sev: add sev-inject-launch-secret
PATCH v4 1/1 sev: add sev-inject-launch-secret
From: Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <[email protected]>
AMD SEV allows a guest owner to inject a secret blob into the memory of a virtual machine. The secret is encrypted with the SEV Transport Encryption Key and integrity is guaranteed with the Transport Integrity Key. Although QEMU facilitates the injection of the launch secret, it cannot access the secret.
--- include/monitor/monitor.h | 3 ++ include/sysemu/sev.h | 2 ++ monitor/misc.c | 8 +++--- qapi/misc-target.json | 18 ++++++++++++ target/i386/monitor.c | 7 +++++ target/i386/sev-stub.c | 5 ++++ target/i386/sev.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ target/i386/trace-events | 1 + 8 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/monitor/monitor.h +3 -0
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@#include "block/block.h" #include "qapi/qapi-types-misc.h" #include "qemu/readline.h" +#include "include/exec/hwaddr.h" typedef struct MonitorHMP MonitorHMP ;typedef struct MonitorOptions MonitorOptions ;
@@ -37,6 +38,8 @@ void monitor_flush(Monitor *mon);int monitor_set_cpu (Monitor *mon,int cpu_index);int monitor_get_cpu_index (Monitor *mon); +void *gpa2hva (MemoryRegion **p_mr,hwaddr addr,uint64_t size,Error **errp); +void monitor_read_command (MonitorHMP *mon,int show_prompt);int monitor_read_password (MonitorHMP *mon,ReadLineFunc *readline_func,void *opaque);
include/sysemu/sev.h +2 -0
@@ -18,4 +18,6 @@void *sev_guest_init (const char *id);int sev_encrypt_data (void *handle,uint8_t *ptr,uint64_t len); +int sev_inject_launch_secret (const char *hdr,const char *secret, +uint64_t gpa,Error **errp);#endif
monitor/misc.c +4 -4
@@ -667,10 +667,10 @@ static void hmp_physical_memory_dump(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)memory_dump (mon, count, format, size, addr,1 ); } -static void *gpa2hva (MemoryRegion **p_mr,hwaddr addr,Error **errp) +void *gpa2hva (MemoryRegion **p_mr,hwaddr addr,uint64_t size,Error **errp) {MemoryRegionSection mrs =memory_region_find (get_system_memory (), - addr,1 ); + addr, size);if (!mrs.mr) {error_setg (errp,"No memory is mapped at address 0x%" HWADDR_PRIx, addr);
@@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ static void hmp_gpa2hva(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)MemoryRegion *mr =NULL ;void *ptr; - ptr =gpa2hva (&mr, addr, &local_err); + ptr =gpa2hva (&mr, addr,1 , &local_err);if (local_err) {error_report_err (local_err);return ;
@@ -770,7 +770,7 @@ static void hmp_gpa2hpa(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)void *ptr;uint64_t physaddr; - ptr =gpa2hva (&mr, addr, &local_err); + ptr =gpa2hva (&mr, addr,1 , &local_err);if (local_err) {error_report_err (local_err);return ;
qapi/misc-target.json +18 -0
@@ -201,6 +201,24 @@ { 'command': 'query-sev-capabilities', 'returns': 'SevCapability', 'if': 'defined(TARGET_I386)' } +## +# @sev-inject-launch-secret: +# +# This command injects a secret blob into memory of SEV guest. +# +# @packet-header: the launch secret packet header encoded in base64 +# +# @secret: the launch secret data to be injected encoded in base64 +# +# @gpa: the guest physical address where secret will be injected. +# +# Since: 5.2 +# +## +{ 'command': 'sev-inject-launch-secret', + 'data': { 'packet-header': 'str', 'secret': 'str', 'gpa': 'uint64' }, + 'if': 'defined(TARGET_I386)' } + ## # @dump-skeys: #
target/i386/monitor.c +7 -0
@@ -728,3 +728,10 @@ SevCapability *qmp_query_sev_capabilities(Error **errp) {return sev_get_capabilities (errp); } + +void qmp_sev_inject_launch_secret (const char *packet_hdr, +const char *secret,uint64_t gpa, +Error **errp) +{ +sev_inject_launch_secret (packet_hdr, secret, gpa, errp); +}
target/i386/sev-stub.c +5 -0
@@ -49,3 +49,8 @@ SevCapability *sev_get_capabilities(Error **errp)error_setg (errp,"SEV is not available in this QEMU" );return NULL ; } +int sev_inject_launch_secret (const char *hdr,const char *secret, +uint64_t gpa) +{ +return 1 ; +}
target/i386/sev.c +60 -0
72 lines not on this page · raw message
target/i386/trace-events +1 -0
@@ -15,3 +15,4 @@ kvm_sev_launch_start(int policy, void *session, void *pdh) "policy 0x%x session kvm_sev_launch_update_data(void *addr, uint64_t len) "addr %p len 0x%" PRIu64 kvm_sev_launch_measurement(const char *value) "data %s" kvm_sev_launch_finish(void) "" +kvm_sev_launch_secret(uint64_t hpa, uint64_t hva, uint64_t secret, int len) "hpa 0x%" PRIx64 " hva 0x%" PRIx64 " data 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d"
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1 (Apple Git-117)
Quoted 10 lines · On Wed, Oct 14, 2020 at 11:17:39AM -0400, [email protected] wrote:
From: Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <[email protected]>
AMD SEV allows a guest owner to inject a secret blob into the memory of a virtual machine. The secret is encrypted with the SEV Transport Encryption Key and integrity is guaranteed with the Transport Integrity Key. Although QEMU facilitates the injection of the launch secret, it cannot access the secret.
Signed-off-by Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <[email protected]>
Quoted 10 lines
--- include/monitor/monitor.h | 3 ++ include/sysemu/sev.h | 2 ++ monitor/misc.c | 8 +++--- qapi/misc-target.json | 18 ++++++++++++ target/i386/monitor.c | 7 +++++ target/i386/sev-stub.c | 5 ++++ target/i386/sev.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ target/i386/trace-events | 1 + 8 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Regards,
Daniel
Signature · 3 lines
|: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :| |: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :| |: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
Quoted 168 lines · On 10/14/20 10:17 AM, [email protected] wrote:
From: Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <[email protected]>
AMD SEV allows a guest owner to inject a secret blob into the memory of a virtual machine. The secret is encrypted with the SEV Transport Encryption Key and integrity is guaranteed with the Transport Integrity Key. Although QEMU facilitates the injection of the launch secret, it cannot access the secret.
Signed-off-by Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <[email protected]>--- include/monitor/monitor.h | 3 ++ include/sysemu/sev.h | 2 ++ monitor/misc.c | 8 +++--- qapi/misc-target.json | 18 ++++++++++++ target/i386/monitor.c | 7 +++++ target/i386/sev-stub.c | 5 ++++ target/i386/sev.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ target/i386/trace-events | 1 + 8 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)include/monitor/monitor.h +3
-0@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@#include "block/block.h" #include "qapi/qapi-types-misc.h" #include "qemu/readline.h" +#include "include/exec/hwaddr.h" typedef struct MonitorHMP MonitorHMP ;typedef struct MonitorOptions MonitorOptions ;@@ -37,6 +38,8 @@ void monitor_flush(Monitor *mon);int monitor_set_cpu (Monitor *mon,int cpu_index);int monitor_get_cpu_index (Monitor *mon); +void *gpa2hva (MemoryRegion **p_mr,hwaddr addr,uint64_t size,Error **errp); +void monitor_read_command (MonitorHMP *mon,int show_prompt);int monitor_read_password (MonitorHMP *mon,ReadLineFunc *readline_func,void *opaque);include/sysemu/sev.h +2
-0@@ -18,4 +18,6 @@void *sev_guest_init (const char *id);int sev_encrypt_data (void *handle,uint8_t *ptr,uint64_t len); +int sev_inject_launch_secret (const char *hdr,const char *secret, +uint64_t gpa,Error **errp);#endif monitor/misc.c +4
-4@@ -667,10 +667,10 @@ static void hmp_physical_memory_dump(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)memory_dump (mon, count, format, size, addr,1 ); } -static void *gpa2hva (MemoryRegion **p_mr,hwaddr addr,Error **errp) +void *gpa2hva (MemoryRegion **p_mr,hwaddr addr,uint64_t size,Error **errp) {MemoryRegionSection mrs =memory_region_find (get_system_memory (), - addr,1 ); + addr, size);if (!mrs.mr) {error_setg (errp,"No memory is mapped at address 0x%" HWADDR_PRIx, addr);@@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ static void hmp_gpa2hva(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)MemoryRegion *mr =NULL ;void *ptr; - ptr =gpa2hva (&mr, addr, &local_err); + ptr =gpa2hva (&mr, addr,1 , &local_err);if (local_err) {error_report_err (local_err);return ;@@ -770,7 +770,7 @@ static void hmp_gpa2hpa(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)void *ptr;uint64_t physaddr; - ptr =gpa2hva (&mr, addr, &local_err); + ptr =gpa2hva (&mr, addr,1 , &local_err);if (local_err) {error_report_err (local_err);return ;qapi/misc-target.json +18
-0@@ -201,6 +201,24 @@ { 'command': 'query-sev-capabilities', 'returns': 'SevCapability', 'if': 'defined(TARGET_I386)' } +## +# @sev-inject-launch-secret: +# +# This command injects a secret blob into memory of SEV guest. +# +# @packet-header: the launch secret packet header encoded in base64 +# +# @secret: the launch secret data to be injected encoded in base64 +# +# @gpa: the guest physical address where secret will be injected. +# +# Since: 5.2 +# +## +{ 'command': 'sev-inject-launch-secret', + 'data': { 'packet-header': 'str', 'secret': 'str', 'gpa': 'uint64' }, + 'if': 'defined(TARGET_I386)' } + ## # @dump-skeys: #target/i386/monitor.c +7
-0@@ -728,3 +728,10 @@ SevCapability *qmp_query_sev_capabilities(Error **errp) {return sev_get_capabilities (errp); } + +void qmp_sev_inject_launch_secret (const char *packet_hdr, +const char *secret,uint64_t gpa, +Error **errp) +{ +sev_inject_launch_secret (packet_hdr, secret, gpa, errp); +}target/i386/sev-stub.c +5
-0@@ -49,3 +49,8 @@ SevCapability *sev_get_capabilities(Error **errp)error_setg (errp,"SEV is not available in this QEMU" );return NULL ; } +int sev_inject_launch_secret (const char *hdr,const char *secret, +uint64_t gpa) +{ +return 1 ; +}target/i386/sev.c +8
-0@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@#include "trace.h" #include "migration/blocker.h" #include "qom/object.h" +#include "exec/address-spaces.h" +#include "monitor/monitor.h" #define TYPE_SEV_GUEST "sev-guest"OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE (SevGuestState,SEV_GUEST )@@ -785,6 +787,64 @@ sev_encrypt_data(void *handle, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len)return 0 ; } +int sev_inject_launch_secret (const char *packet_hdr,const char *secret, +uint64_t gpa,Error **errp) +{ +struct kvm_sev_launch_secret input; + g_autofree guchar *data = NULL, *hdr = NULL; +int error, ret =1 ;
target/i386/sev.c sev_encrypt_data(void *handle, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len) · line 805
Quoted 10 lines
target/i386/sev.c +10
-0+void *hva; +gsize hdr_sz =0 , data_sz =0 ; +MemoryRegion *mr =NULL ; + +/* secret can be injected only in this state */ +if (!sev_check_state (sev_guest,SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_SECRET )) { +error_setg (errp,"SEV: Not in correct state. (LSECRET) %x" , + sev_guest->state); +return 1 ; + }
Should we be checking the sev_guest variable is assigned before the state check ? This will prevent an assert() if user calls the sev_inject_launch_secret on non-SEV guest.
Quoted 54 lines
target/i386/sev.c +42
-0+ + hdr =g_base64_decode (packet_hdr, &hdr_sz); +if (!hdr || !hdr_sz) { +error_setg (errp,"SEV: Failed to decode sequence header" ); +return 1 ; + } + + data =g_base64_decode (secret, &data_sz); +if (!data || !data_sz) { +error_setg (errp,"SEV: Failed to decode data" ); +return 1 ; + } + + hva =gpa2hva (&mr, gpa, data_sz, errp); +if (!hva) { +error_prepend (errp,"SEV: Failed to calculate guest address: " ); +return 1 ; + } + + input.hdr_uaddr = (uint64_t )(unsigned long )hdr; + input.hdr_len = hdr_sz; + + input.trans_uaddr = (uint64_t )(unsigned long )data; + input.trans_len = data_sz; + + input.guest_uaddr = (uint64_t )(unsigned long )hva; + input.guest_len = data_sz; + +trace_kvm_sev_launch_secret (gpa, input.guest_uaddr, + input.trans_uaddr, input.trans_len); + + ret =sev_ioctl (sev_guest->sev_fd,KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET , + &input, &error); +if (ret) { +error_setg (errp,"SEV: failed to inject secret ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'" , + ret, error,fw_error_to_str (error)); +return ret; + } + +return 0 ; +} +static void sev_register_types (void ) {target/i386/trace-events +1
-0@@ -15,3 +15,4 @@ kvm_sev_launch_start(int policy, void *session, void *pdh) "policy 0x%x session kvm_sev_launch_update_data(void *addr, uint64_t len) "addr %p len 0x%" PRIu64 kvm_sev_launch_measurement(const char *value) "data %s" kvm_sev_launch_finish(void) "" +kvm_sev_launch_secret(uint64_t hpa, uint64_t hva, uint64_t secret, int len) "hpa 0x%" PRIx64 " hva 0x%" PRIx64 " data 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d"
Quoted 188 lines · Brijesh Singh
Quoted 187 lines · On 10/14/20 10:17 AM, [email protected] wrote:
From: Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <[email protected]>
AMD SEV allows a guest owner to inject a secret blob into the memory of a virtual machine. The secret is encrypted with the SEV Transport Encryption Key and integrity is guaranteed with the Transport Integrity Key. Although QEMU facilitates the injection of the launch secret, it cannot access the secret.
Signed-off-by Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <[email protected]>--- include/monitor/monitor.h | 3 ++ include/sysemu/sev.h | 2 ++ monitor/misc.c | 8 +++--- qapi/misc-target.json | 18 ++++++++++++ target/i386/monitor.c | 7 +++++ target/i386/sev-stub.c | 5 ++++ target/i386/sev.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ target/i386/trace-events | 1 + 8 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)include/monitor/monitor.h +3
-0@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@#include "block/block.h" #include "qapi/qapi-types-misc.h" #include "qemu/readline.h" +#include "include/exec/hwaddr.h" typedef struct MonitorHMP MonitorHMP ;typedef struct MonitorOptions MonitorOptions ;@@ -37,6 +38,8 @@ void monitor_flush(Monitor *mon);int monitor_set_cpu (Monitor *mon,int cpu_index);int monitor_get_cpu_index (Monitor *mon); +void *gpa2hva (MemoryRegion **p_mr,hwaddr addr,uint64_t size,Error **errp); +void monitor_read_command (MonitorHMP *mon,int show_prompt); int monitor_read_password(MonitorHMP *mon, ReadLineFunc
*readline_func,void *opaque);include/sysemu/sev.h +2
-0@@ -18,4 +18,6 @@void *sev_guest_init (const char *id);int sev_encrypt_data (void *handle,uint8_t *ptr,uint64_t len); +int sev_inject_launch_secret (const char *hdr,const char *secret, +uint64_t gpa,Error **errp);#endif monitor/misc.c +2
-2@@ -667,10 +667,10 @@ static void hmp_physical_memory_dump(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)memory_dump (mon, count, format, size, addr,1 ); } -static void *gpa2hva(MemoryRegion **p_mr, hwaddr addr, Error **errp) +void *gpa2hva (MemoryRegion **p_mr,hwaddr addr,uint64_t size,Error **errp) {MemoryRegionSection mrs =memory_region_find (get_system_memory (), - addr,1 ); + addr, size);if (!mrs.mr) { error_setg(errp, "No memory is mapped at address 0x%"
HWADDR_PRIx, addr);monitor/misc.c +1
-1@@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ static void hmp_gpa2hva(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)MemoryRegion *mr =NULL ;void *ptr; - ptr =gpa2hva (&mr, addr, &local_err); + ptr =gpa2hva (&mr, addr,1 , &local_err);if (local_err) {error_report_err (local_err);return;monitor/misc.c +1
-1@@ -770,7 +770,7 @@ static void hmp_gpa2hpa(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)void *ptr;uint64_t physaddr; - ptr =gpa2hva (&mr, addr, &local_err); + ptr =gpa2hva (&mr, addr,1 , &local_err);if (local_err) {error_report_err (local_err);return;qapi/misc-target.json +18
-0@@ -201,6 +201,24 @@ { 'command': 'query-sev-capabilities', 'returns': 'SevCapability', 'if': 'defined(TARGET_I386)' } +## +# @sev-inject-launch-secret: +# +# This command injects a secret blob into memory of SEV guest. +# +# @packet-header: the launch secret packet header encoded in base64 +# +# @secret: the launch secret data to be injected encoded in base64 +# +# @gpa: the guest physical address where secret will be injected. +# +# Since: 5.2 +# +## +{ 'command': 'sev-inject-launch-secret', + 'data': { 'packet-header': 'str', 'secret': 'str', 'gpa': 'uint64' }, + 'if': 'defined(TARGET_I386)' } + ## # @dump-skeys:#
target/i386/monitor.c +7
-0@@ -728,3 +728,10 @@ SevCapability *qmp_query_sev_capabilities(Error **errp) {return sev_get_capabilities (errp); } + +void qmp_sev_inject_launch_secret (const char *packet_hdr, +const char *secret,uint64_t gpa, +Error **errp) +{ +sev_inject_launch_secret (packet_hdr, secret, gpa, errp); +}target/i386/sev-stub.c +5
-0@@ -49,3 +49,8 @@ SevCapability *sev_get_capabilities(Error **errp)error_setg (errp,"SEV is not available in this QEMU" );return NULL ; } +int sev_inject_launch_secret (const char *hdr,const char *secret, +uint64_t gpa) +{ +return 1 ; +}target/i386/sev.c +15
-0@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@#include "trace.h" #include "migration/blocker.h" #include "qom/object.h" +#include "exec/address-spaces.h" +#include "monitor/monitor.h" #define TYPE_SEV_GUEST "sev-guest"OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE (SevGuestState,SEV_GUEST )@@ -785,6 +787,64 @@ sev_encrypt_data(void *handle, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len)return 0 ; } +int sev_inject_launch_secret (const char *packet_hdr,const char *secret, +uint64_t gpa,Error **errp) +{ +struct kvm_sev_launch_secret input; + g_autofree guchar *data = NULL, *hdr = NULL; +int error, ret =1 ; +void *hva; +gsize hdr_sz =0 , data_sz =0 ; +MemoryRegion *mr =NULL ; + +/* secret can be injected only in this state */ +if (!sev_check_state (sev_guest,SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_SECRET )) { + error_setg(errp, "SEV: Not in correct state. (LSECRET) %x",
Quoted 10 lines
target/i386/sev.c sev_encrypt_data(void *handle, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len) · line 805
Quoted 3 lines
target/i386/sev.c +3
-0+ sev_guest->state); +return 1 ; + }Should we be checking the
sev_guestvariable is assigned before the state check ? This will prevent anassert()if user calls thesev_inject_launch_secreton non-SEV guest.
Probably a good idea.
Quoted 59 lines
Quoted 59 lines
target/i386/sev.c +35
-0+ + hdr =g_base64_decode (packet_hdr, &hdr_sz); +if (!hdr || !hdr_sz) { +error_setg (errp,"SEV: Failed to decode sequence header" ); +return 1 ; + } + + data =g_base64_decode (secret, &data_sz); +if (!data || !data_sz) { +error_setg (errp,"SEV: Failed to decode data" ); +return 1 ; + } + + hva =gpa2hva (&mr, gpa, data_sz, errp); +if (!hva) { +error_prepend (errp,"SEV: Failed to calculate guest address: " ); +return 1 ; + } + + input.hdr_uaddr = (uint64_t )(unsigned long )hdr; + input.hdr_len = hdr_sz; + + input.trans_uaddr = (uint64_t )(unsigned long )data; + input.trans_len = data_sz; + + input.guest_uaddr = (uint64_t )(unsigned long )hva; + input.guest_len = data_sz; + +trace_kvm_sev_launch_secret (gpa, input.guest_uaddr, + input.trans_uaddr, input.trans_len); + + ret =sev_ioctl (sev_guest->sev_fd,KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET , + &input, &error); +if (ret) { + error_setg(errp, "SEV: failed to inject secret ret=%dfw_error=%d '%s'",
target/i386/sev.c +7
-0+ ret, error, fw_error_to_str(error)); +return ret; + } + +return 0 ; +} +static void sev_register_types (void ) {target/i386/trace-events +0
-0@@ -15,3 +15,4 @@ kvm_sev_launch_start(int policy, void *session, void *pdh) "policy 0x%x session kvm_sev_launch_update_data(void *addr, uint64_t len) "addr %p len0x%" PRIu64
kvm_sev_launch_measurement(const char *value)"data %s"kvm_sev_launch_finish(void)""
+kvm_sev_launch_secret(uint64_t hpa,uint64_thva,uint64_tsecret, int len) "hpa 0x%" PRIx64 " hva 0x%" PRIx64 " data 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d"