ceph: fix spurious recover_session=clean errors
RFC PATCH 2/4 ceph: don't mark mount as SHUTDOWN when recovering session
In reply to Jeff LaytonWhen recovering a session (a'la recover_session=clean), we want to do all of the operations that we do on a forced umount, but changing the mount state to SHUTDOWN is wrong and can cause queued MDS requests to fail when the session comes back.
Only mark it as SHUTDOWN when umount_begin is called.
--- fs/ceph/super.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/ceph/super.c +9 -4
@@ -832,6 +832,13 @@ static void destroy_caches(void)ceph_fscache_unregister (); } +static void __ceph_umount_begin (struct ceph_fs_client *fsc) +{ +ceph_osdc_abort_requests (&fsc->client->osdc, -EIO ); +ceph_mdsc_force_umount (fsc->mdsc); + fsc->filp_gen++;// invalidate open files +} +/* * ceph_umount_begin - initiate forced umount. Tear down the * mount, skipping steps that may hang while waiting for server(s).
@@ -844,9 +851,7 @@ static void ceph_umount_begin(struct super_block *sb)if (!fsc)return ; fsc->mount_state =CEPH_MOUNT_SHUTDOWN ; -ceph_osdc_abort_requests (&fsc->client->osdc, -EIO ); -ceph_mdsc_force_umount (fsc->mdsc); - fsc->filp_gen++;// invalidate open files +__ceph_umount_begin (fsc); }static const struct super_operations ceph_super_ops = {
@@ -1235,7 +1240,7 @@ int ceph_force_reconnect(struct super_block *sb)struct ceph_fs_client *fsc =ceph_sb_to_client (sb);int err =0 ; -ceph_umount_begin (sb); +__ceph_umount_begin (fsc);/* Make sure all page caches get invalidated. * see remove_session_caps_cb() */
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
cover ceph: fix spurious recover_session=clean errors
Ilya noticed that he would get spurious EACCES errors on calls done just after blocklisting the client on mounts with recover_session=clean. The session would get marked as REJECTED and that caused in-flight calls to die with EACCES. This patchset seems to smooth over the problem, but I'm not fully convinced it's the right approach.
The potential issue I see is that the client could take cap references to do a call on a session that has been blocklisted. We then queue the message and reestablish the session, but we may not have been granted the same caps by the MDS at that point.
If this is a problem, then we probably need to rework it so that we return a distinct error code in this situation and have the upper layers issue a completely new mds request (with new cap refs, etc.)
Obviously, that's a much more invasive approach though, so it would be nice to avoid that if this would suffice.
Jeff Layton (4):
ceph: don't WARN when removing caps due to blocklisting
ceph: don't mark mount as SHUTDOWN when recovering session
ceph: remove timeout on allowing reconnect after blocklisting
ceph: queue request when CLEANRECOVER is set
fs/ceph/caps.c | 2 +- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 10 ++++------ fs/ceph/super.c | 13 +++++++++---- fs/ceph/super.h | 1 - 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
RFC PATCH 4/4 ceph: queue request when CLEANRECOVER is set
Ilya noticed that the first access to a blacklisted mount would often get back -EACCES, but then subsequent calls would be OK. The problem is in __do_request. If the session is marked as REJECTED, a hard error is returned instead of waiting for a new session to come into being.
When the session is REJECTED and the mount was done with recover_session=clean, queue the request to the waiting_for_map queue, which will be awoken after tearing down the old session.
URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/47385
--- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +4 -1
@@ -2819,7 +2819,10 @@ static void __do_request(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc,if (session->s_state !=CEPH_MDS_SESSION_OPEN && session->s_state !=CEPH_MDS_SESSION_HUNG ) {if (session->s_state ==CEPH_MDS_SESSION_REJECTED ) { - err = -EACCES ; +if (ceph_test_mount_opt (mdsc->fsc,CLEANRECOVER )) +list_add (&req->r_wait, &mdsc->waiting_for_map); +else + err = -EACCES ; goto out_session; }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
RFC PATCH 1/4 ceph: don't WARN when removing caps due to blocklisting
In reply to Jeff LaytonWe expect to remove dirty caps when the client is blocklisted. Don't throw a warning in that case.
--- fs/ceph/caps.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ceph/caps.c +1 -1
@@ -1149,7 +1149,7 @@ void __ceph_remove_cap(struct ceph_cap *cap, bool queue_release)/* remove from inode's cap rbtree, and clear auth cap */ rb_erase (&cap->ci_node, &ci->i_caps);if (ci->i_auth_cap == cap) { -WARN_ON_ONCE (!list_empty (&ci->i_dirty_item)); +WARN_ON_ONCE (!list_empty (&ci->i_dirty_item) && !mdsc->fsc->blocklisted); ci->i_auth_cap =NULL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
RFC PATCH 3/4 ceph: remove timeout on allowing reconnect after blocklisting
In reply to Jeff Layton30 minutes is a long time to wait, and this makes it difficult to test the feature by manually blocklisting clients. Remove the timeout infrastructure and just allow the client to reconnect at will.
--- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 5 ----- fs/ceph/super.h | 1 - 2 files changed, 6 deletions(-)
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +0 -5
@@ -4374,12 +4374,7 @@ static void maybe_recover_session(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc)if (!READ_ONCE (fsc->blocklisted))return ; -if (fsc->last_auto_reconnect && -time_before (jiffies, fsc->last_auto_reconnect +HZ *60 *30 )) -return ; -pr_info ("auto reconnect after blocklisted\n" ); - fsc->last_auto_reconnect = jiffies;ceph_force_reconnect (fsc->sb); }
fs/ceph/super.h +0 -1
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ struct ceph_fs_client {unsigned long mount_state; -unsigned long last_auto_reconnect;bool blocklisted;bool have_copy_from2;
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [RFC PATCH 2/4] ceph: don't mark mount as SHUTDOWN when recovering session
In reply to Jeff LaytonQuoted 6 lines · Jeff Layton
When recovering a session (a'la recover_session=clean), we want to do all of the operations that we do on a forced umount, but changing the mount state to SHUTDOWN is wrong and can cause queued MDS requests to fail when the session comes back.
code that cleanup page cache check the SHUTDOWN state.
Quoted 48 lines
Only mark it as SHUTDOWN when
umount_beginis called.Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/super.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)fs/ceph/super.c +9
-5@@ -832,6 +832,13 @@ static void destroy_caches(void)ceph_fscache_unregister (); } +static void __ceph_umount_begin (struct ceph_fs_client *fsc) +{ +ceph_osdc_abort_requests (&fsc->client->osdc, -EIO ); +ceph_mdsc_force_umount (fsc->mdsc); + fsc->filp_gen++;// invalidate open files +} +/* * ceph_umount_begin - initiate forced umount. Tear down the * mount, skipping steps that may hang while waiting for server(s). @@ -844,9 +851,7 @@ static void ceph_umount_begin(struct super_block *sb)if (!fsc)return ; fsc->mount_state =CEPH_MOUNT_SHUTDOWN ; -ceph_osdc_abort_requests (&fsc->client->osdc, -EIO ); -ceph_mdsc_force_umount (fsc->mdsc); - fsc->filp_gen++;// invalidate open files +__ceph_umount_begin (fsc); }static const struct super_operations ceph_super_ops = {@@ -1235,7 +1240,7 @@ int ceph_force_reconnect(struct super_block *sb)struct ceph_fs_client *fsc =ceph_sb_to_client (sb);int err =0 ; -ceph_umount_begin (sb); +__ceph_umount_begin (fsc);/* Make sure all page caches get invalidated. * see remove_session_caps_cb() */ --2.26.2
Quoted 7 lines · Jeff Layton
Ilya noticed that he would get spurious EACCES errors on calls done just after blocklisting the client on mounts with recover_session=clean. The session would get marked as REJECTED and that caused in-flight calls to die with EACCES. This patchset seems to smooth over the problem, but I'm not fully convinced it's the right approach.
the root is cause is that client does not recover session instantly after getting rejected by mds. Before session gets recovered, client continues to return error.
Quoted 27 lines
The potential issue I see is that the client could take cap references to do a call on a session that has been blocklisted. We then queue the message and reestablish the session, but we may not have been granted the same caps by the MDS at that point.
If this is a problem, then we probably need to rework it so that we return a distinct error code in this situation and have the upper layers issue a completely new mds request (with new cap refs, etc.)
Obviously, that's a much more invasive approach though, so it would be nice to avoid that if this would suffice.
Jeff Layton (4):
ceph: don't WARN when removing caps due to blocklisting
ceph: don't mark mount as SHUTDOWN when recovering session
ceph: remove timeout on allowing reconnect after blocklisting
ceph: queue request when CLEANRECOVER is setfs/ceph/caps.c | 2 +- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 10 ++++------ fs/ceph/super.c | 13 +++++++++---- fs/ceph/super.h | 1 - 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)--
2.26.2
Re: [RFC PATCH 4/4] ceph: queue request when CLEANRECOVER is set
In reply to Jeff LaytonQuoted 22 lines · Jeff Layton
Ilya noticed that the first access to a blacklisted mount would often get back
-EACCES, but then subsequent calls would be OK. The problem is in__do_request. If the session is marked as REJECTED, a hard error is returned instead of waiting for a new session to come into being.When the session is REJECTED and the mount was done with recover_session=clean, queue the request to the
waiting_for_mapqueue, which will be awoken after tearing down the old session.URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/47385
Reported-by Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)fs/ceph/mds_client.c +0
-0
fs/ceph/mds_client.c static void __do_request(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, · line 2825
Quoted 8 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +4
-1@@ -2819,7 +2819,10 @@ static void __do_request(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc,if (session->s_state !=CEPH_MDS_SESSION_OPEN && session->s_state !=CEPH_MDS_SESSION_HUNG ) {if (session->s_state ==CEPH_MDS_SESSION_REJECTED ) { - err = -EACCES ; +if (ceph_test_mount_opt (mdsc->fsc,CLEANRECOVER )) +list_add (&req->r_wait, &mdsc->waiting_for_map); +else + err = -EACCES ;
During recovering session, client drops all dirty caps and abort all osd requests. It does not make sense , some operations are waiting, the others get aborted.
Quoted 6 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +0
-1goto out_session; }/* -- 2.26.2
Ilya Dryomov
maintainerQuoted 10 lines · Zheng
Quoted 7 lines · Jeff Layton
Ilya noticed that he would get spurious EACCES errors on calls done just after blocklisting the client on mounts with recover_session=clean. The session would get marked as REJECTED and that caused in-flight calls to die with EACCES. This patchset seems to smooth over the problem, but I'm not fully convinced it's the right approach.
Quoted 3 lines
the root is cause is that client does not recover session instantly after getting rejected by mds. Before session gets recovered, client continues to return error.
Hi Zheng,
I don't think it's about whether that happens instantly or not. In the example from [1], the first "ls" would fail even if issued minutes after the session reject message and the reconnect. From the user's POV it is well after the automatic recovery promised by recover_session=clean.
[1] https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/47385
Thanks,
Ilya
Quoted 29 lines
Quoted 29 lines
The potential issue I see is that the client could take cap references to do a call on a session that has been blocklisted. We then queue the message and reestablish the session, but we may not have been granted the same caps by the MDS at that point.
If this is a problem, then we probably need to rework it so that we return a distinct error code in this situation and have the upper layers issue a completely new mds request (with new cap refs, etc.)
Obviously, that's a much more invasive approach though, so it would be nice to avoid that if this would suffice.
Jeff Layton (4):
ceph: don't WARN when removing caps due to blocklisting
ceph: don't mark mount as SHUTDOWN when recovering session
ceph: remove timeout on allowing reconnect after blocklisting
ceph: queue request when CLEANRECOVER is setfs/ceph/caps.c | 2 +- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 10 ++++------ fs/ceph/super.c | 13 +++++++++---- fs/ceph/super.h | 1 - 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)--
2.26.2
Quoted 18 lines · Ilya Dryomov
Quoted 10 lines · Zheng
Quoted 7 lines · Jeff Layton
Ilya noticed that he would get spurious EACCES errors on calls done just after blocklisting the client on mounts with recover_session=clean. The session would get marked as REJECTED and that caused in-flight calls to die with EACCES. This patchset seems to smooth over the problem, but I'm not fully convinced it's the right approach.
Quoted 3 lines
the root is cause is that client does not recover session instantly after getting rejected by mds. Before session gets recovered, client continues to return error.
Hi Zheng,
Quoted 7 lines
I don't think it's about whether that happens instantly or not. In the example from [1], the first "ls" would fail even if issued minutes after the session reject message and the reconnect. From the user's POV it is well after the automatic recovery promised by recover_session=clean.
Reconnect should close all old session. It's likely because that client didn't detect it's blacklisted.
Quoted 34 lines
Thanks,
Ilya
Quoted 29 lines
Quoted 29 lines
The potential issue I see is that the client could take cap references to do a call on a session that has been blocklisted. We then queue the message and reestablish the session, but we may not have been granted the same caps by the MDS at that point.
If this is a problem, then we probably need to rework it so that we return a distinct error code in this situation and have the upper layers issue a completely new mds request (with new cap refs, etc.)
Obviously, that's a much more invasive approach though, so it would be nice to avoid that if this would suffice.
Jeff Layton (4):
ceph: don't WARN when removing caps due to blocklisting
ceph: don't mark mount as SHUTDOWN when recovering session
ceph: remove timeout on allowing reconnect after blocklisting
ceph: queue request when CLEANRECOVER is setfs/ceph/caps.c | 2 +- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 10 ++++------ fs/ceph/super.c | 13 +++++++++---- fs/ceph/super.h | 1 - 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)--
2.26.2
Ilya Dryomov
maintainerQuoted 26 lines · Zheng
Quoted 24 lines · Ilya Dryomov
Quoted 10 lines · Zheng
Quoted 7 lines · Jeff Layton
Ilya noticed that he would get spurious EACCES errors on calls done just after blocklisting the client on mounts with recover_session=clean. The session would get marked as REJECTED and that caused in-flight calls to die with EACCES. This patchset seems to smooth over the problem, but I'm not fully convinced it's the right approach.
Quoted 3 lines
the root is cause is that client does not recover session instantly after getting rejected by mds. Before session gets recovered, client continues to return error.
Hi Zheng,
I don't think it's about whether that happens instantly or not. In the example from [1], the first "ls" would fail even if issued minutes after the session reject message and the reconnect. From the user's POV it is well after the automatic recovery promised by recover_session=clean.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Reconnect should close all old session. It's likely because that client didn't detect it's blacklisted.
Sorry, I should have pasted dmesg there as well. It _does_ detect blacklisting -- notice that I wrote "after the session reject message and the reconnect".
Thanks,
Ilya
Re: [RFC PATCH 2/4] ceph: don't mark mount as SHUTDOWN when recovering session
In reply to Yan, ZhengQuoted 9 lines · Zheng
Quoted 5 lines · Jeff Layton
When recovering a session (a'la recover_session=clean), we want to do all of the operations that we do on a forced umount, but changing the mount state to SHUTDOWN is wrong and can cause queued MDS requests to fail when the session comes back.
code that cleanup page cache check the SHUTDOWN state.
Ok, so we do need to do something else there if we don't mark the thing SHUTDOWN. Maybe we ought to declare a new mount_state for this...CEPH_MOUNT_RECOVERING ?
Quoted 48 lines
Quoted 48 lines
Only mark it as SHUTDOWN when
umount_beginis called.Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/super.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)fs/ceph/super.c +9
-5@@ -832,6 +832,13 @@ static void destroy_caches(void)ceph_fscache_unregister (); } +static void __ceph_umount_begin (struct ceph_fs_client *fsc) +{ +ceph_osdc_abort_requests (&fsc->client->osdc, -EIO ); +ceph_mdsc_force_umount (fsc->mdsc); + fsc->filp_gen++;// invalidate open files +} +/* * ceph_umount_begin - initiate forced umount. Tear down the * mount, skipping steps that may hang while waiting for server(s). @@ -844,9 +851,7 @@ static void ceph_umount_begin(struct super_block *sb)if (!fsc)return ; fsc->mount_state =CEPH_MOUNT_SHUTDOWN ; -ceph_osdc_abort_requests (&fsc->client->osdc, -EIO ); -ceph_mdsc_force_umount (fsc->mdsc); - fsc->filp_gen++;// invalidate open files +__ceph_umount_begin (fsc); }static const struct super_operations ceph_super_ops = {@@ -1235,7 +1240,7 @@ int ceph_force_reconnect(struct super_block *sb)struct ceph_fs_client *fsc =ceph_sb_to_client (sb);int err =0 ; -ceph_umount_begin (sb); +__ceph_umount_begin (fsc);/* Make sure all page caches get invalidated. * see remove_session_caps_cb() */ --2.26.2
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Re: [RFC PATCH 4/4] ceph: queue request when CLEANRECOVER is set
In reply to Yan, ZhengQuoted 26 lines · Zheng
Quoted 25 lines · Jeff Layton
Ilya noticed that the first access to a blacklisted mount would often get back
-EACCES, but then subsequent calls would be OK. The problem is in__do_request. If the session is marked as REJECTED, a hard error is returned instead of waiting for a new session to come into being.When the session is REJECTED and the mount was done with recover_session=clean, queue the request to the
waiting_for_mapqueue, which will be awoken after tearing down the old session.URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/47385
Reported-by Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)fs/ceph/mds_client.c +0
-1@@ -2819,7 +2819,10 @@ static void __do_request(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc,if (session->s_state !=CEPH_MDS_SESSION_OPEN && session->s_state !=CEPH_MDS_SESSION_HUNG ) {if (session->s_state ==CEPH_MDS_SESSION_REJECTED ) { - err = -EACCES ;
Quoted 9 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c static void __do_request(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, · line 2825
Quoted 4 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +4
-0+if (ceph_test_mount_opt (mdsc->fsc,CLEANRECOVER )) +list_add (&req->r_wait, &mdsc->waiting_for_map); +else + err = -EACCES ;During recovering session, client drops all dirty caps and abort all osd requests. It does not make sense , some operations are waiting, the others get aborted.
It makes sense to drop the caps and fail writeback of pages that were dirty. The issue here is what to do with MDS (metadata) requests that come in just after we notice the blocklisting but before the session has been reestablished. Most of those aren't going to have any dependency on the state of the pagecache.
They also (for the most part) won't have a dependency on caps. The main exception I see is async unlink (async creates will be saved by the fact we'll be dropping our delegated inode number range). An async unlink could end up stalling across a recovery. The new MDS probably won't have granted Du caps by the time the call goes out. We could cancel that but likely would have already returned success on the unlink() call.
Granted, with all of this we're _way_ outside the realm of POSIX behavior, so ultimately the right behavior is whatever we decide it should be. Anyone who turns this stuff on should be prepared for some of the operations leading up to the blocklisting to vaporize.
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Quoted 23 lines · Ilya Dryomov
Quoted 22 lines · Zheng
Quoted 21 lines · Ilya Dryomov
Quoted 11 lines · Zheng
Quoted 6 lines · Jeff Layton
Ilya noticed that he would get spurious EACCES errors on calls done just after blocklisting the client on mounts with recover_session=clean. The session would get marked as REJECTED and that caused in-flight calls to die with EACCES. This patchset seems to smooth over the problem, but I'm not fully convinced it's the right approach.
the root is cause is that client does not recover session instantly after getting rejected by mds. Before session gets recovered, client continues to return error.
Hi Zheng,
I don't think it's about whether that happens instantly or not. In the example from [1], the first "ls" would fail even if issued minutes after the session reject message and the reconnect. From the user's POV it is well after the automatic recovery promised by recover_session=clean.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Reconnect should close all old session. It's likely because that client didn't detect it's blacklisted.
Sorry, I should have pasted dmesg there as well. It _does_ detect blacklisting -- notice that I wrote "after the session reject message and the reconnect".
Yep, this is pretty easy to reproduce too (as Ilya points out in the tracker).
I'm open to other ways of smoothing this over. If we end up with a small window where errors can occur, then so be it, but I think we can probably do better than we have now.
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Quoted 22 lines · Zheng
Quoted 21 lines · Ilya Dryomov
Quoted 11 lines · Zheng
Quoted 6 lines · Jeff Layton
Ilya noticed that he would get spurious EACCES errors on calls done just after blocklisting the client on mounts with recover_session=clean. The session would get marked as REJECTED and that caused in-flight calls to die with EACCES. This patchset seems to smooth over the problem, but I'm not fully convinced it's the right approach.
the root is cause is that client does not recover session instantly after getting rejected by mds. Before session gets recovered, client continues to return error.
Hi Zheng,
I don't think it's about whether that happens instantly or not. In the example from [1], the first "ls" would fail even if issued minutes after the session reject message and the reconnect. From the user's POV it is well after the automatic recovery promised by recover_session=clean.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
Reconnect should close all old session. It's likely because that client didn't detect it's blacklisted.
I should have described this better -- let me explain:
It did detect that it was blocklisted (almost immediately) because the MDS shuts down the session. I think it immediately sends a SESSION_REJECT message when blacklisting and indicates that it has been blocklisted.
At that point the session is CEPH_MDS_SESSION_REJECTED. The next MDS calls through would see that it was in that state and would return -EACCES. Eventually, the delayed work runs and then the session gets reconnected, and further calls proceed normally.
So, I think this is just a timing thing for the most part. The workqueue job runs on a delay of round_jiffies_relative(HZ * 5);, and that's long enough for the disruption to be noticeable.
While this was happening during 'ls' for Ilya, it could happen in anything that involves sending a request to the MDS. I think we want to prevent new opens from erroring out during this window if we can.
The real question is whether this is safe in all cases. For instance, if the call that we're idling is dependent on holding certain caps, then it's possible we will have lost them when we got REJECTED.
Hmm...so that means patch 4/4 is probably wrong. I'll comment further in a reply to that patch.
Quoted 32 lines
Quoted 32 lines
Thanks,
Ilya
Quoted 28 lines
Quoted 28 lines
The potential issue I see is that the client could take cap references to do a call on a session that has been blocklisted. We then queue the message and reestablish the session, but we may not have been granted the same caps by the MDS at that point.
If this is a problem, then we probably need to rework it so that we return a distinct error code in this situation and have the upper layers issue a completely new mds request (with new cap refs, etc.)
Obviously, that's a much more invasive approach though, so it would be nice to avoid that if this would suffice.
Jeff Layton (4):
ceph: don't WARN when removing caps due to blocklisting
ceph: don't mark mount as SHUTDOWN when recovering session
ceph: remove timeout on allowing reconnect after blocklisting
ceph: queue request when CLEANRECOVER is setfs/ceph/caps.c | 2 +- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 10 ++++------ fs/ceph/super.c | 13 +++++++++---- fs/ceph/super.h | 1 - 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)--
2.26.2
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Re: [RFC PATCH 4/4] ceph: queue request when CLEANRECOVER is set
In reply to Jeff LaytonQuoted 22 lines · Jeff Layton
Ilya noticed that the first access to a blacklisted mount would often get back
-EACCES, but then subsequent calls would be OK. The problem is in__do_request. If the session is marked as REJECTED, a hard error is returned instead of waiting for a new session to come into being.When the session is REJECTED and the mount was done with recover_session=clean, queue the request to the
waiting_for_mapqueue, which will be awoken after tearing down the old session.URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/47385
Reported-by Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)fs/ceph/mds_client.c +0
-0@@ -2819,7 +2819,10 @@ static void __do_request(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, if (session->s_state != CEPH_MDS_SESSION_OPEN &&
fs/ceph/mds_client.c static void __do_request(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, · line 2828
Quoted 10 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +4
-1session->s_state != CEPH_MDS_SESSION_HUNG) {if (session->s_state ==CEPH_MDS_SESSION_REJECTED ) { - err = -EACCES ; +if (ceph_test_mount_opt (mdsc->fsc,CLEANRECOVER )) +list_add (&req->r_wait, &mdsc->waiting_for_map); +else + err = -EACCES ; goto out_session; }/*
I think this is wrong when CEPH_MDS_R_ASYNC is set. I'll send a v2 set if we end up staying with this approach.
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Quoted 46 lines · Jeff Layton
Quoted 22 lines · Zheng
Quoted 21 lines · Ilya Dryomov
Quoted 11 lines · Zheng
Quoted 6 lines · Jeff Layton
Ilya noticed that he would get spurious EACCES errors on calls done just after blocklisting the client on mounts with recover_session=clean. The session would get marked as REJECTED and that caused in-flight calls to die with EACCES. This patchset seems to smooth over the problem, but I'm not fully convinced it's the right approach.
the root is cause is that client does not recover session instantly after getting rejected by mds. Before session gets recovered, client continues to return error.
Hi Zheng,
I don't think it's about whether that happens instantly or not. In the example from [1], the first "ls" would fail even if issued minutes after the session reject message and the reconnect. From the user's POV it is well after the automatic recovery promised by recover_session=clean.
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Reconnect should close all old session. It's likely because that client didn't detect it's blacklisted.
I should have described this better -- let me explain:
It did detect that it was blocklisted (almost immediately) because the MDS shuts down the session. I think it immediately sends a
SESSION_REJECTmessage when blacklisting and indicates that it has been blocklisted.At that point the session is
CEPH_MDS_SESSION_REJECTED. The next MDS calls through would see that it was in that state and would return-EACCES. Eventually, the delayed work runs and then the session gets reconnected, and further calls proceed normally.So, I think this is just a timing thing for the most part. The workqueue job runs on a delay of
round_jiffies_relative(HZ * 5);, and that's long enough for the disruption to be noticeable.
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While this was happening during 'ls' for Ilya, it could happen in anything that involves sending a request to the MDS. I think we want to prevent new opens from erroring out during this window if we can.
The real question is whether this is safe in all cases. For instance, if the call that we're idling is dependent on holding certain caps, then it's possible we will have lost them when we got REJECTED.
The session in rejected state is new session. It should hold no caps.
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Hmm...so that means patch 4/4 is probably wrong. I'll comment further in a reply to that patch.
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Thanks,
Ilya
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The potential issue I see is that the client could take cap references to do a call on a session that has been blocklisted. We then queue the message and reestablish the session, but we may not have been granted the same caps by the MDS at that point.
If this is a problem, then we probably need to rework it so that we return a distinct error code in this situation and have the upper layers issue a completely new mds request (with new cap refs, etc.)
Obviously, that's a much more invasive approach though, so it would be nice to avoid that if this would suffice.
Jeff Layton (4):
ceph: don't WARN when removing caps due to blocklisting
ceph: don't mark mount as SHUTDOWN when recovering session
ceph: remove timeout on allowing reconnect after blocklisting
ceph: queue request when CLEANRECOVER is setfs/ceph/caps.c | 2 +- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 10 ++++------ fs/ceph/super.c | 13 +++++++++---- fs/ceph/super.h | 1 - 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)Quoted 3 lines
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--
2.26.2--
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
v2 cover ceph: fix spurious recover_session=clean errors
In reply to Jeff Laytonv2: fix handling of async requests in patch to queue requests
This is basically the same patchset as before, with a small revision to the last patch to fix up the handling of async requests. With this version, an async request will not be queued but instead will return -EJUKEBOX so the caller can drive a synchronous request.
Original cover letter follows:
Ilya noticed that he would get spurious EACCES errors on calls done just after blocklisting the client on mounts with recover_session=clean. The session would get marked as REJECTED and that caused in-flight calls to die with EACCES. This patchset seems to smooth over the problem, but I'm not fully convinced it's the right approach.
The potential issue I see is that the client could take cap references to do a call on a session that has been blocklisted. We then queue the message and reestablish the session, but we may not have been granted the same caps by the MDS at that point.
If this is a problem, then we probably need to rework it so that we return a distinct error code in this situation and have the upper layers issue a completely new mds request (with new cap refs, etc.)
Obviously, that's a much more invasive approach though, so it would be nice to avoid that if this would suffice.
Jeff Layton (4):
ceph: don't WARN when removing caps due to blocklisting
ceph: don't mark mount as SHUTDOWN when recovering session
ceph: remove timeout on allowing reconnect after blocklisting
ceph: queue MDS requests to REJECTED sessions when CLEANRECOVER is set
fs/ceph/caps.c | 2 +- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 23 ++++++++++++++--------- fs/ceph/super.c | 13 +++++++++---- fs/ceph/super.h | 1 - 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
RFC PATCH v2 1/4 ceph: don't WARN when removing caps due to blocklisting
We expect to remove dirty caps when the client is blocklisted. Don't throw a warning in that case.
--- fs/ceph/caps.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ceph/caps.c +1 -1
@@ -1149,7 +1149,7 @@ void __ceph_remove_cap(struct ceph_cap *cap, bool queue_release)/* remove from inode's cap rbtree, and clear auth cap */ rb_erase (&cap->ci_node, &ci->i_caps);if (ci->i_auth_cap == cap) { -WARN_ON_ONCE (!list_empty (&ci->i_dirty_item)); +WARN_ON_ONCE (!list_empty (&ci->i_dirty_item) && !mdsc->fsc->blocklisted); ci->i_auth_cap =NULL ; }
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2.26.2
RFC PATCH v2 2/4 ceph: don't mark mount as SHUTDOWN when recovering session
In reply to Jeff LaytonWhen recovering a session (a'la recover_session=clean), we want to do all of the operations that we do on a forced umount, but changing the mount state to SHUTDOWN is wrong and can cause queued MDS requests to fail when the session comes back.
Only mark it as SHUTDOWN when umount_begin is called.
--- fs/ceph/super.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/ceph/super.c +9 -4
@@ -832,6 +832,13 @@ static void destroy_caches(void)ceph_fscache_unregister (); } +static void __ceph_umount_begin (struct ceph_fs_client *fsc) +{ +ceph_osdc_abort_requests (&fsc->client->osdc, -EIO ); +ceph_mdsc_force_umount (fsc->mdsc); + fsc->filp_gen++;// invalidate open files +} +/* * ceph_umount_begin - initiate forced umount. Tear down the * mount, skipping steps that may hang while waiting for server(s).
@@ -844,9 +851,7 @@ static void ceph_umount_begin(struct super_block *sb)if (!fsc)return ; fsc->mount_state =CEPH_MOUNT_SHUTDOWN ; -ceph_osdc_abort_requests (&fsc->client->osdc, -EIO ); -ceph_mdsc_force_umount (fsc->mdsc); - fsc->filp_gen++;// invalidate open files +__ceph_umount_begin (fsc); }static const struct super_operations ceph_super_ops = {
@@ -1235,7 +1240,7 @@ int ceph_force_reconnect(struct super_block *sb)struct ceph_fs_client *fsc =ceph_sb_to_client (sb);int err =0 ; -ceph_umount_begin (sb); +__ceph_umount_begin (fsc);/* Make sure all page caches get invalidated. * see remove_session_caps_cb() */
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2.26.2
RFC PATCH v2 3/4 ceph: remove timeout on allowing reconnect after blocklisting
In reply to Jeff Layton30 minutes is a long time to wait, and this makes it difficult to test the feature by manually blocklisting clients. Remove the timeout infrastructure and just allow the client to reconnect at will.
--- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 5 ----- fs/ceph/super.h | 1 - 2 files changed, 6 deletions(-)
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +0 -5
@@ -4374,12 +4374,7 @@ static void maybe_recover_session(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc)if (!READ_ONCE (fsc->blocklisted))return ; -if (fsc->last_auto_reconnect && -time_before (jiffies, fsc->last_auto_reconnect +HZ *60 *30 )) -return ; -pr_info ("auto reconnect after blocklisted\n" ); - fsc->last_auto_reconnect = jiffies;ceph_force_reconnect (fsc->sb); }
fs/ceph/super.h +0 -1
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ struct ceph_fs_client {unsigned long mount_state; -unsigned long last_auto_reconnect;bool blocklisted;bool have_copy_from2;
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2.26.2
RFC PATCH v2 4/4 ceph: queue MDS requests to REJECTED sessions when CLEANRECOVER is set
In reply to Jeff LaytonIlya noticed that the first access to a blacklisted mount would often get back -EACCES, but then subsequent calls would be OK. The problem is in __do_request. If the session is marked as REJECTED, a hard error is returned instead of waiting for a new session to come into being.
When the session is REJECTED and the mount was done with recover_session=clean, queue the request to the waiting_for_map queue, which will be awoken after tearing down the old session. We can only do this for sync requests though, so check for async ones first and just let the callers redrive a sync request.
URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/47385
--- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +14 -4
@@ -2818,10 +2818,6 @@ static void __do_request(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, ceph_session_state_name(session->s_state));if (session->s_state !=CEPH_MDS_SESSION_OPEN && session->s_state !=CEPH_MDS_SESSION_HUNG ) { -if (session->s_state ==CEPH_MDS_SESSION_REJECTED ) { - err = -EACCES ; - goto out_session; - }/* * We cannot queue async requests since the caps and delegated * inodes are bound to the session. Just return -EJUKEBOX and
@@ -2831,6 +2827,20 @@ static void __do_request(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, err = -EJUKEBOX ; goto out_session; } + +/* +* If the session has been REJECTED, then return a hard error, +* unless it's a CLEANRECOVER mount, in which case we'll queue +* it to the mdsc queue. +*/ +if (session->s_state ==CEPH_MDS_SESSION_REJECTED ) { +if (ceph_test_mount_opt (mdsc->fsc,CLEANRECOVER )) +list_add (&req->r_wait, &mdsc->waiting_for_map); +else + err = -EACCES ; + goto out_session; + } +if (session->s_state ==CEPH_MDS_SESSION_NEW || session->s_state ==CEPH_MDS_SESSION_CLOSING ) { err =__open_session (mdsc, session);
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2.26.2
Quoted 50 lines · Zheng
Quoted 49 lines · Jeff Layton
Quoted 22 lines · Zheng
Quoted 21 lines · Ilya Dryomov
Quoted 11 lines · Zheng
Quoted 6 lines · Jeff Layton
Ilya noticed that he would get spurious EACCES errors on calls done just after blocklisting the client on mounts with recover_session=clean. The session would get marked as REJECTED and that caused in-flight calls to die with EACCES. This patchset seems to smooth over the problem, but I'm not fully convinced it's the right approach.
the root is cause is that client does not recover session instantly after getting rejected by mds. Before session gets recovered, client continues to return error.
Hi Zheng,
I don't think it's about whether that happens instantly or not. In the example from [1], the first "ls" would fail even if issued minutes after the session reject message and the reconnect. From the user's POV it is well after the automatic recovery promised by recover_session=clean.
Quoted 5 lines
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Reconnect should close all old session. It's likely because that client didn't detect it's blacklisted.
I should have described this better -- let me explain:
It did detect that it was blocklisted (almost immediately) because the MDS shuts down the session. I think it immediately sends a
SESSION_REJECTmessage when blacklisting and indicates that it has been blocklisted.At that point the session is
CEPH_MDS_SESSION_REJECTED. The next MDS calls through would see that it was in that state and would return-EACCES. Eventually, the delayed work runs and then the session gets reconnected, and further calls proceed normally.So, I think this is just a timing thing for the most part. The workqueue job runs on a delay of
round_jiffies_relative(HZ * 5);, and that's long enough for the disruption to be noticeable.While this was happening during 'ls' for Ilya, it could happen in anything that involves sending a request to the MDS. I think we want to prevent new opens from erroring out during this window if we can.
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The real question is whether this is safe in all cases. For instance, if the call that we're idling is dependent on holding certain caps, then it's possible we will have lost them when we got REJECTED.
The session in rejected state is new session. It should hold no caps.
Right.
We're actually OK here wrt to async requests as they will return EJUKEBOX and the caller will redrive a synchronous request. Other MClientRequest calls don't require that the client hold any caps, AFAICT, so idling them until we can establish a new session should be OK, no?
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Hmm...so that means patch 4/4 is probably wrong. I'll comment further in a reply to that patch.
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Thanks,
Ilya
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The potential issue I see is that the client could take cap references to do a call on a session that has been blocklisted. We then queue the message and reestablish the session, but we may not have been granted the same caps by the MDS at that point.
If this is a problem, then we probably need to rework it so that we return a distinct error code in this situation and have the upper layers issue a completely new mds request (with new cap refs, etc.)
Obviously, that's a much more invasive approach though, so it would be nice to avoid that if this would suffice.
Jeff Layton (4):
ceph: don't WARN when removing caps due to blocklisting
ceph: don't mark mount as SHUTDOWN when recovering session
ceph: remove timeout on allowing reconnect after blocklisting
ceph: queue request when CLEANRECOVER is setfs/ceph/caps.c | 2 +- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 10 ++++------ fs/ceph/super.c | 13 +++++++++---- fs/ceph/super.h | 1 - 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)Quoted 3 lines
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--
2.26.2--
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>