IMA: Generalize early boot data measurement
Subsystems (4)
v3 cover IMA: Generalize early boot data measurement
The current implementation of early boot measurement in the IMA subsystem is specific to asymmetric keys. It does not handle early boot measurement of data from other subsystems such as Linux Security Module (LSM), Device-Mapper, etc. As a result, data provided by these subsystems during system boot are not measured by IMA.
This patch series makes the early boot key measurement functions generic such that they can be used to measure any early boot data. The functions in ima_queue_keys.c are refactored to a new file ima_queue_data.c. The kernel configuration CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS is removed and instead a new function namely ima_queuing_enabled() is added to check if the subsystems using early boot data measurement are enabled. Since measurement of asymmetric keys is the first consumer of early boot measurement, enable queuing if CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS and CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING are both enabled.
The IMA hook to measure kernel critical data ima_measure_critical_data() is updated to utilize early boot measurement support.
This series is based on the following repo/branch:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git
branch: next-integrity
commit aa662fc04f5b ("ima: Fix NULL pointer dereference in ima_file_hash")
This patch is dependent on the following patch series:
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11795559/
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian (3):
IMA: Generalize early boot measurement of asymmetric keys
IMA: Support measurement of generic data during early
IMA: Support early boot measurement of critical data
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 6 - security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 3 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 29 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 7 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 10 + security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_data.c | 200 +++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 175 ---------------- 9 files changed, 229 insertions(+), 205 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_data.c delete mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
PATCH v3 1/3 IMA: Generalize early boot measurement of asymmetric keys
The current implementation of early boot measurement in
the IMA subsystem is specific to asymmetric keys. It does not handle early boot measurement of data from other subsystems such as Linux Security Module (LSM), Device-Mapper, etc. As a result, data provided by these subsystems during system boot are not measured by IMA.
Update the early boot key measurement functions to handle any early boot data. Refactor the code from ima_queue_keys.c to a new file ima_queue_data.c.
Remove the kernel configuration CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS and instead define a new function namely ima_queuing_enabled() to check if the subsystems using early boot data measurement are enabled. Since measurement of asymmetric keys is the first consumer of early boot measurement, enable queuing if CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS and CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING are both enabled.
--- security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 6 - security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 3 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 25 +-- security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 6 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_data.c | 188 +++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 175 ----------------- 8 files changed, 202 insertions(+), 205 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_data.c delete mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +0 -6
@@ -322,12 +322,6 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS depends on ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE=y default y -config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS - bool - depends on IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS - depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING - default y - config IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT bool depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY
security/integrity/ima/Makefile +1 -2
@@ -7,10 +7,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \ - ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o + ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o ima_queue_data.o ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) += ima_modsig.o ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += ima_asymmetric_keys.o -ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS) += ima_queue_keys.o
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +8 -17
@@ -257,29 +257,20 @@ static inline bool ima_kernel_data_source_is_supported(const char *source)return false; } -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS /* -* To track keys that need to be measured. +* To track data that need to be measured. */ -struct ima_key_entry { +struct ima_data_entry {struct list_head list;void *payload;size_t payload_len; -char *keyring_name; +const char *event_name; }; -void ima_init_key_queue (void ); -bool ima_should_queue_key (void ); -bool ima_queue_key (struct key *keyring,const void *payload, -size_t payload_len); -void ima_process_queued_keys (void ); -#else -static inline void ima_init_key_queue (void ) {} -static inline bool ima_should_queue_key (void ) {return false; } -static inline bool ima_queue_key (struct key *keyring, -const void *payload, -size_t payload_len) {return false; } -static inline void ima_process_queued_keys (void ) {} -#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS */ +void ima_init_data_queue (void ); +bool ima_should_queue_data (void ); +bool ima_queue_data (const char *event_name,const void *payload, +size_t payload_len); +void ima_process_queued_data (void );/* LIM API function definitions */ int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c +3 -3
@@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,if (!payload || (payload_len ==0 ))return ; -if (ima_should_queue_key ()) - queued =ima_queue_key (keyring, payload, payload_len); - +if (ima_should_queue_data ()) + queued =ima_queue_data (keyring->description, payload, + payload_len);if (queued)return ;
security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +1 -1
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ int __init ima_init(void)if (rc !=0 )return rc; -ima_init_key_queue (); +ima_init_data_queue ();return rc; }
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1 -1
@@ -907,7 +907,7 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)ima_update_policy_flag ();/* Custom IMA policy has been loaded */ -ima_process_queued_keys (); +ima_process_queued_data (); }/* Keep the enumeration in sync with the policy_tokens! */
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_data.c new file +188 -0
188 lines not on this page · raw message
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c deleted +0 -175
175 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
PATCH v3 2/3 IMA: Support measurement of generic data during early
In reply to Lakshmi RamasubramanianCurrently, early boot measurement of data is specific to key measurement. To make it generic to handle any early boot data measurement, additional arguments need to be saved in the queue for deferred processing. The arguments include the IMA hook func, data specific to the given func, and a boolean flag to determine if we need to measure the given payload or the hash of the payload.
Add new fields to ima_data_entry struct to pass additional data for the deferred handling of queued data. Update the queue functions to handle the new data saved in the ima_data_entry struct.
--- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 6 ++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 3 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_data.c | 28 ++++++++++++++------ 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +5 -1
@@ -265,11 +265,15 @@ struct ima_data_entry {void *payload;size_t payload_len;const char *event_name; +const char *event_data; +enum ima_hooks func; +bool measure_payload_hash; };void ima_init_data_queue (void );bool ima_should_queue_data (void );bool ima_queue_data (const char *event_name,const void *payload, -size_t payload_len); +size_t payload_len,const char *event_data, +enum ima_hooks func,bool measure_payload_hash);void ima_process_queued_data (void );/* LIM API function definitions */
security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c +2 -1
@@ -39,7 +39,8 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,if (ima_should_queue_data ()) queued =ima_queue_data (keyring->description, payload, - payload_len); + payload_len, keyring->description, +KEY_CHECK , false);if (queued)return ;
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_data.c +20 -8
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ static void ima_free_data_entry(struct ima_data_entry *entry)kvfree (entry->payload);kfree (entry->event_name); +kfree (entry->event_data);kfree (entry); }
@@ -83,7 +84,10 @@ static void *ima_kvmemdup(const void *src, size_t len)static struct ima_data_entry *ima_alloc_data_entry (const char *event_name,const void *payload, -size_t payload_len) +size_t payload_len, +const char *event_data, +enum ima_hooks func, +bool measure_payload_hash) {struct ima_data_entry *entry;
@@ -97,9 +101,15 @@ static struct ima_data_entry *ima_alloc_data_entry(const char *event_name,*/ entry->payload =ima_kvmemdup (payload, payload_len); entry->event_name =kstrdup (event_name,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (event_data) + entry->event_data =kstrdup (event_data,GFP_KERNEL ); + entry->payload_len = payload_len; + entry->func = func; + entry->measure_payload_hash = measure_payload_hash; -if (!entry->payload || !entry->event_name) +if (!entry->payload || !entry->event_name || + (event_data && !entry->event_data)) goto out;INIT_LIST_HEAD (&entry->list);
@@ -107,19 +117,21 @@ static struct ima_data_entry *ima_alloc_data_entry(const char *event_name, out:integrity_audit_message (AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR ,NULL , - event_name,func_measure_str (KEY_CHECK ), + event_name,func_measure_str (func),"ENOMEM" , -ENOMEM ,0 , -ENOMEM );ima_free_data_entry (entry);return NULL ; }bool ima_queue_data (const char *event_name,const void *payload, -size_t payload_len) +size_t payload_len,const char *event_data, +enum ima_hooks func,bool measure_payload_hash) {bool queued = false;struct ima_data_entry *entry; - entry =ima_alloc_data_entry (event_name, payload, payload_len); + entry =ima_alloc_data_entry (event_name, payload, payload_len, + event_data, func, measure_payload_hash);if (!entry)return false;
@@ -174,9 +186,9 @@ void ima_process_queued_data(void)process_buffer_measurement (NULL , entry->payload, entry->payload_len, entry->event_name, -KEY_CHECK ,0 , - entry->event_name, - false); + entry->func,0 , + entry->event_data, + entry->measure_payload_hash);list_del (&entry->list);ima_free_data_entry (entry); }
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
PATCH v3 3/3 IMA: Support early boot measurement of critical data
In reply to Lakshmi RamasubramanianThe IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() requires a custom IMA policy to be loaded to determine what data should be measured by IMA. If a custom policy is not loaded by the time ima_measure_critical_data() is called, then IMA needs to queue the data until a policy is loaded.
Update ima_measure_critical_data() to utilize early boot measurement support to defer processing data if a custom IMA policy is not yet loaded.
--- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +10 -0
@@ -898,6 +898,8 @@ void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name, const void *buf, int buf_len, bool measure_buf_hash) { + bool queued = false; +if (!event_name || !event_data_source || !buf || !buf_len) {pr_err ("Invalid arguments passed to %s().\n" , __func__);return ;
@@ -909,6 +911,14 @@ void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name,return ; } +if (ima_should_queue_data ()) + queued =ima_queue_data (event_name, buf, buf_len, + event_data_source,CRITICAL_DATA , + measure_buf_hash); + +if (queued) +return ; +process_buffer_measurement (NULL , buf, buf_len, event_name,CRITICAL_DATA ,0 , event_data_source, measure_buf_hash);
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0