont_measure fsmagic=0x858458f6dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
measure func=BPRM_CHECK
measure func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=MODULE_CHECK uid=0
measure func=LSM_STATE template=ima-buf
measure func=LSM_POLICY
Also, I noticed the following in my dmesg output:
[ 68.870715] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 68.870715] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1 at mm/page_alloc.c:4826 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x627/0x700 [ 68.870715] Modules linked in: 8139too crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel qxl serio_raw drm_ttm_helper ttm drm_kms_helper virtio_console cec drm 8139cp ata_generic mii pata_acpi floppy qemu_fw_cfg fuse [ 68.870715] CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 5.8.0-rc2+ #44 [ 68.870715] RIP: 0010:__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x627/0x700 [ 68.870715] Code: ff ff 75 6c 48 8b 85 48 ff ff ff 4c 89 c2 44 89 e6 44 89 ff 41 c6 45 d0 00 49 89 45 b8 e8 41 e2 ff ff 49 89 c6 e9 9d fc ff ff <0f> 0b e9 d4 fd ff ff 0f 0b e9 bc fc ff ff 0f 0b e9 f9 fd ff ff e8 [ 68.870715] RSP: 0000:ffff8881e82a7a18 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 68.870715] RAX: ffffed103d054f48 RBX: 1ffff1103d054f48 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 68.870715] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000b RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 68.870715] RBP: ffff8881e82a7ae8 R08: ffffffffaa3fe2d5 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 68.870715] R10: fffffbfff5a88f0f R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 00000000007eef6a [ 68.870715] R13: 0000000000040cc0 R14: 000000000000000b R15: ffffffffadde766b [ 68.870715] FS: 00007fdeb168c600(0000) GS:ffff8881e9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 68.870715] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 68.870715] CR2: 00007fdeb17dd1d6 CR3: 00000001cc2d2002 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [ 68.870715] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 68.870715] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 68.870715] Call Trace: [ 68.870715] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xf5/0x110 [ 68.870715] ? __alloc_pages_slowpath.constprop.0+0x17a0/0x17a0 [ 68.870715] ? match_held_lock+0x2e/0x240 [ 68.870715] ? policy_nodemask+0x1a/0xa0 [ 68.870715] ? policy_node+0x56/0x60 [ 68.870715] kmalloc_order+0x25/0xc0 [ 68.870715] kmalloc_order_trace+0x1d/0x140 [ 68.870715] kmemdup+0x1a/0x40 [ 68.870715] ima_queue_data+0x61/0x370 [ 68.870715] ima_measure_lsm_data+0x32/0x60 [ 68.870715] selinux_measure_state+0x2b8/0x2bd [ 68.870715] ? selinux_event_name+0xe0/0xe0 [ 68.870715] ? rcu_is_watching+0x39/0x50 [ 68.870715] security_load_policy+0x44c/0x8e0 [ 68.870715] ? mark_lock+0xa6/0xbd0 [ 68.870715] ? security_change_sid+0x90/0x90 [ 68.870715] ? mark_held_locks+0x3e/0xa0 [ 68.870715] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x100/0x260 [ 68.870715] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 [ 68.870715] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0xc5/0x1b0 [ 68.870715] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 [ 68.870715] ? copy_user_enhanced_fast_string+0xe/0x30 [ 68.870715] sel_write_load+0x157/0x260 [ 68.870715] vfs_write+0x135/0x290 [ 68.870715] ksys_write+0xb1/0x140 [ 68.870715] ? __ia32_sys_read+0x50/0x50 [ 68.870715] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x100/0x260 [ 68.870715] ? do_syscall_64+0x12/0xb0 [ 68.870715] do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 [ 68.870715] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 68.870715] RIP: 0033:0x7fdeb2539497 [ 68.870715] Code: Bad RIP value. [ 68.870715] RSP: 002b:00007fff6352b308 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 68.870715] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000020 RCX: 00007fdeb2539497 [ 68.870715] RDX: 00000000007eef6a RSI: 00007fdeb0de1000 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 68.870715] RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 00007fdeb25d0040 R09: 00007fff6352b1a0 [ 68.870715] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fdeb0de1000 [ 68.870715] R13: 00000000007eef6a R14: 000000000000000f R15: 0000000000000003 [ 68.870715] irq event stamp: 23486085 [ 68.870715] hardirqs last enabled at (23486085): [<ffffffffaa419406>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x46/0x60 [ 68.870715] hardirqs last disabled at (23486084): [<ffffffffaa419443>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x23/0x90 [ 68.870715] softirqs last enabled at (23486074): [<ffffffffaa8004f3>] __do_softirq+0x4f3/0x662 [ 68.870715] softirqs last disabled at (23486067): [<ffffffffaa601072>] asm_call_on_stack+0x12/0x20 [ 68.870715] ---[ end trace fb02740ff6f4d0cd ]---
Stephen Smalley
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 3/4] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure state and policy
Quoted 108 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 7 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 6 lines · Stephen Smalley
Possibly I'm missing something but with these patches applied on top of next-integrity, and the following lines added to
/etc/ima/ima-policy:measure func=LSM_STATE template=ima-buf
measure func=LSM_POLICYQuoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I still don't get the selinux-state or selinux-policy-hash entries in the
ascii_runtime_measurementsfile. No errors during loading of the ima policy as far as I can see.Could you please check if the following config is set?
CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA=yYes, I have that set.
Quoted 2 lines
Try changing
/sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprotand checkascii_runtime_measurementsfile again?No change. Likewise for changing enforce or running
load_policyagain.Quoted 3 lines
Also, could you please check if
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policycontainsLSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYentries?Yes, it does. However, I noticed that if I reduce the policy to only contain those entries and no others and reboot, then I get measurements. Whereas if I append them to an existing policy like the one below, they seem to be ignored:
dont_measurefsmagic=0x9fa0dont_measurefsmagic=0x62656572dont_measurefsmagic=0x64626720dont_measurefsmagic=0x1021994dont_measurefsmagic=0x858458f6dont_measurefsmagic=0x73636673
measure func=BPRM_CHECK
measure func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=MODULE_CHECK uid=0
measure func=LSM_STATE template=ima-buf
measure func=LSM_POLICYAlso, I noticed the following in my dmesg output:
[ 68.870715] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 68.870715] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1 at mm/page_alloc.c:4826 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x627/0x700 [ 68.870715] Modules linked in: 8139too crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel qxl serio_raw drm_ttm_helper ttm drm_kms_helper virtio_console cec drm 8139cp ata_generic mii pata_acpi floppy qemu_fw_cfg fuse [ 68.870715] CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 5.8.0-rc2+ #44 [ 68.870715] RIP: 0010:__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x627/0x700 [ 68.870715] Code: ff ff 75 6c 48 8b 85 48 ff ff ff 4c 89 c2 44 89 e6 44 89 ff 41 c6 45 d0 00 49 89 45 b8 e8 41 e2 ff ff 49 89 c6 e9 9d fc ff ff <0f> 0b e9 d4 fd ff ff 0f 0b e9 bc fc ff ff 0f 0b e9 f9 fd ff ff e8 [ 68.870715] RSP: 0000:ffff8881e82a7a18 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 68.870715] RAX: ffffed103d054f48 RBX: 1ffff1103d054f48 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 68.870715] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000b RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 68.870715] RBP: ffff8881e82a7ae8 R08: ffffffffaa3fe2d5 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 68.870715] R10: fffffbfff5a88f0f R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 00000000007eef6a [ 68.870715] R13: 0000000000040cc0 R14: 000000000000000b R15: ffffffffadde766b [ 68.870715] FS: 00007fdeb168c600(0000) GS:ffff8881e9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 68.870715] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 68.870715] CR2: 00007fdeb17dd1d6 CR3: 00000001cc2d2002 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [ 68.870715] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 68.870715] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 68.870715] Call Trace: [ 68.870715] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xf5/0x110 [ 68.870715] ? __alloc_pages_slowpath.constprop.0+0x17a0/0x17a0 [ 68.870715] ? match_held_lock+0x2e/0x240 [ 68.870715] ? policy_nodemask+0x1a/0xa0 [ 68.870715] ? policy_node+0x56/0x60 [ 68.870715] kmalloc_order+0x25/0xc0 [ 68.870715] kmalloc_order_trace+0x1d/0x140 [ 68.870715] kmemdup+0x1a/0x40 [ 68.870715] ima_queue_data+0x61/0x370 [ 68.870715] ima_measure_lsm_data+0x32/0x60 [ 68.870715] selinux_measure_state+0x2b8/0x2bd [ 68.870715] ? selinux_event_name+0xe0/0xe0 [ 68.870715] ? rcu_is_watching+0x39/0x50 [ 68.870715] security_load_policy+0x44c/0x8e0 [ 68.870715] ? mark_lock+0xa6/0xbd0 [ 68.870715] ? security_change_sid+0x90/0x90 [ 68.870715] ? mark_held_locks+0x3e/0xa0 [ 68.870715] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x100/0x260 [ 68.870715] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 [ 68.870715] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0xc5/0x1b0 [ 68.870715] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 [ 68.870715] ? copy_user_enhanced_fast_string+0xe/0x30 [ 68.870715] sel_write_load+0x157/0x260 [ 68.870715] vfs_write+0x135/0x290 [ 68.870715] ksys_write+0xb1/0x140 [ 68.870715] ? __ia32_sys_read+0x50/0x50 [ 68.870715] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x100/0x260 [ 68.870715] ? do_syscall_64+0x12/0xb0 [ 68.870715] do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 [ 68.870715] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 68.870715] RIP: 0033:0x7fdeb2539497 [ 68.870715] Code: Bad RIP value. [ 68.870715] RSP: 002b:00007fff6352b308 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 68.870715] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000020 RCX: 00007fdeb2539497 [ 68.870715] RDX: 00000000007eef6a RSI: 00007fdeb0de1000 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 68.870715] RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 00007fdeb25d0040 R09: 00007fff6352b1a0 [ 68.870715] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fdeb0de1000 [ 68.870715] R13: 00000000007eef6a R14: 000000000000000f R15: 0000000000000003 [ 68.870715] irq event stamp: 23486085 [ 68.870715] hardirqs last enabled at (23486085):
Quoted 8 lines
[<
ffffffffaa419406>]_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x46/0x60[ 68.870715] hardirqs last disabled at (23486084): [<ffffffffaa419443>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x23/0x90 [ 68.870715] softirqs last enabled at (23486074): [<ffffffffaa8004f3>] __do_softirq+0x4f3/0x662 [ 68.870715] softirqs last disabled at (23486067): [<ffffffffaa601072>] asm_call_on_stack+0x12/0x20 [ 68.870715] ---[ end trace fb02740ff6f4d0cd ]---
I think one issue here is that systemd loads SELinux policy first, then IMA policy, so it doesn't know whether it needs to measure SELinux policy on first policy load, and another issue is that the policy is too large to just queue the policy data itself this way (or you need to use an allocator that can handle larger sizes).
Re: [PATCH v5 3/4] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure state and policy
Quoted 119 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 108 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 7 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 6 lines · Stephen Smalley
Possibly I'm missing something but with these patches applied on top of next-integrity, and the following lines added to
/etc/ima/ima-policy:measure func=LSM_STATE template=ima-buf
measure func=LSM_POLICYQuoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I still don't get the selinux-state or selinux-policy-hash entries in the
ascii_runtime_measurementsfile. No errors during loading of the ima policy as far as I can see.Could you please check if the following config is set?
CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA=yYes, I have that set.
Quoted 2 lines
Try changing
/sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprotand checkascii_runtime_measurementsfile again?No change. Likewise for changing enforce or running
load_policyagain.Quoted 3 lines
Also, could you please check if
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policycontainsLSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYentries?Yes, it does. However, I noticed that if I reduce the policy to only contain those entries and no others and reboot, then I get measurements. Whereas if I append them to an existing policy like the one below, they seem to be ignored:
dont_measurefsmagic=0x9fa0dont_measurefsmagic=0x62656572dont_measurefsmagic=0x64626720dont_measurefsmagic=0x1021994dont_measurefsmagic=0x858458f6dont_measurefsmagic=0x73636673
measure func=BPRM_CHECK
measure func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=MODULE_CHECK uid=0
measure func=LSM_STATE template=ima-buf
measure func=LSM_POLICYAlso, I noticed the following in my dmesg output:
[ 68.870715] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 68.870715] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1 atmm/page_alloc.c:4826__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x627/0x700
[ 68.870715] Modules linked in: 8139toocrct10dif_pclmulcrc32_pclmulcrc32c_intelghash_clmulni_intelqxlserio_rawdrm_ttm_helperttmdrm_kms_helpervirtio_consolecec drm 8139cpata_genericmiipata_acpifloppyqemu_fw_cfgfuse
[ 68.870715] CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 5.8.0-rc2+ #44 [ 68.870715] RIP: 0010:__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x627/0x700
[ 68.870715] Code: ff ff 75 6c 48 8b 85 48 ff ff ff 4c 89 c2 44 89 e6 44 89 ff 41 c6 45 d0 00 49 89 45 b8 e8 41 e2 ff ff 49 89 c6 e9 9d fc ff ff <0f> 0b e9 d4 fd ff ff 0f 0b e9 bc fc ff ff 0f 0b e9 f9 fd ff ff e8
[ 68.870715] RSP: 0000:ffff8881e82a7a18 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 68.870715] RAX:ffffed103d054f48RBX:1ffff1103d054f48RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 68.870715] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI:000000000000000bRDI: 0000000000000000 [ 68.870715] RBP:ffff8881e82a7ae8R08:ffffffffaa3fe2d5R09: 0000000000000001 [ 68.870715] R10:fffffbfff5a88f0fR11: 0000000000000001 R12:00000000007eef6a[ 68.870715] R13:0000000000040cc0R14:000000000000000bR15:ffffffffadde766b[ 68.870715] FS: 00007fdeb168c600(0000) GS:ffff8881e9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 68.870715] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 68.870715] CR2:00007fdeb17dd1d6CR3:00000001cc2d2002CR4:00000000003606e0[ 68.870715] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 68.870715] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6:00000000fffe0ff0DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 68.870715] Call Trace:
[ 68.870715] ?sched_clock_cpu+0xf5/0x110
[ 68.870715] ? __alloc_pages_slowpath.constprop.0+0x17a0/0x17a0 [ 68.870715] ?match_held_lock+0x2e/0x240
[ 68.870715] ?policy_nodemask+0x1a/0xa0
[ 68.870715] ?policy_node+0x56/0x60
[ 68.870715]kmalloc_order+0x25/0xc0
[ 68.870715]kmalloc_order_trace+0x1d/0x140
[ 68.870715]kmemdup+0x1a/0x40
[ 68.870715]ima_queue_data+0x61/0x370
[ 68.870715]ima_measure_lsm_data+0x32/0x60
[ 68.870715]selinux_measure_state+0x2b8/0x2bd
[ 68.870715] ?selinux_event_name+0xe0/0xe0
[ 68.870715] ?rcu_is_watching+0x39/0x50
[ 68.870715]security_load_policy+0x44c/0x8e0
[ 68.870715] ?mark_lock+0xa6/0xbd0
[ 68.870715] ?security_change_sid+0x90/0x90
[ 68.870715] ?mark_held_locks+0x3e/0xa0
[ 68.870715] ?lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x100/0x260
[ 68.870715] ?asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[ 68.870715] ?lockdep_hardirqs_on+0xc5/0x1b0
[ 68.870715] ?asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[ 68.870715] ?copy_user_enhanced_fast_string+0xe/0x30
[ 68.870715]sel_write_load+0x157/0x260
[ 68.870715]vfs_write+0x135/0x290
[ 68.870715]ksys_write+0xb1/0x140
[ 68.870715] ?__ia32_sys_read+0x50/0x50
[ 68.870715] ?lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x100/0x260
[ 68.870715] ?do_syscall_64+0x12/0xb0
[ 68.870715]do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0
[ 68.870715]entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 68.870715] RIP: 0033:0x7fdeb2539497
[ 68.870715] Code: Bad RIP value.
[ 68.870715] RSP: 002b:00007fff6352b308 EFLAGS: 00000246ORIG_RAX:
0000000000000001
[ 68.870715] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000020 RCX:00007fdeb2539497[ 68.870715] RDX:00000000007eef6aRSI:00007fdeb0de1000RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 68.870715] RBP: 0000000000000004 R08:00007fdeb25d0040R09:00007fff6352b1a0[ 68.870715] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12:00007fdeb0de1000[ 68.870715] R13:00000000007eef6aR14:000000000000000fR15: 0000000000000003 [ 68.870715] irq event stamp: 23486085
[ 68.870715] hardirqs last enabled at (23486085):Quoted 8 lines
[<
ffffffffaa419406>]_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x46/0x60[ 68.870715] hardirqs last disabled at (23486084):
[<ffffffffaa419443>]_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x23/0x90[ 68.870715] softirqs last enabled at (23486074):
[<ffffffffaa8004f3>]__do_softirq+0x4f3/0x662
[ 68.870715] softirqs last disabled at (23486067):
[<ffffffffaa601072>]asm_call_on_stack+0x12/0x20[ 68.870715] ---[ end tracefb02740ff6f4d0cd]---
Quoted 2 lines
I think one issue here is that systemd loads SELinux policy first, then IMA policy, so it doesn't know whether it needs to measure SELinux policy on first policy load, and another issue is that the policy is too large to just queue the policy data itself this way (or you need to use an allocator that can handle larger sizes).
The problem seems to be that a lock is held when the IMA hook to measure the LSM state is called. So memory allocation is not allowed, but the hook is doing an allocation. I'll address this - thanks for catching it.
I have the following CONFIGs enabled, but I still don't see the above issue on my machine.
Could you please let me know what CONFIG(s) to enable?
#
# Lock Debugging (spinlocks, mutexes, etc...)
#CONFIG_LOCK_DEBUGGING_SUPPORT=yCONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING=yCONFIG_DEBUG_RT_MUTEXES=yCONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK=yCONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES=yCONFIG_DEBUG_WW_MUTEX_SLOWPATH=yCONFIG_DEBUG_RWSEMS=yCONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC=yCONFIG_LOCKDEP=yCONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP=y
I'll also try with the policy you have, check why the LSM policy is ignored when there are other policy entries.
thanks,
-lakshmi
Stephen Smalley
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 3/4] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure state and policy
Quoted 120 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 119 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 116 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 7 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 6 lines · Stephen Smalley
Possibly I'm missing something but with these patches applied on top of next-integrity, and the following lines added to
/etc/ima/ima-policy:measure func=LSM_STATE template=ima-buf
measure func=LSM_POLICYQuoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I still don't get the selinux-state or selinux-policy-hash entries in the
ascii_runtime_measurementsfile. No errors during loading of the ima policy as far as I can see.Could you please check if the following config is set?
CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA=yYes, I have that set.
Quoted 2 lines
Try changing
/sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprotand checkascii_runtime_measurementsfile again?No change. Likewise for changing enforce or running
load_policyagain.Quoted 3 lines
Also, could you please check if
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policycontainsLSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYentries?Yes, it does. However, I noticed that if I reduce the policy to only contain those entries and no others and reboot, then I get measurements. Whereas if I append them to an existing policy like the one below, they seem to be ignored:
dont_measurefsmagic=0x9fa0dont_measurefsmagic=0x62656572dont_measurefsmagic=0x64626720dont_measurefsmagic=0x1021994dont_measurefsmagic=0x858458f6dont_measurefsmagic=0x73636673
measure func=BPRM_CHECK
measure func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=MODULE_CHECK uid=0
measure func=LSM_STATE template=ima-buf
measure func=LSM_POLICYAlso, I noticed the following in my dmesg output:
[ 68.870715] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 68.870715] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1 atmm/page_alloc.c:4826__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x627/0x700
[ 68.870715] Modules linked in: 8139toocrct10dif_pclmulcrc32_pclmulcrc32c_intelghash_clmulni_intelqxlserio_rawdrm_ttm_helperttmdrm_kms_helpervirtio_consolecec drm 8139cpata_genericmiipata_acpifloppyqemu_fw_cfgfuse
[ 68.870715] CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 5.8.0-rc2+ #44 [ 68.870715] RIP: 0010:__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x627/0x700
[ 68.870715] Code: ff ff 75 6c 48 8b 85 48 ff ff ff 4c 89 c2 44 89 e6 44 89 ff 41 c6 45 d0 00 49 89 45 b8 e8 41 e2 ff ff 49 89 c6 e9 9d fc ff ff <0f> 0b e9 d4 fd ff ff 0f 0b e9 bc fc ff ff 0f 0b e9 f9 fd ff ff e8
[ 68.870715] RSP: 0000:ffff8881e82a7a18 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 68.870715] RAX:ffffed103d054f48RBX:1ffff1103d054f48RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 68.870715] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI:000000000000000bRDI: 0000000000000000 [ 68.870715] RBP:ffff8881e82a7ae8R08:ffffffffaa3fe2d5R09: 0000000000000001 [ 68.870715] R10:fffffbfff5a88f0fR11: 0000000000000001 R12:00000000007eef6a[ 68.870715] R13:0000000000040cc0R14:000000000000000bR15:ffffffffadde766b[ 68.870715] FS: 00007fdeb168c600(0000) GS:ffff8881e9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 68.870715] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 68.870715] CR2:00007fdeb17dd1d6CR3:00000001cc2d2002CR4:00000000003606e0[ 68.870715] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 68.870715] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6:00000000fffe0ff0DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 68.870715] Call Trace:
[ 68.870715] ?sched_clock_cpu+0xf5/0x110
[ 68.870715] ? __alloc_pages_slowpath.constprop.0+0x17a0/0x17a0 [ 68.870715] ?match_held_lock+0x2e/0x240
[ 68.870715] ?policy_nodemask+0x1a/0xa0
[ 68.870715] ?policy_node+0x56/0x60
[ 68.870715]kmalloc_order+0x25/0xc0
[ 68.870715]kmalloc_order_trace+0x1d/0x140
[ 68.870715]kmemdup+0x1a/0x40
[ 68.870715]ima_queue_data+0x61/0x370
[ 68.870715]ima_measure_lsm_data+0x32/0x60
[ 68.870715]selinux_measure_state+0x2b8/0x2bd
[ 68.870715] ?selinux_event_name+0xe0/0xe0
[ 68.870715] ?rcu_is_watching+0x39/0x50
[ 68.870715]security_load_policy+0x44c/0x8e0
[ 68.870715] ?mark_lock+0xa6/0xbd0
[ 68.870715] ?security_change_sid+0x90/0x90
[ 68.870715] ?mark_held_locks+0x3e/0xa0
[ 68.870715] ?lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x100/0x260
[ 68.870715] ?asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[ 68.870715] ?lockdep_hardirqs_on+0xc5/0x1b0
[ 68.870715] ?asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[ 68.870715] ?copy_user_enhanced_fast_string+0xe/0x30
[ 68.870715]sel_write_load+0x157/0x260
[ 68.870715]vfs_write+0x135/0x290
[ 68.870715]ksys_write+0xb1/0x140
[ 68.870715] ?__ia32_sys_read+0x50/0x50
[ 68.870715] ?lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x100/0x260
[ 68.870715] ?do_syscall_64+0x12/0xb0
[ 68.870715]do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0
[ 68.870715]entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 68.870715] RIP: 0033:0x7fdeb2539497
[ 68.870715] Code: Bad RIP value.
[ 68.870715] RSP: 002b:00007fff6352b308 EFLAGS: 00000246ORIG_RAX:
0000000000000001
[ 68.870715] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000020 RCX:00007fdeb2539497[ 68.870715] RDX:00000000007eef6aRSI:00007fdeb0de1000RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 68.870715] RBP: 0000000000000004 R08:00007fdeb25d0040R09:00007fff6352b1a0[ 68.870715] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12:00007fdeb0de1000[ 68.870715] R13:00000000007eef6aR14:000000000000000fR15: 0000000000000003 [ 68.870715] irq event stamp: 23486085
[ 68.870715] hardirqs last enabled at (23486085):
[<ffffffffaa419406>]_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x46/0x60
[ 68.870715] hardirqs last disabled at (23486084):
[<ffffffffaa419443>]_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x23/0x90
[ 68.870715] softirqs last enabled at (23486074):
[<ffffffffaa8004f3>]__do_softirq+0x4f3/0x662
[ 68.870715] softirqs last disabled at (23486067):
[<ffffffffaa601072>]asm_call_on_stack+0x12/0x20
[ 68.870715] ---[ end tracefb02740ff6f4d0cd]---
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I think one issue here is that systemd loads SELinux policy first, then IMA policy, so it doesn't know whether it needs to measure SELinux policy on first policy load, and another issue is that the policy is too large to just queue the policy data itself this way (or you need to use an allocator that can handle larger sizes).
The problem seems to be that a lock is held when the IMA hook to measure the LSM state is called. So memory allocation is not allowed, but the hook is doing an allocation. I'll address this - thanks for catching it.
I have the following CONFIGs enabled, but I still don't see the above issue on my machine.
The warning has to do with the memory allocation order being above the max order supported for kmalloc. I think the problem is that ima_alloc_data_entry() is using kmemdup() to duplicate a payload of arbitrary size. Policies on e.g. Fedora can be quite large, so you can't assume they can be allocated with kmalloc and friends.
Re: [PATCH v5 3/4] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure state and policy
Quoted 11 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 10 lines
[ 68.870715] irq event stamp: 23486085
[ 68.870715] hardirqs last enabled at (23486085):
[<ffffffffaa419406>]_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x46/0x60[ 68.870715] hardirqs last disabled at (23486084):
[<ffffffffaa419443>]_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x23/0x90[ 68.870715] softirqs last enabled at (23486074):
[<ffffffffaa8004f3>]__do_softirq+0x4f3/0x662
[ 68.870715] softirqs last disabled at (23486067):
[<ffffffffaa601072>]asm_call_on_stack+0x12/0x20[ 68.870715] ---[ end tracefb02740ff6f4d0cd]---
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I think one issue here is that systemd loads SELinux policy first, then IMA policy, so it doesn't know whether it needs to measure SELinux policy on first policy load, and another issue is that the policy is too large to just queue the policy data itself this way (or you need to use an allocator that can handle larger sizes).
The problem seems to be that a lock is held when the IMA hook to measure the LSM state is called. So memory allocation is not allowed, but the hook is doing an allocation. I'll address this - thanks for catching it.
I have the following CONFIGs enabled, but I still don't see the above issue on my machine.
The warning has to do with the memory allocation order being above the max order supported for kmalloc. I think the problem is that
ima_alloc_data_entry()is usingkmemdup()to duplicate a payload of arbitrary size. Policies on e.g. Fedora can be quite large, so you can't assume they can be allocated with kmalloc and friends.
Thanks for clarifying. Yes ima_alloc_entry() does use kmemdup to save the given buffer (to be measured) until IMA loads custom policy.
On my machine the SELinux policy size is about 2MB.
Perhaps vmalloc would be better than using kmalloc? If there are better options for such large buffer allocation, please let me know.
-lakshmi
Stephen Smalley
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 3/4] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure state and policy
Quoted 20 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 18 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 10 lines
[ 68.870715] irq event stamp: 23486085
[ 68.870715] hardirqs last enabled at (23486085):
[<ffffffffaa419406>]_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x46/0x60[ 68.870715] hardirqs last disabled at (23486084):
[<ffffffffaa419443>]_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x23/0x90[ 68.870715] softirqs last enabled at (23486074):
[<ffffffffaa8004f3>]__do_softirq+0x4f3/0x662
[ 68.870715] softirqs last disabled at (23486067):
[<ffffffffaa601072>]asm_call_on_stack+0x12/0x20[ 68.870715] ---[ end tracefb02740ff6f4d0cd]---Quoted 2 lines
I think one issue here is that systemd loads SELinux policy first, then IMA policy, so it doesn't know whether it needs to measure SELinux policy on first policy load, and another issue is that the policy is too large to just queue the policy data itself this way (or you need to use an allocator that can handle larger sizes).
The problem seems to be that a lock is held when the IMA hook to measure the LSM state is called. So memory allocation is not allowed, but the hook is doing an allocation. I'll address this - thanks for catching it.
I have the following CONFIGs enabled, but I still don't see the above issue on my machine.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The warning has to do with the memory allocation order being above the max order supported for kmalloc. I think the problem is that
ima_alloc_data_entry()is usingkmemdup()to duplicate a payload of arbitrary size. Policies on e.g. Fedora can be quite large, so you can't assume they can be allocated with kmalloc and friends.Thanks for clarifying. Yes
ima_alloc_entry()does use kmemdup to save the given buffer (to be measured) until IMA loads custom policy.On my machine the SELinux policy size is about 2MB.
Perhaps vmalloc would be better than using kmalloc? If there are better options for such large buffer allocation, please let me know.
kvmalloc() can be used to select whichever one is most appropriate.
Stephen Smalley
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 3/4] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure state and policy
Quoted 25 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 23 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 20 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 10 lines
[ 68.870715] irq event stamp: 23486085
[ 68.870715] hardirqs last enabled at (23486085):
[<ffffffffaa419406>]_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x46/0x60[ 68.870715] hardirqs last disabled at (23486084):
[<ffffffffaa419443>]_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x23/0x90[ 68.870715] softirqs last enabled at (23486074):
[<ffffffffaa8004f3>]__do_softirq+0x4f3/0x662
[ 68.870715] softirqs last disabled at (23486067):
[<ffffffffaa601072>]asm_call_on_stack+0x12/0x20[ 68.870715] ---[ end tracefb02740ff6f4d0cd]---Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I think one issue here is that systemd loads SELinux policy first, then IMA policy, so it doesn't know whether it needs to measure SELinux policy on first policy load, and another issue is that the policy is too large to just queue the policy data itself this way (or you need to use an allocator that can handle larger sizes).
The problem seems to be that a lock is held when the IMA hook to measure the LSM state is called. So memory allocation is not allowed, but the hook is doing an allocation. I'll address this - thanks for catching it.
I have the following CONFIGs enabled, but I still don't see the above issue on my machine.
The warning has to do with the memory allocation order being above the max order supported for kmalloc. I think the problem is that
ima_alloc_data_entry()is usingkmemdup()to duplicate a payload of arbitrary size. Policies on e.g. Fedora can be quite large, so you can't assume they can be allocated with kmalloc and friends.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Thanks for clarifying. Yes
ima_alloc_entry()does use kmemdup to save the given buffer (to be measured) until IMA loads custom policy.On my machine the SELinux policy size is about 2MB.
Perhaps vmalloc would be better than using kmalloc? If there are better options for such large buffer allocation, please let me know.
kvmalloc()can be used to select whichever one is most appropriate.
Other option would be for ima to compute and save the hash(es) of the payload and not the payload itself for later use. I guess you won't know at that point which hash algorithm is desired?
Re: [PATCH v5 3/4] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure state and policy
Quoted 6 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Perhaps vmalloc would be better than using kmalloc? If there are better options for such large buffer allocation, please let me know.
kvmalloc()can be used to select whichever one is most appropriate.Other option would be for ima to compute and save the hash(es) of the payload and not the payload itself for later use. I guess you won't know at that point which hash algorithm is desired?
I think IMA hash algorithm would be known at that point, but IMA policy is not loaded yet (which is why I need to queue up the buffer and process when policy is loaded).
I tried vmalloc and tested it with upto 16MB buffer (just made up a SELinux policy buffer of size 16MB) - that works fine.
I will try kvmalloc().
Also, I fixed the issue with LSM data not measured when using the IMA policy you had. Good catch.
Will post the updated patches today.
thanks,
-lakshmi